While there is regular interaction between members of the political executive in most countries and the military branches, the timing of Xi’s interaction with a cross-section of forces responsible for China’s internal and external security has been taken note of by military strategists. 2020 saw China’s worst conflict in decades with India that led to casualties on both sides. India and China remain engaged in a protracted confrontation in the icy Himalayas, with the theatre of conflict expanding to Arunachal Pradesh, where Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Tawang sector in December 2022. Xi has launched large-scale exercises and regular patrols in areas claimed by China like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. China’s air force has been flying near Taiwan with increasing regularity and its war games close to Taiwan’s shores went to unprecedented levels last year after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island.

China’s air force has been flying near Taiwan with increasing regularity and its war games close to Taiwan’s shores went to unprecedented levels last year after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island.

In addition to external factors, one needs to carefully peruse domestic discourse in China. 2022 was an important year in China’s political calendar as Xi was expected to wrest an unprecedented third term in October 2022, bringing a renewed focus on the preparedness of the defence forces.

Overhauling the military

Significantly, Xi in his capacity as the Chief of the Central Military Commission (CMC) – an important institution of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that is responsible for managing the armed forces – inspected its joint operations command centre in November 2022. His address warned that on account of the rapidly transforming situation the nation faced grave risks and that the forces must focus their energy on fighting wars, and expediting training to enable the People’s Liberation Army to win wars. Earlier addressing the National Defence and Military Reform Seminar in September 2022, Xi asserted that the reform of national defence during his tenure had been a historic achievement since it had addressed “structural obstacles and institutional issues. In different phases, Xi has restructured troop units and command theatres. China has built capacities to soldier on new fronts like space and cyberspace with the formation of the Strategic Support Force. The PLA Rocket Force was upgraded to a full military service branch and, is in charge of China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces.

China has built capacities to soldier on new fronts like space and cyberspace with the formation of the Strategic Support Force.

Moreover, there has been a painstaking effort in China’s internal propaganda to burnish Xi’s role in the transformation of the PLA as a modern force, and billed as his signature initiative. CMC vice-chairperson General Zhang Youxia argued in an article in the People’s Daily that the defence forces had been exposed to risks before Xi took over in 2012 and that he carried out the task of rebuilding the army and purging it of corrupt generals. Implicit in this assertion is that Xi’s predecessors allowed a drift in the armed forces, imperilling national security. It may be recalled that there was a purge of CMC chairpersons Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, and other senior military figures shortly after Xi took over on grounds that they had been responsible for taking bribes in lieu of doling out promotions in the armed forces. The downfall of senior figures in the military establishment revealed the extent of the unholy practice of buying ranks in the services, which has put a question mark on the combat readiness of one of the world’s largest armies. At a time when Xi has branded the modernisation of the PLA as a pet project, he has to constantly harp on its preparedness.

Ukrain-Taiwan analogy

Since the Ukraine crisis, China has assiduously promoted a view that the situation is due to America’s obsession with forming alliances that threaten stability. Juxtaposing the European situation in Asia, an article in the PLA Daily describes the Indo-Pacific strategy as responsible for creating blocs in Asia and therefore, endangering peace and stability. In fact to the contrary, China’s live-fire drills in the Taiwan straits in response to the Pelosi visit last year spilt over to Japan with missiles landing in the latter’s exclusive economic zone. This has led to a growing belief among the Japanese elite that Japan would not remain unscathed in the eventuality of China’s invasion of Taiwan. This belief has consequently led to Japan boosting its security cooperation with the US and increasing its defence budget. In the Xi era, China’s internal narrative has tried to weaponise historical grievances, particularly Japan’s wartime role in China. In 2014, it declared two national holidays: “War against Japanese Aggression Victory Day” and “Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day”, and publicly honoured the assassin of Japan’s Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito.

Juxtaposing the European situation in Asia, an article in the PLA Daily describes the Indo-Pacific strategy as responsible for creating blocs in Asia and therefore, endangering peace and stability.

To conclude, first, the bribes-for-promotions scandal will linger on in the psyche of China’s political elite despite the PLA’s overhaul, and continue to cast doubts on its efficacy. Besides, the armed forces still remain untested in battle, having last seen active combat in the late 1970s in the Sino-Vietnamese war. To bridge the gap, China has sought to engage veterans of foreign militaries to train its personnel as evidenced from an inquiry launched by the Australian government recently to uncover China’s overtures to their defence personnel. Second, China’s elite see Japan’s security posturing from a prism of history that has caused its strategists to argue that the latter is moving away from its avowed pacifism, which has led to Xi’s call to his army for greater combat readiness. Considering Xi’s belligerence, it is not something the world can ignore.

The post Xi’s repeated calls to the PLA to prep for war appeared first on IMR.

The Army has just concluded adventure sports activities with civilians along the LAC in areas that were previously closed off to civilians. These activities were held from end of August to November, covering areas from Arunachal Pradesh to Sikkim.

From mountaineering and white-water expeditions to treks of more than 700 km, both civilians and groups from the local regions participated in the three-month-long activities, Army sources said.

Essentially, this marks an evolution of India’s philosophy towards the border regions and its management, especially at the LAC. From earlier being “inaccessible” to civilians, they are now slowly being open to the outside world.

These steps come even as the government focuses on checking the acute problem of border migration along the LAC by providing better infrastructure than before.

“Due to security concerns, traditionally we would never open these areas to civilians and tourists. However, it is important that now we are giving access,” Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (retired), former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Army’s Northern Command.

The adventure activities also come after the government’s infrastructure push along the LAC in Arunachal and Sikkim, the decision to open up parts of Siachen glacier to tourists in 2019, and the Border Road Organisation’s plan to set up cafés for tourists at the frontiers in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Nagaland amongst other border states.

“Looking at it holistically, this seems part of a deft strategy to stake India’s claim to border areas in a non-combative way and show presence,” said a defence analyst who didn’t want to be identified.

Expeditions and adventure trips not only increase knowledge about these places within the country, but they also increase cross-cultural contact and give strong proof of these parts being an integral part of India, the analyst added.

Sources explained that the Chinese started building villages along the LAC to establish and showcase the control over their side of the border or in territories held by them for years.

First of the initial tactics of the Chinese used to be to leave behind packets of chips, juices and even cigarettes in the Indian claimed areas of the LAC to establish their presence, they said. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also used to paint rocks with their flag to showcase their presence.

Over time, the Indian Army started employing the same tactics and taking pictures and videos of their patrols which came handy during border meetings, the sources said.

Expeditions not new 

“While making the border areas accessible to tourists and civilians isn’t necessarily a new policy, it is now taking place on a larger scale due to better infrastructure,” Lt. Gen Shokin Chauhan (retired), former GoC 8 Mountain Division Ladakh and D-G Assam Rifles.

It will be correct to say that there is an additional focus on these activities, Hooda added.

The Army started treks for civilians in Siachen in the early 2000s besides some areas along the LAC. The idea was simple — to stake claim over the far-flung areas of the borders by having a presence. Especially given that they remain uninhabited for most of the year, Chauhan explained. “This is Indian land, and we must own it. No question of the Chinese taking it.”

These measures also come at a time when China has been building villages on the eastern side of the LAC across Arunachal Pradesh to lay claim to the territory.

“China’s building villages near LAC shows that it is essential to have the presence of your own citizens in these border areas to stake a claim,” said Lt. Gen. Hooda.

So, India carrying out mountaineering expeditions, enhancing tourist accessibility, and maintaining grazing grounds, all help to bolster its claim through civilian presence at the LAC, he explained.

Adventure tourism & employment opportunity 

Apart from the strategic purposes, the adventure activities organised by the Army are also significant for local economies, employment, and the adventure tourism sector.

“The campaign has generated a buzz in the adventure tourism circuit and has improved awareness about the potential of adventure tourism in the North-East,” an Army source said, adding that it also reflected positive “civil-military” relations during the three months at the LAC in the region.

Focus on adventure tourism can also boost employment opportunities and the economy in these regions, providing a sustainable model of development for the communities in the border regions.

Active participation and cooperation between states and the Army and the inclusivity shown in this initiative, wherein both men and women, local talent as well as enthusiasts from varied places took part, is a sign of the changing times and a bright future for the North-East, the sources added.

The post Army facilitating civilian adventure activities near LAC appeared first on IMR.

The overall situation in the area is under control but the actions of the Chinese drones had to be prevented to avoid any claims they make in future.

If the drones are flying parallel to the LAC, India, as per the agreements between the two sides, does not have any issues with them, but if they are picked up by radars flying towards Indian territory, it is necessary that actions are taken to prevent any violation.

The Indian Air Force has a strong presence in the northeast with squadrons of Su-30 fighter jets deployed at multiple locations, including in Tezpur and Chhabra in Assam. The Rafale combat jets have also been deployed very close to Hashimara in West Bengal.

The Indian Air Force has also strengthened its air defence coverage in the area with the operationalisation of the S-400 air defence system in the Assam sector. The system can take care of any aerial threat over the entire area.

The Chinese and Indian sides recently agreed on multiple measures to prevent any aerial escalations after the violation of air space by the Chinese in the Ladakh sector earlier this year.

After provocations by the Chinese in the area, India strongly took up the issue at military talks and it was decided that fighter aircraft of both sides would remain much behind the perceived Line of Actual Control in the area. The drones of the two sides, however, are allowed to fly in forward locations to keep watch over each other’s activities.

The post Air Force monitoring Chinese drones near northeast border appeared first on IMR.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The post Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? – Part 1 appeared first on IMR.

In his nearly three-hour “candid” talks with visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, external affairs minister S Jaishankar asserted that restoration of normalcy in ties will require restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Wang flew into Delhi from Kabul on 24 March evening in an unannounced trip in the first highest-level visit to India by a Chinese leader after the border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted nearly two years ago.

At a media briefing shortly after his talks with Wang, Jaishankar said: “If we are both committed to improving our ties then this commitment must find full expression in the ongoing disengagement talks.”

Describing the current situation as a “work in progress”, he also said that relations between India and China have been “disturbed” as a result of the Chinese actions in April 2020.

“So long there are very large deployments, border situation is not normal. We still have ongoing friction areas, have made progress in resolving some friction areas including Pangong Tso. Our discussion today was how to take this forward,” he said.

The border issue is understood to have figured prominently in the meeting between Wang and Doval too. Both sides agreed on the importance of early and complete disengagement in remaining areas to allow bilateral ties to take their natural course. They also stressed the need to continue positive interactions at diplomatic,military levels for restoration of peace, sources said.

Wang also met National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who pressed insisted on an early and complete disengagement of troops in Ladakh, a source with knowledge of the discussions said. “The continuation of the present situation is not in our mutual interest,” the source quoted Doval as telling Wang.

“Restoration of peace and tranquillity will help build mutual trust and create enabling environment for progress in relations,” Doval added.

New Delhi has made it abundantly clear that it cannot be “business as usual” with China until the border stand-off is resolved on mutually acceptable terms.

‘Allow Indian students to return’

Jaishankar also raised with his Chinese counterpart the issue of return of Indian students to China to resume their studies and hoped that Beijing will adopt a “non-discriminatory approach” on it.

“I took up strongly the predicament of Indian students studying in China who have not been allowed to return, citing Covid restrictions. We hope that China will take a non-discriminatory approach since it involves the future of so many young people,” Jaishankar said.

“Minister Wang Yi assured me that he would speak to the relevant authorities on his return on this matter. He also recognised the particular concerns that medical students have in this difficult situation,” he said.

A large number of Indian students had come back to India when China has closed down all universities following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. China had restricted travel by suspending visa and residence permits from March 27, 2020, in view of the pandemic.

‘There should be immediate ceasefire in Ukraine’

The two ministers agreed on the need for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue to defuse the war in Ukraine.

“Wang Yi presented the Chinese understanding, the Chinese view of the situation developed there and the developments pertaining to it, and I presented the Indian view,” Jaishankar said.

The external affairs minister said both sides discussed their respective approaches and perspectives and agreed that diplomacy and dialogue must be the priority.

“I think, the Indian view, many of you may have heard me speak about it yesterday in Parliament as well. And obviously, what he said was his view and what I said was my view, but where we had a common element was that both of us agreed on the importance of an immediate ceasefire as well as a return to diplomacy and dialogue,” he said.

The external affairs minister said in Parliament on 24 March that India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been “steadfast and consistent” and that it wants resolution of the conflict through talks.

India has not criticised Russia yet for its invasion of Ukraine and also abstained from voting at the UN platforms in condemning the Russian attack.

China has close ties with Russia and it has been giving signals about its willingness to assist Moscow in offsetting the impact of economic sanctions announced by the US and other Western countries following the Russian attack on Ukraine.

Wang’s Kashmir remarks at OIC meet discussed

The external affairs minister said that the remark made by Chinese foreign minister at the OIC meet, which had sparked a strong response from New Delhi, featured in their talks.

Jaishankar said he conveyed to Wang that India hopes that China would follow an independent policy in respect to New Delhi and will not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries.

“Did the issue of what Minister Wang Yi said at the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) Conference come up? Yes, it did. I referred to it. I explained to him, why we found that statement objectionable. It was a subject discussed at some length. There was a larger context as well,” Jaishankar told reporters.

“I conveyed that we hope that China would follow an independent policy in respect of India and not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries and other relationships,” said Jaishankar.

3,500 km long border, varied perceptions

The India-China border, stretching from Arunachal Pradesh in the east to Ladakh, is largely undemarcated. Both sides claim vast swathes of each other’s territory, primarily due to differences in perception about the exact location of the Line of Actual Control.

The border remained largely peaceful since the war of 1962, barring occasional skirmishes- until June 2020.

A violent clash erupted over a Chinese incursion into Indian territory and preventing Indian border patrols. 20 Indian soldiers were martyred when PLA troops attacked with hand-held weapons. Several reports said the Chinese side also suffered at least 35 casualties. However it has never been officially acknowledged by China.

Both sides deployed large number of troops and heavy weaponry in the region following the Galwan clash. The resulting stand-off has not been fully resolved, even after 15 rounds of military-level talks.

Growing trade, and the imbalance

Trade remains heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour. India’s trade deficit with China is the largest it has with any county, and the imbalance has been steadily widening.

The exports from India to China have increased from $10.17 billion in 2016-17 to $21.19 billion in 2020-21. The imports from China have increased from $61.28 billion to $65.21 billion during the same period.

More than 100 Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises and electronics manufacturers that have come to dominate the country’s mobile phone market, operate in India.

Since the Galwan clash of 2020, New Delhi has tightened the screws on Chinese players by increasing scrutiny of investments or imports and banning some mobile apps.

The post EAM Jaishankar recounts talks with visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang appeared first on IMR.

Several stretches of the lengthy frontier are disputed and relations have soured dramatically since 20 Indian soldiers died in a brawl in June 2020 on one section between Ladakh and Tibet.

Since then, both sides have reinforced the region with thousands of extra soldiers and military hardware as multiple rounds of talks have failed to de-escalate tensions.

This week, the Ministry of Civil Affairs said it had “standardised” the names of 15 places in Zangnan (“South Tibet”) – Beijing’s title for the region India calls Arunachal Pradesh – and gave them all formal Chinese names.

The renaming of residential areas, rivers and mountains followed a similar move in 2017 involving six other locations in the same area.

“Arunachal Pradesh has always been, and will always be an integral part of India,” India’s Foreign Ministry said on Thursday (Dec 30).

“Assigning invented names to places in Arunachal Pradesh does not alter this fact,” spokesman Arindam Bagchi said in a statement.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said, “Southern Tibet is in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, and has historically been Chinese territory,” adding the renaming came within “the scope of China’s sovereignty”.

Tibet has alternated over the centuries between independence and control by China, which says it “peacefully liberated” the rugged plateau in 1951.

It fiercely defends and militarises the Tibetan border and brushes aside any debate about Chinese historical ownership of the region.

India meanwhile sees China’s new Land Borders Law, approved in October and set to come into force on Jan 1, as a hardening of Beijing’s position.

The law calls China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity “sacred and inviolable” and enables Beijing to “take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines territorial sovereignty and land boundaries”.

India said in October that it expected that “China will avoid undertaking action under the pretext of this law which could unilaterally alter the situation in the India-China border areas”.

The post India says China ‘inventing’ names in disputed region appeared first on IMR.

Asked about the missing youths from Arunachal Pradesh at a press conference, Zhao Lijian, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson, said: “China’s position with regard to the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, i.e. South Tibet region, is consistent and clear. We have never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh, illegally established on the Chinese territory. Regarding the specifics (missing youth), I am not aware of it now.”

ALSO READ China now steps up activity near Arunachal

China had last raked up the issue in mid-February when Union Home Minister Amit Shah had visited Arunachal Pradesh on its statehood day. The Chinese MFA’s reaction then was stronger, accusing the minister of violating China’s territorial sovereignty and undermining the stability of the border area.

The MEA had then shot back with its standard reaction, reiterating that Arunachal was an “integral, inalienable part” of India and added that “objecting to a visit of any leader of India to Arunachal Pradesh does not stand to reason and understanding of India”.

This time, however, the Chinese objection, although milder than the previous reaction, comes when the LAC standoff in eastern Ladakh shows no signs of abating even after a recent meeting of the two Defence Ministers in Moscow and several rounds of military and diplomatic talks.

The five missing boys belong to the Tagin tribe. The All Tagin Students’ Union, while condemning China for ‘abducting the teenagers’, on Monday accused the authorities of not paying enough attention to the country’s strategically important area

Source

The post China Denies Abducting Arunachal Boys appeared first on IMR.