China has been taking advantage of huge Indian market to enhance its economic strength in the garb of peace and tranquillity but it has been working quietly and deliberately against the Indian national interests which became obvious in Apr-May 2020 wherein it carried out large scale transgressions in Eastern Ladakh which are still continuing.

The sacrifices by CO and 19-unit personnel during the Galwan clash are a watershed moment for Indian Defence Forces wherein the Chinese have betrayed India ‘once again’. This necessitates that the Indian masses understand the Chinese behavioural pattern as that has not emerged ‘overnight’. It is towards this that the book ‘China Betrays Again’ written by Maj Gen (Dr) Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd) fills this gap to assist the readers to comprehend the multiple dynamics of Chinese expansionist agenda and as to why it behaves the way it behaves.

ALSO READ: China Fuelling An Asian NATO?

The Book also throws light on Galwan clash, multiple rounds of Corps commander level discussions, infrastructure development and implications for India & China due to continuing Stand Off. It also highlights as to how the Chinese have converted the ‘territorial issue’ into a ‘sovereignty issue’ by adopting its Land Boundary Law effective from 1 Jan 2022.

China is also aggressively changing/ bringing in new sovereignty markers by extended infrastructure development and establishment of the model villages all along the LAC which have to be actively responded by India with enhanced focus on the ‘vibrant villages.

The author has taken pains to elaborate the developments in China since 1911 including conflicts between ROC and PRC. The expansionist agenda and its physical manifestation has also been comprehensively covered. This will help in crystal gazing in its future behaviour.

The details of border disputes and LAC disputes have been comprehensively covered in the simplest language for reader to understand. The book also helps to understand the Chinese design of debt trapping in the other countries with specific details of Sri Lanka.

ALSO READ: Fujian – China’s Newest Type 03 Aircraft Carrier

The book also looks at multiple other issues connected with China whether it is BRI or CPEC. Chinese collusivity with Pakistan and its impact on the resolution of the Siachen glacier has also been comprehensively covered.

The reader will be able to get a clear sense of the Chinese activities in South China Sea as well as East China Sea besides its efforts to affect the freedom of navigation for the other countries. Its ambitions to integrate Taiwan have also been covered in detail.        

Prof Hoppymon Jacob has written the ‘Foreword’ of the book which comprehensively captures the essence of the content. The book has been published by ‘Sabre and Quill’ publishers containing 283 pages with cost of Rs 1295/- for hardcover edition. The book is available at Amazon, Sabre & Quill publishers and Book Mart distributors. Author signed copies can be obtained directly from the author.

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On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

Disengagement at Pp15

In the Chang Chenmo sector, where the LAC and the 1959 Claim Line coincide, there were no areas of differing perception as such. This sector is the gateway to the three southern approaches that lead to Aksai Chin. One approach to the east leads to Lanak La, through which the Tibet-Xinjiang highway passes. Two approaches are to the north via the Changlung Nala – PP17A and Kugrang River – PP15, which lead to the upper reaches of the Galwan River.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has its main post at Karam Singh Hill at the junction of Kugrang and Chang Chenmo rivers and an outpost at Gogra. PPs 15, 16 and 17A were patrolled but not physically held. Alarmed at the rapid development of roads by India to PP15, PP17A and towards Kongka La, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded 3 to 4 km across the LAC between PPs 15 and 16 and PPs 17A and 17.

These intrusions were contested by Indian forces and a stalemate ensued. During negotiations, the Chinese gave a new version of the 1959 Claim Line up to their intrusions, running along the middle as opposed to the well-established LAC, which runs along the crest of the ridge to the north of the Kugrang River.

Disengagement with respect to the Changlung Nala intrusion took place between 4-5 August 2021, after the 12th round of military talks on 31 July.  However, China refused to budge on the intrusion between PPs 15 and 16. It insisted on a buffer zone of 30-35 km along the entire length of the Kugrang River up to Karam Singh Hill. This proposal was also mooted during Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi earlier in March 2022.

PLA enjoyed the terrain advantage in both the intrusion areas in this sector. Due to terrain configuration, the Chanchenmo sector, dependent on a tenuous 100 km long road from Lukung which can be cut off at several places, is untenable in war unless disproportionate forces are deployed.

Depsang and Demchok Next

India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

Negotiations for disengagement in Depsang Plains and Demchok will be arduous and prolonged.

Comments

Considering that it took nine years to restore the status quo post the Sumdorong Chu confrontation of 1986-87 which began during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure and ended under the Narasimha Rao government, it is clear that border negotiations with China are a long and arduous process.

The withdrawal of soldiers and dismantling of temporary infrastructure took place less than two months after the two sides took part in the 16th round of high-level military talks. India’s insistence on a sustained dialogue to thrash out issues and settle differences has borne fruit.

The India-China standoff has been continuing since May 2020; its impact on bilateral ties cannot be overestimated. The situation reached a flashpoint in June 2020 when rival troops were involved in a bloody clash in the Galwan valley. Since then, an uneasy calm has prevailed in Ladakh, with India trying to keep pace with China in terms of troop build-up, round-the-clock surveillance and raising of infrastructure.

Even as the PP-15 breakthrough is welcome, the Indian defence forces cannot rule out the possibility of another misadventure by the People’s Liberation Army. Indian troops have to remain on their toes to ensure that peace and tranquillity are maintained on a long-term basis along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Now that PP-15 has been successfully dealt with, the next logical step should be to resolve the stalemate in Demchok and Depsang regions. Doing the needful will prepare the ground for talks on the long-festering boundary dispute. It is imperative to clearly delineate and demarcate the nearly 3,500-km LAC by mutual consent and establish it as permanent international border so as to preclude future imbroglios. New Delhi has been asserting that normalcy in bilateral relations is not possible unless sincere efforts are made to ensure a friction-free border.

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“Both sides have completed disengagement at PP15 in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of the troops of both sides to their respective areas,” one defence source said. Verification was carried out to ensure compliance including aerial surveillance, another source added.

However, details and modalities of the disengagement were not available. In the past, buffer zones were created at the friction points as per the understanding at the Corps Commanders level with no patrolling to be undertaken by either side till overall disengagement and de-escalation is achieved, after which the two sides are to work out new patrolling norms.

On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

However, while India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

As reported earlier, since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC. As reported by The Hindu, according to senior officials, Indian Army last accessed the PPs in Depsang in January/February 2020.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

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These tanks will be used to counter Chinese deployment of a large number of similar armoured columns along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Sources in the defence and security establishment told ThePrint that the Army has finalised the general staff quality requirements and will approach the defence ministry in September for the Acceptance of Necessity (AON) — the first step that will set the project rolling.

The Army is looking at a light tank with a maximum weight of 25 tons — with a margin of 10 per cent— with the same firepower as its regular tanks, but also armed with Artificial Intelligence (AI), integration of tactical surveillance drones to provide a high degree of situational awareness and loitering munition, along with an active protection system.

An active protection system is designed to protect vehicles from anti-tank guided missiles and projectiles away from combat vehicles.  

The Army also wants the light tank to be amphibious, so it can be deployed across riverine regions and even the Pangong Tso lake in Eastern Ladakh.

The project has been named ‘Zorawar’ after Zorawar Singh Kahluria — a military general who served under Jammu’s Raja Gulab Singh —known as the ‘conquerer of Ladakh’.  

“We will approach the defence ministry for AON as early as next month. This would be an indigenous project which will be designed and manufactured in India. We hope to have the production of a prototype and beginning of trials in three years from the sanction of the project,” a source said. 

Sources further said that the proposed conversion of the Vajra-tracked self-propelled artillery into a light tank has been shelved because it won’t be able to meet the weight criteria that the Army is looking for. 

They added that the 25-ton weight is the maximum that can allow for the tanks to be airlifted in high-altitude zones.

China’s light tank deployment gave them an advantage

Sources said that the Ladakh stand-off with China has shown that armoured columns are one of the most prominent factors in defining the operational capability of the land forces. 

Army sources admitted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had inducted a large number of technologically modern, “state of art” tanks, which were being employed operationally as a mix of medium and light tanks with high power-to-weight ratios. 

The increased threat on the northern borders is likely to remain a threat in the foreseeable future, sources further said, adding that while the Army had also deployed its T-90 and T-72 tanks — surprising the Chinese — lighter tanks would mean faster deployment and increased mobility in mountainous terrain.

The Army currently operates three different types of tanks with the latest being the Arjun Mk 1A, which weighs a massive 68.5 tons. The T-90 weighs about 46 tons and the T-72 about 45 tons.

“Tanks were primarily designed for operations in plains and desert terrain and have their own limitations when employed in High-Altitude Areas (HAAs). They face a similar handicap when employed in the marginal terrain of the Rann of Kutch,” another source told ThePrint.

“It is, therefore, an operational necessity to procure light tanks to overcome the limitations faced by medium battle tanks and equip the Indian Army for all contingencies in HAA, marginal terrain and island territories, besides its utilisation in the plains, semi-deserts, and deserts,” the source added.

Sources explained that the setbackthat the world supply chain has experienced in defence-related component supplies because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has impacted both manufacturing and sustenance of the foreign fleet of tanks that India is currently holding. 

It’s therefore essential to design and develop the light tank indigenously for the Indian Army, they added.

The sources made it clear that India will not be going in for the Russian Sprut light tanks, but added that they are looking for something with similar capabilities. 

The Modi government had in March this year given in-principle approval for the indigenous design and development of light tanks for mountain warfare. 

This move sealed the prospect of possible induction of the Sprut tanks that the Russians had offered to India during Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s Russia visit in 2020. 

Past history of Indian light tank deployment 

The Army has in the past successfully employed light tanks as force multipliers in multiple battle engagements in the past. 

This includes the deployment of Stuart tanks of the 254 Indian Tank Brigade in the Battle of Kohima in World War II, at Naushera, Jhangar, Rajauri, and most successfully, at Zojila in the Indo-Pak War 1947-48.

The AMX-13 tanks were deployed at Chushul and Bomdila in 1962 and in Chammb in 1965.

The amphibious PT-76 light tanks were deployed successfully in 1971, with the tanks leading the race to Dacca. 

The AMX-13 and PT-76 tanks were phased out in the 1980s after the focus of the Army shifted primarily to the western borders, resulting in the conversion of PT-76 units to the T-72 profile. 

The requirement of a light tank capability, which had proved in the past to be a battle-winning factor for the Indian Army in mountainous and riverine terrain, had been voiced on numerous occasions since 1982, sources said.

“Current threat scenario and the contours of the likely future wars have thrown up new challenges for which the Indian Army has to be prepared. The equipment profile of tanks in the Indian Army must have the versatility and flexibility of medium and light platforms,” a third source said.

Sources said that a lightweight agile platform with a high power-to-weight ratio with substantial firepower, protection, surveillance, and communication capabilities is essential to provide the Army the versatility to execute operations in varying terrain against diverse threats and equipment profiles of adversaries. 

“Armoured Fighting Vehicle-Indian Light Tank (AFV-ILT) offering capability for multiple employment options along with niche technologies is, therefore, an operational imperative,” one of the sources cited above said.  

(Edited by Uttara Ramaswamy)

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The provocation efforts by the Chinese side are being continued despite the matter being raised at the Corps Commander level talks.

Chinese aircraft have been regularly flying close to the LAC over the past three to four weeks, which is being seen as an effort to check Indian defence mechanisms in the region.

Indian Air Force (IAF) is responding to the situation responsibly and is not taking any chances to tackle the threat as well as not letting the matter escalate in any way.

As per the sources, the IAF has taken strong measures to respond to these provocations as it has moved its most powerful fighter jets, including the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000, to advanced bases from where they can respond to Chinese movements within minutes.

It seems that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is tense over the upgradation of IAF infrastructure in the Ladakh region, they added.

Sources further said that the IAF is responding to these actions in a “calibrated manner” and is also monitoring Chinese flight patterns in the area where they are flying at both low and high altitudes.

India is working at a brisk pace to upgrade its military infrastructure in Ladakh after China tried to unilaterally change the status quo on the LAC in the April-May 2020 time frame.

The provocation by Chinese fighter jets began around June 24-25 when a Chinese fighter jet flew very close to a point of friction in eastern Ladakh.

After that, there were several CBM violations between the two sides on the LAC near Chumar sector and this has been going on since then, they asserted, adding that the IAF, including its Rafale fighter jets, is also doing extensive flying in the eastern Ladakh region.

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The G695 national expressway will be only the second national highway through the disputed Aksai Chin region, where China controls 38,000 sq km of land claimed by India, since the controversial construction of the G219 highway in the 1950s, and is expected to be completed by 2035.

The new highway, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on Wednesday, will run even closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than G219 and is likely to broadly run along the course of G219 from Mazha in Xinjiang in the north, through Aksai Chin, which is currently administered under the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, heading south along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan, and down to Lhunze in southeastern Tibet right across the border from Arunachal Pradesh.

While a map of the proposed highway has not been released, the route described by the report will mean the highway will likely cut across Aksai Chin. Its course will bring it close to several disputed areas that have seen recent tensions, the Post reported, from Eastern Ladakh down to near Doklam close to the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. “Details of the new construction remain unclear, but the highway, when completed, may also go near hotly contested areas such as the Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the LAC,” the report said.

The plan for G695 follows long-held discussions to build another border highway to supplement G219 and act as another key artery that could help China mobilise resources rapidly towards border areas. China has also stepped up the construction of secondary highways at the provincial level that will connect the national highways to remote border areas.

This week, Beijing unveiled a new national road network plan that aims to build 4,61,000 km of roads — including 1,62,000 km of national expressways and 2,99,000 km of provincial highways — by 2035. Under the plan, the official China News Service reported, all cities with a 1 lakh population will be connected to a national highway in 30 minutes.

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The talks took place at the Chushul-Moldo meeting point, on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The meet concluded at 10.30 pm after 13 hours.

Major focus of the talks was on disengagement in the Hot Springs area. The Indian side was expected to press for disengagement as soon as possible in all the remaining friction points, including resolution of issues in Depsang Bulge and Demchok.

In pure diplomatic language, the talks were constructive without any positive outcome and reaching mutually acceptable solutions is work in progress. This means both the Indian Army and the PLA commanders will continue to engage in future but there is no guarantee on whether the PLA will restore April 2020 status quo ante in Gogra-Hot Springs or resolve the Depsang Bulge or CNJ issue.

Fact is that the PLA with new border law and rapid military and technological upgradation on their side of the unresolved LAC is converting the 3,488 km line into Line of Control.

MoD statement

A statement issued by the Ministry of Defence on Thursday evening said representatives from the defence and foreign affairs establishments of the two sides were present at the meeting. “They agreed that both sides should follow the guidance provided by the state leaders and work for the resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.”

The statements issued by both sides were not as blunt and sharp as those issued after the 13th round of talks on October 10, 2021, when they blamed each other for the failure of the talks.

This time, the statement said: “The two sides have agreed to stay in close contact and maintain dialogue via military and diplomatic channels and work out a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.” It also spoke about agreeing to hold the next round of the commanders’ talks at the earliest. Since June 2020, there have been 14 rounds of talks. Though there has been partial success, troop build-up on either side, for now, shows no signs of getting back to the pre-April 2020 levels. At the talks yesterday, India and China agreed that the two sides would consolidate the “previous outcomes” and take effective efforts to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the western sector.

The “previous outcomes” mentioned in the statement referred to the disengagement at PP-17, PP-17A, and north and south banks of the Pangong Tso, a 135-km glacial lake. India shares 832-km LAC with China in the eastern Ladakh sector.

Rise in Tensions

With the corps commander-level talks doing little to ease tensions, the confrontation could likely get worse at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, and that Beijing may not continue with the regular lines of communication.

While India didn’t expect movement on the disengagement plans, owing to China’s recent actions to deploy more troops at the LAC, the commentary from Beijing this time that India had made “unreasonable demands” has prompted strategic sources in New Delhi to believe that this could lead to a ‘Galwan-like’ flare-up.

The sticky issues

While disengagement has taken place in the Pangong Tso area and at the Gogra Post, a stand-off continues over Patrolling Point 15 (PP15) in Hot Springs, the Depsang Plains and in the Demchok area.

India and China have six to seven hotlines but there has been little progress in the talks. A larger plan to resolve the issue with the establishment of a hotline at the DGMO level remains unfulfilled.

The Indian side clearly failed to persuade the PLA towards disengagement from Gogra-Hot Springs near Kongka La as well as resolving patrolling rights issues in Depsang Bulge in Daulet Beg Oldi sector and Charding Nullah Junction in Demchok sector.

The Indian Army apparently raised the issue of PLA building a bridge over Pangong Tso, east of Srijap Complex, for faster troop deployment and rapid militarisation of the occupied Aksai Chin area by the Chinese Army all along the 597-km Ladakh LAC.

There would be no immediate disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point (PP)-15, also known as Hot Springs. Resultantly, Indian forces would stick to their locations and positions at the LAC. Weapons, equipment, tanks, artillery guns and other high technology surveillance systems would also be around. Both sides have some 75,000 troops in the sector.

13th Round

The 13th round of talks had taken place on October 10, 2021 and they ended in a stalemate. Both sides had failed to make any headway in the talks with the Indian Army saying after the dialogue that the “constructive suggestions” made by it were neither agreeable to the Chinese side nor it could provide any “forward-looking” proposals.

In their virtual diplomatic talks on November 18, India and China agreed to hold the 14th round of military talks at an early date to achieve the objective of complete disengagement in remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh.

Continued Stand-off

Both the Indian and PLA armies are locked in a stand-off all along Ladakh LAC since the Chinese Army under instructions from the Central Military Commission under President Xi Jinping decided to unilaterally change the LAC and impose the rejected 1959 cartographical line on the Ladakh LAC in May 2020. Since then the two sides are fully deployed with more than three divisions of troops on each side with missile, rocket, artillery and tank regiments apart from the Air Force being on standby in the hinterland. The PLA by transgressing in Pangong Tso, Galwan, Gogra-Hot Springs area in May 2020 broke the bilateral 1993 and 1996 peace and tranquility agreements signed at the level of heads of states.

Both sides gradually enhanced their deployment by rushing in tens of thousands of soldiers as well as heavy weaponry.

As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year in the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the sensitive sector.

Ever since the LAC stand-off began in April-May 2020, both sides have mainly followed a three-tier approach — regular talks at the diplomatic and military levels, along with a dialogue track between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi.

To top all of this, talks were also held between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi. It was Doval and Yang who agreed to a disengagement plan in 2020.

This time the talks failed as the Chinese have replaced Gen. Xu Qiling, who was promoted in July, with Gen. Wang Haijiang, and that as a result a “comfort level” had not been achieved. 

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Chinese and Indian troops on the northern and southern shores of Pangong Tso began “synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between Corps Commanders when they met on January 24.

According to the disengagement agreement, announced by the two countries, Chinese troops will move back to Finger 8 and Indian troops will pull back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post between Finger 2 and 3 of the northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake. Further, there would be a temporary moratorium on military activities, including patrolling to the traditional areas.

Defence Minister’s Statement

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 11 February, about the “present situation in eastern Ladakh.” A statement was issued by the Chinese Defence Ministry a day before.

He said “I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the north and south bank of the Pangong Lake.”

As per the agreement, both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner in these areas, he said.

The defence minister assured the House that India has not conceded anything while entering into the disengagement process, adding there are “some outstanding issues” with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in eastern Ladakh.

Giving details of the pact, the Minister said, “The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8. Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3,” he said.

“A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both north and south bank area will be removed,” Singh said.

He also informed the Elders that for the time being patrolling by both the armies in that area will not take place till the outstanding issues were addressed in the future military and diplomatic level parley.

“These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas,” the defence minister said.

Based on this agreement action started from 10 February, he said, on the north and south bank. “It is expected that this will restore the situation to before the standoff of last year,” Singh said. Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed. Singh also mentioned that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

•             LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.

•             Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.

•             All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”.

Chinese Statement

Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, had said in a written statement on Wednesday: “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10.”

“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the Chinese statement said.

Importance of the Region

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

Further, it was on the south bank of the lake that Indian forces had gained strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, in an action in late August 2020, outwitting the Chinese. Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier. Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap, which is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector. However, India had been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.

The PLA has vacated the features of Helmet and Black Top, South of Pangong Tso Lake, while the Indian Army has come down from the dominating features of Point 5167, Bump and Magar Hill that India seized at the beginning of August.

The disengagement agreement covers only the Pangong Tso Lake sector in Central Ladakh, but makes no mention of Depsang sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Northern Ladakh, where PLA troops have crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and established themselves 15-18 kilometres inside territory that India has always claimed and patrolled. Since April, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from accessing Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13 on the LAC.

The Indian Army regards Depsang as a critical sector, since controlling this would provide the PLA with a springboard to capture DBO, cut off India from the Karakoram Pass, and progress operations towards India’s vital Siachen Glacier sector.

While the start of disengagement involves the troops in contact on the front lines in Ladakh, there remain close to 100,000 troops from the PLA and the Indian Army that were deployed behind the front lines as reserves in case fighting broke out. It is likely that these would only be withdrawn after successful disengagement by the troops in contact.

Verification of Disengagement

The Indian Army used drones and high-resolution cameras to check and record dismantling of the Chinese infrastructure at the Pangong Tso Lake in Eastern Ladakh as part of the agreement for disengagement. The process at both northern and southern banks of the lake was completed by 20 February.

China had created a military garrison at Finger 7 where 13 jetties were stationed, long range guns were positioned, bunkers were constructed and permanent structures built to accommodate thousands of troops.

Field commanders of both sides met almost on a daily basis to take forward the disengagement process.

Lessons Learnt

India’s intelligence agencies and Armed Forces must remain geared for any adverse development and keep plans ready to prevent China from surprising us, be it occupation of any strategic feature along our Northern borders extending from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh or a repeat of a Galwan like situation proactively.

Back in July 1962, ‘partial’ withdrawal of Chinese troops from Ladakh was a treachery. Barely three months later, China invaded Indian territory.

Restoration of status quo ante on LAC will not only add to Indian Army and Modi government’s military credibility but also persuade President Xi Jinping to restrain his Western Theatre Commander to undertake any military misadventure in future.

China will continue to follow the strategy of engaging the Indian forces on the northern borders in controlled standoffs to create a major dilemma for a possible two-front confrontation and distribution of resources between land and maritime borders.

The Chinese would prefer to keep India engaged in small wars and engagements hampering India’s ambition of rising to the level of a world power from the regional power.

China may also employ hybrid warfare techniques to create internal turbulence in India. It may target India’s ethnic, regional and religious diversity. India must prepare itself against grey zone warfare.

India must continually exercise full strategic autonomy based upon its identified interests and diversify its partnerships while keeping China engaged.

The military has to be modernized through self-reliance and India’s economy has to rise to higher levels of growth.

National and political unity is required to neutralise the Chinese threat, strengthening hard and soft power, internal stability, mature politics, and national resolve.

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The sudden and very significant break-through in this period has been the successful disengagement talks between India and China over the Pangong lake North and South banks. Disengagement started 10 February and was completed by 20th at surprising speed. The eagerness with which the PLA executed the rearward movement could be indicative of two things. First, the PLA has had a very tough time in the Ladakh winter and was keen to pull back troops. The second is, given that India had gained a significant tactical advantage South of the Pangong Tso – China was in a hurry to clinch what it clearly felt was a favourable deal. In fact, there were considerable misgivings that India had given away its strongest bargaining chip very early on in the talks. Indeed, India had gained a significant military advantage by securing the Kailash Range heights of Rezang-La – Rechin La in end-Aug 2020, which enabled us to dominate the Chinese Moldo garrison and the traditional invasion route to Ladakh via the Spangur Gap. The tactical advantages of the South bank far out-weighed those the Chinese army had gained in the north bank. So what was critical was – what would happen next in the other friction points in Depsang, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and Hot springs area? As expected, the Chinese seem to have dug in their heels there. Initial talks about these have been inconclusive.

It is now time to take stock. What were the Chinese motivations for the sudden and large scale incursions in Eastern Ladakh last year? One surmise is that the Chinese were genuinely perturbed over Indian assertiveness in Jammu & Kashmir as demonstrated by the cross-border air-strike at Balakote, the abrogation of Article 370 and trifurcation of J&K. They had to view this also in relation to India’s major push for long over-due infrastructure development in Eastern Ladakh. This, they felt, posed a threat to their Aksai Chin road as also their China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In my view, this major military coercive exercise was designed to primarily reassure Pakistan that it was not alone and China would definitely step in to aid that beleaguered ally against an increasingly assertive India. The express purpose was to encourage Pakistan to resume its asymmetric warfare in J&K & Punjab. So, this was a large scale coercive deployment exercise designed to brow-beat India and cow it down without a shot being fired.

If so, it largely fail to achieve its purpose. Though India was initially taken by surprise due to the Covid backdrop, it reacted strongly. To begin with, it carried out a rapid counter-mobilization and soon mirror imaged the Chinese deployment. It matched the PLA tank for tank, soldier for soldier and gun for gun. The Air Force also responded aggressively. In fact, India went for emergency induction of some 30 MiG-29 and Su-30 fighters and speeded up induction of Rafales and S-400 SAM systems. India was ready for a fight if China wanted one. Then came the high-profile Galwan clash in June 2020, where China used lethal force and some 20 Indian soldiers were martyred. Though no firearms were used, it was a major incident that trash-canned all the peace & tranquility accords from 1993 onwards and completely destroyed mutual trust between the two countries. The nation was outraged. Our boys had counted some 65 Chinese soldiers being carried away on stretchers. It was difficult to ascertain how many were fatal cases.

India enhanced its build-up and in end-Aug last year undertook a surprise, pre-emptive manoeuvre to occupy the Rezang La – Rechin La Ridge directly overlooking the Chinese Moldo garrison. This was a brilliant move that unhinged the Chinese. They were stupefied and rushed up tanks in a bid to sweep off the Indians. They were surprised to see Indian T-90 tanks there and a major face-off ensued – which has only been resolved now.

So what has made the Chinese blink? Their initial calculations of a low cost operation to coerce India seem to have gone awry. India refused to cow down and counter-mobilized. The situation escalated and soon became a stalemate with advantage – India.

Chinese strategic thinking lays emphasis on just one main strategic direction at a given point of time. Right now this is focused on Taiwan-South China Sea and the east coast of China. China clearly is not in a mood to open another major front on its western flank in Xinjiang. It defies common sense and all strategic logic. Hence, its quest for a face-saving pull-back from a futile coercive deployment that singularly failed to coerce India. Not surprisingly, Pakistan has also sought de-escalation on the Line of Control.

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“Delivery would commence from May 2021,” the Army tweeted.

Official sources said the boats are being procured for surveillance of Pangong lake as well as other water bodies in mountainous areas.

In a statement, Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) said it signed a contract with the Indian Army for supply of the ‘high performance specialised patrol crafts’ on Thursday and that they will be fitted with specialised equipment to meet the requirement of the force.
“These craft will be constructed at GSL, Goa and will be only few crafts in the world for such specialized operations,” it said in a brief statement.

Nearly 50,000 Indian Army troops are deployed in a high state of combat readiness in various mountainous locations in eastern Ladakh in sub-zero temperatures as multiple rounds of talks between the two sides have not yielded concrete outcome to resolve the standoff.

China has also deployed an equal number of troops, according to officials.

The eighth and last round of military talks had taken place on November 6 during which both sides broadly discussed disengagement of troops from specific friction points.

Around three-and-half months back, Indian troops occupied a number of strategic heights in the Mukhpari, Rechin La and Magar hill areas around the southern bank of the Pangong lake after the Chinese military attempted to intimidate them in the area on the intervening night of August 29 and 30.

The Pangong lake and areas around it are considered very important. India has stepped up surveillance of the lake after the standoff began in early May.

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