Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

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Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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According to reports from Kabul, the Chaman border crossing was evacuated, and medical emergency declared as more than 15 civilians were injured in heavy machine gun and mortar firing by both TTP fighters and Afghanistan Taliban. The clashes erupted after Pakistan Army ostensibly tried to repair the border fence forcing both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to retaliate. As many as seven Pak nationals were killed in cross-border shelling by the Taliban earlier in December.

With series of clashes erupting all along the Af-Pak border, the Taliban experiment is proving to be costly for the Pakistan government in Islamabad and its deep state in adjoining Rawalpindi. While the Taliban government occupied Kabul on August 15, 2021, with the help of then Pakistan ISI chief Gen Faiz Hameed, a protégé of then PM Imran Khan Niazi, the ultra-conservative Sunni Pashtun government has turned against its once upon a time handlers and started targeting the Republic.

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan has taken Islamic radicalization in Pakistan to a different level with a large section of public wanting that Islamic Republic should be turned into Emirate with Sharia law akin to Afghanistan. Although Pakistani deep state thought that Taliban would push the TTP to compromise with Rawalpindi and lead to indefinite ceasefire, the radical extremist group broke the ceasefire on November 28 and asked its cadre to carry out attack in the entire Republic.

Even though then Pakistan PM Imran Khan Niazi praised the Taliban occupation of Kabul by calling it “throwing off their shackles of slavery” under two decades of US occupation, the Sunni Pashtun force is today totally at odds with Islamabad as it refuses to recognize the Durand Line as the border. The Taliban have made it amply clear that it does not recognize the British drawn Durand Line as it divides the Pashtun community and hence they want Pashtun dominated areas on Af-Pak border to be under control of Kabul.

With the Taliban government refusing to act as proxy of Rawalpindi, Pakistan is still to recognize the Emirate of Afghanistan despite Islamabad being the chief promoter of the Sunni group for the past three decades. Instead, it is using terror groups like so-called Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other terror groups to destabilize the Taliban government in Kabul. It is the same extremist forces which are also trying to spread instability and radicalization in the Central Asian Republics much to the chagrin of Russia.

While India has reached out to Taliban as part of its historic commitment to help the Afghan people notwithstanding the political regime in power, the strategic depth game of Pakistan against India has gone awry with the Sunni Pashtun not interested in fighting proxy wars for Rawalpindi headquarters. With Pakistan’s western borders heating up due to regular clashes with TTP and Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s plan has gone all topsy-turvy.

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The firing started after a sniper, reportedly belonging to the Taliban, shot dead two Pak soldiers where a border fence was being installed. The Pakistani side fired at border hamlets in response, prompting retaliation from the Afghan side.

Heavy clashes took place in the area, with a number of shells and artillery hitting the villagers, the local reports further said.

Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Saturday claimed responsibility for the December 19 attack on federal minister Shibli Faraz in Darra Adam Khel in which his driver and bodyguard were injured.

The latest border clashes come amid claims from both Taliban and Pakistan that they have resolved the recent row over border fencing by agreeing that further work on the project that led to a tense situation would be done through consensus.

A senior official, who spoke to a group of journalists on Friday, said it had been decided at a senior level that fencing-related issues would in the future be dealt with through mutual agreement.

The official, however, did not exactly specify at which level the talks between Pakistan and the de facto Afghan government were held after Wednesday’s incident in which Taliban fighters disrupted border fencing and took away spools of barbed wire, the Dawn newspaper reported.

Pakistan has been fencing the 2600-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan since 2017 to end terrorist infiltration and smuggling despite very intense opposition from the neighbouring country, the report said.

Besides the erection of a fence, the project also includes the construction of border posts and forts, and the raising of new wings of Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that guards the border.

The official said 90 per cent of the fencing had been completed. Fencing has been a contentious issue in Pakistan-Afghanistan ties because the Afghans dispute the border demarcation done during the colonial period.

While Afghan Pashtuns define their country borders on basis of Durand Line, Pakistan is opposed to this demarcation.

The differences over the status of the border have been so intense that they have in the past resulted in several fatal clashes between the troops of the two countries.

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Pakistan has solicited funding for the Taliban, bankrolled Taliban operations, provided diplomatic support as the Taliban’s virtual emissaries abroad, arranged training for Taliban fighters, recruited skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planned and directed offensives, provided and facilitated shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions apparently directly providing combat support.

The Pakistan government has repeatedly denied that it provides any military support to the Taliban in its diplomacy regarding its extensive operations in Afghanistan.

In direct violation of U.N. sanctions Pakistan’s army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contributed to making the Taliban a highly effective military force. Pakistan’s notoriously porous border with Afghanistan facilitated the transshipment of men and materiel.

History of Military Support

Pakistan has a history of military support for different factions within Afghanistan, extending at least as far back as the early 1970s. During the 1980s, Pakistan, which was host to more than two million Afghan refugees, was the most significant front-line state serving as a secure base for the mujahidin fighting against the Soviet intervention.

Pakistan also served, in the 1980s, as a U.S. stalking horse: the U.S., through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling some $2-3 billion worth of covert assistance to the mujahidin, training over 80,000 of them.

Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, serving and former Pakistani military officers continued to provide training and advisory services in training camps within Afghanistan and eventually to Taliban forces in combat.

In addition, Pakistan promoted the emergence of a government in Afghanistan that would reduce Pakistan’s own vulnerability to internal unrest by helping to contain the nationalist aspirations of tribes whose territories straddle the Pakistani-Afghan border.

Pakistan also sought to quell local support for Afghanistan’s ambitions of redrawing the Durand line. Thus, Pakistan came to throw its support behind the Hizb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun-dominated group that espoused an Islamist rather than nationalist agenda. Because the U.S. granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling its covert assistance to the mujahidin based in Pakistan, Pakistan was able to give Hikmatyar the lion’s share.

Strategic Depth

Throughout the war against the communist government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan asserted a mix of internal and external concerns. The ISI and Pakistan army sought leverage against the hostile neighbour on its eastern border, India, by giving Pakistan “strategic depth.”

Pakistan has always wanted Afghanistan as strategic depth against India. An Afghanistan that facilitated those connections and provided Pakistan with a base to pursue its objectives in Kashmir would give it greater security against India. It has also been part of the ‘Great Game’ against India. Pakistan believes that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will eliminate Indian threat through Afghanistan.

With strategic depth, Pakistan can retreat into Afghanistan if India attacks. Second, they can rain their missiles on India from Afghanistan. And third, they can utilize jihadis from Afghanistan to launch a new jihad in Kashmir.

The New Taliban

Islamabad believes that it has the Taliban by the scruff of the neck, a term once used by Pakistan’s Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, during the time of the Kargil operations.

But the Taliban of today are not the naïve Talibs that the Pakistanis created under the leadership of Mullah Omar. This generation are seasoned militants who have sometimes experienced jail and ill-treatment at the hands of the Pakistanis. Islamabad hopes that its control over the Taliban logistics will continue to provide it leverage, as will the presence of its powerful proxy—the Haqqani Network which has been absorbed into the Taliban over the past two decades. But the rapid consolidation of authority over Afghanistan by the Taliban and their outreach to Iran is likely to have upset those calculations.

Pakistan has an uphill task in converting its tactical advantages in Afghanistan into strategic gains. The Pakistan army is now in the driver’s seat in Kabul. But can it drive the Afghan state and society anywhere, let alone in a sensible direction?

It did not come as a surprise that Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), dashed to Kabul after Taliban’s victory to secure his government’s interests. Hamid’s role was also to mediate between different Taliban factions on power-sharing and launch a sustainable new Afghan government.

With Pakistan supported Haqqani group occupying cabinet berths in the new Afghan dispensation, terrorist groups are likely to continue to flourish, rather than be controlled, as globally demanded. The Haqqanis are suspected to be close to the Islamic State (ISIS-K) which launched the suicide attack on Kabul airport. They are also closely associated with Pak-backed terrorist groups, JeM and LeT, which operate in Kashmir. The new Afghan army chief, Qari Fasihuddin, has ties with the ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). Russian security agencies believe that thousands of ISIS-K cadres are concentrated along Afghanistan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Hence, the world rejected the Afghan government and tended to ignore its populace, pushing this responsibility on to Pakistan. Pakistan is itself in financial doldrums and facing food shortages. It cannot afford to fund and feed an additional 40 million without global support. Pakistan, which should have enforced a globally desired government in Kabul, at least initially, pushed one which it could control, ignoring global demands.

It is possible that Pakistan would have promised to support and fund Afghanistan in return for creating a government which it desires. Now it is saddled with a nation which, though possessing billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment, lacks basic food stocks and funds to administer the country. Afghanistan may be compelled to export drugs or sell US equipment for immediate financial needs.

The Problem With Durand Line

What the Pakistanis do not realize is that they have a soft underbelly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan is strong enough to destabilise Afghanistan, but not powerful enough to construct a stable political order across the Durand Line.

While the Taliban were beholden to Pakistan for evicting the Soviets from their land, they never recognized the Durand Line as their official border with Pakistan. The Taliban consider the Durand Line as a figment of the British imagination. Afghanistan dearly wants to merge Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with itself. Needless to say the Pakistanis are not happy with this ambition. They want the Durand Line to be recognized as the international border with Afghanistan as soon as possible.

The Durand Line is a legacy of the 19th century Great Game between the Russian and British empires in which Afghanistan was used as a buffer by the British against a feared Russian expansionism to its east.

The agreement demarcating what became known as the Durand Line was signed on November 12, 1893 between the British civil servant Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman, then the Afghan ruler, essentially a British puppet. His agreement with Durand demarcated the limits of his and British India’s “spheres of influence” on the Afghan “frontier” with India.

In reality, the line cut through Pashtun tribal areas, leaving villages, families, and land divided between the two “spheres of influence”. It has been described as a “line of hatred”, arbitrary, illogical, cruel and a trickery on the Pashtuns. Some historians believe it was a ploy to divide the Pashtuns so that the British could keep control over them easily. It also put on the British side the strategic Khyber Pass.

With Independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited the Durand Line, and with it also the Pashtun rejection of the line, and Afghanistan’s refusal to recognise it. Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan joining the United Nations in 1947.

‘Pashtunistan’ — an independent country of the Pashtuns — was a demand made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the time of Partition, although he later resigned himself to the reality of Partition. The proximity of the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ to India was a point of tension between the two countries almost immediately. The fear of Indian support to Pashtun nationalism haunts Pakistan to date, and is embedded in its Afghan policy.

Pakistan’s creation and support for the Taliban is seen by some as a move to obliterate ethnic Pashtun nationalism with an Islamic identity. But it did not work out the way Pakistan had planned. When the Taliban seized power in Kabul the first time, they rejected the Durand Line. They also strengthened Pashtun identity with an Islamic radicalism to produce the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose terrorist attacks since 2007 left the country shaken.

As cross-border tensions peaked in 2017 with several attacks on Pakistani border posts by militants that Pakistan accused Afghanistan of sheltering – while the Afghan government accused Pakistan of giving safe haven to Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network – Pakistan began erecting a fence on the Durand Line. While it may have reduced the movement of militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it did little to stop the movement of Afghan Taliban across and back.

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1980s and Early 90s: The Genesis

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was facing resistance from the country’s hardline Islamists. Pakistan, then a firm US ally, was apprehensive of the Soviets stretching their influence further south, or even invading Balochistan.

Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia, with covert financial and arms support to the hardliner militias, ensured a Soviet withdrawal in 1992.

A power sharing deal between various Afghan parties and warlords was ineffective, and four years of Afghan civil war followed.

In the melee and power vacuum, a group of fighters, predominantly Pashto tribesmen in the south coalesced into the Taliban. It also drew Pashto students from seminaries across the border in Pakistan. Under the leadership of its founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban spread rapidly throughout Afghanistan.

It promised to liberate Afghanistan from corrupt leadership of warlords, and establish a pure Islamic society.

1999: An ‘Unholy Nexus’

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 linking the Taliban and al-Qaida as terrorist entities and imposing sanctions on their funding.

The move followed a period of ascendancy for al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden.

The Taliban, which rose from the ashes of Afghanistan’s post-Soviet civil war, provided sanctuary to the Osama-led group for its operations.

2001: War on Terror

The Al-Qaida launched the deadliest terror attacks on US soil by crashing passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Close to three thousand people died in the attacks.

Following the terror strikes, US President George W Bush declared a “war against terrorism” and zeroed in on al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Days after the attack, Bush signed into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11. This resolution was later cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, including its invasion of Afghanistan.

A US-led offensive over the next couple of months forced Taliban to cede its key strongholds. However, bin Laden escaped to Pakistan during this period.

After the fall of Kabul in November, Hamid Karzai was installed as interim administration head of Afghanistan. Days later, the Taliban regime surrendered Kandahar with its leader Mullah Omar fleeing the city.

2002-2004: A Move Towards Peace

The US-led forces launched attacks against Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, including Operation Anaconda.

In April 2002, Bush called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and announced “Marshall Plan” for the country. Although, the US never came close to Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending for Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the US military created a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with UN and non-governmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government.

Separately, Pentagon also began shifting military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan in the direction of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Later that year, Karzai was picked to head the country’s transitional government.

In 2003, the Bush administration announced an end to “major combat” in the country. At this time, there were only 8,000 US soldiers stationed in Afghanistan.

Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan in 2014 after voters turned out to cast ballots in large numbers. He won with 55% of the vote. While his election victory was marred by accusations of fraud by his opponents, the democratic process augured well for a nation which had not gone to the polls since 1969.

2006: Bloody Resurgence

Violence increased across the country during the summer months, with intense fighting erupting in the south in July.

The number of suicide attacks quintupled from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, while remotely detonated bombings more than doubled to 1,677. Despite a string of recent election successes, some experts blamed a faltering central government for the spike in attacks.

In 2007, notorious Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a joint operation by Afghan, US and Nato forces in the south of Afghanistan.

By 2008, investigations found that errant fire from a US gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians in Herat, drawing condemnation from President Hamid Karzai and bolstering Taliban claims that coalition forces are unable to protect the population.

2009: Obama’s New Strategy

Months after assuming the Oval Office, President Barack Obama announced a new strategy for the US war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy: disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its safe havens in Pakistan and prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

He also sanctioned the deployment of additional US forces to the country. President Karzai welcomed the strategy.

In July, nearly four thousand US Marines launched a major offensive in southern Afghanistan in response to a growing Taliban insurgency. The operation focused on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009, there were about 60,000-68,000 US forces in Afghanistan.

A couple of months later, President Hamid Karzai won another term. However, as concerns over Karzai’s administration grew, the US and other international partners called for improved governance.

In December, President Obama announced a major escalation of the US mission and committed an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight. For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame was put on the US military presence with Obama eyeing troop drawdown by July 2011.

2011: Osama bin Laden Eliminated

Almost 10 years after the deadly 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in Pakistan in May, 2011.

The death of America’s primary target for a war that started ten years ago fueled the long-simmering debate about continuing the Afghanistan war. As President Obama prepared to announce the withdrawal of some or all of the thirty thousand surge troops in July, Congressional lawmakers increasingly called for a hastened drawdown.

2014: US Announces Troop Withdrawal

President Barack Obama announced a timetable for withdrawing most US forces by the end of 2016. He said the drawdown will free resources for counterterrorism priorities elsewhere.

In September, newly-elected president Ashraf Ghani signed a power-sharing agreement with his chief opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, who had mobilized thousands of protestors as he challenged the voting results. The agreement was brokered after intensive diplomacy by US.

Despite the truce, the power struggle between Ghani and Abdullah gave the Taliban strategic heft as it started making gains in the countryside.

In 2015, the Afghanistan government publicly announced that Mullah Omar had died in 2013. Taliban said he died of tuberculosis and his last days were spent in a hideout in Afghanistan.

2017-2018: Trump Hints at Prolonged War

In a policy shift, President Donald Trump said that decisions about US withdrawal will be based on “conditions on the ground” rather than arbitrary timelines.

He also invited India to play a greater role in rebuilding Afghanistan while castigating Pakistan for harboring insurgents.

In the following year, Taliban launched major attacks in Kabul that kill more than 115 people amid a broader upsurge in violence.

The attacks came after the Trump administration stepped up offensive against Taliban with air strikes and troop deployment across rural areas. Simultaneously, the Trump administration cut off security assistance worth billions of dollars to Pakistan for what President Trump called its “lies and deceit” in harboring Taliban terrorists.

2019: Peace Talks Progress

By the end of 2018, the Taliban and US peace talks made major progress with special US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and top Taliban official Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar leading the negotiations.

In 2019, the Taliban sought withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in exchange for a pledge to block international terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil.

In September, Trump abruptly broke off peace talks a week after Khalilzad announced that an agreement had been reached “in principle” with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump said he canceled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a US soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. Taliban warned that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.

2020: Road to Peace

In 2020, US envoy Khalilzad and the Taliban’s Baradar finally signed an agreement to pave the way for a significant drawdown of US troops. It included guarantees from the Taliban that the country will not be used for terrorist activities.

The US-Taliban deal did not call for an immediate ceasefire, and in the days after its signing, Taliban fighters carried out dozens of attacks against Afghan security forces. The US responded with an air strike against the Taliban in the southern province of Helmand.

In September, the Taliban representatives and Afghan government officials met face-to-face for the first time in Doha, Qatar, after nearly twenty years of war. Both sides expressed eagerness to bring peace to Afghanistan and establish a framework for Afghan society after US troop withdrawal.

While the Afghan government pushed for a ceasefire, the Taliban reiterated its call for the country to be governed through an Islamic system.

2021: US Troop Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover

President Biden announced that US will not meet the deadline set under the US-Taliban agreement to withdraw all troops by May 1 and instead released a plan for a full withdrawal by September 11, 2021. “It’s time to end America’s longest war,” he said.

Biden said that Washington will continue to assist Afghan security forces and support the peace process. The Taliban said it will not participate in “any conference” on Afghanistan’s future until all foreign troops leave.

Taliban started capturing territories after Biden’s announcement, beginning with the take over of Nerkh district just outside Kabul.

By August, nearly the entire country, except Kabul, came under Taliban control as its fighters took city after city.

On August 15, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani left the country for Tajikistan amid an imminent Taliban takeover.

The post A Timeline of Taliban’s Emergence appeared first on IMR.

Relations with Neighbouring Countries

One of the reasons for the expected turmoil in Afghanistan is that several countries in the vicinity are interpreting the post-U.S. power vacuum in Afghanistan as an opportunity.

Iran and Saudi Arabia want to dominate Afghanistan to ensure they stay ahead in the race for regional hegemony. Both are working in coordination to maintain unity among the Taliban who have representatives from various ethnic groups and clans that are expected to jostle for political power.

Afghanistan is in the heart of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia and there cannot be a political vacuum in this unique region.

In August 1998, Taliban forces attacked the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif and killed 10 Iranian diplomats and a correspondent of IRNA, Iranian News Agency. Iran, at the time, supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that operated mainly out of the Panjshir Valley under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud. However, this time around Iran is not in an axis with India, Russia and Tajikistan in dealing with the Taliban which made the Tehran-Taliban harmony possible.

This time Iran has taken a bold initiative to overcame past bitterness with the Taliban. Iran’s growing confidence in handling the Taliban had been on display since Al Quds force under Qasem Soleimani took interest in building ties with the Taliban. Iran’s Quds Force now under the leadership of Esmail Qaani, who succeeded General Soleimani after his assassination on January 3, 2020 has been building stronger links with the Taliban which has been a cause of concern for Saudi Arabia.

Apart from hosting the Taliban leaders repeatedly in the past, Iran has already shown its goodwill to the Taliban by resuming export of energy to Afghanistan, which is yet to form a formal government. Iranian moves and the Saudi-Pakistan initiatives point to the rivalry between the two regional blocks. The Iranian and Saudi moves on Afghanistan indeed are the real indicators of the shape of the future of Afghanistan.

Ethnic Divisions and Taliban Unity

Despite its current reign over popular imagination, that of a unified whole, united under an Islamic goal, Taliban is not a unitary organisation. It is a collation of a large number of local militia, banded together on ethnic/tribal lines.

It is a moot question as to how the spoils will be distributed between the Pashtun tribes, while the other groups from Jalalabad and Nuristan have also raised their demands. The key differences appear to be on policy with regard to women, education, narcotics, existing source of riches and China, despite its violation of the rights of Uyghur Muslims, anathema to an Islamic Emirate.

What allowed the Taliban to take over — a series of local deals along tribal lines — may well stop them from forming the political coalition necessary to form a government.”

The Helmandis were reported to have taken over the Ministry of Finance on August 17, reflecting their desire to control that ministry, possibly in order to facilitate their control of opium and heroin production in Helmand — the largest producer of opium in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, a week later, Helmandis were appointed, not just as Finance, but also as Ministers of Interior and Defence. This tilts the balance between the rustic, rural, opium-rich Helmandis and the militarily superior Haqqanis.

There are also contradictory reports of Helmandis/Kandaharis and Haqqanis taking over control of the security of Kabul, both sets of factions not very keen to cooperate on sharing the spoils of war. This regionalisation, added to ethnic factionalism, makes this coalition very difficult to build.

Multiple other schisms are emerging, including the absence of representation of the northerners, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — main beneficiaries of the past two decades and with a large presence in Kabul’s 5-6 million population. The more the Taliban beat common people on the streets with chains and with every single wanton killing, they are to be seen as an occupational force by these segments, making their victory tenuous.

There are other groups too – al-Qaeda, IS-Khorasan, Uighurs (ETIM), Uzbeks (IMU), Tajiks (Khatiba Imam al Bukhari) and Pakistani groups such as the TTP, LeT, JeM, Jamaat ul Ahraar, Lashkar-e-Islam and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. All of them have linkages with Taliban fighters on the ground but power-sharing negotiations may end up pitching them on opposite sides.

Al Qaeda

The Taliban government was ousted by a U.S.-led intervention following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States masterminded by al Qaeda leaders based in Afghanistan, and 20 years of warfare followed.

The Taliban had provided al-Qaeda with sanctuary while it ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The US invaded and overthrew the Taliban after it refused to turn over al-Qaida leaders following the Sept. 11, 2001 attack. During the course of the 20-year US war, al-Qaeda was vastly diminished, but questions have arisen about its future prospects.

In a February 2020 agreement with the Trump regime, Taliban leaders pledged not to support al-Qaeda or other extremist groups that would threaten the US. But US officials believe the Taliban maintain ties to al-Qaeda, and many nations, including Gulf Arab states, are concerned that the Taliban’s return to power could open the door to a resurgence of al-Qaeda influence.

The post Taliban’s External and Internal Challenges appeared first on IMR.

While no one knows if Taliban have changed, it will find that Afghanistan has changed in the last 20 years. It is a young nation with a median age of 18-and-a-half years. More than two-thirds of the population is below 30, and this cohort has grown up in a conservative but open society; 60% of the population enjoys internet access. They, along with women and minorities, will resist a return to the Islamic Emirate of the 1990s.

Their first attempt at projecting themselves as urbane has not given them the desired results. The world saw through their statement that women would be allowed to work but within the framework of Islamic law. Still, they continue to balance their belief in strict, even regressive, religious laws and their desire for global legitimacy. The problem with the Taliban is that despite the acquired sophistication of the visible leadership, the ground-level fighters are the ones who will decide how the country will be run. Would the Taliban’s international leadership be willing to offer more concessions to the international community — like distancing from terror groups based in Afghanistan, amnesty to Afghans who supported the US, protection to working women, freedom of movement for foreign embassy officials — than the grassroots Taliban fighters are willing to tolerate?

Would the Taliban be willing to hold regular elections in the country as evidence of its belief in democracy? Will they allow ordinary Afghans to continue to shed conservatism and practice social freedoms they have come to enjoy in the last two decades? The Taliban is yet to give proof of the kind of governance it prefers — one that is, like in the past, known for its notorious cruelty or an authoritarian religious regime with a moderate face.

The Taliban are yet to present themselves as a cohesive group that can be given a second chance to retain power they have acquired so easily and by force.

Promises Broken

The dispensation in Kabul includes 30 Pashtuns, two Tajiks and one Uzbek, of whom 17 are UNSC proscribed terrorists. Its powerful interior minister is the pro-Pakistan Sirajuddin Haqqani, who carries a $10 million bounty on his head.

Moderates, involved in negotiations in Doha and those who were pro-Iran, were sidelined. Women were excluded. The Afghan government has made no effort to convince the global community of its intention to adhere to promises made in Doha.

Treatment of Women

Despite an attempt to show a liberal face, the Taliban have been enforcing a strict religious code on the public and violence against anyone who resists. The last time the Taliban were in power, women were not allowed to work. They had to cover their faces and be accompanied by a male relative outside their homes. Girls were not allowed to go to school. The Taliban had also banned TV, music, painting and photography, handed out brutal forms of punishment to those violating their Islamic code, and persecuted minorities.

There were reports of women being told to stay at home in Kabul, Helmand and Herat and not go to work or to school/college, contrary to the original announcement of Zabiullah Mujahid (spokesperson) on 16 August, while he overturned that statement on 24 August, saying women were asked to temporarily stay away.

The Haqqanis, Wardakis and Logari factions are vocal in asking women to work and study as they were doing pre-August 15. The Pashtun factions seem to be at cross-purpose on the subject at a time when jubilation over winning the war should have set aside differences.

The key differences that appear to be emerging are on policy with regard to women, education, narcotics, source of riches and China, despite its vicious violations of the rights of Uyghur Muslims, an anathema to an Islamic Emirate.

The Taliban initially issued statements that women would be part of the new cabinet. Within two days all female TV anchors were sacked and the women who tried to protest were publicly thrashed with belts.

Taliban spokesman Zakirullah Hashmi had to eat crow when he said, “A woman can’t be a minister… It is not necessary for women to be in the cabinet. They should give birth.”

Afghanistan’s history is littered with tales of resistance. Five women stood fearlessly with placards of protest. Their numbers were limited, but they were a symbol of resistance. Newspapers and television channels showed a Talib aiming his gun at a woman who had fearlessly flung aside her burqa’s mesh from her face. Now, Afghan women enjoy tremendous support among social media users.

While those associated with the past regime have been targeted, the Taliban have neither spared children nor women through their heavily armed moral police. Beauty parlours have been shut and billboards and ads with women’s faces have been blackened in the capital city.

When the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, it had imposed an extreme version of Sharia law. While the harsh punishments appealed to some men seeking law and order, it was devastating for women: Schools for girls were closed and women were rarely permitted to leave the house. The group also banned nearly all forms of entertainment, from music and television to sports and kite-flying.

The American invasion brought a new constitution that treated men and women equally. Although women still faced discrimination, life was far better than under Taliban rule, with girls and boys able to attend school together. Many Afghans also got a taste of modern life, with access to the internet, Western films and a popular national cricket team.

While the group is “a very different kind of Taliban” from earlier decades, it remains to be seen if Afghanistan’s new rulers will allow women in government, cooperate with former enemies and respect basic freedoms.

The US and its allies said recognition of any Taliban-led government would depend on the Taliban’s willingness to create an inclusive discussion that includes women and minority groups.

Anti-Taliban Protests

Since seizing Kabul on 15 August, the Taliban presented a more moderate face to the world, saying they wanted peace, would not take revenge against old enemies and would respect the rights of women within the framework of Islamic law.

But flag-waving protesters took to the streets of Kabul and more Afghan cities on August 19 as popular opposition to the Taliban spread. Protests flared up in Jalalabad and a district of Paktia Province and eastern cities and several killed by the Taliban.

US Conditions

The Taliban are consolidating their hold on Kabul by identifying and eliminating those involved with the security set-up of the previous regime while trying to work out a face-saver transitional government in lieu of recognition from the west.

The United States, the European Union and others have cast doubt on such assurances, saying formal recognition of the new government – and the economic aid that would flow from that – is contingent on action.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that Germany was ready to resume a diplomatic presence in Kabul if the Taliban met certain conditions.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said that Paris had yet to see positive signals the group had changed.

The Biden administration had committed to at least $300 million in reconstruction assistance after the US withdrawal to “demonstrate our enduring support for the Afghan people.” And the Afghan people certainly need it. According to a 2019 World Bank study, 75% of the Afghan government budget is funded by international donors, with the US the largest by far.

The good news is that the Biden administration has begun to set out conditions for recognising the Taliban. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the US would recognize and work with a Taliban emirate in Afghanistan if it respected the rights of its citizens and did not harbour terrorists. The US Treasury Department has frozen all Afghan government assets in US banks.

But one never knows with the Biden administration. After all, it is still trying to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and return of frozen assets with another Islamic regime, in Iran, that shows as much respect for human rights — and as much hospitality to international terrorists — as the Taliban.

Pakistan Factor

All these inherent contradictions are confused with Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, which promise to make the formation of a government very difficult, leave alone its continuance. Pakistan is clearly focused on an inclusive government, concerned that the Pashtun versus others sentiment must not emerge, else its original concern, that of an independent Pakhtunistan, will cause it serious bother.

The Taliban today is also not a unified entity. Mullah Baradar is a co-founder of the Taliban and Mullah Omar was his brother-in-law. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) took him into custody in 2010 to punish him for being in direct contact with President Hamid Karzai. Eight years in ISI custody is unlikely to have left him with happy memories. The Doha negotiators constitute the public face but the fighting has been done by local commanders on the ground. The Quetta shura is headed by a cleric, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and two deputies, Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar who has been overseeing military operations in the south, and Sirajuddin Haqqani who heads the Haqqani network, operating in the east.

One of the most interesting parts of the history of modern Afghanistan is that it was the only country which formally objected to the creation of Pakistan when the British left India. It was their contention that the Durand Line, which divided Pashtun tribal areas and incorporated the eastern regions into Pakistan, was merely an artificial line arbitrarily drawn by the British. Pashtuns were the people who lived in the eastern slopes and foothills of the Hindu Kush mountain ranges up to the plains of the Indus. After independence, the Pashtuns dreamt of an independent Pakhtunistan. In the early years of the 21st century, the military of Pakistan sought to crush this dream by killing almost half a million Pashtuns and displacing over three million, all in the name of the myth that religion breeds brotherhood and unity.

Taliban was united only once in its history that is during the leadership of Mullah Omar. Subsequently, it was the ISI of Pakistan that maintained unity among the factions like the Haqqanis, Durranis and others.

There is an intricate relationship between Taliban and Pakistani state with the former having their bases and families in various parts of Pakistan. However, it is a fact that the Taliban don’t recognise the Durand Line, which is one of the existential issues for Pakistan’s Punjabi elite, both in the military as well as political spectrum.

The old headache of relationship between the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban is already bothering the Pakistani governing elite. This is reflected in the recent release of TTP terrorists such as Maulana Faqir Mohammad, who is from Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. He is the former deputy chief of the TTP with reported ties to the al-Qaeda leadership.

Deobandi Extremism Funds Taliban

To understand their governance model, one must look at the Deoband school of Islam which started during 1866, as part of the revivalist movement that was sweeping British India. The Deobandi movement became the most popular school of Islamic thought among Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line. Many prominent Pashtun community leaders established Deobandi seminaries in these areas. In other parts of British India, however, they faced competition from other Islamic schools, primarily Barelvi Islam, the most popular Islamic school in what is now Pakistan’s Punjab province. It was not surprising that during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, Deobandi seminaries on both sides of the Durand Line, as many scholars have pointed out, were the prime target of Saudi funding and influence. Along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries that recognised the Taliban after they assumed power in 1996.

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