The judgement inflamed these tensions, and led to protests and clashes between the Meitei community and the hill tribes, which resulted in at least 73 deaths. The Supreme Court stepped in and stayed the Manipur High Court’s judgement, but the violence continued.

The Meitei community has long sought to be included in the Scheduled Tribes list, which would give them a number of benefits, including reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. However, the hill tribes have opposed this move, arguing that the Meiteis are not a tribal community and that their inclusion in the list would unfairly disadvantage them.

Underlying Factors

There are a number of reasons for the strife in Manipur today. Among them are political tensions, economic problems, drug trafficking, religious conversion and inter-tribal rivalry.

Manipur is a state with a long history of political instability. There are a number of different ethnic groups in the state, and there is often tension between them. This tension has been exacerbated by the fact that Manipur is a border state, and it is often caught up in the conflicts between India and its neighbors.

Manipur is a poor state, and there is a lot of poverty and unemployment. This has led to frustration and anger among the people, which has been exploited by some groups who are trying to incite violence.

Manipur is a major transit point for drug trafficking from Southeast Asia to India. This has led to the growth of drug addiction and crime in the state, which has further exacerbated the tensions.

Religious conversion is one of the factors. Manipur is predominantly Hindu. A number of groups in Manipur are opposed to Christianity and conversions in the state. These include some Hindu groups who argue that Christianity is a foreign religion that is incompatible with Manipuri culture, Meitei Inpi a socio-cultural organization that represents the Meitei community, and the United Naga Council, which represents the Naga people, the majority ethnic group in the hill districts of Manipur.

Tribal Rivalries

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas in Manipur is a complex and long-standing one. Land disputes, political and cultural differences have contributed to the rivalry. In 1992-1994, there was a major outbreak of violence between Kukis and Nagas that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people. There have also been smaller-scale incidents of violence between the groups in recent years.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas all have competing claims to land in Manipur. This has led to conflict over land ownership and resources. They have different political goals. The Kukis want to create a separate Kuki state, the Meiteis want to maintain the status quo, and the Nagas want to create a greater Nagalim state that would include parts of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas have different cultures and customs. This has led to misunderstandings and mistrust between the groups.

The Kuki people are an ethnic group native to Northeast India and Burma (Myanmar). They are one of the largest ethnic groups in Manipur, accounting for about 20% of the state’s population. They are believed to have migrated to the area from the Chin Hills of Burma in the 16th or 17th century. In the 18th century, the Kuki people were forced to flee their homes in Burma due to persecution. They migrated to Manipur and other parts of Northeast India. In the 1990s, there was a major conflict between Kukis and Nagas in Manipur. The conflict was caused by land disputes and political differences. The Kuki people have long demanded a separate Kuki state.

The Kukis were originally animists, but they were converted to Christianity by British missionaries in the 19th century.

In 1901, the Kuki population in Manipur was 150,000, accounting for about 25% of the state’s population. By 1941 it was 250,000, (30%). In 2011, it was 600,000 (20%) and by 2022 it was estimated to be around 750,000 (22%).

The Meitei population has also grown in the last 100 years, but not as significantly as the Kuki population, due to lower birth rate, out-migration of Meiteis to other parts of India and Conversion to Hinduism and Islam.

The Meitei population has remained at about 60% of the state’s population.

Drugs Trade

The cultivation of poppy is illegal in India, but poppy plant is a major source of income for many people in Manipur. The poppy plant is a key ingredient in the production of heroin. The drug trade in Manipur is controlled by a number of criminal gangs and mafias. These gangs are often armed and violent.

The drug trade has a number of negative impacts on the Manipur society. It has led to an increase in crime in Manipur and degradation of the social fabric in Manipur because drug addiction can lead to family breakdown, unemployment, and poverty.

Kuki militant groups, Rohingya refugees and Manipuri gangs are involved in the drug trade. Kuki militants are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who offer them money or weapons in exchange for their involvement. Rohingya refugees are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who take advantage of their vulnerability through threat of deportation. Manipuri gangs are often involved in the cultivation and production of poppy, as well as the trafficking of heroin.

The Manipur government has taken a number of steps to stop poppy cultivation and limit the drug trade in Manipur. These include law enforcement, social programmes and economic development.

In 2019, the Manipur Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB) department reported that 963 drug traffickers, including 768 men and 195 women, were detained under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. Law enforcement agencies have also destroyed large swathes of poppy cultivation. In 2020 and February 2021, law enforcement agencies destroyed 1,420 acres of poppy plantation.

In 2019, the Manipur government reported that the area under poppy cultivation had decreased by 20% compared to the previous year. However, the drug trade remains a serious problem in Manipur.

In 2021, the Manipur government rewarded total cash of Rs 10 lakh to a village in Ukhrul district for voluntarily destroying poppy plants grown in the village. In 2022, the Manipur government launched a “War on Drugs” campaign, which aims to destroy poppy cultivation and bring drug traffickers to justice. As of March 2023, the Manipur government has arrested over 2,500 people for drug-related offenses and has destroyed over 15,496 acres of poppy cultivation.

Religious Conversions

Manipur has a history of missionaries working for conversions since 1900. The first missionaries to arrive in Manipur were from the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society (ABFMS), who began their work in the state in 1894. The ABFMS missionaries were initially focused on providing education and medical care to the people of Manipur, but they soon began to evangelize as well.

In the early 1900s, the ABFMS missionaries were joined by missionaries from other Christian denominations, including the Church of England, the Salvation Army, and the Presbyterian Church. These missionaries also focused on education and medical care, but they were also more aggressive in their evangelism efforts.

As a result of the work of these missionaries, the number of Christians in Manipur grew steadily in the early 20th century. By the 1950s, Christians made up about 20% of the population of Manipur.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of conversions to Christianity in Manipur accelerated. This was due in part to the work of indigenous Christian leaders, who began to organize their own evangelistic campaigns. It was also due to the fact that the Indian government began to provide financial support to Christian missionary organizations.

In the 1970s, only about 30% of the population of Manipur was Christian. However, by 2011, this number had risen to 45%. This growth has been particularly rapid among the Meitei community, who are the majority ethnic group in Manipur.

The perceived threat that Christianity poses to the traditional culture and values of Manipur, has come to the fore in Manipur recently. Some people have accused missionaries of using coercion and financial inducement to convert people to Christianity, and this has led to anger and resentment among some Hindu groups.

In 2014, the Manipur government passed a law that made it illegal to convert people by force or inducement. However, the law has been criticized by some for being too vague and for not doing enough to protect religious freedom.

Peace Measures

The central government and the state government has taken a number of steps to bring normalcy in Manipur in the last two months. These include deploying additional security forces to help restore law and order, initiating dialogue with the Kuki and Meitei communities, providing relief to the affected people and launching a peace campaign

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There is a need for greater understanding and dialogue between the different religious communities in the state, in order to find a way to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The drug trade in Manipur is a complex issue with no easy solutions. The drug trade has also damaged the social fabric of the state and has made it more difficult to address other problems, such as the conflict between Kuki and Naga groups.

In order to address the problem, it is important to address the root causes of the involvement of these groups, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity.

It is important to take a comprehensive approach that includes law enforcement, social programs, and economic development. Law enforcement needs to be strengthened to crack down on the drug trade and to bring traffickers to justice. Social programs need to be implemented to help people who are addicted to drugs and to prevent people from becoming addicted in the first place. Economic development needs to be promoted to create jobs and opportunities for people, so that they do not feel the need to turn to crime or the drug trade to make a living.

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas is a serious problem that has had a negative impact on the state of Manipur. It has led to displacement, loss of life, and a general atmosphere of fear and mistrust. There is no easy solution to the rivalry, but it is important for the different groups to find ways to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The growing Kuki population has been a source of tension in Manipur. Some Meiteis have expressed concerns about the Kuki population growth, and there have been some incidents of violence between the two groups. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of Kukis and Meiteis live peacefully together.

The Indian government and the Manipur government have made some progress in bringing normalcy to Manipur. However, the situation remains tense, and there is a risk that violence could break out again. It is important for the two governments to continue their efforts to resolve the underlying tensions between the Kuki and Meitei communities.

The post Underlying Causes of the Strife in Manipur appeared first on IMR.

The clashes began on May 3, 2023, after a Manipur High Court verdict directed the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status. The tribal communities, who are already classified as Scheduled Tribes, protested the Meitei demand, arguing that it would give them an unfair advantage.

The violence quickly escalated, with both sides resorted to arson, looting, and violence. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police were deployed to restore order, but the clashes continued.

The violence has had a devastating impact on Manipur. The economy has been crippled, and schools and businesses have been forced to close. Thousands of people have been displaced from their homes, and many have lost their livelihoods.

The central government called for an end to the violence, and the Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities. However, sporadic incidents of violence continued.

Historical Causes for Enmity

The enmity between the Meitei and Kuki people in Manipur has a long and complex history. There are a number of factors that have contributed to the conflict, including:

Land and resource disputes. The Meitei people are the majority ethnic group in Manipur, and they have traditionally controlled the most fertile land and other resources. The Kuki people are a tribal group, and they have often been displaced from their traditional lands by the Meitei. This has led to resentment and conflict between the two groups.

Political and economic marginalization. The Kuki people have often felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Cultural differences. The Meitei and Kuki people have different cultures and customs. This has sometimes led to misunderstandings and conflict between the two groups. For example, the Meitei people are Hindu, while the Kuki people are mostly Christian. This has led to clashes over religious issues.

Historical grievances. The Meitei and Kuki people have a history of conflict, dating back to the 19th century. In 1917, the Kuki people rebelled against the British Raj, which was then ruling Manipur. The rebellion was suppressed, but it left a legacy of bitterness between the two groups.

Recent Events

Some more recent events contributed to the tensions between the Meitei and Kuki people. In 2015, there were a series of clashes between the two groups in Churachandpur district. These clashes were sparked by a land dispute, but they also highlighted the deep-seated mistrust and resentment that exists between the two groups.

The immediate causes of the violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur are complex and multifaceted. However, some of the most significant factors include:

The Manipur High Court’s order directing the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status mentioned above.

The Tribal Solidarity March organized by the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) in the ten Hill Districts of Manipur on 3 May 2023. The march was in protest against the Manipur High Court’s order and the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status.

The spread of misinformation and rumors on social media. Misinformation and rumors about the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status spread rapidly on social media, fueling tensions between the two communities.

The failure of the state government to address the grievances of the Kuki people. The Kuki people have long felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Mitigating Measures

The state and central governments took a number of actions to control the situation in Manipur, including:

Deploying security forces. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police have been deployed to the state to restore order and protect civilians.

Imposing curfews. Curfews have been imposed in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Prohibiting public gatherings. Public gatherings have been prohibited in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Launching investigations. The state government has launched investigations into the violence to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

Providing relief to victims. The state government has provided relief to the victims of the violence, including food, shelter, and medical care.

Appointing a mediator. The central government has appointed a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution.

The state and central governments have also taken steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people, including:

Setting up a committee to look into the grievances of the Kuki people.The committee will be headed by a retired judge and will have representatives from both the Meitei and Kuki communities.

Providing more political representation to the Kuki people. The state government has said that it will increase the number of seats reserved for Kukis in the Manipur Legislative Assembly.

Promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas. The state government has said that it will invest in infrastructure and other development projects in the Kuki-dominated areas.

It is too early to say whether these measures will be enough to end the violence and restore peace to Manipur.

Long Term Solutions

Some of the important steps that need to be taken for the long-term include:

Addressing the root causes of the conflict. This includes addressing issues such as land and resource disputes, political and economic marginalization, cultural differences, and historical grievances.

Building trust and understanding between the two communities. This can be done through dialogue, education, and cultural exchange.

Creating a more equitable and just society. This includes ensuring that all communities have equal access to political representation, economic opportunities, and social services.

Promoting peace and reconciliation. This includes supporting initiatives that promote forgiveness, healing, and coexistence.

Here are some additional suggestions for long-term solutions to the conflict:

Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission. This would be a body that would investigate the violence and its causes, and would recommend measures to promote healing and reconciliation.

Creating a more decentralized government. This would give more power to local communities, and would help to address the feeling of marginalization that many Kuki people feel.

Promoting inter-community dialogue and understanding. This could be done through education, cultural exchange, and other initiatives.

Ensuring that all communities have access to justice. This would include ensuring that the police and judiciary are fair and impartial, and that victims of violence have access to compensation and other forms of redress.

Recommendations

For a peaceful resolution to the conflict:

The state government should take steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people. This includes providing more political representation to the Kuki people, promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas, and ensuring that the Kuki people have access to justice.

The central government should appoint a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution. The mediator should be someone who is respected by both communities and who has the skills and experience necessary to help them find a mutually agreeable solution.

The media should be more responsible in reporting on the conflict. The media should avoid spreading misinformation and rumors, and should focus on reporting the facts in a balanced and objective way.

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There have been a number of political controversies that have erupted in preventing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Some political parties have used the conflict to their advantage, stoking tensions between the two communities in order to gain votes.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process. The violence in Manipur is a reminder of the deep-seated ethnic tensions that exist in the state. It is also a reminder of the challenges that the Indian government faces in maintaining peace and order in its northeastern states.

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Events in Manipur

May 3, 2023: Clashes broke out between Meitei and Kuki communities in Churachandpur district.

May 4, 2023: The Indian Army was deployed to Manipur to restore order.

May 5, 2023: The Manipur government imposed a curfew in Churachandpur district.

May 6, 2023: The violence spreads to other parts of Manipur.

May 7, 2023: The central government announced a compensation package for the victims of the violence.

May 8, 2023: The Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities.

June 1, 2023: The violence subsided, but sporadic incidents continued.

July 14, 2023: The situation in Manipur remained tense, but there were no major incidents of violence.

The post Violence in Manipur appeared first on IMR.

Some of the civilians died when villagers, alarmed by the gunfire and death of their brethren, clashed with the troops. At least two vehicles of the Army Special unit were set on fire.

Following the incident, protests erupted across Nagaland on 5 December with a mob of about 500 men attacking and vandalising a camp of the paramilitary Assam Rifles in district headquarters Mon. At least two persons were killed during the attack.

Soon after the violence in Mon, Section 144 of the CrPC was imposed in the district to prevent gatherings and restricting the movement of vehicles.

Official Version

The official version is that, based on intelligence inputs about the movement of insurgents, the Army laid an ambush. An approaching vehicle was signalled to stop but it tried to flee, which aroused suspicion. The Army personnel thereupon opened fire, which resulted in the death of eight persons. The villagers, thereafter, reportedly surrounded the Army unit and attacked them with daos and firearms. The forces again opened fire — this time in self-defence — killing six more civilians. Army personnel also suffered injuries.

The key Naga group negotiating with the Centre, NSCN(I-M), has declared it a “black day” for all Nagas and termed the incident “unprecedented in recent history”, while the Naga National Political Group (NNPG) has blamed the continued implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958 for such incidents.

Armed Forces Special Powers Act

After the Mon incident, there was renewed clamour for the repeal of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which has been in force in the state since 1958. Large-scale protests and even a 16-year-long hunger strike by Irom Chanu Sharmila in Manipur for the repeal of the law have not moved the governments over the past several decades.

Counterinsurgency operations are full of uncertainties. Intelligence may be right, it may be false. Sometimes you walk into a trap. It is not easy to distinguish friend from foe. To fire or not to fire is always a difficult decision. A split second makes all the difference. In such a situation, mistakes and even blunders happen. It need hardly be said that the US generally takes no action in such cases which are dismissed as “collateral damage”. We have much better institutional arrangements for such lapses.

Government has already, during the last few years, been gradually withdrawing AFSPA from different areas. The Act was withdrawn from Tripura in 2015 and Meghalaya in 2018 while in Arunachal Pradesh it is now restricted to the three districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding. The whole of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur (except the Imphal municipal area), however, continue to be under AFSPA. The Jeevan Reddy Commission had, in 2005, recommended the repeal of the Act. The matter could be examined again in consultation with all stakeholders and a well-considered decision taken, keeping in view the requirements of national security.

Peace Talks

The NNPG, which comprises seven insurgent groups that have so far supported the peace talks process, rescinding many of its earlier demands such as separate flag, said in a statement that the actions of the military have “belittled the commitments made by the Indian Prime Minister and Home Minister”. It said, “The draconian laws in Nagaland and military atrocities over many decades have made Naga people very aware that they are not and will never be Indians.”

The killings could be exploited by certain insurgent groups to recruit and even strengthen the hands of the NSCN(I-M), which will likely push for its demands with greater vigour given that the government is on the back foot. Even groups seen being in favour of signing the deal quickly will have to reflect the public anger to remain relevant, sources said.

The Framework Agreement (FA) itself is turning out to be the biggest roadblock before a final deal. Government officials say the wordings are so vague that both sides have interpreted them according to their own convenience.

The NSCN(I-M) has argued that the FA is clear that India and Nagaland would share “sovereign power” and coexist as “two entities”. This, it has argued, is affirmation that India accepts the desire of Naga people for sovereignty and staying within India as a separate entity. It has said this simply means India had agreed to a separate flag and constitution for Nagaland. The Centre has said there is no question of granting sovereignty to a state within India and so both the flag and the constitution are out of the question.

Way Ahead

Not many people in the country know that the rebel Nagas have gone back on every agreement that the Government of India negotiated with them in the past. The Naga People’s Convention held in 1957 demanded that the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) be merged into a single unit. The demand was conceded and the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) was formed. Another Naga People’s Convention, held in 1959, demanded the creation of a separate state of Nagaland. This was also conceded and Nagaland was carved out in 1963. Then there was the Shillong Agreement in 1975 whereby the underground groups agreed to deposit their arms while the government agreed to release the rebels held in detention and give liberal grants for their rehabilitation. The hardcore elements, however, did not abide by the terms of the agreement.

The Centre would have to assuage public anger arising out of the mistaken killings through an impartial and quick probe, followed by action on those responsible. Only after the government can convince people that it means well, despite the killings, can the Centre can resume discussions.

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The NSCN (I-M) has demanded that Nagaland Governor R.N. Ravi should be removed as the interlocutor for talks on the Naga accord.

While the other Naga groups also took exception to the Governor’s remarks to the Chief Minister, they have differed with the NSCN (I-M) on the demand for Mr. Ravi’s removal as interlocutor.

Miffed, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), on 10 August, for the first time released the details of the 2015 Framework agreement amid peace negotiations in New Delhi. The framework agreement, which was signed in presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, came after over 80 rounds of negotiations spanning 18 years, with the first breakthrough made in 1997 when the ceasefire agreement was sealed after decades of insurgency in Nagaland which started soon after India”s Independence in 1947.

After skipping a meeting in Kohima convened by Governor R N Ravi, who is also the interlocutor in the Naga peace talks, the group is directly sitting with the Centre to salvage the decade-old dialogues.

Requesting for a new interlocutor, NSCN (IM) has faulted Governor Ravi for deleting a crucial word from the original framework and circulating a modified framework with other groups. The agreement released by NSCN (IM) stated that along with sovereign power-sharing, an “enduring inclusive new relationship of peaceful co-existence of the two entities” will be provided. Governor Ravi has, in turn, dropped the word “new” while sharing the framework with other umbrella groups like Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs). 

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Issues Involved

First, the trust deficit against the Nagaland governor as an interlocutor. The new revelation by NSCN (IM) has widened the existing mistrust against Governor Ravi. In the past, peace talks between NSCN (IM) and Governor Ravi had concluded in a stalemate over the demand for a separate constitution and flag. Since then the governor has come down heavily on the extortion trails of NSCN (IM) and also pressurized the government department for details on those involved with different groups. This has irked groups like NNPGs, who has been critical of the governor’s lack of empathy towards diverse interests in the process. The publication of the framework echoes a common sentiment amongst groups who had so far cooperated with the Centre that the governor is using a deal to force a consensus in the peace process. 

Second, the declining popularity of the NSCN(IM). The ongoing NSCN (IM) ‘s talks with the Centre follows a time when the group is facing resistance on its ability to represent the collective Naga identity. Even though NSCN (IM) continues to be the largest group championing the nationalist cause, it still has not been able to balance out concerns on its overpowering Tangkhul character. Since the death of Isak Swu and Muivah’s deteriorating health, the group has been deemed as Tangkhul centric in its decision-making by the larger Nagas in Nagaland. The top leaders of NSCN (IM) had in the past decided against disclosing the 2015 framework, thereby giving in to the fears of a peace process being dominated by one tribe. Hence as the group looks to enter the political process and represent the larger Naga identity, its acceptance in the state will depend on how it holds its end in the peace talks with the Centre. 

Third, long-drawn peace processes in the Northeast with no resolution. The peace processes in the Northeast have become less about peace, and more a strategy aligning with the development and security-centric approach of the central government. On the one hand, the Centre sits in the negotiating table ironing out the issues and on the other adopts a strong policing to keep insurgency in check. The fear of the return of insurgency has become imminent as the peace talks end in stalemate. Similar has been the fate of the Naga peace process structured around the NSCN (IM). It has been failing as the group’s acceptance in Nagaland, and Manipur shrinks and the ailing old leaders continue to lead the peace process alienating the youth in the cadre-based group. The current government has, in turn, lost patience and made the process transactional with ignorance towards the emotive nature of the Naga identity assertion. 

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Five years since the signing of a framework agreement between the Indian government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), the deadlock in the talks that came about in October 2019 persists with the emergence of bottlenecks.

differences between the NNPGs and the NSCN (I-M) are not insignificant. The NSCN (I-M) still insists on a “Greater Nagalim” beyond the boundaries of Nagaland State besides seeking a flag and constitution. Most of the NNPGs based in Nagaland on the other hand have sought to settle the issue without disturbing the State boundaries while keeping the “Greater Nagalim” question in abeyance. Any moves to alter boundaries will intensify ethnic conflicts and insurgencies beyond Nagaland, especially in Manipur. The increasing support in Nagaland for a solution without affecting boundaries should have compelled the NSCN (I-M) to move away from its intransigent position. Instead, the rebel group has sought to redefine the talks process by expressing its lack of confidence in Mr. Ravi.

Replacing the governor is not the solution but imperative and will put the talks back to square one. The approach of ‘What’s in a word’ has costed the interlocutor as he fails to heed the emotive and political significance of the framework. The Naga peace process needs a strong interlocutor who represents the region. As the Centre looks for a September resolution it is important to remember signing the final peace deal is not the end but only the beginning of a larger political process towards inclusion. 

The peace talks between the NSCN (IM) and the Centre raise faint hopes of a peace agreement, but the sovereign nature of the group’s demands will further delay the process unless a middle path is achieved.

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Deputy spokesman of Thailand Police Col Kissana Phattanacharoen said, the seized weapons were intended to create havoc and the discovery comes amid intelligence reports about suspicious activities being planned by a certain group of people.

Indian security agencies have expressed concern over Chinese weapons being provided to the terror groups active in Myanmar. They claimed the the Arakan Army (AA) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), active in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, and India’s northeast insurgents were mainly procuring weapons sourced from China by local gun runners.

An attack on the Assam Rifles patrol on 29 July, near Sadiktampak village along Indo-Myanmar border in Chandel district of Manipur, was carried out by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, the United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent) and a lesser known Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF), a splinter group of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Issac-Muivah). 3 Assam Rifles personnel were killed. All these groups are based in Myanmar.

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Chinese Pipeline

In November 2019, a huge cache of Chinese weapons was seized in Shan state by the Burmese Army including surface-to-air missiles. Among the weapons seized were 39 M-22 assault rifles, 29 medium machine guns, 69 M-21 assault rifles, nine M-16 assault rifles, 21-RPG and one FN-6-man portable air defence system which is the shoulder-fired surface to air missile. During the investigation, it was revealed that all the weapons were to be delivered to terror groups and were smuggled through China.

The Chinese made weapons are also available for the insurgent groups of North-Eastern states. As per Indian intelligence report, ULFA Chief Paresh Barua is currently residing in China and actively involved in supplying Chinese made weapons to various groups.

In 2004, ten truckloads of arms and ammunition smuggled from China were seized by the Bangladesh Army. In another incident in 2010 when north-east militant Anthony Shimray, who had returned from Nepal, was apprehended by Indian security agencies. During the interrogation, Shimray disclosed that he was tasked to send a large consignment of AK 47s, M16 rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and rocket launchers among other arms and ammunition from China to India.

These weapons were to be sent from China’s Beihei through an agent from Bangkok to Bangladesh’s Cax Bazaar. From there, the weapons were to be made available to militant groups of northeast.

Indian and Myanmar’s insurgent groups mostly purchase arms from Norinco, a Chinese government-owned armed factory in Yunnan. Some corrupt officials of the Norinco reportedly have also set up an illegal arms manufacturing facility at Myanmar-China border to produce “fakes” of their original products.

Joint Indo-Myanmar Operations

In 2019, Indian and Myanmar Armies had carried out a joint coordinated operation in their respective borders against Arakan Army and other rebel groups under the code name ‘Operation Sunrise’ to secure the Kaladan Project. The Arakan Army has set up several camps in areas across Mizoram’s Lawngtlai district, posing a threat to the Kaladan Project. This project is being viewed as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia.

Since the launch of the operation last year, several bases of the militants dotted along the 1,640-km-long India-Myanmar border were destroyed by the armed forces of the two countries.

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Kaladan Project

India entered into a framework agreement with Myanmar in April 2008, to facilitate the implementation of the project. On completion, the project will help connect Mizoram with the Sittwe Port in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. On the Indian side, work is on to extend the Aizawl-Saiha National Highway by 90 km to the international border at Zorinpui.

Pakistan’s Mischief

Pakistan’s ISI was reportedly trying to recruit Rohingya jihadis for terror activities in Bangladesh and the eastern part of India. There is a strong link available between Let and terror group Aqamul Mujahideen, which is a breakaway group from the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami Arakan (HUJI-A), headed by Abdus Qadoos Burmi, a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin has called jihad in Myanmar. Abdus Qadoos Burmi has shared stages with LeT chief Hafiz Saeed.

As per some reports, Beijing had also been taking help from Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI against India. China and Pakistan had jointly set up an operational hub against India in Bangladesh capital city Dhaka with the aim of contacting militant groups of northeast states.

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Since Galwan clash, it has been a concern for India that China could wage a proxy war in northeast. There are all possibilities that China will like to take advantage of the presence of so many anti-India groups in its backyard.

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China-Myanmar Border Pact No Guarantee of Peace

Mere drawing of the boundary does not bring an end to the centuries-old influence of neighbouring areas. The Burmese project for a stable nation-state may have resolved a boundary row with China, but it failed to end insecurity.

China shares with Myanmar a boundary stretching 1,358 miles in length. Like India, Myanmar’s point of reference on the boundary issue was the imperial claims, conventions, agreements and records. China has refused to abide by the imperial conventions or claims on the ground that they are one-sided interpretations of the boundary.

The circumstances in which the Sino-Myanmar boundary settlement took place were marked by high political fluidity prevailing in Myanmar. After gaining independence in 1948, Northern Myanmar became the area where the Chinese nationalist troops, called Kuomintang exiles, established bases as they retreated after facing defeat at the hands of the advancing communists. As the communists established power in mainland China, they forced the then governing political elite in Burma to drive away the Kuomintang exiles to Taiwan and other neighbouring countries.

Like India, China signed an agreement for five principles of peaceful existence, famously known as the Panchsheel agreement, with the Myanmar Prime Minister U Nu in 1954. However, the context in which the agreement was signed was heavily skewed against Myanmar as the Chinese troops were already inside Myanmar and they laid claim over parts of Northern Myanmar. This was coupled with the massive inflow of population from China to Myanmar as this changed the demography of many of the Myanmar cities.

After several rounds of negotiations between the two sides in the backdrop of a fierce power struggle taking place in Myanmar, both the countries agreed on a boundary in October 1960. It seemed pragmatism had prevailed. There was a territorial swap based on geography and administrative ease. No doubt, the agreement between the two countries has largely held but the situation that followed in Northern Myanmar in the last six decades is nothing short of a civil war.

The three highland regions, namely, Kachin, Wa and Shan, inhabited by the country’s ethnic and religious minorities with political and economic grievances, are insurgency-hit parts of Myanmar with a strong trans-border influence from China. Chinese state institutions, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the regional government of China’s neighbouring Yunnan province, maintain equities with all the stakeholders, including the insurgent groups, across the border in a calibrated and sophisticated manner. The insurgencies are seen as a threat to national security and unity by the Burmese ethnic majority, living in the plains of Irrawaddy delta, thus becoming the raison d’être for military domination in the power structure.

Wa state, which has trans-border civilian, economic and alleged military ties with China, is de facto autonomous and a modus vivendi exists between the Tatmadaw, the local name of Myanmar military, and the United Wa State Army since 1989.

In Kachin, China maintains its relationship with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an insurgent group active in the region, as well as Tatmadaw. The region has jade mines, which is often the site of mass casualties as locals work as miners in inhospitable and unsafe conditions. On July 2, a landslide at a mine in Hpakant town in Kachin state claimed 172 lives. China is the biggest market for jade as it is considered an auspicious stone by the wealthy Chinese. The value of illegal trade of jade is several times more than the legal trade, creating a corrupt ecosystem of the senior officials of Tatmadaw, KIA commanders and the Chinese market.

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This agreement can be called the Bodoland Territorial Region or BTR Accord as the existing Bodoland Territorial Areas District (BTAD) has been renamed as BTR. The BTR Accord is unique, wherein, it is the first peace agreement in the North-East where all the existing insurgent groups in a particular area have put their signatures, with a joint commitment to end violence and strive for progress and development. A key achievement by government negotiators has been their flexible approach in letting the area’s frontline student organisation, the ABSU, be a signatory to the deal.

There were speculations that the prime minister was likely to indicate that his government was looking to resolving other issues – such as the years-long armed conflict with Naga groups in the North-East or Gorkha demonstrators in northern Bengal – using a road map similar to the successful negotiations with all four factions of the banned National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).

Background

This was the third Bodo accord signed in the last 27 years when the violent movement for a separate Bodoland state claimed hundreds of lives, led to destruction of public and private property.

The first Bodo accord was signed with the All-Bodo Students Union (ABSU) in 1993, leading to the creation of Bodoland Autonomous Council with limited political powers.

In 2003, the second Bodo accord was signed with the militant group Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), leading to the formation of Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) with four districts of Assam – Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baska and Udalguri – called the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD).

The BTC has control over 30 subjects like education, forests, horticulture, but no jurisdiction on the police, revenue and general administration departments, which are controlled by the Assam government. The BTC was formed under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution.

Despite the 2003 agreement, the demand for a separate Bodo state outside Assam continued to be raised by several frontline Bodo groups, including the ruling Bodo People’s Front (BPF), an ally of the BJP in the state, as well as all rebel NDFB factions, besides the student group- ABSU. Government leaders assure that with the signing of the new Bodo pact, the demand for a separate Bodo state has been shelved.

The Accord

To arrive at the new Accord, negotiations were held with Bodo organisations for a comprehensive and final solution to their demands while keeping intact the territorial integrity of the State of Assam. NDFB chief Gobinda Basumatary, one of the signatories, observed that since most of the powers and aspirations of people seeking a separate state have been provided for in the new Accord, there is no need any more to demand a separate state.

Apart from more legislative, executive, administrative and financial powers, BTR is expected to see exchange of villages. A commission headed by a retired judge will work out a mechanism for inclusion of villages with a majority tribal population, contiguous to the present Bodo Council area, into BTR. Likewise, villages with a majority non-tribal population currently under the Bodo Council, but contiguous to non-Sixth Schedule areas (meaning areas outside the Council jurisdiction), will be excluded from the Council. This is expected to address the issues of both tribals, currently outside the Bodo Council as well as non-tribals, currently living within the Council.

Again, from 40 seats, the BTR Council will now have 60 seats. Up to 16 of these 60 seats could be open seats, meaning seats where non-tribals can also contest elections. Besides, there will be six nominated members in the BTR Council, including two women members and two from unrepresented communities. Therefore, for anyone to say that non-tribals have no reservations in the new BTR Accord it is incorrect.

Other significant provisions of the new accord are the decisions to set up a Bodo-Kachari Welfare Council for ‘focussed development’ of Bodo villages located outside the Bodo Council area, and declaring Bodo language in Devnagri script as an associate official language of Assam. Besides, measures for protection of the Bodo language and culture and setting up several institutions of higher and technical education have also been provided in the Accord.

Further, an economic programme of Rs1,500 crore will be implemented in the next three years. The Centre and the state will have equal contribution of Rs. 750 crore each. The deal has also made it mandatory for the Assam government to earmark an amount of Rs 250 crore per annum for a period of three years for development of areas under the BTR Council. The Centre will contribute an equal amount of Rs 250 crore per annum for the same period.

The funds will be used to set up industry, for employment package and to promote eco-tourism. Under the socio-cultural package, the government will set up a Central university in the name of Upendranath Brahma and a national sports university. The other projects include a regional medical institute, hotel management campus, a Mother Dairy plant, a National Institute of Technology and more Navodaya Vidyalayas.

Three days after signing a peace pact with the government, Assam’s chief minister Sarbananda Sonowal and other dignitaries attended the Arms and Ammunition Laying Down ceremony at GMCH auditorium, in Guwahati, on 30 January 2020. Over 1,600 cadres of the Bodo militant

group NDFB surrendered their arms and ammunition, which included over 4,800 weapons, including AK rifles, light-machine guns and stenguns

The chief minister said a comprehensive rehabilitation policy would be formulated for providing employment opportunities to the surrendered militants so that they could make meaningful contribution to the process of nation-building.

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The Bodo settlement sketches out a road map on the government’s thinking and how it wants to proceed with militants groups of the North-East. It is a multipronged effort by security agencies and other arms of the government to engage with militant groups with the aim of bringing them to the negotiating table. On the whole, the new Bodo Accord has many firsts. For the first time a student organisation which had acted as a catalyst and unifier has become a signatory to an accord along with a civil society conglomeration. This presents itself as a new peace template for the region especially when government pushes its peace efforts in states like Manipur.

The government has been working on signing peace deals with insurgent groups such as Manipur’s United National Liberation (UNLF) Front – the oldest Meitei group agitating for a separate independent socialist state – and its armed outfit Manipur People’s Army. The UNLF, is active in Jiribam in Manipur and the Cachar district of Assam has an estimated cadre strength of 3,000.Also, they are engaging with outfits such as the Kanglei Yawol KannaLup (KYKL), another Meitei militant organization.

 In Assam and Nagaland, efforts are also on to convince United Liberation Front of Assam (Independence), the last remaining ULFA faction, to join the talks. In Nagaland, with leaders such as Y Wangtin Naga breaking away from the Myanmar based NSCN (Khaplang) group and joining talks along with the NSCN (Reformation) the situation is much smoother. The government has decided not to engage with the Myanmar based NSCN (Khaplang) faction. However, on the contrary, strategic analysists suggest that bettering ties with Myanmar will be more productive approach of dealing with threats than otherwise intended.

Further, although the Accord was successful, the biggest challenge before all the stakeholders, including the government, would be to make it sustainable by enforcing commitments given in the new peace-accord. It is observed that the new Bodo accord has also created a political polarisation in the state. The All Bodo Students Union is expected to hold mega consultation with civil society groups to decide their future course of action after the Bodo Accord.

Analysts suggest that the Accord has altered the political dynamics in the Bodo heartland. If NDFB faction leaders now decide to join hands with an existing political party, United People’s Party Liberal (UPPL), that had backed these groups, or float a new political party and jump into the council elections scheduled in a few months’ time, the BPF is bound to face competition. Therefore, it is clear that unlike in the past, the Bodo Council, now renamed BTR, is set to witness a turf war or a political battle for supremacy among political parties or formations.

However, existing realities pose questions such as – will the Assam BJP’s key ally, the Mahilary-led BPF, give up so easily? It seems unlikely, because the BPF has been in power for the past 17 years in a row, not just with the BJP as an ally, but with the Congress before that. But with ABSU going all ballistic against the BPF and calling for a change in the political setup ruling Assam’s Bodo areas, the battle in the coming council polls is going to be tough. Besides, the fight in the 12 Bodo-dominated Assembly seats will also be interesting in the 2021 elections.

In all, North-East truly can enjoy fruits of peace and development if the Accord fulfils what it promises and become a bridge between India and Southeast Asia under New Delhi’s Act East policy. Although other insurgency movements too need a similar negotiated settlement. But what comes as an additional obstacle to North-East peace in recent months is the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) push, against which Assam is protesting and which has the potential to revive dying separatist movements. Thus, the central government needs to be cautious with its moves like CAA that could potentially light new fires in the North-East.

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The members of the insurgent groups – United Liberation Front of Assam -Independence (ULFA (I)), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Rava National Liberation Front (RNLF), Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI (M)), National Santhal Liberation Army (NSLA), Adivashi Dragon Fighter (ADF) and NLFB – joined the mainstream in front of Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal at a programme in Guwahati, Assam.

The surrendred militants came to a unilateral ceasefire between 2015 and 2019. These groups were not related to NDFB (S) militants, who declared ceasefire earlier in January 2020.

Almost half of them (301) were from a little-known Bengali group – National Liberation Front of Bengali (NLFB), followed by 178 from ADF and 87 from the NSLA.

The others who surrendered included 50 cadres of the ULFA(I), eight militants of the NDFB, six insurgents of the KLO, 13 members of the RNLF and one CPI (M) militant.

Besides 177 arms, the militants also laid down 58 magazines, 1.93 kg explosives, 52 grenades, 71 bombs, three rocket launchers, 306 detonators, two RT sets and 17 khukris.

Suspension of Operations by NDFB

The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Saoraigwra) or NDFB (S) had joined the peace process and signed a tripartite Suspension of Operations (SOO) Agreement with the central government and Assam government on 16 January. NDFB (S) became the signatory entity to the proposed comprehensive Memorandum of Settlement with the Bodo organisations in order to accelerate the peace process.

The SOO agreement states, “National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB), under the leadership of B Saoraigwra agreed to abjure violence, come overground and join the peace process by being a signatory to the proposed comprehensive Memorandum of Settlement with Bodo organisations.”

The tripartite SOO Agreement was signed by the Front president, B Saoraigwra, Commissioner & Secretary, Home & Political, Assam, Ashutosh Agnihotri and Joint Secretary (Northeast), Ministry of Home Affairs, Satyendra Garg.

During the agreement signing event, BR Ferrenga, general secretary of NDFB(S) and two mediators Rajkumar Prithviraj Narayan Dev Mech and Thulunga Basumatary were also present.

Director general of police Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta appealed to former NDFB leader Songbijit Ingti Kathar and its prominent members B Bidai and Batha, who are still at large, to join the peace process. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution was implemented to create the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in 2003 after a political accord with erstwhile militant outfit Bodo Liberation Tigers, leading to BLT cadres joining the political mainstream. However, NDFB under the leadership Ranjan Daimary did not give up violence.

The Saoraigwra faction is the third group of NDFB to initiate peace talks with New Delhi. Earlier in 2005, the NDFB (Progressive) faction signed a ceasefire agreement with New Delhi. Over 3,000 members of NDFB (P) are currently housed in three government-approved designated ceasefire camps in Udalguri, Baksa, and Kokrajhar districts of Assam.

Rehabilitation Programme

Assam has a rehabilitation programme for surrendered militants in place. They get financial assistance from the government and can also avail of a bank loan to start a business or invest the money in farming or entrepreneurship, according to officials.

A screening committee comprising the civil administration, the police, the Army and other security agencies decide the eligibility for rehabilitation package. There have been reports of non-extremists becoming beneficiaries in order to show a certain number of “surrendered militants”.

Inactive Outfits

South Asia Terrorism Portal, which keeps track of militant outfits and their activities classified NLFB and ADF as inactive outfits while it classified NLSA among outfits who are in peace talks or ceasefire.

According to Kamal Pal, the former chief of the NLFB, the group was formed in Kokrajhar district in 2011 in reaction to “atrocities against the Bengalis including how they were being marked as doubtful voters and put in detention camps.”

The group gave up arms in December 2015 and was hopeful that the members would be rehabilitated by the current government.

Stop Press

The government signed an accord, on 27 January, with the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) providing political and economic bonanza and a move that is expected to boost peace in the Northeast, which has been spearheading a movement for a Bodoland state. The tripartite agreement was signed with the representatives of factions of banned organisations, NDFB, All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), and Assam government in the presence of Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal.

The pact provides political and economic bonanza to the tribals, sans the outfit’s key demand of a separate Bodoland state or union territory.

Union Home Minister Amit Shah said, 1,550 cadres along with 130 weapons will surrender on January 30.

This is the third Bodo accord to be signed in last 27 years when the violent movement for a separate Bodoland state claimed hundreds of lives, destruction of public and private properties. The first Bodo accord was signed with the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) in 1993, leading to creation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council with limited political powers. In 2003, the second Bodo accord was signed with the militant group Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), leading to formation of a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) with four districts of Assam – Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baska and Udalguri — called the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD).

The BTC has control over 30 subjects like education, forests, horticulture but no jurisdiction on the police, revenue and general administration departments, which are controlled by the Assam government.

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