The Atlantic Council published a paper titled “Thwarting Kremlin Aggression Today For Constructive Relations Tomorrow” authored by Anders Åslund, John E. Herbst, David J. Kramer, Alexander Vershbow and Brian Whitmore in February 2022, as part of its series of papers on Global Strategy 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The paper offers a comprehensive strategy to manage and develop US relations with Russia over the next twenty years. This strategy seeks to thwart current Kremlin efforts to undermine the international system that the United States helped create after World War II and revise after the Cold War; to cooperate in the short and medium term on issues of mutual interest, in particular arms control; and to establish in the long term a broad cooperative relationship once Moscow recognizes that its own security and prosperity are best realized in partnership with the United States and the West.

Here is the Executive Summary

After the end of World War II, the United States, its allies, and partners built a rules-based international system that ushered in peace, prosperity, and freedom in many parts of the world. The system has come under fire from revisionist powers, mainly China and Russia, seeking to fundamentally change the established international order. This paper seeks to address how to manage the multifaceted challenges Russia poses.

There are broadly two views of the threat posed by Russia. One maintains that Russia is a revisionist power that uses all means of state power, including military aggression, to impose its will on its neighborhood and to undermine US, NATO, and the European Union’s (EU’s) interests in an effort to revise the international order. The second view does not deny Kremlin misbehavior but contends that NATO and the EU have not been sensitive to traditional Russian interests, especially in the post-Soviet space, and have responded too strongly to Kremlin provocations with sanctions, military support to Ukraine, and enhancing NATO’s military presence on its eastern flank.

This paper leans toward the first view but seeks to transcend the debate by laying out a vision for a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. In brief, Russia is a historic great power with talented people and great natural resources. Unfortunately, within a decade of the fall of the Soviet Union, an authoritarian system formed in Russia with strong state control of the economy that directed resources to the leadership and privileged insiders, and its leader launched an aggressive foreign policy. In sum, for more than a decade, Kremlin policies have not been good for Russia, its neighbors, or the West. 

Washington should seek to build a relationship with Russia in the long run—likely, but not necessarily, post-Putin—based on mutual respect, respect for international law, and respect for the international order that emerged after World War II and the Cold War. This is a Russia with which the United States would cooperate on many political issues, and with which there would be substantial economic cooperation. It would also be a Russia whose people would prosper.

A peaceful, prosperous Russia is a distinct possibility if we approach US policy realistically, and that starts with a clear-eyed look at the global system and Russia today.

The Russia challenge is evident in the economic, diplomatic, governance, and security domains.

The list of Kremlin provocations is long and includes military action notably in Georgia and Ukraine and changing borders by force, relentless and ongoing cyberattacks, electoral interference in the United States and numerous other democratic countries, assassinations abroad, disinformation campaigns, coup attempts, and efforts to buck up dictators. There is also evidence that Moscow is likely behind some of the directed energy attacks on US officials that produce the Havana Syndrome. Russian President Vladimir Putin presides over these active measures and malign activities in his quest to destabilize the international order that the Kremlin calculates works against its interests.

All of this is a sign of fear of and opposition to democracy, especially in Russia’s neighborhood. While the Biden administration evaluates the Chinese threat to US interests as its top priority, the Russian threat to the rules-based order, in the short term at least, has been more aggressive and persistent.1 The United States does not have the luxury of focusing only on China.

The strategy outlines the following overarching short, medium, and long-term goals.

Short term: Thwart and deter the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy, which seeks to weaken NATO, the EU, and their respective principal states, especially the United States, and to restore Russian hegemony in Eurasia. Push back against Kremlin repression at home.

Short and medium term: Seek areas of cooperation where US and Russian interests may overlap: arms control, counterterrorism in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, reduced military confrontations, and an effective response to climate change. It also includes dialogue with Russian elites on possible future cooperation and outreach to the Russian people.

Longer term: Describe in clear terms the cooperative relationship that would emerge with a prosperous, powerful Russia that plays a constructive role in the rules-based international order. While this is a long-term objective, it should immediately be enshrined in US policy.

The strategy consists of four major elements.

1) WORK WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER IMMEDIATE DANGER FROM MOSCOW: The first element of the strategy is to ensure that US allies and partners understand the danger coming from Moscow and work together to counter it. The United States should:

Maintain and strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, both conventional and nuclear.

• Enhance the already significant forward presence on NATO’s northeastern flank.

• Establish a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. To do this the United States should:

• Work with NATO to establish a stronger and more regular NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.

• Enhance cooperation with and defense support for NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine in the Black Sea.

• Establish mutual understanding with the EU on the danger from Moscow and how to meet it.

• Build on the first Summit for Democracy to highlight Moscow’s aggressive policies in Ukraine and Georgia and show staunch support for the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.

2) ESTABLISH CLEAR REDLINES ON MOSCOW’S BEHAVIOR: The second element of the strategy is to thwart Kremlin aggression and provocations against US interests and the international liberal order. The United States must establish clear redlines as a deterrent and be prepared to act swiftly when Moscow threatens or crosses them. Ukraine is the current center of Moscow’s revisionist foreign policy and needs the self-defense capabilities to deter further aggression. Frustrating Kremlin aggression in Ukraine reduces the risk of Kremlin provocations against the United States’ Eastern European NATO allies and may well prove the key to persuading it to change policy course. The US policy response should involve military, economic, and diplomatic tools, specifically to:

• Encourage Ukraine’s military to become completely interoperable with NATO.

• Increase US military aid to Ukraine to $1 billion per year and encourage additional assistance from other NATO members. Make Ukraine’s defense to a NATO objective.

• Provide Ukraine with anti-ship missiles, naval drones, and air defense systems.

• Maintain and strengthen the current sanctions regime. Impose new sanctions promptly the next time that Moscow either escalates its military operation in Ukraine or commits a major new provocation there. In concert with the EU, impose progressively tighter sanctions as Moscow continues its current operation in the Donbas. The sanctions for new escalation should be stronger than those for ongoing aggression.

• Impose proportionate sanctions for Moscow’s ongoing, under-the-radar aggression in Georgia, and consider sanctions on Moscow for its efforts to extort geopolitical concessions from Moldova for gas supplies.

• Focus on the most effective sanctions, financial sanctions and personal sanctions, on Kremlin oligarchs.

• Maintain public attention on Moscow’s occupation of Crimea, the Donbas, and Georgia.

• Take a more active role in the Minsk peace process and consult with the parties to ensure that Ukraine is not pressured to make undue concessions to Moscow. Prepare to enter negotiations fully when Moscow is ready to negotiate its withdrawal from the Donbas.

Equally important, the United States should respond forcefully to Kremlin provocations against itself, as well as its allies and partners globally:  

• Respond to Kremlin election interference, cyber operations, and assassinations abroad promptly with public diplomacy, sanctions, and, in the case of cyberattacks, counter operations.

• Support the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.

• Provide strong support to the current reformist Moldovan government so that its reforms can succeed in spite of a Russian gas embargo.

Take advantage of Kremlin weaknesses in countering and deterring provocations:

• Uncover and publicize in English and Russian information about the corruption of the Russian regime and order US intelligence to establish the financial holdings of Putin, top Kremlin officials, and Putin cronies in the West. The appropriate classified information on this should be declassified, published, and publicized in English and Russian.

• Enact and enforce strong and transparent laws against money laundering and other hidden channels, including requirements for shell companies to disclose beneficial owners, that corrupt Putin cronies and Kremlin-associated actors use to further Russian state interests or their own.

• Implement the Corporate Transparency Act of 2020 rigorously.

• Significantly increase funding to Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and use other means, including the use of the Russian diaspora, to provide information to the Russian people.

• Pay consistent but low-key attention to points of friction in the Russia-China relationship and particularly Chinese territorial claims in Russia.

• Support Russian political figures, civil society activists, and influencers facing repression and highlight election practices in Russia that prevent the Russian people from fairly choosing their political leaders.

• Counter the Kremlin narrative that the United States and the West seek to encircle and weaken Russia; make clear that the United States looks forward to a closer, mutually beneficial partnership with a democratic Russia that respects the sovereignty of its neighbors.

3) WORK TOGETHER WHERE POSSIBLE. The third element of the strategy is to work with Moscow to reduce the dangers of competition and to explore cooperation in areas where interests may overlap. This starts with mitigating nuclear confrontation and reducing the risk of escalation of military incidents, but not at the expense of strong pushback against Kremlin provocations.

• Encourage NATO to maintain a mix of strategic and tactical nuclear options to dissuade the Russians from believing they can succeed with their “escalate to deescalate” strategy.

• Be open to maintaining and negotiating verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia that also address nonstrategic systems and other destabilizing technologies.

• Regulate interactions between Russian and US warships and warplanes that risk escalating into confrontation. Reestablish the Open Skies Treaty.

• Cooperate with the Russian government on shared threats, including counterterrorism, counter-narcotics efforts, COVID-19, and climate change.

• Work to prevent the spread of Islamic extremism into Central Asia.

4) LAY OUT A VISION FOR CLOSE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A PROSPEROUS RUSSIA. The fourth element of the strategy is to pursue a multiple-track policy designed to promote a significant improvement in relations with Russia once Moscow turns away from a revisionist foreign policy. While this policy is part of the long game, it should begin now because it will take time to have an impact. The purpose is to start to condition the Russian government, elites, and people that US intentions toward Russia are not hostile and that good relations with the United States and the West and an opening of the political and economic system would lead to both prosperity and security. As part of this, Washington should:

• Establish a framework for more interaction now with the Russian people and better relations with a future Russian government.

• Engage with all major segments of Russian society simultaneously, including various levels of Russian government, the general Russian public, elites, and involved members of the global Russian diaspora.

• Maintain and increase support for the “non-systemic” Russian opposition.2

• Sanction officials (and their spouses and children) who order and implement repressive measures.

• Increase the transparency of offshore funds and freeze and hold the assets of senior Kremlin officials and their associates in a trust fund for return to the Russian people when a Russian government that respects the rule of law is established. This would require new legislation to allow the transfer of funds.

• Impose strict reciprocity in the treatment of state media in Russia and the United States, respectively. If Russia expels RFE/RL, the United States should expel Sputnik and RT.

• Increase support for US-Russia educational and cultural exchange programs, especially for high school and college students.

• Propose track 1.5 or track 2 dialogues on alternative futures for the US-Russia relationship.

• Establish a similar dialogue with representatives of the non-systemic opposition and with the Russian diaspora.

The post Atlantic Council Global Strategy 2022 Paper appeared first on IMR.

Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Vivek Ram Chaudhari assumed office as Chief of Air Staff on 30 September 2021 facing a wide spectrum of challenges, including the reorganisation of India’s military into new theatre commands, the reservations expressed by the IAF about its “support” role and the visible depletion in operational air assets due to obsolescence and lack of new platforms, readiness for future war, the threat from China and the geopolitical flux that includes the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the setback in Galwan apropos China which continues to fester.

The Threat From China

China has gone in for a major upgrade of its airbases facing India, with hardened shelters and other infrastructure to increase deployment of fighters and bombers, but its air force incurs “a huge penalty” in operating from such high-altitude areas, said the IAF chief.

“The capability of the PLAAF (Chinese air force) to launch multiple missions is limited. That is a weak area for them. We are fully prepared to deal with any situation and challenge in the region,” he added, at his maiden press conference as IAF Chief, on 5 October, ahead of IAF Day on October 8.

The high-altitude and rarefied air at Chinese air bases, like Hotan, Ngari Gunsa and Shigatse, severely limits the weapon and fuel-carrying capacity of fighters. IAF, however, can deploy fully-loaded Rafale and Sukhoi-30MKI fighters from bases like Bareilly, Hasimara, Tezpur and Chabua for strike missions across the frontier.

ACM Chaudhari said there is “nothing to fear about” the collusive threat from China and Pakistan. “Be assured, we are well-prepared to handle a two-front contingency,” he said, though he did flag concerns over the possibility of “western technologies” reaching China from Pakistan.

Two-front War

The IAF chief also said his force is fully prepared to deal with any security challenge in eastern Ladakh, and noted that new infrastructure created by the Chinese side in the region will not affect India’s combat capabilities.

ACM Chaudhari said the Chinese Air Force is still present on three air bases on their side of the Line of Actual Control but China’s capability to launch multiple high altitude missions would remain weak.

He added India is fully ready to deal with a “two-front” war scenario involving China and Pakistan. He said the only worry is Western technology passing from Pakistan to China.

“The prompt actions in response to developments in eastern Ladakh was a testament to the Indian Air Force’s combat readiness,” he said.

Future War

At the press conference, the Air Chief highlighted the paradigm change in future warfare including the non-kinetic, non-lethal challenges. He said IAF has its own strategy in place to have directed energy weapons, unmanned wingmen among other futuristic technologies. Indian Airforce is enhancing the offensive strike capability that has become even more potent with the induction of cutting edge weapons.

According to Air Chief, the Air Force have hardened its networks to avoid cyber attacks for which adequate safeguards are being taken to protect the critical infrastructure of the country.

On China’s capability to launch multiple high altitude missions, Air Chief Marshal said it would remain weak. ACM VR Chaudhari also said that PLAAF is still present along the LAC but this is not going to affect the IAF air operations.

In response to a question on threats faced by India, he said, “I can assure you that we are fully aware of the threats that we face, and our acquisitions, training, and tactics developed to counter such a threat”.

The IAF chief also said that the ability to “seamlessly integrate” new weapons, new data, into the network and train its personnel to operate them, and keep them “future-ready” was the way forward.

“I can say with some degree of confidence that the way we go about analysing the threat perception, carrying out global scan of the political situation, of the acquisitions and modernisation of the adversaries, and to counter that we plan are our own acquisition for air force, and linked to that is training, and development of new tactics,” he said.

“Every time you find there is an imbalance in technology and pure numbers, we counter it with better tactics and better training,” the IAF chief added.

Asked about the delivery of the S-400 air defence systems by Russia, the Air Chief said the first batch is expected to arrive within this year.

On the deployment of anti-drone technology, he said efforts are underway to enhance indigenous capabilities.

Decline in Squadron Strength

The decline in platforms is stark and from a strength of 42 combat squadrons in 2002, the IAF now operates barely 30. ACM Chaudhari noted that this shortfall in numbers would remain through this decade. “Even with planned inductions, the squadrons will remain around 35. The target of 42 will not be possible for 10-15 years,” said the IAF chief.

The existing four MiG-21 squadrons will be retired in the next three to four years. Moreover, Jaguar, Mirage-2000 and MiG-29 squadrons will also begin to be phased out towards the end of this decade.

The planned inductions of 73 Tejas Mark-1A jets and 10 trainers in the 2024-2028 timeframe under the Rs 46,898 crore deal inked with defence Hindustan Aeronautics in February 2021 will provide a fillip even as the sturdy MIGs are finally phased out.

A more optimistic scenario is envisaged for the next decade, when the IAF hopes to induct the indigenous fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) — a new platform that would be built in India with a foreign entity, the “original equipment manufacturer” (OEM), and thereby move up to 35 squadrons.

The AMCA is “under design” and India’s track record in the design and manufacture of indigenous fighter aircraft is cost- and time-intensive. IAF plans to induct seven AMCA squadrons. “The DRDO has set aggressive timelines for the AMCA project, with deliveries slated to begin from the early years of the next decade. We are fully committed to the project,” said the IAF chief.

IAF also plans to get the “acceptance of necessity” next year for its long-pending mega “Make in India” project for 114 new fighters for over Rs 1.25 lakh crore. The request for information for 114 jets has just been issued. Rafale will obviously be the frontrunner in this, with India having already bought 36 of them under the Rs 59,000 crore deal inked with France in September 2016. The other six contenders are F/A-18 and F-21 (US), Gripen-E (Sweden), Sukhoi-35 and MiG-35 (Russia) and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

“Support Arm”

Asked about the recent remarks of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat that the IAF was a “support arm”, ACM Chaudhari said that in any conflict in the world, the air force has had multiple roles.

He said the roles vary from offensive strike and air transportation to supporting the army and maritime forces.

“There are various roles for air forces and it is true for the Indian Air Force. Capability of our training and equipment caters to multiple roles,” he said.

ACM Chaudhari underlined that no one service can go alone into any battle, and would “need the support of the other two services. It is true for all services. It is not that just that the IAF only is the support arm, the Army also at times has to support the IAF in its air operations”.

Theatrisation and Joint Commands

The CDS has been focussing on bringing convergence among the three services and restructuring military commands to effectively deal with future security challenges.

There has been a growing perception that the Indian Air Force has some reservations about the theaterisation programme.
ACM Chaudhari, strongly pitched for joint planning and operations among the three Services, but made it clear that structures and processes of theaterisation will have to take into account individual strengths and doctrines of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

“We are fully committed to integration and jointmanship. There is no doubt,” ACM Chaudhari said at the press conference on 5 October.

ACM Chaudhari supported his predecessor ACM RKS Bhadauria’s focus on the need for structures and processes to cater for future warfare. “That is the key element of restructuring into theatres. The strengths of each service need to be taken into account and need to be synchronised for the net combat capability of the nation,” he said.

The IAF chief also underlined that the doctrines of each service also need to be kept in mind while designing the structures, and added that his force’s concerns have been considered and deliberations and discussions are on.

Accidents

On being asked about a large number of accidents, IAF Chief said, the fact that we have had a large number of accidents on the MiG-21 fleet is not deniable. But data also shows that there has been a reduction in the no. of accidents in this fleet. Let me assure you that every aircraft that flies goes through all checks rigorously.

The post Challenges Facing the Indian Air Force appeared first on IMR.