A wide range of niche technologies are being inducted to enhance long range precision attack capabilities. Loitering munitions in land and sea-based versions are being inducted to enhance the targeting capabilities. Additionally, containerised missile systems are being inducted to enhance the operational capability and to augment flexibility in operations.

The Navy has transformed from a ‘Buyers Navy’ into a ‘Builders Navy’, with aircraft carrier, destroyers, stealth frigates, corvettes, submarines and other war vessels being constructed in our country. Today, of the 66 ships under construction 64 are being built in India. Further, approvals have been given for 24 ships and submarines that are all planned to be constructed in Indian Shipyards. At present, IN has achieved approximately 90% indigenisation in the float segment, 60% in the move segment, and 50% in the fight segment. Indian Navy is committed to becoming a fully Aatmanirbhar Navy by 2047.

A number of ships and submarines have been commissioned in 2023.

INS Vagir, fifth Submarine of Kalvari class, was commissioned on January 23, 2023.

INS Tarmugli returned by the Govt of Maldives was re-commissioned after refit on December 14, 2023.

INS Imphal, the third stealth ship of Project-15B was commissioned on 26 December 2023.

Sandhayak (Yard 3025), the first of the four Survey Vessel (Large) ships was delivered to Indian Navy by GRSE on December 4, 2023.

The third GRSE ship of Project P17A Frigates, Vindhyagiri (Yard 3024), was launched on Aug 17, 2023 at GRSE.

The fourth ship of Survey Vessel Large, i.e. Sanshodhak (Yard 3028) was launched on June 13, 2023 at L&T Shipyard.

Two ASW Shallow Water Craft (ASW SWC) namely Androth (Yard 3035) and Anjadip (Yard 3030) were launched on March 21 and June 13, 2023 respectively at GRSE.

Three more ASW SWC namely Mahe (Yard 523), Malvan (Yard 524) and Magrol (Yard 525) were concurrently launched on November 30, 2023 at CSL, Kochi.

The last of the seven P17A ships, i.e. Mahendragiri (Yard 12654) was launched on September 1, 2023 at MDL, Mumbai.

1st Diving Support Craft A-20 (Yard-325) was launched on August 31, 2023 at Titagarh Rail Systems Ltd, Kolkata.

INS Vikrant completed Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) on May 31, 2023. With the IOC, the ship has proven the Aviation Facilities Complex, achieved day and night landing of MiG-29K, completed landing trials of all helicopters in the Naval inventory.

Atmanirbharta in Defence is having a profound affect on the operational efficiency of the Indian Navy. During 2023 alone, a number of approvals were given by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). These included:

Medium-Range Anti-Ship Missiles for surface platforms in November 2023.

Next Generation Survey Vessels and avionic upgradation of Dornier aircraft in September 2023.

26 Rafale-Marine aircraft along with associated ancillary equipment, weapons, simulator, spares, documentation, crew training and logistic support in July 2023.

15 MQ-9B Sea Guardian High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAs) in June 2023.

Ship-launched BrahMos missiles and Utility Helicopters-Maritime in March 2023

Brahmos Launcher and Fire Control System for the Shivalik class of ships and Next Generation Missile Vessels in January 2023.

The Ministry of Defence signed contracts with a number of companies to strengthen the capabilities of the Indian Navy. Among them were:

13 Lynx-U2 Fire Control Systems from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL).

Three Cadet Training Ships from Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T).

11 Next Generation Offshore Patrol Vessels and six Next Generation Missile Vessels from different Indian shipyards.

Five Fleet Support Ships (FSS) from Hindustan Shipyard Limited.

16 Upgraded Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM) anti-missile/anti-aircraft point defence weapon system from Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited.

Medium Refit with Life Certification of Sub-Surface Killer Class of Submarine ‘INS Shankush’ with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders.

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Status Quo Continuation. The status quo might persist due to the potential risks and consequences associated with a military conflict. Economic interdependence, global diplomatic pressure, and the uncertainty of the outcome could act as deterrents.

Incremental Escalation. Possibility exists of a gradual increase in tensions or provocative actions, such as military exercises, to test international responses. This incremental approach could allow China to assert influence over Taiwan without a full-scale invasion.

Diplomatic Solution. There is little chance of a diplomatic resolution to the Taiwan issue. International mediation and negotiations could potentially address the concerns of both sides and prevent a military conflict. Diplomatic efforts would likely involve key stakeholders such as the United States and other regional powers.

Military Invasion. While significant risks are involved, shifts in China’s internal politics, nationalist sentiments, or perceived threats to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy could contribute to a more aggressive stance.

All of the conditions that China may consider for undertaking the military invasion of Taiwan are developing fast:

Strategic Calculations. China may consider the global strategic environment and assess whether geopolitical dynamics, regional power balances, or the perceived interests of major powers might provide an opportune moment for an invasion. Changes in the global balance of power could influence China’s calculations.

Internal Stability and Nationalism. While the internal political environment in China is not really stable, if the Chinese government faces domestic challenges, it might use nationalism as a unifying force.

Perceived Weakness of the International Community. China may assess the willingness and capacity of the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, to respond effectively to a military intervention. A perception of disunity, indecision, or reluctance among key players could potentially embolden China.

Economic and Technological Advancements. China’s economic and technological advancements have contributed to its military capabilities, impacting its confidence in successfully executing a military campaign. Advances in areas such as cyber capabilities, space technology, and naval power are important factors.

Information Warfare and Perception Management. China is in a position to employ information warfare and strategic communication to shape international perceptions, control the narrative, and justify its actions.

We at IMR consider that the time is opportune for China to undertake military action and seek the reunification of Taiwan, in that the conditions today can minimize opposition, maximize the chances of success, and reduce the potential risks.

The war in Ukraine and Gaza, couple with developments in the Middle East, are significant global distractions that have diverted the attention of major powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and reduced their capacity or willingness to respond promptly to a Taiwan crisis.

As of September 2023, nearly half of Taiwanese say they prefer independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% seek a continuation of the status quo. 11.8% say they hope for future reunification.

China perceives U.S. power has declined and it is less committed to its security commitments in the region.

We have conjured up a scenario of the invasion of Taiwan in 2024 and how it unfolds is covered in this issue.

The post EDITORIAL – Conditions for the Invasion of Taiwan appeared first on IMR.

Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine had 2,50,000 men in arms to start with. Later it mobilised fully to field about 5,50,000 men. Given that most of the fighting was in heavily built-up areas, the force ratios were badly skewed to start with. Despite this, it was amazing that the Russian forces encircled Kiev, secured almost 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donetsk provinces and secured a land corridor to Crimea. They captured all Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Odessa was the only port left with Ukraine. Having met most of his minimal objectives, Putin started peace negotiations mediated by Turkiye. As a goodwill gesture he withdrew his forces from Kiev. The western media painted this as a rout of Russian forces. The Russian force was overstretched and exhausted after six months of fighting. By Jul-Aug 2022 the Ukrainians launched a much-heralded counter offensive in Kherson. The Russians had to pull out troops from Kharkiev to face this attack. The US satellites saw this gap. Americans encouraged Ukrainians to attack here even as Russian forces were withdrawing to the line of the Orkill river. On paper, this Ukrainian offensive looked like a brilliant Blitzkrieg and as it hit thin air and made rapid progress.

There was an outcry in Russia. Sergei Markov, and other pro-war Russians exhorted Putin to stop this strange phoney war (semi- war) in Ukraine and start a real war that Russia could win easily. Putin was forced to mobilise 3,00,000 reservists. The Syrian war combat vet, Gen Suvorvikin began construction of the three-tiered defence line using Russian construction companies. This 1200 km long Maginot line had deep minefields, anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth. Russia had realised that given the present state of technology, the advantage was clearly with the defender.

Operations in 2023

Meanwhile, the US and Nato helped create 9 new Ukrainian brigades equipped with a mish-mash of Leopard and Challenger tanks along with Bradley ICVs and Strykers. These were brand new formations and not combat-hardened troops. Ukrainians raised their 9th and 10th Strike Corps for the much-advertised counter-offensive in which they claimed they would throw Russians out of all captured territories. This Spring counter-offensive was finally launched on 4 June 2023. The attacks came in Zaporizhzhi and Bakhmut sectors.

There was strong difference of opinion between the Americans and Ukrainians about this splitting of forces. The Russian plan was based upon the Kursk battle of 1943, when the Russians had let the German Panzers attack first, inflicted heavy casualties with artillery and combat aviation and then switched to a major counter-offensive. The Russians had manned their first line with Spetsnaz troops, ATGMs and drones, who could vector down airstrikes and artillery fires. The Ukrainian attacks were led by mine-clearing trawl tanks and ploughs. This caused the attacking columns to bunch up and take heavy casualties. The Russians used their Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with the 7-10 km range Vykhir anti-tank missiles to destroy the Leopard and Challenger tanks from stand-off ranges. Su-24 ground attack aircraft and Russian artillery took a very heavy toll of attacking formations. Remotely delivered mines rapidly closed minefield safe-lanes behind trawl tanks. Most attacks could not make it even to the first Russian defence line.

By end-Jun, the Ukrainian offensive by their 9 Strike Corps had ended in a fiasco. There was great deal of recrimination between the Americans and Ukrainian generals. The Americans called the Ukrainians “casualty averse”. They berated them for frittering effort away in Bakhmut. When the Ukrainians resisted, the Americans forced Zelenskyy to sack his defence minister Reznikov and most top officials in the ministry. Investigations were launched into corruption scandals. Finally, in Aug, the Ukrainians resumed the offensive in Zaporizhzhia with their fresh 10 Corps. Under US pressure, they moved out some troops from Bakhmut, to this sector. They claimed to have breached the first defence line in Robotinye. The Russians also pulled out formations from their own Kupiansk counter-attack to plug this breach. Heavy losses were inflicted by Russian combat aviation, artillery and drones. Soon, this second corps-sized offensive also petered out with heavy losses. The new innovation was heavy Ukrainian investment in counter-battery (CB) fires to supress Russian artillery.

To draw media attention away from the glaring failure of the Ukrainian ground offensive, the Americans put pressure on the Ukrainians to mount major air attacks on the ports in Crimea and HQ of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet using Storm Shadow and Spice (French) cruise stand-off attack missiles. One Kilo-class submarine and a landing ship were damaged. Ukraine also mounted drone attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. Though tactical damage was minimal, the psy ops value of these attacks was considerable and served to distract attention from the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, Russia has conscripted some 2,70,000 additional troops and is readying for its major counter-offensive. Generals in Moscow have been urging Putin to expedite this offensive so as to seize and retain the initiative. So far, there are no clear indications of when this would materialise. This will, in all probability, be a winter offensive as the current campaign season is drawing to a close. Meanwhile, Russian retaliatory attacks on Kiev, Odessa and other cities have started to target the power grid, so Ukraine will have a miserable winter ahead. This battle will certainly stretch to 2024. However, the US NATO strategy of a long war to exhaust Russia may backfire. Already NATO members like Poland are feeling the fatigue and US funding has been halted temporarily.

The post EDITORIAL—The Ukraine War in 2023 appeared first on IMR.

 For the world, the prime lesson of this war is the paradigm shift between the power of Defence over Offense. With satellite surveillance and drones, surprise is virtually impossible to achieve. Modern technology has made attacks prohibitively costly. It was this that had deterred China so far.

Russia was attacking across land. China would have to mount a prohibitively costly amphibious assault over 80 miles of sea. Politically and militarily, it would be a very high-risk venture with inordinately high chances of failure and fiasco. China’s habitually cautious political and military leadership baulked at taking such risks. There was an air of triumphalism in America then. They completely believed their own propaganda that they had beaten Russia hollow. The Americans went out of their way to rub China’s nose in the dirt. China was taunted with a series of high-profile political visits to Taiwan. There was a reckless air of hubris in Washington that it could take on Russia and China simultaneously and beat the hell out of both of them. The reality check came in June-July 2023, when the long advertised Ukrainian counter-offensive stalled badly on solid Russian defence lines. This seems to have engendered a sobering rethink in Washington and a number of senior officials (including the legendary Henry Kissinger) were sent to placate a humiliated and infuriated China. With its shrill and strident rhetoric of the last few decades, no Chinese leadership can afford to be seen as backing down on Taiwan. The more they wait, the stronger will Taiwan’s defences become. It’s a Hobson’s choice.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military also seems to have seen through the shrill Western propaganda on Ukraine. Xi Jiniping has been exhorting his commanders to speed up their preparations and avoid any more humiliations. Intelligence of this hardened Chinese stance and, perhaps, a speeded up timeline for Taiwan, has possibly induced Washington to hold out an olive branch. It is one thing to talk glibly of a two-front war. It is quite another to fight one. It is also a monumental strategic folly to do so. Kissinger had specifically advised against such a high-risk venture and went himself to patch up with Beijing.

China has learnt its lessons from Ukraine. It should now be investing heavily on enhancing its arsenal of Tactical Ballistic Missiles, Cruise and Hypersonic missile capabilities. It has already started to push up its nuclear arsenal from 350 to over a 1000 war heads. It is rapidly augmenting its naval capabilities for amphibious assault. With such a determined national effort, this build up process should not take very long. The Chinese Strategic Support Forces will play a major role in waging cyber and electronic warfare and will launch a major cognitive war offensive to shape the global narrative and maintain information dominance.

A China-Taiwan war, however, will not be a limited and localised conflict. China will have to exert really hard to deter, delay and defeat third party intervention. At stake will also be the vital semi-conductors or micro-chip industry of the world. Taiwan is one of the largest chip-making countries on the planet. The world cannot afford to let that capacity fall into Chinese hands. If she is seen as winning, the US itself may have to undertake a scorched earth policy by bombing Taiwan’s chip-making plants (even as Great Britain had bombed the French fleet after France surrendered in World War II). That worry is also behind the attempt at friend-shoring chip making, by encouraging India and Vietnam, etc, to start the manufacture of micro-chips in a big way and create new supply chains.

The post EDITORIAL—China’s War Plans Delayed appeared first on IMR.

Chinese non-state actors are very involved in Chinese cyber operations. A wide variety of non-state entities, such as contractors and technology conglomerates (Alibaba, Huawei, etc.), have worked in tandem with the CCP on a variety of research, development, and execution of cyber operations.

Over the years, PLA unit officers have been indicted in the US on charges of theft of confidential business information from U.S. commercial firms and planting malware on their computers.

Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors aggressively target U.S. and Allied political, economic, military, educational, and critical infrastructure (CI) personnel and organizations to steal sensitive data, emerging and key technology, intellectual property, and personally identifiable information (PII), including political targets and now have the ability to influence elections. In March 2021, United States intelligence community released analysis in finding that China had considered interfering with the election but decided against it on concerns it would fail or backfire.

While cyber espionage for national security concerns is a common action conducted by most countries, cyber espionage for economic benefit is an accusation continually made against the Chinese government and military.

China is focussed towards developing the domestic technology industry and its capabilities, to counter the “eight King Kongs” (Apple, Cisco, Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Qualcomm).

The scale of China’s cyber operations dwarfs those of other countries in the region—the complexity and sheer range of targeting, and the number of domestic technology companies whose increasingly global reach may be utilized for intelligence gain and influence.

Beijing has nurtured a tech industry and environment that actively support the party-state’s aims to bolster government surveillance and cyber capabilities. From large firms to startups, many companies work with the state to conduct vulnerability research, develop threat detection capabilities, and produce security and intelligence products.

In India, most major attacks on Indian government networks, such as the National Security Council, have originated from China. Chinese hackers are experts in operating botnets. Multiple instances of Chinese cyber attacks against India’s cyberspace have been reported including ransomware attack on the servers of All India Institute of Medical Sciences in…

India needs a a culture of cyber security investment and strategy. At the very least, we need to ensure security personnel monitor key internal security capabilities and can identify anomalous behaviour. Any known Chinese state-sponsored indicators of compromise and tactics, techniques, and procedures must be identified for immediate response.

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China’s aircraft carrier fleet is becoming more advanced, with larger and more capable ships, making them more powerful projection of military power.

China’s carrier-borne aircraft fleet is becoming more advanced and capable with the inclusion of stealth capabilities, making them more difficult to detect and defend against.

China’s frigates and destroyers are becoming more advanced and capable with the inclusion of stealth technology and advanced weaponry, making them more powerful in their roles as defensive and offensive platforms.

Developments in anti-ship missiles have led to concerns about the potential threat they pose to naval vessels in the region, particularly in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea.

China’s amphibious ships are becoming larger and more capable, making them more powerful platforms for amphibious operations and power projection.

Nuclear and Conventional Submarines

In terms of nuclear-powered submarines, China has developed the Type 095 and Type 096 classes of submarines, are believed to be equipped with advanced stealth technology and more advanced weaponry, including new types of cruise missiles and torpedoes.

China has also developed new conventional diesel-electric stealth submarines such as the Type 039A and Type 039B, equipped with land-attack cruise missiles.

Aircraft Carriers

The Chinese Navy currently operates two aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet-era carrier and the Type 001A, which is a domestically built carrier.

China is currently building its third aircraft carrier, the Type 002. It will be the first aircraft carrier to be equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), instead of traditional steam catapults.

China is also developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Type 003, which is currently under construction. It will be the first aircraft carrier of its kind in the Chinese Navy and will be equipped with advanced technologies such as an EMALS, a more advanced radar system, and a larger flight deck.

Carrier-borne Aircraft

The Chinese Navy currently operates the J-15, a carrier-borne fighter aircraft, which is based on the Russian Su-33 aircraft and is primarily used for air defense and strike missions. The J-15 is equipped with advanced avionics, weapons systems, and radar, allowing it to engage both air and ground targets.

China is also developing a new carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the J-31, which is designed to have a stealth capability, to operate from both the Liaoning and the Type 001A aircraft carriers.

China is also working on a new advanced carrier-borne early warning aircraft, the KJ-600.

In addition, China has been developing new carrier-borne unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Lijian (Sharp Sword) stealth UAV which is designed for reconnaissance and strike missions.

Chinese Naval Surface Combatants

In terms of frigates, China has developed the Type 054A and Type 054B classes of stealth frigates, which are equipped with advanced weapons systems, including anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles, as well as radar and sonar systems.

In terms of destroyers, China has developed the Type 055 class of stealth destroyers, which are equipped with advanced weapons systems, including long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as radar and sonar systems.

China is also developing the Type 056 class of stealth corvettes, which are smaller than frigates but larger than patrol boats.

Anti-ship Missiles

China has developed long-range, supersonic anti-ship missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26, which are capable of striking targets at distances of up to 1,500 and 2,500 km respectively. China has also developed the YJ-12, an anti-ship missile that can be launched from land, ships, and aircraft and is capable of flying at low altitude to evade radar detection.

Another recent development is the Type 022 fast attack missile boat which is equipped with YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. Also, the development of the H-6N bomber that can carry CJ-20 air-launched cruise missiles with a range of about 2,500 km, capable of striking ships and land-based targets.

Amphibious Ships

China’s current amphibious ships include the Type 071 and Type 072III classes of landing platform docks (LPDs) and the Type 073 and Type 074 classes of landing ship tanks (LSTs) with a variety of capabilities.

China is also developing the Type 075 class of amphibious assault ships, which are larger than current ships and are expected to have a greater amphibious assault capabilities, including the ability to carry more landing craft and aircraft, as well as being equipped with a well-deck and a flight deck.

The post EDITORIAL—Alarming Rise in Chinese Naval Power appeared first on IMR.

With the advent of new technologies that have enabled new domains of warfare, the Indian Armed Forces must begin exploring how to exploit multi-domain operations as opposed to just land, air and maritime domain.

Cyber, Space and the Electromagnetic spectrum did not exist during previous conflicts.

Distributed, multi-domain and joint all domain operations (MDO and JADO) are fast becoming the defining doctrines of this new era.

Essentially, they are the synchronisation of aircraft, ground forces and vehicles, satellites and ships, their systems and all sources of data. Together they deliver a complete picture of the battlespace and empower personnel – in theatre or command – to quickly make decisions that drive action.

Cyberspace is a critical element of this new age of combat; as the electromagnetic spectrum itself – a string of frequencies from radio to microwaves, visible light, X-rays and gamma rays which transmit data – may become. The US, UK and others are looking ever more closely at it.

For future MDOs, artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a critical role, helping decipher data, determine its operational relevance and then present informed options for decision-making jointly across all Services.

If the Army can bring them together along with manoeuvre warfare, which is the Army’s strength, and integrate them at the time and point of choosing, this can open windows of domain superiority leading to denial of access and areas.

For example, Cyberspace can provide opening in the air domain by taking air defence weapons offline, which will then create openings for land and maritime, leading to a new level of complication for the enemy.

For example, when the enemy is engaging you with artillery or you are being engaged from the air, another domain brings in its effects to bear and neutralises the threat. It means you have to look at what equipment you need, what kind of network you need, what kind of training you need, and a lot of interoperability and inter-connectivity.

Cyber is ubiquitous across the battlefield and warfare. The Army has not yet made a beginning to use this domain to facilitate own operations or to disrupt the enemy’s. It does not have cyber forces. Cyber advisories and guidelines do not make up doctrines or methods to adopt in operations, much less in an integrated manner with other domains.

Russian forces have very expertly used the cyber domain to facilitate targeting with their artillery against Ukrainian ground forces demonstrating the ability to take action in one domain and produce an effect or dominate another domain.

The US Navy and Air Force are working on new technologies and capabilities through programmes like Project Overmatch and the Advanced Battle Management System, respectively. Together both forces have developed more than a dozen projects they are collaborating on, bringing all domains together to share and utilise information and assess and respond in synergy.

In the UK, this is being addressed by what the MoD calls the Digital Backbone, a digital transformation programme that will allow information sharing and communication regardless of the hardware being used.

We must at least learn from events in Ukraine, evolve our concepts, map out a phased delivery approach and experiment.

Air-Land Battle doctrine, once the flavour of studies at the Army War College involved two domains – air and land. That alone will not work in the future.

The Armed Forces are not currently organized or trained in this manner. The Training Commands of the three Services have a role and responsibility to integrate these capabilities.

Multi-domain warfare is something on which the Indian Armed Forces have to start at the very beginning and approach it from a joint aspect. Single service approach will just not do.

The goal is to better enable the Services to fight together effectively in all domains simultaneously, to present multiple dilemmas for the enemy. That will mean looking at how do we organize, how to equip and how to train to do that.

A new mindset is needed to enable multi-domain action.

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It is the first aircraft carrier to be built in India, and represents the country’s growing capabilities in naval shipbuilding. As a symbol of national pride and military power, the INS Vikrant is an important component of India’s strategic defence capabilities. The aircraft carrier will play a crucial role in India’s ability to project naval power and defend its interests in the Indian Ocean region. It will also be a major boost to the Indian Navy’s Blue Water capability.

Building an aircraft carrier is a highly complex and challenging task that involves several factors. Aircraft carriers are some of the largest and most complex ships ever built, requiring advanced engineering and design capabilities to ensure they can withstand the stresses of prolonged use at sea. Building an aircraft carrier requires advanced shipbuilding techniques, and the use of specialized materials such as steel and aluminum. The process also requires a large workforce and a significant investment in infrastructure.

An aircraft carrier must have a wide range of systems and equipment, including propulsion systems, navigation and communication systems, weapons systems, and aircraft launch and recovery systems, all of which must be integrated and tested to ensure they work together seamlessly.

Building an aircraft carrier is an extremely expensive endeavor that requires large investments in research and development as well as construction. The construction of an aircraft carrier is time-consuming process, it usually take years to complete.

There are several arguments in favor of having aircraft carriers as a part of a country’s naval fleet besides providing the ability to project naval power and influence over long distances, allowing for rapid deployment of military assets in response to global crises and emergencies.

Aircraft carriers provide the navy a blue water capability to operate far from home ports, allow for the deployment of fighter jets and other aircraft, which can provide air support to other naval vessels and ground troops, as well as conduct reconnaissance and strike missions. Along with their accompanying strike groups, aircraft carriers can be used to assert naval control over a specific area of the ocean, enabling a country to maintain sea lanes of communication and protect its own shipping.

Aircraft carriers can serve as powerful symbols of a country’s military strength and capabilities, and can be used to exert diplomatic pressure in international relations.

While aircraft carriers have many advantages, there are also several arguments against having them, the biggest of them being their vulnerability to attack from submarines, missiles, and other weapons. Their loss could be a significant blow to a country’s military capabilities. Aircraft carriers are also specialized platforms, designed for specific roles and missions. This can limit their flexibility and make them less adaptable to changing strategic situations.

The composition of a carrier strike group can vary depending on the specific mission. It may typically include escort ships to provide air and missile defence, submarines, supply ships, amphibious ships, aircraft, : The carrier carries a complement of aircraft, including fighters, bombers, and surveillance aircraft capable of conducting a wide range of missions, helicopters,  and support vessels.

Aircraft carriers are vulnerable to a variety of threats, including submarine-launched torpedoes, cruise missiles and special forces; land and sea-based missiles; mines; suicide attacks by terrorists and cyber attacks.

Protective measures inclrease the complexity of operating carrier groups. Escort ships, anti-submarine warfare measures, air defence systems, electronic warfare support measures, decoy systems, cyber defence measures, are all essential.

The design development and construction of an aircraft carrier requires some critical technologies.

Advanced materials such as high-strength steel and aluminum alloys, powerful propulsion systems, flight deck technologies, Air Traffic Control systems, catapults and launch systems, advanced modeling and simulation, are some of the essential technologies, which can become obsolete quickly, making them less effective over time and not able to keep up with the rapid changes in naval warfare technology.

The post EDITORIAL – Indigenous Aircraft Carrier is a Technology Milestone appeared first on IMR.

Ultimately, the aim is indigenisation. A Twin-Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) is being developed but it will take some time. In the interim, the Navy is looking for an aircraft from among the two to meet their requirements.

The procurement size was earlier 57 twin-engine carrier fighters, which is now set to be downsized to around 26, including a few twin-seater trainer variants.

IAF’s MRFA Acquisition

On the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft acquisition for the Indian Air Force – the IAF has already received responses from multiple vendors to its RFI. The top contenders for the multi-billion dollar deal include Lockheed Martin’s F-21, Boeing’s F/A-18, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Russian aircraft MiG 35 and Swedish aerospace giant Saab’s Gripen jet.

In April 2019, the IAF issued an RFI (Request for Information), or initial tender, to acquire 114 jets at a cost of around USD 18 billion.

The winner of the Indian Air Force’s mega project to procure 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) will have to ensure the transfer of technology as it would be implemented under the framework of the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative

The entire process will be executed under the provisions of the DAP (Defence Acquisition Procedure) 2020, the selected OEM (Original Equipment Maker) will have to comply with India’s requirements of transfer of technology and Make-in-India that would add to our indigenous fighter aircraft manufacturing capability.

The number of squadrons of the IAF is going down gradually because of the phasing out of old aircraft. The IAF is not going to reach the sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons in the next 10-15 years. Hence, a two-pronged strategy has being adopted towards maintaining the IAF’s strength that involves induction of new generation platforms and up-gradation of the existing fleet.

Procurement of 114 jets under the MRFA project and acquisition of 83 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas will help the IAF significantly enhance its combat prowess.

India is also working on an ambitious USD 5 billion project to develop a fifth-generation medium-weight deep penetration fighter jet to significantly bolster its air power capability.

IAF’s Current Fleet

Presently, India operates six kinds of fighter aircraft – Su-30MKI, Rafale, Tejas, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and MiG-21. Considering MiG-21’s frequent accidents, the IAF is expected to decomm-ission the ageing aircraft by 2025. So effectively, we have five types of fighter jets.

Among all, Sukhoi Su-30MKI is the largest and primary fleet of the Indian Air Force. With a total of 284 operational numbers, the Russia-made Sukhoi is an air superiority fighter with additional air-to-ground strike capability.

Next is the Jaguar (Shamsher). IAF has 139 Jaguars. Attached with EL/M-2052 AESA radars and new avionics, Jaguar is considered a ground attack specialized fighter jet.

Dassault Mirage 2000 (Vajra), is the fourth generation single-engine multi-role fighter jet. Currently, about 50 different variants of Mirage are being operated by IAF. In February 2019, Mirage-2000 fighter jets were used to hit terror camps in Balakot inside PoK. Attached with Israeli laser-guided SPICE bombs, the Mirage-200 is a highly reliable aircraft for India.

With all these fourth-generation fighter jets, India now has inducted 36 Dassault Rafales – A French twin-engine canard delta wing multirole fighter jet is capable of performing air supremacy, interdiction, aerial reconnaissance, ground support, in-depth strike, anti-ship strike, and nuclear deterrence missions.

The post EDITORIAL – Navy’s Deck-based Fighters appeared first on IMR.

India’s neutral stand is mainly because all the key protagonists in the crisis are India’s close allies. Hence, India’s unaligned and diplomatic efforts. Possible support to Russia might hamper India’s relations with the NATO countries, including USA.

India’s stand on Ukraine has been appreciated within the country and by other countries, notably Pakistan, whose prime minister Imran Khan too appreciated India’s role and policies.

India-Russia relationship still continues to remain strong. Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment. India is also procuring the S-400 Triumf Missile from Russia, despite strong US opposition.  A new ten-year defence pact between the two countries was being discussed. India-Russia annual trade is also worth about $10 billion. India’s support to Ukraine may mean Russia developing stronger ties with China and Pakistan. That can be a real-time threat to India’s national security.

Ukraine has consistently taken anti-Indian position in the United Nations, be it in terms of voting against India in UNSC after 1998 nuclear tests, voting for UN intervention in Kashmir after abrogation of Article 370 or in terms of selling military equipment to Pakistan to use against India.

India wants de-escalation of the crisis, but only through arbitration or conciliation. Thus, considering all the angles to this crisis, India is adopting the strategy to solve this dispute keeping in mind that any country’s national interest is above the overall global interest.

The US has managed to get most countries on its side, and the United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion has been supported by many countries. Countries like India chose to abstain from the vote due to a strong and continuing linkage with Russia, and due to considerations of what such a vote will imply to the geopolitics of the region.

The immediate impact is, of course, adverse due to high oil prices and investor nervousness. India has a very large oil deficit and also a current account deficit. The latter needs a continuous supply of foreign investor dollars to plug that deficit. On food security, India is on a strong footing. Its military capabilities are significantly inferior to China, mainly due to a resource constraint. But the level of preparedness and the advantage of terrain means that the asymmetry is considerably reduced.

The US will soon have to think about the more important geopolitical alignment and strategy around its bigger rival, China. So far, the Quad formation (with the US, India, Japan and Australia) has not delivered any tangible benefits to India. But the strategic importance of India could grow. It is conceivable that in a new configuration, the Americans will value an alignment with India more than the reverse. India, too, has a strong trade and investment relationship already. If its domestic economy shows steady and consistent high growth, it can become important to the US when dealing with a strong China.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng attacked the Quad thus, “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. Amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.

The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India.

Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with prime minister Narendra Modi, and did not insist that India echo their position.

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