Unsavoury Advices

On 22 March, China sent unsavoury advice to the Philippines over its decision to further boost bilateral relations with the US. The reasons cited by Secretary Blinken while in Manila, was China’s “provocative actions” in the region, the US diplomat was confident that it would “promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.” These assertions were just too much for Xi’s strategists to swallow comfortably. Naturally, with growing tension in the regional waters particularly around the contested Spratly Island, China views this as an ‘unnecessary intervention’ from the US. China also felt unhappy with the news from Japan that it plans to convert its 16 seaports and airports into dual-use military infrastructure. Global Times in a commentary on 29^th March termed the Japanese action as “Japan’s resurgence of militarism”. It appeared particularly infuriated that the new plans are actively promoted by the US in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Not long back China had sent detailed advice on how Taiwan should plan and conduct its national election. In fact, it termed them as a regional election in its territory of Taiwan. From time to time, China has felt like advising many countries about their domestic policies. The list included major countries like Australia and India as well. Its ‘pearls’ of advice to India have special considerations about the conduct of diplomacy, foreign trade, state-to-state relations, multilateral military exercises, and of course, a list of restricted locations that must remain out of bounds in any case. China does not restrict its ‘advisories’ to comments from the Foreign Office but mostly it is pursued in great earnest by its state agencies and deeply controlled media.

ALSO READ: Chinese Influence Operations

The world has a great spectacle to witness the Chinese interference in the just concluded Taiwan national election where China pushed its state machinery to create a massive disinformation campaign discrediting the Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling alliance, and promoting its choice of candidates. It offered free trips to the mainland for a ‘better understanding’ of the perspective. When the election drew closer it even sent muffled threats to voters to ‘choose carefully’ as it imposed import restrictions under the garb of trade investigations.

In an aggressive show of strength, its fighters continue to breach the Median Line over the Taiwan Straits, once assumed as a sacrosanct air boundary between China and Taiwan. Its ships have dangerously attacked and blocked tiny Philippine boats with water cannons knocking them out of action on multiple occasions. It continues to send its ‘fishing boats’ further deeper into Senkaku Island raising alarms of territorial violation from the Japanese. Significantly, China conducts its affairs the way it desires, at the same time expecting everyone else to follow its directives. That’s being closest to how one can define the word hypocrites!

Raising Security Concerns

Countries in the neighbourhood of China not only feel threatened by its continued aggressive behaviour but are extremely worried about deteriorating future course. Japan’s National Security Council presented a very disturbing picture of the growing Chinese threat to Japan’s sovereignty. It was highlighted that with its current capacity, Japan would not be able to sustain a conflict with China. This strongly drove Japan to find a fix which was illustrated when they changed their national security outlook in December 2022 and dispensed with terms like Self Defence Force enshrined in Article 9 of their constitution. This was one of the reasons why Japan was so interested in getting NATO to set its foot there through a first-of-a-kind ‘Liaison Office’. Australia on the other hand was another major neutral power which decided it was time to ‘change course’. It boosted its defence investments, critically planned to adopt new platforms like nuclear submarines and almost rushed into the security grouping of AUKUS along with the UK and the US.

Deepening security concerns from China also took their toll on ASEAN. For the first time it decided to institute a dedicated commission for dialogue and discussion under the collective security approach for its members. Privately many ASEAN members have expressed alarming concerns over China’s hostile approach towards them. At one time ASEAN had entirely focussed on China to draw economic benefits, but the dramatic change in the situation demands credible management of security vulnerabilities with the same country. China has somehow been successful in creating a serious security quandary among almost all its neighbours. In global geopolitics unpredictability and unsavoury approaches are highly despised. It pushes countries further to find newer ways to preserve their sovereignty and dignity.

In such an unstable environment, countries joining hands in a promising formal security alliance is surely not out of context. If that happens, it will be a watershed moment for Asia and a point of no return. Xi’s chosen advisors may hurriedly dismiss such a scenario, and clearly, it is not an easy choice anyway. However, the perception is – they may be doomed if they choose and surely doomed if they don’t. It is a dark reality about China’s bloated ambitions and sadly for it, early signs of countries coming together have already begun to show!

Unmistakable Similarities

Existing home truths point to unmistakable similarities between Asian security challenges and what Europe was going through at the fag end of the Second World War. Noticeably, China is striving to get the aura of the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the near term, it wanted to be counted as ‘equal’ to the US while carrying a secret ambition of soon replacing it as the most powerful country in the world. The hanging fear of war among European nations at that time seemed replaced by a growing security threat among many Asian countries today. A pre-security alliance before NATO already existed in the form of the ‘Brussels Pact’, whose charter was to ensure “Collective Self-Defence” for its five members. Asia has already witnessed the formation of QUAD and AUKUS with a deep security undertone;

The US formed an integral part of NATO since its inception while it held special relations with the UK. In the Asian context, the US already maintains a strong presence both politically and militarily, while it holds special relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Soviets have tried to strengthen their influence with Eastern Europe. China does not have that buffer but it has someone like North Korea which is much more powerful than maybe what Belarus is for Russia today. A formal alliance like NATO in Asia may not be imminent but it may also be just a ‘few events’ away.

Asian Security Alliance

If and when the deteriorating security environment dictates the formation of a formal alliance, say an ‘Asian Security Alliance’(ASA), the driving purpose would only be to ensure ‘collective security’ for its members. It would be undoubtedly looking for the NATO construct as an inspiration, especially the nuances of Article 5 and Article 10, which define the alliance’s commitment to security for its members and modalities for membership. However, it would also present an opportunity to incorporate measures ab initio which are seen as creating hurdles and conflict within NATO today. The existing ingredients definitely indicate that an ASA would probably be a reality sooner than later while being a much-improved version of NATO, offering better security resolutions.

NATO has served one great purpose – its members haven’t seen a major war for more than half a century. This will be one of the most important stimulations towards the formation of the ASA. However, ASA must look to ensure its actions are – ‘time relevant’, unlike NATO it must dispense with the condition of ‘unanimity’. It should be able to undertake timely preventive military action with say even a 2/3rd majority, while punitive military actions could be undertaken with a 3/4th majority. Such an arrangement would obviate a ‘decision dilemma’ within the organisation which at critical times could be purposefully induced by the prime adversary through the weakest link and prevent unanimity from ever coming across, eventually defeating the entire raison d’être of the alliance.

ALSO READ: China’s Cyber Ranges for Attack and Defence

The membership should remain ‘by invite’ and only for those who meet the strict requirements to which its members are supposed to commit especially funding and national military spending. To give strength to this multi-nation grouping, it may propose that each member must get into a bilateral security commitment as a prerequisite to join the grouping. First, it would remove the scope of conflict among members, and second, it would fully commit them in the time of need removing all scope of geopolitical influences. It would enhance every member’s confidence that their national security challenges will be addressed promptly and cannot keep waiting for phoney approvals from the UNSC or unanimity of views. Such security arrangements are probably becoming more relevant as the UN has become hostage to a select few who continue to stall popular action time and again by their veto. This would create a new powerful grouping taking its place as a major pole, simultaneously addressing the yearning for multipolarity in global affairs. It will considerably diminish the idea of the sole superpower and prevent the urge for global policing.

Global Realities

In the existing dynamics, the ASA appears much more capable of stabilising the security situation in the Asian theatre. It will allow every member irrespective of their size and potential to better commit its national resources for its people without ever having to worry about bullying by anyone. It will definitely not be against anyone and remain very attractive for everyone! The charter would make it possible for even Taiwan and China to be members simultaneously, as long as both commit to abide by the bilateral security commitment of ‘no war’ and coming to fully help the other in case of any threat. Those who would find it ‘uncomfortable to join’ will have no locus standi to criticise it, as the entry though conditional, is ‘not denied’ for anyone. The global realities have given one prominent message to all that practice of shadow boxing and cold war tactics only create greater complications, sucking in more and more resources. A plain-vanilla grouping is what addresses the problem, especially against wayward adversaries and unpredictable proxies. When the scale of reprisal and fear of suffering become obvious it would create invisible guard rails keeping lunatics on globally accepted behavioural norms. Pundits in China must be strategising their next move to have a greater destabilising impact upon their chosen adversary, but they must also remain watchful, their every act is only pushing the tiniest of countries to gain stronger resolve to stand up and guard their national pride. China may end up being the greatest contributor towards the creation of an eventual security alliance like ASA, without ever qualifying as a member of the same!

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In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.

Security Situation in the South China Sea

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.

The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments.

In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended to further solidify PRC claims in these areas-especially in terms of domestic law- and justify its actions in the region.

In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.

When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 2022.

South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations

Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.

The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available to Beijing

East China Sea

The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels-including four equipped with deck guns-sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

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Immediately after the great International Fleet review that Japan hosted on November 6 at Sagami Bay, four Quad partners – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – will commence the Malabar naval exercise off Yokosuka on Tuesday (November 8). This exercise will conclude on November 18.

The Navy chiefs of the four Quad countries met in Tokyo on November 5. They exchanged views on “further enhancing inter-operability” in future editions of the Malabar multilateral naval exercise.

The timing of both the IFR and Malabar exercise is significant, coming as they do in the wake of China’s increasing aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific and North Korea firing record numbers of missiles.

Incidentally, the IFR marked the 70th anniversary of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) founding. Around 40 warships from 13 countries came together in Sagami Bay, off Tokyo.

The naval parade involved 38 vessels, 18 from friendly countries such as the United States, South Korea, Britain, Australia, Singapore, India, and Thailand. Thirty-three aircraft flew overhead, including submarine-hunting patrol planes and helicopters. India’s two frontline warships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta were in this parade.

Overseeing the parade, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said that Japan and like-minded nations must be prepared for situations in which “some countries trample on the peace and security of others through the use or threat of force.”

In a speech aboard the MSDF helicopter carrier Izumo, Kishida reiterated Tokyo’s plans to “fundamentally strengthen” Japan’s defense capabilities within five years.

His assertion that “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent invasion of Ukraine, must never be tolerated in any region of the world” is also aimed at China, which is threatening to take over Taiwan Kishida forcibly and is staking territorial claims on the Japanese islands in the East China Sea.

However, it should be noted that the IFR, by its nature, is a symbolic and friendly gesture in which the host countries invite even the navies of the countries with which it has adversarial relations.

In this context, it was significant that China declined the Japanese invitation to send its vessels to the IFR. And equally substantial was Japan’s withdrawal of its invitation to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

It was clear that by hosting the IFR, Japan signaled that it is firmly committed to the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Tokyo would like the international community to cement trust in its Self-Defense Forces as a proactive, reliable security partner, particularly in the maritime domain, where the power balance appears to be shifting toward China’s advantage of late.

That explains why Japan now consistently sends MSDF ships to similar events overseas, dispatches forces for engagements under its Indo-Pacific Deployment operations, and is one of the biggest supporters of exercises hosted by organizations such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus.

QUAD At The Malabar Military Drills

In contrast, however, the Malabar exercise is a proper military exercise. Over the next ten days, it will see the four Quad navies in action. Reportedly, the exercise will witness “high-tempo” drills in multiple domains and complex surface, sub-surface, and air operations, including live firing drills.

Apart from the ships (Shivalik and Kamotra), the Indian Navy is deploying other naval assets, including P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, in this exercise.

It may be noted that INS Shivalik is a multi-role guided missile stealth frigate, and INS Kamorta is an anti-submarine corvette. Both of them are indigenously produced, reflecting thus the growing capability of India to build its warships. And both of them are part of the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet based at Visakhapatnam.

Incidentally, this will be the 26th edition of the Malabar naval exercise. It started in 1992 as a bilateral drill between the Indian Navy and the US Navy in the Indian Ocean. Japan became a permanent member of the exercise in 2015. And Australia joined in 2020. It is an annual war game taking place in various parts of the Indo-Pacific.

Unmistakably, the continuous rise of the Chinese Navy (PLA Navy) in the Indo-Pacific binds all four countries in joining hands and bringing their armed forces together to develop joint strategies through military exercises. In the maritime domain, it is realized that they must act in unison individually; it is becoming tough to catch up with China’s growing naval prowess.

According to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (2022), China now ranks second after the United States on the Global Naval Powers Ranking 2022 (India ranks seventh). China also has the largest number of major surface combatants of any navy globally, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 surface ships and submarines. The rate of its annual addition of naval vessels and frigates is the highest in the world.

This policy of acting together by the Quad partners, all concerned over the growing hegemony of China in the Indo-Pacific, was also manifested last week, with India and Australia conducting a bilateral maritime exercise off the Indian coast of Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal.

Australia’s flagship regional engagement activity, Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE), arrived in Visakhapatnam on October 30. It comprised two ships (HMAS Adelaide and Anzac), helicopters, and 1,500 personnel. The Indian contingent in the exercise included INS Ships Jalashwa and Kavaratti. The exercise concluded on November 5.

Terming India and Australia as the guardians of the flanks of the Indian Ocean, visiting Australian Navy Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Jonathan Earley said that since the Indo-Pacific is marked by the ongoing “big power muscle movement,” it is vital that India and Australia must train together to build trust and confidence while stressing on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the region.

He said good progress had been made on MDA and the exchange of information on the movement of military vessels in the region, a growing area of cooperation among the Quad countries. “There is an opportunity for that to grow in more classified domains.

That is ongoing… The enthusiasm and the motivation to share more are certainly there,” Earley added, adding that expanding surveillance in the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and India’s recent acquisition of MH-60R helicopters build commonality.

He highlighted how the Quad countries have several common military platforms, with India acquiring more and more military hardware from the US. “The recent reciprocal exchange of P-8 aircraft exercises between the two countries had gone “exceptionally well,” said the Australian Admiral.

India’s Shifting Focus From Land To Maritime Power

Incidentally, the Indo-Australian exercise was taking place during India’s second Naval Commanders’ Conference in New Delhi (October 31  to November 3), which, among other challenges in the Indian Ocean region, is of vital concern to India, did focus on Chinese maritime activities.

The conference, addressed by India’s defense minister Rajnath Singh, new Chief of defense staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, and the Navy Chief Admiral Hari Kumar, focused on how the Indian Navy would remain “a combat-ready, credible, cohesive, and future-proof force.”

Admiral Hari Kumar is on record to have stated that China remains a formidable challenge and has increased its presence not only along India’s land borders but also in the maritime domain by leveraging anti-piracy operations to normalize its naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

“At any point, we have anything between five to eight Chinese Navy units, be it warships or research vessels, and a host of Chinese fishing vessels operating in the IOR. We keep an eye on them and see how they are undertaking their activities in the IOR”, according to the Indian Navy Chief.

The IOR, which includes the Middle East, the eastern coast of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, is a significant region of interest for the Indian Navy. More than 70% of the country’s imports and exports pass through sea lanes in this region. Therefore, the growing Chinese naval presence in the IOR seriously threatens India’s vital security interests.

In recent years, Indian strategic planners have rediscovered the importance of maritime power for the country’s security. Empires have risen and fallen as they lost command of the seas, whether the Persian, Napoleon, or Great Britain.

India was a global player as long as it had maritime interactions from Zanzibar off the coast of Africa to the shores of the Arabian Peninsula, all the way through the Andaman Sea to the mainland and islands of SouthEast Asia through people, faiths, ideas, mythologies, art, architecture and goods. India’s decline started when it became land-centric under the Mughal rule.

Even after independence in 1947, because of the wars with China and Pakistan, this land-centric or the “continentality-mindset” prevailed, with the Indian Navy getting scant attention in the security outlook.

Interestingly, China, like India, also had this continentality – mindset not long ago. But China now has become a foremost maritime power. Therefore, India’s stand is also shifting, as Admiral Arun Prakash, a former Indian Navy Chief, says, from pure ‘Continentality’ to the requisite mix of ‘Continentality-Maritimity.’

Accordingly, the Indian Navy is also growing. As Admiral Hari Kumar highlighted during the Naval Commanders’ conference, the Indian Navy has been strengthened by the recent commissioning of the second carrier INS Vikrant, acquiring of more missile power, two ALH squadrons, and the launch of platforms like Surat, Udaygiri, Dunagiri, Nistar, Nipun, and Nirdeshak.

He further pointed out that the maiden concurrent deployment of Indian Navy ships across six continents on August 15 this year served as valuable signaling to underscore India’s credibility – at home, in the region, and worldwide.

In the last six months, operational deployments have also emphasized India’s credibility, with a footprint covering all major oceans of the world, he added.

All this is said to be India’s signal that it will challenge China’s hegemonistic activities in the Indo-Pacific and the IOR in particular. And in this, India is not alone. India has solid support from Australia, Japan, and the United States in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

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BrahMos Aerospace CEO Atul Rane recently said that three or four nations in South East Asia and the Middle East could buy Indo-Russian BrahMos missiles in the next few years.

“I expect another one or two we will have another three-four countries on board from South East Asia and the Middle East. Those countries which are coming in the press – Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia,” the chief executive said. “In the Middle East, it could be UAE, Saudi Arabia,” Rane emphasized.

Oman has also shown interest in the BrahMos missiles, Rane said.

If a deal is indeed signed between the two sides, Indonesia will become the second ASEAN member country after the Philippines to import missiles from India. In January 2022, India signed a $375 million deal with Manila to supply three BrahMos ground-based anti-ship missiles.

In 2018, Indonesia first expressed interest in purchasing the Indo-Russian jointly produced cruise missile.

The negotiations with Jakarta have been in advanced stages for a while and were also on the “top of the agenda” when the Indonesian Defense Minister visited India in July 2020.

Indonesia plans to equip its warships with the BrahMos missile. The short-range BrahMos ramjet supersonic cruise missile can be launched from aircraft, ships, land platforms, and submarines. Additionally, this missile can fly at 2.8 Mach, or three times the speed of sound.

Comparison with Harpoon

It is pertinent to note that the US has a close functional partnership with most ASEAN states. In fact, Taiwan already has Harpoon missiles in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

The Harpoon is an over-the-horizon, subsonic, high-explosive anti-ship missile. It follows its target with active radar and detonates on contact. The missile’s 224-kilogram payload is intended to provide a sharp burst. The flexible missile can be launched from vehicles, including trucks, submarines, and airplanes. The Harpoon has gone through several Blocks or stages of development. The newest operational Harpoon model, Block 2, has enhanced resilience to countermeasures and better targeting, among other significant characteristics.

In contrast, BrahMos is one of the few cruise missiles worldwide that can travel at high supersonic speeds. The missile is exceptionally challenging to intercept due to its speed. Harpoon is a subsonic missile, while BrahMos’ supersonic speed is one of its most significant advantages.

Another advantage that BrahMos has over the Harpoon missile is its low radar signature which makes it harder to intercept. While Harpoon Block II missile has a maximum range of 240 kilometers, the BrahMos can hit a target as far as 290 kilometers. Further, the BrahMos can carry a payload of 200-300 kilograms.

While the Harpoon can be launched from a fixed-wing aircraft, surface ship, and submarines, the BrahMos missile could be launched from the ground, ships, submarines, and fixed-wing aircraft.

While the Philippines has bought ground-based anti-ship missiles, Indonesia could be buying the warship variant. This is the versatility that BrahMos offers.

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BrahMos Aerospace CEO Atul Rane recently told TASS that about three or four nations in South East Asia and the Middle East could buy Indo-Russian BrahMos missiles in the next few years.

“I expect another one or two we will have another three-four countries on board from South East Asia and the Middle East. Those countries which are coming in the press – Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia,” the chief executive said. “In the Middle East, it could be UAE, Saudi Arabia,” Rane emphasized.

Oman has also shown interest in the BrahMos missiles, Rane said. Earlier, according to some sources that confirmed to Financial Express Online, “Talks with Indonesia are in advanced stage for the export of the Indo-Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.

If a deal is indeed signed between the two sides, Indonesia will become the second ASEAN member country after the Philippines to import missiles from India. In January 2022, India signed a $375 million deal with Manila to supply three BrahMos ground-based anti-ship missiles.

In 2018, Indonesia first expressed interest in purchasing the Indo-Russian jointly produced cruise missile. As talks proceeded, a team from the BrahMos joint venture visited an Indonesian shipyard in Surabaya in 2018 to “assess the fitting of the missile on Indonesian warships,” as noted by Hindustan Times.

The negotiations with Jakarta have been in advanced stages for a while and were also on the “top of the agenda” when the Indonesian Defense Minister visited India in July 2020.

Indonesia plans to equip its warships with the BrahMos missile. The short-range BrahMos ramjet supersonic cruise missile can be launched from aircraft, ships, land platforms, and submarines. Additionally, this missile can fly at 2.8 Mach, or three times the speed of sound.

The agreement with Indonesia, which is anticipated to be finalized by the year’s end or next year, will offer India a strategic foothold in the area and accelerate the policy push to increase defense exports significantly.

India has traditionally been a defense importer, and the present government is hell-bent on carving its space in the export market.

However, that also presents a question of why the South East Asian countries are showing interest in the BrahMos missile jointly developed by India and Russia over the Harpoon missile developed by the United States.

It is pertinent to note that the US has a close functional partnership with most ASEAN states. In fact, Taiwan already has Harpoon missiles in the wider Indo-Pacific region. EurAsian Times spoke to experts for a perspective.

Why BrahMos Over Harpoons?

The Harpoon is an over-the-horizon, subsonic, high-explosive anti-ship missile. It follows its target with active radar and detonates on contact. The missile’s 224-kilogram payload is intended to provide a sharp burst.

The flexible missile can be launched from vehicles, including trucks, submarines, and airplanes. The Harpoon has gone through several Blocks or stages of development.

The newest operational Harpoon model, Block 2, has enhanced resilience to countermeasures and better targeting, among other significant characteristics.

In contrast, BrahMos is one of the few cruise missiles worldwide that can travel at high supersonic speeds. The missile is exceptionally challenging to intercept due to its speed. Harpoon is a subsonic missile, while BrahMos’ supersonic speed is one of its most significant advantages.

Another advantage that BrahMos has over the Harpoon missile is its low radar signature which makes it harder to intercept. While Harpoon Block II missile has a maximum range of 240 kilometers, the BrahMos can hit a target as far as 290 kilometers. Further, the BrahMos can carry a payload of 200-300 kilograms.

While the Harpoon can be launched from a fixed-wing aircraft, surface ship, and submarines, the BrahMos missile could be launched from the ground, ships, submarines, and fixed-wing aircraft.

While the Philippines has bought ground-based anti-ship missiles, Indonesia could be buying the warship variant. This is the versatility that BrahMos offers.

According to a Philippines-based military analyst Miguel Miranda, “the Indonesian navy operates a dazzling and somewhat ridiculous arsenal of different naval and coastal weaponry, including Chinese anti-ship missiles and even the Russian Yakhont, which is the missile the BrahMos is based upon.

The Harpoon is combat proven and in service with many countries, but it’s far from a unique weapon system as it’s subsonic, radar homing, and an old design. There are many similar missiles, and the Indonesians already have French-made Exocets.

The biggest selling point of the BrahMos is that it’s from a family of supersonic missiles that can be used on mobile launchers, naval surface and subsurface combatants, and even aircraft.”

While these are technical aspects, former Vice Admiral of the Indian Navy Shekhar Sinha gave us a different perspective: “First, affordability & cost is a preeminent reason. Second, in the foreign policy assessment, ASEAN probably sees Indian policies, both political & security, as more suitable for partnership than the United States.

Third, India’s policy of SAGAR and Act East. Help and assistance to neighbors have made a lasting impression on its maritime neighbors. It is India’s sincerity that is acknowledged by these nations. And lastly, India’s consistency in its China policy provides an underlying similarity with the ASEAN countries.”

India’s BrahMos Route To Challenge China

Apart from Indonesia, several other nations in the South East Asian region, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, could be interested in BrahMos, developed on a modest budget of $300 million.

The BrahMos missile is among the best-performing in the class of air-breathing supersonic cruise missiles. The sale would potentially face no obstacle from the Russian side, which mostly remains on cordial terms with most ASEAN countries.

The military and bilateral relationship between India and Indonesia have been steadily strengthening due to Indonesia’s centrality in New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific Policy.

New Delhi sees Jakarta as a critical partner in its ‘Act East’ policy aimed at expanding connectivity and strategic ties with Southeast Asia to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

The two nations launched a joint project to develop the crucial Indonesian port of Sabang, which is 90 nautical miles from India’s own Andaman and the Nicobar Islands and just off the northern tip of Sumatra side of the Malacca Strait, which is very strategic to China.

India could be seen negotiating a deal with countries with active disputes with China in the South China Sea- mainly the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

For instance, China consistently enters Indonesian waters, claiming the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia to the north of the Natuna Islands as “traditional fishing grounds.” In addition to containing fishing grounds, the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands also contain oil and gas resources.

Indonesia’s potential purchase of BrahMos missiles is a part of a more considerable effort to deter China from threatening its sovereignty by strengthening its military. It is also in the process of upgrading its Air Force with new fighter jets.

On its part, the Philippines bears the largest brunt of the contest for the Spratly Islands. In 2021, it complained about the weeks-long presence of dozens of vessels from China’s so-called ‘maritime militia’ at Whitsun Reef, which lies about 320 kilometers (175 nautical miles) west of Palawan Island within its EEZ. The Chinese Coast Guard regularly intimidates the Filipinos at sea.

As for Vietnam, it remains embroiled in a perpetual dispute with China over the ownership of the Paracel Islands. Faced with an enemy several times the size of its military, it remains vulnerable to threats from the Chinese PLA. This is one of the primary reasons it is talking with India to purchase a BrahMos missile.

Not too long ago, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh signed India’s first-ever significant Mutual Logistics Agreement in the wake of growing Chinese intimidation in the region. And as far as Malaysia is concerned, India is not only pitching the BrahMos missile but also aggressively pushing the sale of LCA Tejas, which could see a massive breakthrough.

 The Indian Air Force Tejas performs at the opening ceremony of the Singapore Air Show on February 15, 2022.

These countries face a threat from China and have ongoing disputes with the Asian giant, assisting them increases China’s burden in the South China Sea.

It is, of course, in India’s interest to ensure that China has enough problems in its backyard to divert its attention and reduce the pressure it can bring on India and the Indian Ocean. India’s ongoing territorial dispute with China makes this much more critical, as do China’s growing naval capabilities.

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That reality is the basis of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. This strategy outlines President Biden’s vision to more firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region in the process. Its central focus is sustained and creative collaboration with allies, partners, and institutions, within the region and beyond it.

The United States will pursue an Indo-Pacific region that is:

FREE AND OPEN

Our vital interests and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. Our strategy begins with strengthening resilience, both within individual countries, as we have done in the United States, and among them. We will advance a free and open region, including by:

• Investing in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society
• Improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform
• Ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law
• Advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyber space

CONNECTED

A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity for a new age. The alliances, organizations, and rules that the United States and its partners have helped to build must be adapted. We will build collective capacity within and beyond the region, including by:

• Deepening our five regional treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand
• Strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands
• Contributing to an empowered and unified ASEAN
• Strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments
• Supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership
• Partnering to build resilience in the Pacific Islands
• Forging connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic
• Expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands

PROSPEROUS

The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific. That fact requires investments to encourage innovation, strengthen economic competitiveness, produce good-paying jobs, rebuild supply chains, and expand economic opportunities for middle-class families: 1.5 billion people in the Indo-Pacific will join the global middle class this decade. We will drive Indo-Pacific prosperity, including by:

• Proposing an Indo-Pacific economic framework, through which we will:
• Develop new approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental standards
• Govern our digital economies and cross-border data flows according to open principles, including through a new digital economy framework
• Advance resilient and secure supply chains that are diverse, open, and predictable
• Make shared investments in decarbonization and clean energy
• Promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), including in our 2023 host year
• Closing the region’s infrastructure gap through Build Back Better World with G7 partners

SECURE

For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence necessary to support regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity. We are extending and modernizing that role and enhancing our capabilities to defend our interests and to deter aggression against U.S. territory and against our allies and partners. We will bolster Indo-Pacific security, drawing on all instruments of power to deter aggression and to counter coercion, including by:

Advancing integrated deterrence

Deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners

Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait
Innovating to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical- and emerging-technology areas

Strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with our ROK and Japanese allies and pursuing the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Continuing to deliver on AUKUS

Expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats

Working with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative

RESILIENT

The Indo-Pacific faces major transnational challenges. Climate change is growing ever-more severe as South Asia’s glaciers melt and the Pacific Islands battle existential rises in sea levels. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to inflict a painful human and economic toll across the region. And Indo-Pacific governments grapple with natural disasters, resource scarcity, internal conflict, and governance challenges. Left unchecked, these forces threaten to destabilize the region. We will build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats, including by:

• Working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius
• Reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation
• Ending the COVID-19 pandemic and bolstering global health security

The White House

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Beijing dismissed the proposal, preferring instead to send military forces to the South China Sea and exploit resources. In the recent past, Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels entered In-donesia’s North Natuna Sea Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), resulting in a diplomatic dispute, with Indonesia claiming it would never accept China’s nine-dash line, nor compromise with China. A number of Chinese vessels had previously been engaged in a conflict with Vietnamese au-thorities in the vicinity of an oil block within Vietnam’s EEZ.

Indonesia is not a claimant in South China Sea, but it opposes the portion of its Exclusive Eco-nomic Zone that originates from the Natuna Islands (which Indonesia considers significant not only for its protection but also for its economic development), but it “allegedly” also encroaches on China’s self-proclaimed Nine Dash Line.

Natuna Stand-off

“There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China,” was a frequently-heard slogan of Indonesian leaders for decades. That fails to recognise the persisting maritime dispute between them. In late December last year, several Chinese coast guard ships escorted more than three dozen Chinese fishing boats into the waters off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, which was not only within China’s self-proclaimed’ nine-dash line’ but also Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone near the South China Sea’s Natuna Islands.

The latest incident follows the pattern of Chinese vessels operating in maritime regions that are contested by China with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Conscious of this, Jakarta immediately summoned the Chinese ambassador and issued a formal diplomatic protest. Indonesia deployed five warships, and four F-16 jet fighters in the two-week conflict that followed at the far south end of the South China Sea. The response from Indonesia has been more about pushing the Chinese away without escalating tensions. Chinese coast guard vessels and Indonesian naval vessels were engaged in a confrontation for the first week of 2020, reminiscent of earlier standoffs between Chinese forces and those in the Philippines and Vietnam over the last decade.

China argued that the waters of Natuna had been their fishing grounds for decades, since the area lies within its self-proclaimed line of nine-dash.

Claims over Natuna

United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains the authority of coastal states over their territorial waters of up to 12 nauti-cal miles from the baseline. A coastal state has sovereignty and absolute power at territorial sea over its maritime area, subsoil, and airspace. A coastal state may make claims for an EEZ in ma-ritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles measured from coastal state baseline.

Indonesia, in particular the EEZ between the two states of the North Natuna Sea, is yet to fully resolve its maritime boundary with Vietnam. That creates a “gray area” in which affected States can exercise sovereign rights. Territorial confusion creates a’ blame game’ in which both states can assert sovereignty over the’ gray area.’ When Vietnam and Indonesia correctly settle territorial disputes in the North Natuna Sea including EEZ claims, the region is open to both nations’ claims. Indonesia is entitled to send its vessels to carry out naval patrols while Vietnam is al-lowed to carry out UNCLOS-approved activities in areas it considers part of its EEZ.

On the other hand, China does not recognize maritime areas in the vicinity of Natuna as its EEZ but within its’ nine-dash line’ as part of its traditional waters.’ That is why China claims it has the right to fish there. The’ nine-dash line’ was rejected by the Permanent Court of International Ar-bitration in 2016, which ruled the line was against the principle of UNCLOS in 1982.

China’s Strategic Calculations in Natuna

The southern limits of its expansive claims for hegemony in the South China Sea, demarcated by nine-dash line have never been fully defined. In light of the previous skirmishes with Indonesia , and the recent standoff, it is evident that China claims the region as part of its territorial waters. Clearly, there are different aspects to the issue that China might have considered while sparking off the dispute.

First, Beijing is now in a position to make better use of militarized outposts across the South China Sea and allow more routine and longer-lasting patrols of its claims to sovereignty. Indone-sia’s Natuna Islands are situated approximately 700 miles southwest of China’s Spratly outposts, well within the range of Chinese naval, coast guard aircraft and artificial island air force patrols.

China has been engaged in long-term negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to conclude a Code of Conduct in South China Sea. Strangely, though China’s maritime claims overlap with the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia, Jakarta has long maintained the position of not being officially a claimant in the ASEAN negotiations. The rationale behind that is, it does not consider the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands to be part of the South China Sea. As a non-claimant, Jakarta had little reason to collaborate with claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines in pursuing a legally binding Code of Conduct by 2021. Yet recent tensions around the Natuna Islands may change the scenario. ASEAN’s chair in 2020, Vietnam, is already dealing with Vanguard Bank standoff with China. Hence, alienating another influential ASEAN member state could prove futile in future.

Conclusion

ASEAN countries have limited capability when it comes to challenging China. China has been building South China Sea as a springboard to project its naval power.

Vietnam already has a dispute with Indonesia over Natuna. Hence, it is unlikely that Vietnam would give any categorical focus to China- Indonesia dispute. This would imply, that the internal disputes itself within ASEAN countries is a weak link in the entire dispute and hence ASEAN is unlikely to come up with a joint response to Chinese coercive action anytime soon.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that an anti-China front might never emerge in ASEAN. The ASEAN countries gain major economic benefits from China and would not want a scenario where they have a political or military fall out with China.

Indonesia presently is focused on internal stability which depends on its rapid economic development supported by Chinese investment and support.

China too has resisted any coercive aggressive action. Recent policy changes in China have also given some signs of a willingness to pursue a peaceful resolution. If China believes it has a valid claim to fish in the claimed EEZ in Indonesia, it has shown restraint in its response to protests from Indonesia.

Clearly, Indonesia does not want this spat to escalate. Its response was subdued. This time, al-though military vessels and aircraft were deployed to the area, their actions were restrained.

Since illegal fishing is a persisting issue and the disputing countries clearly want to maintain re-straint. Hence, an agreement over fisheries could be thought of.

One more aspect to look out for is amidst the persisting multilaterals, mini laterals and hubs and spokes alliances in function in response to the persisting violation of freedom of navigation rules, it is important to understand how the prominent powers in the region who consistently emphasize on ASEAN centrality respond to the persisting security dilemma. Russia has just entered the game (for resource exploration in Philippines and Vietnam) in China’s self proclaimed waters. Also the fact that China and Russia are reviving their old friendship one has to study the real rationale of Russia’s initiative to factor in.

It is a fact that in Southeast Asia the claimant states of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines do not possess the capacity or ability of China to demonstrate its territorial integr-ity in the South China Sea. Thus, these nations should put aside their differences towards China and reach a consensus on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Apparently a careful bal-ance must be struck between assertion of power and tactful diplomacy between actors on all sides, because armed conflict is not desirable for any party involved.

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In the security domain, India has been admitted into security led forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Summit( EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting(ADMM) Plus despite initial reluctance on the part of some ASEAN member states. Given that India has no history of territorial dispute or military conflict with Southeast Asia and it shares common norms for peace and security, India stands as an assuring power.

India’s defence relations with ASEAN can be looked at from both bilateral and multilateral perspective. India and ASEAN states have engaged in joint military exercises, organized operations, naval port calls, training and education, security dialogues, exchange of high-level visits, defence supplies, etc. in terms of bilateral defence ties.

Bilateral Perspective

For India, relations with South East Asian countries has a direct bearing on its Indo-Pacific strategy in which China is an important factor. Thus, India’s Act East Policy is welcomed in the region including the defence and security dimension as well. Relations with Thailand on the Bay of Bengal littoral and with Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia straddling the Malacca Straits have strategic significance not only because of their position, but also because of their growing economies and their respective trade and commerce stature.

In addition, Malacca Strait is the key transit point through which more than 55% of India’s trade goes through. Another worrying factor for India is China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean . On the high seas, there are risks and challenges of piracy and smuggling and other non-conventional threats that threaten the smooth flow of trade and commerce, thereby propelling countries to protect the sea lanes. Cooperation between India and these countries in defence and security has thus acquired increased salience over the years.

Myanmar. Myanmar shares long border with China in the north and is contiguous with the disputed Sino-Indian border. The geography makes it vulnerable to numerous strategic and security implications. Infiltration of the insurgents and arms trafficking in the Northeast is a priority for India. China’s strategic military ties with Myanmar makes it imperative for India to develop a robust defence and security cooperative framework with Myanmar. India has been pursuing enhanced defence relationship with Myanmar as a component of its erstwhile Look East and now Act East Policy.

A regular feature of bilateral security cooperation was the procurement of combat hardware, regular high-level military exchanges on both sides and joint training exercises. Since 2013, both countries’ navies have been carrying out organized patrols along the maritime boundary.

Thailand. In December 2011, the First India-Thailand Defence Dialogue took place in New Delhi, and in January 2012 a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation was signed. Regular joint exercises, coordinated maritime patrols near the international maritime border to counter terrorism, piracy and smuggling, training of officers at the training institutions of each other’s armed forces and participation as observers in military exercises fall within the scope of bilateral defence cooperation.

Thailand Navy was a regular participant in India led Milan series of joint naval exercises held biennially in Bay of Bengal. There is cooperation between the armies of both countries beyond the maritime domain.

The frequency and scale of bilateral exercises, however, needs to be increased and probably taken to the same level as what the Indian armed forces are doing with other South East Asian countries such as Singapore or Vietnam. There is substantial potential to broaden security cooperation with Thailand.

Singapore. In intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, Singapore has been a traditional supporter of India. India and Singapore have forged cooperation over the years in training forces, maritime safety, joint naval exercises, defence technology collaboration and military exchange programs. In addition, India provided access to armed forces in Singapore to use Indian training facilities such as air force and firing ranges for artillery. Naval drills are held annually between the two navies since 1994.

Indonesia. India’s Maritime Neighbour Indonesia in the ASEAN group is also India’s largest trading partner. Indonesia is India’s maritime neighbour with the closest distance between the two being about 90 nautical miles from India’s Great Nicobar Island. Both countries signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001. Since 2002, they have been carrying out regular joint India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol along the maritime boundaries involving both navies ‘ ships and maritime aircraft. With the creation of a bilateral strategic partnership in 2005, the commitment to defence gained some momentum. Bilateral cooperation across the army, navy and air force has increased. At the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram in 2012, joint army drills codenamed’ Garuda Shakti ‘ exercise took place.

There is daily formal communication between the Army and the Navies on both sides. Maritime cooperation between the two nations is an unstoppable part of the ongoing development of the strategic partnership. In December 2016, both sides emerged with a “Shared Vision of Indo-Pacific Indian-Indonesian Maritime Cooperation.”

Malaysia. Malaysia is India’s strategic partner and is strong on India’s Act East Policy. Since the signing of the MoU on Defence Cooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993, Indo-Malaysian defence and security cooperation is thus integral to the broader bilateral and regional engagement. The Army, Air Force and Naval Chiefs have regular high-level visits from both sides. The annual India-Malaysia Defence Cooperation Meeting was upgraded at the level of the Secretary of Defence during PM Modi’s visit to Malaysia in July 2018. Joint army exercise called’ Harimau Shakti’ has been carried out with the intention of exchanging the best practices and procedures of both armies in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Since 1997, the Malaysian Navy has been participating in the multilateral series of’ Milan’ joint naval exercises.

Vietnam. The security relationship between India and Vietnam was strong. Their mutual views of global and regional order in terms of strategy and security have helped shape commonalities. Over the years, India has improved its political-strategic relationship with Vietnam. This in turn helped the cooperation between defence and security to gain momentum.

A Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2007 further strengthened India-Vietnam’s officially signed defence and security partnership in 2000. This outlined how to further institutionalize and broaden the cooperation in defence and security. In addition to resolving the problems of non-conventional threats such as transnational crime and drug trafficking, the agreement established a mechanism for civil nuclear cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation and strengthening regional security. Cooperation in defence and security remains an important aspect of the strategic partnership between the two countries. In May 2015, the two countries signed a Joint Vision Statement on Cooperation in Defence for the duration 2015-2020. The Indo-Vietnam relationship was upgraded to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2016 to enhance cooperation in defence and security.

Philippines. There has been little progress in India’s security cooperation profile with the Philippines. The 2006 bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement allows Naval and Coast Guard ships to share training, high-level visits, research tours and port calls. Their bilateral MOU on Defence Industry and Logistics Cooperation, signed in 2017, covered the purchase and export of defence articles and shared logistics support and services, as well as cooperation in defence material development, production and procurement.

It is quite apparent that there has not been much initiative in order to develop their bilateral defence ties. The second meeting of the Joint Committee for Defence Cooperation (JDCC) between the Philippines and India was held in 2017, five years after the first meeting of this kind in 2012.

Cambodia and Laos. The security relations between India and Cambodia and Laos are at an elementary level right now. Since 2007, India has been educating the Cambodian troops on demining as various conflicts and wars have left the countryside strewn with a large number of unmarked mining grounds.

Prime minister Modi stated in 2018 that India would strengthen relations in key areas of defence, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. Both sides expressed a desire to enhance cooperation in the maritime domain, including the preservation of the marine and coastal environment, anti-piracy cooperation and the security of sea lanes of communication in order to preserve peace and ensure navigation security in the Indo-Pacific region. But no specific steps have been listed to achieve these results.

Brunei. At the political level, Brunei endorsed India’s Act East Policy as well as India’s increasing relationship with ASEAN. Indian naval ships have visited Brunei on goodwill visits on a regular basis and also participated in the July 2011 Brunei International Fleet Review to mark the Royal Brunei Armed Forces ‘ 50th anniversary.

Brunei naval ships participated in the Milan series joint naval exercises in India. Furthermore, both sides also participated in the Defence Expos of each other. Military leaders and personnel have also visited both sides to improve the security relationship, both bilaterally and, multilaterally, at the meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus. In 2018, India and Brunei agreed to further strengthen defence relations by exchanging experiences, information, training, and trainers; holding joint military exercises, seminars, and discussions; and cooperating with defence industries.

It is quite clear that India needs to build on its relationship with Cambodia, Laos and Brunei in terms of defence and stability. India’s enhanced cooperation with these countries in politics and defence could have some effect on balancing the increasing Chinese presence in these countries.

Multilateral Perspective

India has also engaged the Southeast Asian states through multilateral initiatives such as Milan and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to project itself as a benevolent military power.

India is part of the framework of ADDM Plus that involves ten ASEAN countries and eight other nations. ADMM Plus, a central forum of ministers, fosters strategic dialogue and security cooperation between ASEAN and its eight partner countries, that is. China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. ADMM Plus also includes “expert working groups” focused on seven different areas including counter-terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian and disaster relief and assistance for peacekeeping operations. Besides the Shangri-La dialogue, it is the only place that allows Southeast Asian defence chiefs to meet with counterparts from major powers such as the US and China.

ASEAN member countries took part in a series of joint naval exercises led by Milan in India. For the most part, the naval exercises aim to create a platform for the region’s littoral navies to share views on maritime cooperation and to conduct HADR drills and tackle non-traditional security challenges.

While in the initial years only a few countries such as India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, all on the Bay of Bengal coast participated in the first edition of Milan exercises, many other countries’ navies joined for the manoeuvres over a period of time.

India has been participating regularly in joint naval exercises led by KOMODO in Indonesia since its beginning in 2014. The main focus of these exercises is on HADR.

India at ADMM Plus 2019

India’s participation in ADMM Plus reflects its goal of strengthening the relationship between defense and security with ASEAN countries. This year’s 6th ADMM Plus Summit was held in Bangkok on November 17. The central theme of the ADMM Plus Summit was “Advancing Sustainable Security Partnership,” which implies the importance of sustainability, harmony, stability, security, and navigation rights.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh outlined key aspects of India’s involvement in the ADMM Plus project. In the wake of the growing security challenges. He proposed the necessity to expand the matrix of defense preparedness that should encompass both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Referring to the severity of the security challenges raised by ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’, Rajnath Singh reiterated India’s policy of zero tolerance of terrorism and called for collective action to counter the threat.

He indicated India’s stand against the growing assertiveness of China in its maritime neighborhood, but reaffirmed India’s commitment to rules-based order to address the issue of maritime security, recognizing international law as the leading anchor for dispute resolution. India also acknowledged its commitment to climate change, HADR. India stressed the importance of dialogue as an essential tool to strengthen regional security structure while at the same time maintaining ‘ASEAN Centrality.’

Conclusion

India’s security dynamics with ASEAN is conditioned by two primary factors:

•             ASEAN outlook on the Indo Pacific that dilutes the narrative of India being projected as a balancer against China. While it recognizes the changing geopolitical realities, it emphasizes on exploring potential synergies with sub-regional frameworks.

•             The rising urgency of addressing non-conventional threats in the maritime domain. In both the aspects, the elements of defence ties needs to be strengthened for maintaining their mutual commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.

Despite progress made in India-ASEAN ties over the past 25 years, the relationship still has tremendous scope for further development.

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