Russia’s Strategy

Russia’s approach to war planning, particularly concerning the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, has often been misinterpreted. The Russian strategy exhibits remarkable tactical prowess, maturity, and calculated decision-making. By drawing Ukraine into a prolonged state of attrition, Russia aims to exhaust Ukrainian resources while incrementally advancing its positions. This accumulative push allows Russia to secure territorial gains and serves a strategic purpose by creating a buffer zone and gaining leverage in negotiations. Additionally, Russia’s strategy of gradual advance serves to root out the potential for insurgency within the territories it seeks to control. By consolidating their positions methodically, Moscow aims to preemptively address any potential resistance or insurgency from local populations, which helps maintain control over the newly acquired territories with the priority of stabilizing the regions under Russian control.

The Russian strategy evolved over the early course of the operation, which was intended to reign in the Ukrainian regime out of its NATO ambitions and the ethnocultural cleansing of the Donbas region, but not to occupy or annex Ukrainian territory per se. But as the narrative from Western countries became more entrenched with hostility and delusional opportunism to use Ukraine to degrade Russia permanently, the Russian strategy shifted to the gradual bleeding and destruction of Ukrainian military capabilities, including its projection of power and threat.

Hence, fundamentally, Russia has never completely aimed at capturing Ukrainian territory in a grand scenario. Russia also knew that such a strategy would be militarily frivolous in terms of tactical, operational, and strategic goals. However, it was also not in its long-term political interests and was fraught with significant risks. Russia is not fighting the war the Soviet Union had during WWII. Neither is Russia the Soviet Union, nor are the historical contexts or exigencies under which it operates similar to or necessitates conducting itself based on what might have been relevant almost eighty years ago! Russia also never had the military manpower at the outset of the Special Military Operation or even today to roam across Ukraine. And it has to preserve a significant portion of its forces to protect itself from potential ongoing aggression from NATO and its multiple allies close to Russian territory.

Ukrainian Forces

Ukraine’s force structure is always difficult to understand because of its tendency to form ad hoc battlegroups and its practice of fragmenting forces into resident brigade commands. In fact, ORBAT and force distribution in Ukraine are in a league of their own. As a result, the AFU’s organization and force generation are often more opaque and difficult to understand than Russia’s, for example. Whereas Russia uses conventional army-level groups, Ukraine has no organic commands over the brigade level. The chains of higher command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are extraordinarily flexible and irregular entities. Ukraine’s entire fighting organization is an improvised mixture and modification around established formations. That aspect applies especially to its highest field commands down to the brigade level. The AFU field command system’s most conspicuous anomaly is its absence of any division-level (and higher) formations. Ukraine started abolishing the Division around a decade ago in a forced restructuring.

The German Kampfgruppe units during WWII were used as a contingency against front disarray, severe losses, and replacements. They were ad-hoc combat units formed during World War II by the German Army, often composed of infantry, armor, and supporting elements for specialized tasks or missions. The AFU idealization of all-level Kampfgruppen is bizarrely unique. That said, the primary picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings,” vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) in Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south: Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always tricky, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. Ukrainian Army-level formations are absent because they simply do not exist, and such arrangements prove to be a pressing challenge for any formal military establishment.

War Doctrine

But, as the Operation evolved, Russia rather quickly devised a strategy of destroying Ukraine’s Military and, by extension, degrading its NATO sponsors through long-term attrition, where the territorial battles have been used as opportunities to demolish Ukrainian forces little by little, as death by a thousand cuts over an extended period and across a vastly stretched battlefield where killing the enemy and destroying its equipment is the primary goal no matter how limited the amount of territory actually gained.

As far as Russia’s War Doctrine in Ukraine is concerned, Russia is committed to positional attrition warfare as this maximizes the asymmetry of their advantage. This depletes the firepower of not only the Ukrainian Armed Forces but also of NATO members without engaging in direct conflict with them. Russian Armed Forces iron out Ukrainian defenses with artillery and then push forward into pulverized defenses. As Ukraine continues to funnel units to refill positions, they play into the hands of the Russian Military. Noting the importance of deploying fresh operational reserves as a crucial element of any counterattack, Russia keeps the burn rate at the front high. It degrades Ukraine’s ability to form reserves and continues to place immense pressure on Ukraine and NATO, not solely in terms of seizing territory but in terms of attrition, chipping away infrastructure, and creating a cumulative impact on Ukraine’s overall fighting capability. Kiev’s position is untenable as they may be able to fight effective static defense from prepared positions. Still, they cannot reverse Russian gains or respond to new breakthroughs without a combined arms reserve. Any serious effort by Ukraine to retrieve the fortified cities will divert the scarce trained manpower and equipment, thus squashing any attempts of offensive campaigns. They are also currently exhausted to the point where they lack combat-effective combined arms reserve units. Furthermore, such units have been unable to maneuver efficiently due to fuel shortages and incessant Russian artillery and air strikes.

Russia’s Advances

Russia is slowly advancing on almost every axis of the theater, which has both strategic and tactical implications, as the Ukrainians are being forced to burn reserves while being prevented from rotating and reconstituting their forces, as well as a precise operational formulation. Russia’s maneuver scheme must be kept in mind regarding its minimum end-state objectives: to capture the remaining Donbas city agglomerations (around Slovyansk) around Kramatorsk Although the war and Russia’s military ambitions may not end there.

At present, there are several main axes of advancement: On the central axis of the front, the Russian thrusts on the Avdiivka axis and the Chasiv Yar axis converge on the crucial Ukrainian hub of Konstytinivka, capturing which is a prerequisite for any serious effort to advance on Kramatorsk.

Simultaneously, Russian forces exert ongoing pressure on the northern front, employing a gradual squeeze tactic on the city of Kupyansk at the apex of the Oskil line and advancing towards Lyman along the Zherebets axis. These maneuvers aim to establish a foothold towards the strategic objective of Kramatorsk, contingent upon Russian control of the north bank of the Donets River up to the Izyum confluence with the Oskil.

In the southern sectors, Russia expands its zone of influence following the capture of Marinka, likely intending to build momentum towards Kurakhove, thereby placing the Ukrainian stronghold of Ugledar in a precarious position. Ugledar’s proximity to Russian rail lines vital for the land bridge amplifies its strategic significance, prompting Russian efforts to seize it. Additionally, Russian forces target the Ukrainian-held Robotyne salient, a remnant of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. While these assaults serve to tie down Ukrainian forces, they also aim to preempt any Ukrainian aspirations to utilize Robotyne as a launching point for future offensives towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations serve both attritional purposes and the strategic neutralization of Ukrainian staging areas. The overarching operational scenario indicates Moscow is gaining offensive momentum across the entire theater. This trend undermines Ukrainian combat effectiveness by impeding rotation, regeneration, and lateral troop movements while depleting Ukraine’s already limited reserves.

Sustaining the War Effort

The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition – a grueling campaign marked by relentless assaults against entrenched defenses, where concrete, steel, and explosives dictate the tempo. Ukraine confronts a stark reality: Russia’s military buildup nears critical mass, tipping the scales decidedly in Moscow’s favor. Initially strengthened by a substantial shell inventory, Ukraine’s arsenal benefitted from meticulous resource management and international aid, notably from the United States and South Korea. However, sustained high-intensity combat depleted much of these reserves, leaving Ukrainian forces grappling with a critical shortage of artillery ammunition.

Ukraine has sought to expand its production capabilities to sustain its war effort, primarily in Europe and the United States. Yet, this strategy encounters formidable obstacles: sluggish industrial ramp-up, production targets insufficient to match Russia’s onslaught, and logistical hurdles such as barrel scarcity. The United States has fared better in ramping production, slated to deliver approximately 500000 shells in 2024. Europe faces various problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus-driven decision-making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also makes manufacturers hesitant to invest significantly in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”

Ukraine’s ammunition shortfall remains dire even if the USA and Europe meet their delivery targets. Optimistically, combined efforts might yield 1.3 million rounds annually, equating to a modest daily allocation-insufficient for sustained offensive operations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Reznikov’s assertion of needing nearly 12000 shells daily underscores the magnitude of the challenge. While this figure may be aspirational, conservative estimates suggest Ukraine requires at least 200000 shells monthly to maintain a functional military posture. However, with current projections, Ukraine faces an uphill battle in amassing the requisite stockpile for intensified offensives. Artillery barrels deteriorate with prolonged use, typically lasting around 2500 shots for a howitzer. Consequently, assuming sustained firing rates as desired by Reznikov, Ukraine would face the wearing out of approximately 125-150 guns per month. Complicating matters further, Ukraine operates at least 17 different artillery platforms. Meanwhile, Russia’s shell production capacity has been significantly underestimated. Domestic Russian production has surged, with Estonian estimates indicating around 3.5 million shells produced in 2023, which is expected to increase to 4.5 million in 2024. Russia has considerable capability to sustain a firing rate of up to 12000 shells per day, with reserve surge capacity. Even if European production surges as anticipated, there remains a substantial advantage for Russia, potentially reaching a ratio of 3-1 or even 5-1 in artillery firepower. This advantage is compounded by Western reports of increased Russian production of advanced strike systems such as cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs, boasting greater power and range. Recent publications, such as those from the Royal United Services Institute, highlight Russia’s capacity to deliver significant numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, and missiles, further solidifying its military dominance.

The most important question is simple: whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is, of course, the German-Soviet War. Even though the Third Reich enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. During the Battle of Kursk, Hitler even quipped that the loss ratios should predict an imminent German victory. Loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation. Estonian intelligence estimates underscore Russia’s ability to continually train, equip, and deploy additional troops, outpacing current loss rates. RUSI further emphasizes the growth in Russian forces deployed in Ukraine, from 360000 to 470000 over the last year, highlighting the formidable challenge Ukraine faces. Russian force generation continues to grow steadily over time rather than merely replenishing losses.

In contrast, Ukrainian forces face increasing manpower shortages, with under-strength brigades tasked with increasingly demanding operations. It’s evident that Ukrainian reserves are dwindling, as highlighted in Avdiivka, where brigades from other fronts were hastily deployed, indicating a lack of strategic reserves. The elite 3rd Assault Brigade was even committed in the final stages of the battle to stem the tide. Meanwhile, units like the 110th Mechanized engaged for months, suffered significant attrition due to the inability to rotate out. In contrast, Russia conducts regular troop rotations while Ukrainian forces remain on the front lines due to a shortage of replacements.

The Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves: “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”

What to Expect?

In the near term, one could expect Russia to progress toward the following intermediate operational goals:

•   Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Novomikhailovka and Toretsk

•   An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk

•   Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liquidation of the Ugledar salient

•   Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

While 2022 witnessed initial successes for Ukraine, 2023 saw missed opportunities despite ample Western assistance. Instead, Ukraine exhausted valuable resources in defending Bakhmut and futilely attacked a well-prepared Russian defense in the south. With Russian force generation rising inexorably, Ukraine faces the looming threat of strategic defeat. To avert this, Ukraine must pursue a radical mobilization plan bolstered by increased support from its allies. However, Ukraine lacks the capacity to train and equip its forces independently. Without substantial NATO assistance, a total mobilization risks escalating casualties without significant gains. Yet, even maintaining current levels of aid is challenging amidst waning international support and domestic crises in crucial NATO member states.

2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and quickly supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax, and the war turns in an evident and irreversible way against Ukraine. As Steve Harris of Iron Maiden remarked in one of the most iconic songs of the band, “The sands of time for me are running low…”, Kiev has almost no time and resources to ‘orchestrate’ (special courtesy Wagner PMC) any meaningful offensive operations. Of course, once substantially degraded, the Ukrainian regime and its allies would be at Russia’s mercy in shaping the postwar era in Ukraine, both politically and territorially. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that industry, manufacturing & the physical economy have always been relevant, and newly emerging powers such as India must grasp this insight to develop a broadly industrialized economy in the wake of a real two-front threat and a rewarding prospect of becoming a serious global power. That said, the window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine and now opens wide for Russia. In this sense, one must appreciate how a few meters in this theatre equals hundreds of miles relative to the grand old wars of the previous century. The heinous attack at the Crocus City Hall marks the beginning of a new phase in the conflict. March 2024. Not very far from Fontainebleau, a windy dawn at Brussels unfolds skies seven and a half decades old. The sun struggles to pierce through the misty haze, and the approaching summer months carry the weight of a hot war.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 2) appeared first on IMR.

Montgomery himself said it best. When asked what it would take for the Red Army to break through to the Atlantic, he simply answered: “Shoes.”

As the dust now settled on the conclusion of World War II, Western European leadership was anxious about a potential tactical challenge – a communist-led land invasion. The USSR had emerged from the conflict as a formidable power, while its former European allies were weakened after the War. Yet, to understand the gravity of this situation, we must rewind our clocks by seven years to the onset of WWII itself. The Second World War had an odd symmetry in that it ended much the same way it started: with a well-drilled, technically advanced, and operationally ambitious army carving apart an outmatched foe. Of course, the major phase of the war began with Germany’s swift devastation of Poland, which rewrote the book on mechanized operations. The Soviet Union’s equally totalizing and fast victory of Manchuria in August 1945 marked the end of the war, or at least the final major land campaign.

To provide proper context, it is essential to tell the tale of the Battle of Kursk before proceeding with Manchuria. In the challenging spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht faced a daunting situation. Army Group South’s efforts to reach the Caucasus had been in vain, and the aftermath of the Stalingrad defeat required a monumental effort led by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein to salvage the Army. With Soviet forces outnumbering the Germans twofold on the eastern front and having a significant advantage of reserve troops, the odds were stacked against the Germans. The Red Army’s superiority in tube and rocket artillery further compounded the challenges. Manstein’s successful counterattack in Central Ukraine had pushed the Soviets back, regaining key cities like Kharkov and Belgorod. However, a planned offensive towards Kursk had to be canceled due to weaknesses in the German formations further north, which resulted in the Soviets occupying a significant bulge centered around Kursk.

Battle of Kursk

The plan was to have armies from Army Group Center and Army Group South attack the base of the bulge, meet at the rear, and encircle the Soviet forces within. However, Manstein faced obstacles with the mud season halting operations during the spring thaw, causing both sides to pause and regroup. German intelligence believed the USSR could deploy 40 fresh divisions in Kursk. In reality, they deployed 800 divisions! The Red Army planned to fill the bulge with troops and artillery, denying the Wehrmacht any possibility of encirclement. This demonstrates the importance of operational reserves in warfare. However, it is also crucial to note that a clash of tanks occurred at Prokhorovka, where the powerful Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army aimed to counterattack against the approaching SS spearhead, leading to a close-range tank-on-tank combat. However, the clash resulted in a tactical debacle for the Soviet tank army, as they launched an ill-advised frontal assault against technologically superior German vehicles. The technological gap between the German Big Cats – the Panzer V Panther, and the Tiger proved to be serious opponents for the Soviet tanks. Although, the battle at Prokhorovka did not greatly alter the course of the larger Kursk operation, as the German attack failed to break through the heavily fortified Soviet defenses. But this was a clarion call for the Soviet military planners.

Manchuria

Now, Manchuria is one of the many forgotten fronts of the War despite being among the oldest. The Japanese had been meandering in Manchuria since 1931, consolidating a pseudo-colony and puppet state ostensibly called Manchukuo, which served as a launching pad for more than a decade of Japanese incursions and operations in China. For a brief period, the Asian land front had been a key pivot of world affairs, with the Japanese and the Soviet Red Army fighting a series of skirmishes along the Siberian-Manchurian border and Japan’s brutal 1937 invasion of China, which was an indicator of the impending global war. However, circumstances had pulled attention and resources in other directions, particularly the events of 1941, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet War and the Great Pacific War. After a few years, as a significant geopolitical pivot, Manchuria was relegated to the background and became a lonely, forgotten front of the Japanese Empire until 1945.

Among the many topics discussed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 was the Soviet Union’s long-delayed entry into the war against Japan, opening an overland front against Japan’s mainland colonies. Although it seems relatively obvious that Japanese defeat was inevitable, given the relentless American advance through the Pacific and the onset of regular strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands, there were concrete reasons why Soviet entry into the war was necessary to hasten Japanese surrender. More specifically, the Japanese continued to harbor hopes late into the war that the Soviet Union would choose to mediate between Japan and the United States, negotiating a conditional end to the war that fell short of total Japanese surrender. Soviet entry into the war against Japan would dash these hopes. The Soviet Union’s overrunning of Japanese colonies in Asia would emphasize to Tokyo that they had nothing to fight for. Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union spent the summer of 1945 preparing for one final operation to shatter Japan in Manchuria.

The Soviet maneuver scheme was tightly choreographed and well-conceived – representing in many ways a type of encore, perfected demonstration of the operational art that had been developed and practiced at such a high cost in Europe. The strategic plan involved utilizing the unique geography of Manchuria, which extended into the Soviet Union’s borders. The plan was designed to rapidly and efficiently attack several rail and transportation hubs situated in the Japanese rear. These hubs were identified as Qiqihar, Harbin, Changchun, and Mukden, and the aim was to secure them quickly and effectively. By rapidly bypassing the main Japanese field armies and converging on transit hubs in the rear, the Red Army effectively isolated all the Japanese armies from each other and from their lines of communication to the rear, effectively slicing Manchuria into a host of separated pockets.

It is important to acknowledge that the Japanese faced insurmountable odds in resisting the attack. The Soviet force was overwhelmingly equipped with manpower and resources-three fronts consisting of over 1.5 million men, 5000 armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of artillery pieces and rocket launchers. The Japanese were facing an uphill battle from the onset. Imperial Japan (including Manchurian proxy forces) had a paper strength of perhaps 900000 men, but the vast majority of this force was unfit for combat. Virtually all of the Japanese Army’s veteran units and equipment had been steadily transferred to the Pacific in a cannibalizing trickle-a vain attempt to slow the American onslaught. Accordingly, by 1945, the Japanese Kwantung Army had been reduced to a lightly armed and poorly trained conscript force suitable only for police actions and counterinsurgency against Chinese partisans.

There was nothing for the Japanese to do. The Kwantung Army had far less of a fighting chance in 1945 than the Wehrmacht had in the spring of that year. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets broke through everywhere at will when they began the assault on 9th August. Soviet armored forces comfortably overran Japanese positions, which were armed primarily with archaic, low-caliber antitank weaponry that could not penetrate Soviet armor even at point-blank range. By the end of the first day, the Soviet pincers were driving far into the rear. The offensive demonstrated the Red Army’s extreme proficiency in organizing enormous operations and moving at high speeds. By August 20 (after only 11 days), the Red Army had reached the Korean border and captured all their objectives in the Japanese rear, in effect completely overrunning a theater that was even larger than France. Many of the Soviet spearheads had driven more than three hundred miles in a little over a week.

The combat aspects of the operation were ludicrous, given the totalizing level of Soviet overmatch. Red Army losses hardly breached the 5-digit mark, which is inconsequential for an operation of this scale. What was genuinely impressive – and terrifying to alert observers – was the Red Army’s clear demonstration of its capacity to organize colossal operations in scale, both in the size of the forces and the distances covered. Soviet forces would begin a formal withdrawal from Manchuria and Korea in 1946. Still, as they receded, they left in their wake consolidated and well-supported communist political machines, including the Workers Party of Korea under Chairman Kim Il Sung and the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. The Soviet Union presented something of a unique geopolitical triple threat. In its own right, it had astonishing state capacity to field massive armies and roll them over continent-sized spaces. It had a proven model of effective political institutions that could allow local communist parties to establish powerful political monopolies.

All of these powers had been on full display in Asia, with the lightning advance, the rapid consolidation and funneling of resources to local communist parties, and the durable North Korean and Chinese party states that were left behind once the Red Army withdrew. To make matters even worse, this powerful Soviet expansion apparatus was now precariously forward deployed deep in the heart of Europe, with the Soviet frontier pushing all the way into Central Germany. The fear that the Soviet Union would replicate its Manchurian exploits in Europe became the foundational anxiety of the Cold War – predating both Soviet atomic weapons and, by extension, the fear of nuclear war. As early as 1947, France and the United Kingdom began signing joint defense pacts, which expanded to include Belgium and the Netherlands with the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, bringing about the short-lived “Western Union Defense Organization” (WUDO). It was clear, however, that such a limited alliance structure would be utterly inadequate in the event of war with the Soviet Union. France and Britain were degraded, threadbare powers in no place to fight yet another major war.

The Cold War

The beginning of the Cold War can be best identified as a sequence of events in 1948 and 1949, which together represented the breakdown of the post-war Soviet-American cooperation in Europe and the consolidation of the power blocs that would characterize the Cold War. In those intervening years after the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook a series of actions designed to consolidate their positions in Europe according to the postwar settlement. The US rehabilitated Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, while the USSR forbade Eastern bloc countries from participating. There was thus a certain degree of symmetry as both the USSR and the United States consolidated the two spheres of Europe, creating a sharp split down the spine of the continent. The US intervened in Greece to prevent a communist takeover, followed by a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet abandonment of the Allied Control Council ended any joint administration in occupied Germany. The situation worsened with the attempted communist putsch in Berlin and the Soviet blockade of the German capital, leading to the Berlin airlift. The formation of NATO in April 1949 was a response to the deteriorating security situation. The Soviet Union predictably followed with the Warsaw Pact a few years later. The Cold War was on.

The doctrines established during the Cold War have persisted to a significant extent in the present tactical situation in Europe. NATO’s expansion has not helped ease these considerations. The balance between evolving military technologies and the constraints of available resources continues to shape contemporary military strategies in the European theater.

Modern-day Russia has overcome its Kurskian deficiencies by arming itself with some of the world’s most advanced weaponry and establishing an elaborate, yet normative means of use.

However, a notable departure from historical precedents such as Kursk and Manchuria is Russia’s manpower limitation. This has impacted its ability to swiftly conduct large-scale Manchurian offensives in Ukraine. This scarcity of manpower has influenced Russia’s tactical decision-making, leading to a more calculated approach to strategic dynamics.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 1) appeared first on IMR.

You will not find a better book written about the Kargil “Operations”. Written by a fauji brat, Gaurav was on the front lines with the troops. He experienced it all. This is one book that has come straight from the heart.

The narrative is very informative; the pathos, brutality, the odds facing the soldiers, the true diplomatic underpinnings behind the conflict – these are the findings in the book which the mass media had failed to bring to the masses during the course of the war.

The book covers all the aspects of the conflict. It touches the operations with the human aspects of the war. From soldiers’ love letters to the rigorous battles on the top. The details of the operation and interviews of various officers including the top brass makes it even more interesting.

At its peak, the infiltration touched nearly two brigades or 4,000-5,000 soldiers from Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry and half that number at its lowest level towards the end of the war in July. It was brought to a close by truly awesome acts of bravery by Indian officers and jawans – and by Washington DC.

Earlier in the summer, General Malik had left on a 10-day trip to eastern Europe while Lt-General Khanna proceeded on vacation to Pune. “If the chief of a million-strong army stops going out (abroad) when a patrol goes missing or an (ammunition) dump is targeted, then I will not even be able to go to the toilet,” General Malik tells journalist Gaurav Sawant in Dateline Kargil, a lucid, albeit hagiographic account of the border war.

The initial casual attitude of the higher level officers has been brilliantly exposed. When the actual level of intrusion by the enemy troops came to light, how the Indian Army re-organized and prepared itself for the daunting task of re-capturing the peaks, has been elucidated in great details. The role of artillery in helping the infantry has been explained for general readers. The battle for every peak at Tololing, Kaksar, Khalubar, Jubar and Mushkow valley has been explained with great care and clarity. The bravery, courage, planning and fellow-feeling of the officers and soldiers have been described. The attitude of the officers towards journalists and other civilians at the initial stage is required to be noted. However, this attitude changed when the Army started gaining success. The author has also briefly mentioned the role of Air Force and Navy during the war.

The most important chapter of the book is the ‘The Lessons Learnt’. Here the author has brilliantly explained the errors of the Indian Army , how the enemy exploited the gaps between Indian defences and the recommendations of the Committee headed by Late K. Subramaniam in this regard.

The book has provided many details of the day-to-day activities during the battle. He has intimately mingled with the officers and soldiers during the war and explained their mind-set during the battle. We come to know the mind-set of the soldiers during the successes as well as during the failures.

The book is divided into forty-six chapters. These are: Those Early Days – The Initial Setbacks – Mass Exodus – The Induction of Artillery – The Tololing Assault – More Troops Move In – Yeh Dil Mange More – Victory At A Price – The Air Operations – The Early Batalik Battles – Love’s labour Lost – The Spiritual Battle – Surinder Singh At Kaksar – The Picture Improves – The Para-Operations – The Artillery Battle – Life of A Jawan – Planning For Tiger Hill – The Artillery Support – The Infantry Assault – The Counter Attack – Back To Batalik – Batalik Battles Pick Up – Soldiers Soldier On – Peak Khalubar Recaptured – Jubar Falls, India Celebrates – Operation Safed Sugar – Battle In Mushkoh Valley – Courage at Point 4875 – Bearding The Lion – The Safe Passage – The Reluctant Withdrawal – Jockeying For Heights – Pakistan’s Unkept Promise – The Siege Within – The Turtuk Trouble – The Brave Among The Enemy – The Postmortem Begins – Hack Pack At War – Families Stand By – The Naval Operations – Crisis In Command? – Friends And Foes – The Aftermath – The Lessons Learnt – Proving A Point.

Gaurav Sawant is the son of Brig Chitranjan Sawant (Retd), a well-known Army officer of Indian Army. Gaurav is an alumnus of Saint. Stephen’s College, Delhi and at the time of writing this book, he was the Principal Correspondent (Defence) with the Indian Express. He did his masters in Medieval Indian History from the Delhi University and is a Guest Lecturer at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi.

Dateline Kargil by Gaurav Savant
384 pages, Rs 699, 2022 edition

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1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE is yet another masterpiece in the galaxy of books on military history being brought out every second or third year by the Dehra Dun-born acclaimed military historian Shiv Kunal Verma. It is by far the most eloquent account of the 1965 War and “it sets the bar in military writing,” say some of the critics. 

While India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous 1962 War against the Chinese, a belligerent and somewhat overconfident Pakistan decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, it launched its initial military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May of 1965; India strongly responded. However, by the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN, and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch ‘skirmishes’.

Pakistan then launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 imagining it to be its Brahmastra. It deployed nearly 12,000 trained Mujahids in multiple groups, each named after historical plunderers of the sub-continent. Confident that it had the superior armour like M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and better fighter planes such as F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, and better submarines than India, the Pakistanis expected that in the event of an expanded war, the Indians would collapse just as they had against China in NEFA three years previously,” Verma writes in the Introduction.

Focus shifts to International Border

However, contrary to the Pakistan’s expectations, India firmly repulsed the attack and cut off its entry and exist points into the Kashmir Valley by capturing the Haji Pir Bulge. Operation Gibraltar thus fizzled out. Stung by its reverses, Pakistan then launched Operation Grand Slam in September 1965 in Chhamb and Jaurian. The resultant Indian counter-attack saw the focus shift to various other sectors – Lahore, Barki, Kasur [Khem Karan], Fazilka, Sialkot, and Barmer – on the international border. With the rival Air Force formations getting involved almost simultaneously, the Armed ‘Skirmishes’ turned into a full-scale war.

Continuing the narrative, Verma writes, “As they had in 1962, the junior officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces admirably acquitted themselves despite the on-the-fly reorganization of Forces, lack of intelligence, obsolete equipment, and lackluster military leadership. What could have ended in victory instead culminated in a stalemate. Official Indian figures put the total number of causalities at 12,714, out of which 2,763 were killed, 8,444 wounded, and 1,507 missing. An estimated 2,000 casualties occurred after the Ceasefire, raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN as a global Peacekeeping body. Neutral observers put the Pakistani deaths at over 5,000. The conflict ended when the Tashkent Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 10 January 1966, agreeing to observe the ceasefire lines and withdraw their respective armed personnel to positions that they had held before 5 August 1965.”

However, the Tashkent agreement was not without an accompanying tragedy; within hours of its signing, India’s diminutive Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

A scion of an Army family, Shiv Kunal together with his better half Dipti Bhalla,  enjoys the unique distinction of having worked in conjunction with all the three Wings of the Indian Armed Forces over the past two-and-a-half decades producing short films on military-related issues. Their documentary ‘The Standard Bearers’ on the National Defence Academy (NDA) turned out to be a classic in its own genre. 

I wonder why Shiv Kunal and others of his ilk attribute the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as the culmination of the ‘skirmishes’ that had continuously taken place in the Runn of Kutch between the two countries during April to September 1965. On the contrary, these so called ‘skirmishes’ in the Kutch region were meant to test India’s preparedness, and were a prelude to a well planned strategy aimed at completing the half-finished job in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortuitously, Shiv Kunal’s 1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE by virtue of its rich content has emerged as an excellent text book for the students of military history. Propitiously, the incumbent Commandant at the Shimla-based Army Training Command Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, a ‘man of letters’ himself, would gladly consider prescribing it as a text book for the entrance examinations of the various Courses as also at the military training institutions like Indian Military Academy, National Defence Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College et al.  

The Book running into 557 pages including 48 pages of colour photographs and maps with hardcover weighs about a kilogram. Its entire content is in a small font that is not easy on the eye. It would, perhaps, be better in two volumes.

1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE undoubtedly provides a definitive account of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Raj Kanwar

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The birth anniversary of freedom fighter Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose is celebrated every year on 23 January. He is considered to be one of the most iconic and influential leaders, who played a significant role in gaining independence from the British Rule.

Bose’s birth anniversary is marked as Subhas Chandra Bose Jayanti or Netaji Jayanti across the country. In states such as West Bengal, Jharkhand, Tripura and Assam, the day is an official holiday. This year, the country observed Netaji’s 125th birth anniversary. The government declared that Bose’s birth anniversary will be celebrated as Parakram Diwas. Republic Day 2022 celebrations began from 23 January instead of 24 January to include the birth anniversary of Netaji.

Prime minister Narendra Modi announced that a grand statue of the freedom fighter would be installed at India Gate “as a symbol of India’s indebtedness to him” and until the statue is completed, a hologram statue, which was unveiled on 23 January,  would be present at the same place.

Bose’s Life

Bose was born in 1897 in Odisha’s Cuttack to Prabhabati Bose and Janakinath Bose. From a very young age, Netaji considered Swami Vivekanand as his spiritual guru.

To be a part of the freedom struggle in India, Netaji left gave up on joining the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and came back from England.

He became Congress president in 1938. After reelection in 1939, differences arose between him and Gandhi. The senior leadership in the Congress supported Gandhi, and Bose resigned as president and was eventually ousted from the party.

Differences with Congress

Subhas Chandra Bose and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar – the two stalwarts of India’s independence movement – worked in close coordination and played an instrumental role in forcing the British to leave India after World War II.

Both of them had their differences with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru-led Congress and chose a different path to end the colonial rule focusing on the militarisation and a straight fight on the battlefield against the British.

After being deprived and outmanoeuvred of his legitimate second term as Congress president by Mahatma Gandhi’s machinations in 1939, Bose had remained, more or less, on the sidelines of the freedom struggle. He had also parted company with Jawaharlal Nehru, forging his own socialist, political party, Forward Bloc. Given that he differed with the dominant Gandhian view that India could be liberated by non-violence means alone, he had felt frustrated and underutilised.

It was Savarkar, who suggested to Bose, on 22 June, 1940 that he should try to leave India and undertake the risk of going over to Germany to organise the Indian forces there fallen in German hands as captives and then with German help should proceed to Japan to join hands with Rash Behari Bose.

Escape to Germany and Japan

Bose escaped from house arrest in Calcutta on 17 January 1941. Dressed as a Pathan, he was driven by his nephew, Sisir Kumar Bose, to Gomoh, now Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, station in Jharkhand. From there, he travelled overland and in disguise to Peshawar, then to the Soviet Union as the Italian Count Orlando Mazzotta, escorted from Afghanistan to Moscow by NKVD or the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

The Soviets, however, were not interested in helping him or the cause of Indian independence. They handed him over to the German Ambassador.

Flown in a special plane to Berlin in April, Bose met foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Heinrich Luitpold Himmler, Head of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the Gestapo. Bose also met the German Führer und Reichskanzler, or “Leader and Chancellor”, Adolf Hitler.

During his stay in Germany, Bose founded the Free India Centre in Berlin, raising a small army of 4,500 soldiers called the Indian Legion consisting of British Indian prisoners of war captured from North Africa. But Germany was unable to devote the resources or manpower to free India, nor was an overland campaign through so many territories or terrains feasible.

Japan, on the other hand, had been spectacularly successful in the eastern front of World War II, with victory after sensational victory. Following the dramatic fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the mighty British empire itself did not look invincible.

A large number of British Indian soldiers were held captive in forced labour camps by the Japanese. In Europe, on the other hand, the tide of war began to turn against Germany. Bose, therefore, decided to try another strategy, to approach Japan instead of Germany, for help. And to invade India from the East rather than the West.

In February 1943, Netaji boarded a German U-180 submarine at Laboe, Northern Germany, first heading westward, across the heavily mined North Sea.

Bose transferred to a Japanese I-29 submarine after rounding the Cape of Good Hope. On 11 May 1943, he finally reached Tokyo in Imperial Japan, after a short stop in Singapore. In Tokyo, he received the support of Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo as well as the army high command.

Raising of the INA

In Japan, Bose joined Rash Behari Bose. Both resolved to form an Indian National Army under the direct command of Indian officers who would conduct the campaign to liberate India.

An Indian Independence League (IIL) was established and its conference was held in Bangkok in June 1942. Over 100 delegates participated from Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Philippines, Japan, China, Java, Sumatra, Hong Kong and the Andamans. The conference raised the tricolour flag of India and also invited Subhas Bose to East Asia. Indian soldiers who had been captured by the Japanese in the war but had now sworn allegiance to liberate their motherland and eschew the British were also recruited in this group. More than 25,000 volunteers swore to join the INA that was formally set up on 1 September 1942.

Bose’s Indian National Army was the second such army raised in Singapore. The first attempt, made by Rash Behari Bose in 1942, after the fall of Singapore, failed. It was Netaji who was destined to make it happen. He landed in Singapore from Japan on 2 July 1943 to an enthusiastic welcome, assuming command of the Indian National Army on 4 July 1943. Addressing his troops the following day, he gave them the resounding call, “Chalo Dilli” or “Onward to Delhi.”

Subhas was made the leader of the Indian independence movement and hailed as Netaji by his followers, with the war cry of ‘Jai Hind’. Bose called his army Azad Hind Fauj (Free India Force). Under Bose, INA’s motto was Ittefaq (Unity), Itmad (Faith) and Kurbani (Sacrifice). Nationalism was no less than a sort of religious faith.

Declaration of Independence

Indians would do well to remember that before we became a republic or even achieved Independence, great freedom fighters and revolutionaries had already announced India’s Independence.

India’s independence was proclaimed from Singapore on 21 October 1943, with the formation of an interim government, which eleven countries actually recognised.

In a motivational speech for the Indian National Army at a rally of Indians in Burma on 4 July 1944, Bose’s most famous quote was “Give me blood, and I shall give you freedom!” In this, he urged the people of India to join him in his fight against the British Raj.

1943 -45

The INA’s first commitment was in the Japanese thrust towards Eastern Indian frontiers of Manipur. INA’s special forces, the Bahadur Group, were involved in operations behind enemy lines both during the diversionary attacks in Arakan, as well as the Japanese thrust towards Imphal and Kohima.

The Japanese also took possession of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 1942 and a year later, the Provisional Government and the INA were established in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

On 6 July 1944, in a speech broadcast by the Azad Hind Radio from Singapore, Bose addressed Mahatma Gandhi as the “Father of the Nation” and asked for his blessings and good wishes for the war he was fighting.

After the Japanese defeat at the battles of Kohima and Imphal, Bose’s Provisional Government’s aim of establishing a base in mainland India was lost forever. Still the INA fought in key battles against the British Indian Army in Burmese territory, notable in Meiktilla, Mandalay, Pegu, Nyangyu and Mount Popa.

A large proportion of the INA troops surrendered. The remaining troops retreated with Bose towards Malaya or made for Thailand. Japan’s surrender at the end of the war also led to the surrender of the remaining elements of the Indian National Army. The INA prisoners were then repatriated to India. The British Raj, though never seriously threatened by the INA, tried 300 INA officers for treason in the INA trials, but eventually backtracked.

Controversy over Bose’s Death

Many refuse to believe that Bose’s death occurred from third-degree burns on 18 August 1945 after his overloaded Japanese plane crashed in Japanese-ruled Formosa (now Taiwan). Bose’s ashes are stored in a golden pagoda at the Renkōji Temple, Tokyo. Some believe that he was transferred to the Russians by the Japanese, where he died at the

Recent declassified files on the inquiries into Bose’s death indicate that he died alone in a Soviet prison in Siberia under Joseph Stalin’s rule.

Two inquiry reports by Shah Nawaz Committee and one-man GD Khosla Commission, set up in 1956 and 1970 by the Congress governments led by Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi respectively, concluded that Bose died in a plane crash at Taihoku airport.

The declassified documents and exhibits in the National Archives raise serious doubts about the veracity of these reports. However, the third and last report of the Mukherjee Commission established in 1999 had trashed the probe findings, though it doesn’t explain what exactly happened to Netaji. Congress MP and diplomat Dr Satyanarayan Sinha (now deceased) deposed before the Khosla Commission that Netaji was imprisoned in cell number 45 of Yakutsk Prison in Siberia. This information was given to him by a former NKVD agent, Kozlov, who had met Bose in prison. Sinha had served in the Russian Army as an interpreter and later in the Indian Foreign Service. The commission ignored all evidence provided by Sinha.

The post Remembering Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose appeared first on IMR.

Sweeping the Eastern and Western Fronts

I was then posted in Odisha, and after dispersing our own aircraft I was airborne in the ELINT at about 2200 hours to reconfirm the radar orbat as had been painstakingly recorded during the preceding months. It was full moon with terrific visibility, We flew at about 28000 feet charting a course from Kolkata northwards, turning East around East Pakistan keeping a good 20 kms inside India till we reached Agartala. We had no idea of any fighters to cover us because we heard no other RT transmissions.

It was quite eerie knowing that hostilities had been declared and here we were carrying out the first passive operations against the adversary. Surely, all Indian radars were active looking out for enemy aircraft. If anything, the ELINT platform is a most precious and extremely expensive piece of airborne equipment, and critical for knowing what the enemy radars are doing, where they are and are they mobile or static. If there had been any threat to the ELINT mission, I was sure help was close by. I was wrong. Later, I learnt that not one IAF fighter was airborne and all our aircraft on Operational Readiness Platforms (ORP) were for intercepting PAF bombers. We were unprotected and alone. This was to be repeated two days later on the Western front. I landed back at about 0200 hours on 4 December, exhausted and tense, yet excited by the events that must follow the declaration of hostilities. How many would perish in this war I wondered? Many did.

By nightfall on 4 December, I was at an airfield in Western UP. The next morning I was tasked to fly a lengthy sweep starting from somewhere near Jammu flying South just inside the border. Many thoughts went through my mind, and I talked it over with the other pilot and navigator. How close to the border would be safe, how should we position ourselves near Jammu, would we have fighter cover close by, in case of a threat what procedure would we follow, and how do we get into a safe zone?

Losing the ELINT aircraft would be unacceptable and disastrous. I was at 30,000 feet by 0730 hours. In our aircraft the navigator was extremely busy logging his position every two minutes. The special operators were recording their findings. Later, the two data would be correlated and enemy radar dispositions would be confirmed. We had flown this path many times during the last six months. Most surely the adversary was aware of our intent and took counter measures. But today, 5 December, he dare not shut down even one radar and give us that opening to enter. It was a very good day to revalidate their radar orbat. Were they not doing the same thing we asked each other?

Were We Vulnerable to Interception?

In the cockpit we talked about the possibility of being intercepted by Mirage III, F-86 or F-104s. Could not one of these enter Indian airspace very low, then climb rapidly with afterburners to about 30,000 ft, fire missiles at us and scoot back? What had the IAF done to ensure that such an attack could not happen? We had no inkling about this. Our job was to sweep, record, return, collate, compare, and then to do it again. The reader should be amazed at this mind-set in December 1971. I know today that fighter cover was never planned for ELINT operations during peace. But we were now at war, fighters were flying thick and fast, our air defence environment was fully loaded and the ELINT aircraft was the only electronic eyes & ears we had. Did it not need super protection? Forget about the crew, what about the aircraft with its irreplaceable equipment? By the time we had talked about all this we were well past Jaisalmer heading towards Jamnagar, from where we returned to our base intact.

I often ruminate as to whether the PAF ever considered intercepting the Indian ELINT aircraft even with a suicide mission. You may speculate how the IAF would intercept Pakistani ELINT aircraft today. You will recall that on 10 August 1999, a Pakistan Navy Atlantique was shot down by IAF MiGs from Bhuj as the Atlantique had transgressed into Indian airspace on what appeared to be ELINT mission. A month earlier in July 1999, India had destroyed and evicted Pakistani intrusions in Kargil.

The next day, 6 December, another sweep was flown by another crew, and yes, this time fighter escorts were actually positioned close by. The value of our ELINT missions had dawned on us.

Across East Pakistan Unarmed

Maintain 090 Degrees. It is asserted that the PAF ceased to exist as a fighting force in East Pakistan by 6 December, and that not a single PAF fighter got airborne after that date. True or false, I do not know, but I flew right across East Pakistan on 9 December. I was on a routine flight in an An-12 from Sarsawa in Western UP to Kumbigram or Silchar. Just short of Katihar, where we normally turn North towards Kishanganj, we got a radio call from one of our radars, advising us to continue on a heading of 090. Both of us (pilots) looked at each other in surprise, and discussed it with the navigator who was senior to us. Nonsense we concluded. This must be a Pakistani controller luring us into his trap. No way were we going 090 degrees and dutifully turned North. Immediately, the same radar called up and once again asked us to turn back onto 090. We maintained silence convinced that though the call signs and frequency were correct, this has to be a devious trap. Why should the IAF make an unarmed An-12 fly into East Pakistan at the height of armed hostilities? This is “pucca gadbad” we agreed, and remained North-bound.

Authenticate Yourself. Very soon a stern message came across, a different voice, I clearly recollect, demanding why we were disobeying instructions. On the flight deck we decided to authenticate the credentials of the radar unit. You will know that all aircraft and ATC units have authentication sheets which have a ‘Challenge & Answer’ system. It is used to ascertain the identity of an approaching aircraft. The challenge is given by ATC and answered by the aircraft. The authentication sheet has alpha-numeric combinations and it is a secret document. So we decided to challenge the radar unit and, lo and behold, he answered correctly. Considering we were being asked to enter East Pakistan we decided to do it again with another set of codes. The reply was correct. The option of not turning East onto 090 direct for Kumbigram was no longer available. Very reluctantly we banked right and got onto a course direct from Kishanganj to Kumbigram. I do not think any IAF aircraft had done this since 1947 and here we were in an An-12 crossing East Pakistan at about 28,000 feet flying at 400 kms/hr in the middle of a hot shooting war. What a juicy target we must have been for the PAF.

What was Achieved? Do place this moment in perspective. The IAF was still pounding targets in East Pakistan. The Indian Army was far away from Dhaka. The brilliant helicopter aero-bridge across the Meghna river was being launched on this very day by Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC IV Corps and the para-drop at Tangail would happen two days later. On board the An-12 there was silence and all eyes peeled outside as if our stern looks would frighten an attacking F-86. Were we bait? Why this method to lure PAF fighters into the sky for battle? And what if our Gnats/ MiGs did not show up? What if we had actually been enticed into East Pakistan and the Authentication Sheets had been compromised? Our radar spoke with us once or twice and our route took us between Dinajpur and Rangpur, past Meymensingh close to Sylhet and then onto Kumbigram. Were we relieved when we entered Indian air space?

I tried very hard to find out why this was done but never got an answer for 21 years between 1972 till I retired in 1993.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: In the Air Over East Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

During the conflict, East Pakistan’s naval ports were left defenseless as the Eastern Military Command of Pakistan had decided to fight the war without the navy and faced with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, the navy planned to remain in the ports when war broke out.

In the eastern wing, the Pakistan Navy had heavily depended on her gun boat squadron. Pakistan’s Eastern Naval Command was in direct command of Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff who also served as the right-hand of Lieutenant-General Niazi. The Pakistan Navy had 4 gun boats (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, and Sylhet). The boats were capable of attaining maximum speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors. Having known as Pakistan Navy’s brown water navy, the gun boats were equipped with various weapons, including heavy machine guns. The boats were adequate for patrolling and led anti-insurgency operations. But they were hopelessly out of place in a conventional warfare.

Operation Jackpot had severely damaged the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. Before the start of hostilities, all the naval gun boats were stationed at the Chittagong. As the air operations began, IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sank on 4 December. On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired. Rajashahi managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16.

Covert Naval Operations

The Indian Navy started the covert naval operations, which were executed successfully. The Eastern Naval Command of Indian Navy had coordinated, planned, and executed these covert naval operations. In the end months of 1971, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan’s Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. The Pakistan Army’s Combatant High Command, The GHQ, insisted and pressured Pakistan Navy to deploy PNS Ghazi and to extend its sphere of naval operations, into East-Pakistan shores.

In the Eastern wing of Pakistan, the Navy had never maintained a squadron of warships, despite the calls were made by Eastern Naval Command’s Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff.[citation needed] Instead, a brown water navy was formed consisting a gun boats riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, in eastern wing, repair and logistic facilities were not developed at Chittagong. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command virtually faced no opposition from the Eastern theatre. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.

On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF’s capability to retaliate.

The Pakistan Navy responded by deploying her aging long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, to counter the threat as the Naval Command had overruled the objections by her officers. The PNS Ghazi, under the command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, was assigned to locate the INS Vikrant, but when it was not able to locate, decided to mine the port of Vishakapatnam the Headquarter of Eastern Naval Command. The Indian Navy’s Naval Intelligence laid a trap to sink the submarine by giving fake reports about the aircraft carrier. At around midnight of 3-4 December, the PNS Ghazi began its operation of laying mines. The Indian Navy dispatched INS Rajput to counter the threat.

The INS Rajput’s sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.

The sinking of Ghazi turned out to be a major blow and setback for Pakistan Naval operations in East-Pakistan. It diminished the possibilities of carry out the large scale of Pakistan naval operations in Bay of Bengal. It also eliminated further threat possessed by Pakistan Navy to Indian Eastern Naval Command. On reconnaissance mission, the Ghazi was ordered to report back to her garrison on November 26, and admitted a report Naval Combatant Headquarter, NHQ. However, it was failed to return to her garrison. Anxiety grew day by day at the NHQ and NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the submarine failed to produce results.

On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. On December 7/8, the airfields of PAF were destroyed, and the campaign continued until 9 December. On December 12, Pakistan Navy laid mines on amphibious landing approaches to Chittagong. This proved a useful trap for some time, and it had denied any direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed. The Indian Navy therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox Bazar with the aim cutting off the line of re-treat for Pakistan Army troops. On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier. After fighting for days, the human cost was very high for Pakistani forces, and no opposition or resistance was offered by Pakistani forces to Indian forces.

The successful Indian Air Operations and Operation Jackpot, led by the Bengali units with the support of Indian Army, undermined the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. By the time Pakistan Defences Forces surrendered, the Navy had suffered the most damage as almost all of the gun boats, destroyer (PNS Sylhet), and the long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, were lost in the conflict, including their officers.

On December 16, at 16:13hrs, Deputy Command of Eastern Command and the Commander of Eastern Naval Command, Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff surrendered his Naval Command to Vice-Admiral R.N. Krishna Eastern Naval Command.

The Sinking of PNS Ghazi – Pak Version

In his book, “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”, written in 1972 soon after the war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 337)

“The submarine Ghazi was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The Ghazi’s task was to carry out offensive mine laying against Visakhapatnam.

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in the area.

“On 14 November 1971, PNS Ghazi, under the command of Cdr Zafar Mohammad Khan, sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol.

“The first indication of Ghazi’s tragic fate came when a message by NHQ India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December but issued strangely enough on 9 December, was intercepted. Both the manner of its release and the text quoted below clarified very little: “I am pleased to announce that Pakistan Navy Submarine Ghazi sunk off Visakhapatnam by our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and other conclusive evidence floated to surface yesterday – 091101 EF”… As it happened, the release of the message on 9 December also served to divert attention of their public from the sinking of Khukri on this very date even though the claim of sinking Ghazi was apparently made a few hours before the loss of Khukri”.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: Naval War in the East appeared first on IMR.

In the fourteen-day Indo-Pak War of 1971the Indian Navy came of age, attacked Karachi twice and sank five ships, kept the Pakistan Navy at bay and captured two Pakistani merchant ships, though it lost INS Khukri, which sank to INS PNS Hangor’s torpedo attack with loss of 194 lives just off Diu. An Alize which was on an EW mission was shot down on with Lt Cdr Aku Roy in Kutch sea area. In the East, Navy wrote a new chapter of naval warfare and contributed to the hastened surrender by Pakistani forces.

When prime minister Indira Gandhi gave directions to the three Service chiefs – Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, Admiral SM Nanda and Air Chief Marshal PC Lal – to make preparations for war in earnest, the ‘War Book’ was updated, logistics beefed up and exercises undertaken, with simulated plans of attack in war. The operational orders were put in place and the Armed Forces practiced drills in conjunction. The co-ordination between the Chiefs with Manekshaw and the Government was the best India ever seen. Manekshaw donned and acted like a de facto Chief of Defence Staff. Mrs Gandhi reposed faith in him and this was key to the victory that followed.

The Navy practiced anti-submarine warfare and sent submarines for patrols off the Pakistan coast. It exercised missile attacks against Karachi with the newly acquired Osa-class boats with40 km-range missiles and excellent homing nose radars. The Osas possessed the Rangout radars which when switched on ‘High Power’, could get ranges of over 35 km. The boats lacked range but the Navy devised means to tow them to long distances with nylon tow ropes. The Navy arranged to fuel the boats in forward positions on the West Coast at Porbunder and Okha.

Dawn broke on 3 December like any other, with tension in the air. That evening witnessed the beginning of a new chapter in Indian history. Pakistani Air Force fighters struck at seven major air fields – Srinagar, Avantipur (Kashmir), Amritsar, Pathankot, Ambala (Punjab) Barmer and Jodhpur (Rajasthan) – between 1740 and 1810 hours just after dusk, hoping to cripple the Indian Air Force on the ground. But the Indian aircraft had been well dispersed, and only slight damage was caused. At 1830 hours, the Pakistani armoured forces and infantry crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir in the Poonch sector and 11 border posts in Kashmir and Punjab were heavily shelled. Mrs Gandhi spoke to the nation by radio and announced that the country was at war with Pakistan.

The signal message from Chief of Naval Staff Admiral SM Nanda released at the outbreak of hostilities was clear: “Pakistan has committed an unprovoked aggression against us and our defence services have been ordered to meet this challenge with full courage and determination. My objective is to seek and destroy Pakistani lines of communication and, along with the sister Services, inflict the maximum damage on the enemy war machine.

I expect all officers, sailors and civilians in the Navy to do their duty and act according to the best traditions of our great Service. No sacrifice should be too much for us. Let us write a new and glorious chapter in the history of our Service”.

The Western Fleet was at sea ready for battle. Apparently, the Pakistani Fleet failed to come out which confused the Indian Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Chandy Kuruvilla. The C-in-C Western Naval Command, Vice Adm S.N. Kohli opened his war orders and set in motion the attack on Karachi. The Western Fleet, with a missile boat should have been going towards Karachi as practiced, but the Fleet felt it had been located and got sidetracked into intercepting merchant ships and began a hunt for the Pakistan Fleet. By happenstance, Hunters from the OCU Jamnagar under Wing Cdr Pete Wilson attacked Karachi on 4 December morning and set the Kemari oil tanks on fire.

On 3rd night, INS Kiltan (Cdr Gopal Rao) was given command of a force with INS Katchall (Cdr K.N. Zadu) and ordered to close up with INS Nirghat (Lt Cdr I.J. Sharma), INS Nipat (Cdr Babru Yadav, K-25, Lt Cdr B.N. Kavina) and INS Veer (Lt Cdr O..P. Mehta). They were then put on their way to Karachi under shore control in Operation Trident. C-in-C Kohli was seen in the Maritime Operations Room at Bombay, fingers crossed, having let his killer dogs loose on Karachi with no air cover.

With speed in excess of 28 knots, the Osa missile boats, which offer minimum radar targets, approached Karachi in darkness after releasing tow and launched their Styx missiles on the enemy ships. Pakistani officers on duty in the control room at Karachi failed to realize that it was a seaborne attack. Assuming it was an air attack, the Pakistan defenders were confused, mesmerized and utterly in disarray to arrange for seaward defence. In the biggest naval battle since the Second World War, this Indian Task Force sank the Pakistani destroyers Khaibar (formerly HMS Cadiz) under Capt Naseem Malik, the minesweeper Muhafiz and a merchant ship off Karachi in the late hours of 4 December. One missile was fired landward.

Missile warfare entered the world’s naval vocabulary. All Indian commanding officers were decorated for their heroic sortie, which will long be remembered for it earned the Navy two Maha Vir Chakras and four Veer Chakras. 4 December is celebrated as Navy Day.

Not one of the Indian units which attacked Karachi received the slightest damage in the first major naval battle fought by the Indian Navy since Independence. What largely contributed to the big victory was the “daring and perfectly timed action” of the units of the Western Naval Command. Times London reported “Independent observers with long enough memories have compared the operation of 4/5 December with the sinking of British warships, Prince of Wales and Repulse by the Japanese off Singapore in 1941. The two fleets of the Indian Navy have bagged more than two warships but the kill is not as important as the element of surprise involved in the operations and the sense of shock it must have caused to the enemy”.

Operation Python

On 8 December, whilst the Fleet was still to flex its muscles, the second raid on Karachi was let loose in Operation Python. INS Trishul (F15, Captain K.M.V. Nair) and INS Talwar (Cdr. S.S. Kumar) were ordered to rendezvous with the missile boat INS Vinash (Lt Cdr Vijay Jerath) and proceed for a strike on Karachi. The missile attack sank one ship and set the Kemari oil tanks again on fire. There was euphoria in the Indian Navy, But, on 9 December, while the officers and men on board INS Khukri were tuned in to listen to the All India Radio news at 8.50 pm on the ship’s SRE (Sound Reproduction Equipment), while on an anti-submarine warfare mission to look out for a reported Pak submarine, the ship was hit by more than one torpedo, possibly two, fired from one of Pakistan Navy’s three newly acquired Daphne-class submarines, the Hangor (Cdr A. Tasneem) about 40 miles off Diu Head. Eighteen officers and 176 sailors perished as INS Kirpan nearby in company left the area to return with forces for rescue next day. In command of INS Khukri was Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla a 45-year old tall, strapping royal Navy-trained anti-submarine warfare specialist with earlier command experience of destroyer INS Rana and Second-in-Command of INS Krishna (the Kistna). One can picture him on the bridge of his ship, after realizing that there was no hope and forced to give the order “Abandon Ship’.

A famous broadcaster announced the sinking, saying “Captain Mulla was seen smoking a cigarette and gave his life jacket to another in the highest traditions of navies.”

Admiral SM Nanda issued a signal that officers must not go down with ships but return to fight another day with the experience.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: The Naval War in the West appeared first on IMR.

2 Corps

In the southwestern sector 2 Corps, under Lt Gen TN Raina, launched its thrust with 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division. It was well supported by a regiment plus a squadron of armour and was headed towards Kushtia and Jessore. By 6 December the well-entrenched Pakistani garrison in Jessore had apparently panicked and had pulled out. By 7 December the advancing columns had moved 30 km further up to Zenida. Magura, the next objective, was taken the next day. By 9 December, the leading elements were on the banks of the Madhumati river and preparations were underway for the capture of Kushtia. Contrary to the 2 Corps assessment, defences of Kushtia proved to be a tough nut to crack. The defenders held their ground for two long days before extricating themselves. By 12 December both Kushtia and the Hardinge Bridge, with some of its spans demolished, were in the bag. By then Indian forces were being concentrated for an assault on Daulatpur, a town close to Khulna. Operations for reducing Daulatpur were still in progress when the cease-fire came into effect. With hindsight, it appears that 2 Corps may have achieved more spectacular results if it had made a push towards Dacca once Jessore and Zenida had fallen.

33 Corps

Lt Gen ML Thapan, commanding 33 Corps, had 20 Mountain Division and two independent brigade groups. He was also permitted to commit one brigade of 6 Mountain Division, located in the Siliguri corridor, with a rider to ensure that it would be reverted within 48 hours if necessary. The Corps plan in a nutshell was to launch two brigades from the north towards Dinajpur and Rangpur. The divisional thrust from the west was to bypass Hilli from the north and then swing south to capture Bogra. The northern thrusts made spectacular progress. Their dash and determination totally surprised the defenders. By 9 December, Dinajpur had been contacted. Garrisons at Saidpur and Rangpur had been tied down. The divisional thrust also made steady progress. By 4 December, it had captured Charkai, 11 km inside. While positions immediately to the north of Hilli were still being fought for, advancing columns had moved further towards Nawabganj. It was captured mainly by the Mukti Bahini. By 7 December road Rangpur – Bogra had been severed. The same day, Maj Gen Shah, GOC 16 Pakistan Infantry Division, and his party were ambushed. However, the General managed to avoid capture. The thrust was, thereafter, developed due south towards Gobindganj and Bogra. In the meantime, Hilli had finally been captured on 11 December. It was one of the hardest fought battles of the eastern theatre. By 14 December, a roadblock had been established south of Bogra and parts of the township had been captured. Fierce fighting continued as the defenders shrank into the inner core of the built up area. However, all of them surrendered on 16 December 1971.

101 Communication Zone

Further to the east of 33 Corps was the area of operations of 101 Communication Zone. Both sides had assigned the lowest priority to this sector. Maj Gen GS Gill had just about two brigades to launch his thrust against a weak enemy brigade holding Jamalpur and Mymensingh strong points. His main effort was to head towards Jamalpur. The Pakistani outpost at Kamalpur surrendered on 4 December. Bakshiganj further south withdrew soon on being attacked. On 5 December Maj Gen GS Gill sustained injuries as his jeep went over a mine. He had to be evacuated and was replaced by Maj Gen GC Nagra. By 9 December, one more brigade, had been allotted to this sector and all was set for the capture of Jamalpur. That is when the Pakistani garrisons of Jamalpur and Mymensingh were ordered back for the close defence of Dacca. Thus, both these towns were in Indian hands on 11 December. That very evening a para drop took place at Tangail further south of Jamalpur towards Dacca. A link up was established on 12 December and the final push was made for Dacca. As it transpired, it was through this least priority sector that Dacca was entered first.

4 Corps

4 Corps in the east was under Lt Gen Sagat Singh and had 8, 23 and 57 Mountain Divisions on its order of battle. The Corps plan envisaged three Divisional thrusts to liberate all areas east of Meghna river, cut off rail and road communications to Chittagong, and force a crossing across Meghna to head for Dacca.

In the very opening stages, in the battle of Gangasagar near Akhaura, Lance Naik Albert Ekka of 14 Guards proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. During the attack he got wounded while single handedly silencing an enemy machine gun. Unmindful of his injuries, he charged on to clear yet another machine gun post by bayoneting the crew. He later succumbed to his wounds. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra for most conspicuous bravery and became the only one to be so honoured in the eastern theatre during the war.

Akhaura fell on 5 December. By 7 December Brahmanbaria had been taken and the troops were racing towards Ashuganj. By then, in a daring heliborne operation, a battalion had been landed in Sylhet — a move that completely unnerved the Pakistanis. Comilla and Laksham were captured by 9 December. Efforts to hustle out the defenders from Ashuganj did not succeed and the bridge there could not be secured before it was blown by the Pakistanis in panic. However, using helicopters in the moonlit night, Meghna was ‘airbridged’. By 14 December more forces had got across Meghna using river craft. That day the first artillery shells were fired on Dacca. 4 Corps formations were on the outskirts of Dacca and Mynamati was still being fought for, when the Pakistani forces surrendered unconditionally.

Unconditional Surrender

Independent of these Corps thrusts, the air borne assault by 2 Para on 11 December near Tangail hastened the proceedings and the fall of Dacca. Lt Col KS Pannu, commanding the Para Group, was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra for his determined combat leadership. On 12 December, a sea borne assault by a battalion group was launched towards Cox’s Bazar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping into Burma. Both the Navy and the Air Force had achieved complete mastery of the sea and the air space and had supported the operations of the Eastern Command admirably.

After 12 December 1971, Gen Manekshaw had been sending messages to Niazi to surrender. Later, leaflets urging the same were also dropped. Radio frequencies on which HQ Eastern Command could be contacted were also made known. The deadline of 0900 hours on 16 December 1971 set for an unconditional surrender was extended to 1500 hours the same day at Niazi’s behest. That morning, Maj Gen Gandharva Nagra had already reached Niazi’s HQ and was soon joined by Maj Gen JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command. The Pakistani General was soon convinced that surrender was the only option.

In a hurriedly organised surrender ceremony at the Dacca Race Course, Lt Gen AAK Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender and handed over his revolver to the victorious Indian commander before thousands of cheering and delirious crowds. Shouts of “Joi Bangla” rent the air. Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, accepted history’s greatest surrender since the end of the Second World War. Later that evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced to an ecstatic Lok Sabha that Dacca was the free capital of a free nation and offered a unilateral cease-fire in the western theatre with effect from December 17, 1971.

The audacity and speed of operations had kept the opponents off balance throughout. Over 90,000 personnel were taken prisoners of war. The Indian Army had achieved a stunning and memorable victory.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: The Lightening Campaign appeared first on IMR.

Though the East provided 75 per cent of the foreign earnings and exports, the reins of power were almost exclusively in the hands of West Pakistanis. Initially, Pakistan called itself a democracy, but effectively the country was run by the army, the President from 1958 to 1969 being Field-Marshal Ayub Khan.

The arrest, in 1966 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League and the outstanding political figure in East Pakistan, convinced his supporters that limited autonomy was no longer a realistic aim and that total separation was the only answer. In March 1969, Ayub Khan, having lost all semblance of popular support, gave way to General Yahya Khan, who, in December, 1970, held an election in which the Awami League won a clear majority, whereupon Yahya announced the indefinite postponement of the opening of Parliament. Rioting broke out in East Pakistan; on 25 March, 1971, the Sheikh was again arrested and the following day the unofficially styled ‘Bangladesh’ seceded from the Government of Pakistan by unilateral declaration. Yahya then sent Lt Gen Tikka Khan to East Pakistan with orders to ‘sort them out’. Thereafter, the army went on the rampage and some estimate that as many as a million civilians were murdered.

Refugees poured into India and those who remained, having nothing to lose, flocked to join the Awami League’s militant resistance organization, the Mukti Bahini, including most of the 70,000 locally recruited members of the armed forces. By August, six million refugees had fled to West Bengal, an intolerable burden for the Indian Government, whose armed forces were now actively preparing to come to the aid of the Mukti Bahini. This was not practicable until November when the monsoon would be over and the ground hard enough to allow large-scale operations, while the onset of winter would close the Sino-lndian frontier and inhibit interference from China.

There were several clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the East Pakistani border in October and November, when the latter crossed the frontier in ‘hot pursuit’ of the Mukti Bahini, finally leading, on 3 December, to the outbreak of open warfare on two fronts.

Save for the hilly tracts of Chittagong, East Pakistan was a riverine country. The river Brahmaputra flows through the centre to divide the country into two. Both these halves are further dissected by the Ganga river in the west and the Meghna river in the East. Besides, there are many other water channels and rivulets in between. On the few arterial roads which exist there are only two bridges across these mighty rivers – the Hardinge Bridge over the Ganga and the bridge across the Meghna at Ashuganj. Inland waterways cater for most of the surface communications within. All in all, East Pakistan terrain was excellent for defensive operations.

 Towards the end of April 1971, the Indian government gave the first indication of a possible military intervention in East Pakistan to Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, the Chief of the Army Staff. For a variety of sound strategic military reasons he advised the government against a hasty and indecisive military venture. The government too had other political compulsions and better sense prevailed. Consequently, the Army Chief set in motion a well-conceived plan to prepare for an all out war. To avoid getting bogged down in the riverine terrain, it had to be well after the monsoons and to preclude possible Chinese intervention, it had to be nearer the winter by when the passes on the high Himalayas close.

Shortages in manpower and equipment were made up steadily. The army’s resources, particularly the engineer effort and the bridging equipment, were judiciously allotted to the two widely separated western and eastern theatres. Formations were affiliated to the newly raised HQ 2 Corps. Territorial Army units were embodied and reservists were called up. Additional communication zone units were also raised to ensure better logistics support.

All this while Eastern Command was abuzz with hectic activities. In April 1971, it had only one division earmarked for a possible role in East Pakistan. Two more divisions were pulled out from their counter insurgency commitments. Three divisions were milked out from those having their role in Sikkim and in Arunachal Pradesh. One more division, otherwise intended for the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border, was also placed under the Command. Operational control of all Border Security Force units deployed along the East Pakistan border was handed over to Eastern Command. All formations, operationally oriented either for a role in the mountains or for counter-insurgency operations, were trained and prepared for the impending riverine operations. Measures to create the necessary logistics infrastructure, to support the operational contingencies, were initiated. Operational plans were evolved, coordinated with the Navy and the Air Force and were finalised.

 In the event of war, Pakistan had apparently visualised an Indian offensive attempting a shallow penetration, to install the Provisional Bangladesh Government. They had also counted on American support and Chinese intervention to restrain India. Hence, Pakistan’s overall defensive philosophy was to cause maximum delay by holding fortress like strong defences on all routes of ingress along the border. In consonance with their threat analysis, deployment towards the west and the north was to be heavier. For this defensive plan, Lt Gen AAK Niazi had a strength of about four divisions and seven wings of paramilitary forces. 9 Pakistan Infantry Division, with its HQ at Jessore, was to guard the western approaches. 16 Pakistan Infantry Division was responsible for the Dinajpur-Rangpur salient towards the northwest and had its HQ at Nator. The northern sector of Mymensingh was considered the least threatened and had only about a brigade deployed to defend it. Wary of the preparatory activities in Tripura, the eastern approaches to Dacca were being guarded by 14 Pakistan Infantry Division located at Comilla. Rings of defences had also been prepared around Dacca. Thus, hoping to fight set piece defensive battles of attrition, Niazi had opted for orthodox positional warfare and could be faulted for rigidity.

 In contrast, Lt Gen JS Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, had a plan that was bold and had streaks of originality. It sought to defeat the very premises of the defender’s strategy. In essence there were to be three thrusts by 2, 33 and 4 Corps from the west, north and the east, respectively. Each Corps was to contain the enemy strong points with small forces while the larger components were to bypass these for objectives in depth. All three Corps had planned to maintain speed of action, without tactical pauses, for a dash to Dacca before the defences around it could be occupied. The enemy was to be forced to react to Indian moves throughout. That is where superior generalship lay.

Mukti Bahini

After Lieutenant General Tikka Khan’s crack down, many officers and men from the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the police, had tried to raise an armed rebellion. Their disjointed efforts did not create the desired impact and they gradually trickled into India. Many of them had come with their weapons. They provided the nucleus for the Mukti Bahini. Trained and equipped by the Indian army, they were meshed into the operational plans of the formations of Eastern Command. Till August 1971, motivated bands of Mukti Bahini had operated along the border or had ventured only a few kilometers across. By October 1971, however, the Mukti Bahini had stepped up its activities to tie down sizeable Pakistani forces along the border and on many static duties well in depth.

Tension mounted further as the Pakistani forces resorted to unprovoked firing on Indian posts and civilian targets alike. Between November 20 and 23, 1971 fierce battles were fought at Garibpur, around Hilli, and at Atgram. The commanding officers of all the three battalions which fought these actions – 14 Punjab, 8 Guards and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles – went on to earn Maha Vir Chakras.

War broke out on December 3, 1971. On that day the Eastern Command was also responsible for the northern borders with China and for the ongoing counter-insurgency operations in many eastern states. The total forces under the Eastern Army nearly touched the half million mark.

Eastern Front Timeline

3 December       Pakistan Air Force attacks Agartala airfield.

4 December       India launches integrated ground, air and naval offensive. Aircraft from the carrier Vikrant bomb airfield at Cox’s Bazar. Dacca bombed every 1/2 hour.

5 December       Indian Army links up with Mukti Bahini and enters E. Pakistan from five directions.

6 December       India announces recognition of independent state of Bangladesh.

5-14 December Indian troops occupy East Pakistan towns on:

5th – Akhaura, Laksham

6th – Feni

7th – Sylhet, Jessore

8th – Magura, Comilla, Brahman-baria

9th – Chandpur, Daudkandi

10th – Bhairab Bazar

11th – Noakhali, Nasirabad, Kushtia

12th – Narsingdi

14th – Bogra

14 December Indian artillery starts shelling Dacca. Garrisons now still holding out only at Dacca, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Khulna, Barisal, Chittagong and Mainamati (a fortified cantonment outside Comilla).

15 December     Indian forces close on Dacca from all sides.

16 December     General Niazi signs surrender document for Pakistan, though fighting continues in the Khulna and Sylhet areas until 17 December. Excerpted from yet-to-be-published “The Fighting Spirit: An Illustrated Account of the Indian Army’s Operations in the Twentieth Century” by Maj Gen RK Arora.

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