China has lent substantial amounts to various countries for energy and infrastructure projects, primarily under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

These debts reflect China’s extensive global investments in energy, transport, and connectivity projects, often resulting in significant financial obligations for borrowing nations.

Main projects Driving Pakistan’s Debt to China

Pakistan’s debt to China is primarily driven by projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Here are the main projects contributing to Pakistan’s debt:

Energy Projects. A significant portion of Pakistan’s debt stems from energy infrastructure, including coal, hydro, wind, and solar power plants. These projects were designed to address Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages but have resulted in substantial financial obligations due to high-interest loans and capacity payments owed to Chinese companies. Under the Energy Framework Agreement, Pakistan is required to allocate funds to ensure Chinese investors are compensated for any shortfalls, further adding to its financial burden.

Infrastructure Development. CPEC includes the construction of highways and motorways, such as the Karakoram Highway and the Multan-Sukkur Motorway, which aim to improve connectivity within Pakistan and with China. The modernization of Pakistan Railways, including the Main Line-1 (ML-1) project, is another key component of CPEC. This project alone is estimated to cost $6.8 billion.

Gwadar Port Development. The development of Gwadar Port and its associated infrastructure has been a central focus of CPEC. This includes port facilities, an international airport, and free trade zones aimed at making Gwadar a regional trade hub.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs). CPEC includes the establishment of SEZs across Pakistan to promote industrialization and attract foreign investment. However, these zones have yet to deliver significant economic benefits.

Pipelines and Energy Transmission. Projects include oil and gas pipelines as well as energy transmission lines to facilitate energy distribution across Pakistan.

While these projects have improved infrastructure and energy availability in Pakistan, they have also created a heavy debt burden due to high-interest loans, limited economic returns from the projects, and inefficiencies in project management. As of 2023, China accounted for approximately 30% of Pakistan’s external debt, with much of it tied to CPEC-related initiatives.

Debt Converted to Ownership

China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” refers to instances where countries, unable to repay loans for major infrastructure projects funded by China, have ceded control of strategic assets. Below are notable examples where this has occurred:

Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota Port to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017 after failing to repay $1.4 billion in loans from China. This has been widely cited as a classic example of debt-trap diplomacy, granting China strategic influence in the Indian Ocean.

Laos. In 2020, Laos ceded a 90% stake in its electricity grid (Électricité du Laos Transmission Company) to a Chinese company after struggling with debt repayments. This move gave China significant control over the country’s energy infrastructure, raising concerns about its ability to influence domestic energy supplies.

Tajikistan. Facing challenges in repaying Chinese loans, Tajikistan reportedly granted mining rights for gold and silver deposits to Chinese companies. This arrangement has been viewed as a way for China to secure valuable natural resources in exchange for debt relief.

Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, heavily indebted to China, risks losing control over key infrastructure such as the Bishkek thermal power plant and the Datka-Kemin power transmission line if it defaults on its loans.

Zambia. There have been concerns that Zambia might lose control of ZESCO (electricity company) due to its inability to service Chinese loans tied to energy and infrastructure projects. While no formal transfer has occurred yet, the situation highlights the risks of debt dependency.

These examples illustrate how China’s lending practices can lead to significant economic and strategic leverage over borrowing nations, often involving critical infrastructure or natural resources. However, it is worth noting that some analysts argue that these cases are exceptions rather than standard practice and that many countries willingly accept such terms due to their pressing financial needs.

The post CHINA How China’s Debt Traps Work appeared first on IMR.

Ports Controlled by China

Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka). China Merchants Port Holdings owns a 70% stake in this port. Located near major shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, Hambantota is critical for China’s access to Middle Eastern oil and trade routes. The port has been leased to China for 99 years, raising concerns about its potential military use.

Gwadar Port (Pakistan). Operated by the China Overseas Port Holding Company. Situated near the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar is a key part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It provides China with direct access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing traditional routes through the Malacca Strait.

Port of Piraeus (Greece). COSCO Shipping holds a majority stake in this port. Piraeus serves as China’s gateway to Europe, facilitating trade and logistics across the continent. It is one of the largest container ports in Europe and plays a vital role in China’s MSR strategy.

Djibouti Port (Djibouti). Operated by Chinese companies alongside China’s only overseas naval base. Located at the entrance to the Red Sea, Djibouti is critical for controlling access to the Suez Canal and monitoring maritime traffic in East Africa. Its dual-use capability supports both commercial and military operations.

Chancay Port (Peru). COSCO Shipping owns a 60% stake. Recently developed as part of China’s expansion into Latin America, Chancay connects Chinese markets with South American commodities like copper and lithium.

Khalifa Port (United Arab Emirates). Operated by COSCO Shipping Ports. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, Khalifa Port strengthens China’s presence in the Middle East and facilitates trade with Europe and Africa.

Panama Ports (Panama Canal). Hutchison Ports operates ports on both sides of the canal. Though China does not control the canal itself, its presence in Panama enhances its ability to influence global shipping routes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Darwin Port (Australia). A Chinese company holds a 99-year lease on this port. Strategically located near Southeast Asia, Darwin Port is critical for China’s trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region.

Colombo Port City (Sri Lanka). Developed by Chinese firms under a long-term lease agreement. This artificial city is designed as a hub for trade, finance, and logistics in South Asia, reinforcing China’s economic influence in the region.

Antwerp and Zeebrugge Ports (Belgium). COSCO Shipping has stakes in these European ports. These ports are vital for China’s trade with Northern Europe and serve as logistical hubs for its MSR network.

Port of Valencia (Spain). Managed by COSCO Shipping Ports. Valencia is a key European port connecting China with Mediterranean markets under the MSR framework.

Karachi Port (Pakistan). Operated jointly under agreements with Chinese firms. Karachi complements Gwadar as part of China’s strategy to secure maritime routes in South Asia.

Solomon Islands Ports. Recent investments have given China operational control over ports in this Pacific nation. These ports bolster China’s presence in Oceania, providing strategic access to Pacific shipping lanes.

Lamu Port (Kenya). Developed with significant Chinese investment. Lamu is part of China’s push into East Africa, connecting African resources with Asian markets via maritime routes.

Freeport Container Terminal (Bahamas). Managed by Hutchison Ports. This port enhances China’s reach into the Caribbean and provides logistical support for transatlantic trade.

Other Significant Ports

Beyond the most prominent ports like Hambantota, Gwadar, and Piraeus, there are several other significant ports that play critical roles in China’s global strategy. Below is a list of the next 10 important ports under Chinese control or influence, along with reasons for their strategic significance:

Felixstowe Port (United Kingdom). Operated by Hutchison Ports. As one of the largest container ports in the UK, Felixstowe is vital for trade between Europe and Asia. Its location strengthens China’s foothold in Northern European logistics and trade routes.

Rotterdam Port (Netherlands). COSCO Shipping has stakes in the port. Rotterdam is Europe’s largest port and a key gateway for goods entering and leaving the continent. China’s involvement here ensures access to European markets and enhances its Maritime Silk Road presence.

Lekki Port (Nigeria). Developed with Chinese investment. Located in West Africa, Lekki is designed to be a major hub for trade between Africa and Asia. It supports China’s access to African raw materials while serving as a potential base for future naval operations.

Walvis Bay Port (Namibia). Supported by Chinese development projects. Strategically located on the Atlantic coast, Walvis Bay provides China with access to Southern African trade routes and has been speculated as a potential site for future PLA Navy basing.

Balboa and Cristóbal Ports (Panama Canal). Operated by Hutchison Ports. These ports flank the Panama Canal, a critical chokepoint connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Control over these ports allows China to influence global shipping routes and monitor U.S. naval movements.

Mombasa Port (Kenya). Developed with Chinese loans and operated under agreements favoring Chinese firms. Mombasa is East Africa’s largest port and a key node for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It connects African markets to Asia and supports China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region.

Luanda Port (Angola). Developed with significant Chinese investment. Angola is a major oil supplier to China, making Luanda critical for securing energy supplies. The port also serves as a gateway to Southern Africa’s markets.

Victoria Port (Seychelles). Supported by Chinese infrastructure investments. Located in the Indian Ocean, this port enhances China’s maritime presence in a region critical for global shipping lanes and potential naval deployments.

Dar es Salaam Port (Tanzania). Upgraded with Chinese funding. Dar es Salaam is a major East African port that facilitates trade between Africa and Asia. Its location complements China’s broader strategy of controlling Indian Ocean trade routes.

Punta Arenas Port (Chile). Proposed deepwater port project under Chinese consideration. Situated near the Drake Passage, this port would provide China with access to Antarctic shipping routes and enhance its influence in South America.

Geopolitical Implications

Ports like Balboa, Cristóbal, and Punta Arenas allow China to monitor or influence critical maritime chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and Drake Passage.

Ports in Africa (e.g., Lekki, Luanda) facilitate the export of essential resources like oil, minerals, and agricultural products directly to China.

European ports like Felixstowe and Rotterdam strengthen China’s ability to dominate supply chains connecting Asia with Europe.

Several ports have dual-use potential, supporting both commercial operations and future military deployments (e.g., Walvis Bay, Victoria).

These ports are integral nodes in China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy, enhancing connectivity between continents.

China’s control over these strategic ports enables it to secure vital maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. It can influence global supply chains by controlling key logistics hubs. Its control; enhance its military capabilities through dual-use infrastructure that can support naval operations during conflicts. Lastly, China’s economic influence is expanded by creating exclusive economic zones around these ports.

Conclusion

China’s growing network of overseas ports highlights its ambition to dominate global maritime trade while securing geopolitical leverage over critical shipping lanes. These investments are strategically distributed across continents-Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania-making them central to Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative goals. While these developments provide economic benefits to host countries, they also raise concerns about dependency on China and potential military use during geopolitical crises. China’s approach underscores Beijing’s long-term vision for maritime dominance while raising concerns about dependency among host nations and potential security risks for rival powers like the United States.

The post CHINA Strategic Ports Worldwide Under Chinese Control appeared first on IMR.

Here are a few instances where China has been accused of leveraging lawfare:

South China Sea Dispute: China has used its legal interpretation of maritime law to assert sovereignty over vast portions of the South China Sea. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, invalidating China’s claims. However, China rejected the ruling and continued to fortify its positions in the disputed territories.

Intellectual Property Litigation: Chinese companies have been involved in numerous intellectual property disputes globally. In some cases, China has been accused of supporting or encouraging these companies to file lawsuits as a strategic move to gain access to foreign technologies or to create obstacles for foreign competitors.

Legal Actions against Dissidents: China has been known to target dissidents or activists living abroad through legal means. For example, Chinese authorities have used extradition requests, Interpol notices, and red notices to pressure foreign governments to detain and extradite individuals critical of the Chinese government.

Influence over International Organizations: China has been accused of using its economic and political clout to influence international organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies. By leveraging its influence, China seeks to shape global norms, regulations, and policies that align with its interests and suppress criticism of its actions.

Foreign Investment and Commercial Contracts: China has been accused of using its economic leverage to dictate terms in foreign investment and commercial contracts. Critics argue that China’s state-owned enterprises and government-linked companies often engage in unfair trade practices, including forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and non-compliance with international business standards.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): China’s BRI has faced allegations of debt-trap diplomacy, wherein recipient countries become financially dependent on China and subsequently vulnerable to its influence. Some argue that China uses contractual obligations and legal mechanisms to secure its economic and strategic interests, sometimes at the expense of the sovereignty and long-term stability of partner countries.

Examples of Intellectual Property Litigations

Huawei vs. Samsung: In 2016, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, filed lawsuits against Samsung, a South Korean multinational conglomerate, in multiple countries. Huawei alleged that Samsung infringed on its patents related to wireless communication, user interface, and software. The litigation resulted in cross-licensing agreements between the two companies.

Qualcomm vs. Meizu: Qualcomm, a global semiconductor and telecommunications equipment company, filed patent infringement lawsuits against Meizu, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer, in 2016. Qualcomm accused Meizu of using its patents without a license. The dispute was resolved in 2017 when Meizu agreed to pay licensing fees to Qualcomm.

Ericsson vs. Xiaomi: In 2014, Ericsson, a Swedish multinational networking and telecommunications company, filed a lawsuit against Xiaomi, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer. Ericsson claimed that Xiaomi violated its patents related to wireless communication technology. The companies eventually reached a settlement in 2016, which involved Xiaomi obtaining licenses for Ericsson’s standard-essential patents.

Dolby Laboratories vs. Chinese Manufacturers: Dolby Laboratories, an American audio technology company, has been involved in multiple intellectual property litigations with Chinese manufacturers. Dolby filed lawsuits against companies such as Oppo, Vivo, and OnePlus, accusing them of using its audio compression technologies without proper licensing. Several settlements have been reached between Dolby and the Chinese manufacturers.

Apple vs. Proview: In 2012, Apple was engaged in a trademark dispute with Proview, a Chinese technology company. Proview claimed that it owned the trademark for the term “iPad” in China and demanded compensation from Apple for trademark infringement. The case went through several court battles, and Apple eventually settled the dispute by paying Proview $60 million to acquire the iPad trademark rights in China.

Examples of Influencing International Organisations

United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC): China has been criticized for its efforts to influence the UNHRC. It has been accused of pressuring member states to refrain from criticizing its human rights record, particularly regarding issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. China has also been known to support and promote resolutions that are favorable to its positions while attempting to suppress discussions on sensitive topics.

World Health Organization (WHO): China’s influence over the WHO has faced scrutiny, particularly in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. There have been concerns about China’s transparency and its initial handling of the outbreak. China has been accused of exerting pressure to shape the WHO’s response and downplay the severity of the situation. These allegations have raised questions about the impartiality and independence of the organization.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU): China has been active within the ITU, a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for information and communication technologies. It has sought to shape international telecommunications standards and policies in ways that align with its own technological interests. China has pushed for its own technology companies, such as Huawei, to be included in global telecommunications networks, despite concerns about security risks.

United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): China has sought to increase its influence within ECOSOC, which focuses on economic and social issues. China has been known to promote its own development models and advocate for policies that advance its economic interests. It has also been accused of using its financial resources to gain influence and support from other member states.

International organizations related to trade and finance: China’s influence can be observed in various international organizations related to trade and finance, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China has sought to shape trade rules, promote its own economic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, and increase its voting power and decision-making influence within these organizations.

Classic Hambantota Port Debt Trap

One example often cited as a potential instance of a BRI debt trap is the case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. In 2017, Sri Lanka handed over control of the strategically located port to China Merchants Port Holdings, a state-owned enterprise, under a 99-year lease agreement. This transfer of control came as a result of Sri Lanka’s inability to repay the loans it had obtained from China to finance the construction of the port.

Critics argue that the terms of the initial loan and subsequent negotiations heavily favored China and placed Sri Lanka in a precarious debt situation. Here are some key aspects of the Hambantota Port agreement:

High Debt Burden: Sri Lanka had borrowed approximately $1.3 billion from China to build the port. The high-interest rates and short repayment periods associated with the loan made it challenging for Sri Lanka to meet its financial obligations.

Debt Restructuring: When Sri Lanka struggled to repay the loan, it entered into negotiations with China to restructure the debt. Ultimately, the agreement resulted in China gaining control of the port through a 99-year lease. This move was seen by critics as a means for China to secure a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean region.

Strategic Concerns: The Hambantota Port is strategically located near major shipping routes and holds potential military significance. Concerns have been raised that China’s control over the port could have implications for regional security dynamics, granting China greater influence and potentially challenging the interests of other countries.

While the Hambantota Port case is often cited as an example of a potential BRI debt trap, it’s important to note that debt traps are not universal outcomes of BRI projects. Many BRI initiatives have been implemented successfully, contributing to infrastructure development and economic growth in participating countries. However, the Hambantota Port case has raised concerns about the potential risks associated with the financial arrangements and debt burdens in certain BRI projects.

======================

China’s Strategic ‘Lawfare’ Against Bhutan and Arunachal

On 13 January 2023, the Chinese and Bhutanese delegations met for the 11th Expert Group Meeting on the China-Bhutan Boundary Issues. Here, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on ‘Accelerating the Three-Step Roadmap for China-Bhutan Border Negotiations’.

Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering told Belgian newspaper La Libre Belgique that China is a party to the Doklam tri-junction border dispute. In the interview, Tshering also brushed aside all concerns about Beijing constructing villages inside Bhutanese territory – worrying many in India. Tshering said that Thimphu would be ready to settle its territorial dispute with Beijing after a few meetings.

But even if Beijing and Thimphu can settle their dispute over non-Doklam areas, China isn’t planning to stop claiming the Doklam tri-junction area.

Beijing’s latest lawfare move aims to rename 11 locations in Arunachal Pradesh – approved by the State Council and likely based on recommendations by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The Chinese names assigned to the 11 locations in Arunachal Pradesh are mostly direct transliterations from Tibetan and not new ones. China considers the 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of southern Tibet, which it calls Zangnan.

“Zangnan is part of China’s territory. In accordance with relevant stipulations of the administration of geographical names of the State Council, competent authorities of the Chinese government have standardised the names of some parts of Zangnan. This is within China’s sovereign rights,” said Mao Ning, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson.

The post China’s Lawfare Strategy appeared first on IMR.

China has been pursuing a strategy to acquire influence in small island nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a massive infrastructure development project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects.

In the IOR, China has been investing in infrastructure projects, such as building ports and airports, in small island nations like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan. These investments have been met with both praise and criticism, with some seeing them as a way to boost economic development and connectivity, while others see them as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of these projects, as well as the potential for debt-trap diplomacy. Additionally, there are concerns that these projects may not serve the best interests of the host countries and could lead to increased dependence on China.

China has also been increasing its presence in the IOR through its naval and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

Influence in Sri Lanka

China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka through a variety of means. One key way has been through infrastructure development projects, particularly those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects include the construction of ports, airports, and highways, and are aimed at boosting economic development and connectivity in Sri Lanka.

One of the most notable infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka is the development of the port of Hambantota, which China has invested in and now operates. This has been met with criticism from some, as the port has been seen as a debt trap for Sri Lanka, and has raised concerns about China’s increasing control over strategically important infrastructure in the country.

China has also been investing in other infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka such as the Colombo International Financial City, and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

Another way China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka is through trade and investment. China is one of Sri Lanka’s top trading partners and investors, which has helped to boost the small island nation’s economy.

China has also been increasing its presence in Sri Lanka through its military and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters around the island nation and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

China’s Debt Trap

There are concerns that China has trapped Sri Lanka in a debt trap through infrastructure development projects, and that this may give China strategic advantages in the IOR, which could threaten India’s security. The Sri Lankan government, however, denies these claims and China has denied the use of debt-trap diplomacy.

One example is the development of the port of Hambantota. In 2010, Sri Lanka agreed to a deal with China to develop the port, which included a loan from China for $361 million. However, the port failed to generate enough revenue to cover the loan payments and Sri Lanka was unable to repay the debt. In 2017, as a result, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years to repay the debt.

This has raised concerns that the port, which is located close to India’s southern coast, could be used for military purposes by China, giving it a strategic advantage in the IOR and potentially threatening India’s security.

Another example is the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which were built with Chinese loans but have also failed to generate enough revenue to repay the debt.

Critics argue that this is a pattern of “debt-trap diplomacy” by China, in which it provides loans for infrastructure projects to developing countries, and then, when those countries are unable to repay the debt, uses that as leverage to gain control over strategically important assets.

It is worth noting that Sri Lanka has denied that this is the case and that it has not fallen into a debt trap. Furthermore, China has denied using debt-trap diplomacy, stating that the projects were agreed upon mutually and that the loans were offered on commercial terms.

India’s concerns over Chinese influence

India has expressed concerns over China’s increasing influence in Sri Lanka, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development and military presence.

One of the main concerns is the Hambantota port, which India sees as a potential military threat as it is located close to India’s southern coast. India fears that China may use the port for military purposes.

India has also been concerned about the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, as it sees these projects as a way for China to gain greater economic and strategic control over Sri Lanka.

India is also worried about China’s growing military presence in Sri Lanka, as Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have been increasingly patrolling the waters around the island nation. This has raised concerns that China may be seeking to assert its military and economic power in the region.

India has responded to Chinese influence in Sri Lanka by increasing its own engagement with the island nation, through economic and development assistance, and by strengthening its own military presence in the IOR.

Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over the increasing frequency of Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka. These visits, which have occurred several times in recent years, are seen as a potential threat to India’s security and strategic interests in the IOR.

One concern is that these submarine visits could give China a military advantage in the region, as submarines are equipped with advanced stealth technology and can be used for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and power projection.

Another concern is that these visits could be part of a larger strategy by China to establish a foothold in the IOR.

India has also raised concerns about the potential for these submarine visits to be used for espionage or sabotage, as submarines are able to operate covertly and can access sensitive areas undetected.

In response to these concerns, India has also been building stronger ties with other countries in the region, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Chinese spy ship visit to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over Chinese spy ship visits to Sri Lanka, as these ships are equipped with advanced surveillance technology and can be used for intelligence gathering and monitoring activities in the IOR.

India is worried that these visits could be used to gather intelligence on India’s naval movements and military capabilities, as well as on its economic and political activities in the region. The Indian government is also concerned that these visits could be used to interfere with its trade and energy security in the region.

India is also worried about the potential for these spy ships to support the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could be used to assert China’s military and strategic interests in the region.

Chinese military aid to Sri Lanka

China has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance. This aid has been provided to help Sri Lanka improve its defense capabilities and maintain internal security.

China has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

China’s military aid to Sri Lanka has been met with both praise and criticism. Some have welcomed it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others have criticized it as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of this aid, as well as the potential for it to be used to support human rights abuses by Sri Lankan government.

Indian military aid to Sri Lanka

India has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance, which has been motivated by its desire to promote stability in the region and to counterbalance the influence of other countries. The aid has been met with mixed reactions, with some seeing it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others view it as a way for India to exert greater influence in the region.

India has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security. Some of the prominent items of military aid have been:

Small arms and ammunition. India has provided small arms such as rifles and pistols, as well as ammunition to Sri Lanka to help improve its defense capabilities.

Artillery. India has provided artillery equipment, such as howitzers and mortars, to Sri Lanka to help improve its artillery capabilities.

Naval vessels. India has provided naval vessels, such as patrol boats and fast attack craft, to Sri Lanka to help improve its maritime security capabilities.

Radars and surveillance equipment. India has provided radars and other surveillance equipment to Sri Lanka to help improve its coastal and maritime surveillance capabilities.

Training and technical assistance. India has provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

India has also been concerned about the potential for terrorism and extremism in Sri Lanka, and has provided aid to help Sri Lanka combat these threats.

The post Sri Lanka in China’s Trap appeared first on IMR.

This was seen as a foreign policy move that has not yet been taken by China or Russia, both of which have close strategic and economic ties with these five countries. With growing Chinese footprints in these countries in both the defence and security segment as well as the economic sphere, it has become imperative for India to have a “robust foothold” there, sources said.

India, which considers the Central Asian countries part of its “extended neighbourhood”, firmed up plans to hold the summit meeting when the foreign ministers of these countries visited New Delhi in December 2021 for the third round of the India-Central Asia Dialogue.

India had invited the presidents of the five Central Asian nations as chief guests at the Republic Day celebrations, which was to be followed by a summit meeting, but the plans were cancelled due to the spiralling third wave of the Covid pandemic.

PM Narendra Modi’s Address

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing the virtual summit featuring presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyz Republic, on 27 January, talked about an ‘ambitious vision’ for the future.

In his initial remarks at the Summit, Modi said, “We all are concerned about the Afghan situation and this makes cooperation between India and Central Asia all the more important for regional stability and security.”

The prime minister called for defining an ambitious vision for cooperation between India and Central Asia in the coming years.

Mutual cooperation between India and Central Asia is essential for regional security and prosperity, Modi said.

Modi had paid a visit to all Central Asian countries in 2015. Subsequently, there have been exchanges at high levels at bilateral and multilateral forums.

The event was held to commemorate 30 years of the establishment of India’s diplomatic relations with these nations, witnessed unanimity on taking cooperation to the next level for boosting regional connectivity and security. The leaders agreed on considerably enhancing India-Central Asia trade, which is only about $2 billion at present, nowhere near China’s over $40 billion.

The prime minister and the five presidents decided to set up a joint working group on Afghanistan, with a broad consensus emerging on issues such as combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

Increased Significance

In July 2015, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit all Central Asian countries to boost strategic and trade ties. He also met the leaders of these countries in 2018 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting that was held in Qingdao. However, the strategic importance of the five Central Asian countries “has increased” ever since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021. New Delhi believes these countries will prove to be beneficial for India in having some sort of a channel open with the Taliban regime that is currently in power in Kabul, they said, even as the Modi government has started sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Ties between India and Central Asia started taking a decisive turn as the US government signed the so-called peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020, and fears began to mount about Afghanistan in the aftermath of the NATO’s pullout. Prior to that India mostly looked at Central Asia from the perspective of energy ties.

As India closed all its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan, it also took the initiative to host the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue in November 2021, which was chaired by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. All security chiefs from the five Central Asian nations attended the meeting along with Russia and Iran, to send a message to the Taliban government.

Chinese Influence

New Delhi’s Central Asian outreach assumes significance amid China’s efforts to strengthen ties with these nations that are part of the eight-member SCO, which also includes India. What gives Beijing a geopolitical edge is the fact that it shares borders with three of the five countries.

Two days before the India summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping interacted with Central Asian leaders and announced an assistance of $500 million to support livelihood programmes in these former Soviet bloc countries. He also listed several big projects of strategic importance that had been completed, including the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline, the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway and the China-Tajikistan expressway. In a bid to counter the Chinese challenge, India has extended a $1-billion line of credit for infrastructure development projects and offered to provide more training slots and scholarships to meet the requirements of Central Asian countries.

After the recent unrest in Kazakhstan, Russia sent troops there as part of a peacekeeping mission to restore order, while China firmly backed the beleaguered nation’s efforts to curb violence.

Background

“The inception of the India-Central Asia Dialogue at foreign ministers’ level, the 3rd meeting of which was held in New Delhi from 18 to 20 December 2021, has provided an impetus to India-Central Asia relations,” said an official statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs.

“The participation of the secretaries of National Security Councils of Central Asian countries in the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan held in New Delhi on 10 November 2021 outlined a common regional approach on Afghanistan,” it added.

The issue of maintaining close ties with the Central Asian countries, when it comes to Afghanistan, was something that was also discussed between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the India-Russia Summit held in December 2021.

Besides, India is also keen to strengthen trade and energy ties with the Central Asian countries with a focus on increasing connectivity. New Delhi has pushed for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the TAPI (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India) pipeline for natural gas during the summit.

Comments

The summit is a huge stride for India’s diplomacy and is a first step to carve out its zone of influence.

India should know what it wants out of the Central Asian region and use its influence accordingly. Countries with interests in Central Asia have their own groupings and connect: China from economic (BRI), Russia from strategic (CSTO), Turkey from ethnic (Turkic Council), and the Islamic world from the religious (OIC) It would be befitting for India to give a poignant cultural and historical perspective to the region through a summit-level annual meet. The aims are different – targeting Russia, sabotaging China’s BRI, thrusting Islamisation, economic linkages, military cooperation, trade, lobbying, etc.

Since the region is a critical lynchpin to India’s security policy, the summit will have a waterfall impact to facilitate India’s multifaceted approach towards the region. Central Asia carries no specific stance towards any country, with the exception of Russia. While their strategic visions are often  opaque, they are wary of China.

For three decades, Central Asia remained a cauldron of outside actors. Today, the main security provider to the region is Moscow, which considers Central Asia as its ‘near abroad.’

After the US forces left Afghanistan overnight, the Islamists too have been eyeing to launch their holy jihads to establish new Khilafats there. Regional analysts have estimated that some 8,000 ISIS and Takfiri extremists have been waiting in North Afghanistan to infiltrate across the 2,245 km long porous border.

While leaders of all five states of the CAR have visited India, yet, India’s commercial success has been negligible at a paltry $1.4 billion trade in 2019.

In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) but SCO is only a sluice gate to regulate the Russian and Chinese and prevent them from dominating the region. Moscow tends to use it for regulating India-China tensions.

India’s civilisational influence and still enjoys a range of attributes. The Ferghana Valley was India’s crossing-point (to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) on the Great Silk Road to connect with China and Europe. Buddhism spread to the rest of Asia from here. This can be the basis of an annual summit. A string of cultural events highlighting the facets of medieval culture, art and painting, including Sufi traditions, should be highlighted.

The post India’s First Summit With Central Asian Leaders appeared first on IMR.

Farzana Shah is a Peshawar based journalist. This is an abridged extract of an article which was first published in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020. The views expressed do not reflect the views of IMR

On August 5th, 2019 India unilaterally revoked Article 370 of its Constitution which promised autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, i.e., Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJK). This unlawful decision with its dire pending consequences has triggered an outrage, not only in the region but also at the global level. The entire state has been put under siege with total communication blackout, enforced by deploying thousands of fresh troops. Over 3000 political figures including former chief ministers of the state were arrested under so-called Public Safety Act (PSA).

India also divided the state into two; an act through which she changed the geography of the disputed land, hence practically ending the 1971 Simla Agreement. This agreement has remained a critical milestone for both Pakistan and India, as it was this agreement based upon which both countries established what the world later on recognized as Line of Control (LoC). Not only that, August 5th action also undermined the very foundation of Indian constitution, as Article 370 was obliterated without the essentially required consent of state government and that’s why this action was not a constitutional reform, but a blatant coup in total disregard to the pending UNSC resolutions /UN Charter.

Modi government with full backing from hardliner Hindu groups, abolished IOJK’s autonomous status under a fabricated security threat perception to conceal the real intent. Pak-US peace overtures in Afghanistan had made Delhi very nervous because of the simple fact that any settlement between the US and Taliban would have enabled Pakistan to move almost 200,000 of its troops or at least a large number of these to its eastern borders in Kashmir and elsewhere. Indian desperation to counter Pakistan and limit her growing role in Afghan peace process led to such an abrupt abrogation of special status of IOJK and this timing was no coincidence.

Media reports suggest the Indian intelligence agencies were desperately waiting for this opportunity to strike. Delhi had sensed that a possible deal managed by Pakistan for US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan could eventually renew US military assistance for Pakistan.

Reportedly, to scuttle Afghan peace deal and legitimize Indian stance over Kashmir, Indian spy agency RAW’s new chief Samant Goel called on Narendra Modi on July 5th, 2019 and apprised him of the plan to abolish the Article 370 for IOJK. Preparations for the move were already in place in Delhi as a number of high profile military and intelligence visits were made to IOJK including those by RAW’s chief Goel, Indian NSA Ajit Doval and Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat in the months preceding August 2019. On July 24, Doval also held a meeting with Indian military chiefs and heads of all three intelligence agencies including National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), in the same context.

Media also reported that India had flown Israeli Heron drones across the Pir Panjal range to rehearse controlling mob in case of protesteruption3; military aircrafts made a number of sorties flying relief supplies including food, water and medicines into the Valley for the Indian troops.

After Indian decision of obliteration of Article 370, LoC has become potential conflict with Pakistan under the nuclear overhang because of the simple fact that Delhi has changed the goalpost for future talks on Kashmir. According to Indian leadership, now talks will be on Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Post August 5th environment suggests that India with obliteration of Article 370 actually risked a high intensity insurgency in an already volatile state of IOJK; something India could not have done alone without external backing.

Pakistan’s Current National Security

Predicaments Developments in IOJK are neither random nor isolated as far as their impact on Pakistan’s national security is concerned. It is a dilemma imposed by our geography that Pakistan cannot stay isolated from regional developments. Even in some cases, extra regional developments also impact Pakistan’s security milieu; fast evolving situation in Middle East and ongoing trade war between US and China, are cases in point.

United Nations on April 21, 1948 adopted Kashmir resolution after India took the issue to the UN under article 35 of Chapter VI. Kashmir was declared disputed territory and call for a plebiscite was made as the said chapter outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes. The shadowy annexation of IOJK by India and insistence upon

its fabricated history has resulted in 3 out of4 Indo-Pak wars. With current clampdown on basic human rights in IOJK, there is a clear and present danger of yet another round of conflict. LoC is already red hot; both countries are already exchanging artillery fire. Earlier, in February 2019,both sides deployed air power. India lost 2 fighter jets on 27/2 with one pilot becoming POW; who was immediately returned by Pakistan as a goodwill gesture.

India is desperate to get a role in the region, belittling what Pakistan has been doing for regional stability. This is critical for India to present Pakistan as a perpetrator of global terror, while fact is Pakistan has been the biggest victim of non-state actors’ actions within and without.

Two most important strategic goals of India are:

•             Bigger role, both in the region and world.

•             Solving Kashmir through UNSC resolutions, but after changing its demography to ensure a win. Solving Kashmir will pave the way for permanent UNSC seat; vital prerequisite for India to embark on Akhand Bahart agenda of RSS.

Indian threat has been intensified even more after August 5, 2019. Kashmir has dominated the security debate as it’s going to impact both internal and external security dynamics. How things will unfold in coming weeks and months, depends on how Pakistan formulates and executes its strategy on Kashmir.

Apart from the traditional foe in the east, the country has been fighting an endless war on the west, which despite clear gains, remains a perpetually bleeding front albeit with reduced fatalities.

Notwithstanding these obvious kinetic threats, Pakistan’s security landscape is inevitably affected by certain other factors as well, like peaceful rise of China and her ensuing trade war with the US, culmination of US’ longest war in history in Afghanistan and growing strategic competition around various parts of Asia including South China Sea, Indian Ocean, North Korea, and stand-off between US allies in Strait of Hurmuz against Iran. All these geopolitical development swill directly or indirectly impact Pakistan. Hence, it is likely to continue to be in the eye of global security storm due to its geography and may continue to suffer if not steered wisely.

Pakistan’s Significance to China

Chinese trillion-dollar Belt & Road Initiative(BRI) is pivotal for turning China into a world commercial empire. The region of Azad Jammu and Kashmir gains unprecedented importance in the wake of US-China emerging geopolitical competition worldwide. US wants to hit CPEC just like India for almost similar reasons; CPEC has in fact comprehensively demolished the US envisaged strategic encirclement of China in South China Sea, notwithstanding US quadrilateral alliance with Japan, Australia, and India. Idea was that CPEC brings global connectivity to China, so that Beijing can invest hundreds of billions of US dollars in its reserves to reignite the growth engine, which has slowed down during last 5-7 years (from10% annual to 6.5%). Beijing has plans to expand BRI to 70 countries and CPEC remains a critical part of this Chinese enterprise. Road to China’s strive for challenging American dominance passes through CPEC.

Apart from this economic dimension, the north eastern region of IOJK is attractive due to its close proximity to Russia, China and Pakistan. The Indian action in IOJK gives the US deep state an opportunity for furthering its own scheme of geopolitical maneuvering in Afghanistan, which is instrumental in containing Russia-China-Pakistanat the same time.

While US has remained stranded in Afghan quagmire, China’s BRI has been helping Beijing in positioning China to rise peacefully as a peace broker to the conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq in near future through trade compulsions. These very aspects substantiate the growing geostrategic prominence of Pakistan /Kashmir.

The changing geopolitics has forced Pakistan to adopt a more robust offensive maritime policy, apart from safeguarding its interests attached to land component of CPEC. Pakistan Navy has embarked on an ambitious project of acquiring eight submarines along with multiple advanced naval ships. All these may help restore some balance of power in South Asia /IOR.

China – India – Pakistan Paradigm

Recent, Sino-India skirmishes in Doklam went full circle in locking both the nuclear powers into a possible warlike situation. India has recently expressed her envisioned two front war strategy, which basically relies on the premise of preventing Chinese ingress across the LAC amid a high intensity short lived Indo-Pak conflict adopting Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). After initial denial, the top Indian military brass has not only publically acknowledged its presence, but has also hinted at considering unleashing CSD against Pakistan.

Indian aggressive attempts to outmaneuver Pakistan’s nuclear threshold forced it to adopt a full spectrum deterrence posture, while retaining/displaying the resolve to adopt policy of first use. Though it carries a great promise of strategic stability, but still there is a sizeable Indian defense intelligentsia that conceives this as a weakness in conventional balance of power, hence sees an opportunity of a limited, high-intensity conflict aimed at shallow gains across LoC/IB. This community of India is of the view that such gains will serve a devastating blow to Pakistan’s national morale. Indian strategy is to choke Pakistan economically, while raising cost of its deterrence by triggering an arms race.

Adding current volatile situation in IOJK into above discussed strategic contest between conventional Indo-Pak militaries and growing US-China wrestling for dominance, it would be safe to assume that the probability of an armed conflict in this region was never this high in last 72 years, as it is now.

Critical Appraisal of Pakistan’s Response Strategy

Let us begin with the most critical question, i.e., if all these preparations as highlighted in earlier part of this discourse were underway in India, why Pakistan remained oblivious to these developments about IOJK or was it caught totally unaware /surprised like rest of the World? A critical and candid appraisal is needed.

It would be safe to assume that Pakistan missed the opportunity to preempt and did very little or nothing before August 5th on diplomatic and media fronts to expose and pressurize India. Whatever and wherever it reacted, it did once unilateral annexation of IOJK by Modi had already occurred.

In the wake of Indian move over IOJK, Pakistan repeatedly reiterated its intention to undertake preventive measures to counter threats hurled by India. Such a move had always been seen by the US and her allies as jeopardizing War on Terror, a metrics which puts Pakistan at a crucial position with regard to peace in the region. The equation exhibits importance of Kashmir conflict and consequences of Indian attempt of redrawing map of erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir for the world peace and stability.

On international fora, India always presented Kashmir as a bilateral issue, supposed to be solved under Simla Agreement at bilateral level without any third party intervention. While on the bilateral level, Indian policy on Kashmir is immoveable as it always maintains that Kashmir is an integral part of Union, hence no bilateral dialogue is possible. On the contrary, India showed willingness to discuss Azad Jammu Kashmir and Northern Areas(parts of heretofore Kashmir state) of Pakistan for which nation gave blood in 1947-48 to liberate from the clutches of Dogra Raj; putting added pressure on our diplomacy.

Despite the fact that since 9/11 Pakistan’s security challenges have grown manifold, it has made abundantly clear that Pakistan cannot and will not remain oblivious from what goes on inside the Kashmir valley; any undertakings however, demand a comprehensive understanding of the total security paradigm. Pakistan will have to work pro actively and diplomatically support the indigenous KFM, else the state will be dragged into yet another regional conflict with India, giving her the advantage to choose time and place of her liking.

Notwithstanding initial surprise, post August 5th Pakistan’s political leadership has repeatedly and quite forcefully warned the World at large about the potential threat to global peace emerging from regional conflict in Kashmir in near future; it’s a nuclear flashpoint that has the latent potential to engulf the entire world.

Geo-Strategic Implications

Strategically speaking, the clash of interests among big powers alone makes Kashmir a bone of contention; contested directly by three nuclear powers (intrinsically linked are the strategic interests of two extra regional nuclear powers i.e. US, Russia).

Gilgit-Baltistan region has for centuries been the most vital part of Jammu and Kashmir. It is now a key part of CPEC, the cornerstone of China-Pakistan axis and the flagship project of China’s BRI for global trade domination; it aims at connecting South Asia with Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East /Africa; the shortest route from Arabian Sea ports of Karachi and Gwadar.

The growing competition in different fields(fanning economies and military insecurities) is forcing China and India to gain access to energy rich CARs. International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was envisioned by India as alternative to CPEC. This corridor connects CAR to Iran and to India through Arabian Sea. Obviously, the route is not only much costlier due to its length, but also tremendously insecure as it goes through Iran and Persian Gulf, regions far from stable for long term investments and economic activities. The only alternative short and direct route for India passes through Azad Kashmir and Pakistan’s northern areas. Sooner or later, India will make a move to extend its jurisdiction over this area; current overture in IOJK may have this latent desire imbedded in it.

Apart from economic and strategic dimensions, Kashmir issue has become a cultural and social question as well.

Modi is planning to change the religious demography of IOJK, through ethnic cleansing and Hindu settlements in disputed territory on the lines of Jewish settlements by Israel. This drive itself is being fueled by right-wing Hindutva gangs, who have taken over India and have completely distorted her secular face. Hindutva ideology, much like Hitler’s Nazism, believes in supremacy of their own faith and considers all minorities in India as impure and hence, must be culled from Indian soil.

Modi appealed to the Indian society to”embrace Kashmiris” on Independence Day. It was sensible from both the domestic and international perspectives. But the news coming out of IOJK and even from mainland India, indicates that Hindutva’s control over Indian society has put Indian minorities in grave danger. Lynching of Muslims and Kashmiri students even within Indian cities has become new normal. This explains why Modi was compelled to ensure a complete media clampdown in the IOJK. Apart from that, Modi is now faced with severe internal pressure to act against Pakistan on AJK.

Apropos, it is beyond any doubt that the current fascist regime in India has nefarious designs against Pakistan /Muslims. Ruling RSS/ VHP/BJP has built anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistan sentiment so hard in Indian mainstream media and public discourse that BJP will have to continue undertaking some sort of anti-Pak overtures every now and then, to stay in power; hence current misadventure should not be taken as last.

Possible Emerging Scenarios and their Impact on Pakistan’s National Security

It is evident from the analysis so far that an Indo-US-Israel nexus is at play against Pakistan at multiple levels to close the Kashmir chapter once and for all. Hence, it is now prudent to examine the possible outcomes of Indian political discourse vis-à-vis Pakistan (Table Opposite).

A critical appraisal of the above scenarios suggests that Pakistan will have to walk a very thin line to fight for the Kashmir cause. Biggest challenge is that Pakistan will have to take the initiative and yet not to be seen as an aggressor as per international law. Having tested Pakistan’s response in February 2019, India may not escalate the situation along LoC any further than routine ceasefire violations, without consolidating control over IOJK. India’s best bet in current scenario is to maintain status-quo with a complete information and media control on developments inside IOJK particularly in the valley. This is where Pakistan will have to respond along with aggressive, non-apologetic and bold diplomacy. Proactive Foreign Office (FO) will produce results. If Pakistan keeps waiting for Indian action to react; Islamabad will be playing a losing game from the very onset.

Policy Recommendations

So far, Pakistan has given a standard response to Indian action of August 5th. Prevailing security crisis however, demands a robust and out of box solution, and that too in quick time. International community at best, will not go beyond condemning India over human rights violations in IOJK. In order to do that Pakistan will have to take the war into non-kinetic domains:

•   Information / Cyber Warfare

•   Electronic Warfare (EW) Spectrum

Relevant establishments must provide support to diplomatic efforts being done by government through operations in these two domains with focused goal of extracting authentic information from stakeholders in IOJK most importantly from general public facing the brutalities of Indian oppressive forces. Once information gathered, FO must disseminate it with proper narrative of the state of Pakistan.

A single video clip or picture can change the perception of India, which it has built so painstakingly over the years. Pakistan needs to keep world attention on IOJK and in order to do that communication links inside the valley must be established. Indian decision of communication blackout in IOJK was not random, but part of the planning. Pakistan’s response in these two domains will be purely non-kinetic, denying any involvement of arms. If executed properly anda local uprising occurs inside IOJK, it will make it extremely difficult for India to keep selling the terrorism card on IOJK. Burhan Wani was a local hero, India could not blame his action on Pakistan. Only a native uprising will be just and politically defendable for Pakistan on international forums. Even such an uprising will need support in the information domain.

EW Spectrum would be critical as it will enable Pakistan to keep Indian preparation in check. There is a possibility that India creates a deception in IOJK and opens war across IB on a spot like Pakistan’s soft-belly (Rahim Yar Khan – Kashmore) to sever Karachi from rest of Pakistan. There are rumors suggesting similar planning going on in Indian military headquarters; Pakistan must take requisite safeguards.

Pakistan must also keep refining standard diplomatic response along with taking into consideration above mentioned suggestions. Few areas where improvement can be made are mentioned below:

•             Pakistan, according to UN charter, can openly help Kashmiris in their fight. Indian intervention in East Pakistan and recent Syrian conflict between Russia and the US are clear examples.

•             India may try to capture areas 5 to 7 km inside AJK to make claim on the area. Pakistan army must have own similar plans and be executed preemptively.

•             Question of Kashmir must be debated among legislators on regular basis so that policy can be kept proactive rather than calling session of parliament on special occasions. Kashmir’s importance as vital strategic national interest must be seen by whole nation. Kashmir demands and deserves more pragmatism than emotional outburst.

•             Pakistan’s foreign policy needs more consistency, more inclusiveness of security institutions and constant review of emerging developments around the world particularly in South Asia.

•             Kinetic intervention from Pakistan has proven counter-productive as far as larger goals of Kashmir’s freedom is concerned. It created problems locally as well. State must adopt transparent policy in this regard. Proscribed organizations must remain ineffective and immobile.

•             Pakistan must establish a dedicated and permanent desk at FO focused on human rights violation in India against minorities. These efforts must be driven not by shallow patriotism, but true humanitarian grounds. In this regard, contacts must be established with oppressed groups within Indian society. This desk must be tasked to constantly arranging seminars and programs for this single purpose. Kashmir Committee must work along with this desk.

•             Especial efforts must be put on proactive diplomacy on Kashmir in P-5 nations. Pakistan embassies must conduct seminars, conferences and round tables with local intellectuals about Indian oppression in the valley.

Conclusion

Indian government has gravely endangered the global peace by unilaterally changing the status of disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to RSS/BJP actions in IOJK, future of 8 million Kashmiri Muslims is at stake with a probability of their systematic genocide or forced exodus from their native land. The subsequent strategic situation demanded an appraisal to assess the way forward for the state. This paper is an attempt in the same direction. It argued and examined various vertices of Kashmir’s geography, its linkage with national security and impacts of various policy options. Pakistan will have to act proactively. Standard diplomatic response will not be enough and a delay in decisive line of action will be suicidal.

Pakistan must ensure regional peace by adopting an aggressive and just policy on Kashmir, while also ensuring that state must not be seen as aggressor till the time an armed conflict with India becomes inevitable. Information and EW Spectrum domains must be explored for non-kinetic operations against Indian political and military leadership so that Pakistan can expose Indian atrocities and can achieve higher moral ground before any open conflict.

The post Pak View of Emerging Geopolitical Scenario Post Article 370 Abrogation appeared first on IMR.

China has capitalized on the world’s distraction to claim sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea, intimidate Taiwan and assert more authority over Hong Kong in an attempt to quash the pro-democracy movement there.

It has taken advantage of vulnerable countries dependent on it for medical supplies, investments in the Belt & Road Initiative activities and those suffering from the adverse economic impact of the virus.

After the US suspended funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) the Chinese government pledged millions of dollars in additional support for the organization, giving China even more influence in the global health agency and allowing the country to portray itself as the new champion of multilateralism.

The incompetence of many countries around the world in preparing for and responding to COVID-19 provided China with relative gains. In many quarters, China’s initial failures have been overshadowed by the challenges faced in Europe and the incompetence of the Trump administration.

China believes that it has faced humiliations over the past century and the time is right for China to take revenge with ‘America and the West in decline’. The conflict has intensified with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic to the rest of the world. Beijing feels confident that it has handled the outbreak better than Western democracies.

Hong Kong

Xi used the distraction of the coronavirus pandemic to exert more authority in Hong Kong and crack down on the pro-democracy movement there. On April 18, more than a dozen pro-democracy activists and lawmakers were arrested in Hong Kong, marking the largest single-day roundup in years.

In mid-April, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, the Chinese state agency that closely oversees Hong Kong, criticized some of the city’s lawmakers for filibustering debates, which it said has led to a backlog of legislation.

Taken together, experts say Beijing is using the coronavirus as a cover to cement its authoritarian rule over Hong Kong and stamp out the pro-democracy movement once and for all.

South China Sea

Beijing has long laid claim to disputed islands in the South China Sea. To stake its claim, Chinese naval vessels have pushed other claimants, like the Philippines and Vietnam, out of the area so it can have full control of the islands and the oil and natural gas resources around them.

That practice has not stopped during the pandemic and amounts to sending a message to other countries involved in the South China Sea that China will not back down under any circumstances. Earlier this month, for example, a Chinese ship sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in the South China Sea and claimed other regional islands for itself.

Taiwan

China’s military continues to place pressure on Taiwan, including regular flights by fighter jets near Taiwanese airspace and sending flotillas close to the island. The US clearly sees an extra layer of threat in these times. US warships, which usually sail by Taiwan about once a month, have been in the area at least twice in April.

Africa

China has flexed its muscles on other continents, especially in Africa. Many African governments struggling to respond to the coronavirus asked for debt relief so they could invest more in health care, sanitation, food, and social programs to keep millions of people safe during the pandemic.

Chinese leaders asked officials from Zambia, to provide collateral, in their case Zambian copper-mining assets, sending a signal that it was not for debt forgiveness.

China foreign policy is based on give and take. It expects return on investments made even if it means acting the bully in the time of need and ignoring the racism against Africans back in China during the coronavirus crisis, when many Africans were barred from hotels, restaurants and shops.

Domination of International Bodies

Over the past several years, Beijing has systematically positioned Chinese nationals at the head of a wide range of U.N. agencies. Since 2019, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Agency has been led by Qu Dongyu, formerly China’s vice minister of agriculture. This followed the 2018 reinstatement of Zhao Houlin, who began his career in China’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, for a second four-year term as the secretary-general of the International Telecommunication Union, a crucial body that sets technical standards for communications networks; Zhao has used his position to advance Huawei’s standing as a vendor of 5G telecommunications equipment worldwide. The previous year, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres appointed Liu Zhenmin, formerly China’s vice minister for foreign affairs, to a key position in the U.N.’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs – a body tasked with advancing the U.N.’s hallmark program to promote development, combat climate change and reduce inequality.

In part, this dominance of Chinese nationals in key U.N. agencies reflects Beijing’s savvy diplomatic maneuvering as a rising power, and its position as the world’s second-largest economy. But it’s also possible because of a void left by the United States, which under Trump has repudiated its previous leadership role in international organizations.

And as Chinese technology proliferates across the reaches of the organization, China has joined hands with Russia to institutionalize international norms around surveillance and censorship, including through the passage of a joint U.N. cybercrime resolution in November 2019 that equips authoritarian governments with broad-based authority to repress and censor political dissent online.

In March, just weeks before Trump began talking about curbing funding to the agency, China announced a $20 million donation to the WHO to fight Covid-19.

Diplomatic Offensive

Cheng Jingye, China’s ambassador to Australia, questioned whether Australia was “the best place to send” Chinese students for education, or whether Chinese consumers would want to buy Australian wine and beef, after Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent review of the spread of the virus.

Vice-foreign minister Le Yucheng accused the U.S. of “political manipulation to a level beyond anyone’s imagination” in response to White House pressure over the virus.

In France, Lu Shaye, who previously served as ambassador to Canada, released a series of attacks on the “malevolence” of the French media, calling them lapdogs of the U.S.

In the Netherlands, the Chinese embassy called De Volkskrant newspaper “full of prejudice, discrimination and malice.”

Policy experts in China have explained Beijing aggressiveness was a result of Donald Trump administration manipulating the emotions of other countries to join the U.S. in strategically constraining China.

Pakistan

China exerted quiet pressure on Islamabad to flow against the global current and not blame China. It also prevailed upon Pakistan not to evacuate its nationals from Wuhan even when India offered to air lift when it evacuated its own nationals from China.

In fact, in March, just a week after the WHO declared the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic, Pakistani President Arif Alvi met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Alvi expressed Pakistan’s solidarity at a time when China’s global reputation was at a low point. A week later, the favour was returned when a planeload of Chinese medical face masks landed in Karachi.

In Pakistan’s media, there was a clear push to deflect blame for the pandemic away from China and to trumpet the fact that initial infections came by way of Pakistani pilgrims returning from Iran rather than from Chinese workers and goods or Pakistanis studying in China. Pakistan’s news outlets emphasized the generosity of Chinese aid, including medical supplies, technical experts and cash.

Expectations for China are clearly higher among Pakistan’s leaders and the public at large. Pakistan has appealed to Beijing directly for relief, both for debt repayment and for power purchases. Whether Beijing is actually ready or willing to deliver a truly generous dose of aid that would enable Pakistanis to better weather the storm is a moot question.

Southeast Asia

China is the most influential regional economic and politically strategic power, but large majorities worry about this influence.

China-Southeast Asia relations are unlikely to be significantly damaged by the pandemic. Southeast Asian governments have avoided pointing fingers and instead shown solidarity with China in fighting the virus. Some, like the Cambodian government, have bent over backward; Prime Minister Hun Sen visited China during the peak of the outbreak and declared that “the disease of Cambodian citizens is not a disease caused by the virus ‘corona’ but a disease of fear.” The Chinese government thanked Southeast Asian countries and reciprocated with aid. Chinese narratives portray Southeast Asia as standing with China.

On 1 February, Singapore closed its borders to all travelers from China, the first country in Southeast Asia to do so. The Singaporean government took pains to avoid offending the Chinese government with this decision. On 2 February prime minister Lee Hsien Loong said he knew “that China is doing all it can to contain the spread of the virus. … Even though the virus started in Wuhan, it doesn’t respect nationality or race. It does not check your passport before it goes into your body.”

The Chinese embassy and Chinese foundations and firms have made huge donations of medical supplies not only to Malaysian hospitals and government agencies but also to various social and cultural groups of different ethnic backgrounds. The diplomatic mileage, however, was undermined by a Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi-8 spotted tagging a Malaysian exploration vessel off the coasts of Brunei and eastern Malaysia. China’s activities in the South China Sea left the impression that Beijing was taking advantage of the COVID-19 situation to advance its territorial interests in the disputed waters.

China assisted Indonesia with essential medical supplies flown back from Shanghai by the Indonesian Air Force. Meanwhile, a new ASEAN-China COVID-19 Response Fund has been established in collaboration with the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) states (China, Japan, and South Korea). Beijing has also committed to providing financial and material support through the more established ASEAN-China Cooperation and APT Cooperation Funds.

Affect on Belt and Road Initiative

The nature, pace and scope of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has also been affected, and will continue to do so in the longer-term. Despite the downturn in manufacturing and supply chain activity, the pace of digital BRI activity has ramped up..

BRI has investments across more than 100 countries and multiple sectors per country (power, railways, ports, roads and industrial parks).

All previous forecasts have been altered in the wake of COVID-19 and ongoing commercial tensions between China and the US.

Chinese state companies have turned their focus to investments in ports, power and industrial parks across Southeast Asia.

ICT companies and e-commerce platforms are seeing new opportunities for full digital value-chain under digital BRI activity opening up new avenues for companies such as Alibaba’s DingTalk, Tencent’s WeChat Work and Huawei’s WeLink to bid for market share outside of China, especially in the BRI region.

Chinese state banks are facing greater greater capital constraints, and non-performing loans are likely to rise at home, owing to COVID-19 related financial weakness. With focus turning towards the most commercially profitable supply chain related investments, BRI projects will increasingly focus on profitable supply chain related opportunities in Southeast Asia where the private sector and private capital play a greater role.

Whatever the lasting impact of COVID-19 on the economy, BRI will remain a priority for China. The financial challenges may, though, divert official attention and resources away from BRI over the next year or two.

Health Silk Road

Instead of being the irresponsible government whose failures unleashed a deadly pandemic on the world, China tried to look like the world’s savior, graciously providing critical supplies to countries in need.

China is advancing its Health Silk Road to assert global leadership, conducting diplomatic overtures to leaders across Europe, Latin America and Africa as it deploys medical equipment and aid to hard-hit countries such as Italy.

China sent medical equipment and physicians to countries in Europe that were struggling to deal with coronavirus outbreaks. It has also sent supplies and resources to Serbia, the Netherlands, and Spain. In some cases, China’s benevolence backfired. Some of the test-kits Beijing gave to European nations did not work. Spanish scientists found that testing devices from China correctly identify a positive case only 30 per cent of the time.

China’s aim is to expand its economic reach in Europe and to weaken US alliances in the region. Italy was the first major European country to sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But some countries have got fed up with Beijing’s pressure tactics and posturing.

Some 200 Italian business are now controlled by Chinese owners (not including the ones owned by Chinese living in Italy), while China’s central bank holds stakes in several Italian blue chips like Fiat, Telecom Italia, Generali and Eni, among others.

Comments

Amid the ongoing pandemic, we can expect regional international relations to be increasingly contentious over the distribution of power, the strength of bilateral relationships, choices of rules and institutions, and Chinese versus U.S. narratives of blame and culpability.

Few believe in China’s altruistic moves. Most see them as opportunistic. The US left a leadership void, and China quickly stepped in to fill it. With just a small donation, Beijing gets to look like a staunch advocate of global cooperation and a responsible partner in the public health response to the coronavirus, in contrast to the US.

Experts say this is all part of Xi’s broader strategy to dislodge America as the world’s sole superpower and expand China’s reach around the world. In other words, he’s merely exploiting the coronavirus crisis to achieve his aims even faster.

China’s aggressive attempts to exploit the pandemic for its own benefit have made it harder for governments – especially the United States – to trust and work with the country.

It is far from certain who will win the international diplomatic fight sparked by the crisis-if anyone. But if China comes out on top, it will be a public diplomacy battle that the world’s leading liberal democracies have lost, not one that China has won. The beneficiary of this race to the bottom may be the only superpower left standing: China.

===================

In early May 2017, Chinese police officers in their national uniforms started patrolling streets in Milan and Rome alongside Italian cops.

Masks and other items do not need Chinese regulatory approval before export. Many Chinese testing kits exported were found unfit.

==============

Sino-Indian Relations in Covid Times

Indians have been skeptical of China’s role in handling the coronavirus pandemic. Indian rhetoric has been measured, due primarily to its dependence on China to procure medical supplies and its desire to keep the relationship stable. But India has been concerned with the economic fallout. Many sectors in India, like pharmaceutical, are primarily dependent on China for industrial inputs and ingredients.

India has also been concerned with the pace of Chinese investment in India and Chinese entities’ taking taking advantage of the crisis to acquire vulnerable Indian companies, increase its influence in India’s neighborhood, and exerting a more assertive regional leadership role.

To circumvent hostile Chinese takeovers the government has announced restrictions on foreign direct investment from countries that share a land boundary with India-a move clearly directed against China.

In a bid to keep Chinese influence at bay, India was also active with diplomatic outreach, economic aid, technical assistance, and the provision of medical supplies to Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

India also actively engaged other countries in their fight with COVID-19. As the largest producer of anti-malarial drug hydroxychloroquine, initially it banned exports of the drug on March 25 and further tightened rules on April 4 to bar exports from special economic zones (SEZs). Leter, it approved the supply of the hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol, either as commercial sales or as grants, to 55 countries including US, Brazil, Israel and UAE.

India also engaged other countries in the Indo-Pacific, bilaterally and through a Quad Plus mechanism.

In the public sphere, anti-China sentiment went mainstream in a way usually reserved for India’s other rival, Pakistan. Indians largely blame China for the origin of the virus and criticize its lack of disclosure, its influence on WHO, its sidelining of Taiwan, the quality of its medical supplies, and what are seen as its efforts to take diplomatic or commercial advantage of the crisis.

The post Pandemic Ruthlessly Exploited by China appeared first on IMR.