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During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, China served an ultimatum demanding that India withdraw her posts from Nathu La and Jelep La in Sikkim. In the 17 Mountain Division sector, the main defences were at Changgu, while Nathula was only an observation post. In case of hostilities, the division commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts and fall back on the main defences. Maj Gen Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Division, did not agree with the views of the Corps HQ. Vacating the passes would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire into India, while denying the same to our own troops.

In the event, 27 Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Nathu La remained in Indian hands.

In the first week of August 1967, the border outposts (BOPs) at Nathu La were occupied by 2 Grenadiers, under Lt Col Rai Singh, relieving 18 Rajput. Maj Bishan Singh took over as ‘Tiger Nathu La’. The deployment at Nathu La comprised a platoon each on Camel’s Back, South Shoulder, Centre Bump and Sebu La. The battalion HQ was at GoleGhar, while the 3-inch mortars and administrative base were at Sherabthang.

On 13 August the observation post at Sebu La reported that the Chinese had arrived on the crest line and dug trenches on our side of the IB. When challenged, they filled up the trenches and withdrew. 2 Grenadiers was ordered to lay a three-strand wire fence along the border from Nathu La towards the North Shoulder. However, as soon as work began on the fence on 20 August, the Chinese became agitated and asked the Indians to stop.

On 23 August, Major Bishan Singh reported that about 75 Chinese in battle dress carrying rifles fitted with bayonets were advancing towards Nathu La. They started shouting slogans. Indian troops were ‘standing to’, watching and waiting. After standing on the border for about an hour the Chinese withdrew and all was quiet again.

Fron 2 to 7 September, efforts were made to contruct the bard wire fence and objected by the Chinese every time. At one time Major Bishan and his men were detained but they pushed their way through the Chinese and returned to Nathu La.

On 7 September work started again on laying the wire and it resulted in hand-to-hand fighting and the Chinese pelting stones. The Grenadiers responded in the same manner. On 10 September, Sagat held a conference at the Brigade HQ in Changgu, where he personally briefed everyone on how the operation for constructing the fence was to be carried out next morning. One company of 18 Rajput was brought in to reinforce the defences. An ad hoc force of 90 men was organised into a protection party to charge the Chinese positions if they opened fire. A pioneer platoon was to assist the platoon of 70 Field Company, to lay the wire.

As soon as work commenced on 11 September, the Chinese came up to the fence and tried to stop it. As the arguments became more heated, tempers rose, with both sides standing their ground. Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Lt Col Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet and fell down.

Seeing their CO fall, the Grenadiers became mad with rage. In a fit of fury, they came out of their trenches and attacked the Chinese post, led by Capt PS Dagar. The company of 18 Rajput, under Maj Harbhajan Singh and the sappers and pioneers working on the fence had been caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties from the Chinese firing. Realising that the only way to neutralise the Chinese fire was a physical assault, Harbhajan led a charge on the Chinese position. Several of the Indian troops were mowed down by Chinese machine guns, but those who reached the Chinese bunkers used their bayonets and accounted for many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and Dagar lost their lives in the action, which developed into a full scale battle, lasting six days. Sagat had asked for some medium guns and these were moved up to Kyangnosala, at a height of over 10,000 ft. The artillery OPs proved their worth in bringing down effective fire on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation and the steep incline west of Nathula, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences and did not harm the Indians.

The skirmish at Nathula lasted six days. The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred – 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about 300 casualties.

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The number of Chinese transgressions across the disputed border rose from 428 in 2015 to 663 in 2019, and a number of these transgressions eventually morphed into stand-offs between the two armies. The most prominent examples were near Chumar and Demchok in eastern Ladakh in 2014, at Burtse in northern Ladakh in 2015, and the 73-day stand-off at the Doklam plateau near the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction in 2017.

Smaller incidents of stare-downs between patrolling troops that morphed into fist-fighting were rarely reported, but one in 2017 near Pangong Lake in Ladakh got some media attention after a video showing the two sides hurling stones at each other went public. Another such incident took place on the banks of Pangong Lake in 2019.

Nathu La/ Cho La 1967

The second clash between India China, on 11–14 September 1967 (Nathu La) and 1 October 1967 (Cho La), on the border between China and the Kingdom of Sikkim resulted in a decisive Indian victory and a ceasefire was arranged to end Nathu La clashes. See next article.

Chumar, 2014

A 16-day stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces happened in eastern Ladakh near the village of Chumar, after Indian soldiers tried to block Chinese construction work into what India considered its territory. This stand-off began on 16 September, the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to India, about four months after Modi was elected prime minister.

The stand-off began after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tried to extend the road from Chepzi towards Chumar (which India considers to be its own territory), and the construction work was stopped by Indian soldiers. Meanwhile, in Demchok, which is located in the Chumar area, PLA troops had pushed civilians into Indian territory to prevent ongoing work on an irrigation canal. Soon enough, 1,500 Indian soldiers stood face-to-face with 750 PLA troops.

Following intense diplomatic and military negotiations, the issue was resolved. Troops from both sides agreed to withdraw after a high-level flag meeting led by major-generals. The Chinese agreed to not pursue construction of the Chepzi-Chumar road and India agreed to demolish its observation hut at Tible in the same sector and to refrain from building bunkers there.

Burtse, 2015

Another stand-off took place between Indian and Chinese forces at Burtse in the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh in 2015.

This stand-off ensued after the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) demolished a temporary hut — allegedly meant for surveillance — built by the PLA in Burtse. This was followed by the PLA calling for force reinforcements in the region and the Indian side responding with tit-for-tat additional deployments.

The stand-off was resolved within a week by local army delegations at the ground level itself and did not require any intervention by the governments. Following this, the Indian and Chinese armies decided to conduct a 12-day joint military exercise in China as a major confidence-building measure.

Doklam, 2017

The most prominent stand-off occurred in 2017 at Doklam, near the tri-junction point between India, China and Bhutan. The 73-day stand-off was the longest instance of the two militaries standing eyeball-to-eyeball in decades.

The problem started in June when Chinese army engineers attempted to build a road through the Doklam plateau, claimed by both China and Bhutan. Following ‘coordination’ with Bhutanese authorities, Indian soldiers based just across the border intervened and literally stopped the Chinese crews in their tracks.

What followed was a 73-day stand-off, from 16 June to 28 August, and then weeks of intense diplomatic negotiations. While, initially, the Chinese foreign ministry demanded that India should unilaterally withdraw its troops, eventually both sides agreed and announced their withdrawal on 28 August, returning to their pre-16 June positions.

China blinked as it agreed to stop its road construction in the Doklam region. But over the past couple of years, reports have suggested that China has been quietly building infrastructure and ramping up its military presence in the region, which has helped it gain an advantage in Doklam.

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While India favoured de-escalating the situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through mutual respect and dialogue under the peace and tranquility mechanism in place, the messaging from the [PM’s] meeting mirrored India’s response to the 2017 standoff when Indian troops dug in and stood their ground in the face of a rapid mobilisation by the Chinese side.

While China planned to stare down India into submission with its all-weather ally Pakistan deliberately initiating troop movement in neighbouring Gilgit-Baltistan region, India could not afford to budge from its position as it would amount to acceding to Xi Jinping’s cartographic expansion in the area through military muscle.

Army Chief’s Response

Earlier, army chief Gen MM Naravane had said, on 14 May, that Indian troops were maintaining their “posture” along the border with China while infrastructure development in the frontier areas was on track. He said the incidents in Eastern Ladakh and North Sikkim involved aggressive behavior by Chinese and Indian troops resulting in minor injuries to personnel from both sides. He said both sides “disengaged” after dialogue and interaction at the local level.

“All such incidents are managed by established mechanisms where-in local formations from both sides resolve issues mutually as per established protocols and strategic guidelines given by the prime minister after the Wuhan and Mamallapuram summits,” Gen Naravane said.

“I can say with confidence that the development of infrastructure capabilities along our northern borders is on track. Our force posture will not suffer due to the COVID-19 pandemic,” he said.

Foreign Ministry’s Response

On 21 May, India’s ministry of external affairs (MEA) spokesperson Anurag Srivastava commented on the incidents along the LAC – the nearly 2,200 mile unsettled border between China and India. He rejected Beijing’s claim that Indian troops trespassed into Chinese territory, and accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of “hindering” patrols by Indian soldiers.

“Any suggestion that Indian troops had undertaken activity across the LAC in the Western Sector or the Sikkim Sector is not accurate. Indian troops are fully familiar with the LAC alignment in the India-China border areas and abide by it scrupulously,” he said.

Srivastava’s remarks followed claims by the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on May 19 that Indian troops were attempting to “unilaterally change” the status quo at the boundary between them and “blocking” patrolling by Chinese border guards.

The Chinese foreign ministry issued a statement repeating its claims. Their spokesman Zhao Lijian said that China’s position on the border related issues is clear and consistent. It said that Chinese troops “firmly” dealt with what it called the Indian troops “crossover and infringement activities”, while telling the United States not to interfere in the dispute between India and China.

 “We urge the Indian side to work together with us, abide by our leadership’s important consensus, comply with the agreements signed, refrain from unilateral actions complicating the situation,” said MFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian.

Zhao said, “Between the two countries, we have good border related mechanism and communication channels. We are capable of resolving the issues properly though dialogue and consultation.”

Srivastava, asked about unilateral actions by China in the South China Sea – the establishment of two new administrative districts for the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands and the naming 80 obscure geographical features over the objections of other claimants, said “(The) South China Sea is a part of (the) global commons and India has an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region.”

“We firmly stand with the freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in these international waterways, in accordance with international law,” he added.

The statement was consistent with India’s long-standing position on the maritime disputes in Southeast Asia but it was unusual for a government spokesman to make a public statement on the issue in this way. It was sign that India linked the territorial issues it has with China at the LAC with the situation in the South China Sea.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh comments

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on 30 May that India and China were talking to each other at military and diplomatic levels to resolve the Ladakh standoff. Rajnath Singh also underlined that there was no need for the United States to meditate since the two countries already had a mechanism to resolve problems and it had been set in motion.

“The country should be assured that we will not allow India’s dignity to be hurt under any circumstances,” Rajnath Singh said. “India is doing what it needs to do in the circumstances,” said the defence minister, while declining to spell out the measures.

Rajnath Singh admitted on 2 June that “large numbers” of Chinese troops had crossed into India’s side of the LAC. “It is true that Chinese soldiers (are) on the LAC. There are differences in both sides’ perceptions of where the frontier runs. And the Chinese soldiers have arrived there in large numbers,” he said.

Rajnath voiced confidence that the festering confrontation could be resolved through military-to-military talks and diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing, as was achieved during the Doklam confrontation in 2017.

Rajnath emphatically refused to classify China as an enemy. He said that, while India would never hurt the self-respect and sovereignty of any country, “If anyone violates our sovereignty or tries to make India bow its head, this country would respond with force.”

Comments

China’s “unexpected” manoeuvre should not have been unexpected at all. Last August, China’s government vigorously condemned India’s establishment of Ladakh – including the Chinese-held Aksai Chin Plateau – as a new federal territory.

Deception, concealment and surprise often accompany China’s use of force, with Chinese leaders repeatedly claiming that military preemption was a defensive measure. Its latest assault on India – which China claims is the actual aggressor – was taken straight from that script.

Modi’s vision seems to have been clouded by the naive hope that, by appeasing China, he could reset the bilateral relationship and weaken China’s ties with Pakistan, another revisionist state that lays claims to sizable swaths of Indian territory.

The China-Pakistan axis has long generated high security costs for India and raised the specter of a two-front war. That is why some Indian leaders have pursued a “defensive wedge strategy,” in which the status quo power seeks to drive a wedge between two allied revisionist states, so that it can focus its capabilities on the more threatening challenger.

India has in a way warned that if Chinese troops do not behave on the border, India was not obliged to adhere to the Wuhan consensus, and would reiterate its South China Sea position. The Wuhan consensus refers to an informal summit between Chinese General-Secretary Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2018. There, the two countries vowed to de-escalate tensions between each other for the sake of better bilateral ties.

China’s recent pressure campaigns in the South China Sea against other claimants are beginning to affect India’s interests in the region. India is principally concerned with its deepening economic and commercial ties to Southeast Asia under the new Act East Policy – especially with Indonesia and Vietnam. China has infringed on exclusive economic zones of both of those nations in the past year.

The Indian government is concerned that the tactics China employs to harass claimants in the South China Sea, using survey vessels, maritime militia and its coastguard, could be repeated in the Indian Ocean, closer to India’s shores. A survey by China near the Andaman Islands which was within India’s exclusive economic zone, in December 2019, is a case in point. India was also watching China’s moves to establish outposts in the Maldives.

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