Recent Highlights

Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) is currently working on drone-delivered short-range missiles which will have a range of 1 km to 1.5 km, designed for targets such as vehicles or a gathering of an enemy force or hostile entity. In May 2022, MoD signed a contract with BDL for supply of ASTRA MK-I Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air to Air Missile (AAM) and associated equipment for the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy at a cost of INR 2,971 crore under Buy (Indian-IDDM) category. In February 2022, BDL and the Indian Army signed a contract worth INR 3,131.82 crore for the manufacture and supply of Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missiles. The contract will be executed in three years13. HAL has successfully integrated and tested AASM Hammer from Tejas. The air-to-surface munition (AASM) Hammer is a precision-guided munition developed by Safran Electronics and Defence. IAF had ordered the Hammer for HAL Tejas in 2021.

Indian Army has placed orders for six units of Swathi Mark II Weapon Locating Radar with BEL at an approx. cost of INR 400 crores. Mark II is high altitude optimized variant of the Swathi Weapon Locating Radar that has been cleared after going through a fresh round of trials in the mountain terrain. Swathi Mark II Weapon Locating Radar has been developed by LRDE that is mounted on a BEML-manufactured 6×6 truck, instead of the baseline Swathi that is mounted on an 8×8 heavy-duty truck for easier operations in the mountain terrain. Mark II also has some performance improvements over its predecessor which likely will translate into more orders in near future coming from the Army for the new variant.

Indian Army has inducted Igla-S systems recently bought from Russia under emergency procurement. The contract was signed in December 2020 and the equipment was delivered by December 2021. This includes 24 launchers, 216 missiles and testing equipment. Indian Army and IAF also began to induct advanced Spike anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with longer range and greater armour penetration capabilities. They were ordered under emergency procurements last year. The Israeli family of Spike ATGMs is equally lethal and versatile. The Army is inducting the Spike LR-2 launchers and missiles, which have a ground strike range of 5.5-km, while the IAF is integrating its Russian-origin Mi-17 V5 armed helicopters with Spike NLOS (non-line of sight) missiles that can destroy ground targets around 30-km away.

TASL and L&T have jointly delivered the 100th Akash Air Force Launcher (AAFL) for IAF. AAFL is a multi-technology Weapon Launch Platform for AD Missiles, jointly developed under the IGMDP Program of DRDO by TASL and L&T and produced collaboratively. It comprises a self-powered and fully automated Electro- Mechanical Launching System mounted on a trailer and towed by a prime-mover and is a fully ruggedized all-weather day and night system capable of operating in harsh environmental and terrain conditions.

Adani Defence is setting up South Asia’s largest integrated ammunition complex (spread over 250+ acres and an investment of around INR 1,500 crore) in the Uttar Pradesh Defence Corridor. The ammunition complex will have state-of-the-art technology across small and medium calibre ammunition, along with short-range air defence missiles.

Under Aatmanirbhar Bharat, the Indian industry is living up to the expectations of Make in India, Make for the world. The newly formed DPSUs are not just catering to the domestic needs but also exporting. For example, Advance Weapons and Equipment India Limited (AWEIL) got its first export order from a European firm for major sub-assemblies of artillery guns. The sub-assemblies are worth INR 6 crore, and the deliveries are expected to be completed this year HAL signed an MoU with Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation (PADC) in April that may lead to the export of India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).

The first launch of the Extended Range version of BrahMos missile from Su-30MKI aircraft was conducted in May 2022. With this, the IAF achieved the capability to carry out precision strikes from Su-30MKI aircraft against a land/ sea target over very long ranges.

Recently, DRDO and Indian Navy successfully conducted the maiden flight-test of the indigenously developed Naval Anti-Ship Missile launched from a Naval Helicopter. The start-up – Gurutvaa has delivered Dronaam CUAS to the IAF earlier in May under a contract signed in August 2021. Gurutvaa will be fulfilling the remaining part of the order in the next 4-5 months. The system underwent design review in October 2021 and the first prototype trials were conducted in December 2021. A second trial of a production standard system, which incorporated suggestions from the first trial, was conducted by IAF in February 2022. The Dronaam system is developed completely indigenously and has proved effective at disrupting the GNSS (global navigation satellite system) navigation and jamming radio frequencies of UAVs.

Key air defence and missile technologies/products developed under this cluster include ASAT, Naval anti-ship missile, Pranash surface-to surface missile, Prahaar missile, Man-Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile, Nag missile, Prithvi missile, Agni missile, Beyond visual range air-to-air missile, Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missile System (QRSAM), Akash missile.

BrahMos Aerospace, the joint venture (JV) between DRDO and NPO Mashniostroyenia (NPOM), Russia has developed and produced the fastest supersonic missile in the world. In January 2022, BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited (BAPL) signed a contract with the Department of National Defence of the Republic of Philippines for supply of Shore Based Anti- Ship Missile System to Philippines.

Rosoboronexport and High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL) have an agreement to work together for the development of Advanced Pyrotechnic Ignition Systems to meet futuristic requirements of high performance propulsion systems for rockets and missiles. This technology development will facilitate design and development of state-of-the-art solid rocket motors for upcoming products. These products will be based on compact and energy-efficient propulsion systems. Under the aeronautical systems cluster, DRDO developed Nirbhay, a long range sub-sonic Cruise Missile capable of deep penetration into adversary territory to strike high-value targets with precision. Currently, the missile is launched from a mobile articulated launcher. It is being adopted for launch from sea and air platforms.

Under the Development cum Production Partner (DCPP) program, DRDO has allowed the private sector to co-develop missile systems with it and then also produce them. Private sector firms have responded very enthusiastically for participation and bids have been received for the Vertically-launched Short-range Surface to Air Missile system (VL-SRSAM) project. The all-weather air defence missile system is being developed to provide point and area defence against various aerial targets like jets, fighter

aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The canister-based state of art weapon system would be able to identify, track, engage and destroy targets with a high kill probability. It has a strike range of about 40 km.

DRDO has developed an Advanced Chaff Technology to safeguard naval ships against missile attack. Defence Laboratory, Jodhpur has indigenously developed three variants of this critical technology — Short Range Chaff Rocket, Medium Range Chaff Rocket and Long Range Chaff Rocket — meeting Indian Navy’s qualitative requirements. Recently, the Navy conducted trials of all three variants in the Arabian Sea on Indian Naval Ship and found the performance satisfactory. The technology is being given to the industry for production in large quantities. DRDO has developed ‘Kautilya’, a spaceborne ELINT payload for satellite platform to intercept ground-based radars across the globe. The system provides high accuracy in direction finding and location fixing of radar transmissions. Two-dimensional Base Line Interferometric (BLI) array consisting of spiral and pyramidal horn antennas as radiating elements has been realized for Kautilya. The spiral BLI array working in the C-D band, has 7 elements mounted in orthogonal axes, one being common for vertical and horizontal BLI arrays for DF in two orthogonal directions, i.e., elevation and azimuth.

CASDIC, an R&D Centre set up under DRDO is carrying out feasibility studies for the integration of an EW suite on the Su-30 aircraft that is considered the first step toward the development of the Airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft. AEA platforms are capable of disrupting, deceiving, or denying a broad range of military electronic systems including radars and communications. Su-30 aircraft will retain all the multi-mission capabilities with its validated design and the capability to perform a wide range of enemy defence suppression missions. Su-30 Airborne Electronic Attack aircraft will be carrying tactical jamming pods, communication countermeasures set, EW receiver suite, satellite communications, and a high-performance SIGINT sensor system. DRDO has commenced work on the development of Nag Mk II ATGM to be integrated into MBTs in a twin launcher configuration with each launcher holding one missile. Nag Mk II is an improved lightweight ATGM with performance improvement and a minor range bump. It will also adopt some of the technologies from the Helina program (Helicopter borne ATGM) like the new jet vane control system (JVC) into it.

Ongoing Programmes and Opportunities

In June 2022, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for Capital Acquisition Proposals of the Armed Forces amounting to INR 76,390 crore under ‘Buy (Indian)’, ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’ and ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ categories. These include AoN for Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and Weapon Locating Radars (WLRs) for the Indian Army amongst others.

In March 2022, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for Capital Acquisition proposals of Armed Forces amounting to INR 8,357 crore. These include procurement of Air Defence Fire Control Radar (Light) and GSAT 7B Satellite. There is substantial opportunity for the Indian industry once strategic missiles are approved for series production. MSMEs could participate in the supply chain for these missiles. Recent missile tests indicate validation of different missile systems. Some of the successful missile tests since January 2022 till date include Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Agni-4, Short-range ballistic missile Prithvi-II, Vertical Launch Short Range Surface to Air Missile (VLSRSAM), ATGM HELINA, Akash-NG, Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM), Man Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile (MPATGM).

The proposal to buy two new regiments of the Akash Prime missile air defence missiles systems is at an advanced stage. The development is coming at a time when the Indian Army’s Western and South Western commands carried out around a dozen test firings of the existing version of the Akash missiles in the force. A major ongoing program of the Indian Army is the procurement of 220 Air Defence Guns. Further, in May 2022, MoD issued an RFI to procure approximately 250 Long Range Satellite navigation system Guided Missile (LRSGM).

Way Forward

Air defence plays a significant role in protecting the nation’s strategic assets, either static or mobile. India’s air defence requirements are huge. Efforts are underway to make up for critical deficiencies as discussed in the paper.

Going forward, along with need for strategic air defence systems and integrated air defence command, there is a requirement to meet the changing needs posed by the contemporary battlespace. Air defence battle management is a complex, system-of-systems integration with all radars, sensors, weapons, and personnel connected. Its advantages include saving manpower and efficient use of the whole fire chain – one person can operate and respond to the complete chain, support tools to optimize and increase combat effectiveness, technology-enabled warfare strategy and tactics. Netcentric Operations systems must be indigenous since no country will share their warfare tactics. India, as per its perceived enemy profile and the geo-political situation, needs to digitize its concept of operations accordingly.

Ongoing Air Defence Projects (Make 1)

AIP has been accorded for the following:

• Standoff Airborne Jammer
• Directed Energy Weapons (300 KW and more) [high powered electromagnetic devices and highpowered laser devices]
• Communication System (AFNET System Switches, routers, Encryptors and VOIP phones)
• Electro Optical (EO) Pod (with a subsequent upgrade to EO/IR) with highresolution sensing.

Ongoing Air Defence Projects (Make II)

Indian Army

• MEAT (Manoeuvrable Expendable Aerial Target)
• Asibal System (ATGM)
• Medium Range Precision Kill System
• Unit Level Target System – Air Defence
• Mobile Integrated Network Terminal (MINT)
• Integrated Air Defence Combat Simulator
• Mountain Fire Control Radar (Suo Moto)
• HF Software Define Radio (Suo Moto)
• V/UHF Software Define Radio (Suo Moto)
• Drone Kill System
• Laser Beam Riding MANPADS
• Integrated Drone Detection and Interdictions System
• Low Level Light Weight Radar
• Runway Independent Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
• Autonomous – Surveillance and Armed Drone Swarm (Desert)
• Autonomous – Surveillance and Armed Drone Swarm (HAA)

Indian Air Force

• Chaff & flares
• 80 MM Rocket

Indian Navy

• Supersonic Weapon Imitating Flying Target

Extracted from the EY-IMR Knowledge Paper 2022.

The post The Air & Missile Defence Scenario in India appeared first on IMR.

What have been the drivers which have propelled me to take up the project? Well, over the years, I always felt, that there is an abiding deficit of quality and researched reference material on the very many aspects of Ground Based Air Defence; though sporadic articles do appear in various professional journals by Subject Matter Experts. That was my first driver for putting before a discerning reader, a treasure- trove of information which a professional soldier in general and an air warrior on either side of the see-saw of attack and defence in particular, would like to fall back upon, in satiation of their multiple professional needs.

The other driver, of course, is the fulfilment of my own life’s dream, as I said. Starting from the humble beginnings of small snippets in small time magazines, slowly graduating to analytical and researched pieces in magazines of standing and repute-one wanted to take the next-pedestal of cumulating the humble efforts in the form of a book. The first break was provided by USI which published my first book on air defence issues. Duly emboldened by the success of this maiden endeavour; I ventured out to pen down a bigger and a more comprehensive work. This time around, the honour to provide a platform for my two-penny worth of effort was provided by Maj Gen RK Arora, Retd, CEO, IMR under the prestigious banner of IMR Media, to whom I express my most grateful thanks and indebtedness.

Getting to the book at hand, I have deliberately chosen the subject content applying the twin-tests of contemporary relevance, as well as, the prospect of further growth and development of the subject in the foreseeable future. I hope that my selection will match the expectations of the discerning reader cutting across the rank hierarchy and relating both to the ground soldier, as well as, a scholar air warrior.

The book opens with the celebration of the ‘Unmanned Revolution’; I call it a revolution because it is my sense that the `Unmanned Story’ riding on the twin wings of the UAVs and UCAVs is something whose time has come and whose place of prominence in the comity of aerial threat vehicles cannot be wished away. The book reviews the amazing evolutionary journey of these wonder machines starting way back from the end of Nineteenth Century working through the two Great Wars, the Cold War years, the Vietnam War, the Arab Israeli Conflict to the later years of Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo right up to the contemporary Global War on Terror in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It highlights the many combat virtues of UAVs/UCAVs in terms of zero crew fatalities, no training deficit, incredible endurance, wide mission spectrum, open architecture, flexible mission payloads and and more. While the book flags the huge versatility of UAVs and UCAVs, it is also tries to expose its soft underbelly by bringing out the vulnerability of these machines when faced with a resolute air defence warrior equipped with hard and soft kill options. As to the face of the future, the book highlights the emerging research areas riding on nano-technology, robotics and AI, the exciting world of VTOL/SVTOL UAVs, liberation from the Ground Control Station, towards full vehicle autonomy, next generation morphing, the orinthropters, the arrival of SWARMIES and the growth of stealth in UAVs. In the context of bringing down a UAV, the book highlights the multiple challenges in terms of detection, much akin to finding a needle in the haystack, and killing the UAV optimally through hard / soft kill options, lest we end up killing a fly with a sledge hammer.

Coming to the contemporary and the futuristic scene in the UAV / UCAV domain, the book describes the latest concept of MUMT or Manned and Unmanned Teaming, wherein, the experts are trying to extract disproportionate gains by combining superior human intelligence, intuition, grit, tolerance for ambiguity and instant decision making capability of the combat pilot in manned platforms with the brute precision, range, stealth, endurance, immunity and versatility of the unmanned machine. Interestingly, what precipitates out of such teaming are conceptual issues that not only reside in the operational domain, but also in the ethical one. In this, the book tries to pose questions that still beckon for answers; the most pertinent being, ‘Are we ready for Machine over Man?” Probably, not as yet.

The book thereafter presents a comprehensive review of the subject of ‘Ballistic Missile Defence; Capabilities Across Nations and Where Technology is Leading to’. Essentially, an endeavour has been made to capture the nuances of the amazing growth journey of BMD starting from the ‘Era of Vengeance’ where Adolf Hitler’s V2 Rockets came screaming down from the upper atmosphere causing untold devastation on a hapless population to the current date when SSMs are crossing new and newer frontiers in range, reach, lethality and precision. While the defenders are busy in developing counters constituting the complex of Sensors, Shooters and Battle Control Systems, trying to take on the Ballistic Missiles from Terminal to Re-entry to Midcourse and to the yet dream destination of Boost Phase Engagement. Taking a global look, the Chapter describes how the leading BMD makers of the world are trying to synergize the sensor-shooter capabilities across multiple domains spanning across land, sea, air and space – the ultimate high ground. The Chapter also deliberates how the kill options in the BMD domain are moving from the conventional hard kill to electronic kill using High Power Microwaves or Charge Particle Beams trying to debilitate and incapacitate the incoming threat by concentrating on it a few hundred million electron volts of KE in a few seconds, thus destroying the integrity of the material mass of the incoming missiles or the thermal kill using the lasing medium to deliver a shock pulse of coherent beams instantly leading to thermal collapse of the target missile. This Chapter ends by building a hypothetical situation of the possible scenario of transition of capability from ASAT to BMD. In that, it is argued that since the leading space faring nations of the world (most notably, China in our case) have already developed and demonstrated ASAT capability, thus its metamorphosis into a BMD capability on the same scale is not a flight of fancy; it is an ominous reality.

The book then looks at the evolving domain of stealth and counter stealth. Picking up the thread from the days of German Horton Ho 229, which marked the arrival of stealth in the closing years of Second World War, the Chapter chronicles the continuous growth of the stealth concept on both sides of the fence, namely the attacker and the defender. Wearing the realities of Dollars vs Cents in the game of Stealth vs Counter Stealth, it is shown how in the long run, the possession and continous revamping of counter stealth capability will be more economically sustainable and will have lesser ethical burden than doing the same with offensive stealth. Exposing both sides of the coin, while the contents on one hand describe the cutting-edge technologies propelling the growth of stealth, on the other hand, they highlight how the defender is smarting up with enabling capabilities in the counter stealth domain. So while on one side are the RAMs, smart-skin technologies, plasma-driven stealth, the planform alignment and more, on the other side there is an amazing growth in passive sensing capabilities, use of lasers (LIDARs), Schilieren’s Photography and so on. Mention has also been made of the tremendous growth in sensor technology to defeat the Very Low Observable threat using VHF, C/X band radars, OTH radars, MIMO radars, LIDARs and CELLDARs etc stand explained. The Chapter ends in recognition and acknowledgement of the eternal cause effect cycle on both sides of the stealth continuum.

The next Chapter describes the emerging kill options in the air defence weapons of the future. In order to put the felt need in perspective, it starts off by highlighting the very many deficits of the Hard Kill option in terms of range, reach, altitude, reaction time, finite arsenal, response time and so on and how most of these can be overcome using the multiple advantages of the soft kill. It brings out how the leap of technology is fast weaponising the laser option in a multitude of emerging weapons from the mobile tactical variety to advanced medium range capability using innovative ideas for generating adequate lasing energy. The Chapter further describes the promise which the HPM and CPB weapons hold, though, much of it still remains in the pipeline of realisation. Describing the sword and shield relationship, it is stated that so long as the severity and lethality of the air threat continues to grow by way of multiplicity of threat vehicles, precision strike capability and a slew of smart and intelligent munitions, the combat teeth of the defenders will grow alongside in the truism for every sword; a shield. As to the foreseeable future, the day is not far when HPM and CPB weapons will become hard realities. These weapons are not stand alone, other enabling technologies, which are likely to mature by around 2020 include multi-spectral sensing without giving away the position of the fire unit, high data flow with real time signal processing, sensor fusion, multi-sensor, multi-step, multi-mode guidance and control, special fuzes, warheads and more.

The next Chapter highlights yet other non-conventional kill options for the GBADWS. This is through the Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) enablement of GBADWS. This option is based on the growing dependency of aerial threat vehicles on the Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, both for their own avionics and operations, as also, for guiding the smart / precision munitions from the mother aircraft to their intended targets. This kill option aims to provide such an ECM muscle to the GBADWS which enables them to soft kill either the electronics / electromagnetics on board the mother aircraft or to cut/interfere/severe, even for a short while, the umbilical chord represented by the electronic / EM link between the mother aerial threat vehicle and the munitions being guided. It is believed that at speeds in magnitude of several machs and split-second response timings, the link once severed even for a wink can not be restored. Such kill options provide enhanced range effect as it is not limited by the range and reach of hard kill weapons, as also, an unlimited magazine as the ECM capability will be alive so long as the power remains pumped in. Befitting the concept described, the Chapter then highlights the existing weapon systems in the world that are based on this kill option. The Chinese 970 Radar Jamming System, the Israeli Multi-Platform Radar Jamming System, the Russians SPN series of equipment, the UK’s S373 ECM system and the US Mobile Ground to Air Radar jamming system find a mention.

In response to that school of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who have long written the obituaries of the lowly air defence guns and their ammunition, the next Chapter makes an emphatic statement to declare that the air defence guns, the original warhorse of air defence warriors are here to stay as the last sentinels of terminal defence, ready to face the determined attacker that manages to penetrate all the layers of a defender‘s line up. The world scan that follows in support of the above claim highlights a few truths. It firstly reveals that no country has ever discarded its guns, the war horses of 50s and 60s are still around, albeit with fantastic and all enabling qualitative upgrades. Most of these include a state-of-the-art Electro Optical Tracking System (EOTS) complete with its gyro-stablized day camera, high definition night camera with FLIR optics, eye-safe Laser Range Finder (LRF) and a digital Fire Control System (FCS).

It is also revealed that while calibres have gradually come down for 100mm to 85mm-76mm-57mm-40mm-35mm-30mm-23mm-20mm-14.5mm etc, there is no standard fit. While Sweden, Italy and Singapore celebrate their 40mm machines; Germany, Greece and Italy are busy perfecting their 30mm calibre; Russia, Poland, Belgium and Finland are going strong with their 23mm as much as US, France, Israel and Korea are spitting fire with their 20mm Gattlings and more. Besides the gun, ammunition is smarting up along multiple verticals to include warhead triggering at optimum point through embedding of near real-time intelligence at the muzzle end by way of rd-to-rd feeding of muzzle velocity and time of flight, then there is the course-correction strategy through impulse manoeuvre technologies and a whole lot of research is on in the designing of special effect ammunition. Some of these include air burst munition concepts, modular ammunition, other special effects to include higher penetration, higher incendiary, higher fragmentation and more. The various ammunition types include the DART ammunition, Telescoped Ammunition, and the ultimate 3P-Pre-Fragmented Programmable Proximity Fuzed ammunition. In sum, the days of air defence guns and gun ammunition are far from over.

The next Chapter deals with the key trends in the Integrated Air Defence Systems Concept. The central point being made in this Chapter is that of metamorphosis borne out of necessity. Some four to five decades into history there was a time when air threat was linear essentially riding on the twin shoulders of aircraft and helicopters in the visual domain while the number of assets to be protected were finite, thereby enabling themselves to be protected by terminal GBADWS in the point defence mode where fire units were VA/VP centric and were deployed in single and sometimes multiple rings around them.

All the above changed over time as the air threat re-vamped itself both qualitatively and quantitatively. The air threat vehicles grew in multiplicity, their range and reach envelope grew spatially and in range, reach, accuracy, precision and long range stand-off capability. Alongside this, the number of assets to be protected hit the roof, thereby making earlier forms of deployment impossible All this gave rise to the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) concept, where GBADWS were deployed not as VA / VP centric but grid centric, implying that multiple layers of GBADS provided area air defence cover to a large No of VAs / VPs which were fixed / transiting the defended areas. Also all the three verticals of the air defence resources, viz the sensors (radars, visual observers and other technical means), shooters (guns, SAMs, air superiority fighters and interceptors) and Battle Management Systems (BMC⁴I²SR) are amalgamated synergistically into one cohesive unit ready to address the air threat. This concept of IADS has matured over time as an integrated family of GBADWS consisting of sensors, shooters and battle management systems. Such a system is eminently suitable to take on the contemporary, as well as, the futuristic air threat and possesses both the hard kill, as well as, soft kill options which I mentioned earlier. Enabling technologies today empower the IADS with enhanced survivability sensors having a high degree of immunity against radiation and EO sensors. Lately, IADS are also acquiring an anti-stealth muscle. In sum, IADS is the way to go in the foreseeable future.

Picking up the threads from the IADS, the next Chapter describes one of its key constituents; i.e the Air Defence Battle Management and Control System in some detail. If there is one life line of the air defence battle, it is ADBMC² system. Why? Simply because, so much of the entire battle sequence depends upon it; the surveillance of the air space, identification of multiple air threat vehicles, recognizing them as to friend-or-foe, generating a Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) through Multi-Sensor Tracing (MST), threat prioritization, weapon assignment and the dynamic and minute-to-minute control of air defence battle – all depends on ADBMC² system. If this one foundational link is weak, the best of sensors and the best of shooters will simply operate sub-optimally and fall like nine-pins. The Chapter describes the multiple challenges of BMC² system; must prominent being the MST challenge, i.e, the uphill task of filtration and fusion of multiple sensor inputs to remove duplications and provide the RASP. Then, there are other issues of forging a seamless compatibility among disparate systems in the sensor-shooter domain, measuring up to the challenges of survival in a hostile EW environment coupled with relentless SEAD operations by the adversary. The other challenges of BMC² systems include threat processing in a time urgent scenario, positive identification of friend-or-foe to keep fratricide at bay and reducing the response time cycle have been explained. The Chapter ends with a presentation of a panoramic view of the scene of the BMC² and ADC&R systems the world over to bring out the emerging challenges and smart solutions to address them. The countries included are USA, Germany and UK.

The book changes track here from the mainframe sensor-shooter- BMC² stuff and exposes the ever evolving and ever exciting world of simulators and simulation. The chapter explains how simulators are great enablers and are hugely relevant for Army AD where operational equipment is scarce, live training/firing are extremely costly, training space in crew compartments is restricted and operational hours are at a premium. The Chapter explains the hierarchy of simulation from the basic individual trainers to higher order simulation with GIS enablement, 3D simulation to include Aircraft Recognition Simulators and Radar Coverage Predictions Simulators. The former transforms the entire concept of aircraft recognition training ‘to as real as it can get’ while the latter gives a qualitative boost to the entire sequence of sensor deployment. While multi mode EW Simulators have cut down the dependence of live air sp for EW trg, the Class Room Variants of sensors enable an entire class to get trained with live equipment at one go. And finally come the ‘Total Effect Simulators’ which bring alive the complete air defence battle end-to-end thanks to the exciting world of simulators which holds a million promises in the foreseeable future.

The book at this point makes a departure from the contemporary and the futuristic to present a period piece aimed at providing some ‘Takeaways’ to the Air Defence warriors from the Air and Air Defence Campaign in the Gulf War, 1991. Why this war alone? Well, simply because of the amazing facts and figures on both the warring sides. In that, the Coalition Air Force flew something like 1,14,00 sorties in less than two months, averaging about 2000 sorties per day, dropping a colossal 88,500 tons of explosive, executing a strategic airlift of more than 5,00,000 personnel and 54,000 tons of cargo. The Iraqi Air Defence warriors ensured that a formidable Air Defence Punch came to a naught through absurd planning and a criminally sub-optimal exploitation of the might of a slew of GBADWS. In fact it came to such a pass that the defenders actually ‘gave away the battle unfought’. This war brought out the power of ‘smart planning’ by the attackers, who first broke the back of the defenders by crippling the Electronic Order of Battle through selective precision attacks. Once the soul was gone, the passive body of GBADWS was destroyed through a furious campaign of SEAD and precision strike in a technologically enabled and comprehensive mission planning environment. Out of all this the most amazing fact is the ‘fleeing away’ of some 121 of the defenders aircraft to Iran instead of putting up a fight (sic).

It is in the monumental destruction of the defender due to colossal SEAD and sub-optimal exploitation of a formidable AD punch of the defender that lie some takeaways. The caution of not to play into the adversary’s SEAD game come out loud and clear, the ‘Fleeing Away of Iraqi Air Force is beyond comment’, the critical requirement to build the redundancies to overcome dependencies on open communication architectures, the effectiveness of man portable SAMs and the inevitability and last line effectiveness of the gun systems came out loud and clear.

Towards the end, the book carves a brief comparative evaluation of the Chinese WZ10 Attack Helicopter and the AH 64E of USA. A comparison of factual details combined with a comparative evaluation of performance parameters of the two machines reveals that the two are not really comparable one-on-one in the same mould. The Chinese machine enjoys higher manoeuvrability due to a smaller and a lighter profile as required for the topography of Chinese borders, the American helicopter possesses brute fire-power better suited for achieving a higher kill effect in the offensive role.

And finally before signing off, as if to thread the preceding Chapters in one seamless sequence the book presents a Status Summary in the eternal and abiding cause effect cycle between the prosecutors of air threat and the defenders. Catching one end of the thread, the Chapter gives words to the cutting edge developments in the continous revamping of the air threat. In that, it briefly describes the FGFA of front-line nations credited with such amazing features like all-aspect stealth, Low Probability of Interception Radar or LPIR, high performance and structurally lighter airframes with minimal RCS; thanks to nano-materials, high advanced avionics with a capability to network dissimilar platforms in a net-centric domain, array of on-board sensors to provide high degree of immunity, hence, survivability in a hostile EW environment and armed to the teeth with smart / intelligent / precision arsenal capable of BVR delivery from long stand-off ranges.

Inspired by fascination and fear, electrifying moves and devastating capabilities it describes the front-line attack helicopters and gives a flavour of UAVs and UCAVs, the wonder threat vehicles whose time has come. The MUMT and the ethical debate of machine over arms, the SWARMs, the slew of SSMs, ARMs, Cruise Missile and more …. So much for the prosecutors of air threat.

For the defenders, it talks about the exponential growth of GBADWS over time, the evolving and fast maturing concept of layered-and-tiered air defence, the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) complete with its trio of sensors, shooters and BMC² systems, fast re-vamping along separate verticals. The fast evolving art of invisibility and the enabling techniques of finding the needle in the haystack as appropriate similies for stealth and counter-stealth. A word on the last line defence of terminal AD weapons and their evolving ammunition types. The complete hierarchy of SAMs covering the entire range-reach continuum get a mention as the Chapter talks about the missile centric defence of VSHORADS-SRSAMs-QRSAMs and MRSAMs. A discussion on the emerging story of BMD and the quest to reach the ultimate aim of boost phase intercept follow. Then comes the mention of a whole new arsenal of soft kill weapons and what is latest in the field. The curtains finally come down with a brief mention of the ADBMC² system and the challenges involved therein.

In the last words the author makes a confession thus “So much is happening (in the field of air attack-defence continuum), so fast is the technology providing options on both sides of the fence that it is a full time job for SMEs to keep track on the latest at the cutting edge; the eternal duel continues.

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The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme consists of a multi-layered system to protect India from ballistic missile attacks. Phase 1 has been successfully tested and completed and deployment awaits final official permission. Phase 2 is under development.

The system consists of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept any incoming missile launched from 5,000 kilometres away. The system also includes an overlapping network of early warning and tracking radars, as well as command and control posts.

The PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by the AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia, and Israel. The system has undergone several tests but system is yet to be officially commissioned.

Out of about a dozen interceptor missile tests, about ten of them were successful, where they destroyed an incoming missile, mimicking the path emanating from an enemy country. These interceptions took place in a direct, hit-to-kill mode, pulverising the enemy missile in mid-flight in exo-atmosphere (above an altitude of 40 km) and in endo-atmosphere (below an altitude of 30 km). In January 2020, the first phase of BMD programme was completed. After the government’s approval to install the missile shield for the national capital it will take three to four years to install shield.

System Configuration

The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres (LCC) and the Mission Control Centre (MCC). All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network.

The MCC is the software intensive system of the ballistic missile defence system. It receives information from various sources such as radars and satellites which is then processed by ten computers which run simultaneously. The MCC is connected to all other elements of the defence through a WAN. MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It also acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability. After performing all these functions, the MCC assigns the target to the LCC of a launch battery. The LCC starts computing the time to launch the interceptor based upon information received from a radar based on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time and carries out ground guidance computation.

After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a datalink. When the interceptors close onto the target missile, it activates the radar seeker to search for the target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability.

Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) Exercise

On 27 November 2006 a PAD missile successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II Missile at an altitude of 50 km. The Prithvi-II ballistic missile was modified successfully to mimic the trajectory of M-11 missiles.

On March 6, 2009 DRDO carried out a second successful test of the PAD interceptor missile. The target used was ship launched Dhanush missile which followed the trajectory of a missile with range of a 1,500 km. The target was tracked by Swordfish (LRTR) radar and destroyed by the PAD at 75 km (47 mi) altitude.

On March 6, 2011 DRDO successfully test-fired interceptor missile from AAD, which destroyed a ‘hostile’ target ballistic missile, a modified Prithvi, at an altitude of 16 km over the Bay of Bengal.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single stage, solid fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD: it has an inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in the terminal phase. It is 7.5 m tall, weighs around 1.2 tons; and has a diameter of less than 0.5 m.

On 6 December 2007, AAD successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II missile acting as an incoming ballistic missile enemy target. The endo-atmospheric interception was carried out at an altitude of 15 km. The AAD with the help of midcourse updates and its terminal seeker manoeuvred itself towards the target. The AAD scored a direct hit at an altitude of 15 km and at a speed of Mach 4.

Due to two successful interceptor missile tests carried out by India, the scientists said that the AAD missile could be modified into a new extended range up to 150 km.

On 15 March 2010, AAD interceptor missile test was aborted, as the target missile deviated from its path and plunged into the sea. But on 26 July 2010, AAD was successfully test-fired. Again, on 6 March 2011, the interceptor AAD missile achieved the desired result with precision. The interceptor missile had its own mobile launcher, secure data link for interception, independent tracking and homing capabilities and sophisticated radars.

On 10 February 2012 and on 23 November 20212, the AAD was again successfully test-fired

Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar

Swordfish is the target acquisition and fire control radar for the BMD system. The Swordfish Radar, derived from the Israel GreenPine Radar, is a L band Radar.  L band Radar is not a imaging radar.  It is unable to discriminate decoys.

The Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) has a range of 600 to 800 km and can spot objects as small as a cricket ball. The DRDO has upgraded the capacity of Swordfish to 1,500 km. The variant is called Super S Cruise missile defence.

Defence Against Cruise Missiles

Defending against an attack by a cruise missile is similar to tackling low-flying manned aircraft and hence most methods of aircraft defence can be used for a cruise missile defence system. The AAD will be able to handle a cruise missile intercept.

In order to ward off the threats of nuke-tipped cruise missile attack India has a new missile defence programme which will be focused solely on intercepting cruise missiles.

India has also acquired airborne radars like EL/W-2090 AWACS to ensure detection of cruise missiles in order to stay on top of the threat.

The naval version of the Barak-8 long-range anti-air and anti-missile naval defence system developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and DRDO has the capability to intercept incoming enemy cruise missiles and combat jets targeting its warships at sea.

The Indian Air Force and Indian Army have inducted a variant of Barak 8 missile to meet its requirement for a medium-range surface-to-air air defence missile. The Akash missile defence system also has the capability to “neutralise aerial targets like fighter jets, cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles”.

XRSAM (eXtra-long Range Surface to Air Missile) is a long-range mobile surface to air missile defence system under development by DRDO. The missile system will have a range of 250 km against fighter jets, 350 km against cruise missiles, sea skimming anti-ship missiles, AWACS and mid-air refuelers and will be capable of bringing down ballistic missiles and stealth fighters in the terminal stage. The naval version of the missile will also developed to supplement the LR-SAM missile in the Indian Navy.

Chinese Missile Defence

China’s has an advanced anti-satellite programme since 1964. Since its inception, the ASAT program has made progress on the development of three ASAT capable Systems: direct fire, directed-energy weapon, and microsatellites. Tests of these systems have either been directly acknowledged by China, or reported on as ASAT capable. China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counterspace capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers, and directed energy weapons.

The US Defense Intelligence Agency has claimed that China has space weapons capable of shooting out satellites during the early stage of a conflict, including anti-satellite missiles, manoeuvring satellites and lasers and electronic jammers.

People’s Liberation Army has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles.

Anti-Missile Test

Under a test christened “Mission Shakti”, DRDO’s audacious anti-satellite missile test on 27 March 2019, caught the world’s attention. A three-stage missile launched from the APJ Abdul Kalam Island raced towards a satellite called Microsat-R, which was in low-earth orbit a and destroyed it in a direct “hit-to-kill” mode. Microsat-R was orbiting at a velocity of ten km a second at an altitude of 274 km above the earth when the missile intercepted it and blew it to pieces.

The DRDO had developed this satellite which had defence ramifications and ISRO put it into orbit with its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in January 2019.

An official press release said the anti-satellite test demonstrated India’s “capability to defend its assets in outer space”.

In a televised address to the nation soon after the test was executed, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “Mission Shakti was a highly complex one, conducted at extremely high speed, with remarkable precision. It shows the remarkable dexterity of India’s outstanding scientists and the success of our space programme.” Modi said Mission Shakti was especial for two reasons: India was the fourth country (after the US, Russia, and China) to acquire such a specialised capability and the entire effort was indigenous.

On 28 April 2019, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, Chairman, DRDO said during an event of the Aerospace Society of India (AeSI), at Hyderabad, “The ASAT test demonstrated India’s technological capabilities to carry out such a critical mission with a very high degree of precision.” He said that the critical systems including software and sensors for the ASAT test were developed indigenously, and a team of scientists from various specialisations had worked with synergy day and night for six months. The most important challenge during the mission was to ensure that all the systems responded cohesively to ever-changing dynamics, Dr Satheesh Reddy added.

Dr U. Rajababu, Programme Director, AD (Air Defence), said at the meet “the high altitude and high-velocity interception” posed many technical challenges with respect to the development of seekers for early detection of target and trajectory corrections before the target was engaged. When the relative velocity of the systems involved was around 10 km a second, there was a pertinent need for high levels of precision, he said. “The booster [stage in the rocket] needs to provide the requisite velocities, the technologies such as dome-opening, heat-shield etc… need to be precise and smooth, apart from the highly accurate and secured data communications systems. Using accurate sensors and an onboard seeker, the ASAT missile was guided towards the target to ensure direct hit without employing any warhead,” the AesI press release said, quoting Rajababu.

In an informed paper titled “India’s ASAT Test”, published on March 28, 2019, in International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, Rajaram Nagappa, Mrunalini Deshpande, and S. Chandrashekar said: “DRDO has developed, as part of ballistic missile defence, missile interception capabilities. In this process, they would have developed kill vehicles with homing and manoeuvring capabilities. Extending the concept for achieving satellite kill is well within DRDO capabilities. Also, DRDO has ballistic missiles which have the capability of reaching 300 km-altitude for carrying out an interception.  In fact, it can be inferred from the press release that the missile was a two-stage solid propellant missile and the third stage was the kinetic kill weapon. Press reports talk of a three-minute time to hit the satellite. In three minutes, the satellite would have travelled 1350 km. The interception of Microsat-R, representing perhaps an area of two square metres, the related computations and the real-time manoeuvres needed of the war-head indicate the precision achieved in the missile guidance.”

Comments

While India’s demonstration of its ASAT capability is a major milestone in its space history, it is important for India to complement this capability with a robust Space Situational Awareness (SSA) infrastructure, C4ISR capability and related elements. (C4ISR stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance).  Major investments in military space and revamping of the military national security set-up as China, Russia and the US have done should receive some serious attention.

Agni-5 is a 3rd-generation ICBM, It is a solid fuel, road mobile missile. It provides reliable “second strike” capability. Agni V has been developed to offset China’s conventional weapons superiority. Agni with MIRVs can raise concerns in the enemy’s mind that India may have adopted “first-use” policy in its nuclear doctrine.

But while Agni surely enhances India”s credible minimum deterrence posture, it cannot strengthen the posture alone. India also needs to equally focus on aerial and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms – together the three legs would enable India to effectively launch counter and second strike vis-à-vis adversaries. 

In addition, missile systems especially land-based systems would also need to be protected from enemy attacks. That is where India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system to intercept incoming enemy missile systems assumes importance. At present the BMD system is mostly to protect counter-value targets. India should concentrate on protecting counter-force targets including land-based missile systems.

BMD can also be used both as an offensive and defensive system. Agni can be used to launch a “first-strike” on the enemy’s nuclear forces and use its BMD system to prevent adversaries’ missile systems to launch a counter-attack on India’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. However, India needs to clearly elaborate its BMD posture in order to avoid any confusion and state that the BMD would be deployed to strengthen India’s “no-first-use” doctrine.

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An American military commander said in 1958, “He who controls the Moon, controls the Earth.” Earlier, noted strategist and air power votary Giulio Duhet wrote in 1922, ” Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”

When Britain dominated the seas, it ruled the world. The Americans have been dominating the air and space domains, which are now the medium of military operations since the last 50 years. All major powers – USA, Russia, China and even India – are moving aggressively into this domain.

Militarisation of space is a reality. Control and denial of space-based assets is a part of the Chinese PLA doctrine. There has been no war in space but many experts believe that it is more or less imminent.

Space and satellite-based services have changed life on Earth. C4ISR depends largely on space-based assets. Importantly, satellites are used to provide early warning on missile launches, locate nuclear detonations, enable GPS navigation and targeting by airborne EW aircrafts and cruise missiles, high speed satellite communications and situational awareness. Satellite imagery is also used by fighter bombers for physical bombing.

Anti-Satellite Tests

America was in the lead but China has moved in quickly and is investing considerably in space. China sent a man into space in 2003 and carried out an anti-satellite test (ASAT) in 2007. It has a certified satellite global navigation system, BeiDao, with high accuracy. All elements of a 100-ton permanent Chinese space station are in place and it is likely to be fully operational by 2021. Human exploration of the moon is on the cards by 2025 and landing on Mars is planned. China is working on generating energy from space-based orbital solar power plants.

The complexities of ASAT are significant. Proving a point to smash a satellite is one thing, but tackling a military satellite with defensive measures where hundreds of multi-national satellites are orbiting in space is quite another. The interceptor has to pre-determine the point of impact of a satellite orbiting at high speeds as part of a constellation at various altitudes and speeds. That makes it even more complex. The Americans are now developing the concept of escort satellites.

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India is making good progress. Chandrayan-2 was lost on the moon’s surface in 2019 but the effort was laudable. India has planned to send Shukrayaan-1 to orbit Venus in 2023.

Space wars are a reality and India is getting abreast of it. Greater space presence requires to have an ability to launch heavy satellites above 5000 kg weight. India already carries out dozens of launches every year and has the ability to launch at short notice, which translates to readiness of launch means for any purpose. Advances in electronics, cyber capabilities and kinetic weapons, coupled with our space launch capabilities, means we can defend our assets and interests in space and be able to use space for military and counter-space purposes.

As far as launch facilities are concerned, ISRO had sent the first GSLV-III rocket in June 2017 to put GSAT-19 communications satellite in orbit. Soon it will have capabilities to launch 5000 kg payloads. It has already launched satellites belonging to over 35 countries. It is planning on a manned mission to the moon by December 2021, for which cosmonauts are already training in Russia.

India currently has 16 military satellites operational. Spectral resolution is going up and the armed forces are using dedicated satellites. We also has access to a number of good foreign satellites. DRDO and ISRO have the capability to destroy satellites and rockets in their booster phase.

Space Exercises

India has already carried out a simulated space warfare exercise with representatives of the armed forces, ISRO, DRDO and think tanks. They looked at the threat from China to our assets and the gaps that need to be filled in and technologies required to be strengthened. India’s Defence Space Agency has been established. This is a stepping stone to a full-fledged Space Command. It was a logical next step after the BMD tests and ASAT test.

India does not subscribe to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space. The treaty has its limitations. Every country has the right to defend its space assets.

The US has a Space Command, which was established in 1985. It was merged in 2002 with the United States Strategic Command but activated again in 2019, with a reemphasized focus on space as a war-fighting domain. In 2020 the US Air Force Space Force was also established. China has created it own PLA Strategic Support Force.

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India needs to look at global space situational awareness. It will have a vast constellation of satellites in geo-stationary orbit for carrying out multifarious tasks and C4 functions. It will include a cluster of satellites for military ELINT, SAR and electro-optical applications.

Going into the future, India is well on course to develop capabilities to launch heavy satellites, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System is operational and should begin to settle down, small satellites (<100 kgs) should start to function in the manner of UAVs with defence applications. Start-ups in the space technology realm are a welcome change. There is a need to review the higher organisation and decision-making set-up and strategy formulation process for war in view of the considerable inputs available from space-based C4ISR data.

India has all the building blocks necessary to integrate ASAT weapon systems, neutralise hostile satellites in low and polar orbit. It needs more early warning satellites to monitor enemy activities and more ground-based systems to neutralise incoming missiles.

India should start work on its space station. There have been dramatic improvements in intelligence inflow but a lot more needs to be done. The time to invest in space capabilities is now.

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