The themes of eight sessions included emerging technologies and industry capabilities, air threat, integrated air defence battle, communications for the air defence battle, research & development (R&D) and ‘atmanirbharta’ in air defence.

Inaugural Session

Welcome Address. Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, CENJOWS gave the opening remarks with the salience of Air & Missile Defence in protection of national assets and during both defensive and offensive operations. He stressed that the deliberations were important especially in view of emerging challenges with new weapons, war fighting concepts and impending establishment of IADC.

Inaugural Address. Lt Gen AP Singh, Director General Army Air Defence (AAD) gave the inaugural address and talked about  air and missile threats, which, unlike in the past, have become potent and unpredictable. He highlighted the following issues:-

We are experiencing rapid change in technology in sensors and air defence weapons systems. In particular the stealth technology and unmanned vehicles present a formidable challenge.

Air defence equipment cost intensive and needs to be replaced in a phased manner, bearing lifecycle costs in mind.

Legacy equipment, therefore, needs to be sustained and upgraded.

Communication is the bed rock of air defence operations, which should be integrated, instant and real time.

The control of operations needs decentralization with distributed responsibility.

Work is in progress by both, Army and Air force to collate and present inputs of all sensors on one integrated platform.

Industry should offer solutions to upgrade/ modify legacy weapons.

Special Address. Air Mshl SP Wagle, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (DCIDS) (Capability Development), gave a special talk. He mentioned that the current phase of reorganization into IADC would end the hitherto single service fragmented approach to air and missile defence. He highlighted the following issues:-

 The concept of operations and training has to change with integrated air defence operations.

To counter the emerging air and missile defence challenges, new weapons have either been acquired or are in process of being procured by the three services to beef up our air defence in all areas.

Rapid development of weapon technology means faster obsolescence of existing weapons. This poses a challenge in view of budget constraints.

Present day threat comprises a mix of disruptive and low technology weapons.

In the current warfighting scenario, even a weak country possessing low tech weapons can challenge a stronger nation. 

Expensive missiles/ weapons cannot be viable options to intercept / neutralize the low-tech weapons.

Since traditional threats will continue to exist with non-traditional threats, we have to develop capability to tackle both.

Industry’s R/D should keep focus on the current threats.

Use of Artificial Intelligence can shorten the OODA loop and enable safe operations without fratricide.

Access new technology to neutralize new threats such as unmanned / Hypersonic weapons and cruise missiles.

Besides active measures, passive measures and decoys still have great relevance.

Collaborative and joint approach by all stake holders in air defence is the way ahead.

Capacity of Indian Industry. Col KV Kuber, Director Defence & Aerospace, gave out the Industry Perspective. He said that Indian Industry had acquired skill and capacity to build sensors, missiles and tactical weapons and their ammunition for the armed forces. Several indigenous industries like Tata Advanced Systems, Adani, Reliance, Bharat Dynamics, Kalyani Group, BEL, BDL, etc, the have technology and capacity to meet the India’s air defence needs. But, still a lot needs to be done especially to tackle emerging threats in unmanned vehicles, hypersonic, stealth and cyber and electromagnetic domains.

Sessions and Speakers

Air Mshl Anil Chopra, Director Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired Session 2, the theme of which was Industry Capabilities. Ravi M, Bharat Dynamics Ltd. spoke on the work being carried out by BDL to manufacture missiles and the technologies available to them. Rann Marom, VP Business Development India, Rada Electronic Industries, spoke on his company’s capabilities, Abhishek Agarwal, Sr Manager, Saarloha Advanced Materials spoke on “Making India Self-reliant in Defece and Aerospace.”

Air Vice Marshal Makarand Ranade, ACAS Ops (Space), Air HQ chaired the session, the theme of which was “Contours of the Air Threat”. Gp Capt S Dhankhar, from Air Ops Branch, Air HQ spoke on “The Threat from Stand-off and Precision Attack.” Col Rajneesh Suyal, Col Weapons & Systems, Army Design Bureau spoke on “Emerging Threat from UAVs/ Drones.” Cdr Gokul Suresh, Cdr Aircraft Acquisition, ACNS (Air), Naval HQ spoke on “The Air & Missile Threat to Naval Assets.”

Air Vice Marshal PK Srivastava, former Director Bharat Dynamics Ltd and VP L&T chaired the session, whose theme was “Emerging Air Defence Technologies.” Gp Capt KB Mathews, Gp Capt Ops AD GE, Air HQ spoke on “Challenges of Integrated AD Battle and Air Space Management.” Col HK Parashar, of Army Air Defence Directorate spoke on “Low level threat in the Tactical Battle Area and its neutralisation.” Cmde Alok Ananda, Cmde Naval Ops, Naval HQ spoke on “The Air Defence Battle at Sea.”

This was followed by a Special talk by Lt Gen Rajeev Sabharwal, former SOC-in-C on “Communications: A decisive catalyst for the realisation of an Integrated Air Defence Command.”

This was followed by another Special Talk by Lt Gen (Dr) VK Saxena, former DG Army Air Defence, on “Missiles & Strategic Systems.”

Another session on “Emerging Air Defence Technologies” was chaired by Brig Jagdeep Dahiya, former Commander Air Defence Brigade. Gp Capt Saurabh Gupta, of Air Defence Branch, Air HQ spoke on “Lessons from recent aerial engagements in regional conflicts.” Col R Sathya Narayanan, of Army Air Defence Directorate gave a talk on “Lessons for ground-based air defence engagements in contemporary conflicts.”

A session on “Research & Development” was chaired by Air Mshl Rajeev Sachdeva, former DCIDS (Ops), HQ IDS. Sheik Althaf, Scientist G, LRDE, DRDO gave a talk on “Latest developments in AD Radar.” PK Tewari, Scientist F, DRDL, Hyderabad spoke on “Missile-based AD weapon systems.” Dr PN Dwivedi, Scientist F, RCI, DRDO, Hyderabad gave an “Overview of Ballistic Missile Defence.”

The last session on “Atmanirbharta in Air Defence” was chaired by Lt Gen Kuldeep Singh, former DG Army Air Defence. Air Vice Mshl Narmdeshwar Tiwari, ACAS (Plans), Air HQ spoke on “Ongoing and planned procurements and indigenous efforts.” Cdr Inder Kumar Singh, Dte of Staff Requirements, Naval HQ spoke on “Ongoing and planned procurements and indigenous efforts.”

Air Mshl LK Malhotra, former SASO Eastern Air Command gave the Valedictory Address. Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, CENJOWS gave the Closing Remarks and Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review gave the Vote of Thanks.

Key Issues Needing Attention

Some key issues which came to the fore during the deliberations by the speakers were: –

Air Defence faces omni present and multifarious threats, from unmanned vehicles, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles. What should be the Air Defense response to counter these multifarious threats?

Comments. Neutralizing multifarious and complex threats is a challenge. A multi-layered defence and joint network-centric approach can provide credible detection and defence against the aircraft threats. Presently, there is no credible defence against the hypersonic missiles/ glide vehicles. Russian S-400 AD system which will be inducted in India has the capability to intercept hypersonic vehicles as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. However, as defence technology progresses, counter measures will emerge. Technologies such as directed energy weapons, particle beams and other non-kinetic weapons will be likely options for an effective defence against hypersonic missiles.

The air threat particularly in the Tactical Battle Area is complex and challenging.

Comments. The integrated realtime air situation picture will enable quick reaction against the multifarious threats in the TBA while ensuring the safety of own aircraft. Secure communications with redundancy will have to be ensured.

A low technology adversary too can present a challenge to a technologically superior nation.

Comments. Use of relatively cheap rockets and unmanned vehicles in the recent conflicts has brought focus on these weapons. An integrated air picture from the visual and electronic sensors and use of combination of hard and soft kill options would provide effective defence against these threats. Presently, Israeli Iron Dome type of systems are the only answer for the unguided rockets, which are also effective against unmanned platforms. But it is not cost-effective against unguided rockets. R&D for cheaper non-kinetic, multi-use options must continue to neutralize such threats.

It is not possible to change/ replace all legacy weapons due budgetary constraints.

Comments. Upgradation/ modification of the existing weapon systems will ensure that we continue using them with the modern weapon systems.

How do we tackle the emerging ISR and combat drone threats that manifest in different sizes and shapes ranging from very small to large and with less detectability due to low RCS and low velocity?

Comments. For unmanned platforms, a combination of defensive actions like Kinetic and Directed Energy weapons and other non-kinetic measures will have to be employed to neutralize them. DRDO is alive to the challenge. It has already developed an anti-drone system to tackle the drone threats. More anti-drone solutions will emerge in due course with the ongoing iDEX innovations.

Will futuristic Integrated Air Defence Command shorten the OODA loop?

Comments. Real time integrated air situation picture with identification will be available to air defence units at all times. This will ensure that all air borne threats are challenged, diverted or destroyed by suitably chosen air defence weapons without any loss of time.

How will a common air picture be ensured to fight air defence battle?

Comments. All sensors of the three Services and civil agencies will be integrated through IACCS, which carries out multi-sensory tracking and generates a collated composite air picture with identification of all detections for an integrated air and missile defence.

How centralized command and control and decentralized execution of operations will be ensured by the IADC?

Comments. IACCS of Indian Air Force will be linked in real time with Akashteer communication of the Indian Army and Trigun of Indian Navy. This will ensure that all speech and data exchange will take place between them in real-time at designated hierarchy. As a result of this, it will be possible to have centralized control of operations while allowing decentralized execution of tasks.

At present common training of the air defence personnel of Army, Navy and Air force is not carried out.

Comments. Syllabus relevant to the role of each Service should be formulated. This is important to develop common understanding of the air defence processes and procedures.

Why did Armenia suffer heavy losses as compared to Azerbaijan in Nagorno – Karabakh conflict? What are lessons for us?

Comments. Employment of passive defence measures such as camouflage, dispersal of vital assets, use of decoys, blackout and firefighting are relevant against both manned and unmanned threats, since it is still not easy to strike or collect ISR data when target area is well camouflaged. Armenia ignored this vital principle and suffered heavy losses. These measures are relevant in our context too.

Adversaries will use of Cyber and EW measure to blunt our air defences.

Comments. Adversaries may precede attacks by disrupting our command-and-control network and jamming/ saturating our sensors. We, therefore, must train and frequently exercise our operators to discern and operate using alternate measures of communication and detection and employ anti-jamming measures to burn through and detect the threats.

Networks and Communications for Integrated AD Command.   

Lt Gen Rajeev Sabharwal argued that the present communication architecture linking sensors, shooters and decision makers is platform centric, tightly coupled, linear and hierarchical, ie, very stove-piped. He stated that the requirement was to have loosely coupled smart entities, which are sensor/ shooter agnostic, akin to a “publish/ subscribe” topology. Such a system will be asynchronous in time & space, with data accessible/ available to the entitled user anywhere, anytime.

The system should have Low Probability of Interception (LPI), Low Probability of Detection (LPD) and Anti-Jamming features.

Networked links between Akashteer (IACCS at JADC) and Trigun (IACCS at MOC) were recommended. RASP should be available to Army and Naval users in real time. Applications should be network agnostic – IACCS, Akashteer, Trigun should be hosted at national level at Central Data Centres (CDC)/ Designated Service Data Centres and at the theatre level at Theatre Data Centres. There will be integrated data flow to CDS/ NCP. Data sharing mechanism between services data centres to be finalised, as also Common Security framework.

The present networking is only in the physical domain, but needs to be extended to the ‘Social Domain’ (ie any decision maker, any sensor, any shooter) in a “functional”, pan-India Integrated AD Comd. The decision making has to be collaborative.

The network integrates all physical domains (Land, Sea, Air, Space) – Inter- and Intra- domains. Sensors, Cloud, Decision Makers, Shooters (Independent of orgnisation Services) geographic locations, platforms.

AD entities of the 3 Services from tactical to strategic levels must be integrated. IAF, Navy and Army should migrate to NFS as media. NFS Nodes will be linked through voice switches and data centres of services.

Seamless intra-Service communications demand common equipments and trained manpower.

All applications should run on AI engines and data analytics.

Recommendations

Following recommendations have been made:

Since the threat from drones is common to the three Services, a common strategy/plan should be worked out to neutralize these threats. Automation and Artificial intelligence will further make this threat potent. Own “swarming” counter-threats should be developed concurrently.

Communication of three Services should be linked for real time speech and data transfer at the designated level for centralized command and control and effective execution of air defence tasks.

Upgradation/ modification of the legacy air defence weapons should be taken up urgently.

A Joint Air defence directive should be issued before IADC becomes functional.

A relevant joint air defence training strategy should be formulated for the personnel of three Services.

Coordination should be carried out with DRDO and other research agencies to find viable solutions for the new and emerging low cost threats.

A strategy should be devised for neutralization of the ballistic/ cruise and hypersonic threats. Indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and planned induction of NASAM, S-400 system will give capability to tackle these threats. Since the IADC will have the centralized air picture and wherewithal and trained personnel, IADC is the most suited for strategic missile defence.

IACCS links must be extended to the deployed army and naval sensors for generation of composite picture at the earliest.

The threat of stealth fighter/ bombers is a reality in our area, Hence, induction of low frequency/ quantum radars, which can detect such threats are needed particularly in the forward areas.

Army legacy AD weapons like L70, ZSU 23, and fire control radars should be modified/ upgraded to enable these to tackle the new emerging threats.

Both active and passive measures are important steps to neutralize/ divert the threats, even when the    attacks are guided by high-tech navigational aids and targeting systems and carry PGMs.

Cyber and EW action on our command-and-control network and sensors in all probability will precede and/or occur during the manned and unmanned air attacks by the adversary Hence, continuous upgradation of anti-cyber and ECCM must be become part of training curriculum and be practised in the joint exercises.

IADC, when established, should be entrusted with ballistic missile defence since composite air situation is available in which BMD sensors too could be integrated to warn of the ballistic and cruise missile threats.

DRDO has displayed excellent capability in indigenous strategic missiles. We still need to develop long range, medium range, short and QRSAMs.

De-conflicting defensive counter-air responsibilities between proposed IADC and Theatre Commands calls for detailed deliberation.

Valedictory Address

Air Mshl LK Malhotra, covered the highlights of the whole r. He suggested that we need not reinvent the weapon systems. Wherever possible, we should seek transfer of technology and carry out indigenous manufacturing of the weapon systems.

The post EVENT REVIEW – Air & Missile Defence India 2021 appeared first on IMR.

What have been the drivers which have propelled me to take up the project? Well, over the years, I always felt, that there is an abiding deficit of quality and researched reference material on the very many aspects of Ground Based Air Defence; though sporadic articles do appear in various professional journals by Subject Matter Experts. That was my first driver for putting before a discerning reader, a treasure- trove of information which a professional soldier in general and an air warrior on either side of the see-saw of attack and defence in particular, would like to fall back upon, in satiation of their multiple professional needs.

The other driver, of course, is the fulfilment of my own life’s dream, as I said. Starting from the humble beginnings of small snippets in small time magazines, slowly graduating to analytical and researched pieces in magazines of standing and repute-one wanted to take the next-pedestal of cumulating the humble efforts in the form of a book. The first break was provided by USI which published my first book on air defence issues. Duly emboldened by the success of this maiden endeavour; I ventured out to pen down a bigger and a more comprehensive work. This time around, the honour to provide a platform for my two-penny worth of effort was provided by Maj Gen RK Arora, Retd, CEO, IMR under the prestigious banner of IMR Media, to whom I express my most grateful thanks and indebtedness.

Getting to the book at hand, I have deliberately chosen the subject content applying the twin-tests of contemporary relevance, as well as, the prospect of further growth and development of the subject in the foreseeable future. I hope that my selection will match the expectations of the discerning reader cutting across the rank hierarchy and relating both to the ground soldier, as well as, a scholar air warrior.

The book opens with the celebration of the ‘Unmanned Revolution’; I call it a revolution because it is my sense that the `Unmanned Story’ riding on the twin wings of the UAVs and UCAVs is something whose time has come and whose place of prominence in the comity of aerial threat vehicles cannot be wished away. The book reviews the amazing evolutionary journey of these wonder machines starting way back from the end of Nineteenth Century working through the two Great Wars, the Cold War years, the Vietnam War, the Arab Israeli Conflict to the later years of Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo right up to the contemporary Global War on Terror in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It highlights the many combat virtues of UAVs/UCAVs in terms of zero crew fatalities, no training deficit, incredible endurance, wide mission spectrum, open architecture, flexible mission payloads and and more. While the book flags the huge versatility of UAVs and UCAVs, it is also tries to expose its soft underbelly by bringing out the vulnerability of these machines when faced with a resolute air defence warrior equipped with hard and soft kill options. As to the face of the future, the book highlights the emerging research areas riding on nano-technology, robotics and AI, the exciting world of VTOL/SVTOL UAVs, liberation from the Ground Control Station, towards full vehicle autonomy, next generation morphing, the orinthropters, the arrival of SWARMIES and the growth of stealth in UAVs. In the context of bringing down a UAV, the book highlights the multiple challenges in terms of detection, much akin to finding a needle in the haystack, and killing the UAV optimally through hard / soft kill options, lest we end up killing a fly with a sledge hammer.

Coming to the contemporary and the futuristic scene in the UAV / UCAV domain, the book describes the latest concept of MUMT or Manned and Unmanned Teaming, wherein, the experts are trying to extract disproportionate gains by combining superior human intelligence, intuition, grit, tolerance for ambiguity and instant decision making capability of the combat pilot in manned platforms with the brute precision, range, stealth, endurance, immunity and versatility of the unmanned machine. Interestingly, what precipitates out of such teaming are conceptual issues that not only reside in the operational domain, but also in the ethical one. In this, the book tries to pose questions that still beckon for answers; the most pertinent being, ‘Are we ready for Machine over Man?” Probably, not as yet.

The book thereafter presents a comprehensive review of the subject of ‘Ballistic Missile Defence; Capabilities Across Nations and Where Technology is Leading to’. Essentially, an endeavour has been made to capture the nuances of the amazing growth journey of BMD starting from the ‘Era of Vengeance’ where Adolf Hitler’s V2 Rockets came screaming down from the upper atmosphere causing untold devastation on a hapless population to the current date when SSMs are crossing new and newer frontiers in range, reach, lethality and precision. While the defenders are busy in developing counters constituting the complex of Sensors, Shooters and Battle Control Systems, trying to take on the Ballistic Missiles from Terminal to Re-entry to Midcourse and to the yet dream destination of Boost Phase Engagement. Taking a global look, the Chapter describes how the leading BMD makers of the world are trying to synergize the sensor-shooter capabilities across multiple domains spanning across land, sea, air and space – the ultimate high ground. The Chapter also deliberates how the kill options in the BMD domain are moving from the conventional hard kill to electronic kill using High Power Microwaves or Charge Particle Beams trying to debilitate and incapacitate the incoming threat by concentrating on it a few hundred million electron volts of KE in a few seconds, thus destroying the integrity of the material mass of the incoming missiles or the thermal kill using the lasing medium to deliver a shock pulse of coherent beams instantly leading to thermal collapse of the target missile. This Chapter ends by building a hypothetical situation of the possible scenario of transition of capability from ASAT to BMD. In that, it is argued that since the leading space faring nations of the world (most notably, China in our case) have already developed and demonstrated ASAT capability, thus its metamorphosis into a BMD capability on the same scale is not a flight of fancy; it is an ominous reality.

The book then looks at the evolving domain of stealth and counter stealth. Picking up the thread from the days of German Horton Ho 229, which marked the arrival of stealth in the closing years of Second World War, the Chapter chronicles the continuous growth of the stealth concept on both sides of the fence, namely the attacker and the defender. Wearing the realities of Dollars vs Cents in the game of Stealth vs Counter Stealth, it is shown how in the long run, the possession and continous revamping of counter stealth capability will be more economically sustainable and will have lesser ethical burden than doing the same with offensive stealth. Exposing both sides of the coin, while the contents on one hand describe the cutting-edge technologies propelling the growth of stealth, on the other hand, they highlight how the defender is smarting up with enabling capabilities in the counter stealth domain. So while on one side are the RAMs, smart-skin technologies, plasma-driven stealth, the planform alignment and more, on the other side there is an amazing growth in passive sensing capabilities, use of lasers (LIDARs), Schilieren’s Photography and so on. Mention has also been made of the tremendous growth in sensor technology to defeat the Very Low Observable threat using VHF, C/X band radars, OTH radars, MIMO radars, LIDARs and CELLDARs etc stand explained. The Chapter ends in recognition and acknowledgement of the eternal cause effect cycle on both sides of the stealth continuum.

The next Chapter describes the emerging kill options in the air defence weapons of the future. In order to put the felt need in perspective, it starts off by highlighting the very many deficits of the Hard Kill option in terms of range, reach, altitude, reaction time, finite arsenal, response time and so on and how most of these can be overcome using the multiple advantages of the soft kill. It brings out how the leap of technology is fast weaponising the laser option in a multitude of emerging weapons from the mobile tactical variety to advanced medium range capability using innovative ideas for generating adequate lasing energy. The Chapter further describes the promise which the HPM and CPB weapons hold, though, much of it still remains in the pipeline of realisation. Describing the sword and shield relationship, it is stated that so long as the severity and lethality of the air threat continues to grow by way of multiplicity of threat vehicles, precision strike capability and a slew of smart and intelligent munitions, the combat teeth of the defenders will grow alongside in the truism for every sword; a shield. As to the foreseeable future, the day is not far when HPM and CPB weapons will become hard realities. These weapons are not stand alone, other enabling technologies, which are likely to mature by around 2020 include multi-spectral sensing without giving away the position of the fire unit, high data flow with real time signal processing, sensor fusion, multi-sensor, multi-step, multi-mode guidance and control, special fuzes, warheads and more.

The next Chapter highlights yet other non-conventional kill options for the GBADWS. This is through the Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) enablement of GBADWS. This option is based on the growing dependency of aerial threat vehicles on the Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, both for their own avionics and operations, as also, for guiding the smart / precision munitions from the mother aircraft to their intended targets. This kill option aims to provide such an ECM muscle to the GBADWS which enables them to soft kill either the electronics / electromagnetics on board the mother aircraft or to cut/interfere/severe, even for a short while, the umbilical chord represented by the electronic / EM link between the mother aerial threat vehicle and the munitions being guided. It is believed that at speeds in magnitude of several machs and split-second response timings, the link once severed even for a wink can not be restored. Such kill options provide enhanced range effect as it is not limited by the range and reach of hard kill weapons, as also, an unlimited magazine as the ECM capability will be alive so long as the power remains pumped in. Befitting the concept described, the Chapter then highlights the existing weapon systems in the world that are based on this kill option. The Chinese 970 Radar Jamming System, the Israeli Multi-Platform Radar Jamming System, the Russians SPN series of equipment, the UK’s S373 ECM system and the US Mobile Ground to Air Radar jamming system find a mention.

In response to that school of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who have long written the obituaries of the lowly air defence guns and their ammunition, the next Chapter makes an emphatic statement to declare that the air defence guns, the original warhorse of air defence warriors are here to stay as the last sentinels of terminal defence, ready to face the determined attacker that manages to penetrate all the layers of a defender‘s line up. The world scan that follows in support of the above claim highlights a few truths. It firstly reveals that no country has ever discarded its guns, the war horses of 50s and 60s are still around, albeit with fantastic and all enabling qualitative upgrades. Most of these include a state-of-the-art Electro Optical Tracking System (EOTS) complete with its gyro-stablized day camera, high definition night camera with FLIR optics, eye-safe Laser Range Finder (LRF) and a digital Fire Control System (FCS).

It is also revealed that while calibres have gradually come down for 100mm to 85mm-76mm-57mm-40mm-35mm-30mm-23mm-20mm-14.5mm etc, there is no standard fit. While Sweden, Italy and Singapore celebrate their 40mm machines; Germany, Greece and Italy are busy perfecting their 30mm calibre; Russia, Poland, Belgium and Finland are going strong with their 23mm as much as US, France, Israel and Korea are spitting fire with their 20mm Gattlings and more. Besides the gun, ammunition is smarting up along multiple verticals to include warhead triggering at optimum point through embedding of near real-time intelligence at the muzzle end by way of rd-to-rd feeding of muzzle velocity and time of flight, then there is the course-correction strategy through impulse manoeuvre technologies and a whole lot of research is on in the designing of special effect ammunition. Some of these include air burst munition concepts, modular ammunition, other special effects to include higher penetration, higher incendiary, higher fragmentation and more. The various ammunition types include the DART ammunition, Telescoped Ammunition, and the ultimate 3P-Pre-Fragmented Programmable Proximity Fuzed ammunition. In sum, the days of air defence guns and gun ammunition are far from over.

The next Chapter deals with the key trends in the Integrated Air Defence Systems Concept. The central point being made in this Chapter is that of metamorphosis borne out of necessity. Some four to five decades into history there was a time when air threat was linear essentially riding on the twin shoulders of aircraft and helicopters in the visual domain while the number of assets to be protected were finite, thereby enabling themselves to be protected by terminal GBADWS in the point defence mode where fire units were VA/VP centric and were deployed in single and sometimes multiple rings around them.

All the above changed over time as the air threat re-vamped itself both qualitatively and quantitatively. The air threat vehicles grew in multiplicity, their range and reach envelope grew spatially and in range, reach, accuracy, precision and long range stand-off capability. Alongside this, the number of assets to be protected hit the roof, thereby making earlier forms of deployment impossible All this gave rise to the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) concept, where GBADWS were deployed not as VA / VP centric but grid centric, implying that multiple layers of GBADS provided area air defence cover to a large No of VAs / VPs which were fixed / transiting the defended areas. Also all the three verticals of the air defence resources, viz the sensors (radars, visual observers and other technical means), shooters (guns, SAMs, air superiority fighters and interceptors) and Battle Management Systems (BMC⁴I²SR) are amalgamated synergistically into one cohesive unit ready to address the air threat. This concept of IADS has matured over time as an integrated family of GBADWS consisting of sensors, shooters and battle management systems. Such a system is eminently suitable to take on the contemporary, as well as, the futuristic air threat and possesses both the hard kill, as well as, soft kill options which I mentioned earlier. Enabling technologies today empower the IADS with enhanced survivability sensors having a high degree of immunity against radiation and EO sensors. Lately, IADS are also acquiring an anti-stealth muscle. In sum, IADS is the way to go in the foreseeable future.

Picking up the threads from the IADS, the next Chapter describes one of its key constituents; i.e the Air Defence Battle Management and Control System in some detail. If there is one life line of the air defence battle, it is ADBMC² system. Why? Simply because, so much of the entire battle sequence depends upon it; the surveillance of the air space, identification of multiple air threat vehicles, recognizing them as to friend-or-foe, generating a Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) through Multi-Sensor Tracing (MST), threat prioritization, weapon assignment and the dynamic and minute-to-minute control of air defence battle – all depends on ADBMC² system. If this one foundational link is weak, the best of sensors and the best of shooters will simply operate sub-optimally and fall like nine-pins. The Chapter describes the multiple challenges of BMC² system; must prominent being the MST challenge, i.e, the uphill task of filtration and fusion of multiple sensor inputs to remove duplications and provide the RASP. Then, there are other issues of forging a seamless compatibility among disparate systems in the sensor-shooter domain, measuring up to the challenges of survival in a hostile EW environment coupled with relentless SEAD operations by the adversary. The other challenges of BMC² systems include threat processing in a time urgent scenario, positive identification of friend-or-foe to keep fratricide at bay and reducing the response time cycle have been explained. The Chapter ends with a presentation of a panoramic view of the scene of the BMC² and ADC&R systems the world over to bring out the emerging challenges and smart solutions to address them. The countries included are USA, Germany and UK.

The book changes track here from the mainframe sensor-shooter- BMC² stuff and exposes the ever evolving and ever exciting world of simulators and simulation. The chapter explains how simulators are great enablers and are hugely relevant for Army AD where operational equipment is scarce, live training/firing are extremely costly, training space in crew compartments is restricted and operational hours are at a premium. The Chapter explains the hierarchy of simulation from the basic individual trainers to higher order simulation with GIS enablement, 3D simulation to include Aircraft Recognition Simulators and Radar Coverage Predictions Simulators. The former transforms the entire concept of aircraft recognition training ‘to as real as it can get’ while the latter gives a qualitative boost to the entire sequence of sensor deployment. While multi mode EW Simulators have cut down the dependence of live air sp for EW trg, the Class Room Variants of sensors enable an entire class to get trained with live equipment at one go. And finally come the ‘Total Effect Simulators’ which bring alive the complete air defence battle end-to-end thanks to the exciting world of simulators which holds a million promises in the foreseeable future.

The book at this point makes a departure from the contemporary and the futuristic to present a period piece aimed at providing some ‘Takeaways’ to the Air Defence warriors from the Air and Air Defence Campaign in the Gulf War, 1991. Why this war alone? Well, simply because of the amazing facts and figures on both the warring sides. In that, the Coalition Air Force flew something like 1,14,00 sorties in less than two months, averaging about 2000 sorties per day, dropping a colossal 88,500 tons of explosive, executing a strategic airlift of more than 5,00,000 personnel and 54,000 tons of cargo. The Iraqi Air Defence warriors ensured that a formidable Air Defence Punch came to a naught through absurd planning and a criminally sub-optimal exploitation of the might of a slew of GBADWS. In fact it came to such a pass that the defenders actually ‘gave away the battle unfought’. This war brought out the power of ‘smart planning’ by the attackers, who first broke the back of the defenders by crippling the Electronic Order of Battle through selective precision attacks. Once the soul was gone, the passive body of GBADWS was destroyed through a furious campaign of SEAD and precision strike in a technologically enabled and comprehensive mission planning environment. Out of all this the most amazing fact is the ‘fleeing away’ of some 121 of the defenders aircraft to Iran instead of putting up a fight (sic).

It is in the monumental destruction of the defender due to colossal SEAD and sub-optimal exploitation of a formidable AD punch of the defender that lie some takeaways. The caution of not to play into the adversary’s SEAD game come out loud and clear, the ‘Fleeing Away of Iraqi Air Force is beyond comment’, the critical requirement to build the redundancies to overcome dependencies on open communication architectures, the effectiveness of man portable SAMs and the inevitability and last line effectiveness of the gun systems came out loud and clear.

Towards the end, the book carves a brief comparative evaluation of the Chinese WZ10 Attack Helicopter and the AH 64E of USA. A comparison of factual details combined with a comparative evaluation of performance parameters of the two machines reveals that the two are not really comparable one-on-one in the same mould. The Chinese machine enjoys higher manoeuvrability due to a smaller and a lighter profile as required for the topography of Chinese borders, the American helicopter possesses brute fire-power better suited for achieving a higher kill effect in the offensive role.

And finally before signing off, as if to thread the preceding Chapters in one seamless sequence the book presents a Status Summary in the eternal and abiding cause effect cycle between the prosecutors of air threat and the defenders. Catching one end of the thread, the Chapter gives words to the cutting edge developments in the continous revamping of the air threat. In that, it briefly describes the FGFA of front-line nations credited with such amazing features like all-aspect stealth, Low Probability of Interception Radar or LPIR, high performance and structurally lighter airframes with minimal RCS; thanks to nano-materials, high advanced avionics with a capability to network dissimilar platforms in a net-centric domain, array of on-board sensors to provide high degree of immunity, hence, survivability in a hostile EW environment and armed to the teeth with smart / intelligent / precision arsenal capable of BVR delivery from long stand-off ranges.

Inspired by fascination and fear, electrifying moves and devastating capabilities it describes the front-line attack helicopters and gives a flavour of UAVs and UCAVs, the wonder threat vehicles whose time has come. The MUMT and the ethical debate of machine over arms, the SWARMs, the slew of SSMs, ARMs, Cruise Missile and more …. So much for the prosecutors of air threat.

For the defenders, it talks about the exponential growth of GBADWS over time, the evolving and fast maturing concept of layered-and-tiered air defence, the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) complete with its trio of sensors, shooters and BMC² systems, fast re-vamping along separate verticals. The fast evolving art of invisibility and the enabling techniques of finding the needle in the haystack as appropriate similies for stealth and counter-stealth. A word on the last line defence of terminal AD weapons and their evolving ammunition types. The complete hierarchy of SAMs covering the entire range-reach continuum get a mention as the Chapter talks about the missile centric defence of VSHORADS-SRSAMs-QRSAMs and MRSAMs. A discussion on the emerging story of BMD and the quest to reach the ultimate aim of boost phase intercept follow. Then comes the mention of a whole new arsenal of soft kill weapons and what is latest in the field. The curtains finally come down with a brief mention of the ADBMC² system and the challenges involved therein.

In the last words the author makes a confession thus “So much is happening (in the field of air attack-defence continuum), so fast is the technology providing options on both sides of the fence that it is a full time job for SMEs to keep track on the latest at the cutting edge; the eternal duel continues.

The post Book Review: Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems appeared first on IMR.