8 Feb 2024: Taiwan Straits

On 8 Feb 2024, China commenced a series of low-level air and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These gradually increased in scope and scale. By early Mar 24, the PLAAF was sending almost 100 aircraft a day into the ADIZ (air defence identification zone) of Taiwan. The PLA Navy was regularly practising live fire drills in the waters around Taiwan. There were planted articles in the Chinese media saying these military exercises were to deter hotheads in Taiwan from making a Declaration of Independence. Solid intelligence had been received that this was likely. An announcement was made about a major amphibious exercise scheduled for mid or end-Apr that year. The aim of these exercises was to de-sensitise the Taiwanese defence forces as well as the Americans to high levels of military activity. In mid-Mar 24, a former presidential candidate made an impassioned speech condemning the president of Taiwan. He asked for the president’s impeachment and demanded that Taiwan declare Independence forthwith. He screamed, “China is trying to scare us with these endless war drills. This weak government is caving in. Enough is enough. ROC is a sovereign, democratic state. We declare our Independence from the hegemonistic Chinese regime now.”

Base 311 of the Strategic Support Forces Command dealing with Taiwan, went into overdrive. This statement was denounced in shrill terms on Chinese media and by the Chinese foreign minister himself. Chinese embassies in all major countries went into an overdrive with strident condemnation. The Chinese social media went berserk. The US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was concerned enough to call his Chinese counterpart. “What’s happening? “he asked.

“Oh, don’t be alarmed General, these are just the usual noises we have to make to keep hotheads in Taiwan in line,” he soothed. Meanwhile, editorials in Global Times warned, “Let Taiwan not trifle with the mainland. China is a very powerful country.”

8 Apr 2024. Off the Coast of Taiwan.

In early Apr 2024, the met and tide conditions were just right. President Xi gave his final nod. The aircraft carrier battle group led by Liaoning steamed off for exercises in the East China Sea. The newest Fujian CV-18 aircraft carrier with its battle group sailed off for north of Taiwan. It had 70 J-15 aircrafts with an AEW on board. The Shandong CV-17 aircraft carrier battle group sailed for the South China Sea, also for exercises. Large flotillas led by Rinhai-class cruisers started moving out for exercises to off the coast of Fujian for an amphibious landing drill. As a precaution, the US Navy started staging forward one of its aircraft carrier battle groups.

0600 hours, 8 Apr 2024. An intense barrage of DF-11, DF-15 and DF-16 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs 500-700 kms range), Navy anti-ship cruise missiles and YJ-12A supersonic cruise missiles, hit the presidential palace and Ministry of Defence, in Taipei. They also targeted three airfields, six radar stations and some major communication nodes. The president and senior officials were whisked away to safety in the nick of time. One General however, was wounded. At 0630 hours, a second wave of ballistic and cruise missiles hit the remaining air bases and radar stations and three major ammunition dumps and fuel storage tanks. A third wave of missiles struck airfields and radar stations again after an interval of 10 minutes.

Special Forces Operations. Meanwhile, six small teams of PLA Special Forces had landed on the coast of Taiwan via submarines and rubber dinghies well before dawn. They now raided the land-based cruise missile sites of the Taiwanese Navy that could target any invasion force. They succeeded in destroying four sites. The other teams were spotted by civilians and rounded up by the Taiwanese Army.

Air and Maritime Air Operations

0645 hrs, 8 Apr 2024. Some 200 fighter jets of the PLA Air Force crossed the median line and headed straight for Taiwan airfields from the Western direction. They were led by J-20 Stealth aircraft armed with BVR missiles. Just 10 minutes later, 60 aircraft took off from the aircraft carrier Fujian along with an AEW aircraft to help in the expected air-to-air combat with the Taiwan Air Force. Fierce air battles erupted as the dazed Taiwanese fighters rose up to challenge the invaders. The J-20s shot down eight F-16 and two Mirages. The F-16s downed one J-20 and three J-11s with their ARAAM missiles. The Chinese fighters from the Fujian did better, as all attention had been diverted towards the PLA Air Force fighters coming from the west. The Navy fighters bombed the target air bases. When they were returning, some brave Taiwanese F-16s and Mirages scrambled up to engage them. In the ensuing air battle five Mirages and two F–16 fighters were shot down for the loss of three J-15s.

0700 hours, 8 Apr 2024. President Xi Jinping went on TV and radio to broadcast a message. He said, “We had patiently and peacefully tried for re-unification of the motherland but to no avail. We recently received very disturbing intelligence that renegades on the island were trying to declare Independence. Such statements have now indeed been made in Taipei. We have still showed great restraint. Today, the Strategic Rocket Forces have made purely demonstrative strikes on Taiwan along with our PLA Air Force and Naval aviation. To seek reunification of the renegade island with the motherland, we are now announcing an air and maritime blockade of the island with immediate effect. We do not want any further escalation. This is purely an internal matter of China and no other country has any right to intervene. China is a peace loving country and would like to resolve it peacefully. We call upon authorities in Taiwan to commence negotiations at once for peaceful re-unification. That will resolve the crisis

0715 hours, 8 Apr 2024. Crisis Room, White House. Washington.

Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the President and NSA. The president was shaken. “I thought we had defused it. We now have three wars on our hands. Do we want the third?” he asked.

“Mr President, we will have to react. Doing nothing will seriously erode our credibility,” said the grim-faced Chairman JCS.

“Frankly General, if this escalates, how ready are we now for a two-front war?” asked the NSA.

“Ready or not, we have no choice. We simply can’t do nothing. We will have to react,” replied the Chairman JCS obdurately.

“Yes, but can we do it in a way that this doesn’t escalate out of control?” asked the President. The Chairman JCS fell silent. He thought for a bit. Then he said, “Mr President, you could demand that the Chinese immediately call off the blockage and pay compensation for the damage caused in their so called ‘demonstrative’ strike. Meanwhile, we have already told our submarines to stage forward. By tomorrow they should be able to sink one or two major capital ships of the Chinese, as a ‘demonstration’ to start with. One of our aircraft carrier battle groups is already steaming toward the area. I have ordered two more carrier battle groups to set sail immediately,” said the Chairman JCS.

“Sink one or two Chinese warships? Won’t that be a declaration of war, General? asked the NSA.

“Yeah and China is a f—g nuclear armed country. This would be a direct clash, not a proxy war, as in Ukraine,” added the President.

“Sir, we can always say it was not us but one of their own mines they had sown for the blockade. That will put them in a decision dilemma as our carrier battle groups race for Taiwan.”

“What about our carrier battle group already half way? Won’t that get into a mess with their Fujian aircraft carrier or Chinese submarines before your neat subterfuge about mines hitting their ships can confuse them?” asked the President.

The Chairman JCS pursed his lips, “Mr President, that was a deterrence action. The situation has changed drastically now. I can order it to slow down and let other CBGs catch up if you wish to avoid immediate escalation and gain time. That will make the situation a bit more predictable and we won’t blunder into a shooting war right away.”

All three took a deep breath. The President knitted his brows, “OK, do that, I can’t think of anything smarter for the time being,” he said, but he was not liking this whole thing one bit.

1503 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Off North Eastern Coast of Taiwan.

The carrier battle group headed by CV-18 aircarft carrier Fujian had two Rinhai-class cruisers, four Luyang-class destroyers and 6 Jinhai-class frigates. It was the main battle group enforcing the blockade. At 1503 hours on 9 Apr 24, a torpedo struck a Rinhai-class cruiser. There was a massive explosion. The warship caught fire. The ship listed to one side and then sank slowly. Meanwhile, Taiwan scrambled its F-16s and Mirages also to attack this Chinese armada enforcing the blockade. The Taiwan jets were picked both by shore-based J-2000 AWACS and the AEW then in the air from the Fujian. J-15 fighters from the carrier and then a whole host of J-20, J-10 and J-11 aircrafts from the shore-based airfields, swarmed up. A major air battle erupted. The BVRs from the J-20s managed to shoot down 10 Mirages and four F-16s. Three J-15s and two J-10s were shot down in this melee. One Mirage fighter fired an Exocet anti-ship missile and badly damaged a Jiangkai-class frigate of the Chinese Navy. Three American carrier battle groups were now steaming full speed towards Taiwan.

1700 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Joint Operations Room. Beijing.

All members of the CMC and the entire top hierarchy of the PLA were in attendance. The Commander PLA Airforce briefed first. “In yesterday’s air battles we had shot down a total of 18 F-16s and 7 Mirages for a loss one J-20, three J- 10s and three J-11s (ratio 25:7). Today, the Taiwanese Air Force tried to attack our blockading force. In the combined air battle, we have shot down 10 Mirages and 8 F-16s. The enemy managed to shoot down three J-15s and two J-10 fighters (ratio 18 : 5). Overall, Taiwan has lost 43 jet fighters to our 12,” he said.

Commander PLA Navy briefed next. “Comrades, the most important development today is that an American nuclear submarine, fired a torpedo and sank our Rinhai-class cruiser. This is a major loss and is an act of war on part of the Americans. The Taiwanese Air Force mounted a major attack on our Fujian carrier battle group enforcing the blockade but was driven off with huge losses. One of our guided missile Jiangkai-class frigates was, however, damaged. We are now at war with USA and I recommend that we immediately fire DF-21D salvos on his three advancing carrier battle groups and stop them before they join battle.”

“Just one second,” Gen Zhang Youxia interjected. “I just got a call from the US Chairman JCS to say that they have no submarines in that area and this seems an accident caused by our own mines laid for the blockade.”

The Commander of PLA Navy went red in the face. “That’s a blatant lie. We must hit back immediately.”

“How do you want to do that?” asked President Xi Jinping.

Admiral Miao, member CMC spoke up. “As the Commander PLAN has rightly said, we must immediately engage the American aircraft carrier battle groups with non-stop salvos of DF-21D anti-ship missiles, till we draw blood. Meantime, we must not lose time and immediately attack the American bases in Okinawa and Guam. Otherwise, US and Japanese fighters and bombers from there, could hit our blockading forces and our cities on the east coast. Shanghai would be a prime target. Comrade President, this is not the time to hesitate. Hit back before we are hit hard. We must pre-empt the Americans.”

President Xi Jinping’s face was taut with tension. He swallowed hard and then took a few sips of water from his glass. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxia. “Comrade Zhang?” he queried.

“The Admiral is right. But that means full scale war that could go right up even to the nuclear level. So let’s pause and think now. The fact that the Americans have disowned their submarine attack on our Rinhai cruiser, tells me they are not keen to escalate. Maybe, they are also looking for a way out. We have amply shaken them up for now. Should we de-escalate and begin negotiations for a peaceful merger of Taiwan now? Or will that be too soon? Problem is, a day later may simply be too late.”

The question hung unanswered in the tense air of the Joint Operations Room in Beijing. All anxious faces turned towards the President of China.

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30 Jun 2023. White House. Washington.

Director CIA, William Burns asked for a most urgent meeting with President Joe Biden on 30 Jun 23. Director CIA pointed out that the Ukrainian counter-offensive had stalled badly and they had taken heavy losses.

“But you already told me that”, the president interjected. The Director CIA took a deep breath. “But what I’m about to tell you is far worse, Mr President. In fact, it is explosive.” The president looked at him in surprise.

“Mr President, we have received very hard intelligence that China has preponed its time line for attack on Taiwan. We understand that this will go in now in Apr 2024.”

“What? The president was genuinely alarmed. “How do we know this?”

The Director CIA pursed his lips. How much could he reveal now, he wondered to himself. “Mr President, firstly, these are the clear battle indications:-

• The Chinese are rapidly reducing their holdings of US treasury bonds and securities. They are trying to cut down dollar holdings of their forex reserves. They have drawn lessons from how we simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves.

• They are building up their gold reserves.

• They are building up stocks of fuel and food. In fact, even during Covid, they refused to touch their food reserve stocks.

• They are building up their blood banks for military hospitals.

• The PLA has been carrying out increasingly more realistic exercises. They have already practised enforcing a blockade and gaining air and maritime control over and around Taiwan. Next year, they are planning a full-fledged joint island landing campaign exercise which could easily be turned to actuals.”

“All of that still doesn’t give us an exact timeline” said the president impatiently.

“Exactly, Mr President. I took this time to come to you because we wanted to be very certain. But we now have solid human intelligence that the CMC has decided to attack in Apr 2024.”

“How solid?” asked the president.

“I would say rock solid, Mr President.” The President got up in agitation.

“I say we call an immediate meeting with the Chairman JCS and Secretary of State.”

“Mr President, can’t we delay that a bit. It would endanger those very highly-placed sources who have risked their necks to share this.”

“You have given me this explosive bit of intelligence and expect me to sit on it? Talking about a two-front war is one thing, fighting a two-front war is quite another. No, we can’t afford this. We need to head this off preferably. We need to de-escalate right away. Go on a charm offensive,” the president said in considerable agitation.

Consequent to this exchange, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, made two efforts to resume talks with Beijing. This was followed up by Secretary of Treasury Janet Yallen, who went to Beijing and virtually pleaded with the Chinese not to get rid of their US treasury bonds. The way she kow-towed in Beijing had to be seen. Finally, the 100-year old former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the author of the US–China reproachment in the 1970s, himself made a visit to Beijing to placate the Chinese leadership.

18 Aug 2023. On board the presidential plane of XI Jinping. Over Nanjing.

President Xi Jinping made a sudden unannounced visit to HQ Eastern Command Nanjing. On the return flight, Director of China’s State Security Bureau (SSB) boarded the plane. He asked for an absolutely one-on-one meeting with the president on the plane. He had some top-class intelligence to share. The president was surprised. Director SSB apologised, “I’m sorry Comrade President. What I have to tell you is so sensitive that I had to arrange this special flight, just in case your office was bugged.”

“What is it,” asked President Xi, nervously.

“Comrade President, we have been betrayed. Our plans to invade Taiwan have been leaked to the Americans.”

“Leaked? By whom?” the president said as his face clouded with anger.

“Comrade president, I don’t know how to say this but your defence minister and foreign minister, no less, have done this treachery.”

“Li Shang Fu and Quiqiang?” The President was amazed. Both were his proteges and he had promoted them out of turn.

“Are you certain?” he asked in shock.

“Sir, before we came to you, we checked and double-checked. This is the sad truth,” the Director SSB said. “It was Li Shang Fu who told the foreign minister and also shared this decision with the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Rocket Forces.”

“This Li Shang Fu!” the President got up from his seat in rage. He immediately sent for Gen Zhang, Vice Chief of CMC. “Put plans for Taiwan on hold immediately, till we clean up this stinking system,” he was almost spluttering in rage. The system was duly cleaned up. The department for Discipline Inspection went into overdrive. First the foreign minister and then the defence minister simply disappeared from public view. The foreign minister, had a torrid affair with a tele- journalist when he was ambassador in USA. He had even fathered a child with her. The defence minister was involved in huge corruption in defence deals and had been compromised. Terse announcements followed weeks of speculation. Both had been sacked.

30 Oct 2023. Top Secret Meeting CMC. Shenyang.

On 7 Oct 2023, the Hamas struck Israel viciously and achieved complete surprise. Some 1,200 Israeli citizens were killed, 3,700 wounded and 250 taken hostage. Israel mobilised 3,00,000 reservists and reacted in rage. They bombed Gaza to rubble and then launched a brutal ground invasion spearheaded by Merkava tanks. In eight weeks, over 11,000 Palestinians were killed and some 23,000 wounded. US despatched two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and rushed in arms and munitions to Israel. On 30 Oct, Xi Jinping called for another top-secret CMC meeting. This time it was held in Shenyang in northern China. The Director of SSB was in attendance to ensure there was no leakage.

The President began with the Director SSB, “Comrade have we managed to clean up our system?

“Comrade Xi, we have purged the system thoroughly. With your support, the traitors at the highest levels have been dealt with,” he said grimly.

Xi just nodded curtly. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxian. “Comrade Zhang, in view of the Israel-Hamas conflict, what is your assessment of the global situation? Does it create a good window of opportunity for our Taiwan contingency?”

Gen Zhang said, “Comrade President, the situation is excellent. America is bogged down now in two wars, not just one. They have sent in two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and a large number of their army reserves are locked up in Europe. Both conflicts will drag on for a long time. 12% of Israel’s population were orthodox Jews who are extreme and don’t want a two state solution. This will likely go up to 32%. Both these conflicts will drag on. I say it is now or never. The correlation of forces will never be as favourable.”

Xi turned to Gen Hi Wei Dong, “Comrade?” he said briefly.

Gen Hi cleared his throat and said, “I agree entirely with Gen Zhang. The Americans know that we know, they know. In this situation they will least expect us to go ahead with the plan. We now need a good deception plan. Let us mount a good charm offensive to soothe American nerves and go right ahead in Apr 2024. We won’t get a more favourable global situation.”

“So what will it be? A full-scale Amphibious invasion, seizing some middle-sized island or a Blockade?”

Gen Hi said promptly, “The Americans are expecting a full scale invasion. So let us start with a joint fire strike on key targets in Taiwan, follow it up with the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy establishing air and maritime superiority. Concurrently, we announce a maritime blockade and if necessary, enforce it for months, till the renegades in Taiwan cave in. Let us learn from Ukraine. Defence today is far more powerful that attack. So, we put in blockade and, thereby, put the onus of attack on the Americans. Let them attack first. It will be best for our information and cognitive warfare theme – “We showed restraint, it is the Americans who were the aggressors.” This will be far less risky option than full scale invasion.”

Adimiral Miao Hua said excitedly, “I do not agree. The Americans will use submarines to break the blockade. If we do not pre-emptively strike their bases in Guam and Okinawa, they will use them to bomb our fleet and our cities on the east coast. Let us not make the same mistake the Russians did at start of Ukraine war. Either we go full on or not at all. Let’s not go to war with mental brakes full on.”

Gen Hi countered, “The amphibious landing phase will be very risky. They will focus on destroying maximum number of our ships as we come in. With US and Taiwanese air power, cruise and anti-ship missiles and drones they could do very great damage. Besides, do we have the full lift capability for carrying four if not all six of our amphibious brigades to make at least two major beach-heads on the western coast of Taiwan?

Adm Miao interjected, “We have been practising with civilian roll–on roll–off (Ro- Ro) with floating causeways. We have 64 of these that have trained for such assaults. Besides we have the largest merchant marine in the world. Even USA cannot lift as many troops as we can.”

“But these huge ships will be sitting ducks for US and Taiwanese anti–ship and cruise missiles. We could win or lose all. Are we prepared to lose all? And don’t forget, even if you do land successfully, you still have to fight through a very mountainous country with lots of built up areas,” Gen Hi countered.

The palpable tension was showing on President Xi’s face. He took a sip of water.

“So, if we blockade Taiwan, how will the Americans react,” he asked.

Gen Zhang Youxia replied, “The US will react first with his nuclear submarines to torpedo our blockading ships. Then, he will surge forward two or three carrier battle groups, maybe even five.”

“Then what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Zhang replied, “Comrade President, our guided missile Renhai-class cruisers and Luyang-class destroyers have good anti-submarine warfare and anti-air capabilities. Besides, we have our nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines. In addition, our entire PLA Air Force and Marine Aviation will be up in the air. To take care of US carrier battle groups, we will fire salvos of Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles of 2000 km range. The Americans can’t accept casualties. Even if they lose one or two carriers, their ardour to intervene will evaporate quickly.”

There was a total silence in the room. You could cut the air with a knife. President Xi licked his lips to moisten them. His mouth had gone dry with the tension.

“OK, let’s go for the blockade,” he said finally. “But, what will be our pretext?”

“Oh, that is easy, Comrade President. Firstly, presidential elections in Taiwan are on 13 Jan next year. We can always take advantage of any pro-Independence sentiments expressed in the presidential campaign. If that does not work, we have an opposition candidate in our pay – a good agent provocateur. Next year, in March, he will make an impassioned speech denouncing President of Taiwan, ask for her impeachment and demand full Independence now,” said the Director SSB.

President Xi nodded grimly, saying, “Well, if a pro-Independence candidate wins in January elections, we will have very real reason to go in. Comrades, we plan for a blockade next year in Apr 2024. It will give us much better escalation control and lower any risk of catastrophic failure. If the first phase of the blockade goes well, maybe we could still go for full-scale amphibious assault. Let us see how that goes. We have a golden opportunity with the US already bogged down on two fronts. We can’t afford to let this pass. Meanwhile, let’s go on a charm offensive for full scale deception. I’ll go for the summit meeting with President Biden in California as planned on 15 Nov and try to be as nice as possible.” He then concluded the meet.

The post Chinese Leadership Discusses Strategy appeared first on IMR.

16 Feb 2022. Meeting of Central Military Commission (CMC) on Taiwan Question. Beijing

Russia was fully poised to launch its invasion of Ukraine in Feb 22. President Putin had visited China just before the invasion and signed the “friendship without limits” agreement. Xi Jinping had assured Putin of full, tacit support. The Russian invasion could occur anytime now. On 16 Feb 2022, President Xi Jinping had convened a top-secret meeting of the CMC. Once Russia invaded Ukraine, it would create a crisis that would completely tie down the USA and the West. Would that present an ideal opportunity for China to invade Taiwan? Historically, China had exploited the opportunity provided by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, to teach India a lesson while the world was pre-occupied. Was there a similar opportunity coming up? He asked for frank views.

Gen Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of CMC, spoke first. He was one of the last few veterans of the 1979 China-Vietnam war of 1979 still serving, and Xi gave great respect to his views on all matters military. Zhang said, “Comrade President, the West anticipates an invasion of Taiwan earliest in the 2025-27 timeframe. As such, we certainly would achieve strategic surprise if we attack before that. The crucial point is how ready are we today for such a massive operation? My second point is – should we not wait to see how the Russian invasion of Ukraine proceeds? What are the American reactions? Will Russia overcome Ukraine in a 7-10 days’ timeframe, as is being anticipated? The crisis will then dissipate in a very short timeframe. What if Russia fails or gets bogged down? The crisis could then get extended. I say let us wait and watch. It will give us valuable lessons and pointers for our own operation.”

 Xi turned to Gen He Weidong, Second Vice Chairman of CMC. He had been former commander of China’s Eastern Theatre Command and was considered an expert on Taiwan. He said, “I tend to agree with Gen Zhang. It would be most useful and instructive to wait and watch and see how the Russian offensive fares. That will give us clear pointers to how the West will react and we can prepare accordingly.”

President Xi now turned to the CMC members.

Gen Li Shangfu, Defence Minister spoke up next, “Comrades, I don’t think our operations in Taiwan will be contingent upon success or failure of the Russian offensive in Ukraine. A major amphibious invasion of Taiwan will be a very serious decision. Once war in Ukraine distracts global attention, we will have to take a clear cut call and then go firm. A lot of preparations will have to commence now for a major amphibious invasion. The met conditions are ideal in April, May or August each year. You will have to decide, go or no-go and then stick to it firmly. Now is the time to act. We cannot debate forever.”

Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff, was a bit irritated by this oblique criticism of Gen Zhang, from someone who had not heard a shot fired in anger. ”Gen Li Shangfu, have we decided it will be a full-fledged amphibious invasion? We all know what the options are:-

• Air and maritime blockade of Taiwan.

• Limited kinetic strikes with missiles and airpower.

• Capture of small or medium sized offshore island or

• Full scale amphibious invasion.

Have we decided which option we will adopt? A lot will depend upon that.” That led to animated discussion on the options. Finally, Chairman Xi said, “Returning to the main theme, it appears to me that it would help to adopt a wait and watch option for now. Let the Russian invasion be for us a trailer, which will uncover Western reactions and counter moves for us.”

20 Jul 2022. Second Meeting of CMC – Taiwan Question. Beijing

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced on 22 Feb 2022. It made good progress initially. The Russians reached the outskirts of Kiev and captured 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donbas. They created a land link to Crimea and captured all the ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea (less Odessa). However, thereafter they got bogged down. The West imposed severe economic sanctions to cripple the Russian economy. On 20 July, President Xi convened the second meeting of CMC. “Comrades, the Russian offensive in Ukraine seems to have bogged down badly. What has gone wrong? Gen Zhang, you are most combat experienced general here. Can you analyse this for us?

Gen Zhang Youxia said, “Strangely, the Russians opted for invasion “lite” that is so far removed from the standard Russian way of war with emphasis on using overwhelming force and mass. Here, the Russians attacked with just 1,50,000 men, whereas, the Ukrainians were 2,50,000 men to start with and then fully mobilised to get some 5,50,000 men in arms. If most of your fighting was to be in built-up areas, this was a terribly skewed force ratio to start with. The Russians had hoped that technological superiority would help them win, but now they are bogged down badly. Using too little force will just prolong this war. Ukraine has seen the gaps and have now started counter-attacking. The Russians forces are now tired and spread out too thin. I’m really surprised why the Russians are not mobilising. This is war and you can’t afford to fight half–heartedly.”

Lt Gen He Weidong spoke next. “What this war has so clearly demonstrated is that with recent advances in technology – especially satellites, AWACS and drones –  surprise is impossible to achieve. What is worse is, defence today has a very clear advantage over offense. With drones, loitering munitions, precision strike weapons like HIMARS, attacks are becoming prohibitively costly. The attacker has to pay a heavy price, as we have seen.”

Lt Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff pitched in. “The Russian attack was overland. They had no major obstacles to cross. If they took such losses, we will have to pause and think. Our offensive will have to cross 80 miles of sea. An amphibious landing is the most complex and difficult operation to execute. It calls for total command of the sea and maritime domain. With the current state of technology, we will have to bear heavy losses and even accept risk of catastrophic failure. I think we may have to postpone our offensive plans and focus on increasing our military power in the meantime.”

Gen Zhang Shengmin, the powerful head of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, spoke next. “However, Russia has been very successful at defeating Western economic sanctions. The major lesson learnt is that we must immediately start reducing our investments in US securities and treasury bonds. We have to reduce our holding of dollars in US banks. Otherwise, like they simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves, they could do the same to us. We must strive for de-dollarization of global trade and invest more in gold reserves.”

Admiral Miao Hua, member of the CMC said, “Comrades, Americans have already sensed our hesitation and doubt. They are acting in such a triumphalist manner and trying to rub our noses in the dirt. They are being most reckless. They seem to think that they can take on Russia and China together and defeat us both. I do not think this hubris is justified.”

Chairman Xi Jinping was cautious and risk averse as usual. “Comrades, we have to keep in mind ground realities. Seeing the way Russia has become bogged down in Ukraine, this time does not at all seem opportune to proceed with our Taiwan contingency plans. We will have to pend them for now.”

26 Jul 2022. Emergency Meeting of CMC. Beijing

The American truculence towards China seemed to be rising by the day. They openly threatened China not to supply any weapons to Russia or help it evade the economic sanctions. Now, to further rub Chinese noses in the sand, the Americans announced that Congress Speaker Nancy Pilosi would be visiting Taiwan on 2-3 Aug 22 as part of Congress Member Delegation (CODEL). On 26 July, Xi Jinping summoned an emergency meeting of the CMC. He was really upset.

“Comrades, this is too much. The Americans are sending their Speaker, this Pilosi woman, to Taiwan, deliberately to spite us. We will have to work out how we react to this grave provocation.”

Admiral Miao Hua, spoke up instantly, “Comrade president, you will recall this is precisely what I had warned against in the last CMC meeting. The Americans have sensed our hesitation and caution and are trying now to push us around. This will become intolerable, if we let this pass.”

“So, what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Hi Weidong, former Eastern Theatre Commander and Taiwan expert of the CMC, said, “Comrade president, we have worked out an effective response short of war. We will hold an exercise of imposing a simulated blockade of Taiwan. Concurrently, we will hold major air and naval exercises to practise seizing maritime and air control in the Strait. We will fire missiles over Taiwan. That will send a clear message.”

Gen Zhang Youxia added, “Simultaneously, let us cut off all military-to-military contacts with America, so no hot line works, and they worry.”

President Xi grunted, “Sounds good. Let’s do it.”

China fired a number of missiles with impact points all around the seas of Taiwan. Dangerously, four of them flew over Taiwan. The PLA Air force launched 250 sorties that crossed into Taiwan’s AIDZ (air defence identification zone) and 13 Chinese naval units sailed around Taiwan to its north, south east and south west, simulating a blockade. For a time, the Americans were worried. They even escorted Nancy Pilosi’s plane with F-16 fighters as it flew into Taiwan. But when nothing more happened, the Americans saw through the Chinese bluff. The response was more hysteria, exercises and nothing more.

The Ukrainians had started launching counter-attacks to take advantage of serious gaps in Russian defence lines. American satellites were picking up these gaps and vectoring the Ukrainian counter-attacks on the harried and over-stretched Russian contingent of forces in Ukraine. The Americans sent yet another delegation to Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping scowled darkly, “Threats don’t work now. We will have to do something real.”

15 Apr 2023. Top Secret CMC Meeting. Beijing

In Sep 2023, in a belated concession to common sense, the Russians finally mobilised 3,00,000 reservists. Gen Suvorvikin, used civilian construction companies to build a formidable, three-tiered Maginot line for the defence of all territories captured in Ukraine. Defence had proved to be the stronger form of war with current technology. Now, the Russians wanted the over-confident Ukrainians to get a taste of their own medicine. Accordingly, in a repeat of their strategy during the Kursk battle in World War II, the Russians deliberately decided to let the Ukrainians attack first, absorb and defeat these attacks and then go on the counter-offensive. The military situation in Ukraine was clearly shifting In Russia’s favour. That was the time that president Tsai Wen of Taiwan decided to visit the US (7 Apr 2023). President Xi Jinping was infuriated. There was no end to American provocations. Meanwhile, Russia was hitting Ukrainian cities with massive barrages of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed drones. The damage was substantive and highly visible on global TV screens.

On 30 Apr 23, President Xi Jinping summoned the fourth meeting of CMC on the Taiwan issue. This was a top secret meeting held under very tight security blanket in Beijing.

The president said, “Comrades I am now getting sick and tired of American insults and provocations. Our shows of force are not working at all. We will have to now use actual force like our Russian friends. And, by the way, the Russian military position is far stronger than was painted by American propaganda. They were largely winning this war on TV screens. Now the truth is emerging. The war situation is now finally turning in favour of the Russians. Let us emulate the Russian example and finally take the plunge.”

Gen Zhang Youxia cleared his throat, “Comrade President, I could not agree more with you. We have taken enough bullying from the Americans. America’s military industrial capacity has grown weak in their unipolar era. They have transferred huge stocks of ammunition to Ukraine and locked up their land forces reserves in Europe. This could seriously weaken their capability to react to any crisis over Taiwan. I think it is time to take another look at our decision to defer the Taiwan contingency operations. There are very strong reasons to prepone the time-line for Taiwan. Maybe if we strike in 2024 itself we will achieve full strategic surprise and take advantage of America’s preoccupation with Ukraine.”

Gen He Weidong fully endorsed the views of Gen Zhang. He said, “Comrades our military thinking and planning has been very realistic. We have invested so much in our Strategic Rocket Force and our drones. Both have proved their value in combat in Ukraine. It is time to press home this resource. Today, the PLA Navy is the biggest navy in the world and the PLA Air Force has over 1300 fourth generation aircraft. I say let us strike out boldly and resolutely.”

The Defence Minister Gen Li Shangfu was most enthusiastic. He said, “Comrades let us act in a decisive manner and do it finally. We need to set a firm time line cast in stone and then not dither. That will enable the PLA to prepare in a decisive manner. We must take the firm decision today and stick to it with resolve.”

“So, when do you propose we go in? 2024 or the next year?” asked the president. He was not liking the undertone of criticism in the Defence Minster’s statement.

“Comrade president, I think we should go firm on Apr 2024,” Gen Li Shangfu said emphatically.

There was total silence in the room. One could feel the tension. Finally, Xi Jinping spoke up, “Comrades let us do it. We go firm on Apr 2024. Please plan accordingly.”

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The PLA is the Party’s army. In China, the most important mission of the army is to bring and keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power. Conversely, ensuring the military’s loyalty to the Party is an indispensable guarantee for the CCP to stay in power.

Prior to Xi Jinping’s military reforms, the basic mechanisms by which the Party exercised control over the military consisted of the following components.

First, the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) continued to be a key post held by the Party’s supreme leader. Following Jiang Zemin’s rule, the Party secretary concurrently served as president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and CMC chairman in order to concentrate a high degree of power in the secretary.

The second component was the existence of three systems:

The General Political Department system

The PLA Party committee system

The political commissar system.

The General Political Department, which was in charge of political work, was established as the single agency responsible for Party-related activities and political work in the PLA. Until the military reforms, the political work carried out by political organs consisted primarily of:

• Ensuring implementation of the Party’s guidelines, policies, state laws, and the CMC’s directives and orders and steering ideologies in the military;

• Managing organizations;

• Cadre administration;

• Security and military justice work;

• Propaganda and cultural activities;

• Discipline inspection;

• Mass work (building relationships with the masses);

• Liaison work (intelligence and collusion with the adversary).

Party Committees in the military are responsible for decision making in military organizations. Political commissars have the same rank as military commanders and have engaged in decision making as secretaries of PLA Party committees. Military organizations were designed to have a dual leadership system, comprised of military commanders and political commissars under the command of Party committees.

Political Commissars were mainly responsible for ideological education and management of units, enforcement of military regulations, cadre work under the command of Party committees, and security. That is, ideological indoctrination, personnel and organization management, and inspections were carried out as political work to ensure that the Party had command of the military.

Issues Affected

A number of problems had beset Party-Army relations as of the start of Xi Jinping’s regime.

•  CMC chairman had become a position merely in name.

•  The mid-level organizations held power, with the four general departments (General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department) seizing most of the actual functions of the military. In particular, the General Political Department had internalized the functions related to military inspection, such as disciplinary inspection, safety, court procedure, and prosecution, and this created various problems. The PLA’s nature as the Party’s army had the potential of obstructing efficient execu- tion of operations.

• Problem of bribery and corruption.

• Slackening of ideology and discipline due to social pluralization and lack of war experience.

• Concern over U.S. ideological penetration.

For these reasons, organizational reform of Party-Army relations was essential for solving the problems with political control over the military. It was also inevitable for building an army that is capable of winning wars.

Reforms Introduced

In carrying out the most sweeping military reforms since the PRC’s founding, President Xi Jinping has focused on strengthening the Party’s leadership over the military through:

(1) Reestablishment of the CMC Chairman Responsibility System. In November 2012, shortly after he was appointed general secretary of the CCP and CMC chairman, Xi Jinping revised the “Regulations on Central Military Commission Work” so that the CMC chairman responsibility system was specified. The 19th CCP National Congress in 2017 marked the establishment of the CMC chairman responsibility system, and the system was written into the revised Party charter (constitution).

(2) Emphasis on the Leadership of Party Committees. Xi Jinping values the leadership of Party committees in the military and highlights the need to build Party cells in the military. When Xi attended the CMC Party Building Conference in August 2018, he stressed the significance of building Party cells in the military, especially Party committees in the military. Xi reaffirmed that the PLA’s dual leadership system under the command of Party committees would be maintained, and that “All work will be conducted under the unified leadership of Party Committees, and all important issues will be studied and decided by Party committees.” At the same time, for improving combat capability, Xi stated that Party committees in the military would focus on the main responsibilities and tasks of war preparation and war execution.

Xi argued that by enhancing the Party’s leadership, organizational, and executive capabilities, the Party’s political and organizational superiority can be converted into warfare superiority. In particular, he underscored the importance and significant responsibility of high-level Party committees at or above the corps level, and

Xi Jinping talked about problems with Party building in the military, which he referred to as the “seven weakenings.” They are:

•   The weakening of political awareness and political capability;

•   The weakening of centralized and unified leadership by Party committees;

•   The weakening of leadership over war preparations and war execution;

•   The weakening of the principles and combat capability of Party cells;

•   The weakening of management of Party cadres and personnel;

•   The weakening of revolutionary will and combat spirit; and

•   The weakening of responsibility for implementing Party management and Party governance.

(3) Independent Inspection Departments in the Military. Xi Jinping seeks to promote governance in the military and give power to inspection departments to strengthen objective control. He calls this the “fundamental transformation of the military governance system.” Under the previous four general department system, all inspection departments, such as discipline, law, and financial management, were placed in the General Political Department and were unable to exercise independent inspection capabilities. As part of the military reforms, efforts were made to enhance the inspections.

In February 2015, the CMC issued the “Decision on Deeply Promoting Law-based Governance of the Military and Strict Enforcement of Discipline in the New Situation.” These refer to the goal of achieving stable governance in the military through the strict application of law and Party discipline.

Organizational reforms were undertaken to effectively promote governance. That is, as part of the reforms of national defense and the armed forces, inspection departments that had been internalized by the four general departments were given independent status. With the dismantling of the four general departments, the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and the CMC Audit Office were established in the CMC.

The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, which became independent by the reorganization in 2016, sent 10 inspection teams to 15 CMC departments and to each theater command for the first time since the PLA’s founding and began inspection activities. The inspections focused on:

• The implementation status of directives to develop and bolster the Party’s ways and attitude (verify problems, such as not doing even when ordered to, not stopping even when prohibited, not fully adhering to regulations, implementing selectively, and allowing for flexibility);

• The integrity of cadres;

• Compliance with regulations on encouraging saving and opposing wasteful spending; and

• Supervision over the management and use of official military vehicles. Other efforts to strengthen the discipline inspection system include establishing a discipline inspection commission in each military service and branch, as well as having a full-time secretary of the discipline inspection commission, which used to be a concurrent position with deputy member of the Poltburo.

At the theater command level, a dispatch mechanism has been established. This is not an internal mechanism in the theater command but a dispatch mechanism of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. Responsibility for discipline inspection lies with the central state, not the theatre command. The “Regulations on Discipline Inspection,” revised in March 2018, lists 10 categories of discipline inspections, namely, political discipline, organizational discipline, operational discipline (obedience to orders and commands), training discipline (supervision of training), work discipline, safety discipline, integrity discipline, financial discipline, mass discipline (attitude toward civilians), and life discipline. As the above indicates, discipline inspections are not limited to political loyalty and are highly broad in scope, extending to operations and training.

Training inspection, too, is being strengthened. In building an armed forces capable of winning wars, it is important to standardize training and acquire capabilities as intended by the central state.

In this context, supervision of training has been enhanced, including enacting regulations on training inspections. While the CMC Training and Administration Department oversees the training inspections, actual inspections are carried out also by the CMC Joint Staff Department, the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, and the CMC Agency for Offices Administration, with the Training and Administration Department playing a central role. As this fact reveals, the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is engaged in training and operations as well.

In comparison, the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission underwent a more subtle transition. In 1982, the Political and Legal Affairs Leading Small Group was established in the General Political Department. This became an all-military political and legal affairs commission in 2007, but it remained under the jurisdiction of the four general departments. Although the reorganization in 2016 gave it independent status as the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, its authority is considered weaker than that of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission.

(4) Introduction of a Patrol System. The CCP further seeks to strengthen its direct monitoring of organizations and regions by introducing a patrol system. The PLA enacted the “Regulations on Patrol Work” in January 2018. According to the regulations, patrol work is mainly conducted to monitor the discipline of high-level Party committees in the military. At the central state level, the CMC Patrol Work Leading Small Group was established to lead the patrol work. The CMC vice chairman is the head of the small group, the secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is the managing deputy head, and the director of the Political Work Department and the secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission are the deputy heads. An administrative organization is established in the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. The patrols cover the Party committees of CMC departments, theater commands, military services and branches, the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Furthermore, a Patrol Work Leading Small Group is established in the military services and branches and the PAP. The patrol system is headed by the leader of the Party committee in the military, and the secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission is responsible for the implementation work.

The purpose of the patrol inspections is fourfold:

• Supervising and giving guidance on the implementation status of theoretical armament and real combat training under the leadership of Party cells, measurement of their effectiveness, and whether Party cells and cadres are supporting the core (Xi Jinping) and adhering to the Party’s command;

• Supervising whether Party cells are taking proactive responsibility in promoting war preparation and war execution, and supervising measurements of the actual effectiveness of the training and units’ fulfillment of combat capability standards;

• Understanding and resolving small issues, such as what officers and soldiers are opposed to and what they consider as hardships, and what the focus of their patrol inspections is; and

• Training the substratum Party cells and cadres through the process of patrol inspections.

• Reduced Role of the Political Work Department. The CMC Political Work Department, which took over the main activities of the General Political Department, has reduced its authority and role considerably. First, as mentioned above, the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission in the military were given independent status. In addition, it was stipulated that the ultimate responsibility for political work rested with the CMC, and the Political Work Department was positioned as an enforcement body.

Furthermore, it appears that the political work organization at the theater command level has reduced functions. Military regions prior to the reforms had a political department staffed by a full- time director. In the post-reform theater commands, while a political work department is established, its director is no longer a full-time post, with a deputy member of the Politburo dual hatting as the director.

In addition, as mentioned above, the leadership of the Party committees at each level over the     political work organs of the same level has been strengthened. It likely signifies weakening coordination between the upper and lower-level political work organs. This is because the authority of the same-level Party committees is currently being increased, whereas in the past the General Political Department had strong leadership power over lower-level political work organs.

Implications of Tightening Party Control

What are the implications of this tightening of Party control over the military for China’s external activities? First, this tightening of Party control seems to be a vital means of reforming the military and creating an armed forces capable of conducting joint operations and fighting. It is very difficult for military organizations to carry out reform on their own. Especially for an organization like the PLA with rampant bribery and corruption, this requires powerful external intervention, which Xi Jinping is attempting to achieve by bolstering the Party’s leadership.

Also of note is that strengthening the Party’s leadership offers a means of enabling coordination between the military and other organizations. Such strengthening of the Party’s leadership is essential for understanding China’s activities in the maritime gray zone and in the psychological and cognitive domain.

This report has examined the relationship between military organizational reforms and struggles using non-military means. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.

First, Xi Jinping’s military reforms drove the restructuring of Chinese military organizations and strengthened the Party’s leadership over them. Previously, the Party controlled the military mainly through political work organizations and political commissars in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Today, more emphasis is placed on direct control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Focus is on especially the implementation of the Central Military Commission’s chairman responsibility system and the Party committees in the military. Furthermore, military governance through laws and rules is underscored. The Party’s leadership has been reinforced not only over the PLA but also over other military organizations, and mechanisms are being developed for coordination between the military and other governmental actors. These measures were developed also as a response to modern forms of conflict that actively use non-military means.

The People’s Armed Police (PAP) and its subordinate China Coast Guard (CCG) has been restructured. The PAP has been reorganized to specialize in maintaining public security in peacetime and easily contribute to PLA joint operations in a contingency. The reorganization was intended to strip the state of its armed forces and reassign them under the CCP.

The cooperation relationship between the military and other Party governmental organizations is not all that clear. In reality, the Party, the government, and the military may not necessarily be conducting activities in an integrated manner under a consistent system of command. Instead, each actor may be operating under the overarching policies of the Party.

What stands out is that :

• The Party’s leadership is critical to China’s external actions. The Xi Jinping regime strengthened the Party’s leadership in all domains as well as over the organizations engaged in external actions including the military. This is considered not only necessary for maintaining the Party’s rule but also for implementing more strategic external actions. By strengthening the Party’s leadership, the Xi regime succeeded in easing to some extent the problem of “fragmented authoritarianism.”

• What problems and weaknesses face China’s use of non-military means? China has strengthened the Party’s leadership over the military and governmental agencies and developed coordination mechanisms. However, they will not function if the Party itself weakens or falls into chaos. In this sense, the CCP can be both a major strength and a weakness for China’s external actions. There is also no robust mechanism to correct any misjudgments that the CCP might make. Information that goes against the will of the Party is not reported precisely because the Party’s leadership has been strengthened.

Based on the NIDS China Security Report 2023 – China’s Quest for Control of the Cognitive Domain and Gray Zone Situations

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Based on the outcome of the Gulf War, the PLA started researching joint operations in earnest with informatized warfare in mind. From the mid-2000s, the PLA advocated the IJO concept and “Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability,” and presented a joint operations concept that included traditional security domains (land, sea, and air) and new security domains (such as space, cyber electromagnetic, and cognitive domain). Meanwhile, during the Hu Jintao regime, the PLA’s informatization was still in the initial stage. Therefore, the PLA set forth that, for the time being, the feasible joint operations were “joint operations under the conditions of informationization,” which was based on the military doctrine of “local wars under the conditions of informationization.” The joint operations capabilities of the PLA had not necessarily reached a sufficient level in the Hu Jintao era.

The Xi Jinping leadership established “informationized local wars” as a military doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Xi leadership undertook large-scale military reforms in order to strengthen joint operations capabilities based on the IJO concept and “Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability.”

In October 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi advocated the new concepts of “Joint Operations Capability Based on Network Information Systems” and “All-Domain Operations Capability” in order to deepen the IJO concept. The implementation of precision, stealth, and unmanned operations, as well as the gaining of information dominance, are positioned at the core of these concepts, putting more pronounced emphasis on new security domains.

With “intelligentized warfare” proposed from 2019, the PLA is conducting ongoing research on new joint operations concepts, such as “Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations” and “Joint Operations under the Conditions of Intelligentization.” These discussions include the possibility of further PLA reforms, such as the establishment of new military services and the implementation of bolder military reforms.

The Reformed PLA’s Joint Operations Structure

The PLA carried out large-scale military reforms from the end of 2015 to 2016. The reforms were wide-ranging and included:

(1) the dissolution of four general departments and the launch of the multi-department system of the Central Military Commission (CMC); (2) the abolition of the seven military regions (MRs) and the establishment of five theater commands (TCs); (3) the creation of the PLA Army headquarters; (4) the upgrading of the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force and the launch of the PLA Strategic Support Force and the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force; and (5) the expansion of the PLA Navy Marine Corps.

The PLA reforms clarified the distinction between the operational chain of command (CMC-TC headquarters-operational units) and the administrative chain of command (CMC-service headquarters-operational units), based on the policy of “the CMC performs general management, the theaters are mainly in charge of operations, and the services are mainly in charge of force building”. Under this policy, TCs were described as “the only supreme joint operations command organization in their respective strategic directions.” The TCs have greater power and command and control (C2) authority than the MRs before the PLA reforms and have gained in importance.

As part of the PLA reforms, the C2 authority of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) was centralized in the CMC, and the China Coast Guard (CCG) was placed under the PAP, creating the new CMC-PAP-CCG maritime border security management system.

Enforcing the CMC chairman responsibility system strengthened Xi Jinping’s C2 authority over the PLA. In addition, under Xi’s leadership, loyalty to Xi and joint operations were emphasized for selection of the PLA  leadership. Nevertheless, PLA Army personnel still dominate the TC headquarters.

With the formation of the standing CMC Joint Operations Command Center and TC Joint Operations Command Organizations, the PLA established a joint operations command structure for “unification of peacetime structure and wartime structure”. In addition, the PLA has been developing C2 systems for joint operations, interconnecting them with the C2 systems of the military services and integrating them with the C2 systems of government organizations and the civilian sector.

The Transformation of Joint Operations Training and Talent Cultivation Programs through the PLA Reforms, and the Quest for Strengthening Party-Army Relations

In accordance with Xi Jinping’s instruction to become an army that is “ready to fight and win wars,” the PLA further strengthened its joint operations training after the PLA reforms, stepped up trainings in Taiwan’s vicinity and in the South China Sea, and is enhancing its capabilities for commanding joint operations in China-Russia joint exercises. Through a series of joint operations trainings, the PLA has especially strengthened information sharing among the services and connecting their C2 systems. In addition, the PLA improved the quality of trainings by strengthening the training supervision structure.

In order to overcome the shortage of personnel for commanding joint operations, the PLA developed the “triad” System for training new types of military personnel, consisting of military institutional education, unit training practice, and military professional education (online education). The PLA National Defense University is the central academy for cultivating personnel for joint operations, and the joint operations personnel who have been trained at the university are assigned to operational units.

The PLA sought to strengthen the education and training structure by establishing and improving related documents, laws, and regulations. In terms of training, the PLA updated the “Military Training Regulations” and the “Military Training Outline” and enacted the “Trial Guidelines on PLA Joint Operations.” In terms of education, it enacted the “Military Education Policy in the New Era,” the “Trial Regulations on the Education in Military Academies,” and the “Trial Regulations on Military Professional Education for Armed Forces.”

As the PLA strengthens its joint operations structure, some scholars note that the traditional system for maintaining Party-Army relations will become a setback. To address this, the PLA seeks the coexistence of the IJO concept and the maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations by: (1) enforcing the “system of division of the leader’s responsibilities under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee”; (2) focusing on military expertise and scientific and technological knowledge in the selection and cultivation of political officers; and (3) emphasizing the “Three Warfares” and promoting informatization in wartime political work.

Internal Structure of Main Command Post of TC Joint Operations Command

The Commanding officers in the TC JOCO (commander and political commissars) are:

• Intelligence Center

• Communication Center

•  C2 Center (Info Warfare, AD and Special Ops Centres)

• Military Affairs & Mobilization Center

• Political Work Center

• Logistic and Equipment Center

• Command Support Center

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, the PLA has advocated IJO, a concept with broad applicability, in order to adapt flexibly to the developments in U.S. military theories and science and technology. The PLA sought to deepen the IJO concept by pursuing uniqueness, combining tradition (such as “Three Warfares,” military-civil fusion, and maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations) and innovations (such as emphasis on long-range precision attack capability, shift to new security domains, and intelligentized warfare).

Under the strong initiative of Xi Jinping, the PLA reforms developed a joint operations structure that can realize the IJO concept. In line with this, the PLA evolved its joint operations training and personnel cultivation programs and aimed to reconcile the effective execution of the IJO concept and the maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations.

In the PLA reforms, the PLA accomplished many achievements in deepening its joint operations. Meanwhile, there still remain numerous challenges even after the reforms, such as: (1) coordination of authority and roles among the CMC, TCs, and services; (2) insufficient awareness of joint operations and service parochialism; (3) the formalism of joint operations training and coordination between the joint operations training led by the TCs and the training of the services and branches; (4) difficulties with recruiting, cultivating, and retaining personnel skilled in science and technology; and (5) the nature of command authority and capability of political commissars. Overcoming these challenges is expected to take time.

The timetable for the PLA’s modernization sets 2027, 2035, and 2050 as milestone years. In these years, it will be important to estimate the joint operations capabilities of the PLA from multiple aspects, paying attention not only to the increase in defense spending, introduction of new equipment, and statements and actions directed at other countries, but also to the PLA’s joint operations concept, military reforms and the formation of an organizational culture, qualitative improvements in education and training and personnel, and Party-Army relations.

Based on the NIDS, Japan, China Security Report 2022

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Xi, 69, has been reappointed as the General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Central Military Commission (CMC) — the overall high command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for an unprecedented third five-year term by the party’s once-in-a-five-year Congress here last month.

Holding the three powerful posts of the head of the party, the military, and the Presidency, Xi is the only leader besides the party founder Mao Zedong to continue in power after completing 10-year tenure, while all his predecessors retired.

On 8 November, Xi inspected the joint operations command centre of the CMC here which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC.

Upon arriving at the command centre, the Chinese leader was given a briefing, the official media reported.

In his first address to the two million-strong military — the largest in the world — as he kicked off his third term as head of the CMC, Xi said the world is undergoing more profound changes unseen in a century and stressed that China’s national security is facing increased instability and uncertainty, and its military tasks remain arduous.

He said the entire military should devote all its energy to carry out all its work for combat readiness, enhance its capability to fight and win, and effectively fulfill its missions and tasks, state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

Xi instructed them to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and successfully complete various tasks entrusted by the party and the people, the report said.

Though President Xi did not mention a particular country in his address, it came amidst growing international concern over China’s aggressive military manoeuvring in the resource-rich Indo-Pacific region. The armies of China and India are also engaged in a prolonged standoff in eastern Ladakh.

China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam all claim parts of it.

Beijing has built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

Xi said the military leadership must focus on realising the PLA’s centennial goal – to make the PLA a world-class armed force by 2027, which is broadly interpreted as making it on par with the US armed forces.

“We must do all we can to make this happen,” he said.

During his speech at the party congress last month, Xi also set “victory in local wars” as a goal and told the PLA to “improve training and preparation for war in all aspects and improve the ability of the army to fight and win”.

“We will strengthen the normal and diversified use of military forces, carry out military struggles with determination and flexibility, shape the security posture, contain crises and conflicts, and win local wars,” he said.

Commenting on Xi’s address to the military, retired Air Force General Xu Qiliang, who was the former vice-chairman of the CMC, said in a commentary that the PLA must prepare for a rapid transformation from peace to wartime.

“Always maintain a high readiness posture like arrows on a taut string ready to go, to ensure that the troops are prepared to fight at all times,” Xu, who retired from the top post in the CMC, was quoted as saying by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

In his address to the CPC Congress last month, President Xi said China will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, which was interpreted by observers as a call to increase China’s nuclear weapons.

Analysts said Xi’s remarks indicated China would improve its nuclear deterrence capability amid its increasing rivalry with the US.

Song Zhongping, a former People’s Liberation Army instructor, said the statement meant China would “strengthen its development of strategic nuclear forces” to safeguard its national security.

Song said the PLA must strengthen its “nuclear triad” forces – its combination of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles, and air-launched weapons – as well as its second-nuclear strike capability to respond to a nuclear attack.

“All of these require the PLA to have a modern nuclear-armed force … and to moderately increase the nuclear arsenal,” he told the Post.

In his address to the military officials on Tuesday, Xi instructed the armed forces to thoroughly study, publicise and implement the guiding principles of last month’s 20th CPC

National Congress and take concrete actions to further modernize national defence and the military.

He said the entire armed forces implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era, following the military strategy, and adhering to combat effectiveness as the sole criterion.

The new era refers to his assumption of the leadership of the party in 2012.

The command centre, which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, is of great importance and shoulders heavy responsibilities, Xi said.

The command centre should make new and greater contributions to boosting military training and combat preparedness, effectively fulfilling all missions and tasks in the new era, Xi said.

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The most significant outcome of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which ended on 23 October, is the re-election of Xi Jinping for a record third term as the general secretary of the party. This is a prelude to his extension as the President of the People’s Republic and the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission for yet another term, and possibly for life.

Deng Xiaoping, who led China following the disastrous decades of Maoist excesses, pushed the CPC to adopt the norms of collective leadership that led to presidential terms being limited to two and put in place an informal retirement age of 68. Xi has pushed all these conditions aside to emerge as an all-powerful figure after the last 19th Party Congress did away with presidential term limits.

Xi’s power is evident from the two key political ideas introduced into the CPC constitution last week. “Two establishes” calls on the party to recognise Xi as the “core” and to accept his ideas as a key tenet of the party rule. The “two safeguards” calls on the CPC to protect Xi’s status and safeguard the party’s leading role in China.

Xi’s centralisation of power was visible on Sunday, when he paraded China’s apex ruling team, the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) on the dais at the 20th Party Congress on its closing day. They are all his key allies, signalling that loyalty was the key criterion for their appointment.

No. 2 to Xi in the CPC’s apex body is Li Qiang, who is expected to replace Li Keqiang as Prime Minister in March 2023 when the National People’s Congress meets to select a new government. Li Qiang’s current job is as chief of the CPC in Shanghai. Among the other new appointees are Cai Qi, party chief of Beijing, Ding Xuexiang, former chief of staff of Xi, and Li Xi, party leader from Guangdong.

Premier Li Keqiang and Vice-Premier Wang Yang were both dropped from the PBSC. Both are 67 and could have been considered for another term. Another 67-year-old leader, Wang Huning, an associate of Xi was re-elected. Vice-Premier Hu Chunhua, who was once considered a potential successor, failed to make it to the PBSC and was actually dropped from the Politburo itself.

In the lineup of the new leaders, what is significant is dropping of leaders like Li Keqiang, who is a trained economist. Another two important figures — People’s Bank of China Governor Yi Gang and banking regulator Guo Shuqing — have been dropped from the new Central Committee. There is speculation that leaders who take a more liberal approach to economic policy have been dropped.

Having done away with the only significant constitutional limitation on the personal power of a leader attempted by Communist China, the fears are that Xi will also shed restraints in the exercise of that power. He has been known for policies of nationalism, enhancement of the role of the CPC in the everyday life of China, a hard line on Taiwan and confrontation with the West and other countries like India.

There is every expectation that Xi will double down on his policies relating to the economy and security, both of which were important themes of his work report to the Party Congress on its very first day. In the ensuing week, some of the issues were written into the CPC’s constitution. The report provided a policy blueprint for the coming five years.

In his two-hour speech, Xi spelt out the CPC’s priorities on economic policy and security. There were new sections on science and education, signalling the increased emphasis on their role in China’s plans for the future. The essence, according to observers, was on the “Chinese characteristics” of modernisation and governance.

Xi’s emphasis on the economic front was a call to promote the development of science and technology and at the same time orient Chinese economic growth towards a more equal distribution as indicated by the slogan he gave in 2021, calling for “common prosperity”. He has, however, made it clear that the overall policy of promoting economic growth will continue.

There was a significant emphasis on security and a veiled attack on the US, which was attempting to “blackmail, contain, blockade and exert maximum pressure on China.”

Xi boasted that China would have a world-class army by 2027 and said besides “strategic deterrence” (nuclear), “new domain forces with new combat capabilities” would be introduced. From India’s point of view, there was a reference that the PLA modernisation would “shape our security posture, deter and manage crises and conflicts and win local wars.” There is little doubt that this refers to China’s issues with Taiwan and India. The screening of clips of the Galwan clash for the Congress delegates confirmed that India is very much in the minds of decision-makers in Beijing.

The notion of term limits for high offices goes back into history, and so does the opposition to it by strong men like Julius Caesar and Napoleon. Modern experience suggests that in eight to 10 years of office, leaders get jaded. This is evident from the record of office of leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and numerous African heads of government.

There was a certain wisdom in Deng Xiaoping’s effort to promote collective leadership and check the power of a single leader. Those restraints have been removed by Xi and China may once again have to confront the consequences of being ruled by a supremo who has no check on his authority.

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“Despite his seemingly unimpressed face at the summit, Xi is unlikely to break ties with Putin over the lack of Russian progress in Ukraine. Russia simply remains too important a partner in China’s strategy to challenge the United States’ position in the Indo-Pacific,” the institute’s analysis adds.

And interesting given the timing, Xi, on 21 September – the same day that Putin declared a ‘partial’ national military mobilization – addressed a national military seminar, telling top officers to focus their attention on gearing up for potential military action on the horizon.

“It is imperative to conscientiously summarize and apply successful experience in reforms, to master new situations and [understand] the requirements of the tasks, to focus on preparing for wars, and to have the courage to explore and innovate,” Xinhua News Agency quoted the Chinse president as saying.

He said further at the Beijing-hosted defense conference, which included high-ranking representatives of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), as well as the People’s Armed Police Force and military academies, that major reforms to the nations armed forces he initiated starting years ago have been successful.

“Long-standing systemic obstructions, structural incongruities and policy issues in the development of national defense and the armed forces have been resolved,” he told the top defense officials.

SCO conference involved moments where Putin seemed on the defensive, particularly in dialogue with China’s Xi and India’s Modi.

Meanwhile, on 20 September a pair of Western warships make a provocative sail through of the contested Taiwan Strait, at a moment the PLA military continues its heavy patrol presence surrounding Taiwan in the wake of the early August Pelosi visit, as CNN describes:

US and Canadian warships sailed through the Taiwan Strait on Tuesday following weekend remarks from President Joe Biden that the US would defend Taiwan in the event it is attacked by China.

A US Navy ship, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins, conducted a “routine Taiwan Strait transit” on Tuesday, US Navy spokesperson Lt. Mark Langford said in a statement.

The US ship conducted the transit “in cooperation with Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver,” Langford said.

It wasn’t the first time Biden answered with a simple “yes” when pressed on whether the US would defend Taiwan if the island were invaded.

He issued the blunt response when asked in a CBS “60 Minutes” interview which aired Sunday what the US reaction would be if China decided to invade Taiwan. “Yes, if, in fact, there was an unprecedented attack,” he said in a sit-down with CBS’ Scott Pelley. Xi no doubt had such provocative comments from the US commander-in-chief fresh on his mind when he addressed Wednesday’s military conference in Beijing.

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Acutely conscious of the fate of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Chinese President Xi Jinping is particularly concerned that the army remains “an army of the party” and to ensure this, he mandated a series of consecutive year-long education campaigns to instil the CCP’s ideology and correct political orientation among the soldiers. A book released last week, titled “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army Q&A”, has now indelibly affixed his imprimatur on the PLA. It has been distributed throughout the army as “important” reading for officers, soldiers, cadres and the masses.

Xi’s grip on the PLA is near absolute. At an “enlarged” meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) within two days of taking over China’s top three posts, including Chairman of the CMC in November 2012, Xi announced that the political reliability and loyalty would trump all other considerations and be the sole determining criterion for promotions in the PLA. Other steps were taken to ensure the PLA’s “absolute obedience” to the CCP and CMC Chairman. The CCP’s anti-graft outfit, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), weeded out corrupt officers and those of doubtful loyalty and by September 2017 had dismissed over 4,885 officers, including 150 Generals. Each General in the PLA today has been appointed by Xi, who has also donned the operational role of the Commander-in-Chief.

With the PLA maintaining the number of delegates to the upcoming 20th Party Congress at 304, despite its downsizing by 3,00,000 personnel, it appears that the PLA’s representation in the new 20th CCP Central Committee (CC) will probably stay at 37 full members and 22 alternate members as in the outgoing 19th CCP CC. Its representation in the Politburo is similarly unlikely to be reduced. The PLA’s presence in the Party Congress would give Xi added leverage in the CCP CC.

Relevant to India is the attention being paid by Xi to the PLA Western Theatre Command (WTC). The largest of China’s five theatre commands, it exercises operational jurisdiction over China’s borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal and Myanmar. Its tasks include protection of Chinese personnel and assets deployed on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Western Theatre Command was operationally responsible for the intrusions in the Ladakh region in April 2020 that activated the entire 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC).

In this backdrop of continuing tension and deployment of 60,000-70,000 troops each by India and China in the high-altitude eastern Ladakh, what is interesting is that the number of delegates representing the PLA WTC at the 20th Party Congress is nearly double than that of the other four theatre commands. The WTC has selected 30 delegates for the 20th Party Congress. There are other signs of the leadership’s attention to the WTC.

The Chinese President visited Lhasa on July 23, 2021, Chengdu on July 9, 2022, and Urumqi on July 15, 2022, where he met WTC officers. The WTC receives advanced military hardware and latest jet aircraft ahead of all other theatre commands, except the Eastern Theatre Command.

Massive infrastructure projects sanctioned by the 14th Five-Year Plan are scheduled for completion by 2030-35. These will upgrade the WTC’s military capabilities and include new railways, a new highway and 30 additional airfields in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and its surrounding areas.

Coincidentally, the timeline matches that in the article published in June 2013 by Hong Kong-based Wen Wei Po, projecting China’s war with India for the “reconquest of the southern Tibet” between 2035 and 2040.

Furthermore, there is little sign of abatement of the considerable widespread discontent inside China, further inflamed by the “zero Covid” policy and unending lockdowns.

A PLA Daily editorial had earlier warned that the United States could “use the tense domestic situation in China to fan the social upheaval and provoke social conflict.”

“Colour revolutions” is a serious worry for the Chinese leadership. Significant for China’s neighbours and India is the fresh warning issued just weeks before the 20th Party Congress via a commentator’s article, which conveys the views of the CCP CC.

This commentator’s article in the People’s Daily last week stated that the world has become increasingly turbulent and more prone to change. In an unusually candid admission, it said the “country’s security situation has become increasingly unstable and uncertain.” It disclosed the CCP leadership’s concern at the increasingly “prominent issues” related to maritime disputes and the “increased likelihood of chaos on our doorstep”, thus making the task of “defending the country’s political security and social stability more formidable.”

The latest warning clearly implies that Xi is facing a difficult period and will be on the edge. The CCP cadres, public security apparatus and the PLA, including the WTC, are certainly on high alert. In case the situation doesn’t improve, or deteriorates, and the CCP’s authority and legitimacy are perceived as beginning to erode, Xi will be tempted to divert attention and resort to military actions abroad. The developments in Ukraine will be a factor in his calculations. In this backdrop, any expectation, prompted by disingenuous Chinese media comments or the disengagement at Gogra-Hot Springs, that Xi will change his attitude or policy towards India is unfounded and premature.

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China’s vision of having a world-class army by 2049 has been widely discussed and publicized. However, military experts have questioned this vision owing to several distinct weaknesses plaguing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Chinese PLA is currently the world’s largest active military force. It traces its roots to the 1927 Nanchang Uprising of the communists against the Nationalists.

The People’s Liberation Army was formed as an armed wing to counter the Anti-Communist purges during the civil wars. Initially called the Red Army, it grew under Mao Zedong and Zhu De from 5,000 troops in 1929 to 200,000 in 1933. Now it has 2.03 million active and 510,000 reserve personnel.

S. Desai, a research analyst for the China Studies Programme explains that PLA had two important turning points. First, the US’ use of advanced and sophisticated weaponry in the first Gulf War of the 1990s compelled PLA to pursue technological advancement.

Second, he says that the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, Xi Jinping’s championing of the Chinese dream to make PLA a world-class force by 2049 led to its restructuring and rapid modernisation.

However, Desai argues that despite the technological advances and growing military might, PLA has several key weaknesses. “One, PLA is accused of being infected by the peace disease (Hépíng bìng), peacetime habits (Hépíng jixí) and peace problems (Hépíng jibì), as it has not participated in any war since 1979.

This is a condition where a soldier’s casual peacetime approach while training could impact wartime combat readiness,” he writes.

He further says that Xi Jinping knows about this weakness and has therefore introduced changes to PLA’s regime to make it train under “realistic combat conditions”.

“My research also indicates that the number of PLA’s bilateral-trilateral military exercises with the foreign armies has increased since 2014 to compensate for the lack of combat experience. But the impact of this change cannot be verified until PRC goes to war,” says the author.

The second weakness that Desai talks about is that PLA’s military modernisation doesn’t make up for the quality of personnel employed, especially in the technology-centric services such as the navy, air force, rocket force and the strategic support force.

China has one of the largest defence budgets and has allocated the most significant share of spending on capital expenditure. To overcome this, PLA improved its recruitment technique by focusing on employing better-qualified students from specialised and technical universities.

“It felt the need to rework its conscription model to achieve the informatisation goal for the armed forces by 2035, which was announced by Xi in the 2017 party congress,” says Desai. He added that it introduced several financial incentives to attract highly educated talent. However, despite positive inducements, recent reports suggest that the gap still exists and PLA is still facing a shortage of skilled expertise to drive its technology-centric services.

After widespread corruption in the PLA in the 1980s, the then chairman, Jiang Zemin introduced reforms that tried to address this problem by dissolving the military-business complex in 1998, but by then the problem had become pervasive.

After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he launched more than 4000 anti-graft investigations that resulted in the sacking of high-level officers. To compensate for the loss of position of influential officials which could’ve led to resistance within the army, they were given appropriate positions throughout the rank and files of PLA.

“Although this has reduced the resistance, the effectiveness of the reforms, which were meant to reduce corruption, can be questioned,” says Desai.

Another weakness the Desai brings forward is the rising revenue expenditure of the PLA. “China also has the largest pool of 57 million PLA veterans, demanding post-retirement benefits and better retirement deals. These post-retirement wages, pensions and living subsidies are incurred from China’s defence spending. Rising revenue bills, since 2018, will certainly impact capital expenditure in the near future,” he states.

Another revenue expenditure is the commissioning cost to maintain existing weaponry. Thus, the author concludes that the rising revenue bills and increasing maintenance cost will slow China’s military modernisation drive.

He pointed out that other than these reasons, PLA has other weaknesses such as “limited strategic airlift and open-sea refuelling capabilities, limited overseas military bases, lack of joint operations capabilities and the lack of a rotational system within the lower-ranked officers of PLA”.

He concluded by saying that these limitations will not only impact the Chinese dream but also alter its capabilities to attain its strategic military guidelines in the future.

Source

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