The New Relevance of High-Tech and Mass

In the dynamic between offense and defence, between tank and anti-tank weapons, between aircraft and air defence (AD) systems, we have seen a new equilibrium that clearly favours defence over the offense. Tanks, the primary instruments of offense, have taken particularly heavy casualties and the sheer lethality of surface-to-air missiles (S-300, S-400/500) have forced Air Forces to stay away from battle areas and restrict sortie generation rates (to just 250-300 a day). These were over 1600 a day in Gulf War I, some 600/day in Yugoslavia and 460/day in the 1971 Bangladesh War). This is a new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and mass. Any armed forces that fail to cater for this new order of lethality and the consequent need for mass, will be making a fatal mistake. Given the scale of casualties, we will have to focus hard on force–preservation, re-constitution of badly battered units and quick replacement of casualties in all future wars. Towards that end, the Indian Army’s move to cut manpower by two lakhs is very inopportune and ill-timed.

Col Jhonson writes, “What we are witnessing is a pivotal moment in military history, the re-ascendence of defence as the decisive form of war. We had seen it in World War and then we saw the same dynamic re-assert itself again by the end of World War Two. The power of the offensive had been restored at the start of that war by the brilliant German doctrine of Blitzkrieg, (which had created a lethal combination of tanks and Stuka dive bombers), to restore mobility on the battlefield. By the end of World War Two, defensive fire power had caught up once again, defeated the German Blitzkrieg and made attrition supreme on the battlefield once more. Stalin had said correctly “Artillery is the God of War.” In Ukraine, we have simply re-learnt the lessons of World War I and II. That is why the Russians chose to go on the defensive in 2023 and have so far inflicted some 70,000 personnel casualties and destroyed almost 7000 armoured vehicles.

Unprecedented Battle Field Transparency

What has favoured the defender and made the task of the attacker even more difficult is the near total level of battle field transparency in Ukraine. The US satellites, UAVs, AWACs, JSTARS, etc, can pick up virtually every single tank, truck and even soldiers that move on the battlefield. Surprise in the attack has, thus, become virtually impossible to achieve. Concentrations can be picked up immediately and even intentions can be discerned through electronic surveillance of enemy communications. What has made Russia’s task even more difficult is the proxy nature of the war. Had it been a direct clash between US and Russia, the latter could have shot down US spy satellites, AWACS and even drones loitering in Poland or Romania. These are now totally safe from any Russian counter-action. In a direct clash the attacker can take prophylactic action to shoot holes in the sky over the projected area of the offensive by downing enemy satellites with ASAT missiles. The proxy nature of this war has kept the surveillance assets of US and NATO totally unmolested and free to snoop on Russia. The levels of battlefield transparency, thus, available to Ukraine have simply been unprecedented in the annals of warfare.

Return of the Stalemate

The new equivalence or equilibrium between defensive and offensive systems has led to brutal stalemates on the battlefields of Ukraine and unprecedented levels of attrition that are reminiscent of the First World War and its sheer carnage. Once again, as in the two World Wars, medium and heavy artillery has proved to be a decisive, war-winning factor. An Austrian Army Operational Research Statistical Analysis (ORSA) study of the last seven years of combat in the Donbas region, has clearly highlighted that 45% of the tank kills, 65 % of artillery guns and 57 % of the vehicles destroyed were by medium artillery – especially of the 152/155 mm calibre.

Despite all the media hype, the total number of tanks destroyed by Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) – Javelins, TOWs, etc, – were just 13%. A major media hype was created that Javelins, Stingers (and later the HIMARS) were singular war winning factors – the US silver bullets that by themselves would win the war single-handedly. There are no silver bullets in war. People said the tank was now a dinosaur – no longer relevant on the modern battlefield. As Capt Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted earlier, the tank has been pronounced dead so many times in recent military history. Each time it reasserts its relevance. It is still the only viable instrument of shock and offensive action. So even though defence has regained primacy over offense in overall terms, the tank remains the sole instrument of offense on the land battlefields. Like at the end of World War II, tanks may have to be used in mass to overcome lethal defenses. Massive artillery barrages have to pave the way for tanks as we saw in the Donbas. We may need more tanks, not less. Top attack is a new vulnerability for tanks but it is certainly something that can and will be countered by simple expedients like canopies and more sophisticated Active Protection System (APS). Besides, despite all this media hype – actual casualties inflicted by the ATGMs on tanks have just been 13%. The real tank-killer was medium artillery (45% tank kills). As such, earlier lessons of the Second World War have simply been revalidated today.

Drones

Drones – unmanned aerial, ground and sea vehicles – have created a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). We have loitering Kamikaze drones that are able to inflict heavy casualties and yet cost so little. Drones are very useful for gaining tactical and contact intelligence and vector in artillery fire and air strikes and launch missiles and bombs. They have brought about a paradigm shift in the nature of war. The Russians have recently retrofitted Iranian Shahed drones with the Glonass navigation system and used them in mass to mask lethal attacks by their cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and saturate Ukrainians air defences.

Wrong Lessons from Low Intensity Conflicts

In fact, the world has learnt some patently incorrect lessons from the era of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The levels of asymmetry between the opponents was inordinately high in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and also in Iraq and even Yugoslavia and Syria. Due to the sheer asymmetry, patently wrong lessons were learnt which cannot withstand the shock of high intensity conflict between evenly matched opponents. No lessons from Afghanistan or Libya can be applied to any Western conflict with peer group competitors like China or Russia. Given the accuracy of precision guided munitions (PGMs), the levels of lethality have gone up by several orders of magnitude. What the Russia-Ukraine war clearly highlights is the need to graduate quickly beyond the era of LIC entailing inordinately high levels of asymmetry between the two sides. The world is rapidly entering into the era of long duration High Intensity Conflicts between evenly matched opponents, where the levels of attrition will be inordinately high.

Nuclear Backdrop

All such future conventional wars will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. So far, the nuclear threat had served to constrain the levels of combat below the nuclear threshold. However, we are increasingly seeing nuclear red lines being completely ignored on the modern conventional battlefield. So far, the USA and NATO have refrained from direct combat with Russia and China. Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy war that has been bled white. The Americans have certainly fought Russia to the last Ukrainian in the current conflict. Either by deliberate design or by sheer accident, the world is careening towards a dangerous Armageddon, a Third World War that may see limited or full-scale use of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Restraints are fast eroding at a rate that spells serious danger for mankind.

An Economic War Coup de Grace?

In hind sight, it is quite apparent that the US and NATO (by the uncalled for eastward expansion of NATO) had deliberately pushed and provoked Russia into the Ukraine War. With some reflection (and purely in hindsight) it appears that a grand design of waging unrestricted economic war against Russia had already been prepared in the US. The aim was, perhaps, to repeat 1991 – when unrelenting economic war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse. That, however, had been the result of a carefully-calibrated, long term, economic war strategy to bring a nuclear power to its knees. It had been triggered by the American induced oil glut of 1986 in which the US had persuaded its surrogate – Saudi Arabia – to flood the world with cheap oil. In that year (1986) itself, petrol prices had plummeted from $30 a barrel to just around $10 a barrel. This unprecedented fall in oil prices had torpedoed and seriously wounded the Soviet economy. It went into a negative tailspin from which it never really recovered. In 1991, the USSR simply vanished without a shot being fired. The USSR splintered into 15 states and simply ceased to exist.

Was that the design that Joe Biden was trying to replicate? If so, the Second Economic War against Russia seems to have floundered rather badly till now. The outcome of this economic war will be far more consequential than the shooting war in Ukraine. At first the Russian Rouble had fallen rather steeply from 80 roubles to a dollar to over 160 roubles to a dollar. Russia, however, took strong and energetic counter measures. They asked for all payments of oil and gas to be made in roubles. Europe was hopelessly dependent upon Russian gas and oil. Creating alternative infrastructure would take minimum four to five years. Despite all brave talk of sanctions, Europe had no option but to keep buying Russian oil and gas on the sly. The cost of the war in Ukraine has been estimated at a billion dollars a day. It is noteworthy that Europe by itself has paid a billion dollars a day to Russia for its oil and gas and this has financed the Ukraine war for Russia.

Economic War and Europe. The Boomerang?

Europe, however, has been hit the hardest. Structurally its energy linkages with Russia were far too deep and comprehensive to be severed in such a hurry. The sudden removal of 3 million barrels a day of Russian oil has caused energy prices to skyrocket. From $70 a barrel they shot up to $125 a barrel. Russia and Ukraine are also the biggest exporters of food grains and sun flower oil. Energy inflation has now combined with food inflation to give a body blow to the global economy that was still reeling from the disastrous impact of the Covid pandemic. Today, the world is staring at a dangerous recession and stagflation. In hindsight, the economic war offensive against Russia has clearly boomeranged. What has clearly been destroyed beyond repair is the trust that was the basis of globalisation. America’s weaponsation of its banking system and economic institutions has destroyed this trust. Russia had a forex reserved $630 bn. Of this $300 billion was invested in US and European banks. America simply seized this money. Will Russia, China or India or other major economies ever put their money and trust in US banks again?

Impact on India

This military conflict is of overwhelming relevance to India. That is simply because over 70% of our cutting-edge military equipment is still of Russian origin. The Americans have tried to ridicule the performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine. It was not incompetence but a shift in the power of the defence over offense that has resulted in the stalemate. Had the US or NATO armies been attacking, they would have found the going as tough, if not tougher. This campaign is, therefore, being closely studied in all armed forces. Let me summarise some primary lesson in the Indian context:

Military Demographic. Demographics is the key to the outcome of any prolonged conflict. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It has a dire shortage of manpower and it is showing badly. Russia had fielded an Army of 1,50,000 against Ukraine, which has fielded some 2,50,000 (now almost 7,50,000 by some estimates) due to complete mobilization. The Russian constraints are painful and showing. It has had to recycle and use the same forces again and again. Due to embarrassing reverses in Kharkiev, Putin was finally forced, in Sep 2022, to order partial mobilization of 3,00,000 reservists. Had he done this at the outset the war would have been long over. He has now conscripted 2,70,000 fresh troops for his impending counter-offensive in winter. This has painful and obvious lessons for India. India has no dearth of manpower but it is cutting down its manpower and switching from a regular full ‘colour service’ Army to short terms inductees (Agniveers). Russian short term inductees (conscripts) have performed poorly in the Ukraine War. We need to draw immediate lessons from this war and take a fresh look at the Agniveer scheme. We may have to increase service tenures from 4 to 7 years and retention levels from 25% to 50%. Future wars will not just be high-tech but high-tech and mass. Seeing the grim realities of the modern battlefield we simply cannot afford to downsize.

The Tank is Dead. All notions that the tank has been turned into a dinosaur by drones, Javelins and TOWs is highly misplaced and premature. Tanks will continue to be the prime platform for offensive action for decades to come.

Medium Artillery. Artillery of the heavy and medium calibres has proved to be a decisive and war winning factor in the new wars of intense attrition. Artillery has inflicted 45% of the tank kills in Ukraine. Before the Kargil War, India had planned to standardize its Artillery around the 155mm caliber. The Bofors scandal badly derailed this plan. We now need to accelerate the mediumistaion of the Artillery with rapid induction of at least 1800 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) of indigenous manufacture at the earliest.

Air Power. Despite near total air superiority, the Russian use of air power was curiously restrained. Perhaps, this has been due to the vastly enhanced lethality of the AD systems (the S-300 and Buk SAMS and the shoulder-fired Stingers). Russian sortie generation rate at its peak was confined to 250-300 per day. In Gulf War I, the USAF was mounting 1600 sorties per day but against a much weaker and outdated air defence system of Iraq. India needs a 45-squadron Air Force to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. Today, we are down to just 30. This is an alarming situation. We must accelerate our induction of fighters like Tejas and at least a 115 more in the Rafale class. Pending this, 155mm gun induction must be rapidly accelerated to make up for short falls in fire power. We may have to increase reliance on tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to much higher levels.

Drones. Drones have become the new war winning factor. Given their low cost the damage they can inflict on enemy tanks and equipment is formidable. They will have to be fielded in massive numbers.

Retrofitting Russian Tanks. Russian T-72 tanks make up 60% of India’s tank fleet. The war has shown ergonomic design flaws, wherein ammunition is stored in the turret which tends to blow up. We will have to retrofit these tanks with overhang compartments for ammunition stowage behind the turret.

Objectivity and ORSA. It is vital that this seminal conflict in Ukraine be studied dispassionately and objectively. There has been an unprecedented barrage of disinformation and propaganda. A military analyst must sift fact from fiction and discern the truth from post-truth. Only an objective (preferably ORSA-based) analysis will help in separating fact from fiction and draw up accurate lessons learnt. Over 3500 Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) to include Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskandars and Cruise missiles (like Yakhont, Klub and Kalibir) were fired. We need to analyse their accuracy and impact on various types of targets.

Nuclear Backdrop. Another impact of overwhelming import is the nuclear backdrop. We find this aspect being recklessly ignored in the hope of snatching some limited advantage on the conventional battlefield. The nuclear threshold has proved to be rather elastic and flexible in the Ukraine War. Despite repeated Russian threats and nuclear sabre rattling, not a single nuke has been used so far. In fact no nuke has even been moved into firing position. What does that tell us about an India-Pakistan or an India-China war? Are nuclear weapons becoming an unusable resource? Or are we heading for an accidental or deliberate nuclear escalation that could prove to be catastrophic?

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In a historic move for the bloc, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced, on 28 February, that the EU would finance the purchase and delivery of arms to Ukraine totalling €450 million.

Some countries in the bloc would also be sending fighter jets, the EU’s foreign chief Josep Borrell announced.

In another major shift, Germany has broken its long-standing foreign policy of banning all exports of lethal weapons to conflict zones.

Listed alphabetically, here is what donor countries have announced.

* Belgium – 2,000 machine guns, 3,800 tons of fuel, 3,000 additional automatic rifles and 200 anti-tank weapons.

* Canada – helmets, bulletproof vests, anti-tank weapons, ammunition.

* Croatia – €16 million worth of protective gear and light arms

* Czech Republic – 30,000 pistols, 7,000 assault rifles, 3,000 machine guns, sniper rifles, ammunition.

* Czech Republic – military equipment.

* Denmark – 2,700 anti-tank weapons, volunteer brigade.

* EU – will finance the purchase of arms for €450 mn

* Finland – 2,500 assault rifles, 150,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,500 rocket launchers, 70,000 field rations.

* France – defence equipment and fuel support.

* Germany – 1,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, nine Howitzers, 14 armoured vehicles and 10,000 tonnes of fuel to Ukraine.

* Italy – military equipment.

* Netherlands – weapons and protective equipment, 200 Stingers

* Norway – helmets, bulletproof vests, 2,000 M72 anti-tank weapons.

* Portugal – bulletproof vests, helmets, night vision goggles, grenades and ammunition.

* Portugal – military equipment.

* Romania – fuel, body armour, helmets, ammunition, military equipment, medical treatment.

* Slovenia  – rifles, ammunition and helmets.

* Sweden – anti-tank weapons

* USA – €350 million military aid package (adds up to €1 billion over last one year).

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“The less there is to justify a traditional custom, the harder it is to get rid of it”
― Mark Twain,The Adventures of Tom Sawyer

The military tank was born to counter the stagnation of trench warfare during the Great Wars. Defences based on trenches, protected by anti-personnel measures like wire obstacles, minefields, booby-traps, et al, brought warfare to a grinding halt. Soldiers died more of disease and boredom than from gunshots. Emergence of the tank infused fresh impetus to the battlefield, rendering trenches and anti-personnel obstacle systems as redundant as a man’s nipples. The consequent return of “manoeuvre” to the battlefield resulted in new tactics, doctrines and weapon-systems from the 1920s to 1980s.

Defence research & development (R&D) buzzed with development of the tank, from a vehicle that neutralised trench-warfare to an instrument of “manoeuvre force”. This gave birth to supporting elements like armoured personnel carriers (APC), self-propelled (SP) guns, armoured engineering vehicles, mobile command posts, etc. The tank, starting as a supporting tool for infantry in 1917, became a primary arm for battle by the 1940s, needing support from other arms, including the evolving air dimension. The tank reached its pinnacle of glory in the plains of Europe and the deserts of North Africa during World War II under the baton of battle-conductors like Rommel and Guderian.

The tanks immediately caused evolution of anti-tank measures – anti-tank tactics, anti-tank obstacles, anti-tank weapons and even anti-tank tanks. Anti-personnel minefields added anti-tank minefields; trenches graduated to ditch-cum-bunds (DCB), anti-tank weaponry extended from hand-held rocket-launchers to jeep-mounted recoilless (RCL) guns, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), anti-tank artillery and anti-tank bombs from aircraft. Tank technology responded by countered with improved armour, mobility and firepower. Reactive and Cobham armour provided added protection against shaped-charges and kinetic-energy projectiles. Alas, every improvement in armour design increased the tonnage of the tank, necessitating bigger engines, further adding to the weight. The tank gradually lost its race to anti-tank measures. Tank designs shifted focus on passive self-defence. Their aura of offence and shock-effect all but evaporated. Now a tank is more a damsel-in-distress than a knight in shining-armour rescuing one.

A tank is not a cosy place to be in. Cramped spaces, extreme temperatures, dust, noise and a jolting ride are a tankman’s lot. It is not just a weapon system; it also serves as home to the crew during battle. When anti-tank tactics demanded low-silhouette designs, tank’s interiors became even more cramped.

The 1970s doctrine “better to maim than kill” reduced the rifle calibre from 7.63mm to 5.56mm, burdening the enemy with evacuation, treatment and life-long sustenance of the soldier rather than a hasty battlefield burial. Similarly, disablement of a tank appeared far more beneficial than its destruction. A hit that damaged its innards, rattled the crew and killed even one of its vital systems – traction, gunnery, navigation, communication – was a bigger liability than its total destruction.

The tank, sadly, was born under unfavourable stars. Unbeknown to Capt Levavasseur, who in 1903 in Paris, conceptualized lecanon autopropulseur, the primogenitor of today’s tank; some 6,000 km away in Kitty Hawk, USA, Wright Brothers were innocently devising the future arch nemesis of the seminal tank – the aircraft. The uses of the airplane against the tank – starting with conventional bombs, progressing to anti-tank bomblets and then on to multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) to target a squadron of tanks with just one missile – became grossly unfair to the tank. Later, anti-tank helicopters, were able to engage tanks in close-quarter-battles, unlike the fighters. Tank’s countermeasures to all this were as ineffective as all the perfumes of Arabia were on Lady Macbeth’s hands.

Tank is not only the biggest target on the battlefield, it is also tardy and rather blind, with limited riposte capability. Pinpoint satellite surveillance, coupled with smart, extremely accurate, weapon-delivery systems, made tanks’ survivability even more questionable. While satellite-surveillance eliminated tank-hides, disrobing them of all camouflage, smart missiles took pot-shots at them even in moonless nights. The tank was as helpless and exposed as that skinny-dipping girl who finds her clothes stolen at a public beach. A US study in the 1980s concluded in a 14:1 kill-ratio between an anti-tank helicopter and a tank, ie, 14 tanks would die before the helicopter was shot down. Even this shooting of the helicopter was NOT by tanks but by supporting weapon-systems. Another NATO study determined a tank’s life as four hours on an active battlefield, making the 24-hour lifecycle of the Ephemeral Mayfly seem like eternity. Much anti-tank water has flown in R&D labs since those studies, making a tank’s longevity comparable to that of a Chinese toy.

Now, drones and swarms, are waiting to be tested against battle-tanks. Too small to be visible or counter-attacked, drones can sight and illuminate tanks for effective engagement by a plethora of anti-tank weapons. Swarms, still in nascent stage of development, shall prove lethal against all targets, tanks being the easiest. If all roads led to Rome, all weapons seem directed at the tank! In short, the 100-year old concept of battle-tank to overcome anti-personnel obstacles and trench warfare has achieved only that. It has long outlived its use-by-date. Persisting with it is like retaining swords for the infantry.

Future wars shall not see manoeuvre battles a la North Africa Campaign of WW2, when armoured formations raced up and down the Sahara in manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre moves, avoiding conflict and achieving little by way of military victory. The real heroes were the logistics services that fed, fuelled and re-armed these forces. Future wars shall be swift, surgical and hugely destructive. The military aims of the wars shall be met within days. Maybe, even before armoured formations can reach their unloading ramps, missing all action, like the late spectator in a boxing bout that ends in a 15-second knock-out. The future battlefield shall also not be astride the border, entailing classic bridgehead-battles. It shall encompass the entire country, courtesy of the long reach, accuracy and potency of modern weapons, coupled with thread-needling surveillance even in darkness. Global diplomacy would avert full-scale wars in the future, for fear of mass destruction. If there is no war, tanks are not required even more; if there is a war, they may not reach the battlefield or be decimated easily thereon. In summary, tanks are useful today only if prefixed with the word Think!

Armoured formations are not designed to hold ground, the basic prerequisite of a military victory. Infantry is still required to plant that victorious flag – a task no other arm can claim to do. Thus, armoured corps has as much been a supporting arm for the infantry as have been classical supporting arms. Infantry’s “Queen of the Battle” claim is often topped by tankmen, claiming to be “King of the Battle”. They forget the allusion here is to Chess, where a Queen is by far the most powerful piece and the King, a weak, slow-moving liability, needing protection even from pawns. The likeness between tank and King is rather ironic. Little wonder, tanks have not played a crucial role in armed conflicts anywhere in the world since 1971. Many armies of the world are actively considering disbandment of the tank while retaining tank-derivatives like APCs, SP guns, armoured engineering vehicles, bridge-laying tanks, armoured command-posts etc. India could pioneer the trend.

Tanks in India’s Context

Terrain. India has a nearly 15,000 km land-border with seven countries. India’s 6,200km borders with Afghanistan, China, Nepal and Bhutan are mountainous; the borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar are either jungle (1,600km) or riverine (4,100km); all largely unsuited for tank deployment. Only about 50% of the 3,300 km border with Pakistan is suitable for armour warfare. This is about 10% of India’s land border. Ironically, the tank worthy portion of the Indo-Pak border is also the least disputed border territory of India. None of the sensitive and disputed border areas of India lend themselves to mechanised warfare. India has 65 armoured regiments for a 1,650 km tankable border but one aircraft-carrier for its 7,500 km coastline and over 12,000 km of maritime responsibility.

Nature of Operations. The Indian Army has seen four types of operations, viz, wars, low-intensity conflicts (LIC), counter-insurgency operations (CI Ops) and aid-to-civil-authority (ACA). Excepting the wars of 1965 and 1971, armoured formations have played a supporting or an inconsequential role, since 1947. This is not to stigmatise these units; they are just not designed for roles other for than full-blown wars. Their training and equipment are not conducive to ground-holding, patrolling or other tasks in CI Ops, LIC or ACA operations. The bridgehead battle, the raison d’être for tanks, requires all the other-arms jointly paving the way for an armour breakthrough across an anti-tank obstacle system. Armoured formations then attack from the rear, widening the breach and enable infantry formations to capture enemy territory. This task of crossing an obstacle system and attacking from the rear (turning enemy’s defences) can be done faster and with fewer casualties, by troop-carrying helicopter gun-ships with support from attack-helicopters, artillery and air force. Tanks are, obviously, the most unsuitable weapons to use against an obstacle system, designed to stop tanks.

Peacetime Deployment and Mobilisation

In peacetime, armoured formations must be stationed far away from border areas for obvious reasons. When required, these formations need to be mobilised to their operational areas by rail. Other modes of transportation over long distances are neither viable nor available. Compared to infantry formations, move of armoured formations is hugely demanding in railway resources, time consuming in loading and off-loading and extremely vulnerable from air and ground. A tank is never more useless than when loaded for transport. A sitting duck is far safer than a tank in transit, like that cake with “Eat Me” invitation for Alice in Wonderland. Also, mobilisation of formations cannot be hidden in today’s satellite-surveillance scenario. What is worse, the tanks cannot be offloaded just anywhere. They require special ramps at designated rail-heads, away from the operational area and under constant enemy surveillance. An armoured division would require more than a week to be operationally effective after rail resources are provided to it.

Maintenance and Logistics. A tank costs between ₹40 to 60 crores, weighs 40 to 70 tons, consumes 30 to 40 litres of diesel per km and damages paved roads and agricultural fields on the move. It is a complex machine with myriad systems – engines, transmission, traction, cooling, hydraulics, gunnery, communications, navigation, et al. It requires periodic maintenance and special tools. Like an aircraft, a tank becomes unfit-for-war if any of its systems is unserviceable. Onsite maintenance requires special repair-teams with matching mobility and protection. Tank casualties cannot be left in the field for the sake of regimental honour and require special arrangements for evacuation. The spares are costly and unique to the model of the tank. Tank ammunition, because of less demand, proves costlier, per capita, than artillery ammunition.

Training. All defence services train regularly to be ready for battle at the drop of a hat or rise of a balloon. Tank crews are unable to do realistic training with tanks owing to limited training mileage. Tanks need to be transported to the ranges for firing and manoeuvre training. This involves the entire rigmarole of expensive mobilisation discussed above. Training on mock-ups and simulators does not provide the kind of experience and confidence actual manoeuvre of tank-formations in dusty, noisy and obstacle-ridden environment does. No regiment commander, since 1971, has seen his 40-odd tanks operating together in a battlefield situation or its simulation. How can a regiment operate in war without ever training in peace; unless firing at the ranges and manoeuvering at troop-level is considered adequate?

A tank is an expensive equipment, not just to procure – to maintain, transport and operate as well. The A vehicles alone of an armoured division consume about 16,000 litres of diesel for every kilometre of travel. The case rests itself. Still, in matters of national defence the swaying argument is not whether we can afford but whether we can afford NOT to. Time was when India’s army had to afford tanks. From hindsight, that time lapsed 50 years ago. To continue with tanks now means forfeiting Economy of Effort as a Principle of War. Persisting with tanks because of past achievements is like including Gavaskar for India’s next West Indies’ tour. The invaluable sword had similarly to be banished when gunpowder was discovered. Change is inevitable, especially if it is tactically and economically compelling. Our romance with tanks is understandable. It is a lot like attachment to stuff in the attic; that we never use but cannot throw away. Once thrown, the cleanliness and space availability are abundantly refreshing.

Recommendations

Time has come to prune the tank from Army’s inventory. Armoured divisions must be shed immediately. Armoured regiments integral to infantry divisions, for deserts and plains, may be retained. Armoured regiments in other divisions must be shed. Independent armoured brigades may be retained as an army reserve. Supporting equipment, viz, SP artillery, mechanised engineer vehicles, command posts, communication vehicles, etc, can be useful assets for the existing combat commands. Manpower and equipment from disbanded armoured formations can fill vacancies in infantry and mountain divisions. Steel for and from tanks can be more usefully utilized on warships and artillery, both sorely deficient in our inventory.

In this context, India’s recent decision to convert 61 Cavalry from a horse cavalry to a tank regiment is as unthought-out as teenage pregnancy and as retrograde as going from AK-56s back to swords. If anything, horses are more useful than tanks, both in war and in peace. Anybody heard of tank-polo ?

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