Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The map alongside shows the major sea routes between East and West and the choke points on the Sea Lanes of Communications. India, with its unique peninsular shape jutting into the Indian Ocean makes it the biggest player in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Ocean Region stands out for its economic potential and riches, as follows:

•   28 states (21 are members of the IOR Assn)

•   17.5% of global land area

•   35.0% of the world’s total population (2.6 bn of which 1.3 bn Indian)

•   16.8% of all oil reserves

•   27.9% of all natural gas reserves

•   35.5% of global iron production

•   17.8% of world gold production

•   28% of global fish capture

•   Major sea routes connecting East and West

•   50% of world’s sea-borne oil

•   23 of the world’s top 100 container ports

China seems to be on its way to building a global alliance system of its own.  China aspires to equal and eventually surpass America.

It is well known that China has increased strategic engagement and military exchanges with Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.

Next are South-east Asian nations including Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos as well as states further afield such as Egypt and Brazil.

However, China has a formal mutual defence treaty only with North Korea. Pakistan is like a client state. Compared to China, US alliances involve mutual defence clauses, extensive troop-basing agreements, and joint military capabilities.

Many friendly countries also fear China’s rise. There is a trust deficit. Except Russia, most have deepened ties with China primarily for economic reasons including New Zealand.

From Brown to Blue Waters

The establishment of a naval logistics facility in Djibouti in 2017 was justified by the Chinese government claiming that it will support peacekeeping operations, the protection of overseas citizens, anti-piracy operations, and protection of regional BRI-related investments.

The PLAN commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, its second and third aircraft carriers are afloat. Since then it has deployed Type 55 guided-missile cruisers, Type 52C/D destroyers and Type 54A frigates for anti-piracy operations.

It is also expanding its fleet of replenishment and auxiliary vessels, including oilers, salvage and rescue ships, hospital ships, and transport vessels.

China has increased its military-related engagements with countries in the IOR. Its aggregate number of outbound naval port calls and international military exercises began rising dramatically in 2013.

Both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines have undertaken patrols in the Indian Ocean and made port calls at friendly countries.’

Chinese Navy Buildup

The Chinese have other priorities such as Taiwan and Japan before they can come to Indian Ocean. And if they try to deploy a carrier, India is capable enough to handle them.

Nevertheless, China has been constructing aircraft carriers at a fast pace with a projected plan to operate 10 carriers by 2050. At present their third and most advanced aircraft carrier is being built with the first one, Liaoning, being commissioned in 2012 and second, Shandong, in 2019.

Similarly, Currently, PLANSF operates a fleet of 66 submarines which include nuclear as well as conventional submarines. 7 Ballistic missiles submarines are in service (8 more are planned).

Future Prospects

So, Can China and India come to an understanding on the territorial disputes between them?

Will India and China accommodate each other’s spheres of interest and spheres of influence?

Finally, Can India and China get along in the future?

When it comes to territorial claims, the problem with China is that it conjures up the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty to show all of Tibet, parts of J&K and Arunachal Pradesh. But that is the Chinese version of history and Chinese maps.

However,  findings of a project report presented on 23 Jun 2022 at the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China conclude that Tibet was never a part of China before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded it in 1950. Maps from the Ming and Qing dynasties were presented to prove that Tibet was never part of a Chinese empire.

On the question of territorial disputes, the first requirement is to restore the status quo ante on April 2020. India has been consistently maintaining that peace and tranquillity along the LAC were key for the overall development of the bilateral ties.

India and China have held 15 rounds of military talks so far to resolve the eastern Ladakh row. As a result of the talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year on the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

In September 2022, before the SCO summit in Samarkand on 16 September 2022, both sides agreed to further disengagement.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the sensitive sector.

China seems to be exploring a new India strategy that rests on exhibiting its strength advantage (by normalizing border conflicts like the Galwan Valley clash) alongside tactical cooperation (by ensuring that there isn’t a complete breakdown in bilateral ties and keeping the door open for working together when it is in Chinese interest).

At the same time, escalation of tensions or a full-scale conflict is carefully averted so that the United States, whom China considers its principal adversary, does not get to reap a benefit from the situation.

It must be noted that since 1962, the Indian Army is deployed on the Chinese borders vary of any land grab by the Chinese as happened in Sumdorong in 1986. Despite 22 rounds of talks between the SRs no progress worth its name has been made in resolving the territorial disputes.

In the Western Sector, ie, Aksai Chin, the Chinese have made the Sinkiang highway and have planned another one. All creeping forward actions in Ladakh are to protect the new highway from Indian threats. They are unlikely to give up their claims in this area at all.

China is in possession of the Shaksgam Valley ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963. This was also done at China’s request to give depth and for the security of the Karakoram highway.

In fact, the Chinese would like to destroy the road infrastructure and the landing strips made close to the LAC in Ladakh to deny it to Indian forces.

In Southern Ladakh, the Pangong Tso area provides avenues for the Chinese advance to Leh. For tactical reasons, the Chinese will never agree to give up their claims in that area.

In the Eastern Sector, China claims the whole of Arunachal province as Southern Tibet. They have never recognised the McMahon Line as the border between India and Tibet. But indications have been given that they could be amenable to a trade off based on settled populations. It remains to be seen what they mean by settled populations since when residents of Arunachal apply for visas to visit China they issue them on separate paper slips and not on their Indian passports claiming that residents of Arunachal are citizens of China.

Expanding the scope of China’s interests further, Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, its BRI or Two Oceans Strategy, that is, China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, aimed at connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies under Chinese leadership and opening up a dedicated Indian Ocean exit for China, rests heavily on India.

India’s cooperation can secure Chinese gains of vital geopolitical and economic consequences, and its non-cooperation can pose the biggest hurdle to China’s South Asia strategy and advancement of its Indian Ocean footprints.

But to solicit this Indian cooperation, China is unwilling to pay a strategic cost or make any real tradeoff, such as accommodating India’s concerns or aspirations on the disputed border or South Asia or concerning its membership of international organizations.

Deep down, China recognizes India as a key threat that can intercept its energy lifelines, has the potential to replace it in global supply chains, and can compete with China in various international bodies, thereby challenging China’s ability to achieve an “overwhelming power advantage in Asia.”

China may well ask, “What if India manages to get these concessions from China, but still chooses to cooperate with the United States?”

India’s membership of the QUAD, with its political, military, and economic implications also makes China vary of India.

India will never approve of China’s BRI initiative since it has become clear that the real purpose is to help China gain access to strategic infrastructure and potential bases in India’s neighbourhood.

India’s Options

India would do well to come to terms with and perhaps leverage its increasing strategic value to China.

By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in influencing Chinese strategic outcomes Indian policymakers can potentially extract greater concessions and conciliation.

The Tibetan govt-in-exile, the Dalai Lama’s succession, Taiwan, QUAD, BRI, its naval power projection in the South China Sea, its leadership role in global organisations, US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) (aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative in low and middle-income countries), India’s own growing bilateral relations and relevance with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Iran, SAARC countries and the clout offered by a growing economy and market size are levers that India can use against China.

India must also consider the following steps to dissuade China from precipitating problems for India: –

• Improvement in geopolitical, cultural. and military relationships with BIMSTEC and other Countries in IOR.

• Make tangible investments in the countries in IOR,  for strengthening their infrastructure and meet their military needs, to mitigate their overdependence on China.

• Appreciate the importance of India’s relationship with Russia and initiate measures to reassure Russia to fortify that relationship.

• Upgrade capabilities of its defence forces and Coastguard on priority.

Conclusion

My conclusion is that:

The on-going Sino-Indian border crisis has revealed that China has little respect for India’s long-standing efforts to freeze the status quo along the two countries’ disputed frontiers or for New Delhi’s cautious efforts to avoid the appearance of balancing against Beijing.

Rather, it has chosen to expand its control over new parts of the Himalayan borderlands through brazen actions that confront India with the difficult choice of either lumping its losses or escalating through force, if the negotiations presently under way yield meagre returns.

It has forced India to join the rest of Asia in figuring out how to deal with the newest turn in China’s salami-slicing tactics, which now distinctively mark its trajectory as a rising power.

Over the centuries China looked up to Buddhist India. A millennium later, India held Imperial China in great regard. Today, China does not see India as a fellow great power. From a position of strength China does not see the need to accommodate India.

The opposite applies to India. From a position of weakness India feels it cannot afford to accommodate China without loss of standing and strategic autonomy.

Compared to the enormous disparities in economic strength, India and China are not as far apart in military strength. Given the stopping power of the Himalaya and the maritime distances, the imbalance is less daunting.

There will be more Ladakhs. China is likely to be more aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh, which is strategically more important because it’s rich in resources.

China’s comprehensive national power is about seven times that of India. Until India substantially closes the power gap, there’s little prospect of a lasting rapprochement.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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The US, Britain and Australia announced, on 15 September, a new trilateral security alliance for the Indo-Pacific to take on the threats of the 21st century and allow for greater sharing of defence capabilities, including help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, in a bid to counter China’s growing power in the strategically vital region.

Unveiling the ambitious security initiative, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison in a joint statement said their move will promote stability in the Indo-Pacific and support of their shared values and interests. “We are taking another historic step to deepen and formalise cooperation among all three of our nations because we all recognise the imperative of ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific over the long term,” President Biden said at the virtual launch of the new alliance known as AUKUS on Wednesday.

Biden said that the three countries will update and enhance their shared ability to take on the threats of the 21st century, just as they did in the 20th century, together. The United States, Australia, United Kingdom have long been faithful and capable partners and we’re even closer today. Today, we’re taking another historic step to deepen and formalise cooperation among all three of our nations because we all recognise the imperative of ensuring peace stability in the Indo-Pacific over the long term, he said.

Interestingly, the announcement of AUKUS came a week before a meeting of Quad leaders to be hosted by US President Biden in Washington on September 24. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of Australia Morrison and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

What is AUKUS

Under the AUKUS alliance, the three nations have agreed to enhance the development of joint capabilities and technology sharing, foster deeper integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains.
Under the first major initiative of AUKUS, Australia would build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the US and the UK, a capability aimed at promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

France Indignant

The announcement is significant not only because it involves the transfer of nuclear submarine technology to Australia but also since it implies the cancellation of an ongoing U.S.$90 billion project by France to manufacture conventional submarines for Australia.

Paris recalled its Ambassador to Australia, accusing Canberra of “backstabbing” and betrayal. When Australian and French ministers met less than a month earlier, French officials said there had been no talk of cancelling the deal. The two sides had even issued a joint statement indicating the continuation of the submarine programme. But Australia, it seemed, was secretly negotiating a deal with the U.K. and the U.S. Beyond Canberra’s unceremonious termination of the submarine contract, France was angry because it was kept in the dark about the discussions surrounding the new pact.

Chinese Reactions

In Beijing, the Chinese foreign ministry sharply criticised the trilateral military partnership, saying it would closely monitor the pact that will gravely undermine regional stability and aggravate the arms race and hurt international non-proliferation efforts.
Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on 29 September, in a phone conversation with the Malaysian and Bruneian foreign ministers, said the AUKUS move was likely to bring about five dangers to the region.

• Firstly, it will cause risks of nuclear proliferation. While the United States has unilaterally imposed sanctions on countries developing enriched uranium technology, it gave Australia a green light, which will inevitably give rise to more risks of proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, impacting the global non-proliferation regime.
• Secondly, it will induce a new round of arms race. Australia’s move will break the strategic balance in the region. It could not be ruled out that other countries would follow the move to wage a new round of arms race, even crossing the nuclear threshold.
• Thirdly, it will undermine regional prosperity and stability. AUKUS will surely to create tensions, casting a shadow on the region’s peace, stability, and development.
• Fourthly, it will sabotage the building of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.
• Fifthly, it will revive the Cold War mentality. AUKUS, in line with the Quad, complies with and serves the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, seeking to overturn the current status quo and start all over again, with an eye to provoking rivalry among blocs in the region and ushering in geopolitical zero-sum games.

What does AUKUS mean for India

Australia will receive top quality nuclear submarine technology from the U.S. and the U.K., strengthening China deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But if Australia and the U.S. could deceive France, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, what is to prevent them from doing the same with lesser allies?

The Indian Navy presently dominates the Eastern Indian Ocean, but its conventional underwater capability has been shrinking. An Indian plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines has elicited no offer of help from the U.S. that does not share its prized nuclear submarine technology with even its closest allies; all except Australia, evidently.

Washington’s willingness to help Canberra build SSNs raises the possibility that Australia could deploy nuclear submarines in the Eastern Indian Ocean well before India positions its own. The Indian Navy is not building submarines at a pacecommensurate with needs. Notwithstanding shared concerns over China’s growing submarine presence in the region, however, Indian officials are not comfortable with the prospect of friendly SSNs in India’s backyard.

India is being careful in its official response to AUKUS. The bottom line for New Delhi is that it cannot be seen to be taking sides in a feud among friends – France, U.S., U.K. and Australia – some of India’s closest partners.

Officially, foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla distanced Quad — “a plurilateral grouping of four countries that have a shared vision of their attributes and values” — from AUKUS — “a security alliance between three countries”, adding that “from our perspective, it is neither relevant to the Quad nor will it have any impact on its functioning”.

Comments

The objective of AUKUS is “to deal with rapidly evolving threats”, and it envisages closer intelligence-sharing and cooperation in areas of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber-warfare and quantum computing. The US, UK and Australia are already part of the Five Eyes intelligence network, together with Canada and New Zealand. And so, up to this point, AUKUS would have been seen as an attempt to shore up an Anglo-Saxon grouping in the Indo-Pacific, attracting dismissive commentary from Beijing and mild speculation about how AUKUS would engage with Quad. However, it is the abrupt cancelling of the submarine deal that has shocked and angered France.

There was no denying a sense of wariness in New Delhi. It did not help that AUKUS took the focus away from the Quad. The agreement suggested preferential treatment on the part of Washington for a close Anglo-alliance partner. That led some in Delhi to wonder why the U.S. should make an allowance for one Quad partner and not another.
The Indian Navy’s indigenous SSN programme requires a nuclear reactor more powerful than the one installed in the Arihant (a non war-fighting platform). Some in India were hopeful that the U.S. would consider providing the Indian Navy with nuclear submarine propulsion technology.

New Delhi must seize the opportunity to push France to transfer its nuclear propulsion technology. Despite the less than satisfactory experience with the Project 75 ‘Scorpene’ class submarine programme, India, some say, should accept French assistance with building an SSN reactor.

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A Thai proposal to replace China’s relentless efforts to create Kra Canal project, which if implemented would give PLA Navy direct access to Bay of Bengal bypassing Malacca Strait, has been welcomed by India. India had expressed reservations over the proposed canal project as it could be threat to its security interests in the Bay of Bengal.

A canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra would shorten its access to the Indian Ocean by 1,100 kms bypassing Malacca Straits. China has been apprehensive that its commercial tankers and Navy ships can be blocked by USA or regional countries in Malacca Straits. The Kra Canal would have been part of China’s “string of pearls” policy, including control over ports and potential naval bases in Cambodia and Sri Lanka.

Thailand has different plans to construct two deep seaports on both sides of the country’s southern coast, which would be linked via rail and highway – a 100 kilometre highway and rail passageway linking two seaports on either side of Thailand’s southern coast. This proposal replaces the Kra Canal plan.

Wiser about the canal’s inherent dangers, the Thai Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob recently said he preferred building rail and highway links across the isthmus instead of a canal.

Kra Canal

The current Thai canal proposal, known as the 9A route, would involve two parallel channels—each 30 meters deep, 180 meters wide, and running 75 miles at sea level from Songkhla on the Gulf of Thailand to Krabi in the Andaman Sea.

Second Sea Route

A long-mooted canal across southern Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, the narrowest point of the Malay peninsula, which would open a second sea route from China to the Indian Ocean, could allow the Chinese navy to quickly move ships between its newly constructed bases in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean without diverting more than 1000 kms south to round the tip of Malaysia.

The Thai canal could become a crucial strategic asset for China—and a potential noose around Thailand’s narrow southern neck. If Thailand allows China to invest up to $30 billion in digging the canal, it may find that the associated strings are attached forever.

Malacca Strait

The Malacca Strait has been a key corridor of global commerce for centuries, if not millennia. The Italian adventurer Marco Polo sailed through the strait in 1292 on his way home from the court of Kublai Khan. In the early 1400s, China’s Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He passed through on his voyages to India, Africa, and the Middle East. Today, more than 80,000 ships a year transit the strait, which is a key corridor bringing oil to East Asia and manufactured goods back out. Modern Singapore’s prosperity has been built on its strategic location at the narrow southeastern end of the strait.

A quarter of globally traded goods use the Strait of Malacca. The current route through the Malacca Strait has almost reached its safe limit in terms of the shipping volume it can handle. Current alternatives to Malacca, like Indonesia’s Sunda Strait, would require east-west cargos to detour even further out of their way.

Chinese Submarines

Thailand is quietly but steadily pushing back against China by delaying plans to buy two Chinese submarines and expressing interest to replace Chinese proposal to build a canal in Bay of Bengal with its own project, a decision that could be welcomed in Delhi.

Thailand decided to delay, on 31 August, its $ 724 million purchase of two submarines from China, following public outrage over the controversial deal. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha – also defence minister – “requested the navy to consider a delay” in the purchase of the two additional submarines.

Under a 2015 deal, Thailand had finalised its purchase of three submarines in 2017, with the first one expected to be delivered in 2023.

India’s Concerns

At sea, China is attempting to encircle India with a series of alliances and naval bases evocatively known as the string of pearls. China’s greatest vulnerability in its strategy to dominate the Indian Ocean—and thereby India—is the Malacca Strait, a narrow sea lane separating Singapore and Sumatra, through which so much marine traffic must pass that it’s both a lifeline for China’s seaborne trade and the main path for its navy toward South Asia, and points further west. With regards to China’s rivalry with India—and its strategic ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and beyond—anything that reduces the dependency on one narrow chokepoint between potentially hostile powers is vital.

A Thai Canal would fit neatly into Beijing’s plans to encircle India. The Chinese Navy is actively pushing west into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, opening an East African logistics base in Djibouti and conducting joint exercises in the region with the navies of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia. The plethora of China-sponsored port infrastructure projects throughout the region only add to the impression of encirclement. India has responded by gearing up for potential future confrontations with China at sea.

India’s Counter Actions

India can effectively counter Chinese expansionism by upgrading its domestic forward bases and air and naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, specifically to counter China. An Indian union territory with a population of fewer than half a million, the strategic archipelago intersects the sea lanes leading from the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. They also have the potential to quarantine the proposed Thai canal.

Comments

The canal had gained widespread support among Thailand’s political elite. Chinese influence operations in Thailand probably helped shape public opinion.

The politically powerful Thai army argued that Thailand could divert some of that prosperity to itself, building industrial parks and logistics hubs at both ends of what could become one of Asia’s major transit arteries. But Thailand risks splitting itself in two with the proposed project. It has an active insurgency in its three southernmost provinces, which are majority Muslim in religion and majority Malay in ethnicity. The canal could become a symbolic border between “mainland” Thailand in the north and a separatist movement in the south. If Thailand were ever to break in two, the Thai canal could be the fault along which it cracks.

Colombia once had a northwestern isthmus called Panama. When Panamanian secessionists revolted in 1903, the U.S. Navy stepped in to ensure the new country’s independence. Panama has been a virtual U.S. protectorate ever since.

A successful Thai canal project would reconfigure the political geography of Southeast Asia. It would bring in China as a permanent security partner that could not easily be kicked out—just like Panama.

The real concern is that it would further undermine the independence of poor southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Cambodia, which have comparatively weak civil societies that are highly vulnerable to Chinese interference.

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The Ministers reiterated their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific built on a rules-based international order, underpinned by ASEAN centrality, rule of law, sustainable and transparent infrastructure investment, freedom of navigation and overflight, mutual respect for sovereignty, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Highlighting the importance of securing the economic and security interests of all stakeholders having a legitimate interest in the region, the Ministers welcomed the growing understanding on the Indo-Pacific among like-minded countries. They reaffirmed that closer India-US cooperation will support shared interests in promoting security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. They also emphasized that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of any nation in accordance with international law.

“The Ministers welcomed the recent convening of the Second Australia-India-Japan-United States Quadrilateral Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on October 6, 2020.They appreciated the exchange of views on regional issues of mutual interest, as well as ongoing cooperation related to maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, regional connectivity, health security and counter terrorism. The Ministers also welcomed the fact that these Consultations would now be held annually. They expressed their support for further strengthening Quad cooperation through expanded activities, including initiating a dialogue among the development organizations of partner countries.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

“The Ministers expressed their support for sustainable, transparent, quality infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. They looked forward to furthering collaboration between USAID and India’s Development Partnership Administration (DPA) with a view to undertaking joint projects in the region. The Ministers welcomed the establishment of a permanent presence of the US International Development Finance Cooperation (DFC) in India this year. The United States expressed strong support for the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) as a leading mechanism for promoting regional economic development. Recognizing the need to contain the build-up of sovereign debt in developing and low-income countries by ensuring responsible, transparent, and sustainable financing practices for both borrowers and creditors, the Ministers looked forward to exploring ways to cooperate under the Blue Dot Network. They also looked forward to the Second Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) to be held on October 28-29, 2020.

“Building on a strong record of peacekeeping cooperation, the Ministers decided to expand joint capacity building efforts with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific and to participate in multilateral peacekeeping training exercises.

“The Ministers discussed their shared interest in promoting a sovereign, peaceful, united, democratic, inclusive, stable and secure Afghanistan, including support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. They applauded India’s development assistance, and efforts to build trade linkages and multi-modal connectivity infrastructure for Afghanistan to enhance its regional connectivity to sustain growth and development over the long term.

“The United States congratulated India for its non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the term 2021-2022. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to work together in close coordination at the UNSC and in International Organizations. The US also reaffirmed its continued strong support for India’s permanent membership in a reformed UNSC as well as for India’s early entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Advancing the Defence and Security Partnership

“Noting the 15th anniversary of the inaugural US-India Defense Framework Agreement, the Ministers commended what has become a comprehensive, resilient, and multi-faceted Major Defense Partnership (MDP) between India and the United States. They applauded the significant step of the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). They also welcomed enhanced maritime information sharing and maritime domain awareness between their Navies and affirmed their commitment to build upon existing defense information-sharing at the joint-service and service-to-service levels and explore potential new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

“The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral defense consultation and collaboration and to exploring opportunities to expand cooperative capacity-building efforts with partners across the region. They also affirmed their commitment to pursue increased cooperation between the Indian military and US Central Command and Africa Command, including broader participation in exercises and conferences, so as to promote shared security interests. The US appreciated India’s leadership in establishing an Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). The Ministers welcomed the positioning of a Liaison Officer from the US Navy at the IFC-IOR and the positioning of an Indian Liaison Officer at NAVCENT, Bahrain and reiterated their intent to assign additional Liaison Officers.

ALSO READ: INDIA – U.S.: Indo-US Defence Cooperation Enters New Phase

The Ministers expressed satisfaction at the ongoing progress in the implementation of Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), including the expansion of secure communications capabilities to include secure video teleconference capabilities between their respective Navies, Armies and Air Forces as well as between respective Foreign and Defense Ministries. The Ministers welcomed the convening of the Military Cooperation Group (MCG) later this year to review bilateral military-to-military engagement including joint exercises, training and expert exchanges. They looked forward to interaction between the Special Forces of India and the United States.

The Ministers welcomed the inclusion of the Royal Australian Navy in the US-India-Japan MALABAR Naval Exercise scheduled to be held in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea in November 2020. Highlighting the importance of deepening maritime cooperation and the growing sophistication of US-India naval cooperation, the Ministers welcomed the PASSEX carried out by the Navies of both countries. They also looked forward to the convening of the next edition of the Tri-Services Amphibious TIGER TRIUMPH HADR Exercise and Army Exercises YUDH ABHYAS and VAJRA PRAHAR in 2021. The US welcomed India’s co-hosting of the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC), Indo-Pacific Armies Management Seminar (IPAMS) and Senior Enlisted Leader Forum (SELF) in 2023.

“The Ministers decided to work together to realize the development of their respective defense industries. Acknowledging India’s contributions to the global supply chain of major defence platforms and commitment to defense innovation, the Ministers reiterated the importance of Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), and stated their intention to fast track projects under DTTI. They noted with satisfaction the signing of a Statement of Intent (SoI) at the 10th DTTI meeting to strengthen dialogue on defence technology cooperation on several specific DTTI projects as well as a DTTI Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) for identification and development of joint projects. India looked forward to the participation by the US Government and defence industry at the upcoming Aero-India in February 2021.

“Recognizing the importance of cooperation in defence innovation, the Ministers welcomed the inaugural meeting between the Indian Defence Innovation Organization (DIO-iDEX) and US Defense Innovation United (DIU) in July 2020. They also looked forward to the inaugural Industrial Security Annex (ISA) Summit later this year which would further strengthen defence industrial cooperation between both countries.

Strengthening Bilateral India-US Cooperation

“The Ministers welcomed the virtual convening of the 17th meeting of the India-US Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group and the 3rd Session of the India-US Designations Dialogue on September 9-10, 2020. They denounced the use of terrorist proxies and strongly condemned cross border terrorism in all its forms. They emphasised the need for concerted action against all terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The Ministers called on Pakistan to take immediate, sustained and irreversible action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks, and to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators and planners of all such attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, Uri, and Pathankot. The Ministers also committed to continued exchange of information about sanctions and designations against terror groups and individuals, particularly in light of recent legislative changes in India, as well as countering the financing and operations of terrorist organizations, countering radicalism and terrorist use of the internet, cross-border movement of terrorists, and prosecuting, rehabilitating, and reintegrating returning terrorist fighters and family members.

ALSO READ: INDIA-UNITED STATES: India’s Growing Strategic Convergence With USA

“The Ministers intend to enhance their ongoing cooperation in multilateral fora, including the UN. They also reaffirmed their support for the early adoption of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) that will advance and strengthen the framework for global cooperation and reinforce the message that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism.

“In view of the announcement made during President Trump’s visit to India to establish a new India-US Counter-Narcotics Working Group, the Ministers welcomed the proposal to convene the first such virtual meeting later this year, with an in-person meeting in 2021, to enhance cooperation between Indian and US drug and law enforcement agencies. The Ministers welcomed efforts by the US Department of Homeland Security and India’s Ministry of Home Affairs to reinvigorate the Homeland Security Dialogue.

“The Ministers also welcomed the recent convening of the annual India-US Cyber Dialogue on September 15, 2020 and the first India-US Defence Cyber Dialogue on September 17, 2020.

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The new framework of the ministerial dialogue was initiated in order to provide a forward-looking vision for the strategic partnership between the two countries.

At the third Dialogue the ministers reiterated their commitment to further strengthening the India-US. partnership, celebrating more than seven decades of diplomatic engagement between India and the United States.

At the 2+2 talks, the two sides also vowed to ramp up their security ties and boost strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific amidst China’s growing economic and military clout in the region.

Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement

India and US signed five key agreements during the 2+2 India-US ministerial-level dialogue including Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which will allow India real time access to precision data and topographical images from United States military satellites.

The joint statement applauded the significant step of the signing of BECA and welcomed enhanced maritime information sharing and maritime domain awareness between their navies and affirmed their commitment to build upon existing defence information-sharing at the joint-service and service-to-service levels and explore potential new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

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Joint Statement

A Joint Statement, issued after the third India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue said the two countries reiterated their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region built on a rules-based international order.

The ministers welcomed the recent convening of second Australia-India-Japan-United states Quadrilateral Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on October 6 and expressed their support for further strengthening Quad cooperation through expanded activities, including initiating a dialogue among the development organizations of partner countries.

The statement said that building on a strong record of peacekeeping cooperation, the ministers decided to expand joint capacity-building efforts with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific and to participate in multilateral peacekeeping training exercises.

The ministers expressed their support for sustainable, transparent, quality infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region.

During the dialogue, the ministers of the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral defence consultation and collaboration and to exploring opportunities to expand cooperative capacity-building efforts with partners across the region.

They also affirmed their commitment to pursue increased cooperation between the Indian military and US Central Command and Africa Command, including broader participation in exercises and conferences, so as to promote shared security interests.

A shared vision for Indo-Pacific and Global leadership

The ministers reiterated their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific built on a rules-based international order, underpinned by ASEAN centrality, rule of law, sustainable and transparent infrastructure investment, freedom of navigation and overflight, mutual respect for sovereignty, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

They also emphasized that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of any nation in accordance with international law.

ALSO READ: INDO-PACIFIC: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Advances

QUAD

The ministers welcomed the recent convening of the Second Australia-India-Japan-United States Quadrilateral Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on October 6. They also welcomed the fact that these consultations would now be held annually. They expressed their support for further strengthening Quad cooperation through expanded activities, including initiating a dialogue among the development organizations of partner countries.

Peacekeeping

Building on a strong record of peacekeeping cooperation, the ministers decided to expand joint capacity-building efforts with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific and to participate in multilateral peacekeeping training exercises.

Afghanistan

The ministers discussed their shared interest in promoting a sovereign, peaceful, united, democratic, inclusive, stable and secure Afghanistan, including support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. They applauded India’s development assistance, and efforts to build trade linkages and multi-modal connectivity infrastructure for Afghanistan to enhance its regional connectivity to sustain growth and development over the long term.

India’s non-permanent membership in UNSC

The United States congratulated India for its non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the term 2021-2022. The ministers reiterated their commitment to work together in close coordination at the UNSC and in International Organizations. The US also reaffirmed its continued strong support for India’s permanent membership in a reformed UNSC as well as for India’s early entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Advancing the defence and security partnership

They commended what has become a comprehensive, resilient, and multi-faceted Major Defense Partnership (MDP) between India and the United States. They applauded the significant step of the signing of BECA. They also welcomed enhanced maritime information sharing and maritime domain awareness between their Navies and affirmed their commitment to build upon existing defence information-sharing at the joint-service and service-to-service levels and explore potential new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

They also affirmed their commitment to pursue increased cooperation between the Indian military and US Central Command and Africa Command, including broader participation in exercises and conferences, so as to promote shared security interests.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction at the ongoing progress in the implementation of Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), including the expansion of secure communications capabilities to include secure video teleconference capabilities between their respective Navies, Armies and Air Forces as well as between respective foreign and defense ministries. The ministers welcomed the convening of the Military Cooperation Group (MCG) later this year to review bilateral military-to-military engagement including joint exercises, training and expert exchanges. They looked forward to the interaction between the Special Forces of India and the United States.

US-India-Japan Malabar Naval Exercise

The ministers welcomed the inclusion of the Royal Australian Navy in the US-India-Japan Malabar Naval Exercise scheduled to be held in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea in November 2020. Highlighting the importance of deepening maritime cooperation and the growing sophistication of US-India naval cooperation, the Ministers welcomed the PASSEX carried out by the Navies of both countries. They also looked forward to the convening of the next edition of the Tri-Services Amphibious Tiger Triumph HADR Exercise and Army Exercises Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar in 2021. The US. welcomed India’s co-hosting of the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC), Indo-Pacific Armies Management Seminar (IPAMS) and Senior Enlisted Leader Forum (SELF) in 2023.

Defence Industries

The ministers decided to work together to realize the development of their respective defence industries. Acknowledging India’s contributions to the global supply chain of major defence platforms and commitment to defence innovation, the Ministers reiterated the importance of Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and stated their intention to fast track projects under DTTI. They noted with satisfaction the signing of a Statement of Intent (SoI) at the 10th DTTI meeting to strengthen dialogue on defence technology cooperation on several specific DTTI projects as well as a DTTI Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) for identification and development of joint projects. India looked forward to the participation by the US Government and defence industry at the upcoming Aero-India in February 2021.

Recognizing the importance of cooperation in defence innovation, the Ministers welcomed the inaugural meeting between the Indian Defence Innovation Organization (DIO-iDEX) and US Defence Innovation United (DIU) in July 2020. They also looked forward to the inaugural Industrial Security Annex (ISA) Summit later this year which would further strengthen defence industrial cooperation between both countries.

ALSO READ: India-US joint statement riles Pakistan on terror

Counter-Terrorism

In a joint attack on terrorism emanating from Pakistan, India and the United States on Tuesday called on Pakistan to act on terrorism and not allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks. The joint statement issued by both sides after the 2+2 meet in the national capital asked Pakistan to “expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators and planners of all such attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, Uri, and Pathankot”.

The ministers denounced the use of terrorist proxies and strongly condemned cross border terrorism in all its forms. An emphasis was made for the need for concerted action against all terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM).

Both sides have been exchanging information on sanctions and designations against terror groups and individuals. After the Pulwama terror attack of 2019, the US along with India’s allies like France helped to list Masood Azhar as a global terror at the UN. Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammad was responsible for the 2019 terror attack in which India lost more than 40 CRPF personnel.

India’s UNSC Bid

During a news conference after the 2+2 dialogue, the top US diplomat extended support to India’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Pompeo said that the ministerial meeting was a success, saying the bond between the two nations is built on the foundation of a longstanding friendship, partnership, and vibrant democratic traditions.

Meeting with Prime Minister

Pompeo and Esper called on prime minister Narendra Modi at the sidelines of 2+2 ministerial dialogue on 27 October. The leaders discussed several issues of regional and global concern on which the US and India collaborate, including COVID-19 response and shared interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific. They also pledged to further strengthen the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership to better ensure the security and prosperity of both countries, the Indo-Pacific region, and the world.

They conveyed the US government’s continued interest in building stronger relations with India and working together to realise the shared vision and goals.

Comments

In the past two Dialogues the sides have discussed the Indo-Pacific region, regional and global threats, terrorism, disaster relief, training of UN peacekeepers, sustainable infrastructure and connectivity, maritime security, people-to-people ties, exchange programmes for Parliamentarians and young innovators, judicial cooperation, university research partnerships, bilateral Science and Technology arrangements, water management, oceans and space.

The talks took place at a time when India was locked in a tense standoff with China in eastern Ladakh and the Trump administration’s growing friction with Beijing over a host of issues including trade tariff and the Chinese military’s offensive manoeuvres in the South China Sea.

The situation in eastern Ladakh and China’s overall aggressive behaviour including in the Indo-Pacific region figured in the talks, although China was named as such in the joint statement issued after the talks.

Indo-US relations have bipartisan support in the US and the scheduling of the dialogue a few days ahead of the 3 November 3 presidential polls would not impact the talks.

Strategic hedging is the key to move forward in relationships with powerful countries like the USA. India and the USA must now strive to set the course for a Comprehensive Strategic Global Partnership.

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The US, Japan, Australia and India are the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Starting with the then Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, the group was revived in late 2017 and has since been meeting on a semi-annual basis. As the initial proposal for Quad 1.0 in 2007 could not survive, the question for Quad 2.0, since 2017, has been whether the latter can effectively navigate the region’s uncertain dynamics. During the Quad’s decade-long recess, China aggressively solidified its naval presence in the region and efforts to persuade China to halt its aggression bore no fruit. While there is plenty of room for cooperation within the Quad, the discussion of China’s increasing influence over the South China Sea should take centre stage.

The Quad is not a formal military alliance. The US would like to see it become something like an Asian NATO. As deputy secretary of state Stephen Biegun has said, “Remember even NATO started with relatively modest expectations and a number of countries [initially] chose neutrality over NATO membership.” India has long been hesitant about joining any such military alliance and has even put up some resistance to the idea. When it comes to the South China Sea crisis, it remains unclear just how much heed China will pay to a merely political association of these four powers, given how deeply invested the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become in building out the China’s physical footprint in the region. However, because mutual interests among the four powers have increased, while grievances toward China have continued to run ever deeper over the past decade, there are at least two reasons why Quad 2.0 will likely be more effective than Quad 1.0.

First, an even greater convergence of interests between the four members has emerged since the association’s inception. As one of the core examples of the increasing concept of the Indo-Pacific (IP) configuration, which aims to make a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” the Quad seeks to secure the critical sea lanes of communication connecting the two oceans, as a shared objective. Capt (Dr) Gurpreet S. Khurana, who coined the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2007, opined that “free” means no barriers to use of the seas for the prosperity of all states and “open” means “an environment that facilitates sea-going enterprise enabled by inclusiveness of the comity of nations that seek to meet their national ends through the fairness of such enterprise.” Such an integrated strategic vision, which was lacking from Quad 1.0, clearly seems to be driving Quad 2.0.

ALSO READ: INDIA – U.S.: Indo-US Defence Cooperation Enters New Phase

Second, there is currently no comparable alternative means by which these states can deter China’s continued unwelcome advances in the region. In addition, Quad 2.0 reflects the building frustration shared by these states, which emphasize the need for the rule of law in international relations over and against China’s nationalistic and more unilateral approach, which balks at any constraints that might be placed on it under an international rules-based order. As U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Philip Davidson said “an emboldened Communist Party of China seeks to change the world in which Chinese national power is more important than international law.”

The following are examples of grievances by individual states, and their efforts to get redress for their South China Sea disputes with China through reliance on and recourse to international law.

Efforts to restore the rule of law attempted by the Philippines ended in a victory on paper but a failure in practice in 2016. When the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled unanimously, by a vote of 16–0, that there were no legal ground for China to assert that the disputed area is its own based on historical rights, China refused to abide by the ruling.

The US has conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the area, yet Chinese behavior in the region in these disputed waters remains unchanged. Rather, China’s land-reclamation and installation-building projects, along with other “legitimacy-building” efforts around small maritime features, such as sending patrol boats to the area regularly, along with other low-level provocations at sea, continue apace. US frustration has been palpable. Furthermore, China has pursued its own strategy of FONOPs, not only in the South China Sea, but more broadly in the region.

With respect to Australia, China sent a reconnaissance ship near the coast of Queensland to monitor U.S.-Australia naval exercises in July 2017. One of the Chinese major news outlets, the Global Times, reported that while the Australian Ministry of Defence stated that Australia “respects the right of all countries to navigate freely in international waters,” Australian media nevertheless displayed a fierce attitude, declaring that the behavior of the Chinese ship was “provocative” and “worrying.” But the Chinese newspaper went on to say that what was important was for China “to give both parties [the U.S. and Australia] more insights into understanding FONOPs. Australians learn more about the seriousness of the South China Sea issue and understand the Chinese concern [surrounding FONOPs].” This incident shows how China’s view of the scope for their FONOPs goes beyond Southeast Asia, and that sending a strong message to Australia on this matter was strategically important.

Similarly, a PLA Navy reconnaissance vessel entered Japanese territorial waters on 15 June 2016 for about one hour and thirty minutes. This marked the first such incursion since 2004, when a Chinese nuclear submarine did likewise. China’s Ministry of Defense Information Bureau said that the action was “in compliance with freedom of navigation from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” However, Japan’s national broadcasting organization, Nippon HōsōKyōkai (NHK), interpreted this action as being designed to prevent Japan from getting involved with the ongoing South China Sea territorial and navigational freedom disputes. Another Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, described the affair as a “Chinese version of freedom of navigation,” and argued that the reason for China taking such action was that Japan, the U.S. and other states were targeting China for constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and that China saw this as its rivals attempting to erect a string of maritime siege towers around China, thereby making China insecure.

ALSO READ: India holds naval exercise with Japan amid stand-off with China

While Britain is not a member of the Quad, China’s warning to other states that might engage in hampering the building up of China’s “own legitimacy in the South China Sea” has continued. On 3 June 2018, France and Britain’s defence ministries reported that they would send warships to sail through the South China Sea to challenge China’s excessive claims on the region. On 5 June, the Chinese military’s TV network, First Military Intelligence, issued a warning, stating: “China will use British warships as a model to let them taste frustration.” The network further stated that the British case was like “kill[ing] a chicken to give a lesson to monkeys.” (Shā​jī​jǐnghóu). In other words, Britain should be made an example of, in order to scare other countries, so that it dare not follow in the footsteps of the “chicken.”

Such Chinese behavior, which has frustrated states that understand the importance of the rule of the law and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, generates hopeful that the role of the Quad this time around should have a greater chance of success than did the Quad 1.0.

The question remains, then: What about enlarging the Quad’s membership? Bringing in more states from around the region would means both more soft and more hard power. But would smaller nations be willing to join? On the possibility of having a Quad-plus dialogue, Biegun said on 31 August 2020, it might include South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. In addition, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo mentioned on 1 September 2020 that, “in addition to India, Australia and Japan, Korea will become a partner of the United States.” South Korean foreign minister Kang Kyunghwa played down the idea and denied that there had been any formal request from the U.S. to join it or talk about it.”

As the South Korean case reveals, states would prefer to be able to avoid being forced into making a hard binary choice between aligning themselves solely with the U.S. or China. However, in general, these potential “plus” states share the common objective of support for the rule of law and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, since South Korea and New Zealand are already formal military allies of the United States, and since both already have a shared interest in what the Quad is aiming for, if Quad 2.0 can establish unity among its core four members, it can have a brighter future than its previous iteration.

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As the centre of gravity of the global economy shifts from Europe to Asia, the Indian Ocean, which has long been considered as a backwater in global geopolitics, is emerging as the new theatre of strategic competition, world power and conflict. The Indian Ocean is assuming key importance in the emerging Asian geopolitical and geoeconomic scenario. This is reflected in the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific construct, which conceives the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as an interconnected geopolitical and geoeconomic space.

The strategic salience of the Indo-Pacific concept appears to stem from the fact that India has emerged as a central regional actor with growing strategic presence in Southeast and East Asia. The Indian Ocean’s growing strategic importance for the littorals and the major powers stems from the strategic position of its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) which connect Africa, East Asia and the Persian Gulf with Europe and the Americas and also constitute the routes for passage of approximately one-third of international trade and half of the world’s crude oil resources.

Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)

India’s strong focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) was particularly indicated by prime minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, in March 2015, when he stated, “we seek a future for Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region.” Prime Minister Modi outlined a set of goals that included seeking “a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other’s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime security issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.”

SAGAR signifies the economic and maritime security outreach of India’s Act East Policy. In the rapidly deteriorating security environment of the IOR with the emerging traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges, India’s expanding role in the SLOCs security as a net security provider has factored in its growing engagement with the navies of the major powers and the key littoral states for strengthening maritime security along the global routes of transit.

ALSO READ: India holds naval exercise with Japan amid stand-off with China

The United States and Japan are increasingly engaging with India in joint maritime security exercises in the IOR as evident from the growing maritime security cooperation of the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) with the Indian Navy at the bilateral, trilateral level and multilateral levels. India’s strategic convergence with the United States and Japan in the Indian Ocean could be perceived particularly in the expanding trilateral maritime security cooperation as well as in the upgrading of the trilateral dialogue to summit level meeting in 2018. Amid the Sino-Indian tussle along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh the Indian Navy conducted joint naval exercises with the JMSDF in the IOR along the Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean, which was followed by the Indo-US naval exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI).

Joint Naval Exercices

At a time when both India and Japan are facing hostility from China, warships from the Indian Navy and Japanese Navy’s conducting joint exercise in the Malacca Straits is a significant development. Two naval ships each from the Indian Navy and the JMSDF participated in the joint naval drills. The Indo-US naval exercises in the ANI were conducted by eight Indian and American warships that undertook a freedom of passage exercise (PASSEX).

The Indian Navy’s maritime security cooperation with the US and Japanese navies in the IOR during China’s military encroachment in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh is symbolic. It signifies New Delhi’s balancing strategies vis-à-vis China’s muscle flexing manoeuvres in India’s north-eastern territory and its maritime neighbourhood. It also indicates that India is re-evaluating ANI’s role as a critical military base.

ALSO READ: US, Indian Naval Exercise A Clear Signal to China

The strategic advantage that the Andamans provide to India is the ability to exercise surveillance and monitor the world’s most strategic and trafficked Malacca Strait. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) expanding footprint in the IOR, which is particularly evident from the growing presence of Chinese nuclear submarines, is a cause of security worries for New Delhi.

Japan is developing basic infrastructure such as reliable power and communications in the ANI and laying an optic fibre cable across the Bay of Bengal. Japan’s NEC Corporation has been contracted to install an undersea cable from Chennai to ANI. This will support India’s planned build-up of naval and air assets in the islands and possibly an undersea surveillance system to monitor submarines.

India’s security worries also stem from China’s ambitious Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI) connectivity project. The MSRI is being interpreted as the reincarnation of the “String of Pearls” strategy. Beijing’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, seems to be the first step, in what is likely to become a network of Chinese bases, across the Indian Ocean. The military base in Djibouti provides China with a rudimentary power-projection, that is bolstered by its access to ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Chinese submarines have even docked at Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. Thus, Beijing is focusing on acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean to enhance its strategic presence in the region. These developments appear to have factored in India’s intent to bolster its maritime security cooperation with the US and Japan in the IOR.

For rapid naval modernisation, New Delhi is increasingly seeking cooperation from Japan and the US. For example, the Modi government is exploring the possibility of working with Japan in building submarines and has sought technology share from the US for India’s next aircraft carrier. India is also buying a range of American weaponry. New Delhi has procured eight Boeing P-81 aircrafts from the US and has started the acquisition process for six more aircrafts, which will give a boost to its maritime reconnaissance capabilities.

India’s maritime security cooperation with the United States in the ANI and its welcoming Japanese investments in boosting ANI’s infrastructure upgrade indicate that New Delhi perceives Washington and Tokyo as key strategic partners whom India is prepared to trust when it comes to its strategically sensitive regions. It needs to be noted that India-US-Japan trilateral maritime security cooperation received a new boost when in the 2014 Tokyo Declaration New Delhi and Tokyo agreed to hold regular maritime exercises, attaching importance to ‘continued participation’ of Japan in the Malabar exercises. It is significant to note that Japan’s participation in all the Malabar drills held in 2007, 2009 and 2014 was in the capacity of an invited observer. The October 2015 Malabar exercise marked a major turning point with Japan’s inclusion in the Malabar naval cooperation as a permanent participant. Apart from Malabar, the multilateral regional initiatives in the IOR as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) provide effective platform for the three states to bolster maritime security in the IOR in the domain of anti-piracy and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HA-DR).

In the changing security architecture in the IOR, a growing synergy from a political to a strategic focus could be noted in Indo-US-Japanese relations, given that both countries share core strategic interests, whether over their heavy dependence on West Asian oil, the safety of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean region or the growing power disequilibrium in Asia. The extent to which India’s maritime security partnership with the United States and Japan is transformed will have a decisive impact on the political, economic and military balance of power in the post-COVID Asia.

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The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton, as part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG), conducted a cooperative deployment with ships and aircraft from the Indian Navy July 20 and 21.

The two navies conducted multiple exercises while operating together, including a live-fire exercise, an air defence exercise (ADEX), flight operations and a farewell passing exercise.

During the ADEX four ships of the Indian Navy joined Princeton and Sterett to defend each other against simulated threat aircraft and missiles. Ships and crew from both sides were able to achieve a high level of integration and cooperation while conducting many events to include gunnery and air defense exercises.

Along with the ADEX, the two navies also conducted flight operations to solidify the capability of landing American helicopters on the Indian ships, and landing Indian helicopters on the American ships.

The joint exercise raised the diplomatic heat on China. While it was described as a routine “passex” (basic naval exercises when warships of two navies pass by each other in the oceans), the subtext pointed to a subtle demonstration of US-India partnership even as India and China were engaged in a slow disengagement process after the Galwan incident.

The series of exercises, weeks after a similar joint drill with Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean, were meant to  be a cause of worry and anxiety for Beijing.

India has improved its military ties with the US and also strengthened security and strategic ties with Australia, an important partner in the emerging anti-China coalition. The Australia-India Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement and the Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement are two very significant steps in deepening our ties in the emerging Indo-Pacific security and trade architecture.

India shares the security concerns of the countries in the South China Sea and strongly condemns China’s hegemonic moves. India’s IOR strategy includes a robust naval policy and diplomatic outreach towards the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) countries.

India has revived certain naval/maritime possibilities and these include the likelihood of inviting Australia to join the India-US-Japan trilateral Malabar naval exercises towards the end of the year. This points to reviving the Quad — a group of four nations that came under one umbrella for the first time in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.

Earlier, in 2007, India had mounted a Quad-plus Singapore five-nation naval exercise. China then bristled at what it considered to be a latent threat. Delhi, then, chose to placate Beijing’s concerns by reverting to a bilateral Malabar with the US.

Beijing perceives itself vulnerable in the Indo-Pacific given its enormous dependence on unimpeded merchant shipping, which is predicated on the freedom of the oceans and the sea-lines of communication.

Any new realignment of forces such as the China-Pakistan-Turkey-Iran axis will be highly detrimental to India’s security and strategic position in the region. Neither the US nor India can independently take on a hegemonic and expansionist China, which has scant respect for global rule-based order and transparent trade system.

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Ensuring untethered flow of goods, commodities and energy imports have become the priority, thus, the notion of security has shifted from protecting the land territories to securitizing the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). In this age of globalization, a country’s energy reserves determine its relative power, thus, SLOCs today have become the backbone of any nation’s economy. Almost, two-third of every country’s oil imports pass through oceans and seas. Moreover, countries today relentlessly strive to secure their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and the reservoirs of marine resources from foreign interventions. This growing importance of oceans in terms of geo-economics has reconstructed marine spaces as zones of contestation and conflict, where most powerful nations of the globe have begun to make their naval presence felt, thereby, making the overall role of navies more imperative than ever before.

The Case of Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean that theoretically extends from the east coast of Africa and continues up to the west coast of United States includes world’s most important oil trade routes as it connects the major oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf near the Horn of Africa and also incorporates the natural gas reserves of Myanmar in Bay of Bengal. The SLOCs that passes through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) carry almost two-third of world’s oil trade, one-third of cargo and one-half of world’s container traffic. The immense geo-economic importance of the IOR has made it a zone of geopolitical tiff between US, Australia, Japan and China. The idea is to protect the sea lanes and the EEZs. The major threats of the IOR, however, are not restricted to conventional state-centric naval confrontations. Non-traditional factors have emerged, such as, resilience of pirates in red seas, small arms and narcotics trade from the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle, human trafficking and maritime mixed migration (that takes the path from Horn of Africa through the Mediterranean Sea including the cases of Rohingyas from Myanmar), climate change and disasters in the Bay of Bengal (which remains the hotbed of tropical cyclones) and the illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing in the EEZs of the littoral countries.

The Emerging Zone of Conflict

With this changing dynamics of the IOR region, along with the persistent maritime territorial conflicts and naval power projections by the major players, IOR has emerged as a zone of two dominant rivalries. One, in the South China Sea where the conflict is between China and the United States, which is the net security provider for the South East Asian countries like Vietnam and Philippines.

The contest is on two fronts; One, annexation and subsequent protection of Spartly, Parcel Hainan and Zhongsha archipelago and Second, to ensure that China fails to dominate the SLOCs that pass through the Malacca Strait.

The other zone of scuffle remains the Bay of Bengal-Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean Tri-Junction that overlooks the Indian Peninsula. Sino-Indian conflict that gets exposed in this zone is delineated by

•             India’s shoring efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) along with port developments in the littoral countries and China’s attempt to develop one.

•             A Two Ocean’s Strategy, whereby China can bypass the Malacca Strait for its oil trade and to implement the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) by investing in the infrastructural development of the island countries in the IOR.

With China recognized as the pre-eminent threat in the IOR, it becomes implausible to go into further exploration of the region without estimating Chinese footsteps in IOR. For Beijing, Indian Ocean has served as its dominant source of energy. Eighty percent of China’s total oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean and primarily the Malacca Strait. China’s launch of MSRI and BRI is just an attempt to secure and ease its oil importing routes be they land or maritime and, to some extent, avoid the Malacca Strait chokepoint. Thus, in order to secure these ambitions, China is proliferating the presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) by deploying 31st Task Force of PLAN in the IOR. China’s has set up military bases in Djibouti, Jiwani Peninsula near Gwadar, listening port in Coco Islands near Myanmar, apart from developing ports in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh.

India’s Indian Ocean Strategy

Constricted to protecting the northern land frontiers, India’s security predicaments post-Independence were dominated by her brawl with Pakistan and China. However, India never underestimated her stake in Indian Ocean. Since independence, India visualized her role as the ruler of the waves in order to proliferate her influence in the region, thereby, propping up her naval presence in the IOR. In the 1960s, the Indian Navy was allocated only 4 per cent of the total defence expenditure of the country. Today, Indian Navy enjoys 15 per cent of the total defence budget (US$ 66.9 for 2020-21), although it still remains lower than other two sectors – Army and Air Force. India’s role has largely been that of ‘Security Provider’ to ensure that the IOR remain a zone of neutrality with no power having hegemony over it. However, the emerging pockets of intimidation, the threat posed by terrorists in the aftermath of 26/11 Mumbai attack, coupled with India’s ambition to become the dominant regional leader, has lured India to flex her muscles, both by taking a soft power posture through its outreach programmes and investments and by proliferating joint naval exercises with other powers in the region. The IOR, now considered as the Greater Indo-Pacific, is witnessing new areas of cooperation, where India has been included in the ‘Quadripartite Alliance’ with US, Japan and Australia to cooperate on naval patrolling to ensure overall security in the ocean. Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and India Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) New Delhi have hosted naval exercises with Vietnam and trilateral Malabar exercises with US, Japan and Australia. India today is US’s major defence partner in safeguarding the South China Sea. In the soft power domain, India SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) has brought India closer to the littoral islands that includes Maldives, Seychelles and Eastern African countries of Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros.

Strategic Deterrence or Calculated Belligerence?

There are two extreme postures that India can take to strategize the IOR; one; a defensive posture to deter threat and contain further proliferation of foreign navies in the region and second, enhancing its own capabilities to become a maritime power to control the waves, flex its power and boost its presence. However, India has taken up a posture that includes the element of both and here the role of the Indian Navy has become crucial. Indian Navy today possess a mix of aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates and patrolling vessels. Although it currently possess 130 warships, 20 aircrafts, 24 attack submarines and a nuclear ballistic missiles submarine (Arihant), under the modernization process within the Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan (MCPP) it will increase its capabilities to 200 ships, 500 aircrafts and 24 attack submarines by 2027. Apart from enhancing maritime capabilities, India has begun chessboard diplomacy in the IOR. Today, in order to counter Chinese port investments, India has begun to expand her presence by developing deep sea ports in Sitwe, Myanmar and in Sabang, Indonesia that position India close to the Malacca Strait. India’s ambitious Chabahar port project in Iran and port access in Duqm, Oman again place her in the backyard of Chinese presence in Gwadar. India, by now, has already established surveillance radars in Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Oman, Maldives and Sri Lanka with proposals to build a military base in Seychelles and a listening post in Cocos Island, Australia. In order to counter non-traditional security threats, the Indian Navy is working towards calibrating its capacity in Big Data analysis and Artificial Intelligence.

Way Forward and Challenges Ahead

Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak rivalry has remained the pre-dominant threat in the narrations of India’s security doctrine. With the 26/11 Mumbai attack, India’s idea of protecting her frontiers has increasingly included maritime routes as well. However, for China the calculations are tumultuous. It is important to understand that China’s territorial incursions in Ladakh are just to ensure that its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is safe at the time when India has escalated her control over the region. One also cannot deny that China’s ‘Middle Kingdom’ ideology is another determining factor, but the fruits of globalization have ultimately made it important for powers like China to secure her energy import routes. Therefore, there is no doubt that with the completion of China’s BRI, Sino-India rivalry will gradually shift more towards the IOR. The competition that unravels in the region, is about exacting the confidence of small independent littoral countries that are situated in the orbit of the SLOCs. Thus, for India the struggle is multidimensional and there are four imperatives:

•             Safeguarding her own maritime frontiers from foreign, specially Chinese incursions.

•             Ensuring regional consolidation and multilateral cooperation in emerging areas of mapping continental shelf, hydrography, blue water economy and joint naval exercises.

•             To make its defence capabilities available to small independent states that will provide India geo-advantages on two fronts namely, power projection and expansion of influence.

•             To continue with its chess board diplomacy, whereby Indian Navy’s enhanced role as pawns to hinder Chinese inroads is ensured.

Although, a plethora of literature is emerging that analyses the construction of artificial islands, construction of such entities – whether targeted towards India and China – will be opposed in lieu of safeguarding sovereignty. As for challenges, it is the declining budget allocation and lack of resource prioritization for the Navy, coupled with the huge disparity between Indian Navy’s capacities and its current capabilities. But it is high time for realizing that, given the changing dynamics of warfare that is stimulated by the currents of globalization, it is the Navy that will form the future backbone of India’s security. As long as geo-economics continues to define the trends of geo-politics, the Indian Ocean will continue to remain a zone of conflict. It is for our nation to decide how it strategizes the space in which it enjoys the most advantageous cartographical position.

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