According to a new railway plan revealed by the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) government, the rail line will operate near the line of actual control (LAC) and through the disputed Aksai Chin region.

Chinese activity near the LAC is a matter of concern for both India and Tibet.

On January 12, Army Chief General Manoj Pande said that there has been a ‘slight increase’ in the number of Chinese troops at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Aksai Chin (around 38,000 sq km area) was illegally occupied during the 1950s and consolidated its military grip over the area during the 1962 India-China war. The area remained a point of contention between the two countries.

Tibet’s ‘medium to long-term railway plan’ will help expand the TAR rail network to 4,000km by 2025 from the current 1,400km, the railway technology reported.

Tibet, however, claims itself to be independent of China. Recently, on February 13, the 13th Dalai Lama proclaimed that his country had been independent for over 100 years. This incident marked an end to the period of domination by China’s Qing (Manchu) dynasty. However, the period of self-rule and independence ended very soon for Tibet as in 1949 China unlawfully occupied Tibet.

Commemorating the 110th anniversary of Tibet’s Declaration of Independence on February 13, Tibet called for an independent fact-finding mission from the United Nations (UN). The request was to hold China accountable for the mistreatment of Tibet’s people and culture, reported Tibet Rights Collective (TRC).

The fact-finding and investigative missions from the UN must consider the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) harmful “environmental policies” in Tibet, and question CCP about the whereabouts of Tibet’s Panchen Lama, who was abducted in 1995.

As per the report by Railway Technology, the project will cover new routes that will continue up to China’s borders with India and Nepal.

Designed to start in Shigatse, Tibet, the proposed rail line will run northwest along the Nepal border before piercing north via Aksai Chin and ending at Hotan, Xinjiang.

Recently UN experts had also expressed how around a million children of the Tibetan minority were being affected by Chinese government policies aimed at assimilating Tibetan people culturally, religiously and linguistically through a residential school system.

The planned route will travel through Rutog and around Pangong Lake on the Chinese side of the LAC.

The first section from Shigatse to Pakhuktso is anticipated to be completed by 2025, while the remaining line section concluding at Hotan is expected to be completed by 2035.

A state media report citing the plan revealed by the TAR Development and Reform Commission stated: “By 2025, the construction of several railway projects, including the Ya’an-Nyingchi section of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway, the Shigatse-Pakhuktso section of the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway, and the Bomi-Ra’uk section of the Yunnan-Tibet Railway will all see significant progress.

“Improvements to the regional railway network will be of great significance in promoting socioeconomic development and safeguarding national security.”

Notably, Along the LAC in the Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh there are areas of differing perception, wherein both sides patrol the area up to their claim lines. This has been the trend since 2006, the sources claimed. (ANI)

The post India Concerned at Chinese Plans to Begin New Rail Line Near LAC appeared first on IMR.

The G695 national expressway will be only the second national highway through the disputed Aksai Chin region, where China controls 38,000 sq km of land claimed by India, since the controversial construction of the G219 highway in the 1950s, and is expected to be completed by 2035.

The new highway, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on Wednesday, will run even closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than G219 and is likely to broadly run along the course of G219 from Mazha in Xinjiang in the north, through Aksai Chin, which is currently administered under the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, heading south along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan, and down to Lhunze in southeastern Tibet right across the border from Arunachal Pradesh.

While a map of the proposed highway has not been released, the route described by the report will mean the highway will likely cut across Aksai Chin. Its course will bring it close to several disputed areas that have seen recent tensions, the Post reported, from Eastern Ladakh down to near Doklam close to the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. “Details of the new construction remain unclear, but the highway, when completed, may also go near hotly contested areas such as the Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the LAC,” the report said.

The plan for G695 follows long-held discussions to build another border highway to supplement G219 and act as another key artery that could help China mobilise resources rapidly towards border areas. China has also stepped up the construction of secondary highways at the provincial level that will connect the national highways to remote border areas.

This week, Beijing unveiled a new national road network plan that aims to build 4,61,000 km of roads — including 1,62,000 km of national expressways and 2,99,000 km of provincial highways — by 2035. Under the plan, the official China News Service reported, all cities with a 1 lakh population will be connected to a national highway in 30 minutes.

The post China plans another highway in Aksai Chin appeared first on IMR.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The post Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? – Part 1 appeared first on IMR.

There is also a Chinese patrol boat squadron on Pangong Lake itself. All these sub-units taken together would amount to around 500–600 personnel. Reacting to the changed situation, it is likely that additional troops drawn from one or both of their parent Border Defence Regiments’ operational reserves have also been deployed to the area, raising the total PLA border forces in the area to 1,000–1,500 personnel.

The border troops have been reinforced by mobilising more combat forces, most likely from the 6th Mechanised Infantry Division, a northern or high-altitude manoeuvre formation. This formation is normally based at a distance from the Aksai

By May-end, units of main battle tanks and batteries of towed artillery had been deployed at existing Chinese positions north and east of Gogra. This combination of heavy armour and towed artillery is now quite rare in the PLA following the latest military reforms. Normally armoured fighting vehicles would be supported by self-propelled artillery. What is known about the 6th Mechanised Infantry Division is that it has still to receive self-propelled artillery. This is also true of the three other mechanised divisions in the Xinjiang Military District.

In the Pangong Tso and the Fingers Area, the Chinese have now stationed themselves in a strong way in Finger 8. On May 18 and 19, the PLA had brought in around 2,500 troops to the sub-sector. These were regular rather than Border Defence Regiment personnel. This was done very visibly the obvious intention being to overawe the relatively smaller Indian contingent facing them on the lake’s bank. They have established a logistics hub along with deployment of armoured fighting vehicles. Bigger boats for dominating the water bodies and transporting assault troops across them have been brought in. The road built by the Chinese from Finger 8 to Finger 5 alongside the lake also helps them in the quick transfer of troops from there to the Finger 4 base. There is considerable Chinese build-up. This has resulted in shorter reaction time and time taken for movement of troops.

In the Galwan River valley, a Chinese infantry platoon deployed at Patrolling Point 14 (PP14) had been withdrawn by the fourth week of May. The main PLA camp was then established three kilometres further back in territory already occupied by them. We do not know at the moment whether this unit is supported by armour or artillery. Such manoeuvre or fire support seems unlikely in the absence of viable road communications. This has been planned for some time but remains unfinished. A further reinforcement of the sector seems unfeasible at the moment.

What is known is that China now has built up force levels along the LAC to include another mechanised infantry division trained and equipped for high-altitude warfare. Which one could this be? My view is that either 8th or 11th Motorised Infantry Divisions, part of the Xinjiang Military District’s three mechanised formations held in reserve some distance from the Aksai Chin have been deployed.

Indian Humint, Comint and Techint are closely watching the activities, readiness status and operational preparations of another 10,000-12,000 Chinese troops deployed in Xinjiang with high mobility vehicles (Chinese copies of Humvees) and weaponry in the rear positions with the capability to reach the LAC or depth positions ready to launch offensives or in a counter-penetration role within a period of two days. This could be 4th Motorised Infantry Division stationed at Aksu. Its induction into the theatre could tilt the scales in favour of the PLA.

The Chinese normally have two divisions trained and equipped for mountain warfare deployed in the Tibet region. Generally reliable sources claim that reacting to the current crisis and Indian build-up they have brought in close to two extra divisions from locations as far as 2,000 kilometres from mainland China as a counter-measure. This is outside the Aksai Chin region.

The Chinese have a formidable number of troops in Aksai Chin with armour artillery, air defence, drones, helicopters, air support and mechanised infantry. The regional command of the Western Theatre which commands all troops posed against and oversees operations against India has a number of reserves awaiting deployment.

Deploying Air Power Against the Chinese

A number of mistakes were made in the conduct of the 1962 war. By far the biggest one was not using our medium-sized but formidable air force for offensive air operations. Our Canberras, Hunters, Mysteres, Gnats, Ouragans (Toofanis) and Vampires flown by well trained and motivated pilots would have interdicted Chinese lines of communication, strafed, bombed and rocketed their artillery batteries, troop concentrations, headquarters, supply columns and even forward elements. Though combat air patrols and reconnaissance flights were flown by the IAF they were forbidden from firing even a single round. Air Marshal MM Singh, then a Squadron Leader commanding 24 Squadron (Hawks) saw a strong enemy column moving towards one of our forward defended localities in the Walong sector while flying a recce mission in his Vampire fighter. He dived down and had the satisfaction of seeing them scatter in panic even though he wasn’t able to fire even a single shot. It was galling for a professional fighter pilot to be thus hamstrung while troops on the ground were fighting for their lives.

IAF helicopters played a major role in reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, supply of otherwise cut-off posts and communications. Squadron Leader Vinod Sehgal volunteered to fly in his Bell helicopter to the Namka Chu and find out what was the ground situation after communications with the formation under attack there were lost by the divisional headquarters on the first day of the war. Unaware that the Chinese were already targeting the helipad, he tried to land and was shot down, and killed while exiting the machine and making for cover. Here a couple of helicopters fitted with machine-guns and lobbing bombs on advancing enemy troops would’ve caused attrition and boosted the morale of the stricken Indian defenders. But the aggressive spirit so essential for such improvisations was sadly missing. The government irrationally worried over Chinese retaliation against civilian targets had curbed the fighting spirit of the IAF.

Transport aircraft played a major role in 1962. From moving troops to far-flung destinations to supplying posts dependent solely on air-drops to strategic airlift the IAF was everywhere. AN-12s operating from Chandigarh transported AMX-13 tanks to Chushul making a significant impact on the operations in and around the airbase. It was a masterly exercise in improvisation and airmanship. A salute to the transport fleet!

While no air intrusions have been reported by the PLAAF (the Chinese Air Force) the IAF is on full alert. Combat air patrols are in full swing including night sorties. Frontline air-superiority fighters like the Su-30 MKIs. Mig-29s. Mirage 2000s and Jaguars have been moved to operational bases in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana. Bases at Avantipura, Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Halwara, Ambala etc are on high alert.

Apache helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles are ready to take on Chinese armour and mechanised infantry. Not for nothing is the aircraft known as a super tank-killer. Chinook heavy-lift helicopters have been deployed for tactical troop movements, casevac and supply functions. Significantly, the Chinook can carry the M-777 ultralightweight 155mm medium howitzer unslung. This will add greatly to the punch and mobility of strike formations.

Strategic airlift is the IAF’s forte. Using C-17 Globemasters and C-130J Super Hercules transport planes tens of thousands of battle-ready troops have been flown into Ladakh along with the weapons and equipment. Shorter flights with lesser loads have been undertaken by Illyushin IL-76s. A large share of the burden of logistically maintaining the additional troops indicted into the theatre with food, ammunition, medicines, tentage, housing and other supplies through the winter will fall on the transport squadrons.

Quick-reaction surface to air missiles (SAMs) fielded by both the IAF and the Army have been positioned at strategic spots to undertake the air defence of installations, supply and ammunitions dumps, command and control centres and troop and armour concentrations. Defend Indian air space in short. Medium-range, mobile Akash missiles are included in these. These have been modified for deployment and use in high-altitudes.

Source link

The post Chinese Force Levels in Aksai Chin – Indian Military Review appeared first on IMR.

China’s newest sort of light-weight essential battle tank, Sort 15, have been noticed taking part in a current train in a low-temperature mountainous plateau area.

In response to the World Occasions, World Occasions, Sort 15 tanks carried out reside hearth drills at an altitude of 4,500 meters in SW China’s Tibet Autonomous Area.

This sort of tank has vital benefits over different forms of tanks or armored automobiles in such areas, mentioned navy consultants in a World Occasions report.

The Sort 15 light-weight tank is very cell even on plateaus, a kind of terrain which heavy tanks can wrestle in as a result of lack of oxygen to help the engine; any lesser armored automobile that may function on plateaus aren’t any risk to the Sort 15. Which means that the Sort 15 is mainly unrivalled on plateaus.

In a tweet, Editor of Janes and protection journalist Sam Cranny-Evans famous that these tanks belong to the Xizang navy command, which you would possibly know because the Tibet Autonomous Area.

“Tibet has its personal navy formation that sits outdoors of the Group Military construction adopted by nearly all of the PLA, it allows it to give attention to mountain warfare and many others.,” Cranny-Evans wrote.

Source link

The post China deploys its latest lightweight tanks to Aksai Chin appeared first on IMR.