Afghanistan

The Taliban almost certainly will remain firmly in control of Afghanistan during the next year and continue to combat ISIS-Khorasan and anti-Taliban resistance groups, though these groups still conduct deadly attacks in country. The Taliban also continues to restrict al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ activities in accordance with the Taliban’s perception of its Doha Agreement obligations, though some al-Qa’ida elements probably circumvent these restrictions to provide modest covert support to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan militant group. Low-level Taliban members continue to kill or arrest former Afghan government and military personnel, but senior regime leaders probably are not directing this campaign.

The Taliban has made some progress toward gaining de facto recognition with regional partners, despite persistent concerns about the state of human rights, inclusive representation in government, and militancy in Afghanistan. Iran has met with the Taliban to discuss water rights and threats posed by terrorist groups, particularly ISIS-Khorasan and Jaysh al-Adl.

India is pursuing low-level engagement with the Taliban, focused on humanitarian assistance, countering terrorism, and enabling private sector growth.

• Russia is continuing to deepen its relationship with the Taliban, expressing its intent to formally recognize the government and cooperate against terrorism. In September 2024, the Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson emphasized Russian efforts to remove the Taliban from Russia’s list of terrorist groups and develop multilateral cooperation while blaming the West for instability in the country.

• In January 2024, China’s President Xi accepted the diplomatic credentials of a Taliban- appointed ambassador. The Taliban’s focus on improving internal security and reducing violence has enabled some foreign investments from China, including oil extraction and copper mining activities in Afghanistan.

India

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s defense priorities will probably focus on demonstrating global leadership, countering China, and enhancing New Dehli’s military power. India views China as its primary adversary and Pakistan more an ancillary security problem to be managed, despite cross-border attacks in mid-May by both India’s and Pakistan’s militaries.

• Following a late April terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi conducted missile strikes on terrorism-related infrastructure facilities in Pakistan. The missile strike provoked multiple rounds of missile, drone, and loitering munition attacks, and heavy artillery fire, by both militaries from 7 to 10 May. As of 10 May, both militaries had agreed to a full ceasefire.

To counter Chinese influence and boost its global leadership role, India is giving priority to advancing its bilateral defense partnerships in the Indian Ocean region through exercises, training, arms sales, and information sharing. India also has increased trilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and actively participates in multilateral fora such as the Quadrilateral, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN.

• In late October 2024, India and China reached an agreement to move forces away from the two remaining contested positions along the disputed Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The disengagement did not resolve the longstanding dispute about border demarcation but reduced some tension still lingering from a 2020 incident when troops on both sides were killed in a clash along the Line of Actual Control.

India almost certainly will continue promoting its “Made in India” initiative this year to build its domestic defense industry, mitigate supply chain concerns, and modernize its military.

India continued to modernize its military in 2024, conducting a test of the nuclear-capable developmental Agni-I Prime MRBM and the Agni-V multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle while also commissioning its second nuclear-powered submarine to strengthen its nuclear triad and bolster its ability to deter adversaries.

India will maintain its relationship with Russia through 2025 because it views its ties to Russia as important for achieving its economic and defense objectives and sees value in the relationship as a means to offset deepening Russia-China relations. Under Modi, India has reduced its procurement of Russian-origin military equipment but still relies on Russian spare parts to maintain and sustain its large inventory of Russian-origin tanks and fighter aircraft that form the backbone of its military’s ability to counter perceived threats from China and Pakistan.

Pakistan

During the next year, the Pakistani military’s top priorities are likely to remain cross-border skirmishes with regional neighbors, rising attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch nationalist militants, counterterrorism efforts, and nuclear modernization. Despite Pakistan’s daily operations during the past year, militants killed more than 2,500 people in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan regards India as an existential threat and will continue to pursue its military modernization effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage.

• Pakistan is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and maintaining the security of its nuclear materials and nuclear command and control. Pakistan almost certainly procures WMD-applicable goods from foreign suppliers and intermediaries.

• Pakistan primarily is a recipient of China’s economic and military largesse, and Pakistani forces conduct multiple combined military exercises every year with China’s PLA, including a new air exercise completed in November 2024. Foreign materials and technology supporting Pakistan’s WMD programs are very likely acquired primarily from suppliers in China, and sometimes are transshipped through Hong Kong, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. However, terrorist attacks targeting Chinese workers who support China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects has emerged as a point of friction between the countries; seven Chinese nationals were killed in Pakistan in 2024.

• Pakistan and Iran have taken steps, including high-level meetings, to deescalate tensions after the two countries conducted unilateral airstrikes on each other’s territory in January 2024 in response to cross-border terror attacks.

• In September 2024, Taliban and Pakistani border forces clashed near border posts, resulting in the death of eight Taliban fighters. In March 2025, Pakistan and the Afghanistan exchanged air and artillery strikes on each other’s territory, each citing alleged militant infrastructure as the targets.

===

Key Highlights from DIA’s Worldwide Threat Assessment 2025

China’s Strategic Posture:

• Accelerated PLA modernization aims to enable a Taiwan takeover by force if needed.

•  Massive investments in nuclear, space, cyber, and disinformation capabilities.

• Expanding global basing and maritime presence from Cambodia to Africa.

Russia’s War Trajectory:

• Sustained war in Ukraine with incremental gains, high human and material costs.

• Increasing use of cyberattacks, space-based weapons, and destabilization operations across Europe and Africa.

Tech-Driven Threat Evolution: AI, space, cyber, biotech, and unmanned systems are reshaping global conflict and espionage strategies.

Rising Adversarial Coordination: China, Russia, Iran, and NorthKorea are intensifying bilateral military, tech, and diplomatic collaboration to counter U.S. influence.

Hybrid and Asymmetric Warfare: From Iranian proxy strikes to North Korean missile exports and cybercrime, non-traditional threats are expanding in complexity and reach.

Homeland Vulnerabilities: U.S. infrastructure faces growing threats from drones, fentanyl trafficking, cyberattacks, and potential terrorist infiltrations via the southern border.

Global Flashpoints: The Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Red Sea, and Central Asia remain hotspots for escalation with direct implications for U.S. and allied interests.

Bottom line: The security landscape is defined by hybrid conflict, deepening adversarial ties, and accelerating technology disruption.

Strategic foresight and resilience are no longer optional they’re imperative.

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Unsavoury Advices

On 22 March, China sent unsavoury advice to the Philippines over its decision to further boost bilateral relations with the US. The reasons cited by Secretary Blinken while in Manila, was China’s “provocative actions” in the region, the US diplomat was confident that it would “promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.” These assertions were just too much for Xi’s strategists to swallow comfortably. Naturally, with growing tension in the regional waters particularly around the contested Spratly Island, China views this as an ‘unnecessary intervention’ from the US. China also felt unhappy with the news from Japan that it plans to convert its 16 seaports and airports into dual-use military infrastructure. Global Times in a commentary on 29^th March termed the Japanese action as “Japan’s resurgence of militarism”. It appeared particularly infuriated that the new plans are actively promoted by the US in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Not long back China had sent detailed advice on how Taiwan should plan and conduct its national election. In fact, it termed them as a regional election in its territory of Taiwan. From time to time, China has felt like advising many countries about their domestic policies. The list included major countries like Australia and India as well. Its ‘pearls’ of advice to India have special considerations about the conduct of diplomacy, foreign trade, state-to-state relations, multilateral military exercises, and of course, a list of restricted locations that must remain out of bounds in any case. China does not restrict its ‘advisories’ to comments from the Foreign Office but mostly it is pursued in great earnest by its state agencies and deeply controlled media.

ALSO READ: Chinese Influence Operations

The world has a great spectacle to witness the Chinese interference in the just concluded Taiwan national election where China pushed its state machinery to create a massive disinformation campaign discrediting the Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling alliance, and promoting its choice of candidates. It offered free trips to the mainland for a ‘better understanding’ of the perspective. When the election drew closer it even sent muffled threats to voters to ‘choose carefully’ as it imposed import restrictions under the garb of trade investigations.

In an aggressive show of strength, its fighters continue to breach the Median Line over the Taiwan Straits, once assumed as a sacrosanct air boundary between China and Taiwan. Its ships have dangerously attacked and blocked tiny Philippine boats with water cannons knocking them out of action on multiple occasions. It continues to send its ‘fishing boats’ further deeper into Senkaku Island raising alarms of territorial violation from the Japanese. Significantly, China conducts its affairs the way it desires, at the same time expecting everyone else to follow its directives. That’s being closest to how one can define the word hypocrites!

Raising Security Concerns

Countries in the neighbourhood of China not only feel threatened by its continued aggressive behaviour but are extremely worried about deteriorating future course. Japan’s National Security Council presented a very disturbing picture of the growing Chinese threat to Japan’s sovereignty. It was highlighted that with its current capacity, Japan would not be able to sustain a conflict with China. This strongly drove Japan to find a fix which was illustrated when they changed their national security outlook in December 2022 and dispensed with terms like Self Defence Force enshrined in Article 9 of their constitution. This was one of the reasons why Japan was so interested in getting NATO to set its foot there through a first-of-a-kind ‘Liaison Office’. Australia on the other hand was another major neutral power which decided it was time to ‘change course’. It boosted its defence investments, critically planned to adopt new platforms like nuclear submarines and almost rushed into the security grouping of AUKUS along with the UK and the US.

Deepening security concerns from China also took their toll on ASEAN. For the first time it decided to institute a dedicated commission for dialogue and discussion under the collective security approach for its members. Privately many ASEAN members have expressed alarming concerns over China’s hostile approach towards them. At one time ASEAN had entirely focussed on China to draw economic benefits, but the dramatic change in the situation demands credible management of security vulnerabilities with the same country. China has somehow been successful in creating a serious security quandary among almost all its neighbours. In global geopolitics unpredictability and unsavoury approaches are highly despised. It pushes countries further to find newer ways to preserve their sovereignty and dignity.

In such an unstable environment, countries joining hands in a promising formal security alliance is surely not out of context. If that happens, it will be a watershed moment for Asia and a point of no return. Xi’s chosen advisors may hurriedly dismiss such a scenario, and clearly, it is not an easy choice anyway. However, the perception is – they may be doomed if they choose and surely doomed if they don’t. It is a dark reality about China’s bloated ambitions and sadly for it, early signs of countries coming together have already begun to show!

Unmistakable Similarities

Existing home truths point to unmistakable similarities between Asian security challenges and what Europe was going through at the fag end of the Second World War. Noticeably, China is striving to get the aura of the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the near term, it wanted to be counted as ‘equal’ to the US while carrying a secret ambition of soon replacing it as the most powerful country in the world. The hanging fear of war among European nations at that time seemed replaced by a growing security threat among many Asian countries today. A pre-security alliance before NATO already existed in the form of the ‘Brussels Pact’, whose charter was to ensure “Collective Self-Defence” for its five members. Asia has already witnessed the formation of QUAD and AUKUS with a deep security undertone;

The US formed an integral part of NATO since its inception while it held special relations with the UK. In the Asian context, the US already maintains a strong presence both politically and militarily, while it holds special relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Soviets have tried to strengthen their influence with Eastern Europe. China does not have that buffer but it has someone like North Korea which is much more powerful than maybe what Belarus is for Russia today. A formal alliance like NATO in Asia may not be imminent but it may also be just a ‘few events’ away.

Asian Security Alliance

If and when the deteriorating security environment dictates the formation of a formal alliance, say an ‘Asian Security Alliance’(ASA), the driving purpose would only be to ensure ‘collective security’ for its members. It would be undoubtedly looking for the NATO construct as an inspiration, especially the nuances of Article 5 and Article 10, which define the alliance’s commitment to security for its members and modalities for membership. However, it would also present an opportunity to incorporate measures ab initio which are seen as creating hurdles and conflict within NATO today. The existing ingredients definitely indicate that an ASA would probably be a reality sooner than later while being a much-improved version of NATO, offering better security resolutions.

NATO has served one great purpose – its members haven’t seen a major war for more than half a century. This will be one of the most important stimulations towards the formation of the ASA. However, ASA must look to ensure its actions are – ‘time relevant’, unlike NATO it must dispense with the condition of ‘unanimity’. It should be able to undertake timely preventive military action with say even a 2/3rd majority, while punitive military actions could be undertaken with a 3/4th majority. Such an arrangement would obviate a ‘decision dilemma’ within the organisation which at critical times could be purposefully induced by the prime adversary through the weakest link and prevent unanimity from ever coming across, eventually defeating the entire raison d’être of the alliance.

ALSO READ: China’s Cyber Ranges for Attack and Defence

The membership should remain ‘by invite’ and only for those who meet the strict requirements to which its members are supposed to commit especially funding and national military spending. To give strength to this multi-nation grouping, it may propose that each member must get into a bilateral security commitment as a prerequisite to join the grouping. First, it would remove the scope of conflict among members, and second, it would fully commit them in the time of need removing all scope of geopolitical influences. It would enhance every member’s confidence that their national security challenges will be addressed promptly and cannot keep waiting for phoney approvals from the UNSC or unanimity of views. Such security arrangements are probably becoming more relevant as the UN has become hostage to a select few who continue to stall popular action time and again by their veto. This would create a new powerful grouping taking its place as a major pole, simultaneously addressing the yearning for multipolarity in global affairs. It will considerably diminish the idea of the sole superpower and prevent the urge for global policing.

Global Realities

In the existing dynamics, the ASA appears much more capable of stabilising the security situation in the Asian theatre. It will allow every member irrespective of their size and potential to better commit its national resources for its people without ever having to worry about bullying by anyone. It will definitely not be against anyone and remain very attractive for everyone! The charter would make it possible for even Taiwan and China to be members simultaneously, as long as both commit to abide by the bilateral security commitment of ‘no war’ and coming to fully help the other in case of any threat. Those who would find it ‘uncomfortable to join’ will have no locus standi to criticise it, as the entry though conditional, is ‘not denied’ for anyone. The global realities have given one prominent message to all that practice of shadow boxing and cold war tactics only create greater complications, sucking in more and more resources. A plain-vanilla grouping is what addresses the problem, especially against wayward adversaries and unpredictable proxies. When the scale of reprisal and fear of suffering become obvious it would create invisible guard rails keeping lunatics on globally accepted behavioural norms. Pundits in China must be strategising their next move to have a greater destabilising impact upon their chosen adversary, but they must also remain watchful, their every act is only pushing the tiniest of countries to gain stronger resolve to stand up and guard their national pride. China may end up being the greatest contributor towards the creation of an eventual security alliance like ASA, without ever qualifying as a member of the same!

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China has been taking advantage of huge Indian market to enhance its economic strength in the garb of peace and tranquillity but it has been working quietly and deliberately against the Indian national interests which became obvious in Apr-May 2020 wherein it carried out large scale transgressions in Eastern Ladakh which are still continuing.

The sacrifices by CO and 19-unit personnel during the Galwan clash are a watershed moment for Indian Defence Forces wherein the Chinese have betrayed India ‘once again’. This necessitates that the Indian masses understand the Chinese behavioural pattern as that has not emerged ‘overnight’. It is towards this that the book ‘China Betrays Again’ written by Maj Gen (Dr) Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd) fills this gap to assist the readers to comprehend the multiple dynamics of Chinese expansionist agenda and as to why it behaves the way it behaves.

ALSO READ: China Fuelling An Asian NATO?

The Book also throws light on Galwan clash, multiple rounds of Corps commander level discussions, infrastructure development and implications for India & China due to continuing Stand Off. It also highlights as to how the Chinese have converted the ‘territorial issue’ into a ‘sovereignty issue’ by adopting its Land Boundary Law effective from 1 Jan 2022.

China is also aggressively changing/ bringing in new sovereignty markers by extended infrastructure development and establishment of the model villages all along the LAC which have to be actively responded by India with enhanced focus on the ‘vibrant villages.

The author has taken pains to elaborate the developments in China since 1911 including conflicts between ROC and PRC. The expansionist agenda and its physical manifestation has also been comprehensively covered. This will help in crystal gazing in its future behaviour.

The details of border disputes and LAC disputes have been comprehensively covered in the simplest language for reader to understand. The book also helps to understand the Chinese design of debt trapping in the other countries with specific details of Sri Lanka.

ALSO READ: Fujian – China’s Newest Type 03 Aircraft Carrier

The book also looks at multiple other issues connected with China whether it is BRI or CPEC. Chinese collusivity with Pakistan and its impact on the resolution of the Siachen glacier has also been comprehensively covered.

The reader will be able to get a clear sense of the Chinese activities in South China Sea as well as East China Sea besides its efforts to affect the freedom of navigation for the other countries. Its ambitions to integrate Taiwan have also been covered in detail.        

Prof Hoppymon Jacob has written the ‘Foreword’ of the book which comprehensively captures the essence of the content. The book has been published by ‘Sabre and Quill’ publishers containing 283 pages with cost of Rs 1295/- for hardcover edition. The book is available at Amazon, Sabre & Quill publishers and Book Mart distributors. Author signed copies can be obtained directly from the author.

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These shipyards were previously responsible for the construction of the immediate predecessor, the Type 054A frigate, of which at least 40 units have been produced to date for PLAN. Four more modified Type 054A were built at Hudong for Pakistan. Both Hudong and Huangpu have also produced a modified Type 054A adapted for use by the Chinese Coast Guard, referred to as Type 818, and continue to build a newer re-designed variant with as yet to be confirmed designation.

The new frigate, typically referred to as Type 054B, is despite its designation a wholly redesigned warship that is both longer and wider than the existing Type 054. Estimated to have a length of around 147 meters and a beam of 18 meters, its displacement will likely be around 6,000 tons, and as such about 2,000 tons heavier than 054A. Armament and other subsystems are yet to be confirmed, but will include a VLS and very likely a new double-sided rotating active electronically scanned array-radar (AESA) on the main mast. Apart from the basic dimensions the new images also confirm structural differences in configuration over 054A.

ALSO READ: Recent Developments in PLA Navy Surface Combatants

The Type 054B feature a bulkier superstructure and a bridge set higher. A close in weapon system (CIWS), likely a H/PJ-11 11-barrel 30 mm autocannon is placed ahead of the bridge in an overall similar configuration to Type 052D- and Type 055-destroyers. The main gun will likely be a 76 mm H/PJ-26, also in use on Type 054A and the smaller Type 056/A-corvettes. The configuration and type of the vertical launch missile system (VLS) remains to be confirmed, although 32 cells seem plausible. Reasonably the new ship should see adaption of the new Z-20 ASW- and naval utility helicopter, replacing the lighter and less capable Z-9 in use on Type 054A.

The Type 054B frigate under construction at Huangpu has already been painted and launch appears likely in the next few months. The second hull at Hudong was floated out of the drydock in the beginning of June to make way for a civilian cargo vessel getting launched, but then returned into dock for further work. Nevertheless both Type 054B should see launch well before the end of the year. Sighting of further modules at Hudong also suggests that construction of additional frigates is already underway.

In conclusion PLAN appears to be well set up to transition from the large scale production of Type 054A, which by now has established itself as a workhorse for the Chinese Navy. The new Type 054B will likely serve to provide significant further capability, especially for anti-submarine (ASW) warfare, building on the already very substantial capacity available through the numerous Type 054A – and Type 056A – fleets.

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Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

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In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.

Security Situation in the South China Sea

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.

The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments.

In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended to further solidify PRC claims in these areas-especially in terms of domestic law- and justify its actions in the region.

In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.

When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 2022.

South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations

Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.

The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available to Beijing

East China Sea

The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels-including four equipped with deck guns-sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

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The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base. PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley – the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years-the Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military commander negotiations breaking down in October . Due to the sustained military development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely continue through 2022.

China-India Border

Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiations made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials.

Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India.

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Western Theater Command Leadership (2021)

Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong.

Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army DOB: 11/1962

Age: 59

Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou.

Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command DOB: 1958, Age: 63

Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing

Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region DOB: 5/1958. Age: 63

Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province

Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University

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Operations that aim to persuade an audience of a particular viewpoint, energize those who hold specific views, and/or divert target audiences are all examples of influence operations.

Propagandists are vying for users’ already-diminishing attention on social media platforms, according to the logic of distraction. Propagandists could successfully capture user attention without necessarily persuading them, if they can divert target audiences from an unfavorable narrative developing on social media by disseminating alternative theories or muddying the information environment.

Although influence operations can take many different shapes and employ a variety of techniques, there are a few common threads that connect them all. According to a recent study on political influence operations in the Middle East, these operations frequently used one of the following strategies:

• Making an effort to promote one’s own government, culture, or policies;

• Making an argument in favor of or against particular policies.

• Attempts to destabilize foreign relations or domestic situations in rival nations;

• Attempts to make allies appear good and opponents look bad to third-party countries

In a number of these instances, the accounts carrying out the operation pretended to be locals voicing their displeasure with their government or certain political personalities. This strategy of using digital agents of influence is frequently used by social media manipulation operations to conceal the genuine identity of the content source from the target audience. For instance, the Internet Research Agency (IRA) accounts of Russia sent direct messages to members of the Black American and conservative American communities while posing as activists. A misused idiom, a recurring grammatical fault, or even the use of a backtick (‘) where a real speaker would use an apostrophe (‘) are some subtle indicators that might help you spot these false reports. State-level antagonistic actors frequently deploy a variety of strategies, drawing on their own workforce or contracting out to virtual mercenaries.

Since 2016, Twitter and Meta have taken down well over 100 social media influence operations that originated in dozens of different nations. Inauthentic amplification attempts, fake news websites, and persona creation (the creation of false personas to disseminate a message) are frequently used in these operations.

However, influence operations have also greatly increased outside of Facebook and Twitter to other platforms, intimate settings, and encrypted areas. The New York Times reported on how “Iranian agents had infiltrated small [Israeli] WhatsApp groups, Telegram channels and messaging apps” to promote divisive messages. The report was done in collaboration with Israeli disinformation researchers. These influence operations occasionally show inventiveness by using platform rules in an offensive way.

For instance, a campaign in favour of the Tanzanian government that Twitter deleted in 2021 targeted Tanzanian activists’ accounts by making fake allegations of copyright reporting.

Recent studies and media coverage on influence operations have tended to concentrate on foreign campaigns, in which governments or individuals target individuals in other countries. But influence efforts can also be domestically focused, as the Tanzanian case demonstrates. Political actors frequently disseminate clandestine propaganda directed at their constituents in an effort to increase their popularity, detract from that of an adversary, or create commotion inside the political system. Facebook terminated phony accounts associated with Brazilian politicians, President Jair Bolsonaro, and his sons, Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro and Senator Jair Bolsonaro, in 2020 for disseminating divisive content about Brazilian politics. In fact, a lot of critics think that internal influence operations-rather than foreign ones-are the most concerning.

Additionally, influence operations have been used to take sides in intraparty disputes and, in the case of some campaigns linked to the Chinese Communist Party, to hit expatriate groups.

Techniques Employed

China employs a variety of techniques for influence operations to shape opinions, advance its interests, and project power. These techniques can be both overt and covert, and they are often coordinated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its various government agencies. Here are several techniques that China has been known to use:

Propaganda and Media Influence: China maintains a vast propaganda apparatus that includes state-controlled media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, and People’s Daily. These outlets disseminate narratives aligned with the CCP’s objectives and promote positive portrayals of China. They also engage in information warfare by spreading disinformation, censorship, and manipulating online discussions through social media platforms.

Economic Leverage: China utilizes its economic power to exert influence. It may offer financial aid, investment, or loans to other countries, attaching conditions that align with its political objectives. This can create dependencies and influence decision-making processes in target nations.

Diplomatic Influence: China engages in diplomatic efforts to shape global narratives, build alliances, and influence international organizations. It actively seeks to cultivate relationships with political leaders, academic institutions, and think tanks globally. It hosts conferences, forums, and summits to promote its interests and propagate its narratives.

United Front Work: The CCP employs a strategy known as “United Front Work” to co-opt and influence individuals and groups outside of its formal political structure. This includes overseas Chinese communities, ethnic or religious groups, business leaders, and intellectuals. The goal is to create a favorable perception of China and gain support for its policies.

Cyber Espionage and Information Warfare: China has been accused of engaging in state-sponsored cyberattacks and espionage to steal intellectual property, gain access to sensitive information, and manipulate public opinion. It also employs “50 Cent Army” or “Wu Mao” internet trolls who spread pro-China propaganda and disrupt discussions critical of the regime.

Confucius Institutes: China has established Confucius Institutes in various countries, which are cultural and educational centers that promote Chinese language and culture. However, they have been criticized for engaging in censorship, promoting self-censorship, and advancing Chinese Communist Party propaganda.

Overseas Investments and Infrastructure Projects: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-scale infrastructure development project that seeks to enhance connectivity across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. By investing in critical infrastructure projects in other countries, China can deepen its economic ties, gain influence, and extend its geopolitical reach.

United Front Work

United Front Work is a strategy employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to co-opt and influence individuals and groups outside of its formal political structure. Here are a few examples of United Front Work activities carried out by China:

Overseas Chinese Communities: China seeks to influence overseas Chinese communities by establishing various organizations and associations that promote Chinese culture and interests. These organizations often operate under the umbrella of the CCP’s United Front Work Department. They aim to maintain ties with overseas Chinese, encourage support for China’s policies, and discourage dissent or criticism of the CCP.

Ethnic and Religious Groups: China targets ethnic or religious groups within its borders and abroad through United Front Work. For example, it seeks to co-opt Tibetan and Uighur diaspora communities by promoting narratives that downplay human rights concerns and highlight economic development and cultural preservation efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang. China also uses United Front tactics to exert influence over overseas Chinese Muslim organizations.

Business and Intellectual Elites: China actively cultivates relationships with influential business leaders, academics, and intellectuals around the world. Through various means, such as funding research institutions, supporting academic exchanges, and organizing conferences, China seeks to shape narratives, gain access to cutting-edge technologies, and project soft power. These efforts aim to build networks of individuals who are sympathetic to China’s policies and willing to advocate for them.

Political Parties and Politicians: China seeks to cultivate relationships with politicians and political parties in other countries. It may offer financial support, establish friendship associations, or facilitate exchange programs to build political influence. This can involve providing financial assistance, investment opportunities, or other incentives to countries or politicians that align with China’s interests.

Media and Academic Institutions: China invests in media outlets and academic institutions worldwide to enhance its soft power and control narratives. This includes establishing partnerships with foreign media organizations, sponsoring Confucius Institutes in universities (which have been accused of promoting CCP propaganda), and funding research centers or think tanks that produce China-friendly analysis.

Operations and Impact of Influence

Influence operations may have an effect due to their particular content or focus (such as through persuasion) or by undermining public confidence in the information environment as a whole.

Resources, message quality, and operation detectability are sometimes constraints on the direct impact of content in modern influence operations. Depending on the objectives of the operator, these aspects may be more or less important. For instance, the effectiveness of each individual message is probably much less important if operators are merely trying to divert targets rather than persuade them of a particular opinion. Theoretically, language models might one day partially circumvent these limitations.

It is more important to create the impression that any given message can be false or deceptive in order to affect trust in an information environment. Even if influence operations fail to alter people’s opinions, they may cause people to doubt the veracity of information they get from even reliable sources, which could undermine trust in democratic and epistemic institutions more generally.

Content-Based Impact

If an influence operation

• Persuades someone of a specific position or supports an existing one,

• Distracts them from discovering or developing other ideas, or

• Distracts them from making any room for higher quality thought, then it may have an impact dependent on the content.

Often, the intention is to merely divert attention away from information that could be harmful to the operator. Distraction operations frequently take advantage of and worsen preexisting attention rivalries between advertisers, media sources, and platforms to crowd out crucial information with attention-grabbing, irrelevant material. Therefore, distraction operations do not require a target to be convinced by the information spread, but rather that a target not be convinced by (or even take into consideration) any other piece of information.

The impact of an influence operation can be quantified or tracked in both historical and modern cases. For instance, the Soviet Union engaged in an influence campaign to disseminate the myth that the United States government invented the virus in a lab during the HIV epidemic in the 1980s. According to a 2005 research, 27% of African Americans still held this belief. In 2016, the IRA organized rallies and counter protests outside the Islamic Da’wah Center in Houston using manipulative agents of influence on Facebook. As a result of the protests’ inability to take place without the IRA’s involvement, the impact is extremely simple to identify in this case.

While platforms assign blame and give researchers information about influence operations that were shut down, researchers still have little visibility into the impact on users or their post-engagement behavior. Additionally, not every influence operation is discovered. Due to multicausality and the obstacles associated with tracking changes in public opinion over time, even propagandists who try to gauge their own influence occasionally run into problems. Scholars have emphasized that historically, this uncertainty has helped intelligence agencies exaggerate the impact of their influence operations for administrative gain.

Despite these measuring difficulties, several characteristics, such as resources, material quality and messaging, and detectability, obviously restrict the impact of current efforts. Following a brief description of these drawbacks, we go into how generative models might be able to assist you get over them.

• Resources: Just like marketing efforts, the effectiveness of an influence operation depends on one’s ability to reach the target audience with the required material. A political actor employs how many propagandists to write material. How many social media accounts can someone open up to create a false online presence? Low-resource initiatives have a lower chance of reaching their target audience or getting media attention.

• Content’s Quality and Message: People are less likely to be persuaded by messaging if it sharply contradicts their preexisting viewpoint or if the arguments are shoddily put forth or illogically reasoned. Above all else, campaigns with messaging that contradicts targets’ beliefs, fails to successfully integrate with a target’s information environment, and presents weak arguments should be avoided.

• Detectability: Lastly, actions that are rapidly found have a lower likelihood of having an effect. Independent researchers and social media platforms aggressively look for influence operations, which the platforms then take down to reduce their reach. In fact, propagandists’ awareness that these operations can be abandoned might influence their actions, encouraging them to pursue diversion strategies rather than persona creation, which takes more time and effort but can be more persuasive to observers.

It is beneficial to keep these restrictions in mind as we think about the potential contribution of language models to influence campaigns. They could pose a serious problem for the information environment if they can get beyond the current barriers. In Section 4, we go into more detail about this.

Trust-Based Downstream Impact

The second method influence operations might have an effect is via undermining trust. Even when influence campaigns are recognized, their presence, especially at scale, may lead people to become skeptical of other, authentic sources. Degrading public trust does not necessarily require high quality initiatives. Particularly in areas where information technologies make it challenging to determine the reliability of sources, propagandists frequently seek to take advantage of weaknesses in their target’s mental shortcuts for gaining confidence. Influence operators have the ability to erode credibility beyond the narrow focus of their campaign by faking or using deceptive credentials and testimonials, as well as by altering with photographic and video evidence. Lowering societal trust might make it more difficult for a society to plan quick responses to emergencies, which could be an admirable objective for antagonistic actors in and of itself. As a result, propagandists can further their goals in an environment where there is less societal trust. Existing societal division and polarization make it harder for trustworthy actors to gain widespread respect. They can also provide influence operators a foothold to target their messaging at specific audiences, cause discord, and undermine institutional and social confidence. The norms that allow people and organizations to connect and collaborate without the need for numerous rules and processes to manage their behavior are threatened by low universal trust.

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Practice has proved that cognitive domain operations have broken the traditional online and offline data barriers. Through the integrated use of telecommunication networks, the Internet, the Internet of Things and other channels, and with the help of advanced algorithms, the initiator can effectively switch between various spaces and optimize the combat style, and even focus on private spaces and public spaces to accurately release interference information, so as to achieve effects that cannot be achieved by traditional combat methods.

In future cognitive domain operations, the influence of rational factors such as science and logic on individual cognition is likely to be weakened, and cognitive confrontation may become a contest between emotions and emotions.

At present, the rapid development of intelligent technology is changing the logic of information dissemination in an all-round way, making the impact of information on thinking and consciousness more profound and comprehensive, and human brain cognition has truly risen to an important field of military confrontation. In the era of intelligence, the continuous evolution of the information dissemination mechanism will systematically reshape cognitive confrontation from many aspects, thereby promoting fundamental changes in cognitive domain operations.

Artificial intelligence becomes the main driver of cognitive domain operations

In the era of intelligence, information dissemination is based on data, and artificial intelligence technology runs through the entire process of information collection, production, and feedback. The extensive and in-depth application of artificial intelligence, a disruptive technology in the military field, will be the key support for the entire process of future cognitive domain combat planning and implementation.

Artificial intelligence technology will run through multiple scenarios of future cognitive domain operations. In the process of deployment and rhythm control of combat operations in the cognitive domain, all parties involved rely on advanced algorithms as the “regulators” and “gatekeepers” of actions, and a large amount of information about battlefield actions from various combat domains provides information for all parties to the war. Efficient decision-making and implementation of cognitive domain operations provide the driving force. Practice has proved that cognitive domain operations have broken the traditional online and offline data barriers. Through the integrated use of telecommunication networks, the Internet, the Internet of Things and other channels, with the help of advanced algorithms, the initiator can effectively switch between various spaces and optimize the combat style. It even focuses on private spaces and public spaces to accurately release interference information, so as to achieve effects that cannot be achieved by traditional combat methods.

In addition, artificial intelligence has evolved from empowering a single link to connecting all links of combat and the entire process. At present, artificial intelligence is limited to locating target audiences in information dissemination to improve the matching rate of information and destinations. In future cognitive domain operations, artificial intelligence will play a “one-stop” role in the planning and implementation of cognitive domain operations, and will continue to strengthen the coupling between various links. The foreign military believes that in future cognitive domain operations, differentiated delivery of data can be used to activate robots to instantly create public opinion trends and affect cognitive effects. At the level of strategic campaigns, based on long-term tracking data and continuously adjusted and optimized algorithm strategies, it can measure the cognitive situation of different regions and groups, and assist decision makers in planning core narratives and major issues, thereby regulating the implementation of actions and coordinated actions.

Autonomous confrontation has become a prominent feature of cognitive domain operations

With the continuous expansion of intelligent programs from collaborative communication, participatory communication to autonomous communication, and the connected ecology of smart terminals, officers and soldiers will increasingly be able to receive various types of information sent by smart programs and smart terminals on the battlefield in the future. In the virtual space, the interactive communication between digital twins and virtual people will transmit the cognition of people in the real world. From the perspective of the development trend of cognitive domain operations under intelligent conditions, the degree of human intervention will gradually decrease, the collection, synthesis, and transmission of information ammunition will be more autonomous and efficient, and the formulation and execution of discourse strategies and action strategies will become more autonomous. The pace of the whole process is unprecedentedly fast. But as far as the result is concerned, humans are still the ultimate goal of combat in the cognitive domain, and the process of empowerment and acceleration by autonomous weapons will continue to strengthen the control of human cognition.

With the help of autonomous confrontation tools such as intelligent programs, intelligent terminals, digital twins, and virtual humans, all parties participating in the war will have more flexibility in the deployment of cognitive domain combat situations, space-time use, and information content design, and the confrontation between information authenticity and falsehood will be more efficient. protrude. In future cognitive domain operations, autonomous weapons will likely break through the limitations of power and time and space, and their action patterns will become more complex. The practice of foreign militaries shows that the use of the Internet to carry out “spray irrigation” communication for the general public and “drip irrigation” communication for specific groups will become a common pattern of cognitive domain operations. Smart programs and smart terminals can support the development of more and more complex action patterns due to their characteristics of batch replication deployment and non-stop operation. For example, it is possible to quickly mobilize a large number of social robots around specific issues and target specific attack objects, take turns to concentrate and spread information, or use smart devices around specific individuals to collect relevant data, and use dialogue robots, virtual humans and individuals to interact with each other for a long time and continue to guide them achieve combat objectives.

In future cognitive domain operations, autonomous weapons covertly manipulate cognitive domain battlefields will become the norm. Social robots can create fake public opinion and hotspots as needed, thereby generating more fog of individual perception; intelligent synthesis technology will lower the threshold for false information production. As a result, the cost and difficulty of counterfeiting will be increased; robot accounts and virtual human sources will be more difficult to identify, and “one-to-one” cognitive fraud is becoming more and more common.

Emotional Conflict Becomes a Prominent Attribute of Cognitive Domain Operations

In the era of intelligence, new technologies will broaden the scope of human cognition and deepen people’s perception. Extended reality, metaverse and other technologies will more holographically and transparently present the battlefield environment, event scene, etc., and the scene can be touched, felt and interacted, and the audience will be more subject to the influence of perceptual logic when they perceive the truth of the event.

Thanks to the development of the mobile Internet, the rapidity of information dissemination has increased rapidly. Through the centralized release of large batches of information in a short period of time, the response time of individuals can be greatly compressed, making it difficult for individuals to think deeply. Before the full picture of the event is fully displayed, the audience often has formed a position tendency and even turned their attention to a new focus. The mode of outputting conclusions based on fragmented clues intensifies the irrational and emotional response to information. In future cognitive domain operations, the influence of rational factors such as science and logic on individual cognition is likely to be weakened, and cognitive confrontation may become a contest between emotion and emotion. In the choice between resorting to rationality and resorting to sensibility, all parties involved in the war pay more and more attention to moving people with emotion, agitating, occupying and even polarizing the target object’s mind through perceptual means, and leading the confrontation situation in the cognitive domain.

In the era of intelligence, cognitive leverage increasingly relies on emotional competition. On the one hand, cognitive resonance is enhanced with emotional arousal strategies. In future cognitive domain operations, the initiator of the action selectively presents the cruel and fierce battle scenes, post-war scenes, or the process and status quo of soldiers participating in the battle, so as to strongly stimulate the audience’s emotions and awaken the audience’s innermost feelings emotional identity. As a node of the communication network, people can collect various physical signs data through intelligent algorithms, so that the initiators of actions can more accurately study and judge the emotional effects of information, so as to dynamically adjust the content and strengthen emotional responses. Action initiators use data calculations to select groups with similar understanding contexts and the same emotional characteristics, or to select specific individuals who are susceptible and have a greater influence value, and stimulate them through targeted dissemination of homogeneous information flows. Group cognitive resonance.

On the other hand, use the moral coercion strategy to stimulate value recognition. In the face of accumulated and aggravated fragmentation and irrational cognitive response patterns, the initiators of combat operations can occupy the moral high ground through the discourse system of binary opposition, gather the torrent of self-interested value cognition, and then achieve the coercion effect. The rich forms of presentation in the intelligent communication environment and the direct access to the public’s social channels provide a convenient means for action initiators to use this strategy. In local wars in recent years, technological evolution has gradually demonstrated the promotion of moral coercion strategies. For example, social media has exposed the secret diplomacy of the past to the public. The details of communication between the upper echelons and elite groups, etc., and discourse strategies are increasingly emphasizing moral arbitration and criticism, thereby influencing and stimulating the international public to support their own value positions.

The Internet of Everything Expands the Battlefield of Cognitive Domain Operations

With the development of information communication technology, social media has gradually become the main battlefield for shaping cognition. Institutions, individuals and people of all warring parties can directly contact and interact with each other through social media, making all-weather cognitive competition possible.

In the era of intelligent communication, the Internet of Everything has become a new social connection model, and communication subjects and communication behaviors are ubiquitous. Under this influence, the combat space in the cognitive domain will expand to smart IoT terminals and scenarios, and to the two worlds of physical space and virtual space. The Internet of Everything leads to the ubiquity of the combat space in the cognitive domain, which will further promote the ubiquity of combat subjects. Natural persons, intelligent terminals with information sending and receiving capabilities, and even virtual characters in the network world may become combat subjects, and cognitive domain operations will participate in the war. The types of forces will be greatly expanded, and the organizational method of cognitive domain operations will change to distributed coordination.

In future cognitive domain operations, people and machines deep in the conflict will become an important force in combat. With the support of intelligent technology, they will collaborate to draw battlefield pictures and participate in the “writing” of the whole process of war. Soldiers on the frontline continuously share their personal battlefield experiences through social networks, and push them to the world in a timely manner after personalized packaging. Individual equipment and combat platforms will be responsible for battlefield image collection and transmission tasks, and trigger automatic processing and release mechanisms according to preset procedures, cooperate with physical space combat operations in various ways to compete for information control and brain control. With the continuous development of communication technology, frontline soldiers and intelligent equipment can also reprocess and reprocess the information they have in a targeted manner according to the instructions of their superiors, so as to present the battlefield scene they want to express more conveniently and panoramically, to achieve the ultimate goal of fighting in the cognitive domain.

Source: China Military Network – PLA Daily

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