Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is an emerging concept that most modern militaries worldwide are working to integrate into their warfighting doctrines. The key domains encompassed in the concept include the physical domains—land, maritime, air, and space—the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes cyberspace, and the cognitive/human domain. Unlike the integration and coordination achieved by joint forces in the existing system, MDO aims to deter and defeat adversaries in operations below armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in the post-conflict phase of returning to competition.

At a time when the United States and China are experimenting with various facets of the concept, either overtly or through proxies by providing them technologies, India found an opportunity through Operation Sindoor to test and validate its warfighting concepts and technologies. It was the first instance of non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its formations or physically crossing borders—neither by troops nor by aircraft. India showcased its Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence technology and demonstrated its prowess in both offensive and defensive capabilities—drone-centric warfare, resilient and responsive air defence, long-range precision weapons, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and set a new parameter and “new normal” for future operations.

The book is structured in two parts: Part I – Multi-Domain Operations Concept and Part II – Operation Sindoor: Appraisal. The United States pioneered the development of the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept in 2015–16, which later evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by December 2018. Although the MDO concept is yet to mature into a fully functional warfighting doctrine, it now guides the transformation and modernisation of the US Armed Forces and their peers. China is known to be mirroring the same with its own “Chinese characteristics.”

Part I covers the evolution of the concept in the United States and China, defines the concept primarily derived from US philosophy, explores China’s All-Domain Operations concept, examines limitations of the MDO framework, and discusses India’s challenges and options.

In Part II, after explaining the genesis of India’s problem with Pakistan, the author appraises Operation Sindoor against the backdrop of the MDO concept. Although multiple domains were addressed during Operation Sindoor through coordination and integration among the armed forces and various government departments and agencies, the MDO framework as a concept remains a distant goal. Regarding Pakistan, much of its response was propaganda through influence operations. The author effectively debunks Pakistan’s claim of downing five to six Indian fighter jets on Day One of Operation Sindoor by exposing glaring errors in the technological hypothesis developed by Mr. Michael Dahm, which was widely cited by magazines and newspapers supporting Pakistan’s false narrative.

Drone-centric warfare, multi-layered and integrated air defence, and target-centric warfare employing precision weapons—visible aspects of Operation Sindoor—are covered in comprehensive detail for both India and Pakistan. The dominant role played by Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence and the success achieved by indigenous weapons strengthened the government’s resolve to promote it further, a theme well-articulated in the book. The space, EMS, and human domains have also been given due significance.

The hallmark of the book lies in the author’s lucid exposition of Bharat’s strategic culture, which inspires its military ethos. He emphasises that India’s values are indigenous and not borrowed from any other country.

This book, the result of extensive and detailed research by Brigadier (Dr.) Rajeev Bhutani, could not have come at a more opportune time—when nations are actively developing and transforming their forces around the MDO concept. It will be of immense value to military professionals, researchers, scientists and engineers developing defence systems in government, public, and private enterprises, as well as policymakers.

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Advanced technology is rapidly changing the operating environment. Technology breaks down traditional barriers and extends range: cyberattacks and electronic warfare have physical impact. Previously unchallenged domains, such as air, are now vulnerable to short-range threats from the ground, as well as advanced anti-access/area denial equipment. Multi-domain battle creates opportunity in one domain using the capabilities of others, including nontraditional domains such as cyber and space.

Multi Domain Operations in the Indian context are still at the academic stage of understanding. It is an emerging concept. A clear understanding is required about how the armed forces, as part of a joint force, will operate, fight, and campaign successfully across space, cyberspace, and the domains of air, land, and maritime against adversaries.

It is still evolving even in the United States. The U.S. Army concept for multi-domain combined arms operations at echelons above brigade is grappling with the challenges in the expanded multi-domain operations framework and how future armed forces gain and maintain the initiative across the competition continuum, the full range of military operations, and each unique area of operations (AOR) to meet those challenges.

The MDO concept relies heavily on each Service to embrace joint integration and collaboration despite barriers and hesitations that make such cooperation difficult. It is only after jointness is achieved that multi-domain operations can be effective. Historical approaches to achieving superiority in the air, land, and sea domains may no longer be valid.

To be ready for the next war, the armed forces must effectively innovate and adapt concepts, equipment, and training. The future battlefield will be one where integration into joint and multinational forces is a prerequisite for victory.

Three elements that help define the desired effects of MDO are: joint integration, technology, and people. Integration and interdependence lie at the heart of multi-domain concept.

We need to think and shape how land forces might conduct future operations under the multi-domain battle concept.

There is a clear evolutionary link between MDO and previous concepts like Air Land Battle and Joint Operations.

The Army must adapt to meet the requirements for a future force operating in a multi-domain environment.

The IAF does not already have in place its integrated air defence system (IADS) where the most dominant sensor, i.e., the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is intermeshed with airborne and land-based radar networks. The meaningful IADS would need to be extended to other battlefield and shipborne sensors and made more robust with ground-based air defence systems. The combination of manned and unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, surface to surface systems, shipborne systems, electronic jammers and cyber systems will have to be well conceived.

Even in close air support, with introduction of multi-role assets, there is a necessity for multi-domain operations with a better understanding of how to maximize the flexibility and capability that airpower provides when applying multi-role platforms.

India’s Land Warfare Doctrine has set out the case for emerging technologies such as AI and directed-energy weapons. These have the potential to be the foundation for India’s efforts to develop MDO and act as a bulwark against A2AD technologies.

MDO at sea has four domains and three enablers – sea and land , under-sea, and air domain – all battle winning factors. The electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyber are the three enablers.

ARTRAC and the Training Commands of the Air Force and Navy have a pivotal role in providing inputs collaboratively, to integrate and converge their individual land and air domain capabilities in order to create the merged multidomain capabilities that will be required for success in future combat.

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The plan was given a go-ahead by Imran Khan, the then-prime minister who simultaneously held the position of interior minister, during a meeting with Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu in 2018. The secret work was camouflaged under the bilateral agreement on cooperation against cybercrime when in fact it was against perceived influence operations pursued by the US, India and other foreign powers, according to sources familiar with the project, reported Nordic Monitor.

The proposal to establish such a unit was first put on the table during private talks between visiting Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu and his host, Shehryar Khan Afridi, the then-minister of state for interior, on December 17, 2018. The matter was discussed at the senior level and kept confidential from most of the staff at Islamabad’s interior ministry, Nordic Monitor reported.

The first public admission of this clandestine operation was made by Soylu during an interview on October 13, 2022, with a local TV station in Kahramanmaras. He did not name the country but made clear he was in fact talking about Pakistan when he referred to a country that was a five or six-hour direct flight from Turkey. Unlike his predecessors, Soylu has gained notoriety in running troll and bot armies in cyberspace on behalf of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and had worked on similar covert operations even before he became interior minister in September 2016, added Nordic Monitor.

The AKP set up teams to dominate social media in influence operations and attacks on critics. When he was deputy chairman of Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2014 with a research and development portfolio, Soylu secretly set up a large Twitter team to insult and target with offensive language prominent social and political figures who did not embrace the AKP’s ideals and practices. According to the parliamentary record, he controlled a 6,000-strong troll army at the time.

In the end, using intelligence and information as a weapon, the newly revamped cyber police department was turned into machinery to undermine public view of the opposition and smear critics and dissenters within the ruling party, reported Nordic Monitor. Instead of investigating real crime on the internet, the teams at the cyber unit are busy hacking opponents’ emails and social media accounts, collecting private data from cell phones and computers they gained access to and using the hacked material to intimidate and at times blackmail dissidents.

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With the advent of new technologies that have enabled new domains of warfare, the Indian Armed Forces must begin exploring how to exploit multi-domain operations as opposed to just land, air and maritime domain.

Cyber, Space and the Electromagnetic spectrum did not exist during previous conflicts.

Distributed, multi-domain and joint all domain operations (MDO and JADO) are fast becoming the defining doctrines of this new era.

Essentially, they are the synchronisation of aircraft, ground forces and vehicles, satellites and ships, their systems and all sources of data. Together they deliver a complete picture of the battlespace and empower personnel – in theatre or command – to quickly make decisions that drive action.

Cyberspace is a critical element of this new age of combat; as the electromagnetic spectrum itself – a string of frequencies from radio to microwaves, visible light, X-rays and gamma rays which transmit data – may become. The US, UK and others are looking ever more closely at it.

For future MDOs, artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a critical role, helping decipher data, determine its operational relevance and then present informed options for decision-making jointly across all Services.

If the Army can bring them together along with manoeuvre warfare, which is the Army’s strength, and integrate them at the time and point of choosing, this can open windows of domain superiority leading to denial of access and areas.

For example, Cyberspace can provide opening in the air domain by taking air defence weapons offline, which will then create openings for land and maritime, leading to a new level of complication for the enemy.

For example, when the enemy is engaging you with artillery or you are being engaged from the air, another domain brings in its effects to bear and neutralises the threat. It means you have to look at what equipment you need, what kind of network you need, what kind of training you need, and a lot of interoperability and inter-connectivity.

Cyber is ubiquitous across the battlefield and warfare. The Army has not yet made a beginning to use this domain to facilitate own operations or to disrupt the enemy’s. It does not have cyber forces. Cyber advisories and guidelines do not make up doctrines or methods to adopt in operations, much less in an integrated manner with other domains.

Russian forces have very expertly used the cyber domain to facilitate targeting with their artillery against Ukrainian ground forces demonstrating the ability to take action in one domain and produce an effect or dominate another domain.

The US Navy and Air Force are working on new technologies and capabilities through programmes like Project Overmatch and the Advanced Battle Management System, respectively. Together both forces have developed more than a dozen projects they are collaborating on, bringing all domains together to share and utilise information and assess and respond in synergy.

In the UK, this is being addressed by what the MoD calls the Digital Backbone, a digital transformation programme that will allow information sharing and communication regardless of the hardware being used.

We must at least learn from events in Ukraine, evolve our concepts, map out a phased delivery approach and experiment.

Air-Land Battle doctrine, once the flavour of studies at the Army War College involved two domains – air and land. That alone will not work in the future.

The Armed Forces are not currently organized or trained in this manner. The Training Commands of the three Services have a role and responsibility to integrate these capabilities.

Multi-domain warfare is something on which the Indian Armed Forces have to start at the very beginning and approach it from a joint aspect. Single service approach will just not do.

The goal is to better enable the Services to fight together effectively in all domains simultaneously, to present multiple dilemmas for the enemy. That will mean looking at how do we organize, how to equip and how to train to do that.

A new mindset is needed to enable multi-domain action.

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“Any threats in cyberspace directly impact our social, economic, and national security and therefore we need to safeguard our cyberspace,” said Doval at the inauguration of a cybersecurity training workshop on Monday. He said a digital revolution was taking place in the country and referred to the government’s digital services.

National Security Council Secretariat is organising the seminar to equip over 140 officials to combat internal and external threats in association with the Data Security Council of India and the Defence Research and Development Organisation

Lt Gen Rajesh Pant, the national cyber security coordinator, referred to the importance of cyberspace and the necessity of keeping it secure and safe for the citizens, businesses, and governments. He spoke about the ransomware attack on Oil India Limited and the cyber warfare in the global scenario. “The government of India is taking various steps to build capacities and enhance skills in cyber security.”

A cybersecurity policy, which has been in the works for over two years, proposes a multi-stakeholder framework to check propaganda, deception, disinformation, and “adversarial narratives” on social media. The policy has been pending with the government for over a year now.

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The Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) and Indian Military Review will organise a Webex webinar-cum-virtual expo on “Cyber Defence India” on 10 June 2022.

Background

A Chinese hacking group called RedEcho is believed to have attacked Maharashtra’s electricity grid in March 2021, amidst an ongoing crisis in Ladakh. Hackers from North Korea penetrated the Kundankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) in 2019 in a bid to test the cyber security of the plant and steal information about the reactor design.

In some ways, cyber war between India and China is already taking place – after India banned hundreds of Chinese mobile apps, limiting Chinese investments in the Indian economy and giving a bloody nose to the People’s Liberation Army on the Line of Actual Control on 15 June 2020.

The primary objective is cyber military superiority to provide freedom of action in, through, and from cyberspace to support mission objectives. The corollary is to deny freedom of action to adversaries.

Chinese Cyber Attacks

China has been leading a worldwide hacking and economic espionage campaign, using cyber attacks to steal intellectual property in disregard of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

China is one of the world’s pre-eminent players using cyber weapons. Used as methods of espionage, state-sponsored data breaches and server hacks pose a significant threat to global security. China was responsible for worldwide rise of cyber crime by 600% during the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before the virus hit, China had overtaken Russia as the biggest state sponsor of cyber attacks against the West.

Some of the Chinese cyber attacks that have made digital history in the past include:

• Operation Aurora (Jan 2010) affected Internet Explorer, Google and Adobe.
• New York Times’s reporters and employees, in Jan 2013, were attacked for four-months after it published an investigation into how relatives of the then Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, accrued several billion dollars through business dealings.
• The personnel files of more than 20 million people of the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM), were stolen from Nov 2013 to April 2015.
• Four Chinese military hackers were indicted in 2020, for stealing data of 147 million Americans customers of credit-reporting agency Equifax.
• The Vatican’s computer systems were attacked (100 cyber threats a month) by suspected state-sponsored Chinese hackers in July 2020 ahead of talks between Beijing and the Vatican about the renewal of operations of the Catholic Church in China. 
• Two Chinese hackers were indicted, on 7 July 2020, in a bid to steal data from Moderna Inc, the vaccine manufacturer. Spain complained in Sep 2021 that Chinese hackers were stealing Covid research secrets from labs.

Indian Targets

In March 2013, DRDO’s computers were breached by Chinese hackers, who took files related to Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), to a server in Guangdong in China and the Indian defence ministry ordered a probe.

China-linked hacker group, RedFoxtrot, from their intelligence Unit 69010, targeted India’s power sector, including conglomerate NTPC, in March 2021. RedFoxtrot’s predominant targets are sectors like government, defence, and telecommunications across Central Asia, India, and Pakistan.

Some Indian targets included Walchandnagar Industries engaged in India’s Nuclear and Space programmes, and defence manufacturer Alpha Design Technologies and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL).

The Times Group (Feb, Aug 2021), Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), and MP Police Department (June 2021) have been targeted by suspected Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group TAG-28, which used Winnti malware. In June 2021, APT41 was responsible for cyber attack against Air India.

Russia-Ukraine War

Cyber conflicts are fought in the shadows, but in the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, skirmishes have come out in the open, although the scale has not been as anticipated.

Cyber warfare has been happening between them since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian cyber weapon Uroburos had been around since 2005. In 2013, Op Armageddon, a Russian campaign of systematic cyber espionage on the information systems of government agencies, law enforcement, and defence agencies, began to help Russia on the battlefield. The victims of Russian cyber attacks were government agencies of Ukraine, the EU, the United States, defense agencies, international and regional defence and political organizations, think tanks, the media and dissidents.

Ukraine power grid was first successfully hacked in Dec 2015 and then again in Dec 2016. The State Treasury of Ukraine was paralysed in Dec 2016. The largest known mass supply-chain attack took place in June 2017 using Petya virus.

Other Russian attacks have included wiper virus NotPetya inserted into tax accounting software used by Ukrainian firms, which encrypts computers permanently. Malware dubbed Hermetic Wiper prevented computers from rebooting.

As part of cyber access denial and skirmishes restrictions were imposed on Facebook by the Russian government, prompting Facebook to ban ads from Russian state media. Google’s YouTube platform banned state media adverts. Elon Musk, a US tech titan, provided satellite internet access to Ukraine via his Starlink satellites.

Ukraine launched cyber attacks under Operation Groundbait in May 2016. The Surkov Leaks in Oct 2016 made public 2,337 e-mails and hundreds of attachments, with plans for seizing Crimea from Ukraine and fomenting separatist unrest in Donbas. The IT Army of Ukraine was established in Feb 2022 during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Anonymous, the hacker collective has declared cyberwar on Russia. The group has claimed credit for hacking the Russian Ministry of Defence database, and is believed to have hacked multiple state TV channels to show pro-Ukraine content.

The group has claimed credit for several distributed denial of service attacks. Its targets in the past have included the CIA, the Church of Scientology and Islamic State

Anonymous’ Russian targets included:

• Roskomnadzor, the Russian government agency in charge of controlling access to social media sites.
• Russian news channels Russia 24, Channel One, and Moscow 24.
• Kremlin’s official website, the Ministry of Defence database, over 300 Russian media, as well as banking websites.
• Hacktivists wanted to keep Russians connected to the rest of the world and alternative media by publishing their data in the hope of exposing the censorship that the Russian government was putting on its citizens.

Top Cyberattacks of 2021

There are millions of cyber attacks every year. Some prominent ones in 2021 were as follows:

Colonial Pipeline. In May of 2021, Russian hacking group DarkSide attacked Colonial Pipeline, a significant fuel provider, impacting petroleum, diesel, and jet fuel supplies across the East Coast of America.

Brenntag. In May 2021, DarkSide also targeted a German chemical distribution company, Brenntag, stealing 150 GB of encrypted data, demanding ransom. $4.4 million was paid.

Acer. REvil hacker group attacked Taiwanese computer giant, Acer, demanding $50 million as ransom.

CNA Financial. In March 2021, CNA Financial, a US insurance company was attacked which compromised data of 75,000 people. CNA Financial eventually paid $40 million to regain access.

Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn. Social profiles of 214 million social media users (408 gigabytes of compromised data) from these platforms were exposed by a Chinese social media management company called Socialarks.

Bombardier. Canadian plane manufacturer, Bombardier, suffered in February 2021 compromise of the confidential data of suppliers and customers in Feb 2021.

Sierra Wireless. IoT device manufacturer Sierra Wireless was hit by a ransomware attack and had to halt production at its manufacturing in Mar 2021.

Recent Initiatives

The creation of the Defence Cyber Agency in 2019, Cyber Security Coord at the National Security Council (NSC), preparedness for offensive ops by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), defensive measures by National Critical Info Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) and the release of India’s National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) are steps in the right direction. As roles and responsibilities of the armed forces, other government agencies as well as the private sector are articulated, the nation’s vulnerability to cyber attacks will decrease.

The vulnerabilities facing India’s Critical Infrastructure (CI) need to be addressed with greater urgency. Cyber attacks against India’s CI and Strategic Infrastructure (ST), such as nuclear power plants, are not new.

Defensive measures like having a cyber security framework, Cyber Security Awareness, Incident Response Tools, Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing, Multi-Factor Authentication and so on are necessary but offensive defence is the key. Along with space, Indian must prepare for “cross-domain” warfare to include cyberspace.

Webinar Sessions

The webinar has been organised into the following sessions:

(a)        Session 1        – Inaugural

(b)        Session 2        – Cyber Security Technologies

(c)        Session 3        – Countermeasures Framework for Military Networks

(d)        Session 4        – Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities & Protection

(e)        Session 5        – Cyber Warfare Doctrine and Superiority

ALSO READ: Infosec Conferences

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There is good reason to suspect China-Pak collaboration in cyberspace. In recent years, Beijing and Islamabad have deepened their co-operation in the information technology domain. Digital and cyber co-operation are crucial elements of the ‘Long-Term Plan for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (2017-2030)’. The plan emphasises ICT-enabled development and promotion of e-commerce in Pakistan.

But beyond this benign collaboration, China-Pakistan collusion has become a reality where Pakistan has emerged as a proxy for China’s malicious designs. This is particularly true with respect to anti-India propaganda on social media platforms.

During the ongoing border stand-off between India and China along the Line of Actual Control, Pakistan-based Twitter handles posing as Chinese nationals have peddled anti-India propaganda. These Twitter handles have regularly peddled misleading reports related to the violent clash at Galwan Valley in June 2020, as well as about India’s military preparedness. China and Pakistan are also potentially exploring establishing an international news media outlet that will significantly advance their propaganda efforts. Besides, in 2018, both had reportedly joined hands to honey trap Indian Army officers into revealing information regarding troop deployments along the borders with China and Pakistan.

The Chinese side has taken the lead by providing the technology and content, while Pakistan acts as the implementer and disseminator. This collaboration is symbiotic: China needs Pakistan because mainstream social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are banned in China, and command over the English and Hindi languages is very limited in most parts of China’s populace. Moreover, by not directly getting involved and making Pakistan the front end of the anti-India activity, China is able to skirt attribution. For Pakistan, collaborating with China strengthens its strategic partnership and lends the technical edge, which Islamabad’s cyber activities wouldn’t have been able to achieve otherwise.

This cyber collusion is also likely to extend to malicious cyber activities such as APT attacks, with the intention to collect valuable geopolitical, business, and military data. Indian cybersecurity researchers have suspected Chinese assistance to Pakistani cyber campaigns like APT36’s ‘Operation Sidecopy.’ The APT36 is a known threat actor that has used fake COVID-19 health advisory to launch phishing attacks against Indian defence networks to steal confidential information. The threat vector had been active since 2016, indicative of its long duration. Most recently, Pakistan-based hackers conducted a major cyber-attack targeting India’s power generation and transmission sector using the platform supplied by China Mobile Limited, which operates under the brand Zong 4G in Pakistan.

Evidence of Pakistan’s emergence as China’s proxy in cyberspace lies not only in China’s active role in enhancing Pakistan’s ICT infrastructure as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but more so in the modus operandi of cyber actors in both countries at the tactical level involving fake propaganda-based influence operations, and espionage using malware as well as honey traps.

With China-Pakistan cyber collusion becoming a reality, India must prepare for the spectre of a ‘two-front war’ in cyberspace. While their cyber-espionage operations cause loss of sensitive information, their disinformation campaigns — based on anonymity and deniability — pose the real danger of accentuating the existing political polarisation, and social divisions within India.

Moreover, these disinformation campaigns can yield a significant advantage to Pakistan and China by sowing the seeds of doubt among the citizens about their national institutions’ credibility. Therefore, India needs to effectively counter the menace of China-Pakistan cyber collaboration as it has not just national security implications, but indeed implications for India’s democracy as a whole.

In recent years, India has taken steps to plug its cyber vulnerabilities through several legal and institutional measures. Yet, Chinese and Pakistani hackers continue to capitalise on the lack of adequate cybersecurity awareness and poor cyber hygiene practices, such as not checking the veracity of ‘fake news’, clicking on unsolicited web links, among average Indian Internet users, to ensure that their propaganda efforts get the necessary traction, and their malwares breach sensitive computer networks.

Therefore, even as India strengthens its cyber defences by plugging its vulnerabilities, it must implement two steps. At the micro-level, India should increase the citizens’ resilience to emerging cyber threats, and expand cyber hygiene initiatives. At the macro-level, India must amplify its offensive cyber posture to clearly signal its intentions and deter its adversaries.

These steps are necessary for India to prepare for China-Pakistan’s ‘hybrid warfare’.

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