While the Goa Maritime Conclave sought to project the Indian Navy’s cooperative engagement at the strategic-operational level, by providing a forum for the Chiefs-of-Navy and Heads of Maritime Agencies in the Indian Ocean Region, the IPRD, on the other hand, was the principal manifestation of the Navy’s international engagement at the strategic-level, addressing ‘holistic’ maritime security issues across the Indo-Pacific.

The first two editions of IPRD were held in 2018 and 2019 respectively at New Delhi.  IPRD 2020 was cancelled due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The third edition of IPRD was held in 2021 in online mode and the fourth edition was conducted, reverting to a physical format, at New Delhi in 2022.

Theme of IPRD-2023

The overarching theme of IPRD-2023 was “Geopolitical Impacts upon Indo-Pacific Maritime Trade and Connectivity”. This year’s edition of the IPRD built upon the previous one, which focussed upon ‘Operationalising the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)’, by specifically addressing the ‘Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport’ pillar of the IPOI.

IPRD-2023 explored geopolitical impacts upon Indo-Pacific maritime trade and connectivity through six professional sessions spread over a three-day period. 

The sessions were:

Nodes of maritime connectivity;

China’s impact vis-à-vis maritime connectivity across the Indo-Pacific;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade (Part 2);

Private industry in the safety and security of Indo-Pacific maritime trade and shipping; and

Maintaining a rules-based, safe, and secure Indo-Pacific.

Eminent speakers from 16 countries and representatives of the various embassies and high commissions attended and offered diverse regional perspectives on the subject.

Navy Chief’s Address

Speaking at the Indo-Pacific Regional dialogue organised by the Indian Navy, navy chief Admiral R Hari Kumar said that violations of established rules pose a danger to good order at sea. He described the security situation in the South China Sea as “fragile.” He warned that the region is the most militarised in the world and a “contestation” at sea can have adverse economic and social consequences.

“The fragile security situation in the South China Sea, in addition to the happenings of violations of established codes of conduct or confidence building measures, pose a clear and present danger to good order and discipline at sea,” Admiral Kumar said.

The comments were a rare direct reference to the situation in the South China sea and come at a time when China and Pakistan are undertaking large-scale naval drills in the Arabian Sea.

He said that more than 50 warships of extra regional forces are deployed in the Indian Ocean Region on various missions, including anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indo-Pacific has a significant naval presence, which can lead to confrontation and contestation.

“Owing to the increased presence of multinational forces, and differing interpretations of international laws, there is this fear that the region’s ‘global commons’ can change to ‘contested seas’,” he said. The navy chief added that this contestation at sea “can have adverse consequences for security-physical, social as well as economic”.

Admiral Kumar made a case for greater collaboration between nations in the maritime nation. “We are traversing through a contested present into an uncertain future. The future of global commons hinges on cooperative efforts of nations,” he said.

He said that cooperative or collaborative systems amongst like-minded maritime nations are essential for a stable future. He also made a strong case for developing interoperability and trust between nations, saying this requires a sustained and continued engagement.

Chinese Threat

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presents the greatest challenge to the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN is supported by the China Coast Guard and the Chinese maritime militia in furthering Chinese national interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s friendship with Pakistan is of concern as they together present a new challenge to India in the maritime domain. India considers the Indian Ocean region as the key to India’s security and also aims to build credibility in the Indo-Pacific.

The dispute over Taiwan and China’s aggressive posture in the South and East China Seas, and China’s rivalry with America for dominance in those waters has brought the Indo-Pacific region centrestage. China’s ‘grey zone’ operations against US maritime forces and its allies have further sharpened rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s Linkages with the Indo-Pacific

The Indian government’s has often enunciated a vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific is the gateway to the Indian Ocean from the east with crucial trade and security implications. Hence its is of vital interest to India as also to ASEAN countries. India has linkages with many countries of southeast Asia and east Asia. The Indian Navy has been exercising with navies of the ASEAN region for many years. The Malabar series of exercises include participation by the United States navy and Japanese Self Defence Forces. Ther Indian Navy has exercised not only in the Bay of Bengal but in the western Pacific as well.

India’s ‘Look East’ policy was enunciated in the early 1990s, keeping in mind its maritime and security interests. The same has transformed into ‘Act East’ policy. In pursuit of this policy, the Indian Navy has engaged its counterparts in the Indo-Pacific by way of maritime military cooperation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Piracy, maritime terrorism, maritime crimes like drug and human trafficking, are some of the other threats which the Indian Navy has to be deal with. Other non-traditional threats include climate change-induced sea-level rise and maritime pollution. State actors in particular are challenging the rules-based, liberal international order and need to be dealt with.

Indian Navy’s Approach

The Indian Navy provides maritime security for safe trade and monitors vessels that enter or leave the Indian Ocean region through the Malacca Strait, with the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s undertaking regular surveillance. Coordinated naval patrols with Bangladesh, Thai and Indonesian navies have been institutionalised. Maritime partnership exercises are conducted with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, in bilateral or multilateral formats.

Indian naval ships, submarines and aircraft have undertaken long-range overseas deployments, across the Indo-Pacific as far as Japan, Hawaii and Australia.

Towards becoming a net security provider in the region, the Indian Navy has been helping smaller maritime neighbours and providing platforms and equipment for their navies. Neibhbours have appreciated India’s help in training, repairs, expertise in hydrography, maritime surveys and cartographic assistance.

The Indian Navy is the first responder in the region for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, earthquakes, cyclones, and pandemics the Indian Navy’s contribution with relief supplies with professionalism has created yremendous goodwill.

Comments

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the coastlines of East Africa to the western Americas. It is today a vital oceanic space comprising critical chokepoints that carry a majority of the world’s trade. The chokepoints are situated at key geopolitical flashpoints. The Indo-Pacific is now perceived as vital for energy security, maritime security, and maritime commerce. The Indian Navy is is a formidable and potent force to provide such security in the region.

The Indian Navy is preparing a 175-ship plan (25 ships more than its current strength of 150) to particularly deal with the Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean.

India has strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asian countries, and West Asian countries. India is also involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) featuring three partners in the US, Japan, and Australia.

The Indian Navy is playing an important role in realising the Indian government’s vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

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Softer focus for Quad

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, during her visit to India and Pakistan, in first week October 2021, clarified the different track compared to security role for AUKUS. At an event in Mumbai, Wendy Sherman claimed that Quad is meant to discuss soft issues, like vaccines, supply chains, and climate. The American “clarification” came after Quad’s four heads of State met in the US in-person, on 24 September, and stressed the rule of law and regional security. It also came just days before Quad’s second phase of the Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal.

The Quad is a “non-defence, non-military” arrangement, said U.S. Deputy Secretary of State said, indicating at two separate interactions that the purpose of the Australia-India-Japan-United States grouping is meant to cooperate on what are considered ‘softer’ issues.

“The Quad is [a] vehicle which largely operates in security realms that are non-military, non-defence. Things we do together on vaccines, and infrastructure, supply chains, technology and climate — all the forward thinking areas in which we need to gain confidence and ensure security for our people,” Sherman said at an event organised by think-tank Ananta in Mumbai.

In an interview to Pakistan’s official PTV, broadcast, on 9 October, Sherman called the Quad “a cooperative effort to work on things like energy, people-to-people exchanges and infrastructure and supply chain resilience.”

The comments by a senior U.S. official are the clearest signal yet that Washington has shifted its view of the Quad’s agenda, particularly after the announcement of the new Australia-UK-U.S. or AUKUS alliance for nuclear submarines in the Indo-Pacific. The announcement came just a week ahead of the first in-person Quad summit, which Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended in Washington in September.

Indian officials also said the imperatives of the COVID pandemic, including the need for vaccines, technology, supply chain resilience and HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) operations appear to have “clarified” the Biden administration’s plans for the Quad.

When asked about the difference between the Quad and AUKUS at the Ananta interaction, Sherman replied that the two were non-competing “pieces of a puzzle”.

“AUKUS is a one of a kind project, which will be a game changer in a maritime sense in this arena,” Sherman said, speaking about the project for the U.S. and UK to help Australia build a fleet of nuclear propelled submarines “which are faster, harder to detect, more agile”.

Former Indian Ambassador to China Gautam Bambawale, says that in his view, the U.S. position has not shifted. “Quad may not be a military alliance, but it continues to undertake military activities like the Malabar Naval exercise.”

Sherman’s words were in stark contrast to those of Michael Pompeo, the former U.S. Secretary of State during the Trump administration, during the Quad’s Ministerial level meeting just a year ago. “As partners in this Quad, it is more critical now than ever that we collaborate to protect our people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion. We’ve seen it in the south, in the East China Sea, the Mekong, the Himalayas, the Taiwan Straits,” Pompeo had said in his opening statement in Tokyo in September 2020, where he lashed out at the Chinese government’s “authoritarian nature” and criticised it for the Covid pandemic.

The Quad is a club into which India was wooed ardently. Yet, it remained circumspect. It is largely because of India that the Quad remains a non-military club of regional democracies with a “shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific”. AUKUS, on the other hand, is an unabashed security pact; the announcement of its formation came with the news that the UK and the US would help Australia develop and deploy nuclear-powered submarines. The message of taking on China is unambiguous.

India now has the 2+2 dialogues with all three Quad partners, thus maintaining a defence engagement with each, but out of the ambit of the plurilateral.

At the first India-Australia 2+2 ministerial meet in early September, India’s foreign minister, S Jaishankar made an important clarification regarding the Quad. In response to reports in the media of Chinese attempts to portray the Quad as an “Asian NATO”, Jaishankar said that it was a seeming “misrepresentation of reality”.[1] The Quad, he averred, was but a “platform for four countries to cooperate for their benefit and for the benefit of the world…Unlike NATO, a Cold War term, the Quad looked very much to the future, reflecting globalisation and the compulsions of countries to work together.”

Before the Prime Minister‘s US visit in September 2021, foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said Quad was separate from AUKUS, and for that matter, was not lined with the Malabar exercise either, though the same nations were involved in both the Quad and Malabar. It was assumed at that time that India was trying to downplay the role of Quad to assuage any jittery nations in Asia.

That explanation, evidently, did little to convince mandarins in Beijing. Ahead of the Quadrilateral summit in New York in late September 2021 — the first in-person meeting of these country leaders—a Chinese spokesperson denounced the Quad as “a clique formed to target a third country.” The group’s “zero sum thinking and ideological bias”, the official complained, “was unsuited for trust building and cooperation between regional states.”

Australia’s inclusion in the Malabar naval exercises imparts more than a military dimension to the Quadrilateral; it in fact signals unified resolve to Beijing.

At present, the main mechanism for technology cooperation in the Quad is the Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group (or the Quad Working Group) established in March 2021. The Working Group announcement highlighted three broad areas for collaboration: 1) Telecommunications; 2) Principles on technology development, design, and deployment; and 3) Collaboration between national standards bodies. There also exists a Track 2 initiative, supported by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, called the Quad Tech Network, which promotes research and public dialogue on technology issues, focusing on the Indo-Pacific.

The Quad nations came together in the backdrop of China’s modernisation of its military, intrusions into the Taiwan Strait, and its force projections even though they have refrained from taking China’s name formally either as an opponent or challenger in the Indo-Pacific region. The ambiguity about China being the adversary, thus, continues.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US on 22-25 September 2021 was significant for a number of reasons. His delegation includes External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Foreign Secretary Shringla among others.
Ahead of US visit, Modi said his visit to the United States would be an occasion to strengthen the Indo-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership and consolidate ties with Japan and Australia. He said in his address to the United Nations General Assembly he would focus on the pressing global challenges including the Covid-19 pandemic, the need to combat terrorism, climate change, and other important issues. At a media briefing ahead of the prime minister’s visit, foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla had said the developments in Afghanistan would be extensively discussed in the bilateral talks between Modi and Biden and the Indian side would convey that Washington needed to continue focus on that country.

Prime Minister’s Engagements

23 September

• Modi met US Vice-President Kamala Harris.
• The prime minister met one-on-one with five chief executives of top American companies – Heads of Qualcomm, Adobe, First Solar, General Atomics and Blackstone.
• Modi had bilateral meetings with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

24 September
*Modi participated in the first in-person summit of the Quad in Washington and had an important bilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden.

25 September
*Modi attended the UN General Assembly in New York and addressed the General Debate of the High-Level Segment of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
*Meeting With Joe Biden
The meeting with Joe Biden was the first in-person meeting between the two leaders after Biden became President in January.
*Biden and Modi discussed the current regional security situation following the recent developments in Afghanistan and a number of other issues. The need to “stem radicalism, extremism, cross-border terrorism and dismantling of global terrorist network”, also featured in the PM Modi-Biden talks.

Other issues on the agenda discussed with President Joe Biden were as follows:
• The Afghan crisis and its implications
• China’s growing assertiveness
• Ways to stem radicalism and cross-border terrorism
• Expansion of the India-US global partnership
• How to bolster bilateral trade and investment ties
• Strengthen defence and security collaboration
• Boost the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership
• Explore new avenues and emerging technologies, including R&D, innovation and industry linkages

Quad Summit

PM Modi also attended the first in-person Quad summit hosted by the US President. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga also attended the summit. This was Modi’s first in-person meeting with Mr Suga after the latter took over the reins from Shinzo Abe in September last year.
The Quad summit aims to boost cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region amid China’s growing dominance in the area. The Quad countries – Australia, India, Japan and the US – announced a new working group on space, a supply chain initiative and a 5G deployment and diversification effort apart from discussing issues like challenges in the Indo Pacific, climate change and COVID-19 pandemic.

For the US, the Quad meeting marked another step to reviving an American focus on diplomatic efforts, following its dramatic exit from the 20-year Afghanistan war.
Of the three regional groupings that Washington leads in its strategic chess game to manage China’s ascent, the Quad is deliberately the most open. The other two are the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing alliance, comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the newest arrival on the block – AUKUS.

Meeting with Kamala Harris

During his first meeting with US Vice President Kamala Harris, Modi latter brought up Pakistan’s role in terrorism and asked Islamabad to take action so it does not impact America and India’s security.
Modi and Harris had earlier spoken on the telephone in June this year. Harris had offered to prioritise India, in making US vaccines available in the wake of the Covid situation at that time in India.

Address to UN General Assembly

PM Modi will conclude the US visit with an address at the United Nations General Assembly, focusing on global challenges including the pandemic, the need to combat terrorism, climate change and other important issues.

India – US Issues

India and the US are close partners and share an economic and military relationship. Bilateral trade was $88.75 billion (Rs 6.5 lakh crore) in 2019-20, and the stated goal is of taking it to $500 billion (Rs 36.9 lakh crore) over the current decade. A new trade deal between the two countries is off the table but there are other areas of mutual convergence.

1. Defence. Since being designated a ‘major defence partner’ by the US in 2016, India has been able to access cutting-edge US military technology. Both countries conduct more military exercises with each other than with any other country. Over the past 15 years, India has bought arms worth $22 billion (Rs 1.6 lakh crore) from the US and is negotiating a fresh batch of defence deals worth approximately $10 billion (Rs 73,825 crore). The new deals include those for 30 MQ-9B Predator drones, worth approximately $3 billion (Rs 22,147 crore), additional C-130J transport aircraft and NASAMS-II air defence missile systems. India wants this relationship to move into the realm of joint development and to include more cutting-edge prowess in the field of stealth technologies, jet fighter engines and nuclear propulsion reactor technology.
3. Terrorism and Afghanistan. Since the swift takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban and the shocking collapse of the earlier Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its US-trained and equipped military, both India and the US have common concerns about Afghanistan becoming a hub of terrorism, with terrorists operating out of safe havens there to target the world outside, as it was during the previous Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. A shared concern is intelligence cooperation after the US pullout to warn of possible terror threats. The immediate issue at hand is the push by the Taliban to gain global legitimacy, including claiming its seat at the United Nations. The US aims to exert leverage on the Islamist group using what Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last month was a “range of tools”.
4. Climate Change. The two countries this year launched a new high-level team-up—the ‘US-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership’. The partnership envisages bilateral cooperation to meet the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Its goal is to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. To achieve this long-term goal, countries aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible to achieve a climate-neutral world by mid-century.
6. The US has set an economy-wide target of reducing its net greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52 per cent below 2005 levels in 2030. As part of its climate mitigation efforts, India has set a target of installing 450 GW of renewable energy by 2030. The two countries are to collaborate on this 2030 agenda for clean technologies and climate action. The first announcement in this direction was made in New Delhi when Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry travelled to launch the initiative in April 2021.
7. Free and open Indo-Pacific. China’s rise as a military power has sparked global anxiety and uncertainty, particularly with regard to the South China Sea that Beijing has militarised and claims as its territorial waters. Over $5 trillion (Rs 7.3 lakh crore) worth of trade, which is over 60 per cent of the global maritime trade, passes through the South China Sea. An immediate response to China’s belligerence has been the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, in March this year. The Quad countries—US, India, Australia and Japan—are to hold their first in-person meeting at the White House this week after a virtual summit last year. India and the US have reiterate their commitment to a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’—a region comprising the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean and including the South China Sea.
9. Vaccine Exports. In April, India halted vaccine exports after it was hit by a crippling second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic but resumed them from October. Indian manufacturers source raw materials, such as sterile filters and disposable bags for cell culture, used in vaccine production from the US. At a global Covid-19 summit on September 22, PM Modi emphasised that India would be stepping up vaccine production. He said India wants the vaccine raw material supply chains to be kept open so that it could step up vaccine production and resume exports to other countries. Global vaccine supply, particularly to the poorer countries, remains a huge bottleneck. The World Health Organization (WHO) has flagged vaccine inequity wherein a majority of the over 5 billion vaccines have been administered by the rich nations and the poorer countries were left to fend for themselves. President Biden has committed to donating 1.1 billion vaccine doses to the poorer countries, especially those in Africa. This is another area of collaboration between the two countries.

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The inaugural 2+2 ministerial level meeting between India and Australia was held, on 11 September, a fortnight ahead of the first Quad in-person Summit in Washington DC. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajanth Singh met Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton in New Delhi for an in-person meeting. That the two countries have kickstarted this new format of engagement suggests the growing trust and comfort level between India and Australia.

The meeting completed the set of such engagements the members of the Quad are having bilaterally with one another. The first such exercise India had was with Japan later on with the United States and now with Australia, all of whom are also working closely in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taking forward the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of both countries drew a roadmap encompassing political, economic, security and defence-related issues underscoring the importance of “advancing their shared objectives of an open, free, prosperous and rule-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India increased engagement” in this sphere.

Some of the major takeaways from the Australia-India Ministerial Dialogue include enhancing supply chain resilience and strengthening cooperation in the maritime domain. The latter that would enable deeper partnership between the two countries on a range of maritime-related themes such as maritime domain awareness, broadening linkages between maritime agencies, combating challenges like marine litter, and focusing on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The ministers also appreciated the presence of a liaison officer from Australia at the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region, based in Gurgaon.

The ministers used the opportunity to reinforce “their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region” and emphasized the need for the South China Sea Code of Conduct, currently under negotiations between China and ASEAN, to be consistent with international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ministers reiterated their commitment to strengthen their work through a number of trilateral and other minilateral platforms in the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad. Other areas that found prominent mention in the press statement include defense trade cooperation, including continued dialogue between the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of India and Defense Science and Technology Group of Australia, information sharing, and strengthening interoperability through augmented number of bilateral and multinational exercises.

Prime Ministers Meeting

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison met for a virtual summit in June 2020, at which the two sides elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The Australian foreign minister during a recent statement to the press said that the 2+2 dialogue is a direct result of the elevation of the relationship.
During their meeting, the joint statement noted, the four ministers reiterated “their commitment to fully implement the CSP based on mutual trust and understanding, common interests and shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further they highlighted “the importance of advancing their shared objective of an open, free, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India’s increasing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region through the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative and Australia’s Indo-Pacific approach and Pacific Step-Up.” The 2+2 dialogue will be held at least once in two years to maintain the traction in the relationship.

Modi and Morrison met agian, on 23 September, in Washington, a week after they spoke over phone and reviewed the rapid progress in the India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including through the ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue, and exchanged views on regional developments and the forthcoming Quad meeting.
It was the first meeting between the prime ministers of India and Australia since the AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) security partnership was unveiled, on 15 September, by US President Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Morrison.

Comments

A crucial factor in India-Australia bilateral relations that witnessed a quantum leap is in the area of defence. After the country pulled out from Malabar five-nation naval exercise in 2007, Australia was readmitted and took part in the first phase of the exercise hosted during August by the United States off the coast of Guam. This war-game exercise allows the Navies of India, Australia, Japan and the United States to demonstrate, coordination, synergy and inter-operability of the four countries on the high seas.

With India assiduously working on its Atmanirbhar plan and promoting defence manufacturing in the country, the move to further research in this strategic field through India’s Defence Research Development Organisation and Defence Science and Technology Group of Australia would allow both countries to explore new frontiers in critical technology amid India seeking access to source rare earth material from the country.

Given that both New Delhi and Canberra have had to bear the brunt of increasingly belligerent Chinese behavior, including the use of force against India and trade coercion against Australia, these fast-paced strategic developments are understandable.
Australia-India relations have been improving for several years, but relations have seen a dramatic shift in the last couple of years, evident in the number of high-level engagements between the two sides. With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years. After many years, Australia was finally invited back to the Malabar naval exercise last year. For Australia, even as the U.S. security alliance remains central to their security, Canberra has been expanding its Asian partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years.
India, for its part, long avoided taking sides between the U.S. and China. While Sino-Indian relations have been in trouble for several years, the Galwan confrontation in 2020 brought the relationship to an all-time low. The Indian response to Galwan has been very different and much tougher, partly because 20 Indian soldiers died. As a result, India has decided to pursue closer strategic engagements with a number of like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially Australia.

Australia has also seen more than its fair share of bullying behavior from China, much of it because Morrison asked for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic in April 2020. Since then, China has engaged in severe economic and trade coercive practices against Australia, targeting everything from barley, beef, seafood, wheat, and wine to coal, cotton, copper, education, and timber.

Augmented Australia-India ties within bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and other minilaterals and multilateral institutions are a reality that is unlikely to slow down for the foreseeable future. The convergence of strategic interests in ensuring an Indo-Pacific order that is free of hegemonic and muscular policies will bind India and Australia in the coming years. The two will likely also expand their partnership both in pursuing strategic partnerships and thematic ones like supply chain resilience initiative.

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The US, Britain and Australia announced, on 15 September, a new trilateral security alliance for the Indo-Pacific to take on the threats of the 21st century and allow for greater sharing of defence capabilities, including help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, in a bid to counter China’s growing power in the strategically vital region.

Unveiling the ambitious security initiative, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison in a joint statement said their move will promote stability in the Indo-Pacific and support of their shared values and interests. “We are taking another historic step to deepen and formalise cooperation among all three of our nations because we all recognise the imperative of ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific over the long term,” President Biden said at the virtual launch of the new alliance known as AUKUS on Wednesday.

Biden said that the three countries will update and enhance their shared ability to take on the threats of the 21st century, just as they did in the 20th century, together. The United States, Australia, United Kingdom have long been faithful and capable partners and we’re even closer today. Today, we’re taking another historic step to deepen and formalise cooperation among all three of our nations because we all recognise the imperative of ensuring peace stability in the Indo-Pacific over the long term, he said.

Interestingly, the announcement of AUKUS came a week before a meeting of Quad leaders to be hosted by US President Biden in Washington on September 24. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of Australia Morrison and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

What is AUKUS

Under the AUKUS alliance, the three nations have agreed to enhance the development of joint capabilities and technology sharing, foster deeper integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains.
Under the first major initiative of AUKUS, Australia would build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the US and the UK, a capability aimed at promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

France Indignant

The announcement is significant not only because it involves the transfer of nuclear submarine technology to Australia but also since it implies the cancellation of an ongoing U.S.$90 billion project by France to manufacture conventional submarines for Australia.

Paris recalled its Ambassador to Australia, accusing Canberra of “backstabbing” and betrayal. When Australian and French ministers met less than a month earlier, French officials said there had been no talk of cancelling the deal. The two sides had even issued a joint statement indicating the continuation of the submarine programme. But Australia, it seemed, was secretly negotiating a deal with the U.K. and the U.S. Beyond Canberra’s unceremonious termination of the submarine contract, France was angry because it was kept in the dark about the discussions surrounding the new pact.

Chinese Reactions

In Beijing, the Chinese foreign ministry sharply criticised the trilateral military partnership, saying it would closely monitor the pact that will gravely undermine regional stability and aggravate the arms race and hurt international non-proliferation efforts.
Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on 29 September, in a phone conversation with the Malaysian and Bruneian foreign ministers, said the AUKUS move was likely to bring about five dangers to the region.

• Firstly, it will cause risks of nuclear proliferation. While the United States has unilaterally imposed sanctions on countries developing enriched uranium technology, it gave Australia a green light, which will inevitably give rise to more risks of proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, impacting the global non-proliferation regime.
• Secondly, it will induce a new round of arms race. Australia’s move will break the strategic balance in the region. It could not be ruled out that other countries would follow the move to wage a new round of arms race, even crossing the nuclear threshold.
• Thirdly, it will undermine regional prosperity and stability. AUKUS will surely to create tensions, casting a shadow on the region’s peace, stability, and development.
• Fourthly, it will sabotage the building of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.
• Fifthly, it will revive the Cold War mentality. AUKUS, in line with the Quad, complies with and serves the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, seeking to overturn the current status quo and start all over again, with an eye to provoking rivalry among blocs in the region and ushering in geopolitical zero-sum games.

What does AUKUS mean for India

Australia will receive top quality nuclear submarine technology from the U.S. and the U.K., strengthening China deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But if Australia and the U.S. could deceive France, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, what is to prevent them from doing the same with lesser allies?

The Indian Navy presently dominates the Eastern Indian Ocean, but its conventional underwater capability has been shrinking. An Indian plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines has elicited no offer of help from the U.S. that does not share its prized nuclear submarine technology with even its closest allies; all except Australia, evidently.

Washington’s willingness to help Canberra build SSNs raises the possibility that Australia could deploy nuclear submarines in the Eastern Indian Ocean well before India positions its own. The Indian Navy is not building submarines at a pacecommensurate with needs. Notwithstanding shared concerns over China’s growing submarine presence in the region, however, Indian officials are not comfortable with the prospect of friendly SSNs in India’s backyard.

India is being careful in its official response to AUKUS. The bottom line for New Delhi is that it cannot be seen to be taking sides in a feud among friends – France, U.S., U.K. and Australia – some of India’s closest partners.

Officially, foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla distanced Quad — “a plurilateral grouping of four countries that have a shared vision of their attributes and values” — from AUKUS — “a security alliance between three countries”, adding that “from our perspective, it is neither relevant to the Quad nor will it have any impact on its functioning”.

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The objective of AUKUS is “to deal with rapidly evolving threats”, and it envisages closer intelligence-sharing and cooperation in areas of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber-warfare and quantum computing. The US, UK and Australia are already part of the Five Eyes intelligence network, together with Canada and New Zealand. And so, up to this point, AUKUS would have been seen as an attempt to shore up an Anglo-Saxon grouping in the Indo-Pacific, attracting dismissive commentary from Beijing and mild speculation about how AUKUS would engage with Quad. However, it is the abrupt cancelling of the submarine deal that has shocked and angered France.

There was no denying a sense of wariness in New Delhi. It did not help that AUKUS took the focus away from the Quad. The agreement suggested preferential treatment on the part of Washington for a close Anglo-alliance partner. That led some in Delhi to wonder why the U.S. should make an allowance for one Quad partner and not another.
The Indian Navy’s indigenous SSN programme requires a nuclear reactor more powerful than the one installed in the Arihant (a non war-fighting platform). Some in India were hopeful that the U.S. would consider providing the Indian Navy with nuclear submarine propulsion technology.

New Delhi must seize the opportunity to push France to transfer its nuclear propulsion technology. Despite the less than satisfactory experience with the Project 75 ‘Scorpene’ class submarine programme, India, some say, should accept French assistance with building an SSN reactor.

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Given this aggressive behavior, US-China competition has escalated sharply. In December 2017, the US published its latest “National Security Strategy,” and, in 2018, Vice President Mike Pence detailed the administration’s China policy at a speech at the Hudson Institute, both of which indicated a strong US stance toward China. In addition to imposing tariffs, the US has excluded Chinese products and 5G technologies from government procurement in a so-called “high tech war.” To deal with China’s challenging attitude during the COVID-19 crisis, the US has already deployed three aircraft carrier battle groups, as well as B-1 and B-2 strategic bombers, in the Indo-Pacific region.

Against this backdrop, it is important to examine the role of Japan, India, and Australia with regard to the US-China competition. To understand their role, this article first analyzes features of current rivalry between China and the US.

I. Characteristics of the China-US Relationship

Three features of China’s territorial expansion

China’s recent territorial expansion has three features. The first involves the flouting of international law. In the South China Sea, China has expanded its claim and ignored the verdict of an international court. On Senkaku Island of Japan, China is asserting historical rights to an island it has not claimed before 1971. In the case of the India-China border, where 20 Indian soldiers sacrificed their lives in a clash with China this year, the Tibetan exile government stated that these areas belong to India. China has ignored current international law and expanded its territorial claim in all three areas.

ALSO READ: Implications of Japan’s Policies in the Indo-Pacific

The second feature of China’s territorial expansion is timing. It has exploited the situation whenever it finds a “power vacuum.” For example, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands just after France withdrew in the 1950s, and expanded its presence to all of the Paracel Islands after the US withdrew from South Vietnam in 1970s. China occupied six features of the Spratly Islands after the Soviet Union decreased its military presence in Vietnam in the 1980s. And China laid claim to Mischief Reef after US troops withdrew from the Philippines in the 1990s. Recently, China has tried to expand its territorial claims not only in the South China Sea, but also in the East China Sea and the India-China border. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, from 2010-19 China increased its military expenditure by 85 per cent, compared with India’s 37 per cent and Japan’s 2 percent. There is a strong possibility that China is doing so because it believes there is a power vacuum in these areas.

A third feature of China’s territorial expansion is its insistence on excluding outsiders. In issues surrounding the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the India-China border, China has blamed the involvement of non-regional powers as contributing to the problem. China wants to solve these territorial issues on a bilateral basis without the involvement of the US or of the international community.

Analysis of the US stance toward China

To deal with China’s provocation, the US has chosen a tough stance toward China that has two aspects. Militarily, the US has tried to maintain a balance, but economically, the US has tried to decouple from China and make it poorer.

In June 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explained why the number of US troops in Germany has been reduced, and why US troops had also withdrawn from Syria and Afghanistan. He said, “This is going to dictate that in certain places there will be fewer American resources. There’ll be other places-I just talked about the threat from the Chinese Communist Party, so now threats to India, threats to Vietnam, threats to Malaysia, Indonesia, South China Sea challenges, the Philippines. We’re going to make sure we’re postured appropriately to counter the PLA. We think that’s the challenge of our time, and we’re going to make sure we have resources in place to do that.” To counter China’s territorial expansion, the US has increased its military deployment to maintain balance in this region. Because China tends to expand its territorial claim when it finds a power vacuum, maintaining a military counterbalance is the proper way for the US to respond.

Economically, the US strategy is more aggressive. Both its trade war and its high tech war have excluded China’s participation in the US economy. As a result, US experts have started to use the word “decoupling” when referring to relations with China, and the US president himself has indicated the possibility. Because China’s growth and expansionist tactics include rapid military modernization and loaning money to other countries for infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is dependent on a healthy budget. It is, therefore, a wise strategy for the US to focus on reducing China’s wealth.

ALSO READ: Japan deepens intelligence sharing with India, Australia and UK

Indeed, there is a strong possibility that such tough policies toward China will remain long-term policy for three reasons. First, the US became a superpower because it defeated all rivals including Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union and during these conflicts it developed long-term policies that prepared for all scenarios, even unlikely ones. For example, between the two World Wars, the US had an “Orange Plan” to defeat Japan and implemented it during WW II. Similarly, it had a “Black Plan” against Germany. But when these plans were declassified in 1974, the world was surprised to learn that there was also a “Red Plan” to defeat Britain and Canada. (Canada was very upset.) Because the US designated China as a “competitor” in the “National Security Strategy” in 2017, one can assume that it has a contingency plan to defeat China as part of its long-term policy.

Secondly, the tough stance toward China is not the product of the Trump administration alone. For example, the high tech war, which excluded products of Huawei and ZTE, started when the “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE” was published in 2012, during Barack Obama’s presidency. Thus, Republicans and Democrats share many similar goal toward China.

Third, now is the proper time for the US to act if it wants to win the competition with China. The “National Security Strategy” was published in December 2017. At that time, according to the “Military Balance 2018,” published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the US defence budget was $603 billion compared with China’s $150 billion. However, from an economic perspective, according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for 2018, US GDP was at $19.39 trillion, compared with China’s $12.24 trillion.  Compared with the defense budget, the economic gap is narrow. And technologically, according to UNESCO Institute for Statistics figures published in 2018, the US invested $476 billion for research and development and China invested $370 billion. That gap is very small. If the US acts now, it will have the advantage over China. But without such efforts, there is a possibility that US advantages will decline one by one.

II. The Role of Japan, India, and Australia

Three policies toward China

What should Japan, India, and Australia do in dealing with China? In short, they should do the opposite of what China wants. First, if China ignores current international law, other countries should uphold the law strongly and refuse China’s new territorial claims. For example, the US and Australia have already refused China’s territorial claim in the South

China Sea. Second, Japan, India, and Australia need to fill the power vacuum militarily by increasing their military expenditures. Infrastructure cooperation to build strategic road projects is also useful. And these countries should also support countries, including Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, that face Chinese intimidation. Third, Japan, India, and Australia should continue to enhance security cooperation with the US and other like-minded countries.

III. How should Japan, India, and Australia cooperate with the US?

Currently, the US is requesting cooperation from Japan, India and Australia, both militarily and economically. Militarily, the US wants these partner countries to share the security burden by increasing their defense budgets, participating in military activities and importing American weapons. Economically, the US is requesting that Japan, India, and Australia adopt the same tough policies against China. For example, when the US banned the products of Huawei and ZTE, it asked US allies and friendly countries to do the same. Japan and Australia have already banned such products. And India has banned more than 100 apps made in China, including TikTok. The US is also requesting that its allies impose sanctions against government officials and companies that trade with China. For example, the US asked Canada to arrest executives of Huawei.

Japan, India and Australia should not think of this as a burden but a chance. To deal with China, these countries need to fill the regional power vacuum. The US request for increased military spending is not only in the US interest, but in the interest of Japan, India and Australia. Recently, Japan decided to purchase limited offensive capabilities, including small aircraft carriers, F-35 stealth fighter jets and stand-off weapons. India is importing airlift equipment such as heavy and middle transport planes, heavy transport helicopters and air-liftable howitzers from the US in order to establish air-mobile offensive capability against China. Australia also recently published its plan to possess long-range strike capabilities. These offensive capabilities will give these countries more flexible choices when they need to deal with China.

Economic requests are more complicated because China is the first or second-rated trading partner for Japan, India and Australia. However, if Japan, India and Australia depend too heavily on trade with China, the economies of these countries will be like passengers of a sinking ship. Therefore, decoupling or risk diversifying is necessary. Indeed, Japan has already begun to do so. Because Japan has relocated its factories from China to Southeast Asia and South Asia, the number of Japanese citizens living in China has decreased from 150,399 in 2012 to 120,076 in 2018. At the same time, the number of Japanese living in the US has increased from 410,973 in 2012 to 446,925 in 2018. In addition, Japan earmarked $2.2 billion of its record economic stimulus package to help local manufacturers shift production out of China in April 2020. That same month, India adopted a new rule which requires prior government approval on foreign direct investment from the countries that share a land border with it, to deter opportunistic acquisitions.

China’s aggressive territorial expansion spurred the US to take a tough stance toward it. And US allies like Japan, India and Australia need to reevaluate their role. The security situation will demand that these three countries make drastic changes. This will also give them an opportunity to cooperate more deeply with the US and to form a new partnership. Now is the time for the “Quad” to do so.

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Amid growing mil-itary tensions in East Asia and in other parts of the Indo-Pacific, Japan has made sound and steady development with India at an unprecedented pace over the past half a decade that involves a wide and multifaceted areas of cooperation. Notably, in the security domain, the initiation of the minister-level “2 plus 2” dialogue in November 2019 has facilitated the development of the critically important partnership and contributed to the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in early September 2020. The ACSA is expected to enhance interoperability between the defense forces of the two countries, enabling them to share supplies, such as food and fuel and reciprocally provide communications and transportation services during joint drills and rescue operations in case of disasters.

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Equally important, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and has, in addition, taken on a more active international role in line with its region-wide initiative – the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. The FOIP is expected to reinforce the alliance as well as strengthen Tokyo’s international commitment to promote fundamental principles, strengthen regional connectivity and ensure peace and stability in the region. In July 2020, the Ministry of Defense of Japan refined the Vientiane Vision-related initiatives of 2016 and 2019 and released a new document, Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision: Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach, which stresses the need to enhance its defense cooperation and exchanges with countries not only in Southeast Asia, but also in South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Tokyo has specifically listed India, along with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK and France, with which Japan would further strengthen its partnership in harmony with the FOIP vision.

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Yet, the India-Japan security cooperation is not without challenges. The first issue is related to the new U.S. defence posture – the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) – outlined in the summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The DFE is expected to ensure that the U.S. forces would be “strategically predictable” in demonstrating the U.S. commitment to deterring aggression against its allies and partners, and, at the same time, be “operationally unpredictable” forcing the opponents such as China and Russia to “fear when, where and how the U.S. forces might appear rather than being able to anticipate when, where and how they will perform.” Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has officially shifted its primary security priorities from tackling the prolonged international terrorism to engaging in the various types of challenges in the Indo-Pacific notably posed by China, as highlighted in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 NDS. This is an encouraging move for both India and Japan as it implies that the core of the U.S. global military posture will now shift to the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is not yet clear how the U.S. forces will be strengthened in the Indo-Pacific. Issues include, for example, the extent and locations which the level of troops would be expanded as well as the likelihood of the U.S. forces maintaining its current permanent forces or shifting them to rotational forces. Moreover, the operational unpredictability element of the DFE may in fact raise doubts about the reliability or the U.S. commitment to and its presence in the Indo-Pacific. As a practical matter, the positions of the U.S. forces will move away from the region with the DFE as demonstrated by the movement of the U.S. bombers in Guam to mainland U.S. in April 2020. The movement has been carried out to allow the U.S. bombers to have more operational flexibility as it is now easier for the bombers to operate in other parts of the world by taking off from mainland U.S. The move also enables the U.S bombers to stand out of range of foreign missiles such as China’s DF-26, the Guam Killer, which has an operational range of 4,000km. Similarly, there may also be radical changes to how and where the U.S. aircraft carriers would be deployed in the future, with a possible shift in their operational cycles as well as their power projection capabilities. Given the growing strategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific, which has become more evident with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to coordinate deeply with Washington on the presence of the U.S. forces and ensure that the U.S. military commitment to the region remains intact. At the same time, the two countries would also need to ensure that the DFE does not send misleading signals that a power vacuum has emerged to the surrounding countries including China and Russia.

Security Orientation

Second is the issue related to how both New Delhi and Tokyo would deal with a possible pressure from Washington to transform their respective development-driven FOIP into highly security-oriented initiatives. To be sure, India and Japan’s FOIP are not identical. Tokyo’s FOIP primarily aims to strengthen regional connectivity via quality infrastructure development. Admittedly, Tokyo has evolved its FOIP into a more comprehensive initiative by strengthening the linkage between the development and security elements of the FOIP in light of the recent changes in the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, but has been cautious not to transform it into a security-oriented initiative. India’s FOIP, on the other hand, is purely an economic-oriented initiative, and does not include any security element. While both India and Japan’s FOIP are not security-oriented, New Delhi and Tokyo may be forced in not-so-distant future to transform their respective Indo-Pacific initiatives into a more security-oriented one, similar to that adopted by the U.S. given the increasing U.S.-China strategic competition. However, such a transformation would most likely affect the level of support in a negative way towards their respective initiatives especially from the AEAN countries which do not want to take sides with either of the U.S. or China. Moreover, transformation could force the ASEAN countries to distance themselves from India and Tokyo’s FOIP or even worse to openly oppose to their respective initiatives, fearing the danger of losing the ASEAN centrality. New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to reaffirm that their respective development-driven FOIP initiatives remain inclusive and non-security-oriented and that the ASEAN centrality remains at the core of their FOIP to maintain their legitimacy.

Role of Quad

Closely related, some observers have speculated that the foundation of Tokyo’s FOIP rests with the Quad given ex-Prime Minister Abe’s preference for a quadrilateral security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., Australia and India as highlighted with his “Democratic Security Diamond” concept declared in 2012. The four countries resumed the Quad consultations in November 2017 after a 10-year interruption and held a ministerial-level meeting in November 2019. More recently, in early October 2020, the ministers of the Quad countries met in Tokyo with an aim to establish, promote and secure the free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific principles. Importantly, the four countries have been cautious not to develop the Quad into an explicit military initiative or a formal institutional structure that would contain/target countries such as China. They have also intentionally avoided delivering a joint statement. Given the increasing distrust in all four countries due to China’s continuous military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as well as Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong and its initial response to the COVID pandemic, however, the four countries would need to work together in developing a mechanism such as the Quad to offset gains which Beijing could take advantage from enhancing unilateral changes to the status quo from its development and security efforts. Yet, the ASEAN leaders have expressed concerns that the Quad may supplant ASEAN’s role in the region. New Delhi and Tokyo, along with Washington and Canberra, therefore, would need to exercise discretion over the Quad, and ensure that the developments of the Quad would not endanger the principle of ASEAN centrality. Furthermore, India and Japan need to ensure that the Quad would not be embedded with their respective FOIP. Simply put, New Delhi and Tokyo’s development-driven FOIP initiatives need to be pursued separately from the Quad.

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The third issue is related to how India and Japan would address China’s, and to a lesser degree Russia’s, continuous military assertiveness in the region given the differences in India and Japan’s strategic and geographic priorities. For Japan, the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the central pillar in Tokyo’s foreign and security policies, and its primary geographic priorities rest in the East China Sea and subsequently the South China Sea in light of the imminent challenges posed by China and North Korea. Undoubtedly, the Indian Ocean is also key to Japan’s security with the growing significance of maintaining the sea lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific, but it is of secondary importance compared to the two seas listed above. In the case of India, New Delhi has recently expanded and strengthened its partnerships with the regional countries including Japan and the U.S. but maintaining the strategic autonomy remains the foundation of its foreign and security policies. Meanwhile, India’s main areas of geographic interest remain along the territorial borders with Pakistan and China, as well as the Bay of Bengal in the eastern Indian Ocean. That is to say, neither the East China Sea nor the South China Sea is of primary importance for India compared to the regions noted above, although New Delhi has recently expressed, according to the Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana, its intent to carry out navigation activities in the South China Sea in line with its efforts to expand the strategic partnership with Manila.

Importantly, the differences in strategic and geographic priorities between New Delhi and Tokyo, as well as their limited power projection capabilities, affect the level of expectations towards their respective partners. Specifically, it would be unrealistic for New Delhi to expect that Tokyo could give sufficient military assistance along the Line of Control or the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, it would be unpractical for Tokyo to expect that New Delhi could give ample military support in the East and South China Seas. Given such circumstances, it would be important for both Tokyo and New Delhi to contemplate measures other than giving direct military assistance to their respective partners. For example, giving full, timely and firm diplomatic support for the security stance and measures of their respective partners by delivering both official and non-official statements, along with the strengthening of ties between their respective FOIP initiatives, would be beneficial. In addition, holding countries responsible for their authoritative and threatening behaviors at multilateral settings such as the United Nations and the ADMM-plus will also be of great value for further developing the India-Japan partnership.

Military Cooperation

The fourth issue is related to whether to allow foreign military forces including Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) to use the Indian military facilities such as the strategically significant Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). In recent years, Chinese military, which once focused on territorial defense, has expanded its geographic focus of attention as far beyond China’s borders as possible. According to the 2019 report to the U.S. Congress, Chinese state-owned companies either owned equity in or had an operating lease at approximately 70 ports outside China, which could be converted into duo-use military functions or become strategic strongpoints. India’s concerns over China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the Ladakh stand-off with Beijing have spurred New Delhi’s interest in strengthening its military presence at the ANIs. In its relationship with Tokyo, New Delhi examined a joint project to upgrade infrastructure in the ANIs earlier in 2016. It has also been reported that the two countries discussed the possibility of building a region-wide undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) at the ANIs to improve India’s underwater domain awareness. Furthermore, the newly signed ACSA would, with prior approval from New Delhi, enable the SDF to overcome, albeit partially, the lack of power projection capabilities with the use of the ANIs as well as the U.S. base in Diego Garcia for maritime and air operations. However, opening up the islands to foreign militaries including the SDF could increase security concerns among countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, the militarization of ANIs including its use by foreign militaries could eventually lead to a reckless arms race in the littorals, spurring Beijing to take countermeasures such as militarizing key maritime outposts of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, Bangladesh’s Chittagong as well as Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu. Moreover, there are also ecological concerns associated with the militarization of the islands. New Delhi, therefore, needs to give full consideration of both the short-term and the mid-to-long term implications in allowing the use of its military facilities by foreign militaries including the SDF.

The final issue is related to how India and Japan would cope with China’s geo-strategically ambitious economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Given the strategic and economic implications, Tokyo has been more accommodating towards the BRI than New Delhi. Despite the difference, it would be counterproductive for both India and Japan to counter the BRI since the two countries, as noted above, would most likely lose support for their FOIP from the regional countries including the ASEAN member states. Therefore, India and Japan should instead develop alternatives so that the recipient countries would not become overly dependent on and/or exploited by the BRI. Importantly, the alternatives need to complement rather than compete with the BRI, given the vast development needs in the Indo-Pacific. It has been reported that the level of infrastructure demand is higher than the capacities which the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are capable of covering. Participation of India to initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network could be a good case in point. The network was announced by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in November 2019 with an aim to promote sustainable, high-quality, private sector-led infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the increasing complexity and uncertainty of the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership with New Delhi. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the relations are still at an early stage and have yet to become institutionalized. There are also many uncertainties regarding the U.S.-China strategic competition. Furthermore, domestic politics in both Japan and India, as well as in the U.S., including the change in leadership may affect their foreign and security priorities, resulting in a change of pace, if not the overall direction, in developing the India-Japan partnership. Tokyo and New Delhi, therefore, need to take due consideration to the key issues listed above, and develop their relations steadily over time rather than expeditiously rushing toward establishing an alliance-like partnership.

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So far, one or the other of the Quad countries has been reluctant to ruffle Beijing’s feathers at different times. After participating in joint exercises with India in 2007, Australia pulled away, wary of evoking Chinese displeasure. India, too, had been reticent about participating in a grouping directed against China. China’s belligerence in recent months has forced the Quad countries to shed such inhibitions.

The coronavirus, concerns over Chinese government actions in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, military incursions into the South China Sea and political interference have all given an impetus to strengthen the Quad.

The Quad

In response to China’s aggressive policies, the Quad – a strategic coalition of the Indo-Pacific region’s leading democracies (US, India, Japan and Australia) – is solidifying its alliance. Following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four countries in Tokyo, on 6 October, the four countries are now actively working toward establishing a new multilateral security structure for the region.

There are efforts to develop a close security partnership founded on shared values and interests, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free markets, and free trade.

China represents a growing challenge to all these principles.

European Support

The Quad’s focus also extends to ensuring a stable balance of power within a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While all of the Quad partners agree in this principle, Chinese expansionism that has accelerated their recent actions. Even United Kingdom, France and Germany view it (rules-based Indo-Pacific) as essential for international peace and security.

France has appointed an ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, after unveiling a new strategy affirming the region’s importance in any stable, law-based, multipolar global order.

In September 2020, Germany, Europe’s largest economy, which has long enjoyed close ties with Beijing, released its first Indo-Pacific strategy focused on increasing diplomatic pressure on China.

Germany has sought to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy for the European Union. It has released policy guidelines, which call for measures to ensure that rules prevail over a “might-makes-right” approach in the Indo-Pacific. Germany currently holds the European Council presidency.

France

Apart from the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan in addition to the US, India has been exercising regularly with France. The last one was conducted at French Reunion Island in the expanded Indian Ocean waters. India has discussed conducting similar exercises with the UK and Russia.

Giving up its reluctance to offend China which whom it has business interests, French president Emmanuel Macron has appointed Christophe Penot, his ambassador to Australia, to the new post of ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, realising the danger of Chinese hegemony.

During Macron’s visit to India in March 2018, addressing a French gathering in New Delhi, he reminded his countrymen: “France is a power of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; we are present at Reunion, we are also there in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. And we are a maritime power, it is often forgotten but France is the second maritime power in the world. We have a strong navy, we have nuclear submarines equipped like few other powers in the world; a maritime surveillance capability through our own satellites and technologies; it is obvious we are a military and intelligence power ranking us among the first nations in the world.”

C. Raja Mohan and Darshana Baruah wrote for Carnagie India, in 20028,on Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership, thus: “As maritime security acquires greater salience in India’s foreign policy, New Delhi is increasingly looking to leverage its strategic partnerships, particularly with Paris. Although India and France have joined forces on a number of issues since 1998, regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has never risen to the top of the agenda. However, this may be about to change.”

New Multilateral Security Arrangement

The Quad was resurrected in late 2017, but in late-2019, it gained momentum, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level. It had been lying dormant for nine years.

Since the US, Japan and Australia are already tied by bilateral and trilateral security alliances among themselves, the future of the Quad hinges on India. India is also directly facing Chinese territorial aggression besides having a large border with it. This aggression has changed the strategic equation. With India having taken a confrontational position, the Quad is now more likely to shift from consultation and coordination to a strategic alliance for a new multilateral security arrangement for the region.

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The US has been working on getting India into a “soft alliance” devoid of any treaty obligations. On October 26-27, Pompeo and US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited New Delhi for the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts. The meeting concluded with India signing the last of the four foundational agreements, under which both countries are committed to providing reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities, securing military communications, and sharing geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors.

When India invited Australia to the “Malabar” naval war games in November 2020, with the US and Japan, the Chinese communist mouthpiece Global Times, said “it would signal that the Quad military alliance is officially formed.”

During a visit to Malaysia, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that Washington aimed to build an “Indo-Pacific NATO” through the Quad.

The Quad’s consolidation is evidence that the Xi regime’s aggressive policies have started to backfire. International views of China have reached new lows this year.

The Quad symbolises an emerging international effort to establish a check on Chinese power.

India’s Initiative

India took the lead in banning Chinese apps. It was India’s decision that had elevated the Quad dialogue to ministerial-level in 2019. India shed its reticence and decided to welcome Australia to the Malabar 2020 exercise.

India pulled out from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2019. China’s actions have since led to the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) involving India, Japan and Australia, focussed on key sectors such as semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and telecommunications.

US Role

The US has played a key role in the region’s stability and prosperity since Second World II. US military presence prevented Japan from re-arming itself. It has stopped China from risking military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait and kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula. But, China, which is the biggest beneficiary of the trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, does not see it that way.

The US position on the South China Sea, which is in alignment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal award of 2016, boosts the morale of disputants such as the Philippines, who are routinely bullied by China.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

China is maintaining a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region, under the cloak of anti-piracy deployments, with bases in Gwadar and Djibouti for penetrating South Asia, the Gulf region and littoral Africa.

Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI and as an “encirclement” strategy.

Comments

Would the US stand by India if its own ties with China improve? In the event of a war with China, others may not be willing to risk their own relations with Beijing to support India, other than with intelligence support. India’s security challenges are primarily continental. Quad countries may not be may not be able to deal with the kind of challenges that a border war with China entails.

The Quad holds potential for India in the economic and technological domains rather than its value in the military domain by way of building up an alternative global supply chain and reducing trade dependency on China. Tokyo is already seriously exploring such collaboration with India. Similarly, India could take this further with the US and Australia, rather than focus on the military dimension alone.

In the future, the Quad could gradually be elevated to the level of vice minister and minister.

There are no limits to the number of active and possibly participating friends that can be added to the Quad, in the Indian Ocean.

South Asia as a whole has ceased to be the ‘traditional sphere of Indian influence’, a title we may have to share with others.

From left to right, external affairs minister S Jaishankar, Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo pose for a picture before a four Indo-Pacific nations’ foreign ministers meeting at the minister’s office in Tokyo 2020.

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The Malabar exercise aims at interoperability with emphasis on humanitarian assistance, surface war manoeuvres, anti-submarines warfare, counter-terror operations and aerial surveillance. Classically, it is enhancing capabilities of operating jointly in an adverse scenario if the situation so demands.

The invitation by India went out to the Australian Navy two weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad countries held extensive talks in Tokyo, on 6 October, with a focus on enhancing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, a region that has witnessed increasing Chinese military assertiveness.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

In the Quad meeting, foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar stated, “We remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes.” Jaishankar also emphasized that Quad was aiming for ‘maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.’

In her reaction, Australian defence minister Linda Reynolds termed the participation of her country in the exercise a “milestone opportunity” and said it would showcase the “deep trust” between four major Indo-Pacific democracies and their shared will to work together on common security interests.

“High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia’s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Reynolds said.

Growing Ties

Defence and security ties between India and Australia have been on an upswing in the last few years. In June, India and Australia elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a landmark deal for reciprocal access to military bases for logistics support during an online summit between prime minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison. India has already inked mutual logistics support deal with the other two Quad members.

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) allows militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

In September, the navies of India and Australia carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.

The last time Australian naval ships joined Malabar was back in 2007, when it was a five-nation exercise involving India, US, Japan, Singapore and Australia. Until 2007, Malabar was an annual bilateral exercise with the US Navy that was launched in 1992.

Military Strategy

The military strengthening of the Quad raises the possibility of India countering a China offensive in the Himalayas by exercising its option of opening the maritime front. Opening the third front is not impossible since India’s geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean provides the potential to project a potent maritime threat. It involves a measure of risk and the call would have to be taken by the political leadership. Indian military strategy based on defending the land borders and launching an offensive in the maritime domain is only possible with the support of Quad nations acting in concert.

Australia-China Equation

China continues to be Australia’s largest trading partner and accounts for 32.6 per cent of its exports. Besides, China sources iron ore, coal and gas from Australia because of its geographical proximity. India was sceptical about Australia doing anything to jeopardise this mutually beneficial relationship and risk China hitting back.

India’s announcement of Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise was, thus, significant geo-politically because four of the biggest democracies with stakes in the region are collectively committed to preserving open waters and hold off China’s misadventures to monopolise them ruthlessly.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

When virus-hit Australia spearheaded a petition for a neutral, global investigation into Covid-19’s origins and China’s role in it, it was immediately hit by China, which imposed an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley and ban on beef imports. Ever since, Australia had been looking to find allies where it could diversify markets and find support. One of the results was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreed upon by prime minister Scott Morrison and prime minister Narendra Modi on 4 June 2020.

Quad Plus

The current Quad plus which includes South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam, though aimed at China, is more than just a consultative or possibly future military grouping or alliance. It also has an economic component which could benefit India, as all countries within the group seek decoupling from China.

The broad objectives of its participants are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture.

Comments

The move to invite Australia to participate in the Malabar 2020 naval exercises marked an important inflexion point not only in India’s bilateral relations with Australia but also in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.  The naval exercise imparted a military dimension to the Quad.

The main reason behind Delhi’s hesitation so far was the concern that including Australia into the Quad might offend China’s political sensitivity. Clearly, India’s calculus on China has changed as China’s undermined India’s territorial integrity and regional and multilateral interests. The aggression in Ladakh was possibly the last straw.

Administratively, rather than geopolitically, having separate exercises with each of the partners was not logical. It was more sensible to combine them into one. But the multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal produced vehement protests from China, which dubbed it as an “Asian NATO”.

Rather than bringing the Quad partners into India’s territorial battles against Beijing, the strengthening of the Quad is more about expanding India’s bilateral security ties with Australia, whose potential is immense.

India would not desire to be sucked into operations in the South China Sea unless they are of specific concern to India. India would also be careful not to allow its diplomatic ties with Russia, Iran and other nations, where the US has differing perceptions, to deteriorate by joining a US-led alliance.

The full-fledged military alliance gives an emboldened Quad the robustness to act together against Chinese assertiveness and debt-trap diplomacy. So far, only the US had directly dared to call out China. Over time, if mutual interests and concerns converge, the Quad could become what the US calls a NATO-like presence in Asia that could contain China’s expansionist designs. It could lead to the establishment of an economic coalition of sorts, with a Quad Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to reduce the dependence on China.

The Quad consolidation can make it difficult for Beijing to monitor the entire South China Sea, which it claims as its own.

The international order is evolving quickly, mainly due to a consensus amongst every major liberal democracy in the world, that China is a threat – to political systems and open societies, economic self-reliance, and a rules-based regime, particularly in the international seas. Chinese aggression against India makes it incumbent on New Delhi to explore and deepen every international alliance which can serve as a source of symbolic and substantive support, including in the maritime domain where China has obvious vulnerabilities.

One view is that cementing the Quad will alienate China further and make reconciliation difficult. India has realised that China tends to respect power and strength. Economic strength and partnerships such as the Quad can broaden India’s options with China.

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The first phase in the Bay of Bengal, from 3 to 6 November, involved conducting multiple complex drills including surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare operations, cross-deck flying, seamanship evolutions and weapon-firing. The second phase commenced from November 17 on the western front in the Arabian Sea.

ALSO READ: INDIA – U.S.: Indo-US Defence Cooperation Enters New Phase

Destroyer INS Ranvijay, frigate INS Shivalik, off-shore patrol vessel INS Sukanya, fleet support ship INS Shakti, submarine INS Sindhuraj, advanced jet trainer hawk, long-range maritime patrol aircraft P-8I and Dornier maritime patrol aircraft participated from the Indian Navy. Indigenously built submarine Khanderi and P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft of the Indian Navy will also showcase their capabilities during the exercise.

US Navy’s Strike Carrier Nimitz was accompanied by cruiser Princeton and destroyer Sterett in addition to P8A maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The Royal Australian Navy was represented by frigate Ballarat along with its integral helicopter. JMSDF ships also participated.

Phase 1

Phase-1 of MALABAR 2020 witnessed participation of Indian Navy units with United States Ship (USS) John S McCain, Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Ballarat with integral MH-60 helicopter, and Japan Maritime Self Defence Ship (JMSDF) Onami, with integral SH-60 helicopter. Indian Navy’s participation in this phase was led by Rear Admiral Sanjay Vatsayan, Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet and included destroyer Ranvijay, indigenous frigate Shivalik, Offshore Patrol Vessel Sukanya, Fleet Support Ship Shakti, submarine Sindhuraj, P8I and Dornier maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Advanced Jet Trainer Hawk.

Phase 2

During Phase 2 of Exercise, the four navies participated in joint operations centred on the Vikramaditya Carrier Battle Group of the Indian Navy and Nimitz Carrier Strike Group of the US Navy.

The two aircraft carriers, along with other ships, submarines and aircraft of the participating navies, engaged in high-intensity naval operations including cross-deck flying operations and advanced air defence exercises by MIG 29K fighters of Vikramaditya and F/A-18 fighters and E2C Hawkeye from Nimitz. US Navy’s Strike Carrier Nimitz was accompanied by cruiser Princeton and destroyer Sterett in addition to P8A maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

ALSO READ: India, United States and Japan: Strategic Convergence in the Indian Ocean

The Royal Australian Navy and JMSDF were represented by frigate Ballarat and destroyer Murasame respectively, along with their integral helicopters. Indian Navy’s participation in Phase 2 was led by Rear Admiral Krishna Swaminathan, Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet and included aircraft carrier Vikramaditya, indigenous destroyers Kolkata and Chennai, stealth frigate Talwar, Fleet Support Ship Deepak and the integral helicopters of these warships, indigenously built submarine Khanderi and P8I and IL-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

Eastern Fleet’s a destroyer, Frigate, Fleet Support Ship, Offshore Patrol Vessel each along with a submarine and aviation elements like P8i, helicopters and AJT Hawks participated during the Phase I, under the command of Rear Admiral Sanjay Vatsayan, the Eastern Fleet Commander. The Phase II saw, in addition, ‘Dual Carrier’ operations, advanced surface and anti-submarine warfare exercises, seamanship evolutions and weapon firings were also undertaken during both phases of Malabar 2020, demonstrating the synergy, coordination and interoperability between the four friendly navies.

The exercise took place in a congested environment with at least 70 foreign warships patrolling the area between the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s warships were not in the vicinity but were not too far off either – ostensibly conducting anti-pirate operations off the Gulf of Aden.

Chinese Protests

China had protested when these countries exercised together last time and termed it as an “anti-China” grouping. For long, the US had wanted India by its side as a counterweight to China. New Delhi balanced its ties among global heavyweights like Russia and more recently China. But the current border dispute between Indian and China has pushed New Delhi to make ‘Quad’ more meaningful.

A Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece The Global Times termed the Malabar naval drill as “an ill-intentioned attempt to corner China”. It said: “Such an ill-intentioned attempt to corner China is a hollow bluff, and China will not be disrupted by India’s irrationality or US interference.”

Comments

The 24th edition of Malabar highlights enhanced convergence of views amongst the four democracies on maritime issues, and showcased their commitment to an open, inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order.

The drill had substantive geopolitical implications not only in the current China-India face-off, but also in the larger Indo-Pacific context where China is flexing its muscle.

With the Indian Navy expected to commission indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant along with its second nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arighat, by next year, India will be able to project power from Malacca Straits to Gulf of Aden and beyond.

With the US, India, Australia and Japan communicating through deployed assets, liaison officers in each other’s naval commands and Indian Ocean Monitoring Centres, the Quad is definitely a force to reckon with in Indo-Pacific with situational awareness of both West Asia and Africa.

In a clear message for China to realise the strategic autonomy that India practices, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said, on 20 November, that New Delhi’s decisions are solely aimed at protecting its interests.

Other global powers such as France and Germany have also talked about their interest in the Indo-Pacific region to keep it free for open navigation.

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