On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

Disengagement at Pp15

In the Chang Chenmo sector, where the LAC and the 1959 Claim Line coincide, there were no areas of differing perception as such. This sector is the gateway to the three southern approaches that lead to Aksai Chin. One approach to the east leads to Lanak La, through which the Tibet-Xinjiang highway passes. Two approaches are to the north via the Changlung Nala – PP17A and Kugrang River – PP15, which lead to the upper reaches of the Galwan River.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has its main post at Karam Singh Hill at the junction of Kugrang and Chang Chenmo rivers and an outpost at Gogra. PPs 15, 16 and 17A were patrolled but not physically held. Alarmed at the rapid development of roads by India to PP15, PP17A and towards Kongka La, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded 3 to 4 km across the LAC between PPs 15 and 16 and PPs 17A and 17.

These intrusions were contested by Indian forces and a stalemate ensued. During negotiations, the Chinese gave a new version of the 1959 Claim Line up to their intrusions, running along the middle as opposed to the well-established LAC, which runs along the crest of the ridge to the north of the Kugrang River.

Disengagement with respect to the Changlung Nala intrusion took place between 4-5 August 2021, after the 12th round of military talks on 31 July.  However, China refused to budge on the intrusion between PPs 15 and 16. It insisted on a buffer zone of 30-35 km along the entire length of the Kugrang River up to Karam Singh Hill. This proposal was also mooted during Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi earlier in March 2022.

PLA enjoyed the terrain advantage in both the intrusion areas in this sector. Due to terrain configuration, the Chanchenmo sector, dependent on a tenuous 100 km long road from Lukung which can be cut off at several places, is untenable in war unless disproportionate forces are deployed.

Depsang and Demchok Next

India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

Negotiations for disengagement in Depsang Plains and Demchok will be arduous and prolonged.

Comments

Considering that it took nine years to restore the status quo post the Sumdorong Chu confrontation of 1986-87 which began during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure and ended under the Narasimha Rao government, it is clear that border negotiations with China are a long and arduous process.

The withdrawal of soldiers and dismantling of temporary infrastructure took place less than two months after the two sides took part in the 16th round of high-level military talks. India’s insistence on a sustained dialogue to thrash out issues and settle differences has borne fruit.

The India-China standoff has been continuing since May 2020; its impact on bilateral ties cannot be overestimated. The situation reached a flashpoint in June 2020 when rival troops were involved in a bloody clash in the Galwan valley. Since then, an uneasy calm has prevailed in Ladakh, with India trying to keep pace with China in terms of troop build-up, round-the-clock surveillance and raising of infrastructure.

Even as the PP-15 breakthrough is welcome, the Indian defence forces cannot rule out the possibility of another misadventure by the People’s Liberation Army. Indian troops have to remain on their toes to ensure that peace and tranquillity are maintained on a long-term basis along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Now that PP-15 has been successfully dealt with, the next logical step should be to resolve the stalemate in Demchok and Depsang regions. Doing the needful will prepare the ground for talks on the long-festering boundary dispute. It is imperative to clearly delineate and demarcate the nearly 3,500-km LAC by mutual consent and establish it as permanent international border so as to preclude future imbroglios. New Delhi has been asserting that normalcy in bilateral relations is not possible unless sincere efforts are made to ensure a friction-free border.

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“Both sides have completed disengagement at PP15 in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of the troops of both sides to their respective areas,” one defence source said. Verification was carried out to ensure compliance including aerial surveillance, another source added.

However, details and modalities of the disengagement were not available. In the past, buffer zones were created at the friction points as per the understanding at the Corps Commanders level with no patrolling to be undertaken by either side till overall disengagement and de-escalation is achieved, after which the two sides are to work out new patrolling norms.

On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

However, while India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

As reported earlier, since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC. As reported by The Hindu, according to senior officials, Indian Army last accessed the PPs in Depsang in January/February 2020.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

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On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

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The talks took place at the Chushul-Moldo meeting point, on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The meet concluded at 10.30 pm after 13 hours.

Major focus of the talks was on disengagement in the Hot Springs area. The Indian side was expected to press for disengagement as soon as possible in all the remaining friction points, including resolution of issues in Depsang Bulge and Demchok.

In pure diplomatic language, the talks were constructive without any positive outcome and reaching mutually acceptable solutions is work in progress. This means both the Indian Army and the PLA commanders will continue to engage in future but there is no guarantee on whether the PLA will restore April 2020 status quo ante in Gogra-Hot Springs or resolve the Depsang Bulge or CNJ issue.

Fact is that the PLA with new border law and rapid military and technological upgradation on their side of the unresolved LAC is converting the 3,488 km line into Line of Control.

MoD statement

A statement issued by the Ministry of Defence on Thursday evening said representatives from the defence and foreign affairs establishments of the two sides were present at the meeting. “They agreed that both sides should follow the guidance provided by the state leaders and work for the resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.”

The statements issued by both sides were not as blunt and sharp as those issued after the 13th round of talks on October 10, 2021, when they blamed each other for the failure of the talks.

This time, the statement said: “The two sides have agreed to stay in close contact and maintain dialogue via military and diplomatic channels and work out a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.” It also spoke about agreeing to hold the next round of the commanders’ talks at the earliest. Since June 2020, there have been 14 rounds of talks. Though there has been partial success, troop build-up on either side, for now, shows no signs of getting back to the pre-April 2020 levels. At the talks yesterday, India and China agreed that the two sides would consolidate the “previous outcomes” and take effective efforts to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the western sector.

The “previous outcomes” mentioned in the statement referred to the disengagement at PP-17, PP-17A, and north and south banks of the Pangong Tso, a 135-km glacial lake. India shares 832-km LAC with China in the eastern Ladakh sector.

Rise in Tensions

With the corps commander-level talks doing little to ease tensions, the confrontation could likely get worse at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, and that Beijing may not continue with the regular lines of communication.

While India didn’t expect movement on the disengagement plans, owing to China’s recent actions to deploy more troops at the LAC, the commentary from Beijing this time that India had made “unreasonable demands” has prompted strategic sources in New Delhi to believe that this could lead to a ‘Galwan-like’ flare-up.

The sticky issues

While disengagement has taken place in the Pangong Tso area and at the Gogra Post, a stand-off continues over Patrolling Point 15 (PP15) in Hot Springs, the Depsang Plains and in the Demchok area.

India and China have six to seven hotlines but there has been little progress in the talks. A larger plan to resolve the issue with the establishment of a hotline at the DGMO level remains unfulfilled.

The Indian side clearly failed to persuade the PLA towards disengagement from Gogra-Hot Springs near Kongka La as well as resolving patrolling rights issues in Depsang Bulge in Daulet Beg Oldi sector and Charding Nullah Junction in Demchok sector.

The Indian Army apparently raised the issue of PLA building a bridge over Pangong Tso, east of Srijap Complex, for faster troop deployment and rapid militarisation of the occupied Aksai Chin area by the Chinese Army all along the 597-km Ladakh LAC.

There would be no immediate disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point (PP)-15, also known as Hot Springs. Resultantly, Indian forces would stick to their locations and positions at the LAC. Weapons, equipment, tanks, artillery guns and other high technology surveillance systems would also be around. Both sides have some 75,000 troops in the sector.

13th Round

The 13th round of talks had taken place on October 10, 2021 and they ended in a stalemate. Both sides had failed to make any headway in the talks with the Indian Army saying after the dialogue that the “constructive suggestions” made by it were neither agreeable to the Chinese side nor it could provide any “forward-looking” proposals.

In their virtual diplomatic talks on November 18, India and China agreed to hold the 14th round of military talks at an early date to achieve the objective of complete disengagement in remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh.

Continued Stand-off

Both the Indian and PLA armies are locked in a stand-off all along Ladakh LAC since the Chinese Army under instructions from the Central Military Commission under President Xi Jinping decided to unilaterally change the LAC and impose the rejected 1959 cartographical line on the Ladakh LAC in May 2020. Since then the two sides are fully deployed with more than three divisions of troops on each side with missile, rocket, artillery and tank regiments apart from the Air Force being on standby in the hinterland. The PLA by transgressing in Pangong Tso, Galwan, Gogra-Hot Springs area in May 2020 broke the bilateral 1993 and 1996 peace and tranquility agreements signed at the level of heads of states.

Both sides gradually enhanced their deployment by rushing in tens of thousands of soldiers as well as heavy weaponry.

As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year in the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the sensitive sector.

Ever since the LAC stand-off began in April-May 2020, both sides have mainly followed a three-tier approach — regular talks at the diplomatic and military levels, along with a dialogue track between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi.

To top all of this, talks were also held between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi. It was Doval and Yang who agreed to a disengagement plan in 2020.

This time the talks failed as the Chinese have replaced Gen. Xu Qiling, who was promoted in July, with Gen. Wang Haijiang, and that as a result a “comfort level” had not been achieved. 

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