China has lent substantial amounts to various countries for energy and infrastructure projects, primarily under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

These debts reflect China’s extensive global investments in energy, transport, and connectivity projects, often resulting in significant financial obligations for borrowing nations.

Main projects Driving Pakistan’s Debt to China

Pakistan’s debt to China is primarily driven by projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Here are the main projects contributing to Pakistan’s debt:

Energy Projects. A significant portion of Pakistan’s debt stems from energy infrastructure, including coal, hydro, wind, and solar power plants. These projects were designed to address Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages but have resulted in substantial financial obligations due to high-interest loans and capacity payments owed to Chinese companies. Under the Energy Framework Agreement, Pakistan is required to allocate funds to ensure Chinese investors are compensated for any shortfalls, further adding to its financial burden.

Infrastructure Development. CPEC includes the construction of highways and motorways, such as the Karakoram Highway and the Multan-Sukkur Motorway, which aim to improve connectivity within Pakistan and with China. The modernization of Pakistan Railways, including the Main Line-1 (ML-1) project, is another key component of CPEC. This project alone is estimated to cost $6.8 billion.

Gwadar Port Development. The development of Gwadar Port and its associated infrastructure has been a central focus of CPEC. This includes port facilities, an international airport, and free trade zones aimed at making Gwadar a regional trade hub.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs). CPEC includes the establishment of SEZs across Pakistan to promote industrialization and attract foreign investment. However, these zones have yet to deliver significant economic benefits.

Pipelines and Energy Transmission. Projects include oil and gas pipelines as well as energy transmission lines to facilitate energy distribution across Pakistan.

While these projects have improved infrastructure and energy availability in Pakistan, they have also created a heavy debt burden due to high-interest loans, limited economic returns from the projects, and inefficiencies in project management. As of 2023, China accounted for approximately 30% of Pakistan’s external debt, with much of it tied to CPEC-related initiatives.

Debt Converted to Ownership

China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” refers to instances where countries, unable to repay loans for major infrastructure projects funded by China, have ceded control of strategic assets. Below are notable examples where this has occurred:

Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota Port to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017 after failing to repay $1.4 billion in loans from China. This has been widely cited as a classic example of debt-trap diplomacy, granting China strategic influence in the Indian Ocean.

Laos. In 2020, Laos ceded a 90% stake in its electricity grid (Électricité du Laos Transmission Company) to a Chinese company after struggling with debt repayments. This move gave China significant control over the country’s energy infrastructure, raising concerns about its ability to influence domestic energy supplies.

Tajikistan. Facing challenges in repaying Chinese loans, Tajikistan reportedly granted mining rights for gold and silver deposits to Chinese companies. This arrangement has been viewed as a way for China to secure valuable natural resources in exchange for debt relief.

Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, heavily indebted to China, risks losing control over key infrastructure such as the Bishkek thermal power plant and the Datka-Kemin power transmission line if it defaults on its loans.

Zambia. There have been concerns that Zambia might lose control of ZESCO (electricity company) due to its inability to service Chinese loans tied to energy and infrastructure projects. While no formal transfer has occurred yet, the situation highlights the risks of debt dependency.

These examples illustrate how China’s lending practices can lead to significant economic and strategic leverage over borrowing nations, often involving critical infrastructure or natural resources. However, it is worth noting that some analysts argue that these cases are exceptions rather than standard practice and that many countries willingly accept such terms due to their pressing financial needs.

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Ports Controlled by China

Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka). China Merchants Port Holdings owns a 70% stake in this port. Located near major shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, Hambantota is critical for China’s access to Middle Eastern oil and trade routes. The port has been leased to China for 99 years, raising concerns about its potential military use.

Gwadar Port (Pakistan). Operated by the China Overseas Port Holding Company. Situated near the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar is a key part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It provides China with direct access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing traditional routes through the Malacca Strait.

Port of Piraeus (Greece). COSCO Shipping holds a majority stake in this port. Piraeus serves as China’s gateway to Europe, facilitating trade and logistics across the continent. It is one of the largest container ports in Europe and plays a vital role in China’s MSR strategy.

Djibouti Port (Djibouti). Operated by Chinese companies alongside China’s only overseas naval base. Located at the entrance to the Red Sea, Djibouti is critical for controlling access to the Suez Canal and monitoring maritime traffic in East Africa. Its dual-use capability supports both commercial and military operations.

Chancay Port (Peru). COSCO Shipping owns a 60% stake. Recently developed as part of China’s expansion into Latin America, Chancay connects Chinese markets with South American commodities like copper and lithium.

Khalifa Port (United Arab Emirates). Operated by COSCO Shipping Ports. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, Khalifa Port strengthens China’s presence in the Middle East and facilitates trade with Europe and Africa.

Panama Ports (Panama Canal). Hutchison Ports operates ports on both sides of the canal. Though China does not control the canal itself, its presence in Panama enhances its ability to influence global shipping routes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Darwin Port (Australia). A Chinese company holds a 99-year lease on this port. Strategically located near Southeast Asia, Darwin Port is critical for China’s trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region.

Colombo Port City (Sri Lanka). Developed by Chinese firms under a long-term lease agreement. This artificial city is designed as a hub for trade, finance, and logistics in South Asia, reinforcing China’s economic influence in the region.

Antwerp and Zeebrugge Ports (Belgium). COSCO Shipping has stakes in these European ports. These ports are vital for China’s trade with Northern Europe and serve as logistical hubs for its MSR network.

Port of Valencia (Spain). Managed by COSCO Shipping Ports. Valencia is a key European port connecting China with Mediterranean markets under the MSR framework.

Karachi Port (Pakistan). Operated jointly under agreements with Chinese firms. Karachi complements Gwadar as part of China’s strategy to secure maritime routes in South Asia.

Solomon Islands Ports. Recent investments have given China operational control over ports in this Pacific nation. These ports bolster China’s presence in Oceania, providing strategic access to Pacific shipping lanes.

Lamu Port (Kenya). Developed with significant Chinese investment. Lamu is part of China’s push into East Africa, connecting African resources with Asian markets via maritime routes.

Freeport Container Terminal (Bahamas). Managed by Hutchison Ports. This port enhances China’s reach into the Caribbean and provides logistical support for transatlantic trade.

Other Significant Ports

Beyond the most prominent ports like Hambantota, Gwadar, and Piraeus, there are several other significant ports that play critical roles in China’s global strategy. Below is a list of the next 10 important ports under Chinese control or influence, along with reasons for their strategic significance:

Felixstowe Port (United Kingdom). Operated by Hutchison Ports. As one of the largest container ports in the UK, Felixstowe is vital for trade between Europe and Asia. Its location strengthens China’s foothold in Northern European logistics and trade routes.

Rotterdam Port (Netherlands). COSCO Shipping has stakes in the port. Rotterdam is Europe’s largest port and a key gateway for goods entering and leaving the continent. China’s involvement here ensures access to European markets and enhances its Maritime Silk Road presence.

Lekki Port (Nigeria). Developed with Chinese investment. Located in West Africa, Lekki is designed to be a major hub for trade between Africa and Asia. It supports China’s access to African raw materials while serving as a potential base for future naval operations.

Walvis Bay Port (Namibia). Supported by Chinese development projects. Strategically located on the Atlantic coast, Walvis Bay provides China with access to Southern African trade routes and has been speculated as a potential site for future PLA Navy basing.

Balboa and Cristóbal Ports (Panama Canal). Operated by Hutchison Ports. These ports flank the Panama Canal, a critical chokepoint connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Control over these ports allows China to influence global shipping routes and monitor U.S. naval movements.

Mombasa Port (Kenya). Developed with Chinese loans and operated under agreements favoring Chinese firms. Mombasa is East Africa’s largest port and a key node for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It connects African markets to Asia and supports China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region.

Luanda Port (Angola). Developed with significant Chinese investment. Angola is a major oil supplier to China, making Luanda critical for securing energy supplies. The port also serves as a gateway to Southern Africa’s markets.

Victoria Port (Seychelles). Supported by Chinese infrastructure investments. Located in the Indian Ocean, this port enhances China’s maritime presence in a region critical for global shipping lanes and potential naval deployments.

Dar es Salaam Port (Tanzania). Upgraded with Chinese funding. Dar es Salaam is a major East African port that facilitates trade between Africa and Asia. Its location complements China’s broader strategy of controlling Indian Ocean trade routes.

Punta Arenas Port (Chile). Proposed deepwater port project under Chinese consideration. Situated near the Drake Passage, this port would provide China with access to Antarctic shipping routes and enhance its influence in South America.

Geopolitical Implications

Ports like Balboa, Cristóbal, and Punta Arenas allow China to monitor or influence critical maritime chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and Drake Passage.

Ports in Africa (e.g., Lekki, Luanda) facilitate the export of essential resources like oil, minerals, and agricultural products directly to China.

European ports like Felixstowe and Rotterdam strengthen China’s ability to dominate supply chains connecting Asia with Europe.

Several ports have dual-use potential, supporting both commercial operations and future military deployments (e.g., Walvis Bay, Victoria).

These ports are integral nodes in China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy, enhancing connectivity between continents.

China’s control over these strategic ports enables it to secure vital maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. It can influence global supply chains by controlling key logistics hubs. Its control; enhance its military capabilities through dual-use infrastructure that can support naval operations during conflicts. Lastly, China’s economic influence is expanded by creating exclusive economic zones around these ports.

Conclusion

China’s growing network of overseas ports highlights its ambition to dominate global maritime trade while securing geopolitical leverage over critical shipping lanes. These investments are strategically distributed across continents-Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania-making them central to Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative goals. While these developments provide economic benefits to host countries, they also raise concerns about dependency on China and potential military use during geopolitical crises. China’s approach underscores Beijing’s long-term vision for maritime dominance while raising concerns about dependency among host nations and potential security risks for rival powers like the United States.

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Here are a few instances where China has been accused of leveraging lawfare:

South China Sea Dispute: China has used its legal interpretation of maritime law to assert sovereignty over vast portions of the South China Sea. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, invalidating China’s claims. However, China rejected the ruling and continued to fortify its positions in the disputed territories.

Intellectual Property Litigation: Chinese companies have been involved in numerous intellectual property disputes globally. In some cases, China has been accused of supporting or encouraging these companies to file lawsuits as a strategic move to gain access to foreign technologies or to create obstacles for foreign competitors.

Legal Actions against Dissidents: China has been known to target dissidents or activists living abroad through legal means. For example, Chinese authorities have used extradition requests, Interpol notices, and red notices to pressure foreign governments to detain and extradite individuals critical of the Chinese government.

Influence over International Organizations: China has been accused of using its economic and political clout to influence international organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies. By leveraging its influence, China seeks to shape global norms, regulations, and policies that align with its interests and suppress criticism of its actions.

Foreign Investment and Commercial Contracts: China has been accused of using its economic leverage to dictate terms in foreign investment and commercial contracts. Critics argue that China’s state-owned enterprises and government-linked companies often engage in unfair trade practices, including forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and non-compliance with international business standards.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): China’s BRI has faced allegations of debt-trap diplomacy, wherein recipient countries become financially dependent on China and subsequently vulnerable to its influence. Some argue that China uses contractual obligations and legal mechanisms to secure its economic and strategic interests, sometimes at the expense of the sovereignty and long-term stability of partner countries.

Examples of Intellectual Property Litigations

Huawei vs. Samsung: In 2016, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, filed lawsuits against Samsung, a South Korean multinational conglomerate, in multiple countries. Huawei alleged that Samsung infringed on its patents related to wireless communication, user interface, and software. The litigation resulted in cross-licensing agreements between the two companies.

Qualcomm vs. Meizu: Qualcomm, a global semiconductor and telecommunications equipment company, filed patent infringement lawsuits against Meizu, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer, in 2016. Qualcomm accused Meizu of using its patents without a license. The dispute was resolved in 2017 when Meizu agreed to pay licensing fees to Qualcomm.

Ericsson vs. Xiaomi: In 2014, Ericsson, a Swedish multinational networking and telecommunications company, filed a lawsuit against Xiaomi, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer. Ericsson claimed that Xiaomi violated its patents related to wireless communication technology. The companies eventually reached a settlement in 2016, which involved Xiaomi obtaining licenses for Ericsson’s standard-essential patents.

Dolby Laboratories vs. Chinese Manufacturers: Dolby Laboratories, an American audio technology company, has been involved in multiple intellectual property litigations with Chinese manufacturers. Dolby filed lawsuits against companies such as Oppo, Vivo, and OnePlus, accusing them of using its audio compression technologies without proper licensing. Several settlements have been reached between Dolby and the Chinese manufacturers.

Apple vs. Proview: In 2012, Apple was engaged in a trademark dispute with Proview, a Chinese technology company. Proview claimed that it owned the trademark for the term “iPad” in China and demanded compensation from Apple for trademark infringement. The case went through several court battles, and Apple eventually settled the dispute by paying Proview $60 million to acquire the iPad trademark rights in China.

Examples of Influencing International Organisations

United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC): China has been criticized for its efforts to influence the UNHRC. It has been accused of pressuring member states to refrain from criticizing its human rights record, particularly regarding issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. China has also been known to support and promote resolutions that are favorable to its positions while attempting to suppress discussions on sensitive topics.

World Health Organization (WHO): China’s influence over the WHO has faced scrutiny, particularly in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. There have been concerns about China’s transparency and its initial handling of the outbreak. China has been accused of exerting pressure to shape the WHO’s response and downplay the severity of the situation. These allegations have raised questions about the impartiality and independence of the organization.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU): China has been active within the ITU, a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for information and communication technologies. It has sought to shape international telecommunications standards and policies in ways that align with its own technological interests. China has pushed for its own technology companies, such as Huawei, to be included in global telecommunications networks, despite concerns about security risks.

United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): China has sought to increase its influence within ECOSOC, which focuses on economic and social issues. China has been known to promote its own development models and advocate for policies that advance its economic interests. It has also been accused of using its financial resources to gain influence and support from other member states.

International organizations related to trade and finance: China’s influence can be observed in various international organizations related to trade and finance, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China has sought to shape trade rules, promote its own economic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, and increase its voting power and decision-making influence within these organizations.

Classic Hambantota Port Debt Trap

One example often cited as a potential instance of a BRI debt trap is the case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. In 2017, Sri Lanka handed over control of the strategically located port to China Merchants Port Holdings, a state-owned enterprise, under a 99-year lease agreement. This transfer of control came as a result of Sri Lanka’s inability to repay the loans it had obtained from China to finance the construction of the port.

Critics argue that the terms of the initial loan and subsequent negotiations heavily favored China and placed Sri Lanka in a precarious debt situation. Here are some key aspects of the Hambantota Port agreement:

High Debt Burden: Sri Lanka had borrowed approximately $1.3 billion from China to build the port. The high-interest rates and short repayment periods associated with the loan made it challenging for Sri Lanka to meet its financial obligations.

Debt Restructuring: When Sri Lanka struggled to repay the loan, it entered into negotiations with China to restructure the debt. Ultimately, the agreement resulted in China gaining control of the port through a 99-year lease. This move was seen by critics as a means for China to secure a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean region.

Strategic Concerns: The Hambantota Port is strategically located near major shipping routes and holds potential military significance. Concerns have been raised that China’s control over the port could have implications for regional security dynamics, granting China greater influence and potentially challenging the interests of other countries.

While the Hambantota Port case is often cited as an example of a potential BRI debt trap, it’s important to note that debt traps are not universal outcomes of BRI projects. Many BRI initiatives have been implemented successfully, contributing to infrastructure development and economic growth in participating countries. However, the Hambantota Port case has raised concerns about the potential risks associated with the financial arrangements and debt burdens in certain BRI projects.

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China’s Strategic ‘Lawfare’ Against Bhutan and Arunachal

On 13 January 2023, the Chinese and Bhutanese delegations met for the 11th Expert Group Meeting on the China-Bhutan Boundary Issues. Here, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on ‘Accelerating the Three-Step Roadmap for China-Bhutan Border Negotiations’.

Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering told Belgian newspaper La Libre Belgique that China is a party to the Doklam tri-junction border dispute. In the interview, Tshering also brushed aside all concerns about Beijing constructing villages inside Bhutanese territory – worrying many in India. Tshering said that Thimphu would be ready to settle its territorial dispute with Beijing after a few meetings.

But even if Beijing and Thimphu can settle their dispute over non-Doklam areas, China isn’t planning to stop claiming the Doklam tri-junction area.

Beijing’s latest lawfare move aims to rename 11 locations in Arunachal Pradesh – approved by the State Council and likely based on recommendations by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The Chinese names assigned to the 11 locations in Arunachal Pradesh are mostly direct transliterations from Tibetan and not new ones. China considers the 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of southern Tibet, which it calls Zangnan.

“Zangnan is part of China’s territory. In accordance with relevant stipulations of the administration of geographical names of the State Council, competent authorities of the Chinese government have standardised the names of some parts of Zangnan. This is within China’s sovereign rights,” said Mao Ning, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson.

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China has been pursuing a strategy to acquire influence in small island nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a massive infrastructure development project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects.

In the IOR, China has been investing in infrastructure projects, such as building ports and airports, in small island nations like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan. These investments have been met with both praise and criticism, with some seeing them as a way to boost economic development and connectivity, while others see them as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of these projects, as well as the potential for debt-trap diplomacy. Additionally, there are concerns that these projects may not serve the best interests of the host countries and could lead to increased dependence on China.

China has also been increasing its presence in the IOR through its naval and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

Influence in Sri Lanka

China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka through a variety of means. One key way has been through infrastructure development projects, particularly those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects include the construction of ports, airports, and highways, and are aimed at boosting economic development and connectivity in Sri Lanka.

One of the most notable infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka is the development of the port of Hambantota, which China has invested in and now operates. This has been met with criticism from some, as the port has been seen as a debt trap for Sri Lanka, and has raised concerns about China’s increasing control over strategically important infrastructure in the country.

China has also been investing in other infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka such as the Colombo International Financial City, and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

Another way China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka is through trade and investment. China is one of Sri Lanka’s top trading partners and investors, which has helped to boost the small island nation’s economy.

China has also been increasing its presence in Sri Lanka through its military and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters around the island nation and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

China’s Debt Trap

There are concerns that China has trapped Sri Lanka in a debt trap through infrastructure development projects, and that this may give China strategic advantages in the IOR, which could threaten India’s security. The Sri Lankan government, however, denies these claims and China has denied the use of debt-trap diplomacy.

One example is the development of the port of Hambantota. In 2010, Sri Lanka agreed to a deal with China to develop the port, which included a loan from China for $361 million. However, the port failed to generate enough revenue to cover the loan payments and Sri Lanka was unable to repay the debt. In 2017, as a result, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years to repay the debt.

This has raised concerns that the port, which is located close to India’s southern coast, could be used for military purposes by China, giving it a strategic advantage in the IOR and potentially threatening India’s security.

Another example is the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which were built with Chinese loans but have also failed to generate enough revenue to repay the debt.

Critics argue that this is a pattern of “debt-trap diplomacy” by China, in which it provides loans for infrastructure projects to developing countries, and then, when those countries are unable to repay the debt, uses that as leverage to gain control over strategically important assets.

It is worth noting that Sri Lanka has denied that this is the case and that it has not fallen into a debt trap. Furthermore, China has denied using debt-trap diplomacy, stating that the projects were agreed upon mutually and that the loans were offered on commercial terms.

India’s concerns over Chinese influence

India has expressed concerns over China’s increasing influence in Sri Lanka, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development and military presence.

One of the main concerns is the Hambantota port, which India sees as a potential military threat as it is located close to India’s southern coast. India fears that China may use the port for military purposes.

India has also been concerned about the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, as it sees these projects as a way for China to gain greater economic and strategic control over Sri Lanka.

India is also worried about China’s growing military presence in Sri Lanka, as Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have been increasingly patrolling the waters around the island nation. This has raised concerns that China may be seeking to assert its military and economic power in the region.

India has responded to Chinese influence in Sri Lanka by increasing its own engagement with the island nation, through economic and development assistance, and by strengthening its own military presence in the IOR.

Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over the increasing frequency of Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka. These visits, which have occurred several times in recent years, are seen as a potential threat to India’s security and strategic interests in the IOR.

One concern is that these submarine visits could give China a military advantage in the region, as submarines are equipped with advanced stealth technology and can be used for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and power projection.

Another concern is that these visits could be part of a larger strategy by China to establish a foothold in the IOR.

India has also raised concerns about the potential for these submarine visits to be used for espionage or sabotage, as submarines are able to operate covertly and can access sensitive areas undetected.

In response to these concerns, India has also been building stronger ties with other countries in the region, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Chinese spy ship visit to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over Chinese spy ship visits to Sri Lanka, as these ships are equipped with advanced surveillance technology and can be used for intelligence gathering and monitoring activities in the IOR.

India is worried that these visits could be used to gather intelligence on India’s naval movements and military capabilities, as well as on its economic and political activities in the region. The Indian government is also concerned that these visits could be used to interfere with its trade and energy security in the region.

India is also worried about the potential for these spy ships to support the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could be used to assert China’s military and strategic interests in the region.

Chinese military aid to Sri Lanka

China has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance. This aid has been provided to help Sri Lanka improve its defense capabilities and maintain internal security.

China has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

China’s military aid to Sri Lanka has been met with both praise and criticism. Some have welcomed it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others have criticized it as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of this aid, as well as the potential for it to be used to support human rights abuses by Sri Lankan government.

Indian military aid to Sri Lanka

India has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance, which has been motivated by its desire to promote stability in the region and to counterbalance the influence of other countries. The aid has been met with mixed reactions, with some seeing it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others view it as a way for India to exert greater influence in the region.

India has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security. Some of the prominent items of military aid have been:

Small arms and ammunition. India has provided small arms such as rifles and pistols, as well as ammunition to Sri Lanka to help improve its defense capabilities.

Artillery. India has provided artillery equipment, such as howitzers and mortars, to Sri Lanka to help improve its artillery capabilities.

Naval vessels. India has provided naval vessels, such as patrol boats and fast attack craft, to Sri Lanka to help improve its maritime security capabilities.

Radars and surveillance equipment. India has provided radars and other surveillance equipment to Sri Lanka to help improve its coastal and maritime surveillance capabilities.

Training and technical assistance. India has provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

India has also been concerned about the potential for terrorism and extremism in Sri Lanka, and has provided aid to help Sri Lanka combat these threats.

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