According to Pakistan’s bomb disposal teams, 100kg of explosives were utilized to carry the attack in Khar. Due to the large number of casualties, the Pakistani authorities declared a health emergency at the local district hospital. Pakistan’s prime minister Shehbaz Sharif condemning the attack, stated “The terrorists are enemies of Pakistan, we will eliminate them from the face of this earth.” Grandiloquent statement sans any teeth.

The target, JUI-F is a Deobandi Sunni political party. It is a part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan, which is believed to have strong ties with the Afghan Taliban, as well. Like other religious parties, JUI-F, too, has undeniably tried to take advantage of the economic crisis in Pakistan and the arrest of the former Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan. As a result, the JUI-F political rally held on 30 July in Khar was aimed to garner the electoral support ahead of the upcoming elections in Pakistan.

The area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen several attacks in the recent months, and most were claimed by TTP. Bajaur, specifically, has been a hotbed of such attacks and was also controlled by Taliban in the past. During the leadership of Imran Khan, large number of TTP fighters were brought back from Afghanistan into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This was as part of a failed programme for rehabilitation of TTP fighters. Imran Khan claimed that upon assuming power in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban, had ordered their Pakistani fighters to return to Pakistan. He stated that the Pakistani government was left with limited choices; the government could “either line up those 40,000 people, including fighters and their families, and shoot them, or we could rehabilitate them.”

In an effort to alleviate the TTP issue in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), such a plan was actually proposed. Despite the political consensus to “rehabilitate” the terrorists, the program was never implemented. The incoming Taliban fighters were not rehabilitated or employed. Having no options to return to Afghanistan, most fighters were seen rallying for ISIS recruitment or Al Qaeda, with the hope of getting paid. The former Pakistani prime minister, foreseeing the need to nip the TTP issue in the bud, had suggested such a program. He had claimed his government had wanted to resettle TTP fighters in Pakistan’s FATA region, but the efforts were unsuccessful as the provinces had failed to make provision for the necessary resources to counter the elements rejecting the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

There has been a sharp increment in number of TTP fighters in the region, followed by a series of persistent attacks on military and police posts. There is a strong consensus that FATA had provided sanctuary to several regional and foreign jihadist fighters belonging to Taliban, al-Qaida’s central Leadership, and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Safe havens provide the insurgents and terrorists the time to plan attacks, generate critical support for Infrastructure by raising funds, imbibing ideologies and providing technical assistance to associated groups and cells. Known in Pakistan as ilaqa-e-ghair (lawless lands), the Pashtun tribal areas that are around the Peshawar Valley have, without a doubt, been a sanctuary for various groups.

Waziristan is a stronghold of the TTP. The movement commanded by Baitullah Mehsud had been a safe haven for core elements of al-Qaida and the IJU. Despite the advantages that FATA provides for the militants, the area suffers a severe disadvantage due to the financial vulnerability of their protectors – the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to maintain their scale of militancy. The other important factor, which caters to Pakistan’s worries in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, is the ongoing insurgency in the area. This is also known as the War in North-West Pakistan. It is an ongoing armed conflict involving Pakistan and various Islamist jihadist outfit such as the TTP, Jundallah, Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), al-Qaeda, and their Central Asian allies, amongst which are the ISIL, ISIL–Khorasan (ISK), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Movement, Emirate of Caucasus, and elements of organized crime.

Also, ever since Taliban’s exit from the war theatre, ISK has consistently tried to exert it’s monopoly on Jihad in the South Asian region. Treating each other as rivals, ISK and Taliban have consistently launched attacks on their individual leaders, commanders or assets. Recently, Taliban claimed the assassination of an ISK recruiter/ commander, Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar alias Abu Usman Al-Kashmiri, a Srinagar-born ISHP leader recently based in Afghanistan, in a Taliban raid in Kabul. Evidently due to the growing rivalry amongst the two, the attack in Khar on the pro-Taliban JUI-F came as no surprise.

ISIS has in the past, also claimed the responsibility for the assassination of a Pakistani political party official in Inayat Killi. It has recently issued claims in the name of “Khorasan Province” branch (ISKP), which remains predominant in Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. The group also claims attacks in Pakistan in the name of its “Pakistan Province” or “Wilayat-e-Pakistan” branch. In 2019, ISK declared the province of “Wilayat-e-Hind” (Province of Hind) on 12 May, followed by Wilayat-e-Pakistan on 14 May. It is vital to mention that ISIS does not recognize the sovereign borders as decided by the nations but functions as pan-Islamic entity.

In the early years from the conception of the two wilayats, ISK continued to target Taliban and its allies or exploit the local tribal or regional conflicts by planting itself amidst the issues. In India, IS managed a response in Islamist-insurgency-ridden Kashmir, and there was some level of organized support in the form of ISJK.

In Pakistan, ISK conducted large-scale terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties. The jihadist landscape of Pakistan offers greater opportunities to IS and limits the risks of factional issues which may hinder in making it a part of a larger wilayat consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian States. While the growing TTP threat has over-shadowed the activities of ISK in Pakistan due to their frequent attacks, it must be noted that the Islamic State has also been responsible for one of the deadliest bombings in Pakistani history, which killed 149 people in Balochistan in 2018.

Post the Khar attack on 30 July, the response of the Pakistani government was rather underwhelming in regards to their failing security capabilities and counter-terrorism response. Pakistan failed to negotiate peace with the TTP last year. Its military forces have been incapable of sustaining or even launching operations near the Afghan border and have been unable to mount a formal offensive due to its economic crisis and political polarization. The recent attacks have also fuelled tensions between Pakistani officials and the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government has accused the Taliban of providing safe haven to some terror outfits. Taliban officials, of course, have denied that claim.

With the break-down in the Pakistan-Afghan Taliban bilateral relations, there is little chance of any cooperation in counter-terrorism operations between these two states. It is highly unlikely that the current prime minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, will be able to show any game-changing progress on this front any time soon. The same is the case with the newly appointed chief of army staff (COAS), General Asim Munir, too.

At any rate, the Pakistani military will need to be seen as doing something. This may require the Pakistani government to pursue its threat and carry out counter-terrorism measures beyond its borders. The Pakistan army will, however, be very reluctant to do this. Due to Pakistan ISI’s deep involvement with state sponsored terrorism and defence against India and the current deterioration of bilateral relations with Kabul, Pakistan will be forced to re-calibrate its move in regard to its army’s counter-terrorism operations.

The post Recent Spurt in Terror Attacks in NW Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

The Popular Front of India (PFI) was registered at Delhi under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 with the purpose to establish a classless society in which freedom, justice and security are enjoyed by all. The PFI has its headquarters in New Delhi, is present in almost 23 states and is prominently active in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

The organisation was using passive methods to attain larger goals and objectives which run against India’s social fabric. It was found to be involved in several transnational terror activities and many social and political conflicts in India.

PFI members were exposed as ‘ISIS sympathiser’ on Facebook and linked with Harkat Ul Jihad al- Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Al Qaeda.

The PFI was regarded as a reincarnation of the National Development Front (NDF) set up in 1994 in Kerala. In 2006, the NDF was dissolved and re-emerged with the name of PFI, presumably to focus on socio-economic issues ailing minorities – in particular the Kerala-based Muslim community.

The PFI is not just a reincarnation of the NDF – instead there exist multiple shells of organisations within organisations out of which the PFI has emerged.

In 1948 the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) came into existence. The IUML is a political party in Kerala, recognised by the Election Commission of India, which later became the leading party as a part of the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by the Indian National Congress in Kerala since the 1970s.

Next came in line was the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) established in the state of Kerala in 1992 so as to counter the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – which was also a pan-Islamic movement in nature claiming to be superficially working for the welfare of minorities.  

However, the ISS came into limelight during the Babri Mosque demolition in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in the year 1992. It was eventually banned by the government of India. It was discovered that ISS leaders had connections with the ISI in Pakistan. 

As the government proscribed the ISS, it made way for another organisation called the National Development Front established in 1994 in Kerala and intending to focus on socio-economic issues of minorities, especially on Muslim communities in Kerala. NDF’s modus operandi is Da’wa – which means it is missionary in nature, propagating Islam to other communities as well.

The NDF came into limelight only after some among the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) started getting noticed for their extremist jihadi activities and for their call for the liberation and Islamic conversion of India.

One of the members of the SIMI, Prof. P. Koya, began to attend mosque prayers and sponsor post prayer gatherings interactions with the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kerala. He formed another group called the National Democratic Front (NDF). 

After the SIMI was banned in 2001 (after 9/11), the NDF reincarnated itself as the Popular Front of India in 2006.

Interestingly the PFI’s preamble also mentioned that it worked towards socio-economic, cultural and political empowerment of the deprived. Its goals included working for the welfare of Dalits; tribal peoples; religious, the linguistic and cultural minorities; backward classes and women. With these objectives, the PFI justified its existence under the Societies Registration Act (PFI, Constitution).

The PFI’s Modus Operandi

Even though the organisation came into existence aiming for Muslim empowerment, the PFI’s modus-operandi has been to showcase the Muslim agenda as a side show. Instead they kept the issues of vulnerable societies (Women, labours, farmers, Dalits, Adivasi) at the forefront. 

This provided them with the cover of a charitable organisation working for the welfare of minorities and the weaker sections of the society. This was meant to fool the government.

Security agencies alleged that the SIMI ideology influenced its leaders. The PFI’s ultimate goal was to replace the democratic system of India with an Islamic State styled government. The PFI, which calls India its enemy and asks for ‘total Muslim empowerment’, was under scanner in Kerala for its alleged anti-India ideology.

The PFI ran projects like ‘School Chalo’ to encourage education for all up to the secondary level, as well as the ‘Sarva Siksha Gram’ and ‘Adopt a students’ campaigns. These campaigns and projects not only provided them legitimacy to function openly but also provided them cover over their actual missionary work. The PFI’s members believed that India was a democratic country. The doctrine was that slowly they (government of India) were reaching for their necks because of (political and social reasons). PFI members believed that if their rights were breached, then they would be left with no choice but to react – and their holy text provided for a jihad, which they would not be reluctant to utilise and justify their acts. 

PFI maintained the image of a charitable organisation and worked for the ultimate goal establishing an Islamic state by converting and spreading fear through terror acts.

The organisation very ingeniously used one of the features of its preamble on the Dalit and Tribal upliftment and protection of their political rights. This helped the PFI to gain the support of the Bhim Army led by Chandrashekhar Azad, which worked for Dalit Welfare and who also joined the anti-CAA and NRC protests.

The PFI pursued a strategy aimed at communalising Indian polity (Jain, 2017), enforcing Islam, heightening existing social divisions and maintaining a trained bank of volunteers for carrying out actions in the field.

The “PFI had consistently been indulging in actions detrimental to overall national security,” the NIA declared while blaming the outfit for seeking to impose religious orthodoxy on Muslims and using sister outfits like the Sathya Sarani based in Malappuram so as to carry out “forceful conversions” (Jain, 2017).

The outfit seeks the opportunity to enforce religious obscurantism on Muslims and uses its sister organisation Sathya Sarani to perform “forceful conversions” (Gupta, 2020). The PFI has been linked with alleged cases of love jihad in Kerala. In 2017, the NIA, which was then investigating 94 ‘love jihad’ cases registered by the Kerala Police, held four PFI-linked men for forced conversion of Akhila Ashokan in the Hadiya case (Swamy, 2019).

Even though the PFI does not have faith in the constitution of India or its judicial system, its members did not hesitate to use some constitutional powers for their benefit. The PFI believed that the constitution gave them the right to protest. And if the government of India seized such rights, they would be left with no choice but to turn to jihad. In truth, the organisation neither has a true understanding of Islam nor respects the Indian democratic system.

The group also sponsors pronouncedly anti-Zionist and pro-Palestine protests in various parts of country. In July 2014, they started a campaign with nationwide solidarity in favour of Palestinians. The campaign was called “I am Gaza” and was inspired by a series of rallies that took place in several parts of the world (YouTube, 2014).

Cadres of the banned outfit SIMI fast regrouped under the banner of the PFI. This outfit has expanded its tentacles to the north after carrying out the initial recruitment in South India. The spreading tentacles of the PFI and Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), the political wing of the PFI, came to light only when its members became influenced by the taqreer (speeches) of Zakir Naik.

Previously, the members of Kerala-based PFI were arrested on charges of instigating violence in UP, Assam. It was also accused of fanning flames in Karnataka (Swamy, 2019) against North-Eastern peoples, resulting in a mass exodus.

The Popular Front of India protested across the country against the CAA, NRC, and NPR. Its epicentre is located in Shaheen Bagh, New Delhi. It successfully exploited the sense of insecurity created within the Muslim community through various policies and misled the people massively through distorted narratives.

Soon after a few members of the PFI were arrested in connection to the Jafarabad riots, it was found by the Enforcement Directorate that the PFI was receiving funding from various sources.

In 2012 PFI members organised a march to parliament, demanding 10 per cent reserved seats for Muslims (Staff Reporter, 2012). The reasons given in favour of the reservation were as follows:

1) the Constitutional Right of the individual to seek equal opportunity for self-growth and

2) the fight against the backwardness of the Muslim community (confirmed through a quoted minute of a high-level government committee meeting).

In 2012, the PFI launched a promotional campaign ‘why the Popular Front of India?’ where it reiterated upon its mission to restore the rights of the depressed and marginalised sections of the Indian society (Staff Reporter, 2012).

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) has found that some radical organisations, including the Kerala-based PFI, made efforts to send messages to countries in West Asia about the ongoing updating of the NRC (Ranjan, 2017).

Linkages with Terror Outfits and Transnational Activities

Since its inception, PFI’s linkages were found in numerous cases under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the Arms Act and the Explosives Act. While it had a strong foothold in Kerala, the PFI has expanded across the country and included similar-minded groups into their fold such as the Tamil Nadu-based Manitha Neethu Pasarai and the Karnataka Forum for Dignity, among others.

In India, the PFI has been suspected of being involved in several political killings and religious conversions.

The investigation agency also claimed that the PFI and its members had been involved in sending the youth of Kerala to Afghanistan, Syria, and Turkey so as to join Daesh and ISIS. 

On March 25, 2020, in Gurudwara Har Rai Sahib in Kabul, Afghanistan, an attack took place, killing 25 people and injuring approximately 80 more. One of the suicide bombers in the Gurudwara attack was a 29-year-old man called Muhammad Mushin – alias ‘Abu Khalid Al- Hindi’. He was from Kerala, and an active member of the PFI. The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) took the responsibility and shared the image of the Kerala boy in their magazine Al Naba – whose caption stated that ‘he avenged the atrocities on the Muslims in India’.

The PFI’s role has been established in the Easter bombing case. PFI’s actions were also found in the Pune German Bakery case – support was provided to the Indian unit of the LeT.

The NIA busted an Islamic State (IS) module in Kerala and Tamil Nadu which was allegedly planning to carry out major strikes in several parts of south India; the probe revealed that one of the module’s senior members — Mujeeb alias Omar Al Hindi– was associated with the PFI and inclined towards the ideology of the so-called ‘caliphate’ led by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. 

Financing of the PFI

The financing of the PFI was mostly achieved through its membership schemes and also through a donation from individuals in the name of Zakat, which is one of the five main pillars of Islam.

PFI members travelled to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia for fundraising. Also, people living in the Southern part of India and enjoying Gulf connections due to their family working in that region also came back for festivals and made large donations. Several people in Iran and the Middle East also sent donations.

These donations mostly came in the name of social welfare – sometimes for girl child education, mosque construction or madrasa (religious school) establishments. However, they were used for unethical activities. Several such organisations and societies had their licence cancelled under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) after being found to be involved in certain illegal activities.

The Muslim Relief Network (MRN), an NGO started by the PFI, was another entity through which it organised funds – particularly from West Asia – in return for raising voices for the Palestine cause and pressure Indian government.

The post Structure, Aim and Activities of PFI appeared first on IMR.

The United States killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a strike in Afghanistan on 31 July, President Joe Biden announced, calling it a moment of justice for families of 2,977 people killed in September 11, 2001 terror attack. Biden said Zawahiri had been the mastermind behind or played a key role in attacks on the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

It was the biggest blow to the militant group since its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon who had a $25 million bounty on his head, helped coordinate the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

Zawahiri died after a US drone strike in the Afghan capital Kabul. US intelligence determined with “high confidence” through multiple intelligence streams that the man killed was Zawahiri. He was killed on the balcony of a “safe house” in Kabul that he shared with other members of his family. No other casualties occurred.

There were rumors of Zawahiri’s death several times in recent years, and he was long reported to have been in poor health.

In a statement, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that a strike took place and strongly condemned it, calling it a violation of “international principles.”

His death raises questions about whether Zawahiri received sanctuary from the Taliban following their takeover of Kabul in August 2021. US officials said that senior Taliban officials were aware of his presence in the city and said the United States expected the Taliban to abide by an agreement not to allow al Qaeda fighters to re-establish themselves in the country.

The drone attack is the first known US strike inside Afghanistan since US troops and diplomats left the country in August 2021. The move may bolster the credibility of Washington’s assurances that the United States can still address threats from Afghanistan without a military presence in the country.

Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden as al Qaeda leader after years as its main organiser and strategist, but his lack of charisma and competition from rival militants Islamic State hobbled his ability to inspire spectacular attacks on the West.

Until the US announcement, Zawahiri had been rumoured variously to be in Pakistan’s tribal area or inside Afghanistan.

The senior US official said finding Zawahiri was the result of persistent counterterrorism work. The United States identified this year that Zawahiri’s wife, daughter and her children had relocated to a safe house in Kabul, then identified that Zawahiri was there as well.

With other senior al Qaeda members, Zawahiri is believed to have plotted the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole naval vessel in Yemen which killed 17 US sailors and injured more than 30 others, the Rewards for Justice website said.

He was indicted in the United States for his role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and wounded more than 5,000 others.

Both bin Laden and Zawahiri eluded capture when US-led forces toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban government in late 2001 following the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.

Operational Details

Speculation is rife that the United States may have used Hellfire R9X, a warhead-less missile, which is used in finely targeted attacks. The Hellfire R9X first appeared in 2017 when al-Qaeda senior leader Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed. What suggests the use of the missile is that pictures showed no signs of explosion. Over time, the missile has earned names like “flying ginsu,” after a famous 1980s television commercial for ostensibly Japanese kitchen knives, and “ninja bomb”.

In his address, Biden pointed out that there was no harm done to the family members of Zawahiri in the precision strike, and no civilians bore any injuries.

Pakistan

Zawahiri’s presence in a guest house in Kabul, reportedly owned by interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s close aide, became a subject of intense curiosity, given Sirajuddin’s chief patron — the Pakistan deep state.

Al Qaeda After al-Zawahiri

Not as charismatic as Osama bin Laden (OBL), Al Qaeda (AQ) chief Zawahiri remained in his shadows. After OBL’s killing in a US Navy Seal operation in Pakistan in 2011, few experts believed that Zawahiri could hold the network together. However, since 2011, the AQ network has grown across the world, especially in Syria, Mali, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating its puritanical ideology, money and expertise to local militant groups. This happened despite the huge popularity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria amongst radical Muslim youth. The ISIS had also set up a physical Caliphate — a long-cherished goal of international jihad espoused by the AQ.

Under Zawahiri, the AQ network seems to have changed its strategic direction and its branches currently operate more like independent insurgencies — such as through the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. The crucial question is whether the AQ, post-Zawahiri, will lose momentum or whether the collective core leadership that seems to have been quietly working post-OBL could provide a leader as well as offer continuity.

Successor to al- Zawahiri

The most obvious name being discussed to succeed Zawahiri was that of another Egyptian, Saif al-Adel, who was believed to be in charge of external operations. However, given regular reports of his connections “within” Iran, he may not be the “ideal face” to succeed Zawahiri. Some regional leaders, such as from Al Shabab, may be acceptable, given the recent series of “successes” of this branch. The oldest branch, the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is the key source of chief ideologues of jihad, may be used to prop up a cleric as the next AQ Amir in order to lower the profile for some time while keeping the propaganda around the “martyrdom” of Zawahiri going.

Saif al-Adel is on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists. The agency mentions on its website that al-Adel was born on April 11, though his birth year is either 1960 or 1963. He has used aliases like Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani. The FBI has announced a reward of $10 million for any information about him. Saif al-Adel is an Egyptian ex army officer and a founding member of Al Qaeda. He had joined the precursor terror group Maktab al-Khidmat in 1980s.

A second possible successor is Yezid Mebarek, known as Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since 2020. An Algerian citizen, Mebarek ran media operations for AQIM, using a 2013 video to call for global attacks against French interests after Paris sent troops to help quash a militant insurgency in Mali.

A third potential successor is Moroccan-born national Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. He is wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with his membership in Al-Qaeda. He studied software programming in Germany before moving to Afghanistan where he was selected to manage al Qaeda’s main media wing, said the FBI. The son-in-law of Zawahiri, he is a senior Al Qaeda leader.

Doha Agreement Violated

The Taliban had promised in the 2020 Doha Agreement on the terms of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan that they would not harbour al-Qaida members. Nearly a year after the US military’s chaotic pullout from Afghanistan, al-Zawahri’s killing raises questions about the involvement of Taliban leaders in sheltering a mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks and one of America’s most-wanted fugitives.

The Taliban and the US are accusing each other of violating the agreement. But the real question is: Was the Taliban involved in providing intel on Zawahiri for some benefit that would show up in the future, or did intra-Taliban rivalry lead to cooperation against the Haqqani Network? There is a third scenario — of the Pakistan deep state having provided the intel to show the Taliban in a bad light and curry favour with the US, especially in order to deal with the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has caused much violence against Pakistan forces.

Since the Haqqani Network has been mediating talks between the TTP and the Pakistan army, the strike has surely cast doubts about the safety of the TTP leaders who visit Kabul for meetings. Given the links between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani deep state, it is unlikely that the TTP would continue talks, which in any case have not prevented attacks on the Pakistani forces. The TTP has already started accusing the Pakistan army of providing a base to the US for the drone strike. Thus, much more violence is expected in the Af-Pak region in the coming weeks and months.

Zawahiri and India

In 2014, the AQ launched the Al Qaeda In Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the outfit’s South Asia branch. The inaugural video carried an old clip of OBL and a message of Zawahiri appointing a relatively unknown Indian radical Asim Umar, who had fled to Pakistan decades ago. In recent times, the group has posted many videos focused on India, especially on Kashmir. Some of these clips have featured Zawahiri. With his elimination, as well as that of Umar and a few “known” Pakistani faces of the AQIS earlier, the propaganda against India is likely to lose momentum for now. However, since the AQIS is an Af-Pak-based group, it may rebuild itself with support from the Pakistan deep state.

Comments

New Delhi had evacuated its envoy to Afghanistan, Rudrendra Tandon, and 175 other officials posted in the Embassy of India in Kabul on August 17, 2021 – just two days after President Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed in the wake of a swift military campaign by the Taliban. India had also evacuated its officials posted in its consulates in other cities in Afghanistan weeks before the country was taken over by the Taliban.

New Delhi sent a delegation of officials, led by its senior diplomat J P Singh, to Kabul, in early August, to oversee the delivery operations of India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

New Delhi, however, has been having back-channel contacts with the Taliban over the past few years as it had anticipated that the Sunni Islamist militia could eventually return to the governance structure in Kabul after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus giving its mentor Pakistan a strategic edge against India.

India over the past few months also sent food and medicines to Afghanistan as humanitarian assistance, which was distributed through the UN agencies.

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Imran Khan, who was elected as the 22nd prime minister of the country, on 18 August 2018, lost a no-confidence vote in the parliament and, on 11 April 2022, Shehbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan’s new prime minister. Pakistan’s general elections are due in 2023. Hence, Sharif has just a year in office.

Since its formation 75 years ago, the country has had democratically elected governments for only 53 years. In these 53 years, 19 men and one woman have been prime minister, two of them more than once, and not a single one has ever completed a five-year term. The first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, lasted the longest—four years and 63 days—before he was assassinated.

In his first speech at the national assembly as prime minister, Sharif brought up Kashmir. Claiming that the valley was red with the blood of the Kashmiri people since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, he said that Pakistan would continue to “raise its voice for Kashmiri brothers and sisters at every forum…they will be provided diplomatic support, we will give them moral support”.

This is as per formula. No Pakistani prime minister can start off without making some belligerent noises about Kashmir. He cannot afford to be seen as being moderate on this issue.

No matter how hard Pakistan’s politicians try to equate India and Pakistan, India is light years ahead of Pakistan economically, technologically, and on every sociological parameter. If the world ever thinks of Pakistan, it is as a hub of Islamist terrorism.

Pakistan’s army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who allegedly played a big part in Khan’s removal, also seems pragmatic, if one goes by his public utterances. “Pakistan will benefit if we improve ties with India,” he said recently. In February last year, he agreed to a ceasefire on the Line of Control and the ceasefire has held. He perhaps realizes that a military engagement with India makes no sense for Pakistan, given the many other problems the country faces.

Pakistan’s powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability. India is aware of the dynamic of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan and the risk of blowback from the military establishment against India whenever there is momentum for bilateral cooperation.

Pakistan’s Economy

Pakistan’s current account deficit is around 4 per cent of GDP. Pakistan owes $122 billion—a third of its GDP—to various multilateral organisations and nations like China and Saudi Arabia. Foreign currency reserves, already depleted, seem to be now in free fall—in March, they dropped 30 percent from $16.2 billion to $11.3 billion. Interest rates are 12.25 per cent.

Terrorism

The number of terror attacks—and attacks on security forces—by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, has actually increased since Imran Khan, the army and the ISI celebrated the (original) Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August last year.

The TTP has strong links with the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has the tacit support of the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan remains on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money-laundering and terrorist-financing watchdog, precariously perched above the black list. After the 2+2 meeting between the defence and external affairs ministers of India and the US, on 12 April, the two countries issued a joint statement asking Pakistan to take “immediate, sustained, and irreversible action” to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and the 2016 Pathankot attack to be brought to justice.

Afghanistan

Ties between Pakistan’s ISI and the Afghan Taliban have loosened in recent years. The Taliban government is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation.

Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan’s military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.

Imran Khan, who was less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders, is no longer there to support the Taliban.

China-Pakistan

The only piece of good news for them seems to be that China has reiterated that it considers Pakistan an “all-weather strategic cooperation partner” and “iron-clad brother” and praised Sharif’s commitment to the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

The CPEC was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan’s two established political parties, both against Khan. Shehbaz Sharif struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab. Sharif will defend and push the corridor.

United States-Pakistan

Pakistan is not a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India. Since the military calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S. Khan had blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of his Moscow trip.

India-Pakistan

Imran Khan’s ambition was to normalise relations with India and play cricket. Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa also spoke about burying the past and focusing on geo-economy. Kashmir is a core issue in its National Security Policy, though Pakistan has tied itself in knots over it, especially after India annulled Article 370. In August 2019, following the approval of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill in Parliament, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, further tension resulted between the two countries, with Pakistan downgrading diplomatic ties, closing its airspace, and suspending bilateral trade with India.

Pakistan, today, is desperate to begin a formal dialogue with India which ceased in January 2013 after the beheading of an Indian soldier in J&K. Islamabad is also pressing New Delhi to participate even virtually in the SAARC summit, in abeyance since 2016. India is not budging. India is inflexible and has taken the position “no talks till cross-border terrorism stops.”

When Khan became the prime minister, while speaking at the United States Institute of Peace, he admitted to Pakistan having 40-50,000 terrorists who had fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In 2021, after Khan had called the Modi government ‘fascist, unleashing Islamophobia’, India rebutted: ‘The neighbour is an arsonist disguised as a fire-fighter…’

The current cease-fire on LoC — which does not preclude a two-front situation — is the result of one of the many effective back channels.

On Siachen, speaking at the Army Day 2022 media conference, Army Chief Gen Naravane said that demilitarisation of Siachen was possible once Pakistan agreed to marking the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map. In 1988, 1992 and 2006, the two countries came within a whisker of demilitarisation.

Past Attempts at Normalisation

After inaugurating the new Afghan parliament building in Kabul on 25 December 2015, prime minister Narendra Modi, on the way back, unexpectedly landed in Lahore—the political bastion of prime minister Nawaz Sharif – for Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding. The symbolism of an Indian leader setting foot in Pakistan for the first time in 11 years, was unmissable. It riled the military establishment.

India, under Modi, has vigorously pursued a ‘neighbourhood first’ foreign policy. Modi’s vision is to integrate South Asia into a cooperative common space. The deep state in Pakistan pushed back against the attempted normalization of relations with India. Sharif had been ousted once before in a military coup in 1999 for being a ‘traitor’ who came under Indian pressure to withdraw Pakistani troops during the Kargil War. It was clear that the military-intelligence complex in Pakistan calls the shots and reins in politicians who try to cooperate with India.

Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had also undertaken a bus journey from Amritsar in India to Lahore in February 1999 and was welcomed with open arms by prime minister Sharif. Vajpayee had hailed it as ‘a defining moment in South Asian history,’ but soon thereafter, the Pakistani military infiltrated into Kargil without Sharif’s knowledge and in the two-and-half-month war that followed, India lost 500 of its troops to throw out the infiiltrators.

By 2020, Sharif was in self-imposed exile. He blamed it on the deep state in Pakistan

The Pakistani jihadi attack on the IAF base at Pathankot, on 1 Januray 2016, was undertaken to derail the nascent Modi–Sharif peace process.

Future Prospects

India and Pakistan announced, in February 2022, an agreement to renew the 2003 ceasefire. India’s escalating military confrontation with China provided reason to try and stabilise the Pakistan frontier. But the continuation depends on Islamabad addressing Delhi’s core concerns on cross-border terrorism.

While Kashmir remains at the top of Pakistan’s agenda, it seems open to reviving commercial ties. It announced an intent to import sugar and cotton from India, but the Commerce Ministry’s decision was ostentatiously reversed by Imran Khan by declaring that “Pakistan can’t trade with India when Kashmir was bleeding”.

Islamabad is stuck with preconditions — reversing India’s constitutional changes in Kashmir — it has set for a renewed dialogue with Delhi.

Not talking to Pakistan has few domestic political costs to Delhi. Pakistan will have to lift the preconditions for engagement with India. Gen. Bajwa’s second term as army chief ends in November 2022 amidst sharpening civil-military differences. A lot will depend upon his successor.

The post Regime Change in Pak and Prospects of Better Indo-Pak Relations appeared first on IMR.

In his report released, on 3 February, on ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, the secretary general said the “best way” to promote stability and future international support was for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power.

“The Taliban are showing efforts to present itself as a caretaker government. The movement, however, has yet to form governing structures that reflect the country’s ethnic, political and geographic diversity and include women. Efforts are constrained by the lack of resources and capacity, as well as an ideology that clashes in many ways with international norms of governance,” he said.

The report added that Afghanistan was experiencing a massive economic contraction. “The best way to promote stability and future international support is for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power,” Guterres said.

Al Qaeda Still Present

In another report “The 29th edition of the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team” the United Nations Security Council said that terror group al-Qaeda’s Indian subcontinent affiliate has retained a presence in at least six provinces of Afghanistan and has approximately 200-400 fighters, including Indian nationals.

The report, which was released, on 7 February, was prepared by a UNSC group that monitors counter-terrorism sanctions targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

“[Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent] retains a presence in Afghanistan, in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul, where the group fought alongside the Taliban against the ousted government. AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 fighters, mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan,” it said.

The 22-page report, signed by UNSC Committee Chair and Norwegian national Trine Heimerback, also stated that contrary to media reports, Aslam Farooqi, former leader of the Islamic State faction Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISKP), and alleged mastermind of the March 2020 terror attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, had “escaped” from an Afghanistan prison and “subsequently rejoined the group in a senior capacity”.

Terror Groups Have More Freedom Now

“There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history. However, Member States have not reported significant new movements of foreign terrorist fighters to Afghanistan,” the report said. “Primary kinetic threat” in the eyes of the Taliban, contextualising some of the conflicting reporting on ISKP attacks in Afghanistan and the alleged killing of Farooqi. The Uyghur extremist group East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has also backed the Taliban government, the report added.

Islamic State Gaining Ground in West Africa

The report also broadened its focus beyond Afghanistan to track terrorist activity and developments on a global scale, with West Africa representing a particular region of concern where the Islamic State is gaining ground, and Southeast Asia a “bright spot” with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates suffering defeats. In conflict zones like Iraq, ISIS “has evolved into a primarily rural insurgency” while al-Qaeda allies and affiliates continue to control northwestern Syria.

“Both Indonesia and the Philippines reported significant gains in countering threats from ISIL and Al-Qaida affiliates in the South-East Asia region, leading to an overall decline in terrorist activity and some optimism that the operational capability of the groups may be significantly degraded,” the report revealed, adding that lone-wolf attacks are still an ongoing risk.

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China is keeping a hawkish eye on the mineral resources in Afghanistan, especially on lithium and copper. Also, China wants to ensure the security of 60,000 Chinese present in Pakistan for the project linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Beijing Meet

Meanwhile, suggesting a willingness to cooperate, Wang Yi hosted a nine-member Taliban delegation, led by the head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, on July 28 in Tianjin. That the meeting preceding the Taliban victory must have been used to discuss a concrete roadmap for the Taliban. Praising them as “an important military and political force”, Wang Yi urged them to “make a clean break with all terrorist organisations, including the ETIM” and attack them resolutely and effectively. Replying, Baradar hoped for Chinese assistance in reconstruction efforts and assured the Taliban will “never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.” He apparently sidestepped specific mention of the ETIM.

Diplomatic Moves

Within days of the Taliban taking over Kabul, the Chinese foreign ministry said the current Taliban appeared more “clear-headed and rational” than they were when they were in power from 1996 to 2001. Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told Chinese national broadcaster China CGTN TV that China cold play a big role in the “rebuilding, rehabilitation, reconstruction of Afghanistan.”

China hopes the Afghan Taliban can unite with other political parties and with all ethnic groups and build a political framework in keeping with national conditions that is broadly inclusive and will lay the foundation for enduring peace,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said after the Taliban took over.

Nervous About Instability

As one of six countries on its border, China has had years to engage inside Afghanistan. Now the landlocked country is even more unstable and without an external presence like U.S. and NATO troops to provide security guarantees.

It sees the success of a radical Islamist movement in Afghanistan as an inherent threat, leaving it even less likely to want to invest in the kind of infrastructure that might open up an already dangerous borderland even further.

Pakistan has deep ties with the Taliban and has long played the role of intermediary with Beijing. Whenever terrorist groups with links with the Taliban have targeted Chinese nationals and projects – in Pakistan, Beijing pressed Islamabad to find those responsible. China has never been fully confident that Pakistan had a real handle on these insurgent groups

China has all along opposed the various UN resolutions and pleas by several global powers to designate the JeM as a global terrorist organization. By implication, therefore, it can be said that China has been supportive of terror groups patronized by Pakistan for cross-border terrorism, targeting India in particular.

China wants to leverage its stranglehold over the Taliban leadership and control Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to remain a prime mover in the Afghanistan scheme of things.

Concerns About Xinjiang

Beijing is more concerned that terrorist insurgencies do not spill over into its Xinjiang province, where international human rights organizations and countries like the U.S. and U.K. say China is committing widespread abuses against the local Muslim Uyghur population. Beijing has consistently denied these claims.

Afghanistan could become a potential haven for the Uyghur extremist group, which could retaliate against the “widespread repression of Uyghurs.” Instances of Islamic extremist-linked violence have also occurred in other Muslim-dominated pockets in China, like the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region and Yunnan.

Chinese intelligence is aware that Uyghurs have been trained at Al Qaeda training camps in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan and of their presence among the Taliban.

The Taliban’s Chechen, Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur and other fighters are, however, motivated by jihad, adventure, power and cash. Their victory will attract many others from around the world. They are unlikely to agree to halt the bid to expand their Emirate. Chinese analysts are also apprehensive that China’s problems will increase as the US will now focus its attention on containing China and its rise.

Mineral Rich Country

Afghanistan is home to the world’s largest reserves of lithium – the key ingredient of the large-capacity lithium-ion batteries that are widely used in electric vehicles and the renewable energy industry. And since China dominates Lithium-Ion Battery Production worldwide, it may seek long-term a contract with the Taliban to develop Afghanistan’s massive untapped lithium reserves in return for mining rights and ownership arrangements.

Afghanistan is also rich in several other resources such as gold, oil, bauxite, rare earths, chromium, copper, natural gas, uranium, coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, gemstones, talc, sulphur, travertine, gypsum and marble.

But even though Chinese companies (and mining companies in general) have a higher-than-average tolerance for risk, few have made the decision to enter the market in the war-torn nation.

China has already been burned by failed investments in Afghanistan, most notably the copper project at Mes Aynak, which sits just 25 miles (40 kilometers) outside Kabul. The Taliban had made specific commitments not to attack the mine, but even then, China decided to discontinue its operations.

Belt and Road Projects

Afghanistan’s stability is key to protecting the approximately $60 billion in Belt and Road projects in neighboring Pakistan that provide an overland route to the Indian Ocean.

Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid, on 6 September, expressed that the group “desires” to join the CPEC. CPEC is a part of China’s most ambitious project ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, aimed at renewing the country’s historic trade routes in the coastal countries of south-east Asia. With CPEC, Beijing aims to expand its influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia in order to counter the influence of the United States and India.

China’s BRI could get more reach if it able to extend the initiative from Pakistan to Afghanistan, with a Peshawar-to-Kabul motorway. The road, which is already being discussed, would create a much shorter land route for faster and convenient access to markets in the Middle East for Chinese goods. A new route through Kabul would also render India’s reluctance to join BRI less consequential.

American Air Bases and Equipment

In what could have serious security implications for India, the Taliban could hand over the Bagram airbase to China and Kandahar base to Pakistan for operational purposes. America’s former envoy to the United Nations Nikki Haley told Fox News, on 1 September, “We need to watch China, because I think you are going to see China make a move for Bagram Air Force Base.”

While a team of aeronautical engineers of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had inspected all the five airbases in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul, a delegation of Chinese leaders held a meeting with the Taliban top hierarchy to discuss various security-related issues, including the possible takeover of the Bagram military airfield, sources connected to the ongoing developments said.

The military hardware left behind in Afghanistan by the US could potentially lead to arms proliferation in entire Asia and beyond. Tanks and special vehicles left behind by the Americans in Afghanistan are already being shipped to countries like Pakistan and Iran.

The collusion between Pakistan and China could ultimately land the leftover American military hardware in the hands of Beijing which could reverse engineer the technology to upgrade its military. China could also exploit the detailed analysis of the American military technology for developing counter-technologies like radars and jammers to foil the operational edge of the American military hardware being used by the Indian Defence forces

Comments

The Chinese expect that Afghanistan could form an inclusive and broad-based government, adopting a foreign and domestic policy that is prudent and moderate so as to echo and meet the aspiration and shared will of the international community and its own people. Independent analysts, however, feel that such claims on part of China are mere rhetoric to keep the Taliban and Pakistan in good humour. In reality, Chinese plans are unpredictable and diabolical.

China does not indulge in charity. It is evident that China has already made a deal with the Taliban to extend critical strategic, military, financial, governance support and give Taliban the international authenticity it requires to operate freely. In return, the Taliban has to protect Chinese interests in the region, and allow free access for Chinese colonization of Afghanistan.

Supremacy in the region has a lot to do with controlling the geography of the region. China is going about its old tricks, with natural ease.

The Pakistan state is fully compromised and embedded with China, to work for Chinese strategic, military and political interests. China will use Pakistan to ensure the Taliban will not work against China’s interests and keep tabs on it.

China will exploit the unstable geography around India with its aim to be a global military super-power, sooner than later. China is making its nefarious moves to gain full geo-political control of the region, before taking its challenge to the West.

The Taliban will no doubt offer all kinds of assurances but no one knows how they will govern. Recognizing the group as the de facto political authority and engaging with them makes sense for China.

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As the Taliban cemented their total victory in Afghanistan, messages of conciliation came out from their leaders. One of their top leaders, Sher Mohammed Stanikzai, confirmed the Taliban’s commitment of not allowing their territory to be used against any country in the world. Specifically, he said they would not allow India and Pakistan to play out their rivalry in Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders Zabiullah Mujahid, Suhail Shaheen and Stanikzai spoke of their expectations that India would continue to maintain its ‘cultural, economic and trade ties’ with the new Emirate of Afghanistan and retain its invaluable ‘air freight corridor’ with it.

Under the circumstances, India is in no hurry to take a position on Taliban even if the US is looking for an excuse of a negotiated settlement to recognise the radicalised Sunni force. For the Indian government, the parameters of engaging the Taliban are based on its relationship with Pakistan and Pakistan-based Deobandi terrorist groups with India in their cross-hairs.

Strategic Implications

India does not share a border with Afghanistan, except in the Northern Areas under Pakistan’s occupation. A friendly Iran and hostile China and Pakistan share frontiers with Afghanistan. That explains India’s weak Afghan card.

India started talking to the Taliban only three years ago, when it became clear that they would play a part in a future political dispensation in Kabul.

But with America determined to quit, India has found it difficult to gain ground after nearly 20 years.

Deficiencies in India’s economic and diplomatic strategies have resulted in China gaining ground in its vicinity by attracting India’s neighbours — all members of SAARC, of which India is the largest country — to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In July 2020, Iran cancelled an Indian rail project, aimed at connecting the Chabahar port to Zahedan on its Afghan border. And last May, Tehran showed India the door in the Farzad gas project. In both cases, Iran accused India of delaying the projects.

America’s retreat leaves a power vacuum which the Taliban and their terrorist friends could exploit.

Indian Investments

India was the first country that Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership with, the only country that undertook perilous but ambitious projects such as a new Parliament building, the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and the Chabahar port project in Iran, the infrastructure for transit trade. As a consequence, India by far is the one country that polled consistently highest among countries that Afghan people trusted.

India committed significant sums of money as part of the project of building modern Afghanistan. India was able to make a niche among Afghans with its humanitarian aid and $3 billion investments since 2001 for rebuilding a devastated country.

At the Afghanistan Conference in Geneva in 2020, India announced several fresh development commitments including the construction of the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul, as well as several restoration and community development projects.

Indian companies have invested on socio-economic overhead capital worth $3 billion. In 2015, the Prime Minister inaugurated the new Afghan Parliament house built at a cost of $90 million. A slew of ongoing projects including the Aga Khan heritage project to restore Bala Hissar Fort south of Kabul are raising concerns. India’s health infrastructure including Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health and various clinics in several Afghan provinces are hanging in balance.

Thousands of Afghans are in India for work, training, re-skilling, education and medical treatment. Over 2,200 students of Afghan-origin studying in India on scholarship stare at an uncertain future.

Indians in Afghanistan have been an employment and revenue model for India. The Indian embassy in Kabul estimates that 1,710 Indians were employed in banks, hospitals, NGOs, telecom, IT, and universities. On the other hand, import restrictions may force India to seek alternative partners which may not be viable in the near future.

India’s business and trade also comprises the education sector, in which scores of Afghan students throng Indian universities and colleges. The Indian Survey of Higher Education (AISHE) claims that 4,504 student admissions from Afghanistan took place in 2019-20, the second highest flow of students from any country into India. With the current crisis, Afghan students have requested India to continue their course from within the campus and expedite the paperwork on a war footing.

Bilateral Trade

India may not be able to fund projects in Afghanistan, but it could, and should, promote trade which currently stands at around $1.5 billion. This will be a more sustainable way of helping the country. Though Chabahar is there, more could be gained if Islamabad removed its blockade of overland Indian exports to the country.

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will bear an adverse impact on India’s bilateral trade with it. Trade between the two nations amounted to $1.4 billion in 2020-21 and $1.52 billion in 2019-20. It has hit Afghan traders also. Their exports for now are thawed and restoration depends on how situations normalize. Afghans sell dry fruits like dried raisin, walnut, fig, pine nut, almond dried apricot, pistachios and medicinal herbs.

Prices of some commodities may also go up in the Indian markets due to uncertainty over bilateral trade and relations with Afghanistan. Exports from India stood at $826 million whereas imports amounted to $510 million in 2020-21. The not-so-large volume of trade may not look monetarily important but strategically, they help both the countries.

Connectivity

India’s significant contribution in its rebuilding and investments in Afghanistan too would be missed there. India had an ambitious plan with the initiative of International North-South Corridor spanning Iran, central Asia and Eurasia. It is supposed to emerge as a major connector with Modi’s concept linking the corridor to Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran rail link, now operational. It is also supposed to be linked to Chabahar and dedicated freight corridor having special economic zones on its fland being built by India. The Chabahar-Sistan-Baluchistan-Central Asia/Afghanistan route till recently was considered less risky than the high-risk provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. With the changing political scenario this too is likely to become a challenge.

It seems inconceivable and incomprehensible that the Government can choose to simply walk away from such capital invested and nurtured, regardless of the developments in Afghanistan, the domestic political considerations in India and geopolitical sensitivities of some neighbours. Therefore, it would be abdication of responsibility. The Government must instead consider all its options in remaining engaged with Afghanistan for its future and of the ordinary people of Afghanistan who boldly placed their faith in Indian leadership.

Extension of Terrorist Activities

There is a serious incoming internal security threat to India as the victorious Taliban will be the galvanizing force for the Ummah, leading to increased global radicalisation as witnessed when the so-called Islamic State captured Mosul in 2014. Today, the Taliban have become the beacon of political Islam and will attract followers from all over the world.

While the Taliban have traditionally maintained that they have no interest in Kashmir issue and has always rejected the Durand Line, India is waiting on whether the Sunni Islamist force, which draws inspiration from Wahhabism as Deoband does, cuts a deal with TTP in favour of Pakistan Army. TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has already made it clear that it will continue to fight Pakistan Army while thanking Haibatullah Akundzada for releasing their deputy leader Maulvi Faqir Mohammed from Bagram highest security prison. No less than 7,000 hardcore and most brutal terrorists were let go by the Taliban from Bagram prison and the US will have to answer for future terror attacks. It will become clear to India on Pakistan’s leverage on the Afghan Taliban if they try to get their Pakistan namesake on the peace table for Rawalpindi GHQ.

The other issue being watched by Indian counter-terrorism experts is the relationship between the Taliban and Bhawalpur based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) group, which has vowed to target India on Kashmir. One must remember that Jaish Emir Maulana Masood Azhar was taken directly to Emir-ul-Momeen Mullah Omar after he was freed by India in the 1999 IC-814 hijacking at Kandahar. The Taliban have no love lost for Ahle-Hadith Lashkar-e-Tayebba group and are now low on priority of the Pakistani ISI.

If Taliban have no overt interest in Kashmir, then they will not supply top of the line US made weapons, drones and military vehicles or provide terror training camps to Azhar gang in Afghanistan for targeting India. If India is targeted under the umbrella of Taliban despite their public and private assurances, then the next Balakot will be in Afghanistan.

Anas Haqqani, youngest son of the founder of the anti-India Haqqani network, Jalaludin Haqqani, told a news channel that Kashmir was beyond its jurisdiction. But Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen said they had the right to raise their voice for Muslims in Kashmir. Most major attacks against the Indian assets in Afghanistan have been executed by the Haqqanis, who were described by former US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, as a veritable arm of the ISI. Some Taliban statements are in sync with Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s (also called Taliban Khan) who has described the Taliban victory as breaking the shackles of slavery. He has used a similar language to incite revolt in Kashmir. Neelam Irshad Sheikh, a leader from Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party, has even said she hoped the Taliban will help us in Kashmir.

From the Indian perspective, rise of Taliban will not only pose an internal security challenge to the Modi government with large scale radicalisation as a first step, it will also embolden Pakistan based terrorist groups to attack India. Jaish has operated with the Taliban in Afghanistan but it was the ISI that forced Haqqani Network to help LeT cadre to attack Indian embassy and consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar in the past. Lashkar on its own has limited influence in Kunar province of Afghanistan

India Taliban Qatar Meet

Indian Ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal met Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the Head of Taliban’s Political Office in Doha, on 31 August, at the request of the Taliban in Doha to discuss the “safety, security and early return of Indian nationals stranded in Afghanistan” among other things. This appears to be a shift from India’s ‘wait and watch’ policy, and rightly so. The policy has got its own set of limitations.

The meeting between Mittal and Stanekzai, the first time any contact has been made public, took place after prime minister Narendra Modi, noting the evolving situation in Afghanistan, directed that a high-level group comprising external affairs minister S Jaishankar, NSA Ajit Doval and senior officials focus on India’s immediate priorities.

The meeting in Doha followed Stanekzai’s statements over the previous three days. He said India is “very important for this subcontinent” and his group wants to continue Afghanistan’s “cultural”, “economic”, “political” and “trade ties” with India “like in the past.

India’s dilemma was understandable as it has historically abstained from providing legitimacy to the Taliban and had an appreciable degree of rapport with Ashraf Ghani government.

India’s Options

For India, a victim for decades of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, 9/11 was a marker. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in many the global war on terror no longer being the central focus of American attention, India will have to fight many of its battles alone — as it did before 9/11. Hopefully, the lessons of the need for making independent decisions and fighting “your own battles” will not be lost to decision-makers who had hoped that the US would not abandon the cause so soon.

Ironically, though, the emergence of the Islamic State and a reinvigorated Muslim Brotherhood has had the collateral effect of drawing the Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, concerned about the danger posed to their polities by these ideologies, closer to India. America’s draconian sanctions on Iran, including for its alleged terrorist activities, have adversely affected our strategic as well as energy interests in Iran.

As against all these negative realities, India-US counter-terrorism cooperation has productively expanded in important areas. The US recognition of the LeT, JeM, HuM as terrorist groups, and its references to “cross-border terrorism” have been diplomatically helpful, but this has not balanced the far larger unpunished space given to Pakistan despite its terrorist affiliations.

India supported “an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” peace and reconciliation process. But while other countries did not let this prevent their contacts with the Taliban in Doha and elsewhere, India followed it in letter and spirit. With the US out and Ashraf Ghani gone, there was no option except to withdraw all diplomatic presence, closing the embassy for all practical purposes.

India continues to “wait and watch” Afghan developments. While it does so, many new terms are being added to the Indian diplomatic lexicon by supporters of such an approach. These include “strategic patience” and not granting “legitimacy”. While some members of the Indian foreign policy and strategic community now seem willing to accept the need for open contact with the Taliban by the government, others are not willing to go so far.

The Taliban should first guarantee that they will not allow themselves to be used by Pakistan in any jihadi activity in our country. This would be a huge win for India, but it is also to be noted that the Taliban has no interest in Kashmir. In return for this guarantee, India must recognize the Taliban and establish full diplomatic relations with them.

It is in India’s interest to help the emergence of a stable Taliban regime. They have never sought to export their medieval version of Islam; their fault was in allowing others to use their territory to train terrorists. If they are committed to prevent this, the world would be ready to do business with them.

The post India’s Stakes in Talib-Afghanistan appeared first on IMR.

The Taliban, on 7 September, named Mullah Hasan Akhund, an associate of the movement’s late founder, Mullah Omar, as the new head of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. No less crucial was the appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani as interior minister. His organisation happens to be on the terrorism list of the United States of America. He is one of the FBI’s most wanted men because of his involvement in suicide attacks and ties with Al Qaida.

The US asserted in the immediate aftermath of the appointments that there would be no recognition of the Taliban government anytime soon.

The appointment of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, head of the Taliban’s political office and one of the prominent negotiators at the serial conferences in Doha, as Prime Minister Akhund’s deputy, rather than to the top job, was more than a little surprising. Ever since 15 August, when the Taliban brought Kabul under its belt, he had been widely expected to be the next prime minister.

Baradar, once a close friend of Mullah Omar, was a senior Taliban commander in charge of attacks on US forces. He was arrested and imprisoned in Pakistan in 2010, and helmed the Taliban’s political office in Doha after his release in 2018. On the face of it, his claim to the PM’s office was strong, but as it has turned out it was Mullah Hasan Akhund who was eventually given the nod.

Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, son of Mullah Omar, was named as defence minister in a series of ministerial appointments that were said to be in an “acting” capacity. To be tentative is the dominant strain.

The exclusion of women from the seat of authority was the other and unsurprising striking feature of the new dispensation. This rendered rather uncertain the support of a critical section in a profoundly theocratic country. The putative moderate face of the new regime was at a discount.

It is not clear what role in the government would be played by Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban supreme leader. There was no indication that he would play the omnipotent role of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei. Islamabad’s fingerprints were visible in the new arrangement.

Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network has emerged as the most powerful group in the new Taliban government, with four of the clan nominated as cabinet members.

The Haqqani Network takes its name from the leader of the group, Jalaluddin Haqqani, who first fought the Soviet Army in Afghanistan as a loyal ally of the CIA and the ISI, and then fought the US and NATO forces, while he led a protected existence in North Waziristan, where Pakistan gave him and the entire group safe haven.

Jalauddin’s death, in September 2018, was announced as having occurred of natural causes, although it was rumoured that he had died years before. The mantle passed to his son Sirajuddin.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, 48, is the new Interior Minister — an appointment that is a finger in the eye of the international community. He has been a UN-designated global terrorist since 2007, and the FBI has a reward of $10 million for information leading to his arrest. No recent photographs exist of him.

It describes him as “one of the most prominent, influential, charismatic and experienced leaders within the Haqqani Network… and has been one of the major operational commanders of the network since 2004. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Sirajuddin Haqqani took control of the Haqqani Network and has since then led the group into the forefront of insurgent activities in Afghanistan”.

According to the listing, he derived much of his power and authority from his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani — who was also listed, and described as “a go-between for al-Qaeda and the Taliban on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border”. Sirajuddin Haqqani was involved in the suicide bombing attack against a Police Academy bus in Kabul on June 18, 2007, which killed 35 police officers.

Haqqanis in Cabinet

Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, the uncle of Sirajuddin, who has been appointed the Minister for Refugees, was listed as a terrorist in 2011. The listing says he travelled to Gulf countries, as well as in South and South-east Asia to raise funds on behalf of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.

He is said to have been one of several people responsible for the detention of prisoners captured by the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. The listing links him to al-Qaeda as well.

Najibullah Haqqani, Minister for Communication, was listed in 2001. He had been a minister in the previous Taliban regime as well — first the deputy minister for public works, and later, deputy minister for finance. He was militarily active until 2010.

Sheikh Abdul Baqi Haqqani, an associate of Jalaluddin Haqqani and the new Minister for Higher Education, is the only leader of the Haqqani Network in the government who not designated by the UN Security Council. However, he has been sanctioned by the European Union.

On being appointed the shadow minister for education last month, he was reported as saying that while girls could study, “All educational activities will take place according to Shariah.”

Deep Roots in Af-Pak

Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Zadran tribesman from the Loya Paktia (Paktia, Paktika and Khost) area in eastern Afghanistan close to the border with Pakistan, was a member of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet Hizb-e-Islami, and became active as a mujahideen in the 1970s.

He is an alumnus of the Dar-ul-ulum Madrassa, also nown as the jihad factory, in Akhora Khattak in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

As the frontier of the Cold War came to Pakistan’s doors, he and several others were trained in Pakistan for jihad. When the Soviet Army arrived, he was among the CIA’s trusted mujahideen. Charlie Wilson, the US Senator who mustered money and weapons for the war, is said to have described him as “goodness personified”. During this time he forged deep ties with the ISI.

From a base in North Waziristan, Jalaluddin ran guns and fighters for the jihad all through the 1980s. This is also the time when he met Osama bin Laden in Miramshah, the headquarters town of North Waziristan. While he received largesse from the CIA and ISI, Haqqani is said to have also raised his own funds from wealthy sheikhs in Gulf countries, and during his annual Haj pilgrimage.

Haqqani joined hands with the Taliban in 1995, and he and his men fought alongside the Islamist movement against the various warring factions of the mujahideen.

When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, he became the Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs. The relationship between him and Mullah Omar was one of common interests, but it was hardly smooth, with Haqqani resentful of the prominence Mullah Omar gave to his inner circle from Kandahar.

After the ouster of the Taliban regime by the US and allied forces in 2001, the Haqqani family fled to Pakistan, where they are believed to have taken refuge in their old stronghold of Miramshah in North Waziristan.

They were said to be running a parallel administration there, taxing people and making money off construction contracts and investments in real estate in the area. Another source of income was from fund-raising in the Gulf.

Kidnapping for ransom was a major source of income, as was smuggling timber from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

In 2003, when the Taliban began regrouping, the Haqqani clan was central to their efforts. By then, Sirajuddin had taken over most of the operational aspects of the Haqqani Network from his father Jalaluddin.

Military observers credit much of the success of the Taliban to the Haqqani Network. The United States often urged Pakistan to “do more” to eliminate the Haqqani Network, but these efforts remained cosmetic.

The Institute for the Study of War report mentioned earlier says the Pakistani Army consistently refused to launch a military operation in North Waziristan despite the presence of the al-Qaeda’s senior leadership there.

Even while reporting directly to the Taliban Supreme Council, the Haqqani Network retained its own distinct identity.

Links with al-Qaeda, ISIS

As recently as May this year, a UN report described the Haqqani Network as “Taliban’s most combat-ready forces [with] a highly skilled core of members who specialize in complex attacks and provide technical skills, such as improvised explosive device and rocket construction….The Haqqani Network remains a hub for outreach and cooperation with regional foreign terrorist groups and is the primary liaison between the Taliban and Al-Qaida”.

The report, by the Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Committee, also noted that one member state had pointed to a link between the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP) and the Haqqani Network, but the Committee itself was unable to confirm this. The link centred on the leader of the ISIS-KP, Shahab al-Muhajir, who “may also have been previously a mid-level commander in the Haqqani Network”.

An earlier report of the Committee had stated that “one Member State has suggested that certain attacks can be denied by the Taliban and claimed by ISIL-K, (same as the ISIS-KP) with it being unclear whether these attacks were purely orchestrated by the Haqqani Network, or were joint ventures making use of ISIL-K operatives”.

The 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in which a senior diplomat and a military official posted at the Embassy were killed among dozens others, mostly Afghan civilians, was blamed by US and Afghan intelligence on the Haqqani Network.

The National Directorate of Security, the intelligence agency of the erstwhile Afghan government, had provided communication intercepts to Indian authorities that pointed to Haqqani involvement, allegedly with ISI support. A similar claim was made by the CIA. Other reports pointed to a Lashkar-e-Taiba involvement, with support from the Haqqani Network.

The Haqqani Network is also said to have been behind the attacks on Indian construction workers in Afghanistan in the years 2009-2012. The group’s long relationship with and loyalty to the ISI make it an invaluable asset for Pakistan, according to security officials. There is considerable disquiet in the Indian security establishment that Sirajuddin Haqqani is a member of the new government of Afghanistan.

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Pakistan has solicited funding for the Taliban, bankrolled Taliban operations, provided diplomatic support as the Taliban’s virtual emissaries abroad, arranged training for Taliban fighters, recruited skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planned and directed offensives, provided and facilitated shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions apparently directly providing combat support.

The Pakistan government has repeatedly denied that it provides any military support to the Taliban in its diplomacy regarding its extensive operations in Afghanistan.

In direct violation of U.N. sanctions Pakistan’s army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contributed to making the Taliban a highly effective military force. Pakistan’s notoriously porous border with Afghanistan facilitated the transshipment of men and materiel.

History of Military Support

Pakistan has a history of military support for different factions within Afghanistan, extending at least as far back as the early 1970s. During the 1980s, Pakistan, which was host to more than two million Afghan refugees, was the most significant front-line state serving as a secure base for the mujahidin fighting against the Soviet intervention.

Pakistan also served, in the 1980s, as a U.S. stalking horse: the U.S., through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling some $2-3 billion worth of covert assistance to the mujahidin, training over 80,000 of them.

Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, serving and former Pakistani military officers continued to provide training and advisory services in training camps within Afghanistan and eventually to Taliban forces in combat.

In addition, Pakistan promoted the emergence of a government in Afghanistan that would reduce Pakistan’s own vulnerability to internal unrest by helping to contain the nationalist aspirations of tribes whose territories straddle the Pakistani-Afghan border.

Pakistan also sought to quell local support for Afghanistan’s ambitions of redrawing the Durand line. Thus, Pakistan came to throw its support behind the Hizb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun-dominated group that espoused an Islamist rather than nationalist agenda. Because the U.S. granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling its covert assistance to the mujahidin based in Pakistan, Pakistan was able to give Hikmatyar the lion’s share.

Strategic Depth

Throughout the war against the communist government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan asserted a mix of internal and external concerns. The ISI and Pakistan army sought leverage against the hostile neighbour on its eastern border, India, by giving Pakistan “strategic depth.”

Pakistan has always wanted Afghanistan as strategic depth against India. An Afghanistan that facilitated those connections and provided Pakistan with a base to pursue its objectives in Kashmir would give it greater security against India. It has also been part of the ‘Great Game’ against India. Pakistan believes that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will eliminate Indian threat through Afghanistan.

With strategic depth, Pakistan can retreat into Afghanistan if India attacks. Second, they can rain their missiles on India from Afghanistan. And third, they can utilize jihadis from Afghanistan to launch a new jihad in Kashmir.

The New Taliban

Islamabad believes that it has the Taliban by the scruff of the neck, a term once used by Pakistan’s Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, during the time of the Kargil operations.

But the Taliban of today are not the naïve Talibs that the Pakistanis created under the leadership of Mullah Omar. This generation are seasoned militants who have sometimes experienced jail and ill-treatment at the hands of the Pakistanis. Islamabad hopes that its control over the Taliban logistics will continue to provide it leverage, as will the presence of its powerful proxy—the Haqqani Network which has been absorbed into the Taliban over the past two decades. But the rapid consolidation of authority over Afghanistan by the Taliban and their outreach to Iran is likely to have upset those calculations.

Pakistan has an uphill task in converting its tactical advantages in Afghanistan into strategic gains. The Pakistan army is now in the driver’s seat in Kabul. But can it drive the Afghan state and society anywhere, let alone in a sensible direction?

It did not come as a surprise that Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), dashed to Kabul after Taliban’s victory to secure his government’s interests. Hamid’s role was also to mediate between different Taliban factions on power-sharing and launch a sustainable new Afghan government.

With Pakistan supported Haqqani group occupying cabinet berths in the new Afghan dispensation, terrorist groups are likely to continue to flourish, rather than be controlled, as globally demanded. The Haqqanis are suspected to be close to the Islamic State (ISIS-K) which launched the suicide attack on Kabul airport. They are also closely associated with Pak-backed terrorist groups, JeM and LeT, which operate in Kashmir. The new Afghan army chief, Qari Fasihuddin, has ties with the ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). Russian security agencies believe that thousands of ISIS-K cadres are concentrated along Afghanistan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Hence, the world rejected the Afghan government and tended to ignore its populace, pushing this responsibility on to Pakistan. Pakistan is itself in financial doldrums and facing food shortages. It cannot afford to fund and feed an additional 40 million without global support. Pakistan, which should have enforced a globally desired government in Kabul, at least initially, pushed one which it could control, ignoring global demands.

It is possible that Pakistan would have promised to support and fund Afghanistan in return for creating a government which it desires. Now it is saddled with a nation which, though possessing billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment, lacks basic food stocks and funds to administer the country. Afghanistan may be compelled to export drugs or sell US equipment for immediate financial needs.

The Problem With Durand Line

What the Pakistanis do not realize is that they have a soft underbelly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan is strong enough to destabilise Afghanistan, but not powerful enough to construct a stable political order across the Durand Line.

While the Taliban were beholden to Pakistan for evicting the Soviets from their land, they never recognized the Durand Line as their official border with Pakistan. The Taliban consider the Durand Line as a figment of the British imagination. Afghanistan dearly wants to merge Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with itself. Needless to say the Pakistanis are not happy with this ambition. They want the Durand Line to be recognized as the international border with Afghanistan as soon as possible.

The Durand Line is a legacy of the 19th century Great Game between the Russian and British empires in which Afghanistan was used as a buffer by the British against a feared Russian expansionism to its east.

The agreement demarcating what became known as the Durand Line was signed on November 12, 1893 between the British civil servant Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman, then the Afghan ruler, essentially a British puppet. His agreement with Durand demarcated the limits of his and British India’s “spheres of influence” on the Afghan “frontier” with India.

In reality, the line cut through Pashtun tribal areas, leaving villages, families, and land divided between the two “spheres of influence”. It has been described as a “line of hatred”, arbitrary, illogical, cruel and a trickery on the Pashtuns. Some historians believe it was a ploy to divide the Pashtuns so that the British could keep control over them easily. It also put on the British side the strategic Khyber Pass.

With Independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited the Durand Line, and with it also the Pashtun rejection of the line, and Afghanistan’s refusal to recognise it. Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan joining the United Nations in 1947.

‘Pashtunistan’ — an independent country of the Pashtuns — was a demand made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the time of Partition, although he later resigned himself to the reality of Partition. The proximity of the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ to India was a point of tension between the two countries almost immediately. The fear of Indian support to Pashtun nationalism haunts Pakistan to date, and is embedded in its Afghan policy.

Pakistan’s creation and support for the Taliban is seen by some as a move to obliterate ethnic Pashtun nationalism with an Islamic identity. But it did not work out the way Pakistan had planned. When the Taliban seized power in Kabul the first time, they rejected the Durand Line. They also strengthened Pashtun identity with an Islamic radicalism to produce the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose terrorist attacks since 2007 left the country shaken.

As cross-border tensions peaked in 2017 with several attacks on Pakistani border posts by militants that Pakistan accused Afghanistan of sheltering – while the Afghan government accused Pakistan of giving safe haven to Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network – Pakistan began erecting a fence on the Durand Line. While it may have reduced the movement of militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it did little to stop the movement of Afghan Taliban across and back.

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A “decent interval” between US withdrawal and Taliban’s return, which the US had hoped for, did not happen leading to a messy withdrawal. Yet, Biden maintained that his decision was the right one.

The Taliban captured Kabul on 15 August almost 20 years after the U.S. launched its global war on terror. The city of roughly 5 million people fell to the Islamist insurgents without even a fight while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Americans abandoned their Embassy and rushed to Kabul airport.

The Afghan Army soldiers did not fight. Police abandoned their stations. Former Northern Alliance warlords left the country. And the government crumbled like the proverbial house of cards.

The reversal is an embarrassing consequence of misjudging the viability of Afghan government forces — by the US military as well as intelligence agencies — which in some cases chose to surrender their vehicles and weapons rather than fight.

President Biden owned up to no mistake in his decision to end the longest war in the history of the United States. But he rued, with a patronising contemplation, that even two decades of support failed to turn the Afghan military into a force capable of securing its own country. “We gave them every tool they could need. We paid their salaries. Provided for the maintenance of their airplanes,” Biden said.

“We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide was the will to fight for that future,” he said. “One more year, or five more years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot or will not hold its own country”, Biden said, justifying his stand seeking to put an end to “an endless American presence in the middle of another country’s civil conflict”.

It was a war against one of the most resilient fighter forces of the world to secure indemnity from future terrorist attacks and, perhaps, to teach them a hard lesson. A stock-taking in May 2018, however, revealed that not only have the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Al Qaeda made a successful comeback, but also that ISIS has gained a foothold in the country.

Disorderly Evacuation

The incompetence was staggering. Bagram was closed, thus eliminating every possibility of an orderly evacuation. Intelligence assessments were delusional. The evacuation was left to the last day. Visas were not processed or the right people identified. The airport was not prepared.

The whole strategy was an exercise in virtual politics. First, the creation of a virtual Afghan government. It is not surprising that the Taliban moved with such confidence and speed when they were the ones best placed to understand they were not fighting a real army or a real state, but rather a fiction or a ghost projected from Washington on to the screen of Afghanistan.

Even days before the fall of Kabul, the understanding among European ambassadors in the city was that Washington would honour its commitment to provide security for the embassies in the green zone with a residual military force. That commitment had been formally made and people took it seriously. But it too was dropped, and just as suddenly.

America’s Failure

The myth of American impermeability was demolished. For generations, the United States rested on the illusion that it could, when it wanted to, isolate itself from the troublesome world beyond its frontiers.

Unarguably the most powerful military and economic power in history suffered a body blow by a group of individuals attached to a non-state actor, the al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden.

The largest military industrial complex on Earth, with the most powerful intelligence system synergised with real-time information from allies across the world, had failed to recognise the potency of the threat posed by al-Qaeda, and to neutralise it in time.

America’s response was not just swift but ferocious and almost overwhelming in its design, to the point that the use of force seemed to be intended to demonstrate the almost unlimited might of American hegemonic power.

The swift attack on Afghanistan, the dispatching of the Taliban, the building of an almost unprecedented global coalition (“you are with us or you are against us”), a consensus within the UN, the neutralisation of the core of al-Qaeda and ultimately, the killing of Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, demonstrated that America was willing to be unforgiving in dealing with those responsible for 9/11.

There was no terrorist attack of consequence on the US since 9/11. But a wasted war in Iraq (in the futile search for weapons of mass destruction) — and enlarging the mission in Afghanistan, from defeating al-Qaeda to building democracy and civil society to finally handing over power to the Taliban was supremely ironical.

Billions Spent on the Afghan Army

Of the approximately $145 billion the US government spent trying to rebuild Afghanistan, about $83 billion went to developing and sustaining its army and police forces, according to the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a congressionally created watchdog that has tracked the war since 2008. The $145 billion is in addition to $837 billion the United States spent fighting the war, which began with an invasion in October 2001.

But the Afghan security forces collapsed so quickly and completely — in some cases without a shot fired — that the ultimate beneficiary of the American investment turned out to be the Taliban. They grabbed not only political power but also US-supplied firepower — guns, ammunition, helicopters and more.

The Taliban captured an array of modern military equipment when they overran Afghan forces who failed to defend district centers. Bigger gains followed, including combat aircraft, when the Taliban rolled up provincial capitals and military bases with stunning speed, topped by capturing the biggest prize, Kabul.

The US failure to produce a sustainable Afghan army and police force, and the reasons for their collapse, will be studied for years by military analysts. The forces turned out to be hollow, equipped with superior arms but largely missing the crucial ingredient of combat motivation.

What the Afghans received in tangible resources they lacked in the more important intangibles. Morale, discipline, leadership, unit cohesion are more decisive than numbers of forces and equipment.

By contrast, Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgents, with smaller numbers, less sophisticated weaponry and no air power, proved a superior force. US intelligence agencies largely underestimated the scope of that superiority, and even after President Joe Biden announced in April he was withdrawing all US troops, the intelligence agencies did not foresee a Taliban final offensive that would succeed so spectacularly.

Before April, the Afghan government troops were slowly but steadily losing the war. When they learned that their American partners were going home, an impulse to give up without a fight “spread like wildfire.”

The United States tried to develop a credible Afghan defense establishment on the fly, even as it was fighting the Taliban, attempting to widen the political foundations of the government in Kabul and seeking to establish democracy in a country rife with corruption and cronyism. Year after year, US military leaders downplayed the problems and insisted success was coming. Others saw the handwriting on the wall.

Some elements of the Afghan army did fight hard, including commandos whose heroic efforts are yet to be fully documented. But as a whole the security forces created by the United States and its NATO allies amounted to a “house of cards” whose collapse was driven as much by failures of US civilian leaders as their military partners.

The Afghan force-building exercise was so completely dependent on American largesse that the Pentagon even paid the Afghan troops’ salaries. Too often that money, and untold amounts of fuel, were siphoned off by corrupt officers and government overseers.

President Ashraf Ghani lacked the political dexterity required to navigate political complexities, the political skill and temperament to cohere and glue the mosaic of Afghanistan, including varied Pashtun tribes. In the end, he could not inspire his well-equipped army which was no match to the Taliban, whose ideological inspiration comes from a potent mix of Pashtun nationalism and extremist version of Deobandi Islam.

Failure to Understand Complexities

America failed because of its deep cultural misunderstanding of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has suffered deeply from decades of civil war, religious extremism, drug mafia, neighbouring interference (Pakistani shares 2,500 miles of porous border), poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and the presence of different ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and political groups antagonistic to each other for centuries. It was compounded by the fact that the Taliban insurgency was indigenous and from the largest ethnic group (Pashtun) while the Kabul Government was largely being ‘made up of minorities’.

Many Pashtun leaders and intellectuals regret how their lands have been transformed into a staging ground for a global conflict. Pashtun nationalism is a potent force and Pashtuns are not only the predominant ethnic group in much of Afghanistan’s south and east, but are also a major ethnic group in Pakistan’s north and west. The reason for Afghanistan being often monikered as the “land of the Pashtuns” is because Afghan identity has historically been synonymous with “Pashtun” however much the outside world labels its people regardless of ethnic origin and tends to conflate an Afghan national identity with the Pashtun identity.

Phases of the War

Four presidents share responsibility for the missteps in Afghanistan that accumulated over two decades. But only President Joe Biden will be the face of the war’s chaotic, violent conclusion.

Under the command of President George W. Bush, American forces stormed into Afghanistan soon after the terror attacks on a hunt for bin Laden while trying to disrupt al-Qaida’s ability to conduct further assaults on the West. There was immediate success: The Taliban were routed, the terror group disrupted.

But after that came the grinding second phase of the war and a surge of troops from President Barack Obama in 2009. Though Obama later moved to reduce the number of troops, the volume of insurgent attacks and civilian causalities prevented a full drawdown.

Trump mulled meeting the Taliban at Camp David on an earlier Sept. 11 anniversary, only to back away from the idea amid an uproar. But he announced that the U.S. would pull all its forces out by May 2021, an agreement Biden honoured and delayed only slightly.

Biden has argued for more than a decade that Afghanistan was a kind of purgatory for the United States. He found it to be corrupt, addicted to America’s largesse and an unreliable partner that should be made to fend for itself. His goal was to protect Americans from terrorist attacks, not building a country. A majority of Americans favoured bringing troops home.

Casualties and Costs

Over 20 years, the Afghanistan War cost over $2.26 trillion or $ 300 mn per day. 2,500 US soldiers, 4,000 civilians (serving US forces) and 1,145 NATO and coalition troops died. Moere than 20,000 were injured. The medical cost in the long run was $ 300-500 billion.

Since 2001, an estimated 160,000 people had been killed in the war in Afghanistan, of which some 65,000 were Afghan security forces, 44,000 Afghan civilians, 42,500 Taliban fighters and other insurgents, 424 humanitarian aid workers, 67 journalists and media workers are a part.

Comments

An Islamist group with a medieval mindset and modern weapons defeated the world’s most powerful country. The U.S. can say in its defence that its mission was to fight al-Qaeda and that it met its strategic objectives. But in reality, after spending 20 years in Afghanistan to fight terrorism and rebuild the Afghan state, the U.S. ran away from the battlefield, embarrassing itself and leaving its allies helpless.

US President Joe Biden has accused the Afghan government and military of allowing the Taliban to overrun the war-torn country. This unconvincing self-justification cannot conceal the all-pervading sense of betrayal: America simply left Afghanistan in the lurch. By his own admission, the US spent more than $1 trillion in two decades, ostensibly to train and equip the 300,000-strong Afghan military force. So, why did this ‘incredibly well-equipped’ force capitulate so tamely to the Taliban?

Biden’s contention that the US had ‘planned for every contingency’ does not hold water in the light of the chaotic and messy pullout, even as he has deigned to concede that the Taliban takeover happened ‘more quickly’ than anticipated.

America’s unwillingness to take Pakistan to task for helping the Taliban run riot has been plainly visible all along.

Measured by its stated objectives and international consequences, the global war on terror has failed strikingly. Bin Laden’s elimination might have provided a trophy to display, but Islamist terrorism and religious extremism got a tremendous boost with the rise of the Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria, and after its elimination, the pronounced spread in Africa of extremist movements affiliated with the al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Islamist terrorism has viciously struck Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and has targeted Southeast Asia. Europe has suffered dramatic terrorist attacks and an influx of refugees, with political and social consequences marked by the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment and right-wing nationalist forces.

The gap between the objectives of America’s war on terror and actual achievement is clear in our region. The terrorists have neither been defeated nor their organisations destroyed, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan’s state sponsorship of terrorism, not only against India but also against US forces in Afghanistan, the US has looked to Pakistan to facilitate its withdrawal from Afghanistan through its Taliban links, allowing it in the process to obtain its longed for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan against India. The US has failed to “abolish terrorist sanctuaries and havens” in Pakistan, or to compel an unwilling Pakistan to act against the Haqqani group, which now controls Afghanistan’s interior ministry. Ironically, whereas the US acted to destroy the Islamic State in West Asia, it has handed over a state to the Taliban, with the new Afghanistan government liberally composed of UN-designated terrorists. Ironically, Islamist extremists and terrorists have taken over a country without any democratic process with the consent of an America committed to democratic values.

The US war on terror has been selective, marred by double standards, equivocations and geopolitical motives. The stated goal was not to make only America safe, but eliminate the terrorist threat globally as part of America’s leadership role. The way it has withdrawn from Afghanistan has created doubts on whether it will honour its commitments elsewhere, leading countries to hedge. Europe sees the withdrawal as a foreign policy disaster for the western alliance. India is less safe with the Taliban-Pakistan takeover of Afghanistan under the accommodating umbrella of the US.

The US must reflect on its inability to successfully see through wars, despite its enormous military capability. This has implications for its west European and East Asian allies, as well as the Arabs, who depend on the US military to protect themselves.

The Kabul fiasco will undoubtedly affect the US ability to mobilise coalitions against a common cause. With a hostile Iran and Afghanistan, the newly proposed US quadrilateral in Central Asia is a non-starter.

The Americans are unlikely to forgo the ability to intervene in such a key region at some future date. But for that you need an America that can learn the right lessons, overcome domestic divisions and avoid the perils of group-think that afflict large parts of Washington.

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