Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is an emerging concept that most modern militaries worldwide are working to integrate into their warfighting doctrines. The key domains encompassed in the concept include the physical domains—land, maritime, air, and space—the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes cyberspace, and the cognitive/human domain. Unlike the integration and coordination achieved by joint forces in the existing system, MDO aims to deter and defeat adversaries in operations below armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in the post-conflict phase of returning to competition.

At a time when the United States and China are experimenting with various facets of the concept, either overtly or through proxies by providing them technologies, India found an opportunity through Operation Sindoor to test and validate its warfighting concepts and technologies. It was the first instance of non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its formations or physically crossing borders—neither by troops nor by aircraft. India showcased its Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence technology and demonstrated its prowess in both offensive and defensive capabilities—drone-centric warfare, resilient and responsive air defence, long-range precision weapons, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and set a new parameter and “new normal” for future operations.

The book is structured in two parts: Part I – Multi-Domain Operations Concept and Part II – Operation Sindoor: Appraisal. The United States pioneered the development of the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept in 2015–16, which later evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by December 2018. Although the MDO concept is yet to mature into a fully functional warfighting doctrine, it now guides the transformation and modernisation of the US Armed Forces and their peers. China is known to be mirroring the same with its own “Chinese characteristics.”

Part I covers the evolution of the concept in the United States and China, defines the concept primarily derived from US philosophy, explores China’s All-Domain Operations concept, examines limitations of the MDO framework, and discusses India’s challenges and options.

In Part II, after explaining the genesis of India’s problem with Pakistan, the author appraises Operation Sindoor against the backdrop of the MDO concept. Although multiple domains were addressed during Operation Sindoor through coordination and integration among the armed forces and various government departments and agencies, the MDO framework as a concept remains a distant goal. Regarding Pakistan, much of its response was propaganda through influence operations. The author effectively debunks Pakistan’s claim of downing five to six Indian fighter jets on Day One of Operation Sindoor by exposing glaring errors in the technological hypothesis developed by Mr. Michael Dahm, which was widely cited by magazines and newspapers supporting Pakistan’s false narrative.

Drone-centric warfare, multi-layered and integrated air defence, and target-centric warfare employing precision weapons—visible aspects of Operation Sindoor—are covered in comprehensive detail for both India and Pakistan. The dominant role played by Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence and the success achieved by indigenous weapons strengthened the government’s resolve to promote it further, a theme well-articulated in the book. The space, EMS, and human domains have also been given due significance.

The hallmark of the book lies in the author’s lucid exposition of Bharat’s strategic culture, which inspires its military ethos. He emphasises that India’s values are indigenous and not borrowed from any other country.

This book, the result of extensive and detailed research by Brigadier (Dr.) Rajeev Bhutani, could not have come at a more opportune time—when nations are actively developing and transforming their forces around the MDO concept. It will be of immense value to military professionals, researchers, scientists and engineers developing defence systems in government, public, and private enterprises, as well as policymakers.

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Session 1 – Inaugural Session

The seminar was inaugurated by Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ. The welcome remarks were given by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Director General, CAPS. This was followed by an industry perspective provided by Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst & Young. The guest speakers also released the EY-IMR knowledge paper on Air & Missile Defence.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra commenced his introductory statements by addressing the protracted conflict in Ukraine, which has persisted for sixteen months, despite the substantial casualties incurred by both opposing factions. The vulnerabilities manifest themselves through the widespread deployment of tanks, drones, large ships, cruise missiles, and aircraft, which are strategically withheld from entering technical zones due to the presence of formidable air defence systems. The concept of air Denial has been surpassed by both parties involved. Hence, the conflict has once again underscored the significance of the air and missile defence systems. Several key lessons can be derived for India from this conflict, including the imperative of maintaining unhindered supply chains and promoting domestic manufacturing. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of counter-drone technology, which encompasses various tools such as kinetic interception and electromagnetic interdiction. According to Air Marshal Chopra, India is currently developing medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles. However, there is a need to expedite the advancement of cost-effective iterations of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The speaker proposed that the private sector is making significant strides in the field, exemplified by the Kalyani missile creation. This missile was developed through a partnership between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd and DRDO, and its production involved collaboration with various players in the Indian industry, including both public and private sector entities and MSMEs. The author emphasised the government’s initiatives to promote indigenisation, encompassing both the public and commercial domains.

Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ gave the Inaugural Address. He addressed the crucial capabilities of the air defence and missile system in various contexts, including times of peace, periods of uneasy peace, and even in times of war. The activation of this capability is the initial step, while its deactivation is the final action. In certain instances, it persists consistently. It offers both deterrence and the assurance needed to execute air operations. The system encompasses numerous interconnected components and sub-systems that encompass monitoring, control, and the ability to make decisions for destruction swiftly. He highlighted critical advancements in air defence during the last decade while focusing on reducing the size of systems and sub-systems and the increasing lethality of weapons and Unmanned systems, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities. He emphasised the evolving nature of operations, which were formerly limited to land but have since expanded into the air and are now expanding into space. He stressed the necessity of successfully encountering the threats. India’s capacity to cope with threats needs jointmanship as well as an exhaustive capability. The endeavour is to be made not in isolation but as a team. Therefore, the diverse range of threats necessitates an air defence system that can enhance capabilities and multiply abilities multiple-fold. This will entail utilising expedited, reliable, and fortified decision-making mechanisms alongside a fusion of active and passive sensors to generate a comprehensive representation. He concluded by emphasising the interaction between a user and a manufacturer during the initial stages of development of any system is crucial to the smooth transmission of situational awareness and the successful incorporation of the decision-making tool.

Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young, provided the defence industry perspective. He stated that the Indian Air Force was responsible for safeguarding the entirety of the nation’s airspace, which encompasses the island territories and offshore facilities and falls within the jurisdiction of the air defence identification zone. In order to effectively safeguard the expansive airspace, it is imperative to implement a strategy that involves the proactive positioning of surface-to-air missiles, the utilisation of countermeasures against advanced technologies, the establishment of surveillance systems and radar networks, as well as the deployment of short-range surface-to-air missiles to deter and neutralise aerial incursions. Col Kuber emphasised the significance of the heightened dissemination of quantum technologies, the integration of quantum into military operations, and the transformative impact it will have on the character of warfare. The speaker provided an explanation regarding the distinction between quantum and linear phenomena, highlighting the pervasive nature of the former in contrast to the latter. During his discourse, he also referred to the hypersonic glide vehicles. In order to effectively address the issue, it is advisable to develop an anti-missile capability that facilitates the straightforward identification of these entities. The speaker concluded his discourse by comparing the escalating military expenditures of the United States and China and subsequently deliberated on the appropriate course of action for India considering this development. In order to augment its capabilities, the government has pursued collaboration with the private sector to develop advanced weaponry. It will be stipulated to be productive.

SESSION 2 – EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

Session 2 was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Tarun Chaudhry, Asst Chief of Air Staff Ops (Projects), Air HQ. He emphasised technology’s importance in shaping a conflict’s contours. Therefore, it is essential for all parties involved to acknowledge and adapt to new challenges brought about by technological advancements in the context of warfare. He underlined the need to develop an appropriate industrial environment for research and development to quickly provide the essential equipment or solutions. Here, timeframe and R&D efforts are of utmost importance.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ, discussed the ‘Lessons in AD from the Russia-Ukraine War.’ As part of the philosophies/concept of operations, he highlighted the DEAD/SEAD missions conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which allowed the Ukrainians to mount an effective air defence response. Russian forces employed Kh-31 and Kh-58 ARMs extensively against Ukrainian ground-based air defence weapons. The Ukrainians also utilised customised MiG-29s equipped with AGM-88 HARM with success.

The Ukrainian PSU’s innovative and flexible air defence systems have prevented the Russian VKS from dominating the sky. Russia’s VKS employed the S-400 in Belarus and Crimea to illustrate its practical air defence doctrine. The surface-to-air missile system of the S-400 was effective at bringing down aircraft. Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes due to the Ukrainians’ effective use of the S-300 SAM and SA-11. The Pechora system was an effective anti-aircraft armament for the Ukrainians. As part of the anti-missile/SOWs operation, it is impossible to intercept Russian Tochka-U and Iskander missiles due to a lack of adequate interceptor missiles. Between 80% and 90% of Ukrainian missiles were intercepted by the Russian S-400. Intercepting Russian “Zircon,” “Vanguard,” and “DF-ZF” hypersonic cruise missiles during anti-hypersonic operations is complex. He stated that the Russian VKS Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had little effect on the efficacy of the air defence network. Active AD capability and passive AD measures against missiles/ SOWs/ HCMs/HGVs are essential for assuring survivability. AWACS and AEW&C are crucial enablers for AD Operations. The development of future AD capabilities must be prioritised, and plans must account for detecting and eliminating low RCS threats.

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AAD Ops, Army HQ, discussed the ‘Emerging Air Threat: Challenges to Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) from Recent Conflicts.’ He addressed the concept of air threat in its state of being and air threat in its manifestation. Air threats encompass various factors, including numerical strength, quantity, aircraft types, capabilities, operational ranges, refuelling capabilities, and tactical approaches. “Air Threat Manifestation” refers to the strategic process of developing and implementing measures to mitigate air defence risks. The manifestation of air threats necessitates the management of stand-off threats, limited stand-off threats, and dynamic threats. He emphasised the increase in the variety of air attack instruments and the expansion of the range of potential threats, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, they mentioned the emergence of futuristic air threats such as hypersonic and hyper glide technologies, as well as surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they noted the resurgence of conventional dumb bombs, explicitly referring to rocket-boosted kinetic energy (REK) weapons and gliding munitions. According to Brig Manish Kumar the VKS air operation in Russia is limited to the Central Military District (CSFO) and activities related to air defence. The initial chapter operations yielded successful outcomes. The initial attacks were limited to Stand Off Launches utilising Kh series Cruise Missiles and ARMs. However, they were effectively countered by the Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Moreover, the SHAHED-136 introduction was employed in Ukraine. The term “three-layer air defence” is a misnomer. Each layer must be designed to address a specific type of threat. To address various levels of threat, encompassing stand-off threat, limited stand-off threat, and dynamic threat, it becomes imperative to implement a comprehensive array of mitigation measures. He identified the prerequisites for comprehensive air defence solutions, which include low radar cross-section (RCS) surveillance, low-level surveillance, and stealth surveillance. The layout challenges faced by the defence industry encompass several key aspects, including the miniaturisation of components, the management of electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility in limited spaces, the ability to handle multiple targets simultaneously, and the development of cost-effective electronic identification friend or foe (IFF) solutions.

Sh Vasudev Ramakrishna, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, discussed the ‘New Developments in Radars for Detection, Tracking Threats and Targeting.’ He deliberated on radars concerning air and ballistic missile defence. Modern radar systems possess various applications, encompassing areas such as ballistic missile defence, air defence, weapon designation, reconnaissance, commercial utilisation, weather monitoring, and interplanetary investigations. The radar may be categorised as surveillance radars, which possess a mechanical rotation fixed RPM, offer volumetric search capabilities, have fixed target update intervals, and exhibit limited range and angular resolution as well as accuracies; track radars, designed for tracking a single target, have limited search capabilities; and multiple radars for diverse threats, which are specialised in their respective functions and have limited programmability. To construct a unified multifunction radar system in the future, it will be necessary to address various components of radar sub-systems, including waveform agility (such as low pulse repetition frequency and medium pulse repetition frequency, as well as target radar cross-section estimation), as well as the programmability of radar modes (such as air defence and ballistic missile defence).

SESSION 3 – EMERGING THREATS, SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani, Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired session 3. He emphasised the importance of hypersonic weapons and the difficulties faced by current countermeasures in addressing them. In contrast to ballistic missiles that can be easily intercepted and monitored, identifying hypersonic missiles poses a significant challenge. To effectively tackle these challenges, it is imperative to embrace technological advancements.

Air Commodore SM Paranjpe, Team Ldr, Project AD Services Interface Gp, Air HQ addressed the challenges associated with ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as stand-off weapons. He gave an account of the historical background of hypersonics, with particular emphasis on ‘The Great Extinction Event’ that occurred approximately 66 million years ago, resulting in the extinction of all dinosaur species. It also emphasised the historical, contemporary, and prospective dimensions of hypersonic weaponry; and furnished an extensive account of the fundamental principles underlying hypersonic velocities, elucidating various attributes of hypersonics, ultrasonics, supersonics, and related phenomena. He elucidated the distinct challenges associated with stand-off weapons by examining the ballistic trajectory and orbital trajectory within the classification of ballistic armaments. He discussed the tactical obstacles associated with air defence, specifically focusing on four key aspects: being situated beyond the radar horizon and at a low altitude, operating at high altitudes and speeds, flying at low altitudes and high speeds, and possessing small or stealthy characteristics. He gave insight into the origins of the challenges, specifically highlighting the Anti-Hypersonic Weapons Technology Challenge and the requisite scientific expertise. He concluded by directing attention towards the main points to be learned and the actions being implemented to address them, categorising them into three distinct areas: Technology, Organisation, and Operations.

Sh Nandakumar S, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, gave an insight into ‘the OTH Radar for Peninsular & Chinese Front: a Perspective.’ Considering that OTH Radars operate at high frequencies, he emphasised their value. He compared the two Over Horizon (OTH) Radars, such as the Surface Wave OTH (SW OTH) and the Sky Wave OTH (SKW OTH). He emphasised the examination of OTH Radar, specifically highlighting various countries such as Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, and Israel and the respective radar systems they possess. He presented an analysis of a separate survey pertaining to the Skywave Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar, specifically focusing on the United States. He emphasised the various sub-systems of the SkW OTH Radar, including transmitters, receivers, and Tx Antennas, as well as the techniques and technologies employed within these sub-systems. According to the research conducted by Sh Nandakumar S, developing a Skywave Over-the-Horizon Radar (SkW OTHR) for specifically identified locations is feasible. He emphasised the development of Ionosphere modelling is imperative for SkW OTHR. He proposed that the implementation of the Frequency Management System should be completed within a time-frame of approximately five years. He discussed the advancement of the Surface Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) for the Indian Navy, specifically in the Gujarat Peninsula, which is nearing completion. It is anticipated that the radar system will become operational within a year. Additionally, Nandakumar highlighted the forthcoming development of the Two-L shape (180* Coverage) SkW OTHR for Sea/Air Surveillance, which is expected to be completed within a time-frame of 5-7 years. This technological advancement is anticipated to provide the Indian Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities to assess the Chinese front. 

SESSION 4 – AIR DEFENCE COUNTERMEASURES

Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, Asst Chief of Air Staff (Air Defence), Air HQ chaired the session. He highlighted that conventional air defence was designed to detect certain airborne flight objects. In recent times, there have been changes in the basic detection capability; and multiple new threats challenge the domain of air defence. We need to address it on priority.

Wg Cdr KJ Antony, Joint Director AD, Air HQ, presented his views on ‘Countering Stealthy Aerial Threats.’ His presentation centred around four fundamental domains pertaining to the attainment of stealth capabilities. These domains encompassed the concept of stealthy aerial threats, their potential ramifications on air operations, as well as the strategies employed to counteract such threats, encompassing both existing and future technologies. He perceived stealth as a fusion of technological elements aimed at evading or prolonging the process of detection. For example, stealth aircraft must possess minimal signatures across various electromagnetic (EM) spectrum domains, including radar, infrared, acoustics, and visual signature. In order to attain stealth capabilities in a fighter aircraft, it is imperative to strike a delicate equilibrium between the attributes of stealth, manoeuvrability, and cost-effectiveness. The individual emphasised that achieving stealth or low observability can be accomplished by reducing radar cross-section, minimising infrared signature, and diminishing visual signature. He classified stealthy aerial threats into three categories: airborne platforms that employ stealth technology, threats with low radar cross-section (RCS) or low observability, and threats that do not require line-of-sight (LOS) engagement, such as terrain-hugging missiles and ballistic missiles. In order to address the challenge posed by covert airborne threats, the individual in question proposed the implementation of an anti-stealth system capable of functioning autonomously or in conjunction with other systems. This system would utilise multiple sensors to generate a comprehensive air situation depiction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful detection. Ultimately, he emphasised the importance of space-based systems to mitigate the risks posed by stealth aerial threats in forthcoming times.

Cdr Viraat Shiggaon, Cdr Staff Requirements, Naval HQ, explained the ‘AD Countermeasures: Naval Perspective.’ He focused on the growing dangers in the maritime sphere and the accompanying advances in AD technology of the future. While marine air defence (AD) is generally comparable to other services, the sea presents unique obstacles. Cooperative engagement is made possible by both long- and medium-range SAMs. The evolution of modern air defence weaponry is motivated by the changing geopolitical landscape. It serves as an anti-access/area-denial mechanism. Since its final velocity is so incredible, it cannot be stopped by traditional AD systems. The use of decoys and MIRVs increases the difficulty of engagement. The topic of the operations of unmanned vehicles and swarm drones was discussed. It is a low-priced A2/AD weapon that regular armies and insurgents can deploy. He discussed potential future technologies for naval air defence, focusing on “the electromagnetic railgun,” which is affordable and can engage supersonic targets at extended ranges; “laser/microwave weapons,” which can engage hypersonic weapons/anti-drone systems; and “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) interceptors,” which can engage ASBMs during both the boost and re-entry phases. He ended by stressing the importance of indigenisation, the introduction of cutting-edge technology and innovations, and the creation of counter-technologies.

Brig. OP Vaishnav, AAD Dte, Army HQ explained ‘Countering Unmanned Aerial Threats – Future Roadmap.’ He focused on how the aerial danger posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has changed over time. UAS include anything from tiny quad/hexa copters to huge fixed-wing military UAVs. There are three levels of threat – superficial, intermediate, and severe. He pointed out that India’s rivals on both sides can now produce and build unmanned aerial systems on their own. The Burraq, Barq LGB, Wingloong-10, CH-4, Shahpar-2, and Sharp Sword are among the dangerous autonomous weapon systems they want to modernise with. Surveillance, identification, and tracking; microprocessors or calculating a firing solution; and interdiction were the three pillars he emphasised under the Counter UAS system pillars.

Sh Amit Kumar, Scientist F, PGAD, DRDO, presented his views on ‘Countering the Threat from Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles and Stand-off Weapons.’ The increased range and precision of ballistic missiles, their potential use by non-state actors, and the diffusion of ballistic missile technology were all issues he brought up, as was the danger posed by ballistic missiles in the Indian subcontinent, he said. India needs a ballistic missile defence system because of its no-first-use (NFU) nuclear strategy. Ballistic, subsonic, and supersonic cruise missiles are the current go-to options for delivering warheads across vast distances. Using hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and MARVs by adversaries is a common strategy for countering and penetrating missile defences. An emerging danger is the hypersonic glide vehicle. Low altitude gliding, high manoeuvrability, re-targeting area, and high cross-range capability to plan the glide path allow it to penetrate enemy ballistic missile defence while engaging time-critical targets like ballistic missile launch pas/silo, deeply buried command centres, air bases, warships, and tactical targets.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, CAPS, delivered his closing remarks at the conclusion of the ideation sessions. Air Marshal Chopra commended the astute presentations and notable presence of all panellists, as well as the intellectually stimulating questions posed by the audience.

The seminar ended with a Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review.

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With the advent of new technologies that have enabled new domains of warfare, the Indian Armed Forces must begin exploring how to exploit multi-domain operations as opposed to just land, air and maritime domain.

Cyber, Space and the Electromagnetic spectrum did not exist during previous conflicts.

Distributed, multi-domain and joint all domain operations (MDO and JADO) are fast becoming the defining doctrines of this new era.

Essentially, they are the synchronisation of aircraft, ground forces and vehicles, satellites and ships, their systems and all sources of data. Together they deliver a complete picture of the battlespace and empower personnel – in theatre or command – to quickly make decisions that drive action.

Cyberspace is a critical element of this new age of combat; as the electromagnetic spectrum itself – a string of frequencies from radio to microwaves, visible light, X-rays and gamma rays which transmit data – may become. The US, UK and others are looking ever more closely at it.

For future MDOs, artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a critical role, helping decipher data, determine its operational relevance and then present informed options for decision-making jointly across all Services.

If the Army can bring them together along with manoeuvre warfare, which is the Army’s strength, and integrate them at the time and point of choosing, this can open windows of domain superiority leading to denial of access and areas.

For example, Cyberspace can provide opening in the air domain by taking air defence weapons offline, which will then create openings for land and maritime, leading to a new level of complication for the enemy.

For example, when the enemy is engaging you with artillery or you are being engaged from the air, another domain brings in its effects to bear and neutralises the threat. It means you have to look at what equipment you need, what kind of network you need, what kind of training you need, and a lot of interoperability and inter-connectivity.

Cyber is ubiquitous across the battlefield and warfare. The Army has not yet made a beginning to use this domain to facilitate own operations or to disrupt the enemy’s. It does not have cyber forces. Cyber advisories and guidelines do not make up doctrines or methods to adopt in operations, much less in an integrated manner with other domains.

Russian forces have very expertly used the cyber domain to facilitate targeting with their artillery against Ukrainian ground forces demonstrating the ability to take action in one domain and produce an effect or dominate another domain.

The US Navy and Air Force are working on new technologies and capabilities through programmes like Project Overmatch and the Advanced Battle Management System, respectively. Together both forces have developed more than a dozen projects they are collaborating on, bringing all domains together to share and utilise information and assess and respond in synergy.

In the UK, this is being addressed by what the MoD calls the Digital Backbone, a digital transformation programme that will allow information sharing and communication regardless of the hardware being used.

We must at least learn from events in Ukraine, evolve our concepts, map out a phased delivery approach and experiment.

Air-Land Battle doctrine, once the flavour of studies at the Army War College involved two domains – air and land. That alone will not work in the future.

The Armed Forces are not currently organized or trained in this manner. The Training Commands of the three Services have a role and responsibility to integrate these capabilities.

Multi-domain warfare is something on which the Indian Armed Forces have to start at the very beginning and approach it from a joint aspect. Single service approach will just not do.

The goal is to better enable the Services to fight together effectively in all domains simultaneously, to present multiple dilemmas for the enemy. That will mean looking at how do we organize, how to equip and how to train to do that.

A new mindset is needed to enable multi-domain action.

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Electronic attack (EA), electronic defence (ED) and electronic surveillance (ES), electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic protective measures (EPM) and electronic support measures (ESM) are some of terms that are indicative of the total environmental action. Besides EW, other EM operations include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Each country has an EW policy and doctrine.Primary EW activities are in electro-optical; infrared and radio frequency countermeasures; and involves EM compatibility and deception; radio jamming; radar jamming and deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (or anti-jamming); electronic masking, probing, reconnaissance, and intelligence; electronic security; EW reprogramming; emission control; spectrum management; and wartime reserve modes.

EW Operations

EA and ECM involve the offensive use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability including human life. In the case of anti-radiation weapons, many times this includes missiles or bombs that can home in on a specific signal (radio or radar) and follow that path directly to impact, thus destroying the system broadcasting.ED or electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) involves protecting friendly forces from enemy use of ECM. Flares and chaff are often used to distract IR and radar guide missiles to miss their target. Other examples are spread spectrum technologies, use of restricted frequency lists, emissions control, low observability (stealth) technology and DRFM decoy systems.

Electronic Warfare Support

Electronic warfare support (ES) to detect, intercept, identify, locate, and/or localize sources of intended and unintended radiated electromagnetic (EM) energy. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) are the terms used. The purpose is to provide immediate recognition, prioritization, and targeting of threats to battlefield commanders. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), is related process of analysing and identifying intercepted transmissions from sources such as radio communication, mobile phones, radar, or microwave communications. SIGINT covers electronic intelligence (ELINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT). Analysis parameters measured include frequency, bandwidth, modulation, and polarization.

Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) Hacking

Many people do not realize that unguarded fibre optic cables are often easily accessible, making them a potential targets for hackers looking to tap into the huge amounts of data that travel across these fibre networks. Systemic malignant penetration perpetrated by compromising data quality of the stream on the broadband cable through either OFC or copper medium could be an exponentially augmented hazard There are serious security vulnerabilities that impact operations.

Important EW Operations

During World War II, there was extensive use of EW, also referred to as the “Battle of the Beams”. The first application of EW in WWII was to defeat those navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII. Electronic warfare played a major role in many military operations during the Vietnam War. Operation Mole Cricket 19 was a suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force against Syrian targets on 9 June 1982, at the outset of the 1982 Lebanon War. The operation was the first time in history that a Western-equipped air force successfully destroyed a Soviet built SAM network. The result was a decisive Israeli victory, leading to the colloquial name the “Bekaa Valley Turkey Shoot”. The battle lasted about two hours, and involved innovative tactics and technology. By the end of the day, Israeli forces had destroyed 29 of 30 SAM batteries deployed in the Bekaa Valley, and shot down 82-86 enemy aircraft, with minimal losses of its own. In 2007, an Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site (Operation Orchard) used electronic warfare systems to disrupt Syrian air defences while Israeli jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets, and returned to Israel undeterred.

Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE)

DARE is a laboratory of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), located in Bangalore. It is one of the two DRDO laboratories involved in the research and development of airborne electronic warfare and mission avionics systems. It was established in 1986 as a Project Laboratory, then named “Advanced Systems Integration and Evaluation Organisation” (ASIEO). On 1 June 2001, ASIEO became a full-fledged DRDO laboratory and was renamed as Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE). DARE works on development of electronic warfare systems and mission avionics for aircraft. ASIEO developed the first mission computer for Light Combat Aircraft in 1991. It also developed a self-protection suite for the aircraft that included radar warning receiver, laser warning receiver, jammer, missile approach warning system and countermeasure dispensers under a program named Mayawi in collaboration with Israel’s Elisra.

ALSO READ: India must actively protect its air defense systems’ OODA loop

Sukhoi Su-30MKI uses Tarang Mk 2 radar warning receiver developed by DARE and manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). Its mission computer, radar processor and indication management computer were also developed by DARE and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Hyderabad division. In 2006, DARE partnered with EADS’s defence electronics division to develop a missile approach warning system for the Indian Air Force (IAF) based on the latter’s AN/AAR-60 system. The jointly developed system was put into trials in 2008 and was planned to be co-produced with Alpha Technologies. DARE has also partnered with Elisra to jointly develop electronic warfare systems for Indian and Israeli aircraft. DARE has utilized this partnership to develop an electronic warfare suite for Mikoyan MiG-29 named D-29.

DARE has worked with HAL to develop avionics for upgrade programs for several IAF aircraft. It participated in the development of a mission computer for Jaguar and in the development of navigation and electronic warfare systems for Mikoyan MiG-27M. DARE, in collaboration with Centre for Airborne Systems and Defence Electronics Research Laboratory, developed antennas for electronic warfare support measures and communication systems of DRDO AEW&CS. DARE also developed a unified electronic warfare suite with an integrated radar jammer and a radar warning receiver for HAL Tejas.

Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL)

DLRL is a laboratory of the DRDO, located in Hyderabad, to design and development of integrated Electronic Warfare systems for the Indian Armed Forces. For testing and evaluation of EW systems ELSEC, an extension of DLRL, was established in 1998. EW system simulation and modelling facilities are located inside ELSEC to carry out simulation of complex systems. DLRL works on COMINT/ ELINT/ ESM/ ECM systems covering radar and communication frequency bands. It also conducts systems integration and evaluation of these technologies on various platforms, like aircraft, ships, helicopters, vehicles, etc. DLRL also conducts specialized training courses in Electronic Warfare and technology management for DRDO Scientists and officers of the Indian Armed Forces. DLRL is involved in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), providing ground electronic support for IGMDP, and expertise in the design and development of various components, antennas and sub-systems for HF to microwave and millimetric wave frequencies. DLRL has designed, developed and produced a large number of ruggedised EW Systems. These systems have been inducted into the Services after rigorous field evaluation and user testing.

SPECTRA – Rafale’s internal “Electronic Warfare” (EW) System

SPECTRA (Self-Protection Equipment Countering Threats to Rafale Aircraft) was jointly developed by Thales Group and MBDA for the Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft. The full SPECTRA integrated electronic warfare suite provides long-range detection, identification and accurate localisation of infrared homing, radio frequency and laser threats. The system incorporates radar warning receiver, laser warning and Missile Approach Warning for threat detection plus a phased array radar jammer and a decoy dispenser for threat countering. The SPECTRA system consists of two new-generation infrared missile warning sensors. The new infrared array detector enhances performance with regard to the range at which a missile firing will be detected. With two sensors, each equipped with a fish-eye lens, it provides a spherical field of view around the aircraft. It also offers improved rejection of false alarms and gives an angular localisation capability which will be compatible with the future use of Directional Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM). Dassault claims that stealthy jamming modes of SPECTRA actually reduce the aircraft’s apparent radar signature, perhaps using active cancellation technology. SPECTRA ensures Rafale’s outstanding survivability against the latest airborne and ground threats. The system carries out reliable long-range detection, identification and localisation of threats, allowing the pilot to instantly select the most effective defensive measures based on combinations of radar jamming, infrared or radar decoying and evasive manoeuvres. The angular localisation performance of the SPECTRA sensors makes it possible to accurately locate ground threats in order to avoid them, or to target them for destruction with precision guided munitions. The SPECTRA’s airborne threat localisation, gives Rafale superior situational awareness.

French AREOS – Recce Pod

For both strategic and tactical reconnaissance missions, the French Armed Forces have been using the new generation Thales AREOS reconnaissance system on the Rafale. The equipment has been operationally used in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Iraq and Syria. To shorten the intelligence gathering cycle and accelerate the tempo of operations, the AREOS pod is fitted with a data link which allows high resolution images to be transmitted back to military decision makers in real time.

Current and Future Trends in Military EW Systems

Modern warfare has made impressive strides in the areas of communications, radar and surveillance. Military SIGINT platforms are trying to cover the spectrum from HF to Ka band, sometimes over an enormous dynamic range. All efforts are on for improving EW technologies through means such as machine learning. While cognitive EW is a work in progress, the miniaturization and density of electronics components continue to increase, and if cooling technology keeps up, this will drive radio frequency (RF) system functional consolidation and enhance sensor performance.

The future will see multispectral, multimode and multifunction capability, said Chris Rappa, product line director for RF, EW and advanced electronics with BAE Systems’ FAST Labs research and development organization. Active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) are already multimode but over a narrow band, he said. The aim is to build large or small totally digital arrays, where the electronics behind every element in the array are digital and the array can be controlled in every aspect at the element level. Ten years from now Rappa expects to see very large, all-digital, precisely controlled arrays that are multifunction, multimode and capable of learning on the fly to be cooperative or disruptive, whenever they need to be. He expects they will be highly flexible – able to do signals intelligence, ESM, EA, radar, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), and communications, all from one array and one box, and all cognitively and adaptively controlled.

Major Driving Factors – Global EW Market

As per Global Newswire report of December 10, 2019, the global Electronic Warfare market was US$ 25.813 Billion in 2018 and is projected to grow at a CAGR of 4.58% from 2019 to 2026. A major factor for the growth of the market will be the increasing focus on cognitive electronic warfare technology. The increasing rate of change in electronic, cyber, and optical domains will involve a perceptible shift in war-fighting techniques. Since the avenues of technological advancement in these fields are limitless, new generations of equipment will emerge at a rapid rate. The challenge would be to integrate them into the physical domain of war-fighting and achieve the desired effect on the adversary. The relatively new field of Quantum Computing has the potential of creating a new generation of satellites. Trends like these will help drive the market further over the forecast period.

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Equipment like the Russian Krasukha-4 or the Turkish KORAL ground-based jammer can generate very high power output over a broadband of frequencies that can be effective at distances up to 300km, which is a big jump from the previous generation of jammers. Truly multi-role aircraft operating in high threat AD environment will be more effective than single mission electronic attack legacy aircraft. There is a greater emphasis on information superiority and situational awareness, and this is expected to be a major factor driving spending in this sector.Aerial Platform is predicted to be the second-largest segment in the market, with a global market share of over 30% in 2026.

Jon Harper wrote in National Defense in July 2019, that Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that EW is the No. 1 functional area where investments need to be made in the coming years. “Being in a position to achieve superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely critical,” he said. “If you take a look at what China and Russia are doing in terms of their war-fighting strategy, they emphasize being able to operate effectively in the electromagnetic spectrum,” said Mark Gunzinger, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. That includes being able to deny an enemy’s ability to control the spectrum. It is a domain where wars can be won or lost, he said. New offensive and defensive capabilities that could be useful include directed energy weapons such as high power microwaves that are capable of destroying electronic components, and new unmanned systems with EW weapons, he said.

Way Ahead for India

South Asia is becoming a place of EW action, including its coupling with cyber warfare (CW). Chinese armed forces have been going through major reforms since 2015. Armed forces technical functions have been consolidated under the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Forces (PLASSF). Clearly indicating greater focus on intelligence and information warfare. The Chinese recognise the complementarities between the electronic and cyber warfare. The theatre commands are tailored to exploit the unified information warfare service in the form of the PLASSF.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has acquired advanced electronic warfare capabilities and airborne warning and control system aircraft to conduct electronic warfare and to support the command and control. Another area that Pakistan has been pushing is the Software Defined Radio (SDR). These ensure clear or encrypted voice and data communication in VHF and UHF frequency band as well as fully automatic integration with tactical and strategic networks to provide “cellular phone” services to tactical users. A Chinese made JY-27A counter-very-low-observable radar has been seen at Mianwali airbase in Pakistan as per a Jane’s report.

India’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, clearly speaks of enhancing the capabilities in network centric and electronic warfare. India now has a Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) that is already active. IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) greatly enhances the network warfare capability. The Rafale brings a state of the art EW suite. All other combat aircraft of IAF already have electronic self-protection suites, and many have offensive ECM pods. Indian Naval ships have a powerful EW complement. Indian armed forces are pushing to improve network centric and electronic warfare capabilities. Notwithstanding, India is still highly import dependent on high end EW systems. Joint Venture route may be the best option initially. Israel and DRDO have been working closely on many radar and EW projects, including for the LCA ‘Tejas’. There is thus a need to push for indigenous technologies.

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