The US State Department effectively rejected nearly all of China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea, through a statement on “US Position on Maritime Claims in South China Sea” by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on 14 July, which came soon after the US conducted its first dual aircraft carrier exercises in the South China Sea in six years.

Pompeo warned that the “world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire” and that America “stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

America’s unprecedented statement against China’s maritime moves marks a provocative new chapter in their South China Sea showdown.

In his statement, Pompeo invoked the 2016 award handed down by an arbitral tribunal at The Hague that ruled in favor of the Philippines over China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The decision, which China has ignored, questioned the legal basis of  Beijing’s expansive claims under its nine-dash line that lays claim to most of the sea. The arbitral award, handed down four years ago on July 12, “rejected (China’s) maritime claims as having no basis in international law.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement countered that Washington has not yet ratified the UNCLOS.

US Defends SE Asian Allies’ Interests

In a shot across China’s bow, Pompeo specifically rejected China’s claim over land features such as the Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal (defended by a Philippine marine detachment) and the Mischief Reef, all of which fall within “areas that the tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf.”

Aside from its mutual defense treaty ally in the Philippines, the US now also effectively supports the claims of other regional partners, including Vietnam, Malaysia and even Indonesia amid recent rising tensions with China off the energy-rich Natuna islands.

In its statement, the US said that it “rejects any [Chinese] maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off Indonesia).”

It also effectively reaffirmed Malaysia’s claim over the China-claimed James Shoal, since it’s “an entirely submerged feature only 50 nautical miles from Malaysia and some 1,000 nautical miles from China’s coast,” the US statement said.

China’s Response

China’s Foreign Ministry struck back by accusing the US of “deliberately distorting the facts and international law” It said the US “exaggerates the situation in the region” in order to “sow discord between China and other littoral countries.”

The Chinese statement maintained that the South China Sea situation “is peaceful and stable and is still improving” and decried the US for “flexing muscles, stirring up tension and inciting confrontation in the region.” It added: “China is firmly opposed to it.”

US Carrier Force Exercise

US aircraft carriers the USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz with 120 fighters were both deployed for drills in the South China Sea when Pompeo made the foreign policy statement related to the SCS. The exercises took place near Paracel Islands off the Vietnam coast and north of Chinese nuclear submarine base at Hainan Islands. That exercise began on July 4 with “each strike group on its respective operational tasking.”

America’s deployment of the carriers was a “freedom of navigation operation” carried out for the fifth time this year.

The last time that three American aircraft-carriers prowled the Pacific Ocean was in 2017, shortly after President Donald Trump had threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea.

The carriers resumed rare dual exercises in the SCS, teaming up for the second time in July in contested waters. The two-carrier strike force trains to the highest levels of readiness to ensure responsiveness to any contingency through power projection.

The presence of the Nimitz and Reagan in the South China Sea marked the first time two US aircraft carriers have operated together there since 2014 and only the second time since 2001.

A day after Pompeo’s announcement, a US guided missile destroyer sailed near the Chinese-claimed Spratly Islands, also known as the Nansha Islands in China. The move was described as a “freedom of navigation” operation, part of the US Navy’s commitment to asserting “the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognized in international law by challenging the restrictions on innocent passage.”

The Navy used similar language when the two carriers joined up in the South China Sea again on 17 July.

China said the U.S. sent ships to the SCS to flex its muscles. Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said, on 6 July, that the United States had deliberately sent its ships and accused Washington of trying to drive a wedge between the countries in the region.

Air Defence Identification Zone

For a decade, Chinese leaders have mulled the creation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea. China established its first ADIZ in 2013 over the East China Sea. Controversially, it covered the uninhabited Senkaku islands. These are controlled by Japan but claimed by China (which calls them the Diaoyu). America promptly sent two bombers to fly through the zone without permission, to show it would pay no heed. Chinese leaders are now “waiting for the right time” to declare plans for an ADIZ in the South China Sea, according to the South China Morning Post. China may see an ADIZ in the South China Sea as a way of justifying more air patrols there.

An ADIZ there might be easier for China to monitor than the one in the East China Sea  with the use of radars on Hainan island or the Chinese mainland coastline with gaps filled in using surveillance planes or fighter jets or radar-equipped destroyers.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian arrogantly declared that “every country has the right to establish an ADIZ”, and said: “In the light of air security threats China faces over SCS waters, China will carefully and prudently study the relevant issues, taking into account all factors.”

India and the South China Sea

How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for India’s security. It is not China’s sea, Indians have sailed its water for centuries. Delhi has stakes in commerce, peace and security in Indo-Pacific.

Chinese military postures are cause for concern since unilaterally declaring the South China Sea as China’s territorial waters either carries the force of any treaty nor legal standing. The South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common. India has historical rights established by practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.

Comments

The US is now also directly challenging China’s “historic rights” claims over energy and fishery resources across the South China Sea basin and beyond.

US’s proclamation that any action by China to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in SCS waters or to carry out such activities unilaterally would be unlawful was music to the ears of China’s smaller neighbors. These statements represent a natural progression in Washington’s increasingly hawkish policies towards Beijing.

In recent years, the US has upgraded its security cooperation with new partners such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, while maintaining its commitment to traditional allies like the Philippines.

Under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the US aims to increase its bases in Asia and make them harder for China to target in a missile attack, to show Beijing – and US allies – that America is ‘deeply committed’ to defending its interests in the region.

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China’s Aggressive Actions in the South China Sea

In the first half of 2020 alone, Chinese naval or militia forces have rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat, “buzzed” a Philippines naval vessel and harassed a Malaysian oil drilling operation, all within their respective EEZs. China conducted ballistic missile tests in the South China Sea in June 2019 and continues to enhance naval patrols to enforce area denial for others.

On April 3rd China’s coastguard sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel islands. 

On June 10th another one was rammed in the same area by a Chinese ship.

In April and May Chinese coastguard vessels harassed West Capella, a Malaysian drillship near Borneo, prompting America and Australia to send warships.

In the Spratly archipelago, China’s “maritime militia”, disguised as a fishing flotilla, has been swarming near Thitu, an island controlled by the Philippines but claimed by China.

Despite promising America in 2015 that it would not militarise the area, it has built ports, runways and bunkers in the Spratlys and installed missiles on these island fortresses.

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Shringla, a former Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka, was in Bangladesh on his first visit to the country. He was addressing a seminar at the Bangladesh Institute for International Studies (BIISS)., Shringla said Bangladesh has become India’s largest development partner in the world and India’s largest trade partner in the region.

Shringla said India also welcomes the opportunity for Indian officers to train at premier military institutions of Bangladesh, just as the Indian side is ready to open military training institutes at all levels – from officer cadet training to specialised higher command training – to Bangladesh.

India’s advanced air defence system AKASH has great potential for export to friendly countries.

Logistics Bases

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) is looking at setting up logistics bases in Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka as part of initiatives to woo the countries to buy India’s light combat aircraft Tejas and military helicopters.

Chairman and Managing Director of HAL R Madhavan said, on 9 March, that the HAL was considering to build logistics bases in the four countries as they use a number of Russian-origin military aircraft and choppers whose serviceability is “very poor”. He said the HAL is now seriously focusing on boosting exports in sync with the government’s priority and identified South East Asia, West Asia and North Africa to sell key platforms like Tejas, attack helicopter Rudra and advanced light helicopter Dhruv.

Without divulging details, Madhavan said a number of countries in West Asia are also in touch with the HAL for possible procurement of its key products.

The combat jets are classified under various generations depending on their avionics, capability and weapons systems. The current fleet of fighter jets with the IAF range from three-and-half generation to the fourth generation.

South Korea

A Roadmap for Defence Industries Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was exchanged during a bilateral meeting between defence minister Rajnath Singh and Republic of Korea (ROK) defence minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo, on 4 February 2020.

This Roadmap lists a number of possible areas of cooperation in land systems, naval systems, aero systems, guided weapon systems including research and development cooperation, collaboration regarding testing, certification and quality assurance. The roadmap aims to facilitate defence industries in participation and collaboration on Make in India initiatives of Government of India.

This Roadmap also aims to promote investment and technology transfer in Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

ROK companies wishing to invest in India are envisaged to receive support from both Defence Investor Cell and Korea Plus Centre. Several Indian companies are involved in the manufacturing of various defence spare parts in India.

Uganda

Ugandan & Indian officials at the handover event. In the background is the fleet gifted

Uganda has received a fleet of eighty eight (88) motor vehicles including executive buses, ambulances, water trucks and utility lorries donated by the government of India. The fleet also includes a consignment of 44 military trucks to be used by the national army, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).

The vehicles were officially handed over, on 3 March, by the Indian high commissioner to Uganda to Uganda’s minister of foreign affairs.

The donation is a follow-up of pledges made by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi during his official visit to Uganda in July 2018. The visit was part of a wider African tour aimed at deepening India’s ties with Africa.

Nepal

Nepal is working with Russia on payment options for an unspecified number Mi-17 V-5 helicopters, as dollar transactions have been made difficult by US sanctions against Russia. Russia has switched over to payments in national currencies with countries such as India, China and Indonesia as sanctioned Russian entities cannot use the SWIFT international payments system.

The payment in dollars could be made through China or India.

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Beijing dismissed the proposal, preferring instead to send military forces to the South China Sea and exploit resources. In the recent past, Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels entered In-donesia’s North Natuna Sea Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), resulting in a diplomatic dispute, with Indonesia claiming it would never accept China’s nine-dash line, nor compromise with China. A number of Chinese vessels had previously been engaged in a conflict with Vietnamese au-thorities in the vicinity of an oil block within Vietnam’s EEZ.

Indonesia is not a claimant in South China Sea, but it opposes the portion of its Exclusive Eco-nomic Zone that originates from the Natuna Islands (which Indonesia considers significant not only for its protection but also for its economic development), but it “allegedly” also encroaches on China’s self-proclaimed Nine Dash Line.

Natuna Stand-off

“There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China,” was a frequently-heard slogan of Indonesian leaders for decades. That fails to recognise the persisting maritime dispute between them. In late December last year, several Chinese coast guard ships escorted more than three dozen Chinese fishing boats into the waters off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, which was not only within China’s self-proclaimed’ nine-dash line’ but also Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone near the South China Sea’s Natuna Islands.

The latest incident follows the pattern of Chinese vessels operating in maritime regions that are contested by China with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Conscious of this, Jakarta immediately summoned the Chinese ambassador and issued a formal diplomatic protest. Indonesia deployed five warships, and four F-16 jet fighters in the two-week conflict that followed at the far south end of the South China Sea. The response from Indonesia has been more about pushing the Chinese away without escalating tensions. Chinese coast guard vessels and Indonesian naval vessels were engaged in a confrontation for the first week of 2020, reminiscent of earlier standoffs between Chinese forces and those in the Philippines and Vietnam over the last decade.

China argued that the waters of Natuna had been their fishing grounds for decades, since the area lies within its self-proclaimed line of nine-dash.

Claims over Natuna

United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains the authority of coastal states over their territorial waters of up to 12 nauti-cal miles from the baseline. A coastal state has sovereignty and absolute power at territorial sea over its maritime area, subsoil, and airspace. A coastal state may make claims for an EEZ in ma-ritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles measured from coastal state baseline.

Indonesia, in particular the EEZ between the two states of the North Natuna Sea, is yet to fully resolve its maritime boundary with Vietnam. That creates a “gray area” in which affected States can exercise sovereign rights. Territorial confusion creates a’ blame game’ in which both states can assert sovereignty over the’ gray area.’ When Vietnam and Indonesia correctly settle territorial disputes in the North Natuna Sea including EEZ claims, the region is open to both nations’ claims. Indonesia is entitled to send its vessels to carry out naval patrols while Vietnam is al-lowed to carry out UNCLOS-approved activities in areas it considers part of its EEZ.

On the other hand, China does not recognize maritime areas in the vicinity of Natuna as its EEZ but within its’ nine-dash line’ as part of its traditional waters.’ That is why China claims it has the right to fish there. The’ nine-dash line’ was rejected by the Permanent Court of International Ar-bitration in 2016, which ruled the line was against the principle of UNCLOS in 1982.

China’s Strategic Calculations in Natuna

The southern limits of its expansive claims for hegemony in the South China Sea, demarcated by nine-dash line have never been fully defined. In light of the previous skirmishes with Indonesia , and the recent standoff, it is evident that China claims the region as part of its territorial waters. Clearly, there are different aspects to the issue that China might have considered while sparking off the dispute.

First, Beijing is now in a position to make better use of militarized outposts across the South China Sea and allow more routine and longer-lasting patrols of its claims to sovereignty. Indone-sia’s Natuna Islands are situated approximately 700 miles southwest of China’s Spratly outposts, well within the range of Chinese naval, coast guard aircraft and artificial island air force patrols.

China has been engaged in long-term negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to conclude a Code of Conduct in South China Sea. Strangely, though China’s maritime claims overlap with the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia, Jakarta has long maintained the position of not being officially a claimant in the ASEAN negotiations. The rationale behind that is, it does not consider the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands to be part of the South China Sea. As a non-claimant, Jakarta had little reason to collaborate with claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines in pursuing a legally binding Code of Conduct by 2021. Yet recent tensions around the Natuna Islands may change the scenario. ASEAN’s chair in 2020, Vietnam, is already dealing with Vanguard Bank standoff with China. Hence, alienating another influential ASEAN member state could prove futile in future.

Conclusion

ASEAN countries have limited capability when it comes to challenging China. China has been building South China Sea as a springboard to project its naval power.

Vietnam already has a dispute with Indonesia over Natuna. Hence, it is unlikely that Vietnam would give any categorical focus to China- Indonesia dispute. This would imply, that the internal disputes itself within ASEAN countries is a weak link in the entire dispute and hence ASEAN is unlikely to come up with a joint response to Chinese coercive action anytime soon.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that an anti-China front might never emerge in ASEAN. The ASEAN countries gain major economic benefits from China and would not want a scenario where they have a political or military fall out with China.

Indonesia presently is focused on internal stability which depends on its rapid economic development supported by Chinese investment and support.

China too has resisted any coercive aggressive action. Recent policy changes in China have also given some signs of a willingness to pursue a peaceful resolution. If China believes it has a valid claim to fish in the claimed EEZ in Indonesia, it has shown restraint in its response to protests from Indonesia.

Clearly, Indonesia does not want this spat to escalate. Its response was subdued. This time, al-though military vessels and aircraft were deployed to the area, their actions were restrained.

Since illegal fishing is a persisting issue and the disputing countries clearly want to maintain re-straint. Hence, an agreement over fisheries could be thought of.

One more aspect to look out for is amidst the persisting multilaterals, mini laterals and hubs and spokes alliances in function in response to the persisting violation of freedom of navigation rules, it is important to understand how the prominent powers in the region who consistently emphasize on ASEAN centrality respond to the persisting security dilemma. Russia has just entered the game (for resource exploration in Philippines and Vietnam) in China’s self proclaimed waters. Also the fact that China and Russia are reviving their old friendship one has to study the real rationale of Russia’s initiative to factor in.

It is a fact that in Southeast Asia the claimant states of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines do not possess the capacity or ability of China to demonstrate its territorial integr-ity in the South China Sea. Thus, these nations should put aside their differences towards China and reach a consensus on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Apparently a careful bal-ance must be struck between assertion of power and tactful diplomacy between actors on all sides, because armed conflict is not desirable for any party involved.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping has promised to assist Myanmar in financing and constructing a range of infrastructure projects under the proposed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The offer is similar to the one extended to Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Joint Statement

A joint statement, issued on January 18, claimed that “a new chapter” had been opened “in the ever-lasting friendship” between the two countries, stemming from the broad understanding to promote “comprehensive strategic cooperation.” It referred to building the “Myanmar-China Community with a Shared Future.” Exchanges of “experience in governance” will be deepened and strategic communication will be enhanced. Besides, the two governments plan to make good use of the 2+2 high-level consultations, comprising the two foreign ministers and defence ministers.

Rohingya Issue

Relationship between the two countries has warmed since 2017 when China refused to join the international outcry against the military campaign to force more than 730,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh.

China is making the case that some of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects can help alleviate the Rohingya conflict by accelerating the development of the Arakan region. It is also offering projects to promote economic development in the conflict-prone northern frontiers of Myanmar that have long challenged the writ of the central government in the south.

The Chinese also made it clear that the Myanmar government, currently under intense international pressure due to its rigid position on the Rohingya issue, will continue to receive China’s full support. Beijing has positioned itself as the great defender of Myanmar’s legitimate rights, interests and national dignity at a time when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is about to pronounce on the charges of genocide against the Myanmar military.

Three Pillars of CMEC

Xi met Myanmar’s leaders, including state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and army chief Min Aung Hlaing, in the capital, Naypyitaw, on 17 January. Ahead of the visit, Xi wrote an article in the Myanmar newspapers discussing the proposed projects in the economic corridor which will be part of China’s BRI.

“Our two sides need to deepen results-oriented Belt and Road cooperation and move from a conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation in building the CMEC,” Xi said in the article.

Elaborating, Xi said, “Efforts need to be made to promote the three pillars of the CMEC, namely the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone, the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone and New Yangon City.”

Through the agreements signed and discussions held about their follow-up during the visit, CMEC’s three pillars seem to have been consolidated.

The centrepiece of the so called CMEC is a $1.3 billion deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu in Rakhine state, giving Beijing a gateway to the Indian Ocean. A high-speed rail link is also on the cards to connect the port and nearby planned industrial zone with the countries’ shared border. Bilateral trade was worth $16.8 billion last year and Beijing holds the biggest share – around $4 billion or 40% – of Myanmar’s foreign debt.

Myanmar has successfully hammered down the price from $7.2 billion to swerve fears of a Chinese debt-trap, but will still pick up 30 per cent of the bill. Alongside the port, swathes of paddy fields and teak forests are poised to be transformed into a vast industrial zone of garment and food processing factories.

The first segment of the proposed high-speed rail link from China’s landlocked Yunnan province to Myanmar’s west coast will cut through the border town of Muse to former capital Mandalay. But engineering challenges through Myanmar’s hilly Shan State would likely be dwarfed by security concerns. The region is awash with weapons and a centre for meth production as armed rebels and militias jostle for a share of any potential windfall. They will first need to be appeased and reassured the rail link will not jeopardise their income or security.

Yangon authorities hope to revolutionise the sprawling, gridlocked commercial hub by creating a whole new town on the west bank of the city’s river. They say the satellite city will help solve problems of congestion, overpopulation and the lack of electricity and water.

India’s Interests

As China steps into the backwaters of the Bay of Bengal, the littorals of the Bay have a stake in constructing a regional order that limits conflict and promotes cooperation across the Bay of Bengal.China has already acquired the Gwadar port in Pakistan, followed by Hambantota in Sri Lanka in India’s backyard. Instead of seeing itself in irreconcilable competition with Beijing in Myanmar, Delhi should focus on making more effective contribution to Myanmar’s development and security. India needs to focus on quickly completing its own infrastructure projects in Myanmar and develop a new strategy for commercial partnership with Naypyidaw that is in tune with India’s own capabilities and strengths.

Delhi should also strengthen its collaboration with like-minded partners like Japan which has a growing economic presence in Myanmar.

Delhi also needs to bring fresh energy to the dormant dialogue with Beijing on the so-called BCIM corridor involving Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar. Although India has rejected China’s BRI, it has left the door open for cooperation with China on the BCIM corridor.

By pushing mega projects in a country that has not been of much interest in the past, China looks to consolidate a connection between its South-Western province of Yunnan and Bay of Bengal. The Kyaukpyu deep-sea port being developed by China on the eastern bank of Bay of Bengal, when put together with Chinese ambitions of CMEC, creates a full-fledged and high-potential path for China in its trade route.

China, via the CPEC and the Gwadar port, has already established a foot in the Indian subcontinent. With Gwadar in the Arabian Sea, Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal as well as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, China has seemingly engulfed India from point of view of its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). And, while these ports offer China immense potential both from strategic as well as trade perspectives, they garner apprehension for India – the only absentee from China’s BRI.

With BRI derivatives all around, India has a cause for concern. Not only has China propagated its BRI, making its outreach to IOR and gulf peninsula a reality, strangely enough, but there has been no check on its expansion by the US – for whom China’s strides matter the most.

In recent years, Chinese debt trap has been instrumental in treading a path for China to reach Indian waters. IOR has been a prime transit route of the global maritime traffic following the inauguration of the Suez Canal. While naturally, India is comfortably positioned to utilise the benefits of strategically paramount IOR, aggressive Chinese advances to form bases in IOR has ensured competition.

China’s growing geopolitical influence in IOR does not sit well with Indian interests. India has also taken steps to curb Chinese dominance of the area by offering a hefty economic package to the Maldives, empowering the latter to come out of the Chinese debt trap and not give in like Sri Lanka.

With three ports covering the entire peninsula of India in a sense, China wishes to tap on the opportunity-galore IOR. Kyaukpyu allows China to access IOR which unlocks entire South-East Asia.

Year by year, Chinese advances ensure a consolidated foot in the IOR while India spectates. Blessed naturally with a most-strategic position – head of IOR – India has to step up and emerge as a leading power in IOR. While India cannot blame China for its expansion, it can certainly counter it, especially in collaboration with its allies.

Impact on Relations With Myanmar

The situation around India has taken an adverse turn in the recent months. Against the general backdrop of consolidation of China-Pakistan relations, Xi’s visit to Nepal, his strategic gains in Myanmar, and forthcoming visit of the Sri Lankan President to Beijing form part of a pattern. It is one of the setbacks and challenges to India’s diplomacy in South Asia. It calls for deep reflection and comprehensive consultations with the finest minds in the country.

For India, China making inroads along its periphery in South Asia has been a major source of concern, and New Delhi will be watching the progress and implementation of the pacts signed during the visit with a wary eye.

Kyaukpyu could end up being a “dual use” facility – ie, for military as well as commercial uses. India will have to stretch its security capabilities to monitor Chinese activities in the Bay of Bengal.

China’s increased presence in Myanmar could mean constraints on India that wishes to deepen cooperation with Myanmar. India’s northeast is riven with insurgencies. Though New Delhi has taken steps in recent years to sign peace agreements with several groups in the region, the situation still needs careful attention. India and Myanmar have conducted several military operations along their borders in close cooperation with each other.

With Myanmar seemingly drawing closer to China under pressure from the West, Beijing could attempt to keep the country under its influence like it does in the case of Cambodia and Laos. The addition of Myanmar to Laos and Cambodia could also weaken ASEAN from within.

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In the security domain, India has been admitted into security led forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Summit( EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting(ADMM) Plus despite initial reluctance on the part of some ASEAN member states. Given that India has no history of territorial dispute or military conflict with Southeast Asia and it shares common norms for peace and security, India stands as an assuring power.

India’s defence relations with ASEAN can be looked at from both bilateral and multilateral perspective. India and ASEAN states have engaged in joint military exercises, organized operations, naval port calls, training and education, security dialogues, exchange of high-level visits, defence supplies, etc. in terms of bilateral defence ties.

Bilateral Perspective

For India, relations with South East Asian countries has a direct bearing on its Indo-Pacific strategy in which China is an important factor. Thus, India’s Act East Policy is welcomed in the region including the defence and security dimension as well. Relations with Thailand on the Bay of Bengal littoral and with Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia straddling the Malacca Straits have strategic significance not only because of their position, but also because of their growing economies and their respective trade and commerce stature.

In addition, Malacca Strait is the key transit point through which more than 55% of India’s trade goes through. Another worrying factor for India is China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean . On the high seas, there are risks and challenges of piracy and smuggling and other non-conventional threats that threaten the smooth flow of trade and commerce, thereby propelling countries to protect the sea lanes. Cooperation between India and these countries in defence and security has thus acquired increased salience over the years.

Myanmar. Myanmar shares long border with China in the north and is contiguous with the disputed Sino-Indian border. The geography makes it vulnerable to numerous strategic and security implications. Infiltration of the insurgents and arms trafficking in the Northeast is a priority for India. China’s strategic military ties with Myanmar makes it imperative for India to develop a robust defence and security cooperative framework with Myanmar. India has been pursuing enhanced defence relationship with Myanmar as a component of its erstwhile Look East and now Act East Policy.

A regular feature of bilateral security cooperation was the procurement of combat hardware, regular high-level military exchanges on both sides and joint training exercises. Since 2013, both countries’ navies have been carrying out organized patrols along the maritime boundary.

Thailand. In December 2011, the First India-Thailand Defence Dialogue took place in New Delhi, and in January 2012 a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation was signed. Regular joint exercises, coordinated maritime patrols near the international maritime border to counter terrorism, piracy and smuggling, training of officers at the training institutions of each other’s armed forces and participation as observers in military exercises fall within the scope of bilateral defence cooperation.

Thailand Navy was a regular participant in India led Milan series of joint naval exercises held biennially in Bay of Bengal. There is cooperation between the armies of both countries beyond the maritime domain.

The frequency and scale of bilateral exercises, however, needs to be increased and probably taken to the same level as what the Indian armed forces are doing with other South East Asian countries such as Singapore or Vietnam. There is substantial potential to broaden security cooperation with Thailand.

Singapore. In intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, Singapore has been a traditional supporter of India. India and Singapore have forged cooperation over the years in training forces, maritime safety, joint naval exercises, defence technology collaboration and military exchange programs. In addition, India provided access to armed forces in Singapore to use Indian training facilities such as air force and firing ranges for artillery. Naval drills are held annually between the two navies since 1994.

Indonesia. India’s Maritime Neighbour Indonesia in the ASEAN group is also India’s largest trading partner. Indonesia is India’s maritime neighbour with the closest distance between the two being about 90 nautical miles from India’s Great Nicobar Island. Both countries signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001. Since 2002, they have been carrying out regular joint India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol along the maritime boundaries involving both navies ‘ ships and maritime aircraft. With the creation of a bilateral strategic partnership in 2005, the commitment to defence gained some momentum. Bilateral cooperation across the army, navy and air force has increased. At the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram in 2012, joint army drills codenamed’ Garuda Shakti ‘ exercise took place.

There is daily formal communication between the Army and the Navies on both sides. Maritime cooperation between the two nations is an unstoppable part of the ongoing development of the strategic partnership. In December 2016, both sides emerged with a “Shared Vision of Indo-Pacific Indian-Indonesian Maritime Cooperation.”

Malaysia. Malaysia is India’s strategic partner and is strong on India’s Act East Policy. Since the signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993, Indo-Malaysian defence and security cooperation is thus integral to the broader bilateral and regional engagement. The Army, Air Force and Naval Chiefs have regular high-level visits from both sides. The annual India-Malaysia Defence Cooperation Meeting was upgraded at the level of the Secretary of Defence during PM Modi’s visit to Malaysia in July 2018. Joint army exercise called’ Harimau Shakti’ has been carried out with the intention of exchanging the best practices and procedures of both armies in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Since 1997, the Malaysian Navy has been participating in the multilateral series of’ Milan’ joint naval exercises.

Vietnam. The security relationship between India and Vietnam was strong. Their mutual views of global and regional order in terms of strategy and security have helped shape commonalities. Over the years, India has improved its political-strategic relationship with Vietnam. This in turn helped the cooperation between defence and security to gain momentum.

A Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2007 further strengthened India-Vietnam’s officially signed defence and security partnership in 2000. This outlined how to further institutionalize and broaden the cooperation in defence and security. In addition to resolving the problems of non-conventional threats such as transnational crime and drug trafficking, the agreement established a mechanism for civil nuclear cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation and strengthening regional security. Cooperation in defence and security remains an important aspect of the strategic partnership between the two countries. In May 2015, the two countries signed a Joint Vision Statement on Cooperation in Defence for the duration 2015-2020. The Indo-Vietnam relationship was upgraded to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2016 to enhance cooperation in defence and security.

Philippines. There has been little progress in India’s security cooperation profile with the Philippines. The 2006 bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement allows Naval and Coast Guard ships to share training, high-level visits, research tours and port calls. Their bilateral MOU on Defence Industry and Logistics Cooperation, signed in 2017, covered the purchase and export of defence articles and shared logistics support and services, as well as cooperation in defence material development, production and procurement.

It is quite apparent that there has not been much initiative in order to develop their bilateral defence ties. The second meeting of the Joint Committee for Defence Cooperation (JDCC) between the Philippines and India was held in 2017, five years after the first meeting of this kind in 2012.

Cambodia and Laos. The security relations between India and Cambodia and Laos are at an elementary level right now. Since 2007, India has been educating the Cambodian troops on demining as various conflicts and wars have left the countryside strewn with a large number of unmarked mining grounds.

Prime minister Modi stated in 2018 that India would strengthen relations in key areas of defence, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. Both sides expressed a desire to enhance cooperation in the maritime domain, including the preservation of the marine and coastal environment, anti-piracy cooperation and the security of sea lanes of communication in order to preserve peace and ensure navigation security in the Indo-Pacific region. But no specific steps have been listed to achieve these results.

Brunei. At the political level, Brunei endorsed India’s Act East Policy as well as India’s increasing relationship with ASEAN. Indian naval ships have visited Brunei on goodwill visits on a regular basis and also participated in the July 2011 Brunei International Fleet Review to mark the Royal Brunei Armed Forces ‘ 50th anniversary.

Brunei naval ships participated in the Milan series joint naval exercises in India. Furthermore, both sides also participated in the Defence Expos of each other. Military leaders and personnel have also visited both sides to improve the security relationship, both bilaterally and, multilaterally, at the meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus. In 2018, India and Brunei agreed to further strengthen defence relations by exchanging experiences, information, training, and trainers; holding joint military exercises, seminars, and discussions; and cooperating with defence industries.

It is quite clear that India needs to build on its relationship with Cambodia, Laos and Brunei in terms of defence and stability. India’s enhanced cooperation with these countries in politics and defence could have some effect on balancing the increasing Chinese presence in these countries.

Multilateral Perspective

India has also engaged the Southeast Asian states through multilateral initiatives such as Milan and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to project itself as a benevolent military power.

India is part of the framework of ADDM Plus that involves ten ASEAN countries and eight other nations. ADMM Plus, a central forum of ministers, fosters strategic dialogue and security cooperation between ASEAN and its eight partner countries, that is. China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. ADMM Plus also includes “expert working groups” focused on seven different areas including counter-terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian and disaster relief and assistance for peacekeeping operations. Besides the Shangri-La dialogue, it is the only place that allows Southeast Asian defence chiefs to meet with counterparts from major powers such as the US and China.

ASEAN member countries took part in a series of joint naval exercises led by Milan in India. For the most part, the naval exercises aim to create a platform for the region’s littoral navies to share views on maritime cooperation and to conduct HADR drills and tackle non-traditional security challenges.

While in the initial years only a few countries such as India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, all on the Bay of Bengal coast participated in the first edition of Milan exercises, many other countries’ navies joined for the manoeuvres over a period of time.

India has been participating regularly in joint naval exercises led by KOMODO in Indonesia since its beginning in 2014. The main focus of these exercises is on HADR.

India at ADMM Plus 2019

India’s participation in ADMM Plus reflects its goal of strengthening the relationship between defense and security with ASEAN countries. This year’s 6th ADMM Plus Summit was held in Bangkok on November 17. The central theme of the ADMM Plus Summit was “Advancing Sustainable Security Partnership,” which implies the importance of sustainability, harmony, stability, security, and navigation rights.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh outlined key aspects of India’s involvement in the ADMM Plus project. In the wake of the growing security challenges. He proposed the necessity to expand the matrix of defense preparedness that should encompass both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Referring to the severity of the security challenges raised by ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’, Rajnath Singh reiterated India’s policy of zero tolerance of terrorism and called for collective action to counter the threat.

He indicated India’s stand against the growing assertiveness of China in its maritime neighborhood, but reaffirmed India’s commitment to rules-based order to address the issue of maritime security, recognizing international law as the leading anchor for dispute resolution. India also acknowledged its commitment to climate change, HADR. India stressed the importance of dialogue as an essential tool to strengthen regional security structure while at the same time maintaining ‘ASEAN Centrality.’

Conclusion

India’s security dynamics with ASEAN is conditioned by two primary factors:

•             ASEAN outlook on the Indo Pacific that dilutes the narrative of India being projected as a balancer against China. While it recognizes the changing geopolitical realities, it emphasizes on exploring potential synergies with sub-regional frameworks.

•             The rising urgency of addressing non-conventional threats in the maritime domain. In both the aspects, the elements of defence ties needs to be strengthened for maintaining their mutual commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.

Despite progress made in India-ASEAN ties over the past 25 years, the relationship still has tremendous scope for further development.

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