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Session 1 – Inaugural Session

The seminar was inaugurated by Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ. The welcome remarks were given by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Director General, CAPS. This was followed by an industry perspective provided by Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst & Young. The guest speakers also released the EY-IMR knowledge paper on Air & Missile Defence.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra commenced his introductory statements by addressing the protracted conflict in Ukraine, which has persisted for sixteen months, despite the substantial casualties incurred by both opposing factions. The vulnerabilities manifest themselves through the widespread deployment of tanks, drones, large ships, cruise missiles, and aircraft, which are strategically withheld from entering technical zones due to the presence of formidable air defence systems. The concept of air Denial has been surpassed by both parties involved. Hence, the conflict has once again underscored the significance of the air and missile defence systems. Several key lessons can be derived for India from this conflict, including the imperative of maintaining unhindered supply chains and promoting domestic manufacturing. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of counter-drone technology, which encompasses various tools such as kinetic interception and electromagnetic interdiction. According to Air Marshal Chopra, India is currently developing medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles. However, there is a need to expedite the advancement of cost-effective iterations of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The speaker proposed that the private sector is making significant strides in the field, exemplified by the Kalyani missile creation. This missile was developed through a partnership between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd and DRDO, and its production involved collaboration with various players in the Indian industry, including both public and private sector entities and MSMEs. The author emphasised the government’s initiatives to promote indigenisation, encompassing both the public and commercial domains.

Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ gave the Inaugural Address. He addressed the crucial capabilities of the air defence and missile system in various contexts, including times of peace, periods of uneasy peace, and even in times of war. The activation of this capability is the initial step, while its deactivation is the final action. In certain instances, it persists consistently. It offers both deterrence and the assurance needed to execute air operations. The system encompasses numerous interconnected components and sub-systems that encompass monitoring, control, and the ability to make decisions for destruction swiftly. He highlighted critical advancements in air defence during the last decade while focusing on reducing the size of systems and sub-systems and the increasing lethality of weapons and Unmanned systems, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities. He emphasised the evolving nature of operations, which were formerly limited to land but have since expanded into the air and are now expanding into space. He stressed the necessity of successfully encountering the threats. India’s capacity to cope with threats needs jointmanship as well as an exhaustive capability. The endeavour is to be made not in isolation but as a team. Therefore, the diverse range of threats necessitates an air defence system that can enhance capabilities and multiply abilities multiple-fold. This will entail utilising expedited, reliable, and fortified decision-making mechanisms alongside a fusion of active and passive sensors to generate a comprehensive representation. He concluded by emphasising the interaction between a user and a manufacturer during the initial stages of development of any system is crucial to the smooth transmission of situational awareness and the successful incorporation of the decision-making tool.

Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young, provided the defence industry perspective. He stated that the Indian Air Force was responsible for safeguarding the entirety of the nation’s airspace, which encompasses the island territories and offshore facilities and falls within the jurisdiction of the air defence identification zone. In order to effectively safeguard the expansive airspace, it is imperative to implement a strategy that involves the proactive positioning of surface-to-air missiles, the utilisation of countermeasures against advanced technologies, the establishment of surveillance systems and radar networks, as well as the deployment of short-range surface-to-air missiles to deter and neutralise aerial incursions. Col Kuber emphasised the significance of the heightened dissemination of quantum technologies, the integration of quantum into military operations, and the transformative impact it will have on the character of warfare. The speaker provided an explanation regarding the distinction between quantum and linear phenomena, highlighting the pervasive nature of the former in contrast to the latter. During his discourse, he also referred to the hypersonic glide vehicles. In order to effectively address the issue, it is advisable to develop an anti-missile capability that facilitates the straightforward identification of these entities. The speaker concluded his discourse by comparing the escalating military expenditures of the United States and China and subsequently deliberated on the appropriate course of action for India considering this development. In order to augment its capabilities, the government has pursued collaboration with the private sector to develop advanced weaponry. It will be stipulated to be productive.

SESSION 2 – EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

Session 2 was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Tarun Chaudhry, Asst Chief of Air Staff Ops (Projects), Air HQ. He emphasised technology’s importance in shaping a conflict’s contours. Therefore, it is essential for all parties involved to acknowledge and adapt to new challenges brought about by technological advancements in the context of warfare. He underlined the need to develop an appropriate industrial environment for research and development to quickly provide the essential equipment or solutions. Here, timeframe and R&D efforts are of utmost importance.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ, discussed the ‘Lessons in AD from the Russia-Ukraine War.’ As part of the philosophies/concept of operations, he highlighted the DEAD/SEAD missions conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which allowed the Ukrainians to mount an effective air defence response. Russian forces employed Kh-31 and Kh-58 ARMs extensively against Ukrainian ground-based air defence weapons. The Ukrainians also utilised customised MiG-29s equipped with AGM-88 HARM with success.

The Ukrainian PSU’s innovative and flexible air defence systems have prevented the Russian VKS from dominating the sky. Russia’s VKS employed the S-400 in Belarus and Crimea to illustrate its practical air defence doctrine. The surface-to-air missile system of the S-400 was effective at bringing down aircraft. Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes due to the Ukrainians’ effective use of the S-300 SAM and SA-11. The Pechora system was an effective anti-aircraft armament for the Ukrainians. As part of the anti-missile/SOWs operation, it is impossible to intercept Russian Tochka-U and Iskander missiles due to a lack of adequate interceptor missiles. Between 80% and 90% of Ukrainian missiles were intercepted by the Russian S-400. Intercepting Russian “Zircon,” “Vanguard,” and “DF-ZF” hypersonic cruise missiles during anti-hypersonic operations is complex. He stated that the Russian VKS Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had little effect on the efficacy of the air defence network. Active AD capability and passive AD measures against missiles/ SOWs/ HCMs/HGVs are essential for assuring survivability. AWACS and AEW&C are crucial enablers for AD Operations. The development of future AD capabilities must be prioritised, and plans must account for detecting and eliminating low RCS threats.

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AAD Ops, Army HQ, discussed the ‘Emerging Air Threat: Challenges to Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) from Recent Conflicts.’ He addressed the concept of air threat in its state of being and air threat in its manifestation. Air threats encompass various factors, including numerical strength, quantity, aircraft types, capabilities, operational ranges, refuelling capabilities, and tactical approaches. “Air Threat Manifestation” refers to the strategic process of developing and implementing measures to mitigate air defence risks. The manifestation of air threats necessitates the management of stand-off threats, limited stand-off threats, and dynamic threats. He emphasised the increase in the variety of air attack instruments and the expansion of the range of potential threats, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, they mentioned the emergence of futuristic air threats such as hypersonic and hyper glide technologies, as well as surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they noted the resurgence of conventional dumb bombs, explicitly referring to rocket-boosted kinetic energy (REK) weapons and gliding munitions. According to Brig Manish Kumar the VKS air operation in Russia is limited to the Central Military District (CSFO) and activities related to air defence. The initial chapter operations yielded successful outcomes. The initial attacks were limited to Stand Off Launches utilising Kh series Cruise Missiles and ARMs. However, they were effectively countered by the Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Moreover, the SHAHED-136 introduction was employed in Ukraine. The term “three-layer air defence” is a misnomer. Each layer must be designed to address a specific type of threat. To address various levels of threat, encompassing stand-off threat, limited stand-off threat, and dynamic threat, it becomes imperative to implement a comprehensive array of mitigation measures. He identified the prerequisites for comprehensive air defence solutions, which include low radar cross-section (RCS) surveillance, low-level surveillance, and stealth surveillance. The layout challenges faced by the defence industry encompass several key aspects, including the miniaturisation of components, the management of electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility in limited spaces, the ability to handle multiple targets simultaneously, and the development of cost-effective electronic identification friend or foe (IFF) solutions.

Sh Vasudev Ramakrishna, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, discussed the ‘New Developments in Radars for Detection, Tracking Threats and Targeting.’ He deliberated on radars concerning air and ballistic missile defence. Modern radar systems possess various applications, encompassing areas such as ballistic missile defence, air defence, weapon designation, reconnaissance, commercial utilisation, weather monitoring, and interplanetary investigations. The radar may be categorised as surveillance radars, which possess a mechanical rotation fixed RPM, offer volumetric search capabilities, have fixed target update intervals, and exhibit limited range and angular resolution as well as accuracies; track radars, designed for tracking a single target, have limited search capabilities; and multiple radars for diverse threats, which are specialised in their respective functions and have limited programmability. To construct a unified multifunction radar system in the future, it will be necessary to address various components of radar sub-systems, including waveform agility (such as low pulse repetition frequency and medium pulse repetition frequency, as well as target radar cross-section estimation), as well as the programmability of radar modes (such as air defence and ballistic missile defence).

SESSION 3 – EMERGING THREATS, SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani, Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired session 3. He emphasised the importance of hypersonic weapons and the difficulties faced by current countermeasures in addressing them. In contrast to ballistic missiles that can be easily intercepted and monitored, identifying hypersonic missiles poses a significant challenge. To effectively tackle these challenges, it is imperative to embrace technological advancements.

Air Commodore SM Paranjpe, Team Ldr, Project AD Services Interface Gp, Air HQ addressed the challenges associated with ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as stand-off weapons. He gave an account of the historical background of hypersonics, with particular emphasis on ‘The Great Extinction Event’ that occurred approximately 66 million years ago, resulting in the extinction of all dinosaur species. It also emphasised the historical, contemporary, and prospective dimensions of hypersonic weaponry; and furnished an extensive account of the fundamental principles underlying hypersonic velocities, elucidating various attributes of hypersonics, ultrasonics, supersonics, and related phenomena. He elucidated the distinct challenges associated with stand-off weapons by examining the ballistic trajectory and orbital trajectory within the classification of ballistic armaments. He discussed the tactical obstacles associated with air defence, specifically focusing on four key aspects: being situated beyond the radar horizon and at a low altitude, operating at high altitudes and speeds, flying at low altitudes and high speeds, and possessing small or stealthy characteristics. He gave insight into the origins of the challenges, specifically highlighting the Anti-Hypersonic Weapons Technology Challenge and the requisite scientific expertise. He concluded by directing attention towards the main points to be learned and the actions being implemented to address them, categorising them into three distinct areas: Technology, Organisation, and Operations.

Sh Nandakumar S, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, gave an insight into ‘the OTH Radar for Peninsular & Chinese Front: a Perspective.’ Considering that OTH Radars operate at high frequencies, he emphasised their value. He compared the two Over Horizon (OTH) Radars, such as the Surface Wave OTH (SW OTH) and the Sky Wave OTH (SKW OTH). He emphasised the examination of OTH Radar, specifically highlighting various countries such as Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, and Israel and the respective radar systems they possess. He presented an analysis of a separate survey pertaining to the Skywave Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar, specifically focusing on the United States. He emphasised the various sub-systems of the SkW OTH Radar, including transmitters, receivers, and Tx Antennas, as well as the techniques and technologies employed within these sub-systems. According to the research conducted by Sh Nandakumar S, developing a Skywave Over-the-Horizon Radar (SkW OTHR) for specifically identified locations is feasible. He emphasised the development of Ionosphere modelling is imperative for SkW OTHR. He proposed that the implementation of the Frequency Management System should be completed within a time-frame of approximately five years. He discussed the advancement of the Surface Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) for the Indian Navy, specifically in the Gujarat Peninsula, which is nearing completion. It is anticipated that the radar system will become operational within a year. Additionally, Nandakumar highlighted the forthcoming development of the Two-L shape (180* Coverage) SkW OTHR for Sea/Air Surveillance, which is expected to be completed within a time-frame of 5-7 years. This technological advancement is anticipated to provide the Indian Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities to assess the Chinese front. 

SESSION 4 – AIR DEFENCE COUNTERMEASURES

Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, Asst Chief of Air Staff (Air Defence), Air HQ chaired the session. He highlighted that conventional air defence was designed to detect certain airborne flight objects. In recent times, there have been changes in the basic detection capability; and multiple new threats challenge the domain of air defence. We need to address it on priority.

Wg Cdr KJ Antony, Joint Director AD, Air HQ, presented his views on ‘Countering Stealthy Aerial Threats.’ His presentation centred around four fundamental domains pertaining to the attainment of stealth capabilities. These domains encompassed the concept of stealthy aerial threats, their potential ramifications on air operations, as well as the strategies employed to counteract such threats, encompassing both existing and future technologies. He perceived stealth as a fusion of technological elements aimed at evading or prolonging the process of detection. For example, stealth aircraft must possess minimal signatures across various electromagnetic (EM) spectrum domains, including radar, infrared, acoustics, and visual signature. In order to attain stealth capabilities in a fighter aircraft, it is imperative to strike a delicate equilibrium between the attributes of stealth, manoeuvrability, and cost-effectiveness. The individual emphasised that achieving stealth or low observability can be accomplished by reducing radar cross-section, minimising infrared signature, and diminishing visual signature. He classified stealthy aerial threats into three categories: airborne platforms that employ stealth technology, threats with low radar cross-section (RCS) or low observability, and threats that do not require line-of-sight (LOS) engagement, such as terrain-hugging missiles and ballistic missiles. In order to address the challenge posed by covert airborne threats, the individual in question proposed the implementation of an anti-stealth system capable of functioning autonomously or in conjunction with other systems. This system would utilise multiple sensors to generate a comprehensive air situation depiction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful detection. Ultimately, he emphasised the importance of space-based systems to mitigate the risks posed by stealth aerial threats in forthcoming times.

Cdr Viraat Shiggaon, Cdr Staff Requirements, Naval HQ, explained the ‘AD Countermeasures: Naval Perspective.’ He focused on the growing dangers in the maritime sphere and the accompanying advances in AD technology of the future. While marine air defence (AD) is generally comparable to other services, the sea presents unique obstacles. Cooperative engagement is made possible by both long- and medium-range SAMs. The evolution of modern air defence weaponry is motivated by the changing geopolitical landscape. It serves as an anti-access/area-denial mechanism. Since its final velocity is so incredible, it cannot be stopped by traditional AD systems. The use of decoys and MIRVs increases the difficulty of engagement. The topic of the operations of unmanned vehicles and swarm drones was discussed. It is a low-priced A2/AD weapon that regular armies and insurgents can deploy. He discussed potential future technologies for naval air defence, focusing on “the electromagnetic railgun,” which is affordable and can engage supersonic targets at extended ranges; “laser/microwave weapons,” which can engage hypersonic weapons/anti-drone systems; and “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) interceptors,” which can engage ASBMs during both the boost and re-entry phases. He ended by stressing the importance of indigenisation, the introduction of cutting-edge technology and innovations, and the creation of counter-technologies.

Brig. OP Vaishnav, AAD Dte, Army HQ explained ‘Countering Unmanned Aerial Threats – Future Roadmap.’ He focused on how the aerial danger posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has changed over time. UAS include anything from tiny quad/hexa copters to huge fixed-wing military UAVs. There are three levels of threat – superficial, intermediate, and severe. He pointed out that India’s rivals on both sides can now produce and build unmanned aerial systems on their own. The Burraq, Barq LGB, Wingloong-10, CH-4, Shahpar-2, and Sharp Sword are among the dangerous autonomous weapon systems they want to modernise with. Surveillance, identification, and tracking; microprocessors or calculating a firing solution; and interdiction were the three pillars he emphasised under the Counter UAS system pillars.

Sh Amit Kumar, Scientist F, PGAD, DRDO, presented his views on ‘Countering the Threat from Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles and Stand-off Weapons.’ The increased range and precision of ballistic missiles, their potential use by non-state actors, and the diffusion of ballistic missile technology were all issues he brought up, as was the danger posed by ballistic missiles in the Indian subcontinent, he said. India needs a ballistic missile defence system because of its no-first-use (NFU) nuclear strategy. Ballistic, subsonic, and supersonic cruise missiles are the current go-to options for delivering warheads across vast distances. Using hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and MARVs by adversaries is a common strategy for countering and penetrating missile defences. An emerging danger is the hypersonic glide vehicle. Low altitude gliding, high manoeuvrability, re-targeting area, and high cross-range capability to plan the glide path allow it to penetrate enemy ballistic missile defence while engaging time-critical targets like ballistic missile launch pas/silo, deeply buried command centres, air bases, warships, and tactical targets.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, CAPS, delivered his closing remarks at the conclusion of the ideation sessions. Air Marshal Chopra commended the astute presentations and notable presence of all panellists, as well as the intellectually stimulating questions posed by the audience.

The seminar ended with a Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review.

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The New Relevance of High-Tech and Mass

In the dynamic between offense and defence, between tank and anti-tank weapons, between aircraft and air defence (AD) systems, we have seen a new equilibrium that clearly favours defence over the offense. Tanks, the primary instruments of offense, have taken particularly heavy casualties and the sheer lethality of surface-to-air missiles (S-300, S-400/500) have forced Air Forces to stay away from battle areas and restrict sortie generation rates (to just 250-300 a day). These were over 1600 a day in Gulf War I, some 600/day in Yugoslavia and 460/day in the 1971 Bangladesh War). This is a new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and mass. Any armed forces that fail to cater for this new order of lethality and the consequent need for mass, will be making a fatal mistake. Given the scale of casualties, we will have to focus hard on force–preservation, re-constitution of badly battered units and quick replacement of casualties in all future wars. Towards that end, the Indian Army’s move to cut manpower by two lakhs is very inopportune and ill-timed.

Col Jhonson writes, “What we are witnessing is a pivotal moment in military history, the re-ascendence of defence as the decisive form of war. We had seen it in World War and then we saw the same dynamic re-assert itself again by the end of World War Two. The power of the offensive had been restored at the start of that war by the brilliant German doctrine of Blitzkrieg, (which had created a lethal combination of tanks and Stuka dive bombers), to restore mobility on the battlefield. By the end of World War Two, defensive fire power had caught up once again, defeated the German Blitzkrieg and made attrition supreme on the battlefield once more. Stalin had said correctly “Artillery is the God of War.” In Ukraine, we have simply re-learnt the lessons of World War I and II. That is why the Russians chose to go on the defensive in 2023 and have so far inflicted some 70,000 personnel casualties and destroyed almost 7000 armoured vehicles.

Unprecedented Battle Field Transparency

What has favoured the defender and made the task of the attacker even more difficult is the near total level of battle field transparency in Ukraine. The US satellites, UAVs, AWACs, JSTARS, etc, can pick up virtually every single tank, truck and even soldiers that move on the battlefield. Surprise in the attack has, thus, become virtually impossible to achieve. Concentrations can be picked up immediately and even intentions can be discerned through electronic surveillance of enemy communications. What has made Russia’s task even more difficult is the proxy nature of the war. Had it been a direct clash between US and Russia, the latter could have shot down US spy satellites, AWACS and even drones loitering in Poland or Romania. These are now totally safe from any Russian counter-action. In a direct clash the attacker can take prophylactic action to shoot holes in the sky over the projected area of the offensive by downing enemy satellites with ASAT missiles. The proxy nature of this war has kept the surveillance assets of US and NATO totally unmolested and free to snoop on Russia. The levels of battlefield transparency, thus, available to Ukraine have simply been unprecedented in the annals of warfare.

Return of the Stalemate

The new equivalence or equilibrium between defensive and offensive systems has led to brutal stalemates on the battlefields of Ukraine and unprecedented levels of attrition that are reminiscent of the First World War and its sheer carnage. Once again, as in the two World Wars, medium and heavy artillery has proved to be a decisive, war-winning factor. An Austrian Army Operational Research Statistical Analysis (ORSA) study of the last seven years of combat in the Donbas region, has clearly highlighted that 45% of the tank kills, 65 % of artillery guns and 57 % of the vehicles destroyed were by medium artillery – especially of the 152/155 mm calibre.

Despite all the media hype, the total number of tanks destroyed by Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) – Javelins, TOWs, etc, – were just 13%. A major media hype was created that Javelins, Stingers (and later the HIMARS) were singular war winning factors – the US silver bullets that by themselves would win the war single-handedly. There are no silver bullets in war. People said the tank was now a dinosaur – no longer relevant on the modern battlefield. As Capt Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted earlier, the tank has been pronounced dead so many times in recent military history. Each time it reasserts its relevance. It is still the only viable instrument of shock and offensive action. So even though defence has regained primacy over offense in overall terms, the tank remains the sole instrument of offense on the land battlefields. Like at the end of World War II, tanks may have to be used in mass to overcome lethal defenses. Massive artillery barrages have to pave the way for tanks as we saw in the Donbas. We may need more tanks, not less. Top attack is a new vulnerability for tanks but it is certainly something that can and will be countered by simple expedients like canopies and more sophisticated Active Protection System (APS). Besides, despite all this media hype – actual casualties inflicted by the ATGMs on tanks have just been 13%. The real tank-killer was medium artillery (45% tank kills). As such, earlier lessons of the Second World War have simply been revalidated today.

Drones

Drones – unmanned aerial, ground and sea vehicles – have created a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). We have loitering Kamikaze drones that are able to inflict heavy casualties and yet cost so little. Drones are very useful for gaining tactical and contact intelligence and vector in artillery fire and air strikes and launch missiles and bombs. They have brought about a paradigm shift in the nature of war. The Russians have recently retrofitted Iranian Shahed drones with the Glonass navigation system and used them in mass to mask lethal attacks by their cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and saturate Ukrainians air defences.

Wrong Lessons from Low Intensity Conflicts

In fact, the world has learnt some patently incorrect lessons from the era of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The levels of asymmetry between the opponents was inordinately high in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and also in Iraq and even Yugoslavia and Syria. Due to the sheer asymmetry, patently wrong lessons were learnt which cannot withstand the shock of high intensity conflict between evenly matched opponents. No lessons from Afghanistan or Libya can be applied to any Western conflict with peer group competitors like China or Russia. Given the accuracy of precision guided munitions (PGMs), the levels of lethality have gone up by several orders of magnitude. What the Russia-Ukraine war clearly highlights is the need to graduate quickly beyond the era of LIC entailing inordinately high levels of asymmetry between the two sides. The world is rapidly entering into the era of long duration High Intensity Conflicts between evenly matched opponents, where the levels of attrition will be inordinately high.

Nuclear Backdrop

All such future conventional wars will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. So far, the nuclear threat had served to constrain the levels of combat below the nuclear threshold. However, we are increasingly seeing nuclear red lines being completely ignored on the modern conventional battlefield. So far, the USA and NATO have refrained from direct combat with Russia and China. Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy war that has been bled white. The Americans have certainly fought Russia to the last Ukrainian in the current conflict. Either by deliberate design or by sheer accident, the world is careening towards a dangerous Armageddon, a Third World War that may see limited or full-scale use of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Restraints are fast eroding at a rate that spells serious danger for mankind.

An Economic War Coup de Grace?

In hind sight, it is quite apparent that the US and NATO (by the uncalled for eastward expansion of NATO) had deliberately pushed and provoked Russia into the Ukraine War. With some reflection (and purely in hindsight) it appears that a grand design of waging unrestricted economic war against Russia had already been prepared in the US. The aim was, perhaps, to repeat 1991 – when unrelenting economic war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse. That, however, had been the result of a carefully-calibrated, long term, economic war strategy to bring a nuclear power to its knees. It had been triggered by the American induced oil glut of 1986 in which the US had persuaded its surrogate – Saudi Arabia – to flood the world with cheap oil. In that year (1986) itself, petrol prices had plummeted from $30 a barrel to just around $10 a barrel. This unprecedented fall in oil prices had torpedoed and seriously wounded the Soviet economy. It went into a negative tailspin from which it never really recovered. In 1991, the USSR simply vanished without a shot being fired. The USSR splintered into 15 states and simply ceased to exist.

Was that the design that Joe Biden was trying to replicate? If so, the Second Economic War against Russia seems to have floundered rather badly till now. The outcome of this economic war will be far more consequential than the shooting war in Ukraine. At first the Russian Rouble had fallen rather steeply from 80 roubles to a dollar to over 160 roubles to a dollar. Russia, however, took strong and energetic counter measures. They asked for all payments of oil and gas to be made in roubles. Europe was hopelessly dependent upon Russian gas and oil. Creating alternative infrastructure would take minimum four to five years. Despite all brave talk of sanctions, Europe had no option but to keep buying Russian oil and gas on the sly. The cost of the war in Ukraine has been estimated at a billion dollars a day. It is noteworthy that Europe by itself has paid a billion dollars a day to Russia for its oil and gas and this has financed the Ukraine war for Russia.

Economic War and Europe. The Boomerang?

Europe, however, has been hit the hardest. Structurally its energy linkages with Russia were far too deep and comprehensive to be severed in such a hurry. The sudden removal of 3 million barrels a day of Russian oil has caused energy prices to skyrocket. From $70 a barrel they shot up to $125 a barrel. Russia and Ukraine are also the biggest exporters of food grains and sun flower oil. Energy inflation has now combined with food inflation to give a body blow to the global economy that was still reeling from the disastrous impact of the Covid pandemic. Today, the world is staring at a dangerous recession and stagflation. In hindsight, the economic war offensive against Russia has clearly boomeranged. What has clearly been destroyed beyond repair is the trust that was the basis of globalisation. America’s weaponsation of its banking system and economic institutions has destroyed this trust. Russia had a forex reserved $630 bn. Of this $300 billion was invested in US and European banks. America simply seized this money. Will Russia, China or India or other major economies ever put their money and trust in US banks again?

Impact on India

This military conflict is of overwhelming relevance to India. That is simply because over 70% of our cutting-edge military equipment is still of Russian origin. The Americans have tried to ridicule the performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine. It was not incompetence but a shift in the power of the defence over offense that has resulted in the stalemate. Had the US or NATO armies been attacking, they would have found the going as tough, if not tougher. This campaign is, therefore, being closely studied in all armed forces. Let me summarise some primary lesson in the Indian context:

Military Demographic. Demographics is the key to the outcome of any prolonged conflict. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It has a dire shortage of manpower and it is showing badly. Russia had fielded an Army of 1,50,000 against Ukraine, which has fielded some 2,50,000 (now almost 7,50,000 by some estimates) due to complete mobilization. The Russian constraints are painful and showing. It has had to recycle and use the same forces again and again. Due to embarrassing reverses in Kharkiev, Putin was finally forced, in Sep 2022, to order partial mobilization of 3,00,000 reservists. Had he done this at the outset the war would have been long over. He has now conscripted 2,70,000 fresh troops for his impending counter-offensive in winter. This has painful and obvious lessons for India. India has no dearth of manpower but it is cutting down its manpower and switching from a regular full ‘colour service’ Army to short terms inductees (Agniveers). Russian short term inductees (conscripts) have performed poorly in the Ukraine War. We need to draw immediate lessons from this war and take a fresh look at the Agniveer scheme. We may have to increase service tenures from 4 to 7 years and retention levels from 25% to 50%. Future wars will not just be high-tech but high-tech and mass. Seeing the grim realities of the modern battlefield we simply cannot afford to downsize.

The Tank is Dead. All notions that the tank has been turned into a dinosaur by drones, Javelins and TOWs is highly misplaced and premature. Tanks will continue to be the prime platform for offensive action for decades to come.

Medium Artillery. Artillery of the heavy and medium calibres has proved to be a decisive and war winning factor in the new wars of intense attrition. Artillery has inflicted 45% of the tank kills in Ukraine. Before the Kargil War, India had planned to standardize its Artillery around the 155mm caliber. The Bofors scandal badly derailed this plan. We now need to accelerate the mediumistaion of the Artillery with rapid induction of at least 1800 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) of indigenous manufacture at the earliest.

Air Power. Despite near total air superiority, the Russian use of air power was curiously restrained. Perhaps, this has been due to the vastly enhanced lethality of the AD systems (the S-300 and Buk SAMS and the shoulder-fired Stingers). Russian sortie generation rate at its peak was confined to 250-300 per day. In Gulf War I, the USAF was mounting 1600 sorties per day but against a much weaker and outdated air defence system of Iraq. India needs a 45-squadron Air Force to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. Today, we are down to just 30. This is an alarming situation. We must accelerate our induction of fighters like Tejas and at least a 115 more in the Rafale class. Pending this, 155mm gun induction must be rapidly accelerated to make up for short falls in fire power. We may have to increase reliance on tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to much higher levels.

Drones. Drones have become the new war winning factor. Given their low cost the damage they can inflict on enemy tanks and equipment is formidable. They will have to be fielded in massive numbers.

Retrofitting Russian Tanks. Russian T-72 tanks make up 60% of India’s tank fleet. The war has shown ergonomic design flaws, wherein ammunition is stored in the turret which tends to blow up. We will have to retrofit these tanks with overhang compartments for ammunition stowage behind the turret.

Objectivity and ORSA. It is vital that this seminal conflict in Ukraine be studied dispassionately and objectively. There has been an unprecedented barrage of disinformation and propaganda. A military analyst must sift fact from fiction and discern the truth from post-truth. Only an objective (preferably ORSA-based) analysis will help in separating fact from fiction and draw up accurate lessons learnt. Over 3500 Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) to include Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskandars and Cruise missiles (like Yakhont, Klub and Kalibir) were fired. We need to analyse their accuracy and impact on various types of targets.

Nuclear Backdrop. Another impact of overwhelming import is the nuclear backdrop. We find this aspect being recklessly ignored in the hope of snatching some limited advantage on the conventional battlefield. The nuclear threshold has proved to be rather elastic and flexible in the Ukraine War. Despite repeated Russian threats and nuclear sabre rattling, not a single nuke has been used so far. In fact no nuke has even been moved into firing position. What does that tell us about an India-Pakistan or an India-China war? Are nuclear weapons becoming an unusable resource? Or are we heading for an accidental or deliberate nuclear escalation that could prove to be catastrophic?

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A well-supported network is required for integrated cooperation that can share information and data across all domains. Using dual-use satellites to create a secure information network is one possibility.

As per the US Army’s perspective on MDO, no service can conduct multi-domain operations alone. The conduct of operations by a joint force or anything resembling multi-domain operations is challenging since it is dependent upon common understanding of the situational awareness amongst Services. The US military is still coming to grips with its efforts to raise MDO into joint all domain operations.

IAF and MDO

The IAF does not already have in place its integrated air defence system (IADS) where the most dominant sensor, i.e., the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is intermeshed with airborne and land-based radar networks. The meaningful IADS would need to be extended to other battlefield and shipborne sensors and made more robust with ground-based air defence systems. The combination of manned and unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, surface to surface systems, shipborne systems, electronic jammers and cyber systems will have to be, thus, well conceived. For example, SEAD attack could be carried out on the enemy air defence system either by using aerial bombing or cyber-attack on routers, data base, computers or displays or a combination depending on the effects desired. In network centric warfare, the time compression in decision making and consequent force application is pivotal for a winning result.

Leveraging Air Power and Space Domain in MDO.

There is a convergence of the Army and Navy towards leveraging air power in the future conflict. Multiple agencies from air, space, sea and ground sensors are collecting huge data in the battlefield which is the essence of MDO. It entails joint air domain and joint C4ISR. MDO involves multiple forces – surface, marine surface, sub-surface, air, space, missile force, cyber, electro-optical, and various other agencies, including the government. It is for surveillance, battle assessment, command and control, navigation, synchronisation in time and space.

There is a need to have kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite capability, space-based laser electronic warfare can also affect air and surface operations. The key to MDO is ambiguity, and the advantage that satellites provide, in influencing the space, which then becomes another battleground.

Land Warfare Doctrine

The Land Warfare Doctrine propagates deterrence by denial, especially against China’s layered defence and offensive capabilities. India’s Land Warfare Doctrine has set out the case for emerging technologies such as AI and directed-energy weapons. These have the potential to be the foundation for India’s efforts to develop MDO and act as a bulwark against A2AD technologies. MDO will also permit Indian defence forces to pursue Indian national security objectives by compensating for any weaknesses in certain domains. This can be done by combining capabilities in others and producing asymmetric returns and avoiding the unnecessary diffusion and scattering of assets.

MDO at Sea

MDO at sea has four domains and three enablers – sea and land , under-sea, and air domain – all battle winning factors. The electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyber are the three enablers. MDO, as conceived today are fundamental extension of air-land battle. The Navy and Air Force have the air-sea battle, which becomes the joint axis in the manoeuvre. real time networking and command & control  are the two main challenges in MDO.

Integration of Networks

An encrypted data link architecture for net-centric warfare across each domain would be best suited tool for such a task. To facilitate information sharing for enhanced situational awareness, such a network system would need to have a high degree of connectivity and take the least time to establish an accurate common operational picture.

There is a need to combine aspects of network-centricity, combat cloud and combined fires to build a connect between sensing and targeting across domains. Also, there is a need to define the grid construct of the sensing, information, effects and command grids, as well as, layer them to receive, process, store and communicate information over the network. In other words, quick and secure exchange of tactical data like pictures, text messages, imagery and digital voice in real time to be used by combatants/platforms /entities in each domain.

For MDO, the Indian armed forces must evolve the conceptual understanding of strategies, operations, communications mechanisms, enabling policies, C2 styles, force as well as support structures.

Integration of Cyber Domain

Integration of the cyber domain into the Armed Forces Joint Doctrine and operational concepts is required to be effective in regular as well as irregular wars in, from and through cyber space. Our enemies will leverage technological advances to blend space and cyber operations as the battlefield acquires a multi-domain complexion. Structuring multi-domain warfare capability through a Net-Centric structure will not be easy and will require defining the roles and responsibilities, nature of information to be exchanged, connectivity and the degree of coupling of capability across domains. Success, as with any new military concept, will depend on the leadership’s commitment to change and to accord a forceful direction to bring disparate Service interests and functional areas (space, air, sea, land and cyber) together to function through a common network.

Enhancing Jointness through MDO

A joint force certainly facilitates cross-domain synergy, but a single service should also have cross-domain capabilities to some extent. In a joint force, cross-domain synergy creates and exploits symmetrical advantages. Indian Armed Forces have embarked on this challenging route recently and much work needs to be done. Our forces need to focus on their core expertise, including focus in the new military domains.

The main challenges which are foreseen in conduct of MDO includes collusion of our adversaries across the complete spectrum, technology driven ISR capabilities to achieve situational awareness, investment in development of disruptive technologies which have changed the character of war and building fully networked joint command & control structures across all domains. To achieve convergence and to overcome the challenges, it is recommended that joint Multi-Domain Task Forces be created to train and build a cohesive force and build capacities & capabilities towards modernisation in achieving cohesion.

Theaterisation: Way Ahead in Achieving Convergence

There is a need to upgrade existing capacity significantly in the newer domains of cyber, space and human cognition as the mastery of traditional domains of land, air and sea no longer suffice. A typical MDO engagement which is enabled by low orbit technologies, a tri-service combat cloud, a cyber strike, a swarm of offensive drones to take on the counter attacking forces? Therefore, mere structure corrections will not be enough but other cognitive corrections are important along the route to jointmanship. There is a need to create a new kind of mindset and HR skills as investment in softer layers of hard power is a reality – faster the better. The key to decision-making in MDO is harnessing disruptive technologies to create a combat cloud with integrated networks. What is also critical are critical for achieving cohesion in MDO is civil-military fusion, inter-agency cross-pollination, strategic partnerships and a whole of nation approach. MDO is not an option but it is a reality that must be adopted

Cohesion through Convergence of a Joint Force in MDO

It is extremely difficult to capture the exact nature of a future war with definite certainty. It could be assumed that the future war will be multi-dimensional and multi -domain wherein our enemies will tend to blend conventional or asymmetric and hybrid capabilities across all domains, thereby compelling us to re-examine existing military concepts and doctrines. There is a need to incorporate the advanced technologies in a command and control system. A multi-domain connection is necessary if one has to integrate and exploit information from multiple sources, including sensors, databases, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance to formulate an integrated response.

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Development of Phase-I of the two-tier BMD, which is designed to track and destroy nuclear missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the earth’s atmosphere at altitudes from 15-25 km to 80-100 km for “a higher kill probability”, was completed by DRDO some time ago.

The government, however, has so far refrained from sanctioning its full-scale operational deployment at any vital location, sources said. This could be due to the high costs involved, or even strategic calculations that it may provoke Pakistan to go in for a larger nuclear arsenal and countermeasures to defeat the BMD system.

India, of course, has inducted the Russian S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile systems that can detect, track and destroy incoming strategic bombers, jets, spy planes, drones and even some intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

DRDO, on its part, is going ahead in developing the requisite technologies for a full-fledged BMD system. As per the original plan, Phase-I of the BMD system, with interceptors flying at 4.5 Mach supersonic speeds to intercept enemy missiles, was meant to tackle hostile missiles with a 2,000-km strike range. The Phase-II, in turn, is supposed to take on the 5,000-km range class of missiles.

On 2 November, the new interceptor missile called AD-1, with “a large kill altitude” was successfully tested against “an electronic target” from the APJ Abdul Kalam Island off the Odisha coast. The flight-test was carried out with elements of the BMD system being placed at different geographical locations.
“The AD-1 is a long-range interceptor missile designed for both low exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interception of long-range ballistic missiles as well as aircraft (like AWACS or airborne warning and control systems),” the defence ministry said.

Propelled by a two-stage solid motor, the AD-1 is equipped with indigenously-developed advanced control systems, navigation and guidance algorithms to precisely guide the vehicle to the target.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh said AD-1 “is a unique type of interceptor with advanced technologies available with only a very few nations in the world”, while expressing confidence that it will further strengthen the country’s BMD capability and take it to the next level.

DRDO chairman Samir V Kamat, in turn, said the AD-1 interceptor will provide “great operational flexibility to the users and has the capability to engage many different types of targets”.

Only a few countries like the US, Russia, Israel and China have fully-operational BMD systems, with an overlapping network of early-warning and tracking sensors, reliable command and control posts, land and sea-based batteries of advanced interceptor missiles.

India’s BMD programme has been in the works since the late-1990s, with its first interceptor missile being tested in November 2006. Having conducted over a dozen tests of the BMD system since then, a few of which have failed, DRDO in the past has said that it has a “kill probability of 99.8%” with the mix of exo and endo-interceptor missiles. AD-1 is a new and flexible endo-interceptor missile.

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The Indian Air Force (IAF), which is down to 31 fighter jet squadrons (some 16-18 planes in each squadron), is banking on rapid induction of the indigenous Tejas and a separate programme with a foreign partner to ramp up numbers.

The IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, while addressing a press conference ahead of Air Force Day, said 83 of the Tejas Mark 1-A are on order and the proposal to make 114 medium-range fighter aircraft (MRFA) in India has been finalised. The foreign manufacturers in the MRFA project have been asked to have a greater “Make in India” commitment.

Another 10 planes of the first lot of 40 Tejas will be delivered this year. “The project to get 12 additional Sukhoi-30 MKI and 21 of the MiG-29 is deferred,” he added.

On further long-term projects, the IAF chief said the force was committed to the indigenous Tejas Mark 2 and is looking at six squadrons and also the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

The IAF will phase out the three squadrons of MiG-21 by 2024. The phasing out of the fleet of Jaguar jets — six squadrons — will start from 2025 and continue till 2032. By that time, the Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 fleets — three squadrons each — would be scheduled for phasing out, the IAF chief added.

The chief added, “With the given numbers (31 squadrons), it will be impossible to keep watch and do combat air patrol all across the country.” The target of 42 squadrons would remain even though it may take a decade to meet it, the IAF chief said.

‘Transforming for the Future’

The theme for this year’s anniversary celebrations – ‘IAF: Transforming for the Future’ — was very apt and highlighted the Indian Air Force’s need to redefine, reimagine and recalibrate to transform into a contemporary and future-ready force, the Air Chief said.

“Our fighting potential has to be sustained over the years through the induction of 4.5 Gen fighters, AWACS, AEW&C and flight refuelling aircraft. We have initiated necessary steps to ensure our fighter squadron strength remains at the desired level. Indigenous development of six AEW&C Mk-II has been sanctioned and we are actively pursuing the acquisition of ISTAR, UAVs, Counter UAS technology and strengthening our networks,” he said.

Modern armed forces, he said, have to be sufficiently self-reliant to ensure minimum disruptions. “Towards this, Atmanirbharta and Make-in-India are a step in the right direction. Our indigenous operational network AFNET, the backbone of all air operations IACCS, one of the largest maintenance management protocols e-MMS and the fact that we are completely paperless in our offices through the e-Office application is a testimony to our commitment towards becoming self-reliant,” he said.

The LCA, ALH, Akash surface-to-air missile, Astra BVR, LCH and Brahmos, he said, are a few examples of the indigenous hardware that has already been inducted and operationalised.

He said the IAF has signed a contract for 83 LCA Mk 1A and is fully committed to the development of LCA Mk-II and the AMCA.

“The advent of drones, swarm drones, hypersonic weapons and space based ISR systems have added a new dimension to war fighting. To effectively handle the full spectrum, artificial intelligence is being used for quicker decision-making and analysis of big data. I am happy to report that several projects are well underway to utilise the potential of automation, data analytics and artificial intelligence to transform our operational philosophy,” he said.

Phasing Out of Obsolete Aircraft

The Indian Air Force (IAF) maintains that its sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons will remain sacrosant, even though its current numbers have fallen to 31 squadrons. In actual terms, 31 squadrons doesn’t mean “31 squadrons” because the availability ratio of some of the aircraft types was less than 50 percent.

With the growing presence of both Pakistani and Chinese Air Forces, for the IAF, quantity matters when it comes to the ability to operate in a large geographical area and persistence which refers to the ability to conduct 24×7 air patrols. However, even if the entire planned procurement happened without any glitch or time delays, the IAF may just about reach 35 squadrons, against a sanctioned strength of 42, by 2035-36.

Achieving the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons by 2036 is dependent upon the induction of the Tejas Mark 2, the indigenous 5th generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and 114 fighter aircraft for which a Request For Proposal (RFP) is still awaited.

Over the next 15 years, multiple squadrons would be phased out, starting with the three remaining MiG 21 Bison squadrons, which would be out of service by 2025. Following this, six squadrons of aging Jaguars would start being phased out as well, a process that will end by 2031-32. That is when the upgraded fleet of the Mirage 2000s and the MiG 29s will start getting phased out.

Last of the Remaining MiG-21s to Retire

The IAF is set to retire one of its four remaining squadrons of the ageing MiG-21 fighter jets on September 30. The other three MiG-21 squadrons will be phased out by 2025.

Several MiG-21s have crashed in recent years, with the accidents turning the spotlight on India’s longest-serving fighter plane, its safety record and IAF’s plans to replace the ageing jets with newer models in the coming years. Over 400 MiG-21s have been involved in accidents over the past six decades, killing around 200 pilots.

More MiG-21s have crashed than any other fighter jets because they formed the bulk of the combat aircraft in the IAF’s inventory for a long time. The air force had to keep its MiG-21 fleet flying longer than it would have liked because of delays in the induction of new aircraft, as previously reported.

The air force got its first single-engine MiG-21 in 1963, and it went on to induct 874 variants of the Soviet-origin supersonic fighters to bolster its combat potential.

IAF is inducting different variants of the indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft to replace the MiG-21s.

Replacements Planned

The IAF has already ordered 83 LCA Tejas Mk 1A and plans to place an order for the Tejas Mk 2 as well besides the indigenous 5th Generation fighter aircraft, both of which are still in the design phase.

The IAF is keen on the 114 Medium Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) for which it is in the process of firming up the technical requirements, following which a “Request for Proposal (RFP)” would be sent out.

The tender has been pending for long. While initially it was felt that the government may go in for a strategic decision and enter into a government to government contract with France for more Rafale, it appears that the controversy surrounding the original deal has made the government wary. Hence, a decision has been taken to go in for a MRFA contest. The IAF is in the process of taking commitments from the vendors regarding the indigenization element.

IAF to Get New Weapon Systems Branch

Moving to synergise operational requirements of the Indian Air Force, the government has approved the creation of a new Weapon Systems branch which will be responsible for all IAF weapon system operators, and bring them under one roof. The announcement was made by the IAF chief on Air Force Day 8 October.

The Branch will cover four specialised streams of surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, remotely piloted aircraft and weapon system operators in twin and multi-crew aircraft. Creation of this branch will result in savings of over Rs 3,400 crore due to reduced expenditure on flying training.

The establishment of a separate branch for missile system operators, unmanned aerial vehicles and weapon system officers of two-seater aircraft is an effort to synergise operational requirements which differ from active flying. 

A specialised branch will facilitate induction of more complex weapon systems. The weapon systems operator in a twin-seater aircraft does not have to be a full-fledged pilot as his core competence is handling the weapons on board. It would do away with piecemeal deployment of officers from non-specialised branches and institutionalise the non-flying operational cadre. Pilots would be spared from doing the task, thereby making them available for flying duties. This separate branch is also expected to include officers who specialise as intelligence analysts and operate intelligence-gathering tasks in unmanned aerial vehicles as well as space-based assets. Here again, the need for building core competence in a separate branch has long been felt by the IAF brass, given the increasing role of UAVs and space assets in information gathering and advance warning.

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The industry has matured. It has moved from designing as per drawings to now having the ability to design according to the specifications. The encouragement to industry is showing. We have roped them in to make big equipment, on integration of missiles, bombs and many other systems.

The immediate targets, according to Dr Reddy, are increasing the range of air-to-air missiles beyond 150 km and that of surface-to-air missiles beyond 250 km.

Airborne radars and long-range 1,000-plus km radars are the next on plan, with the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for fighter jets ending its final testing. For the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), DRDO “may go in for the special purpose vehicle model”.

The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mark2 is in the final design phase, while the AMCA design is in advanced stages. “We will definitely meet timelines on the AMCA and LCA Mark2,” he said.

On ground fighting equipment, Dr Reddy said, “We are looking for partners for Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) and Future Ready Combat Vehicles (FRCV).”

The scenario, he points out, is changing. “We are getting enquiries for export of Akash missiles, torpedoes and artillery gun, the ATAGS, to name a few.”

Air Independent Propulsion System (AIP), that allows conventional submarines to remain under water for longer periods, has been demonstrated. “We are working to integrate the system. The basic model has been made.”

India, he said, has become self-sufficient in many technological areas like missiles, radars, sonars, electronic warfare systems, Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS), artillery guns, armoured vehicles and fighter aircraft.

“Industry participation is growing. We have at least 2,000 industries, which are capable of making systems and sub-systems of equipment. Close to 10,000 are now suppliers of components,” according to Dr Reddy, who is also the secretary, Department of Defence R&D.

“Industry has matured. It has moved from the ability to design as per drawings to now have the ability to design as per specifications,” he says.

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The move, will provide India’s defence ecosystem with new capabilities and cost effective solutions in the market,” said the IAF.

“The MoU will facilitate HAL and IAI’s decades’ long expertise in developing, manufacturing and producing leading defence platforms. The scope of the MoU also covers ‘passenger to freighter aircraft’ conversion, along with MMTT conversions.

IAI has experience in modified aircraft for the IAF. In the early 2000s, IAI fitted the Phalcon radar into three IAF IL-76 aircraft, converting them into Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).

With the Russian options considered outdated, the IAF will probably have to choose between the Airbus and Boeing options.

The Airbus 330 MRTT carries more fuel than the KC-46A Pegasus – 111 tonnes, as against 96 tonnes – but which remains in many respects a civilian airliner that retains commercial airline-style seating inside for 291 passengers. The KC-46A Pegasus has modular, military style, palletised seating that can be quickly bolted on for up to 160 passengers. Alternatively, it can carry 54 stretchers with patients.

The KC-46A’s tanker-specific avionics include state-of-the-art displays developed for the 787 Dreamliner. The USAF has insisted on the “boom operator” – who operates the boom that pumps fuel at 1,200 gallons per minute into the aircraft being refuelled – having a three-dimensional view from seven cameras that look to the rear.

Airbus, however, points out that its A330-200 has won practically every MRTT contest in the world. It has logged orders from the air forces of Australia, the UK, France, Saudi Arabia, The Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, and the UAE.

For the past decade-and-a-half, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been trying to buy six MMTT aircraft to supplement its eight obsolescent Russian Illyushin-78 refuellers.

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