During the conflict, East Pakistan’s naval ports were left defenseless as the Eastern Military Command of Pakistan had decided to fight the war without the navy and faced with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, the navy planned to remain in the ports when war broke out.

In the eastern wing, the Pakistan Navy had heavily depended on her gun boat squadron. Pakistan’s Eastern Naval Command was in direct command of Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff who also served as the right-hand of Lieutenant-General Niazi. The Pakistan Navy had 4 gun boats (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, and Sylhet). The boats were capable of attaining maximum speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors. Having known as Pakistan Navy’s brown water navy, the gun boats were equipped with various weapons, including heavy machine guns. The boats were adequate for patrolling and led anti-insurgency operations. But they were hopelessly out of place in a conventional warfare.

Operation Jackpot had severely damaged the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. Before the start of hostilities, all the naval gun boats were stationed at the Chittagong. As the air operations began, IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sank on 4 December. On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired. Rajashahi managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16.

Covert Naval Operations

The Indian Navy started the covert naval operations, which were executed successfully. The Eastern Naval Command of Indian Navy had coordinated, planned, and executed these covert naval operations. In the end months of 1971, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan’s Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. The Pakistan Army’s Combatant High Command, The GHQ, insisted and pressured Pakistan Navy to deploy PNS Ghazi and to extend its sphere of naval operations, into East-Pakistan shores.

In the Eastern wing of Pakistan, the Navy had never maintained a squadron of warships, despite the calls were made by Eastern Naval Command’s Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff.[citation needed] Instead, a brown water navy was formed consisting a gun boats riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, in eastern wing, repair and logistic facilities were not developed at Chittagong. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command virtually faced no opposition from the Eastern theatre. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.

On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF’s capability to retaliate.

The Pakistan Navy responded by deploying her aging long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, to counter the threat as the Naval Command had overruled the objections by her officers. The PNS Ghazi, under the command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, was assigned to locate the INS Vikrant, but when it was not able to locate, decided to mine the port of Vishakapatnam the Headquarter of Eastern Naval Command. The Indian Navy’s Naval Intelligence laid a trap to sink the submarine by giving fake reports about the aircraft carrier. At around midnight of 3-4 December, the PNS Ghazi began its operation of laying mines. The Indian Navy dispatched INS Rajput to counter the threat.

The INS Rajput’s sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.

The sinking of Ghazi turned out to be a major blow and setback for Pakistan Naval operations in East-Pakistan. It diminished the possibilities of carry out the large scale of Pakistan naval operations in Bay of Bengal. It also eliminated further threat possessed by Pakistan Navy to Indian Eastern Naval Command. On reconnaissance mission, the Ghazi was ordered to report back to her garrison on November 26, and admitted a report Naval Combatant Headquarter, NHQ. However, it was failed to return to her garrison. Anxiety grew day by day at the NHQ and NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the submarine failed to produce results.

On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. On December 7/8, the airfields of PAF were destroyed, and the campaign continued until 9 December. On December 12, Pakistan Navy laid mines on amphibious landing approaches to Chittagong. This proved a useful trap for some time, and it had denied any direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed. The Indian Navy therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox Bazar with the aim cutting off the line of re-treat for Pakistan Army troops. On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier. After fighting for days, the human cost was very high for Pakistani forces, and no opposition or resistance was offered by Pakistani forces to Indian forces.

The successful Indian Air Operations and Operation Jackpot, led by the Bengali units with the support of Indian Army, undermined the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. By the time Pakistan Defences Forces surrendered, the Navy had suffered the most damage as almost all of the gun boats, destroyer (PNS Sylhet), and the long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, were lost in the conflict, including their officers.

On December 16, at 16:13hrs, Deputy Command of Eastern Command and the Commander of Eastern Naval Command, Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff surrendered his Naval Command to Vice-Admiral R.N. Krishna Eastern Naval Command.

The Sinking of PNS Ghazi – Pak Version

In his book, “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”, written in 1972 soon after the war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 337)

“The submarine Ghazi was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The Ghazi’s task was to carry out offensive mine laying against Visakhapatnam.

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in the area.

“On 14 November 1971, PNS Ghazi, under the command of Cdr Zafar Mohammad Khan, sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol.

“The first indication of Ghazi’s tragic fate came when a message by NHQ India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December but issued strangely enough on 9 December, was intercepted. Both the manner of its release and the text quoted below clarified very little: “I am pleased to announce that Pakistan Navy Submarine Ghazi sunk off Visakhapatnam by our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and other conclusive evidence floated to surface yesterday – 091101 EF”… As it happened, the release of the message on 9 December also served to divert attention of their public from the sinking of Khukri on this very date even though the claim of sinking Ghazi was apparently made a few hours before the loss of Khukri”.

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The Indian Navy (IN) participated in the Second Phase of Multilateral Maritime Exercise Malabar along with the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF), Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the United States Navy (USN). The exercise was conducted in the Bay of Bengal from 12 – 15 Oct 2021. First Phase of the exercise was conducted in the Philippines Sea from 26 – 29 Aug 2021.

The Indian Navy’s participation included INS Ranvijay, INS Satpura, P8I Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and a Submarine. The US Navy was represented by the Aircraft Carrier USS Carl Vinson along with two destroyers, USS Lake Champlain and USS Stockdale. The JMSDF was represented by JS Kaga and JS Murasame. The Royal Australian Navy was represented by HMAS Ballarat and HMAS Sirius.

The Second Phase of the exercise built upon the synergy, coordination and inter-operability developed during the First Phase of the exercise and focussed on advanced surface and anti-submarine warfare exercises, seamanship evolutions and weapon firings.

The Malabar series of exercises, which began as an annual bilateral naval exercise between India and the US in 1992, has seen increasing scope and complexity over the years. The 25th edition of Malabar, conducted in two phases, while observing all protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic, was reflective of the commitment of the participating countries to support a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific as well as a rules-based international order.

On the role of Malabar-2021, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), U.S. Navy, Michael Gilday, said that about 60% of global maritime trade passes through the IOR region, which includes 90% of the oil. The economy of any country depends on free and secure maritime trade and our vision is to hold such joint exercises to keep the oceans free and secure, he said.

The exercise not only opens up naval cooperation among the four countries but also makes trade in the region easier. It is one of the duties of the navy to provide free passage to the commercial trade and such exercises bolster the cause.

First Phase

The Quad countries — Australia, Japan, India, and the United States — participated in the first phase of Malabar naval exercises off the coast of Guam from August 26-29. This was the second time in a row that the exercise included Australia. Since 2015, Japan has been a permanent partner in the exercise.

In a press release, the Indian Ministry of Defence said that “Malabar-21 would witness high-tempo exercises conducted between destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, helicopters and Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft of the participating navies. Complex surface, sub-surface and air operations including Live Weapon Firing Drills, Anti-Surface, Anti-Air and Anti-Submarine Warfare Drills, Joint Manoeuvres and Tactical exercises will be conducted during the exercise.”

Indian frigate INS Shivalik and corvette INS Kadmatt took part in the first phase. The two ships were already in the region as part of their scheduled deployment to Southeast Asia from August 9 onward. Prior to their arrival in Guam for the Malabar 21 exercise, the two ships were in Brunei for an annual exercise and professional interactions with the Royal Brunei Navy.

China’s Concern

China has looked at the growing Quad engagements, and the Malabar exercises in particular, with increasing concern. China has also stepped up its naval exercises. It carried out a live ammunition training near Guangdong in the South China Sea and off the northeast coast near Liaoning in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Strait. The exercises appeared to be conducted with the goal of sending a message of force and strength to the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific partners.

The fact that Australia has become a “regular” partner in the Malabar series of exercises is an indication of India’s hardening position as it pertains to China. 

In April 2021, the Quad plus France engaged in the La Pérouse exercise in the Bay of Bengal, reflecting the growing strategic convergence among a number of Quad-plus countries in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that is respectful of a rules-based order.  

China has been suspicious about the purpose of the Malabar exercise as it feels that the annual war game is an effort to contain its influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

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A Thai proposal to replace China’s relentless efforts to create Kra Canal project, which if implemented would give PLA Navy direct access to Bay of Bengal bypassing Malacca Strait, has been welcomed by India. India had expressed reservations over the proposed canal project as it could be threat to its security interests in the Bay of Bengal.

A canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra would shorten its access to the Indian Ocean by 1,100 kms bypassing Malacca Straits. China has been apprehensive that its commercial tankers and Navy ships can be blocked by USA or regional countries in Malacca Straits. The Kra Canal would have been part of China’s “string of pearls” policy, including control over ports and potential naval bases in Cambodia and Sri Lanka.

Thailand has different plans to construct two deep seaports on both sides of the country’s southern coast, which would be linked via rail and highway – a 100 kilometre highway and rail passageway linking two seaports on either side of Thailand’s southern coast. This proposal replaces the Kra Canal plan.

Wiser about the canal’s inherent dangers, the Thai Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob recently said he preferred building rail and highway links across the isthmus instead of a canal.

Kra Canal

The current Thai canal proposal, known as the 9A route, would involve two parallel channels—each 30 meters deep, 180 meters wide, and running 75 miles at sea level from Songkhla on the Gulf of Thailand to Krabi in the Andaman Sea.

Second Sea Route

A long-mooted canal across southern Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, the narrowest point of the Malay peninsula, which would open a second sea route from China to the Indian Ocean, could allow the Chinese navy to quickly move ships between its newly constructed bases in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean without diverting more than 1000 kms south to round the tip of Malaysia.

The Thai canal could become a crucial strategic asset for China—and a potential noose around Thailand’s narrow southern neck. If Thailand allows China to invest up to $30 billion in digging the canal, it may find that the associated strings are attached forever.

Malacca Strait

The Malacca Strait has been a key corridor of global commerce for centuries, if not millennia. The Italian adventurer Marco Polo sailed through the strait in 1292 on his way home from the court of Kublai Khan. In the early 1400s, China’s Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He passed through on his voyages to India, Africa, and the Middle East. Today, more than 80,000 ships a year transit the strait, which is a key corridor bringing oil to East Asia and manufactured goods back out. Modern Singapore’s prosperity has been built on its strategic location at the narrow southeastern end of the strait.

A quarter of globally traded goods use the Strait of Malacca. The current route through the Malacca Strait has almost reached its safe limit in terms of the shipping volume it can handle. Current alternatives to Malacca, like Indonesia’s Sunda Strait, would require east-west cargos to detour even further out of their way.

Chinese Submarines

Thailand is quietly but steadily pushing back against China by delaying plans to buy two Chinese submarines and expressing interest to replace Chinese proposal to build a canal in Bay of Bengal with its own project, a decision that could be welcomed in Delhi.

Thailand decided to delay, on 31 August, its $ 724 million purchase of two submarines from China, following public outrage over the controversial deal. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha – also defence minister – “requested the navy to consider a delay” in the purchase of the two additional submarines.

Under a 2015 deal, Thailand had finalised its purchase of three submarines in 2017, with the first one expected to be delivered in 2023.

India’s Concerns

At sea, China is attempting to encircle India with a series of alliances and naval bases evocatively known as the string of pearls. China’s greatest vulnerability in its strategy to dominate the Indian Ocean—and thereby India—is the Malacca Strait, a narrow sea lane separating Singapore and Sumatra, through which so much marine traffic must pass that it’s both a lifeline for China’s seaborne trade and the main path for its navy toward South Asia, and points further west. With regards to China’s rivalry with India—and its strategic ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and beyond—anything that reduces the dependency on one narrow chokepoint between potentially hostile powers is vital.

A Thai Canal would fit neatly into Beijing’s plans to encircle India. The Chinese Navy is actively pushing west into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, opening an East African logistics base in Djibouti and conducting joint exercises in the region with the navies of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia. The plethora of China-sponsored port infrastructure projects throughout the region only add to the impression of encirclement. India has responded by gearing up for potential future confrontations with China at sea.

India’s Counter Actions

India can effectively counter Chinese expansionism by upgrading its domestic forward bases and air and naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, specifically to counter China. An Indian union territory with a population of fewer than half a million, the strategic archipelago intersects the sea lanes leading from the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. They also have the potential to quarantine the proposed Thai canal.

Comments

The canal had gained widespread support among Thailand’s political elite. Chinese influence operations in Thailand probably helped shape public opinion.

The politically powerful Thai army argued that Thailand could divert some of that prosperity to itself, building industrial parks and logistics hubs at both ends of what could become one of Asia’s major transit arteries. But Thailand risks splitting itself in two with the proposed project. It has an active insurgency in its three southernmost provinces, which are majority Muslim in religion and majority Malay in ethnicity. The canal could become a symbolic border between “mainland” Thailand in the north and a separatist movement in the south. If Thailand were ever to break in two, the Thai canal could be the fault along which it cracks.

Colombia once had a northwestern isthmus called Panama. When Panamanian secessionists revolted in 1903, the U.S. Navy stepped in to ensure the new country’s independence. Panama has been a virtual U.S. protectorate ever since.

A successful Thai canal project would reconfigure the political geography of Southeast Asia. It would bring in China as a permanent security partner that could not easily be kicked out—just like Panama.

The real concern is that it would further undermine the independence of poor southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Cambodia, which have comparatively weak civil societies that are highly vulnerable to Chinese interference.

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