Student movements have played a defining role in India’s political and social evolution. From the freedom struggle to the Nav Nirman Movement in Gujarat, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests, and more recent agitations over education, employment and citizenship, students have periodically emerged as The Nav Nirman Movement (1973–74) in Gujarat, which began over hostel food charges and corruption before contributing to the fall of the state government, the Bihar student movement that evolved into Jayaprakash Narayan’s ‘Total Revolution’, the anti-Mandal agitations of 1990, and later protests over university autonomy, citizenship legislation and examination irregularities demonstrate how campus issues can sometimes evolve into national political movements. an influential force capable of shaping public discourse.

At the same time, the vast majority of Indian students remain focused on education, employment and personal advancement. Consequently, large-scale student unrest is neither inevitable nor impossible; it emerges only when specific political, economic and social conditions converge.

The challenge for governments and educational institutions is, therefore, not merely to respond to protests, but to understand the conditions under which localized discontent can escalate into a nationwide movement.

1.  Triggering Issues

Large-scale student movements generally begin with a grievance that is perceived as legitimate and widely shared. The trigger itself may be relatively small, but it resonates because it reflects broader concerns.

Common triggering issues include:

• Employment and recruitment: Recent protests over examination paper leaks, delays in recruitment examinations and alleged irregularities in recruitment processes in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan illustrate how employment-related grievances can unite students across institutions. Delays in government recruitment, cancellation of examinations, alleged paper leaks, or perceived unfairness in selection processes.
• Educational policies: The Jawaharlal Nehru University fee-hike protests (2019) demonstrated how educational policy decisions can rapidly mobilize campus opinion. Fee hikes, changes in admission policies, scholarship reductions, hostel regulations or examination reforms.
• Perceived injustice: The death of Rohith Vemula at the University of Hyderabad (2016) generated nationwide student protests because many perceived the issue as extending beyond one individual to questions of institutional fairness and social justice. Disciplinary action against students, allegations of discrimination, or incidents viewed as violations of fairness.
• Economic pressures: Rising unemployment, inflation affecting student households, or reduced economic opportunities.
• Political or constitutional issues: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests (2019–20), particularly at Jamia Millia Islamia, Aligarh Muslim University and JNU, illustrated how broader political issues can mobilize students. Policies perceived to affect democratic rights, academic freedom or civil liberties.
• Catalytic incidents: Police entry into Jamia Millia Islamia in December 2019 transformed localized protests into a national issue by becoming a widely discussed symbolic event. A single event, such as a controversial administrative action or an incident involving use of force, can transform localized dissatisfaction into a wider movement if it is viewed as symbolic of a larger problem.

Importantly, a trigger succeeds only when it reflects an existing reservoir of dissatisfaction. Most isolated incidents do not develop into sustained protests.

2.  Stabilizing Factors

India today possesses several structural factors that reduce the likelihood of prolonged nationwide student unrest.

Career-oriented aspirations. Today’s students are considerably more focused on education, competitive examinations, professional qualifications and employment than previous generations. The opportunity cost of prolonged agitation is therefore much higher.

Fear of legal and disciplinary consequences. Students increasingly recognize that criminal cases, university disciplinary proceedings or prolonged arrests may affect future employment, higher education opportunities, passports and government service. This acts as a significant deterrent against sustained confrontation.

Majority of students remain law-abiding. Most students prefer peaceful academic environments and have little interest in prolonged political activism. Historically, only a relatively small proportion of students actively participate in demonstrations.

Awareness of political exploitation. Many students across ideological lines have become increasingly cautious about being used by political parties for electoral or partisan purposes. This skepticism often limits long-term mobilization.

Presence of organized student bodies. Organizations such as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), along with other student organizations representing diverse ideological perspectives, provide structured channels for student participation. Their presence often moderates spontaneous mobilization by encouraging organized engagement.

Public confidence in political leadership. Confidence in national or state leadership can reduce the willingness of students to assume that institutional mechanisms have completely failed. While political preferences vary considerably across regions and campuses, confidence in elected institutions can contribute to overall stability.

Administrative coordination. Where governments maintain effective coordination between educational institutions, civil administration and law enforcement, isolated incidents are less likely to spread across multiple campuses.

Reservation policies. The anti-Mandal protests of 1990 simultaneously demonstrated how reservation policy itself can become a powerful mobilizing issue among sections of students. India’s reservation system addresses historical inequities and provides educational opportunities to large sections of society. While reservation remains a subject of political debate and can itself generate grievances among different groups, it also contributes to social inclusion for many beneficiaries.

3.  Additional Stabilizing Factors

Several broader social changes further reduce the probability of nationwide student mobilization.

• Increasing enrolment in private universities with relatively different campus cultures.
• Highly competitive examination and coaching ecosystem.
• Strong parental emphasis on career success.
• Digital lifestyles that diffuse attention across multiple interests.
• Diverse educational pathways, making it difficult to unite students around a single issue.
• Availability of online grievance mechanisms in many institutions.
• Expanding private-sector employment opportunities outside traditional government careers.

Collectively, these factors create a society in which students often perceive greater personal benefit from academic progress than from prolonged political activism.

4.  Factors That Can Produce Large-Scale Student Unrest

Despite these stabilizing influences, certain structural conditions can still generate widespread mobilization.

Youth unemployment. Growing concern over employment opportunities has featured prominently in protests relating to railway recruitment and government vacancies. When educated young people perceive diminishing employment opportunities despite significant educational investment, frustration can accumulate across campuses.

Examination and recruitment controversies. Repeated controversies involving examination paper leaks, including recruitment and entrance examinations in several states, have increasingly become flashpoints capable of generating cross-state mobilisation. Repeated examination cancellations, paper leaks, delayed results or recruitment irregularities directly affect millions of students simultaneously and can become powerful unifying issues.

Loss of institutional trust. During the anti-corruption movement of 2011, although not exclusively student-led, large numbers of students joined because many believed conventional institutions were failing to address corruption effectively. Student unrest often intensifies when students conclude that universities, examination authorities or governments are unwilling or unable to address legitimate grievances.

Broad-based policy impact. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act protests illustrated how a policy perceived to have nationwide implications could generate mobilisation across geographically dispersed campuses. Policies affecting students irrespective of region, caste, language or political affiliation are more likely to generate nationwide responses.

Economic distress. Inflation, declining household income and reduced affordability of education can intensify existing dissatisfaction.

Perceived injustice. Students frequently mobilize more readily around issues of fairness than around purely ideological questions. Perceived unequal treatment or arbitrary decisions often generate stronger emotional responses.

Symbolic incidents. The death of Rohith Vemula and the police action at Jamia Millia Islamia became symbolic events that continued to influence public discourse long after the immediate incidents. Certain events become symbols that extend beyond the immediate issue, representing larger concerns about governance, accountability or justice.

5.  Sustaining (or Fuelling) Factors

While triggers initiate movements, different factors determine whether protests remain localized or evolve into sustained campaigns.

Narrative continuity. The JP Movement sustained itself by linking local student grievances with a larger narrative of corruption, governance reform and democratic renewal. A movement gains momentum when participants consistently connect individual incidents to a broader shared narrative.

Public legitimacy. The Nav Nirman Movement gained momentum because public support quickly extended beyond students to the middle classes, traders and civil society. When wider society—including parents, academics, alumni or professional bodies—views student concerns as reasonable, protests tend to receive greater support.

Institutional response. Government and university responses often influence the trajectory of movements. Transparent communication, credible grievance mechanisms and timely engagement can reduce tensions, while delayed or inconsistent responses may increase perceptions of institutional indifference.

Leadership. The emergence of Jayaprakash Narayan during the Bihar student movement transformed a regional agitation into a national political campaign. Recognized student representatives capable of articulating clear demands often provide coherence to movements. Conversely, the absence of credible leadership can lead to fragmentation.

Media attention. Television amplified the anti-Mandal protests in 1990, while social media became a major force multiplier during the 2019–20 university protests. Extensive traditional and social media coverage can elevate local issues into national debates, increasing public awareness and pressure for resolution.

Persistence of the underlying grievance. Movements usually continue when participants believe that the original issue remains unresolved despite repeated representations.

6.  Early Warning and Prevention

Governments and educational institutions should focus on identifying conditions that precede large-scale unrest rather than reacting only after demonstrations occur.

Important indicators include: Historical movements suggest that nationwide student unrest rarely develops suddenly. The Nav Nirman Movement, the JP Movement, the anti-Mandal protests and the CAA-related campus protests all progressed through identifiable stages—from localized grievance to wider public mobilisation.

• Similar grievances emerging simultaneously across multiple campuses.
• Increasing petitions, memoranda and representations on the same issue.
• Growing public discussion among students, faculty and alumni.
• Evidence that localized concerns are acquiring national attention.
• Declining confidence in grievance redressal mechanisms.
• Expansion of peaceful protests to multiple institutions within a short period.
• Increasing polarization between student groups.

Prevention is generally more effective than enforcement.

Effective preventive measures include:

• Responsive grievance redressal systems.
• Transparent communication.
• Timely clarification of policies.
• Independent inquiry into disputed incidents.
• Constructive dialogue with student representatives.
• Consistent application of institutional rules.
• Avoiding unnecessary escalation while maintaining public order.

The objective should be to preserve both institutional authority and public confidence.

Lessons from the “Cockroach Janta Party” Protests

The so-called “Cockroach Janta Party” protests illustrate several broader lessons relevant to governments confronting emerging student-led or youth-driven movements.

First, governments should avoid dismissing apparently small or symbolic protests as insignificant. Symbolic campaigns can resonate if they reflect deeper public anxieties.

Second, rapid and credible communication is often more effective than allowing rumours, speculation or misinformation to fill an information vacuum.

Third, understanding the underlying grievance is more important than focusing solely on visible manifestations such as slogans, demonstrations or online campaigns.

Fourth, maintaining proportionality in administrative and policing responses helps preserve public confidence. Responses perceived as fair, transparent and consistent are less likely to generate wider sympathy for protesters.

Fifth, governments should distinguish between genuine student grievances and attempts by external actors to amplify or exploit them. Durable protests usually succeed only when they resonate with authentic concerns shared by students.

Sixth, governments benefit from continuous engagement with students, educational institutions and civil society, even during periods of relative calm. Trust established before a crisis often proves more valuable than communication initiated after tensions have escalated.

Finally, effective governance requires balancing the protection of democratic freedoms—including peaceful expression and lawful protest—with the responsibility to maintain public order and ensure the uninterrupted functioning of educational institutions.

Conclusion

Student unrest should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. Contemporary India possesses multiple structural stabilizers—including strong career aspirations, diverse student interests, institutional deterrence and greater economic opportunity—that reduce the likelihood of nationwide student movements. Nevertheless, history demonstrates Since 1970, India’s experience—from Nav Nirman and the JP Movement to the anti-Mandal agitation, the University of Hyderabad protests, the JNU fee protests and the CAA-related campus demonstrations—shows that while the issues vary, the dynamics of escalation remain remarkably consistent.

Nevertheless, history demonstrates that widespread unrest can still emerge when broad-based grievances coincide with declining institutional trust and emotionally resonant catalytic events. The most effective governmental strategy is therefore not simply strong enforcement, but responsive governance. Institutions that communicate transparently, resolve grievances promptly, maintain public confidence and engage constructively with students are significantly better positioned to prevent localized discontent from evolving into sustained national movements. Understanding the interaction between triggers, stabilizing influences, sustaining factors and early warning indicators enables policymakers to anticipate challenges before they become crises, thereby safeguarding both democratic participation and social stability.

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For most of the 20th Century, military advantage was purchased with money that only states could spend. Stealth coatings, satellite constellations, cryptographic systems, and precision-guided munitions were the products of defence budgets, classified laboratories, and export-controlled supply chains. That world is receding. A growing share of the technology that now decides battlefield outcomes—commercial drones, small satellites, foundation models, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors—is developed first for civilian markets and only later adapted for war. The direction of technology transfer has quietly reversed, and with it, the advantage once enjoyed by states that could out-invest their rivals in military-specific research is eroding in ways that are difficult to see and harder to reverse.

This erosion is not dramatic. It does not resemble the loss of a battle or the collapse of a treaty. It shows up instead as a widening gap between what a nation’s defence establishment assumes it can do and what a determined adversary, or even a non-state actor with a credit card, can now do as well. Understanding which technologies are driving this shift, how the erosion actually happens, why it has accelerated now, and what a state such as India can do about it is the purpose of this paper.

The Technologies to Watch

Seven categories of dual-use technology deserve close and continuing attention:

• Drones and small unmanned systems. The same motors, cameras, radios, batteries, and flight electronics that power hobbyist drones now underpin tactical ISR platforms and loitering munitions. The crossover is strongest at the small end of the market, where mass-produced commercial components give attackers scale and cost advantages that were unimaginable a decade ago.
• Commercial space and satellite communications. Earth-observation constellations built for agriculture and insurance now provide targeting-grade imagery, while broadband constellations built for rural connectivity now carry military command traffic. A synthetic aperture radar satellite produces the same picture whether the customer is a farmer or an intelligence agency.
• Artificial intelligence and foundation models. Computer vision, autonomous navigation, and large language models developed for consumer and enterprise use now underpin drone targeting, signals analysis, and battlefield decision support. Much of this capability is openly published or commercially licensed rather than classified.
• Quantum computing. Still immature as a computing platform, quantum research already threatens the cryptographic backbone of secure military communications. Adversaries can capture encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available—a strategy known as harvest now, decrypt later.
• Advanced semiconductors. The chips that train frontier AI models and the chips that guide precision munitions increasingly come from the same fabrication lines, making export control an exercise in chasing a single, fungible commodity across a globalised supply chain.
• Cyber and offensive intrusion tools. Commercially sold spyware and intrusion frameworks, built and marketed as lawful-intercept or security-testing products, have repeatedly ended up enabling state-level surveillance and sabotage operations well outside their advertised use case.
• Additive manufacturing and precision electronics. Desktop and industrial 3D printers, combined with widely available design files, allow small workshops to produce drone airframes, munition components, and jigs that once required a dedicated defence-industrial supply chain.

How the Erosion Is Actually Happening

The mechanisms are quieter than they sound:

1. Cost democratisation. Platforms that once cost a state tens of millions of dollars to field now have functional civilian equivalents costing a few hundred or a few thousand. Ukraine alone is estimated to have produced close to two million first-person-view drones in 2024—a scale of precision-strike capability that would have been unthinkable for a state defence budget a generation ago, let alone for the non-state and irregular groups now copying the model.
2. Dependency substitution. Militaries increasingly rely on commercial infrastructure they do not own and cannot fully control. When Ukraine’s access to Starlink connectivity and Maxar’s commercial satellite imagery briefly became a point of political leverage in a negotiation over a critical-minerals deal in February 2025, it exposed how thoroughly modern militaries had come to depend on privately owned, foreign-controlled systems for functions once considered sovereign—communications and intelligence.
3. Silent obsolescence of cryptographic advantage. Encrypted government and military communications are already being harvested and stockpiled by adversaries who cannot yet read them but expect to within the next decade. Recent research has cut the estimated quantum resources needed to break RSA-2048 encryption from twenty million qubits to under one million, with credible estimates of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arriving as early as 2029.
4. Diversion through globalised supply chains. Even where export controls exist on paper, enforcement struggles to keep pace with dual-use goods routed through intermediaries. In December 2025, the United States disrupted a network responsible for diverting more than 160 million dollars’ worth of advanced AI chips to restricted destinations—a single case among a steady stream of similar actions.

Why the Erosion Is Happening

The underlying causes are structural rather than accidental, and they will not resolve themselves:

• The centre of gravity for frontier innovation has moved from defence laboratories to commercial markets. Venture capital and consumer demand now fund research at a scale and speed that defence procurement cycles cannot match. A smartphone camera sensor, a drone flight controller, or a large language model reaches maturity in commercial markets years before an equivalent military-specific programme would clear its requirements process.
• The very nature of dual-use technology resists the tools states have traditionally used to control it. A rocket that launches a weather satellite can launch a reconnaissance satellite; a communications network built for rural broadband can carry military traffic; a robotic arm designed to service a satellite can just as easily interfere with one. Export control regimes built around discrete, identifiable military hardware struggle against technology whose military application is a matter of software configuration rather than physical design.
• Globalisation has distributed manufacturing and expertise across many jurisdictions with uneven enforcement capacity. Well-designed controls in one country can be routed around through a third-country intermediary, a shell subsidiary, or a permissive jurisdiction, as the steady cadence of diversion prosecutions illustrates.
• The states that own the largest share of dual-use infrastructure—commercial satellite operators, cloud providers, and chip manufacturers—are concentrated in a small number of countries. This means access to militarily relevant civilian technology is increasingly conditioned on the political relationship with the country hosting the provider, not merely on the buyer’s ability to pay.

What Can Be Done

None of this argues for retreating from commercial technology, which is neither possible nor desirable. It argues for a deliberate strategy that treats dual-use dependence as a risk to be actively managed rather than a convenience to be passively accepted:

• Build sovereign backup capacity. For functions where foreign commercial dependence has already proven coercible—satellite communications and imagery chief among them—states need at least a minimum viable indigenous or allied alternative that can be activated if commercial access is withdrawn or degraded.
• Accelerate the migration to post-quantum cryptography. Because harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks are already under way, waiting for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer to appear before upgrading encryption guarantees that today’s most sensitive traffic will eventually be exposed. Migration needs to begin now, prioritised by how long the underlying data must stay secret.
• Mandate secure-by-design standards for dual-use platforms. Requiring cybersecurity and anti-spoofing protections to be embedded at the design stage, rather than added afterward, for satellites, drones, and networked sensors closes a class of vulnerability that has already produced a documented rise in signal-spoofing incidents against space assets.
• Coordinate export controls with trusted partners rather than pursuing them unilaterally. Since dual-use goods move through globalised supply chains, controls that are not harmonised across allied jurisdictions simply redirect trade through the weakest link. Recent friction over unpredictable licensing has already strained cooperation between India and the United States on exactly this point.
• Invest in indigenous capacity in the technologies that matter most. Rather than attempting to control or replicate every dual-use technology, states should concentrate scarce capital and talent on sovereign capability in the handful of domains—secure communications, critical sensors, autonomous systems software—where dependence carries the highest strategic cost.
• Treat commercial-sector monitoring as a standing intelligence function. Because the technologies eroding military advantage are being developed in civilian laboratories and start-ups rather than defence establishments, tracking their maturation requires the same systematic attention traditionally reserved for tracking an adversary’s weapons programmes.

Conclusion The erosion of military advantage through dual-use technology is silent precisely because nothing about it looks like a threat when it happens. A start-up ships a better drone camera. A cloud provider trains a more capable model. A satellite operator signs a new broadband customer. Each transaction is commercially unremarkable. Only in aggregate, and usually only in hindsight, does the pattern become visible: capabilities once confined to defence budgets are now available to anyone with market access, and control over the underlying infrastructure has migrated from ministries of defence to corporate boardrooms in a handful of countries. For India, as for every state seeking to preserve a credible military edge, the task ahead is not to resist this shift—which is neither possible nor sensible—but to build the sovereign redundancy, cryptographic resilience, and coordinated export discipline that allow it to draw on the same civilian innovation without becoming hostage to it.

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Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is an emerging concept that most modern militaries worldwide are working to integrate into their warfighting doctrines. The key domains encompassed in the concept include the physical domains—land, maritime, air, and space—the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes cyberspace, and the cognitive/human domain. Unlike the integration and coordination achieved by joint forces in the existing system, MDO aims to deter and defeat adversaries in operations below armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in the post-conflict phase of returning to competition.

At a time when the United States and China are experimenting with various facets of the concept, either overtly or through proxies by providing them technologies, India found an opportunity through Operation Sindoor to test and validate its warfighting concepts and technologies. It was the first instance of non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its formations or physically crossing borders—neither by troops nor by aircraft. India showcased its Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence technology and demonstrated its prowess in both offensive and defensive capabilities—drone-centric warfare, resilient and responsive air defence, long-range precision weapons, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and set a new parameter and “new normal” for future operations.

The book is structured in two parts: Part I – Multi-Domain Operations Concept and Part II – Operation Sindoor: Appraisal. The United States pioneered the development of the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept in 2015–16, which later evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by December 2018. Although the MDO concept is yet to mature into a fully functional warfighting doctrine, it now guides the transformation and modernisation of the US Armed Forces and their peers. China is known to be mirroring the same with its own “Chinese characteristics.”

Part I covers the evolution of the concept in the United States and China, defines the concept primarily derived from US philosophy, explores China’s All-Domain Operations concept, examines limitations of the MDO framework, and discusses India’s challenges and options.

In Part II, after explaining the genesis of India’s problem with Pakistan, the author appraises Operation Sindoor against the backdrop of the MDO concept. Although multiple domains were addressed during Operation Sindoor through coordination and integration among the armed forces and various government departments and agencies, the MDO framework as a concept remains a distant goal. Regarding Pakistan, much of its response was propaganda through influence operations. The author effectively debunks Pakistan’s claim of downing five to six Indian fighter jets on Day One of Operation Sindoor by exposing glaring errors in the technological hypothesis developed by Mr. Michael Dahm, which was widely cited by magazines and newspapers supporting Pakistan’s false narrative.

Drone-centric warfare, multi-layered and integrated air defence, and target-centric warfare employing precision weapons—visible aspects of Operation Sindoor—are covered in comprehensive detail for both India and Pakistan. The dominant role played by Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence and the success achieved by indigenous weapons strengthened the government’s resolve to promote it further, a theme well-articulated in the book. The space, EMS, and human domains have also been given due significance.

The hallmark of the book lies in the author’s lucid exposition of Bharat’s strategic culture, which inspires its military ethos. He emphasises that India’s values are indigenous and not borrowed from any other country.

This book, the result of extensive and detailed research by Brigadier (Dr.) Rajeev Bhutani, could not have come at a more opportune time—when nations are actively developing and transforming their forces around the MDO concept. It will be of immense value to military professionals, researchers, scientists and engineers developing defence systems in government, public, and private enterprises, as well as policymakers.

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During the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, the risks of nuclear weapon use or a nuclear accident at nuclear plants in Zaporizhzhia, occupied by Russia, and Kursk have been repeatedly highlighted. Russia has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons, the latest instance being on February 24, 2026, when it accused the UK and France of helping Ukraine acquire nuclear capability and warned that such actions could trigger a confrontation between nuclear powers. Later, between 18 and 20 May 2026, Russia and Belarus conducted joint nuclear exercises involving missile units and strategic forces practicing nuclear weapon delivery and deployment. Such threats have emanated since the start of the conflict from various levels of the Russian government and military, including President Putin. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin ordered Russia’s military on 27 February 2022 to put its deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons, on “special alert.” On September 21 of the same year, he reiterated his threat to use all types of weapons, asserting that it was not a bluff. This clearly shows that his threats so far had not been taken seriously or lacked credibility, as they were driven by battlefield reversals and a shortage of military personnel in the invasion’s initial stages.

Russia’s nuclear threats reduced in 2023 when its military operations were achieving favourable results, another reason for their low credibility. However, nuclear rhetoric picked up again in 2024, including exercises simulating “theatre” or regional nuclear attacks, in contrast to “strategic” nuclear exercises simulating war with the US. Russian threats have been so frequent and unceasing that they no longer make headlines in Western media. Their recurrence has eroded credibility, rendering them ineffectual. These provocative articulations are assessed to be inconceivable, exaggerated, routine, discordant, and implausible.

The intent of these threats appears to be imposing restraint and influencing Western decisions. Russia has essentially reinforced two red lines for the West: first, the unacceptability of direct involvement and deployment of NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine; second, deterring and constraining the West from providing military aid to Ukraine, specifically offensive weapons platforms that could threaten Russian territory. In the first case, the US and NATO leaders have been extremely cautious and avoided direct resistance to Russia’s invasion. While military assistance was slow initially, it picked up gradually. The West has disregarded Russia’s warnings and provided Ukraine with weapon systems explicitly opposed by the Kremlin, including tanks, drones, and long-range missiles. On August 1, 2024, the first batch of long-awaited F-16 jets arrived in Ukraine, significantly bolstering its air force. Ukraine has since carried out aerial strikes deep into Russian territory, even hitting oil refineries in Siberia. Earlier, it forced Russia to scale down its Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2026 in Moscow due to security concerns. Despite its red lines being violated, Russia has avoided striking NATO territory. This reflects the continued effectiveness of strategic mutual nuclear deterrence among parties to the conflict.

Historically, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by either side has not been taken seriously. During the Cold War, NATO planning envisaged immediate use of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Soviet attack in Europe, to hedge against conventional asymmetry. Yet, nobody assigned a high probability to this option. Similarly, the Soviets remained largely hostile to the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner, such as small-scale battlefield exchanges for bargaining purposes.

India does not face a major nuclear threat from large nuclear powers—the US and Russia—or the medium-sized nuclear forces maintained by the UK and France. Its major adversaries are China and Pakistan. China is the first and only nuclear weapon state recognized under the NPT to have maintained an official NFU policy continuously since it first acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. Since then, it has shown no proclivity for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy based on nuclear threats. While a full-blown war initiated by China to resolve the boundary issue is unlikely in the short term, limited conflict due to escalation of local issues on the LAC could occur, as seen in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. As long as nuclear capabilities remain, China’s intentions can change at any time.

Pakistan’s case is entirely different. It considers the threat from India existential and inimical to its very idea of nationhood. Its strategic thought process is based on proactive and pre-emptive actions. Nuclear weapons give Pakistan the confidence to face a larger neighbour with asymmetry in military, economic, and industrial capacity. It professes that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of conventional conflict. Accordingly, it has a declaratory doctrine of “first use,” and lately has been advocating “early use” as part of strategic signalling to India. It has also alluded to ambiguous territorial, infrastructure, and economic red lines. Ambiguity and irrationality reinforce the deterrence value of nuclear threats. Pakistan seeks to deter India at all levels of war—nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional—while denying India the same equation. It has regularly resorted to nuclear sabre-rattling in past conflicts to influence Indian decision-makers, as demonstrated during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram, surgical strikes across the LC, the Balakot air strikes, and recently Operation Sindoor.

In contrast, India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the twin pillars of NFU and minimum credible deterrence, resulting in massive retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. India believes that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war and are of strategic relevance, not for warfighting. Suggestions have been made in recent years to revise the doctrine, abandon NFU, and incorporate “first use.” The main arguments advanced include the complex regional security environment and technological advances that may degrade the potency of a second strike.

Deterrence is widely accepted as a psychological construct rather than an end in itself. It should inspire fear, where the perceived cost of deterrence breakdown outweighs the benefits of war as a dispute resolution instrument. Even if a nation declares NFU, no one will trust that it will remain committed to NFU if its vital interests are at stake. A degree of calculated ambiguity in a nuclear doctrine is essential for credibility. Restraints on nuclear war are mainly intellectual, ethical, and doctrinal. During the Cold War, the USSR could not have invaded Western Europe even if the US had a declaratory NFU policy. Importantly, it is against the national interest of responsible and status quo powers like India to weaken the nuclear threshold. Conventional attacks are largely considered within the rules of international behaviour in a jus ad bellum situation, such as punitive conventional retaliation by India in response to high-profile terrorist incidents. The possibility of escalation or total eruption makes it unlikely that either side could achieve decisive victory in a limited war by using nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the existence of nuclear weapons cannot be downplayed, and they may be used in extreme cases by a nuclear-capable state. Threats to use nuclear weapons will continue to be made repeatedly to deter and influence adversary decision-making by playing mind games. Under the nuclear overhang, space for conventional operations exists, though its extent remains undefined and can be expanded by the side exercising escalation dominance. Moreover, deterrence is not static; it requires active escalation management throughout a crisis. Therefore, lessons from recent conflicts, particularly the Russia–Ukraine war, reinforce the enduring relevance, resilience, and credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine in maintaining strategic stability.

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Shield AI has established a wholly owned subsidiary, Shield AI India, to support software integration, engineering, and autonomy development, and to grow indigenous engineering and software development capabilities for India. The entity will operate across two offices – the first one in New Delhi, which is operational now, and another in Bengaluru, which is scheduled to open later this summer, thereby enabling closer collaboration with local partners while contributing to the growth of India’s high-technology ecosystem in AI and autonomous systems.

India is central to Shield AI’s global mission, said Ryan Tseng. “The depth of engineering talent here combined with our existing strategic partnerships and the trust placed in us by the Indian Armed Forces make India one of the most important partners in our long-term plans. Shield AI India is our commitment to building lasting capability in the country — not just selling to it.”

“Being a strong partner means being present and working alongside our customers,” said Sarjan Shah, managing director for India at Shield AI. “With our New Delhi office, and with our plans to expand soon in Bengaluru as well, we are strengthening our ability to support India’s autonomy priorities and partner on systems that can be built, deployed, and sustained within the country, while growing a pipeline of Indian engineers and developers who can build and evolve mission autonomy on Indian terms.”

“The U.S.-India relationship is something I was proud to support in my role as INDOPACOM commander, and given what Shield AI is doing in, with, and for India, I could not be prouder to support our partnership. Done right, the U.S.-India relationship can generate vital strategic, defense and economic value for both nations, and we look forward to supporting that overall goal,” said Aquilino.

In November 2024, the company announced a strategic partnership with JSW Defence Pvt. Ltd. to indigenize and manufacture its V-BAT unmanned aircraft system. As part of a $90 million investment, JSW Defence began construction of a large-scale V-BAT production facility at EMC Maheshwaram, Hyderabad in December 2025. The V-BAT production facility being set up by JSW is designed to serve the needs of the Indian Armed Forces and also function as a global production hub.

Shield AI’s expanded India presence also supports its ongoing work with the Indian Armed Forces. Earlier this year, India selected Shield AI to provide Hivemind powered V-BATs and, in addition, licenses for Shield AI’s Hivemind autonomy software for the Indian Army.

V-BAT is a Group 3 vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAS with a ducted-fan design, more than 12 hours of endurance, and a heavy-fuel (JP-8) engine. Proven in the electronic warfare battlefield, V-BAT delivers intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting at significantly lower cost and logistical burden than larger drones. Under partnership with the Indian Army, Hivemind autonomy will integrate onto V-BAT as an autonomous pilot, enabling AI-powered perception, cognition, and beyond-visual-range operations. The company has also announced the development of a next-generation VTOL autonomous combat aircraft, X-BAT.

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This collaboration marks a major milestone in strengthening Safran Aircraft Engines’ supply chain and advancing India’s capabilities in high-precision aerospace manufacturing.

Under this agreement, Uni Tritech Private Limited will start production of aluminum investment cast parts for the LEAP-1A and LEAP-1B engines at its facility in Dharwad, Karnataka (India). The components will be cast, precisely machined, and receive specialized treatments in India, in accordance with the strict quality, safety, and certification standards required for new-generation commercial aircraft engines.

The LEAP engine powers the world’s most advanced single-aisle commercial aircraft and sets a benchmark for fuel efficiency, performance, and durability. This partnership is fully aligned with Safran Aircraft Engines’ strategy to build a resilient and diversified global supply chain, while further consolidating India’s role as a key aerospace manufacturing hub.

The collaboration will leverage Uni Tritech’s advanced foundry technologies, precision machining, and proprietary metallurgical processes, to deliver products meeting the highest standards of performance, durability, and reliability.

“This partnership with Safran Aircraft Engines marks a defining milestone for Uni Tritech and the Neterwala Group. It highlights our expertise in advanced metallurgy and precision engineering, as well as our commitment to supporting global aerospace programs. By manufacturing critical LEAP engine components in India, we are proud to contribute to the growth of a globally competitive aerospace ecosystem,” said Kuldeep Bhan, Group President – Global Metallurgy Business, Neterwala Group.

“Our collaboration with Uni Tritech, Safran Aircraft Engines’ first aluminum foundry partner in India, marks an important step in strengthening the resilience and diversity of our global supply chain. This initiative also highlights India’s expanding role as a key aerospace manufacturing hub, as we work together to supply high-precision components and support the fast-growing ramp-up of the LEAP engine program with the highest industry standards,” said Dominique Dupuy, Safran Aircraft Engines, Vice President, Purchasing.

This agreement highlights the growing alignment between global aerospace industry leaders and Indian manufacturers. It reflects a shared vision to foster innovation, accelerate skills development, and build long-term industrial partnerships to support the future of aviation.

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Modern warfare is rewriting the logic of protection. Across recent conflicts, the battlefield has shown that survivability is no longer determined only by the ability to stop bullets. Fragments, blast effects, drones, top-attack profiles, electronic vulnerability, and the need for mobility have changed the protection equation for soldiers and armoured platforms alike. Advanced ceramics and composites have therefore moved from the laboratory to the centre of operational relevance. They are no longer niche materials; they are now among the most important enablers of future battlefield survivability.

The lessons are stark. The experience of high-intensity conflict, particularly in Ukraine, has underscored that a large proportion of casualties arise from fragments and blast rather than direct bullet impacts. This shifts the design emphasis away from just defeating rifle rounds toward achieving wider, smarter, and more adaptive coverage. In the Indian context, the aftermath of Operation Sindoor further highlighted the urgency of upgrading soldier protection and accelerating the domestic production of modern bulletproof systems.

The Threat Has Changed

The adversary faced by the modern soldier is no longer one-dimensional. Protection systems today must deal with a wide threat spectrum: drone-delivered fragments, mortar splinters, grenades, rifle armour-piercing rounds, heavy machine-gun fire, kinetic-energy penetrators for vehicles, and even the possibility of CBRN-related exposure. Each of these threats demands a different protective response. This is why armour can no longer be understood as a single plate or a single material. It is a layered system of materials, geometry, coverage, and integration.

At the soldier level, the challenge is not only to stop a rifle round but also to protect vulnerable body zones against fragments. Helmets, collars, yokes, deltoid protectors, groin protection, and shin guards all become part of the survivability architecture. At the platform level, the problem becomes even more complex, because vehicles must deal with APFSDS rounds, RPG threats, top-attack profiles, and electronic warfare vulnerabilities. The future of protection is therefore distributed, layered, and mission-specific.

Why Ceramics Matter

The case for advanced ceramics begins with physics. Ceramic strike faces such as boron carbide and silicon carbide are much harder than conventional armour steel, while being significantly lighter. When struck by a projectile, the ceramic does not simply absorb the hit. It erodes, blunts, and fractures the incoming penetrator, dispersing the impact energy. A backing layer — often based on polymers, composites, or ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene — then catches the residual fragments and reduces blunt trauma to the body.

This combination is what makes ceramic-composite armour so effective. It delivers a level of ballistic resistance that would be far too heavy if achieved solely through steel. Weight is not a secondary factor in protection; it is central to combat effectiveness. If armour becomes too heavy, soldier endurance declines, mobility suffers, and battlefield performance deteriorates. That is why boron carbide, with its exceptional hardness and very low density, has become such an important material in modern protective systems.

Transparent ceramics also point to future possibilities. Materials such as aluminium oxynitride can provide ballistic protection in vehicle windows and aircraft canopies while preserving visibility. This illustrates a broader truth: ceramics are not merely replacements for steel plates. They are enablers of a broader design transformation in how protection is conceived.

Geometry Is as Important as Material

One of the most important insights in modern armour design is that performance depends not only on what a system is made of, but also on how it is arranged. Geometry can dramatically improve weight efficiency, flexibility, and multi-hit capability. The same ceramic material may perform very differently depending on whether it is configured as a monolithic plate, a mosaic tile array, a cylindrical honeycomb, or an overlapping fish-scale structure.

This is especially important in an era in which multiple impacts in a confined area are increasingly common. A monolithic plate may be compromised after one hit in a localised zone. A tiled mosaic, by contrast, can isolate damage and preserve protection in adjacent zones. Bio-inspired fish-scale structures offer another advantage: they can conform to curved body surfaces and provide flexible multi-hit coverage in places where flat plates are ineffective.

This means the future of armour lies not simply in stronger materials, but in architected protection systems that combine material science with design intelligence.

Soft Armour Still Matters

If ceramics defeat bullets, soft armour defeats fragments — and fragments matter enormously on the modern battlefield. High-performance fibres, layered intelligently, are indispensable for protecting areas where rigid plates cannot be worn comfortably or continuously. Here again, materials matter, but architecture matters just as much. Fibre orientation, layering pattern, resin or thermoplastic matrix, and hybridisation all influence ballistic performance.

The next leap may also come from hybrid and unconventional materials. Natural fibre-based ballistic composites, when combined with established materials such as Kevlar, show promise for indigenous, lower-cost armour concepts. These should not be dismissed as peripheral experiments. They represent a potentially valuable avenue for India’s own resource-based innovation ecosystem.

The Frontier: Nano, Multifunctionality, and Adaptive Protection

The most exciting developments in armour science are occurring at the frontier where protection, sensing, and multifunctionality begin to merge. Nanomaterials such as carbon nanotubes and graphene are important not only because of their extraordinary mechanical properties, but because they could enable armour to become structurally intelligent. The same material system could provide strength, electromagnetic shielding, and real-time health monitoring of structural damage.

Other advanced concepts, such as shear-thickening-fluid armour, point toward protection systems that remain flexible in normal use but harden instantaneously under impact. This has major implications for areas like the neck, groin, joints, and shoulders, where traditional rigid armour is difficult to apply. Likewise, radiation-shielding composites could become increasingly important for high-altitude operations and future CBRN contingencies. Protection in the future will not be single-function; it will be adaptive and multifunctional.

Additive Manufacturing and the Logistics Revolution

Advanced armour is not only about defeating threats; it is also about how quickly protection can be produced, repaired, and adapted. Traditional ceramic armour is centrally manufactured, transported forward, and difficult to replace once damaged. Additive manufacturing could alter that equation by enabling distributed production of armour components closer to the point of need.

This matters because survivability is as much a logistics problem as it is a materials problem. If replacement inserts, plates, and modular protection elements can be produced or restored faster, the battlefield value of armour increases dramatically. The significance of additive manufacturing therefore lies not merely in fabrication novelty, but in resilience, response time, and supply-chain independence.

India’s Progress: From Research to Reality

India’s armour story is not one of absence; it is one of rapid but still incomplete acceleration. Over the years, institutions such as DRDO, DMRL, IIT Delhi, MIDHANI, and a growing network of private industry have built important capabilities in steels, ceramics, composites, and armour integration.

A major recent example is ABHED — Advanced Ballistics for High Energy Defeat — developed by DRDO and IIT Delhi. It uses indigenous boron carbide ceramic and polymer-based construction, has passed required trials, and offers modular 360-degree protection while remaining within demanding weight limits. Public reporting states that its variants weigh between 8.2 kg and 9.5 kg depending on the BIS threat level, making it a notable step forward in lightweight soldier protection.

At the vehicle level, Kanchan armour remains one of India’s most significant achievements in composite armour design. Advanced ceramic-based vehicle protection is also increasingly moving into production through technology transfers and industry partnerships, including work associated with wheeled armoured platforms and other future combat systems.

India also benefits from a maturing standards ecosystem. IS 17051:2018 has given the country its own performance framework for bullet-resistant jackets, which is important for both procurement clarity and industrial scaling.

The Gaps That Still Remain

Despite this progress, several gaps remain. The first is scale. Operational demand for protective systems still exceeds available supply by a significant margin. The second is multi-hit all-round protection, especially beyond the plate itself and across the full body. The third is validation across India’s harsh thermal envelope, from Siachen’s extreme cold to desert heat.

There is also a clear need to integrate CBRN resilience, smart sensing, and adaptive material systems into the next generation of armour. Finally, India must think ahead to exoskeleton-assisted soldiers and networked battlefield systems, because future armour will not exist in isolation from power, mobility, data, and load-bearing technologies.

The Way Ahead

The way ahead is clear. India needs a coordinated effort that links operational users, defence laboratories, academia, and industry into a sustained materials and protection ecosystem. The priorities are equally clear: multi-hit ceramic architectures, better soft-armour systems, adaptive materials, additive manufacturing closer to the field, smart structural monitoring, CBRN-capable protection, and future-soldier integration.

The material science exists. The institutions exist. The operational urgency certainly exists. What is required now is speed, scale, and coordinated investment.

In the final analysis, armour is not just about plates, fibres, ceramics, or composites. It is about ensuring that the soldier survives long enough to fight, adapt, and prevail. Advanced ceramics and composites are therefore not merely materials of protection; they are materials of combat power.

(This article is based on a talk given by Col Jitender Kaushik, of the Faculty of Studies, College of Military Engineering, Pune, on 7 April 2026 at the Advanced Materials & Additive Manufacturing seminar in New Delhi)

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Emerging Paradigm of Warfare from Platforms to Algorithms

For centuries now, technology has shaped the evolution of warfare. The difference today is the pace and scale at which this transformation is unfolding. Until about three decades ago, warfare was largely platform-centric. Military strength was measured by the ability to field and employ aircraft, tanks, artillery, and naval assets at scale, with industrial capacity and logistics being key determinants of combat outcomes.

A major inflection point came during the Gulf War, which marked the shift towards ‘Precision-Centric Warfare’. Precision-guided munitions, satellite navigation, and networked sensors demonstrated that accuracy and information could deliver effects disproportionate to force size, moving away from platform-centricity. In the years that followed, militaries recalibrated doctrines towards integrating sensors, shooters, and command systems to achieve combat advantage.

Today, we are witnessing a more fundamental and disruptive transformation as warfare is increasingly becoming algorithm-driven and multi-domain, where operations across land, air, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum are synchronised in near-real-time, supplemented by the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence systems across the entire Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop. Decision cycles are compressing, and the ability to process and act on data is emerging as a decisive factor in operational success.

This shift has been clearly visible in ongoing conflicts from Ukraine to the West Asian theatre, and closer to home through lessons from Operation Sindoor. The direction is clear. Advantage is steadily migrating from platforms to technology stacks that connect, enable, and power them.

From Military-Led to Civilian-Driven Innovation

Parallel to this transformation in warfare, the last few decades have witnessed an equally significant shift in the technology landscape. The centre of gravity of innovation has moved from military-led development to civilian-driven ecosystems.

For much of the twentieth century, when regular conflicts and ‘war economies’ were the order of the day, defence establishments defined the technological frontier. Breakthroughs such as the internet, GPS, and advanced communication systems originated within military programmes before finding widespread civilian application. Defence set the pace and direction of innovation, with the civilian industry following.

That equation has now largely reversed. Today, the most disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, semiconductors, robotics, autonomous systems, and data analytics, are driven by the civilian sector. Innovation cycles are faster, technology proliferation is quicker, capital is more accessible, and competition accelerates development in ways traditional defence structures find difficult to match. The transition of major economies from war economies to consumer-driven economies has further accentuated this phenomenon.

For militaries, this creates both opportunity and complexity. Access to advanced technologies has expanded significantly, but dependence on globally distributed ecosystems raises concerns around control, reliability, and long-term resilience. The challenge is not just adoption, but the ability to adapt and integrate these technologies within secure and dependable frameworks.

The Strategic Imperative of Sovereign Technology

In an era of shifting alliances, contested supply chains, and increasing ambiguity in the global order, technology has moved to the centre of strategic autonomy. Access can no longer be taken for granted, and dependencies can quickly translate into strategic constraints.

The issue is not simply about acquiring advanced technologies, but about the degree of control exercised over them across the complete lifecycle of equipment. Through initiatives like Aadhaar and UPI in the civilian domain, India has successfully demonstrated that sovereign and scalable architectures can deliver reliable product quality, resilience, and scale. The lesson for defence lies in recognising the importance of architecture and control.

Sovereignty does not imply isolation. It requires clarity on what must be controlled and where collaboration is viable. In modern defence systems, critical layers often lie beneath the surface. Embedded electronics, software, data architectures, and algorithms determine how systems perform and evolve. Without sufficient depth in these areas, even indigenously produced platforms may remain constrained, with a limited ability to exploit them fully over their entire lifecycles. Building capability in these critical layers will be essential to ensure operational resilience and long-term relevance.

Leveraging Dual-Use Technologies: Connecting the Ecosystem

India is at a unique inflection point. Enabling policy frameworks, a maturing entrepreneurial ecosystem, and an evolving financial landscape have together given rise to a new generation of technology-led enterprises. Earlier, access to finance was largely linked to confirmed orders from government or industry. Today, investors are increasingly backing companies with strong technology, intellectual property, and scalability, accelerating the growth of deep-tech enterprises. Today, an increasing number of indigenous, technology-driven firms operate at the cutting edge of technology and at the intersection of civilian and strategic domains.

These firms are investing in research and building the maturity required to bring agility, innovation, and scalability into areas that were traditionally constrained by slower cycles.

In doing so, they also help to overcome the systemic challenges that various pillars of the Indian defence ecosystem—i.e., the Armed Forces, DRDO, DPSUs, private industry (including start-ups), and academia—face because of the very nature of their structure. Many tech firms are structured in a more agile and effective manner, with the ability to innovate faster, integrate more effectively, and scale solutions with greater efficiency.

These companies can support the Armed Forces in ideation, rapid prototyping, and faster capability absorption. They can also help research organisations, including DRDO, in shortening their development cycles and developing products at the cutting edge of technology. They can help the DPSUs and private industry to develop niche solutions faster with greater efficiency, better quality, higher reliability, and scalability. Many of these companies are working closely with academia, helping align research more closely with real-world problems and challenges. Thus, the real value of dual-use technologies lies in how they connect these elements and emerge as a key enabler.

Technologies Shaping the Next Phase of Capability

The shift towards algorithm-centric and multi-domain operations is being enabled by a set of technologies that cut across platforms and stakeholders. Their impact lies in how they strengthen each part of the ecosystem and how effectively they are integrated.

Digital Twins are an exciting technology and are emerging as a link between design and operations. For the Armed Forces, they can help in planning infrastructure and facilities by testing layouts and workflows before execution. They can also enable a more objective evaluation of systems during trials by allowing equipment to be tested across operational limits objectively, thereby strengthening and shortening the procurement procedures. For in-service platforms, Digital Twins can support continuous performance validation and improve platform availability through predictive maintenance and product validation.

Digital twins can also help the DRDO, academia, and industry in reducing development time of new prototypes as well as in multiple associated areas like prototype validation, quality control, and testing. They can also improve lifecycle management activities, including MRO. They can also help overcome the challenges associated with spiral development of products and solutions, an aspect that the Indian defence ecosystem has been struggling with for a very long time now.

Advanced Simulation Systems are yet another technology area with tremendous dual-use capabilities. Traditionally associated with only training, these systems actually go way beyond training and can help in doctrine validation, evolution of operational plans, as well as process and product development. Even within the domain of training, which has largely been limited to individual training in isolation, the potential of simulation can be transformative.

Through Live, Virtual, and Constructive integration, these systems are changing how training is envisioned, planned, and executed. They can enable integrated training at the crew, unit, formation, and theatre levels across services. Training environments that have traditionally been siloed can now function as a unified continuum. Also, wargaming can be made way more immersive, realistic, and reflective of operational conditions. For DRDO and academia, simulation systems can support experimentation, process improvements, as well as product development.

Electronics and Embedded Systems form the foundation of modern capability. The ability to curate customized electronics designs using indigenous chips and circuits, sensors, and firmware, with customised communication protocols and the ability to integrate with third-party products, is a phenomenal enabler.

This can help us reduce external dependence and create a resilient architecture for the development of indigenous solutions.

For the Armed Forces, control over sensors, communication systems, and electronic warfare capabilities is critical to operational effectiveness. In contested environments, this layer often determines whether systems function as intended. Operating at the heart of critical systems, these technologies energize the products effectively. They also support DRDO, academia, and industry in reducing dependency and strengthening the ability to create specialised subsystems and systems, thereby improving resilience, as well as capabilities, across the product lifecycle.

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning support decision-making across all levels. Shaping transformation across industries and warfare, these systems enable faster data collection, quicker analysis, improved situational awareness, and support for functions such as surveillance, command and control, and logistics. Their role continues to evolve from augmenting human decision-making towards greater levels of autonomy.

Needless to say, homegrown AI and ML platforms can transform our architectures and make them way more capable. For DRDO and academia, AI and ML open avenues for research in data-driven models and predictive systems. For industry, they enable scalable and software-driven solutions across civilian and defence domains, strengthening the dual-use ecosystem.

Autonomous Systems and Robotics are translating intelligence into action. They enable operations in high-risk environments and improve reach and persistence across land, sea, air, and emerging domains. Their application is expanding beyond support roles into core operational functions. Traditionally used for replacing tasks that were considered to be dull, dirty, and dangerous, autonomous and unmanned systems are finding greater resonance across combat and combat support.

For DRDO, academia, and industry applications, they create unprecedented opportunities in autonomy, control systems, and human-machine integration. They also enable the development of next-generation systems that combine efficiency, safety, and operational effectiveness.

Data Platforms are emerging as the central integrative layer across modern defence systems. For the Armed Forces, they enable the creation of a unified operational and logistics picture by bringing together inputs from multiple sensors, platforms, and domains. This significantly enhances situational awareness, shortens decision cycles, and enables coordinated action across formations and services.

For DRDO and academia, data platforms enable data-driven development, modelling, and validation of systems, allowing for a more objective assessment and faster iteration. For industry, they support system integration, analytics, and the development of scalable digital architectures that can operate across both civilian and defence environments. Their effectiveness, however, depends on interoperability, standardisation, and robust security frameworks, making them critical to enabling true network-centric and multi-domain operations.

Space and Geospatial Technologies extend capability across all pillars of the defence ecosystem. For the Armed Forces, they enhance communication, navigation, surveillance, and command and control, while significantly improving operational and logistical planning. Their role is increasingly central in both strategic and tactical operations.

For DRDO and academia, these technologies enable advanced modelling, geospatial analytics, and the integration of satellite-based data into defence systems. For industry, they open up opportunities in downstream applications, geospatial services, and the integration of space-based capabilities with terrestrial systems. Their real value lies in seamless integration with ground-level systems, enabling more informed and precise decision-making.

Taken together, these technologies matter less as standalone capabilities and more in how they are applied collectively. Their strength lies in improving how the ecosystem functions as a whole, enabling faster development, more effective deployment, and continuous adaptation to evolving operational requirements.

Conclusion

The basis of military advantage is shifting. It is no longer defined by platforms alone, but by the ability to integrate, adapt, and scale technology in response to changing operational demands.

Sovereign dual-use technologies are central to this shift. They combine the speed of civilian innovation with the control required for strategic systems, enabling faster capability development, reducing critical dependencies, and strengthening control over critical technological layers. More importantly, they help align the Armed Forces, DRDO, industry, and academia into a more responsive and effective ecosystem. Resilience, in this context, is built through coherence and control. Nations that can anchor their defence capability in sovereign, dual-use technologies will be better placed to adapt, sustain, and evolve in the face of changing operational demands.

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India’s SHANTI Act (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India), enacted in December 2025 is undoubtedly an inflection point in diluting the state’s longstanding monopoly on nuclear power to fast-track clean energy goals. By replacing the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010, it targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 from the current 8.8 GW. It also prioritises indigenous small modular reactors (SMRs) for industrial and captive applications while enabling private Indian firms and joint ventures to build, own, and operate plants with up to 49% equity under central government majority control. Other major key reforms include granting statutory independence to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and reserving state exclusivity over uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and high-level waste.

At present only Russia has fully operational SMRs which have been commercial since 2020 and delivering power reliably to the remote Arctic region in extremely harsh environment. Several other countries like the US, China, Russia, Canada, and the UK are in advance stages aiming for operationalisation in the period 2030-2035. India plans to deploy indigenous SMRs by 2033, with a budget of INR 20,000 crore allocated in 2025-26 for at least five units under the Nuclear Energy Mission. India’s Union Budget 2026-27 extends basic customs duty exemptions on imports of goods required for nuclear power projects until 2035, broadening coverage to all nuclear plants regardless of capacity. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre leads development of Bharat Small Modular Reactors (BSMR), targeting energy-intensive industries, remote areas, and repurposed fossil plants. Besides, India’s private sector is poised for a transformative role in SMR deployment with major firms including Adani Group, Reliance Industries, Tata Power, JSW Energy, Jindal Steel & Power and Hindalco having expressed interest in BSMR development and deployment.

Fail-safe security of SMRs assumes added significance in the Indian context due to the stressed internal security environment in many regions of the country. SMRs present distinct security challenges stemming from their compact size, factory-fabricated designs, and deployment in dispersed locations such as remote regions or industrial sites. They are also likely to be deployed for captive power at energy guzzling large data centers for artificial intelligence and global capability centers. Their smaller footprints and transportability increase sabotage risks, as reduced on-site security personnel compared to large reactors could undermine the security framework against coordinated attacks. Modular construction also heightens proliferation risks by potentially simplifying the unauthorized movement of nuclear materials, necessitating specialized safeguards beyond conventional methods. Additionally, SMRs’ reliance on advanced digital controls expands cyber-attack vulnerabilities, particularly through supply chain weaknesses during multi-vendor factory assembly, with remote or unmanned operations further raising the threat of hacking that could enable sabotage or theft.

Security measures for SMRs need to be predicated on “security by design” concept, integrating protective measures at the inception stage of development to counter physical, cyber and proliferation threats while keeping costs manageable. In the physical domain, threat assessments based on the design dictate a layered security system incorporating barriers, sensors, cameras, and response teams. These measures can be tested against modelling tools to assess any gaps to counter diverse threats. Vulnerability of dispersed SMRs can be further reduced by underground siting, hardened structures and minimal on-site fuel storage. Cyber security measures focus on extensive vendor oversight and monitoring during factory construction phase. SMRs should function on stand-alone digital networks and regular threat modelling to discern vulnerabilities in automated controls and monitoring through encrypted systems with built-in fail-safes and redundancy. India also needs to codify regulatory safeguards aligned with IAEA standards to include modular fuel handling, independent design verification and regulatory independence of AERB. While India’s SMR security roadmap is broadly aligned with global practices, it needs to catch up with the US and Canada in cyber‑security integration and regulatory modular safeguards, including fuel and waste management. India’s approach to cyber security is fragmented and it is still drafting SMR‑specific cyber protocols. India also lacks the practical experience of Russia which has already commercialised operational SMRs. Moreover, SMR-specific human resource needs to be trained to meet India’s deployment window of 2030–2035. In order to adhere to these timelines, pilot projects to match global benchmarks with full physical-cyber security integration and regulatory clarity need to be established by 2030.

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Autonomy as the Next Evolution of Air Power

Air power has always evolved alongside the dominant technologies of its era.
The early twentieth century belonged to mechanics: the mastery of engines, wings, and altitude. The Cold War was defined by electronics: radar, stealth, and precision-guided munitions. The twenty-first century belongs to autonomy: perception, reasoning, and coordinated action.

Our (India’s) strategic environment is shifting under the combined pressures of regional tension, rapid technological diffusion, and the imperative of sovereignty in critical capabilities. Flanked by nuclear‑armed neighbours and operating across contested air and maritime domains, we must present credible deterrence while preserving freedom of action on multiple fronts. Reliance on imported technologies and legacy platforms is ceding to a new requirement: build indigenous, intelligent, and resilient systems that adapt faster than the threats they face. Against this backdrop, autonomy is not a luxury; it is a strategic necessity that will shape our ability to defend our skies, protect our seas, and project power across the Indo‑Pacific.

Understanding Autonomy

At its core, autonomy is the ability of a system to perceive its environment, interpret complex data, decide on a course of action, and execute. Differentiating automation from mission autonomy – whereas automation follows rules, mission autonomy understands context and adapts to uncertainties. In military air power, this means aircraft, drones, and sensors that respond dynamically to threats, collaborate fluidly, and adjust missions in real time without step‑by‑step direction. Such systems can replan routes under electronic attack, prioritize sensor feeds, or coordinate surveillance coverage across regions. Even when GPS and communications are denied, autonomy continues its mission, relying on uploaded data and making informed decisions. Without it, a mission is merely a plan. In contested environments where links break, manual control falters, and operators are overwhelmed, autonomy turns fragility into endurance.

For us in India, autonomy represents both a necessity and an opportunity. The nation’s airspace, stretching from high-altitude Himalayan borders to vast oceanic approaches, demands persistent surveillance, rapid response, and minimal attrition. Distributed intelligence – systems that think and act collaboratively at the edge – offers a path to surveillance without overstretch.

Simultaneously, autonomy eases manpower and logistics constraints. Intelligent mission management reduces cognitive load on pilots, while extending operational reach and endurance. Where pilots are scarce, autonomy can supplement and step in to fly. By integrating onto systems not bound to long runways, autonomy expands basing options and complicates an adversary’s targeting calculus. Most importantly, it restores freedom of action: the ability to adapt faster than potential adversaries in the shifting tempo of modern conflict.

Teaming as Force Multiplication

The potential of autonomy multiplies when thought of not as isolated machines, but as teams – networks of autonomous systems that can learn from, coordinate with, and support one another in complex missions.

Teaming allows multiple autonomous assets, whether airborne, maritime, or ground-based, to distribute tasks dynamically. Each autonomous asset becomes part of an extended neural network: observing, orienting, deciding, and acting in concert with its peers. One sensor platform may detect and classify targets; another may relay data through a resilient mesh network; a third may execute a strike or provide support in the event of interference/jamming. The network continually re-weaves itself; if one node is jammed or destroyed, others reroute around the gap or cover/bridge the gap by reassigning responsibilities among the able team members.

This model transforms air power from platform-centric to ecosystem-centric. Rather than concentrating risk in a few expensive manned aircraft, forces can employ many, relatively inexpensive, intelligent systems working together, offering agility, redundancy, and resilience. This is autonomy not as an isolated function, but as a living, adaptive web. Each operates semi-independently, but all share a common intent shaped by human command.

For India, such teaming has profound implications. Along the northern and north-western borders, autonomous airborne systems could coordinate patrol patterns, identify intrusions, and hand off tracking without saturating command networks. Over the Indian Ocean, autonomous reconnaissance aircraft can team with other maritime surveillance assets and even satellites to create and sustain a continuous intelligence picture or maritime domain awareness, thereby creating an ability to instantly react to suspicious movement or emerging crises.

Team’s adaptive behaviour contributes to its deterrent quality. When one system is lost or degraded, others reassign tasks automatically, preserving mission continuity. This capacity to self-heal under pressure amplifies deterrence through resilience; adversaries cannot easily capitate a force that reorganizes faster than they can target it.

Partnerships for Autonomy Integration and Sovereign Development

Developing and sustaining autonomy at scale demands an industrial and institutional shift. The speed of AI innovation far exceeds the tempo of traditional defence procurement. To remain competitive, India needs ecosystems that combine military discipline with private‑sector agility, academia’s research depth, and a clear pathway from lab to the frontline.

Crucially, to adapt to the autonomy revolution, India does not have to wait for new airframes. Instead, autonomy can be integrated incrementally onto existing platforms, extending their relevance and capability without wholesale replacement. Across the global defence industry, autonomy is already maturing in the field. Private innovators and research institutions have developed and flight-tested adaptable autonomy architectures that can be integrated onto diverse aircraft and mission profiles. Modern mission computers, open avionics standards, and secure datalink architectures allow legacy fighters, transports, and surveillance aircraft to host autonomous functions from adaptive sensor management to semi-autonomous flight operations and cooperative targeting.

By layering autonomy onto proven airframes, air forces can bridge the gap between current capability and future independence, gaining the benefits of intelligent air power while developing the sovereign expertise to field fully autonomous systems in the decade ahead.

For India, this represents a unique opportunity to accelerate modernization without waiting for generational replacement programs. By partnering with experienced autonomy developers, both domestic and international, India can adopt, adapt, and sovereignly certify proven systems as part of its own modernization cycle……leverage what exists now while investing in indigenous development for tomorrow.

Nevertheless, partnership recommended above must be co‑developmental, not solely transactional. Governments, defence organizations, research centres, and private firms must work within shared simulation environments, data ecosystems, and validation frameworks to accelerate progress in developing sovereign autonomy. Integrating proven architectures can help India operationalize autonomy as a near-term force multiplier while building pathways for indigenous evolution. Instead of rigid, multiyear development cycles, autonomy should advance through iterative, test-driven updates that refine performance in real time. Years of development become weeks. Months of development become days. Such collaboration compresses timelines, strengthens accountability, and embeds transparency as a core feature of capability generation, not a bureaucratic afterthought.

The end-goal of these partnerships is sovereign autonomy: the ability to design, test, and certify mission behaviours under a national authority. Sovereign autonomy ensures that governments, not vendors, control the evolution of their own systems. In practical terms, this means separating flight-critical safety software from mission logic so that domestic teams can adapt operational behaviours without compromising safety or revealing proprietary architectures. Partners that enable integration of existing autonomy while also providing a platform for indigenous development set the conditions for enduring success in a fast‑moving defence landscape. It allows us to integrate and develop, test, and deploy intelligent machines faster than ever.

India’s defence modernization programs have begun to reflect this trajectory. Initiatives like iDEX have opened pathways for small and medium enterprises to contribute advanced software, simulation, and sensor solutions.

International partnerships will matter as well. Trusted collaboration on data standards, testing protocols, and secure interfaces can enhance interoperability without surrendering control. The key is open architecture with disciplined governance – a system that allows India to innovate locally while operating globally.

Through the aforementioned partnerships, autonomy becomes not just a capability but an industry – one that strengthens national resilience, creates enduring expertise, and ensures that the authority to adapt and improve remains sovereign.

Deterrence in the Age of Autonomy

Autonomy and teaming are not only operational enablers, but they are also strategic multipliers. They redefine deterrence for an era in which information moves faster than formations and decision speed decides survival.

Where traditional deterrence emphasized visible mass, like fleets, bases, and inventories, modern deterrence emphasizes invisible agility – the capacity to reconfigure faster than an adversary can target, to absorb disruption, and to project power from unexpected directions. Autonomous air power, even more so if it is runway independent, makes this possible. Systems that can operate from dispersed sites, update tactics overnight, and maintain networked awareness across vast distances present an adversary with an unsolvable dilemma: where to strike, and against what? Deterrence arises from uncertainty in the face of a force that learns and adapts in contact.

For us in India, this agility has profound strategic consequences. Autonomous air power allows the nation to extend presence without overstretch, maintain vigilance across multiple fronts and long borders, and recover from attacks more swiftly. When paired with trusted partnerships and sovereign control, it ensures that India can adapt faster than any external actor can constrain it. Moreover, autonomy enhances coalition credibility. When systems are designed with interoperability embedded from the start, our forces can operate seamlessly alongside allies while preserving control of national assets and data. Predictable collaboration reinforces deterrence by signaling both independence and reliability.

The essence of deterrence in the autonomy era lies in its speed, resilience, and trust. Nations that can integrate these elements will command the initiative not by threatening destruction, but by denying instability. Autonomy, intelligently governed, becomes not an escalatory force but a stabilizing one.

The Future Ahead

Autonomy, teaming, and partnership are not separate trends; they are the intertwined pillars of future air power. They shift the balance from hardware to intelligence, from centralization to adaptability, and from ownership to collaboration. India mastering this triad offers operational advantage and simultaneously strategic independence. By integrating mission autonomy into current forces, creating coordinate networks of platforms for missions, and developing sovereign autonomy through public-private partnership, India can shape an air power model rooted in both freedom and responsibility. In the coming decades, the nations that succeed will not be those that build the most machines, but those that build the most coherent systems where humans, algorithms, industries, and allies act in partnership.

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