Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is an emerging concept that most modern militaries worldwide are working to integrate into their warfighting doctrines. The key domains encompassed in the concept include the physical domains—land, maritime, air, and space—the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes cyberspace, and the cognitive/human domain. Unlike the integration and coordination achieved by joint forces in the existing system, MDO aims to deter and defeat adversaries in operations below armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in the post-conflict phase of returning to competition.

At a time when the United States and China are experimenting with various facets of the concept, either overtly or through proxies by providing them technologies, India found an opportunity through Operation Sindoor to test and validate its warfighting concepts and technologies. It was the first instance of non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its formations or physically crossing borders—neither by troops nor by aircraft. India showcased its Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence technology and demonstrated its prowess in both offensive and defensive capabilities—drone-centric warfare, resilient and responsive air defence, long-range precision weapons, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and set a new parameter and “new normal” for future operations.

The book is structured in two parts: Part I – Multi-Domain Operations Concept and Part II – Operation Sindoor: Appraisal. The United States pioneered the development of the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept in 2015–16, which later evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by December 2018. Although the MDO concept is yet to mature into a fully functional warfighting doctrine, it now guides the transformation and modernisation of the US Armed Forces and their peers. China is known to be mirroring the same with its own “Chinese characteristics.”

Part I covers the evolution of the concept in the United States and China, defines the concept primarily derived from US philosophy, explores China’s All-Domain Operations concept, examines limitations of the MDO framework, and discusses India’s challenges and options.

In Part II, after explaining the genesis of India’s problem with Pakistan, the author appraises Operation Sindoor against the backdrop of the MDO concept. Although multiple domains were addressed during Operation Sindoor through coordination and integration among the armed forces and various government departments and agencies, the MDO framework as a concept remains a distant goal. Regarding Pakistan, much of its response was propaganda through influence operations. The author effectively debunks Pakistan’s claim of downing five to six Indian fighter jets on Day One of Operation Sindoor by exposing glaring errors in the technological hypothesis developed by Mr. Michael Dahm, which was widely cited by magazines and newspapers supporting Pakistan’s false narrative.

Drone-centric warfare, multi-layered and integrated air defence, and target-centric warfare employing precision weapons—visible aspects of Operation Sindoor—are covered in comprehensive detail for both India and Pakistan. The dominant role played by Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence and the success achieved by indigenous weapons strengthened the government’s resolve to promote it further, a theme well-articulated in the book. The space, EMS, and human domains have also been given due significance.

The hallmark of the book lies in the author’s lucid exposition of Bharat’s strategic culture, which inspires its military ethos. He emphasises that India’s values are indigenous and not borrowed from any other country.

This book, the result of extensive and detailed research by Brigadier (Dr.) Rajeev Bhutani, could not have come at a more opportune time—when nations are actively developing and transforming their forces around the MDO concept. It will be of immense value to military professionals, researchers, scientists and engineers developing defence systems in government, public, and private enterprises, as well as policymakers.

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The MoD also signed a contract with BEL-Hyderabad for the Instrumented Electronic Warfare Range (IEWR) for the Indian Air Force. BEL also signed an MoU with the Army Design Bureau of the Indian Army for collaboration in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Defence applications. All these contracts assume immense significance especially when it comes to making India a self-reliant nation in terms of defence production and research.

As per BEL, the supply of advanced EW systems will significantly enhance the battle-survivability of the IAF fighter aircraft while undertaking operational missions against adversaries’ ground-based as well as airborne fire control and surveillance radars. The EW suite has been indigenously designed and developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

At the same time, the contract regarding the Instrumented Electronic Warfare Range (IEWR) for the Indian Air Force is being termed as a significant step towards enhancing the capabilities of the IAF to prepare for future warfare. The overall cost of the contract is estimated to be Rs 1,109 crores. The IEWR will be used to test and evaluate airborne Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment and validate their deployment in an operational scenario.

Similarly, the MoU with the Indian Army seeks to bring together the Army Design Bureau (ADB), and BEL under one roof to jointly carry out research activities for the development of innovative AI solutions for the Indian Army. BEL and ADB will co-develop AI-based projects for the Army. The MoU will be executed in a collaborative manner through a nodal organisation named Artificial Intelligence Incubation Hub (AIIH). The AIIH will be co-chaired by the ADG, ADB, and Director, R&D, BEL, with members from the Indian Army and BEL. The MoU also has the provision to co-opt representatives of academia and industry/start-ups.

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An indicator of Chinese activity comes from the fact that this year, the Chinese have sent up 55 rockets. The US leads with 80 launches and the Russians came a poor third with 22. Beijing’s maturity as a space-faring power was confirmed earlier this year when it added the third and last module to its Tiangong space station, which has been occupied by three-man crew since June 2021.

According to the Pentagon report, the Chinese are investing heavily in space and putting money into everything from intelligence assets to weapons such as kinetic-kill missiles and ground lasers. Since 2018, China has almost doubled its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites that are now more than 260, which is about half of the entire world’s ISR systems.

China has one of the most-advanced space programmes in the world and its origins lie in its military doctrine. The Chinese programme was launched by the Fifth Academy of the National Defence Ministry in 1956 and launched its first satellite in 1970.

But today, China has a broad-based programme that includes human space flight, exploration missions to Mars and the moon, alongside the military applications such as enabling long-range precision strikes and using satellite-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and at the same time denying them to adversaries.

The military applications come under the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), which was set up in 2015 and has since centralised all of the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic and psychological operations. It has two broad divisions — the Space Systems Department (SSD) responsible for military space operations and the Network Systems Department (NSD), which handles information warfare.

The SSF space activities are about war fighting and war winning and are deeply integrated with information warfare, which includes cyberwar, technical intelligence, electronic warfare and psychological operations. The current commander of the SSF is General Ju Qiansheng, who earlier headed the NSD.

The SSF’s Space Systems Department is responsible for most of PLA’s space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control and space warfare. The SSD runs the Yuan Wang space support ships, one of which created a furore when it visited Sri Lanka earlier this year.

Perhaps, most significant developments are in the PLA’s counter-space capabilities which seek to degrade and deny space capabilities to adversaries. China, according to the Pentagon report, believes that space-based operations are a crucial element in the US military system and has, thus, pursued a strategy to negate this American advantage. Thus, US reconnaissance, communication, navigation and early-warning satellites will be targeted early in any conflict.

In January 2007, China had tested a direct-ascent ASAT missile that destroyed an old-weather satellite. The resultant debris created a controversy and China has not undertaken such a test since then. The Chinese have also conducted anti-satellite tests using the DN-1 and 2 missiles in 2010, 2013 and 2014, and by a DN-3 missile in 2015. They claimed that these were ballistic missile defence tests, but the Americans insist that these were direct-ascent missiles aimed at ramming into satellites to destroy them. Their assessment is that these missiles are capable of taking out satellites in near geosynchronous orbits where most intelligence and navigation satellites are located.

Reports on China testing a manoeuvring satellite to capture another satellite in space began to appear in 2013 and in July, China tested a deployment involving three satellites in which one of them was fitted with a mechanical arm. The Chinese claimed that this was a test of a system to collect space debris. There is little doubt that China today has the ability to neutralise adversary satellite by capturing them or knocking them off their orbit.

According to a 2020 report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the PLA also has an operational ground-based satellite electronic counter-measures capability designed to disrupt satellite communications, navigation, missile early warning and other satellites through jamming.

The technology was incidentally sourced from Ukraine in the late 1990s and developed indigenously. It is well known that the Chinese also have a well-developed cyberwar capability, which can work in tandem with these jamming systems.

It’s clear that the PLA’s advances in both kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space activities will be a serious problem for the US, which has otherwise enjoyed enormous advantage in space. But by the same measure, India needs to think of ways to meet this burgeoning Chinese threat.

Kartik Bommakanti of the Observer Research Foundation has pointed out that India’s record of heavy-launch vehicles — the type that is needed to hoist certain militarily useful satellites into the orbit — is patchy. By contrast, the Chinese Long March series “are a visible demonstration and example of the Chinese progressing more rapidly than India in the development of geosynchronous launch vehicle.” But this is not the only area where China is ahead of India.

With just five launches in the past year, India can hardly compete with China. It took a tentative step forward when it created the Defence Space Agency under the Integrated Defence Staff in 2019 along with a Defence Space Research Agency. But, it needs to urgently work on a strategy to deal with the China challenge. 

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The overall cost of the contract is estimated to be Rs 1109 crore.

The IEWR will be used to test and evaluate airborne Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment and validate their deployment in an Operational Scenario.

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by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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The present multi-domain warfare and impending theaterisation demand coordination and integration across all domains. Communication enables this coordination with real time interaction and transmission of data amongst the fighting forces in all domains. All this is facilitated now with digitisation of the communication in all dimensions.

The aim of Digitisation and Network Centric Operations (NCO) in the Armed Forces webinar & virtual expo was to provide a forum for the stakeholders in the Services and Industry to enable information exchange on latest technologies particularly relating to the digitisation in the Army, effective network-centric operations, C4ISR, communication systems, decision support information systems for exchange of data and big Data including its challenges and vulnerabilities, the space domain and impact of new technologies (5G, IoT, AI, VR/AR) on warfare.

The event brought together stakeholders from the armed forces, DRDO, public sector, industry and academia and provided them a platform to present their views and discuss pathways.

Inaugural Session

Welcome Address. Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies put the theme of the Webinar in context and highlighted the present multidomain warfighting environment. He emphasized that digitization and net-centric operations were the core of battlefield dominance. All actors were leveraging digitization and NCO by weaponising information technology. He said that we must embrace digital jointness to unlock the digital battle space. Seamless sharing of warfighting information will generate shared operational awareness, effects and tempo which we could use to our advantage to paralise the adversaries OODA cycle. There is a need to seamlessly share info, link sensors & shooters and decision makers, even in a degraded environment, aggregating the combat capabilities of Services while remaining physically disaggregated. C2 Agility brings Force Agility which enhances Force Effectiveness.

Special Address. Vice Admiral Atul Kumar Jain, Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) spoke of the contextual relevance of the webinar with the urgent operational need of Services to move forward towards joint networking and digitisation especially as our adversaries and particularly the Northern neighbour was already exploiting it, leaving no choice but to move forward at a faster pace in this direction. He opined that in modern warfighting the one who dominates in the information domain will stand to win. Space and cyber domains while being independent also influence operations in other domains. In his address, he brought out the relevance of satellite surveillance and satellite communication and several new technologies such as 5G, Artificial intelligence etc., all of which enhance the warfighting capability.

Keynote Address. Lt Gen Upendra Dwivedi, Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Information Systems & Communications), Army HQ gave the Keynote Address and an outline of new initiatives and consolidation of the earlier efforts undertaken by the Indian Army in its journey towards induction of modern technology for conduct of military affairs at all levels involving operational, logistics and human resources. He talked of new generation technologies like Artificial intelligence, 5G, Quantum technology, Robotics, drones and so on. In this journey, the Army is also coordinating with several agencies under the Ministry of information technology, DRDO and academic institutions like IITs and has ordered studies and conducting seminars to remain in step with the new technologies for conduct of military affairs both in peace and war. He was critical of the long process of our defence procurement since by the time products are inducted, these are at the verge of obsolescence. To infuse efficiency in the process, he suggested to pin point accountability for the delays in the procurement process and also suggested a layered GSQR concept which would give time to the concerned staff to introduce workable amendment in the GSQRs so as to stay abreast with the technology. As regards communication, he informed that, as dug in cable communication remains vulnerable, the focus now is on wireless and digitised communication and net centricity between services. He mentioned that an integrated operational and intelligence system will facilitate Theaterisation.

Technology Perspective. Dr Ranjana N, Director, Directorate of Systems and Technology Analysis (DSTA), DRDO HQ, pointed out that digitisation was inevitable. She said that data was a strategic asset. Improved knowledge at all levels could naturally lead to integration in all layers of operations which may even call for changes in the tactics and doctrines. Data must be protected and managed to attain immediate and long-term strategic advantage to the military. Designing of systems is a challenge since it not only has to be robust in hardware and software but, their modularity and scalability is also essential. Cyber hardening of storage, NW and Sensors is equally important. Obsolescence of equipment and their upgradation is big challenge. We are constrained to run old systems with systems of new technologies. Thus, along with old systems, we should able to operate/integrate new sensors and technologies such as 5/6G, AI, big data etc. She cautioned that conceptualisation is the big challenge since the product may not exactly be as visualised. Further, layered architecture and modularity are the key to the modern comn equipment and will have to be developed indigenously. She highlighted that DRDO is working on GIS, Adhoc NW, MANETS, SDR, EW, AI, XL-UUVs, change detection and mine hunting.

Industry Perspective. Col KV Kuber, Director Defence & Aerospace, Ernst & Young gave the industry perspective. He asserted that COVID-19 pandemic had forced digitisation in the country including in the Services. He felt that digitisation in the Services was lagging behind the civil side. Therefore, the pace of digitisation in the Services needed to be hastened particularly in procurement, which could be faster with digitisation. He said that since legacy systems could not be changed in one go, digitisation should be able to integrate the old legacy systems as well. Compatibility, interoperability and backward integration were important. He highlighted the AKANKSHA model of DRDO. He recommended adoption of the waterfall/Agile approach and exhorted that procurement should not be an imprisoned by procedures.

Session 2 was earmarked for Digitisation issues related to the Army. The session was chaired by Lt Gen Dr RS Panwar, former Commandant of Military Collete of Telecom Engineering. Brig Ulhas Kirpekar, Brig Information Systems, Army HQ spoke on “The Digital Army and Initiatives.” Maj Gen K Shankar, Additional Director General Telecom in the Directorate of Signals, Army HQ spoke on the “Role of Army Cloud Centre and Digi Locker.” Brig SS Soin, Brig Telecom, Signals Directorate, Army HQ gave a presentation on “Future of ASCON and AREN Networks.”

The theme of Session 3 was Network Centric Operations and was chaired by Vice Adm Shekhar Sinha, former FOC-in-C Western Naval Command. Capt JS Sachdeva, Captain NCO, Naval HQ spoke on “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap requirements of the Navy for NCO.” Col Vineet Jaiswal, from Directorate of Information Systems gave the “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap requirements of the Army for NCO.” Air Cmde KN Santosh, Principal Director, Operational Networks, Air HQ spoke on “IAF Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap requirements.” Gp Capt Parijat Saurabh, Air HQ spoke on “Meeting Electronic Warfare Threats.”

Session 4 was on C4ISR, Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence. The session chairman was Lt Gen PJS Pannu, former Dy Chief IDS (Operations). Dr K Rajalakshmi Menon, Program Director (ISTAR), Centre for Airborne Studies, DRDO gave a talk on “ISTARS for Indian Armed Forces.” Col Abhijit Singh, Colonel Artillery-9, in the Directorate of Artillery, spoke on “Aerostats for surveillance and C2.”  Gp Capt P Batra, Gp Capt (Airborne Sensors & Networking), Air HQ gave a talk on “Airborne Early Warning Aircraft as Force Multipliers.”

Session 5 was devoted to Communication Systems. Lt Gen Rajeev Sabherwal, former SOC-in-C and Commandant MCTE chaired the session. Col Gurmeet Singh, HQ IDS, gave a talk on “Tri-Services Strategic / Operational Communications.” Brig Rajiv Singh, Brig Tactical Communication Systems, from Signals Directorate spoke on “Battlefield Tri-Services Tactical Communications.” Himansu Kumar Swamy, Scientist E, Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research, DRDO spoke on “Maritime Data analysis & visualization.”

Session 6 was on Information, Data and Big Data – Challenges and Vulnerabilities. The session was chaired by Maj Gen Pritam Bishnoi, former Additional DG Tactical Communications, Signals Directorate, Army HQ. Brig Inder Sethi, Brig CICP, Ordnance Services Directorate spoke on “Data Sovereignty and Big Data Analytics.” Devsena Mishra, Promoter Advanced Technologies gave a talk on “How Big Data and Big Tech undermine national security.” Maj Gen Manjit Singh, Joint Secretary (Cyber) NSC Secretariat gave a talk on “Emerging cyber security threats.”

Session 7 dealt with Space Domination and Satellites under the chairmanship of Lt Gen Satish Dua, former CISC. Air Cmde Prem Kumar, from the Defence Space Agency spoke on “Requirement of robust space situational awareness.” Gp Capt Amarendra Samal, Gp Capt Operations (Space), Air HQ gave a talk on “Steering India towards military space domination.” Capt Manish Kumar, Capt NSO-SA, Naval HQ gave a presentation on “Security of satellite-based Communication networks.”

Session 8 covered New Technologies – 5G, Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence, Virtual Reality/ Augmented Reality and was chaired by Lt Gen MU Nair, Commandant MCTE. Dr Santu Sardar, Director DRDO Young Scientists Lab gave a talk on “Relevance of Quantum Communications Technology for Armed Forces.” Brig Navjot Singh Bedi, Commander Defence Communications Agency. Spoke on “Relevance of 5G for the armed forces.”  Maj Gen Harsh Chibber, Maj Gen ASC HQ Western Command spoke on “Transforming and Reducing Costs of Military Logistics Through IoT.”

The Closing Remarks were given by Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director CENJOWS while the Vote of Thanks was delivered by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor, Indian Military Review.

Key Points Needing Attention

The key points which emerged in the eight sessions of the webinar are tabulated below:-

• Theaterisation would need tri-service digital infrastructure to support seamless op, decision support structure and battlefield management & C2 constructs.            

•  One of the challenges in integration is to have an attitudinal change towards automation and adopting agile processes. This also involves breaking away from silos.                                                                                                                 

•  The architecture of NCO system will require individual Service data centres and secure linkages with the joint regional data centre with a robust and secure cloud storage. The cloud storage will reduce the burden of forward fighting formations, which could retrieve relevant information, as required.

• The ongoing transformation in the strategic and tactical communication network i.e., Army Static Switched Communication Network (ASCON) to Network for Spectrum (NFS) and Army Radio Engineered Network (AREN) to Tactical Communication System (TCS) with overarching presence of satellite communication must continue to achieve the transformational targets. In that, the fibre optics based NFS is the back bone and integrator of three services. This is planned to be supplemented with satellites and microwave communication to extend it till the forward edge of the battle through TCS.

•   Besides three Services, the data and information also emanate from several other sources and also from other domains such as space, cyber etc in different formats which need standardisation.

•  To pick up relevant intelligence, about the adversary’s capabilities / limitations, information sharing will not only be between Services but, could even be from other national/ international sources. This requires synergy with various national and international organisations. With introduction of core strategic network NFS, the Army, Naval and Air force Strategic networks should handshake with it for integration of their data, video and voice communication.                

•  It is important to invest in infrastructure for safe, secure and seamless joint operations with holistic evolution in organisations, doctrine, strategy and tactics.

•   Legal Aspects of Warfighting. We also need to invest in legal aspects of war fighting which are often ignored or do not get due attention.                                                                                                                                  

•   IACCS. Indigenous IACCS of Indian Air Force in its 10 years of operations and in quite robust. Phase 5 would be implemented now. Trigun and Akash Teer projects of Sister services when linked to this system will enhance NCW capability of the Services hence, must be pursued actively.

•   Slow Modernisation. One major challenge is to use the legacy system along with modern equipment. The industry, academia and services have to find an answer to this challenge.

•   Upgradable Systems. Technology upgrades faster than we acquire systems. Therefore, we need to draw a line up what we can absorb and implement and periodically upgrade, say in 5 or 10 years, to reap the benefit of the changing technology.

•   An incremental and evolutionary approach is required in NCW where end state cannot be defined since it is always evolving but, our efforts must be measurable to stay on course towards our goal.

• Role of EW. Dominance in frequency spectrum would aid in gaining advantage over the adversary in the land, sea and air and space domains.

•  ISTAR Development. Integrated Surveillance Targeting and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) under development by DRDO, with close interaction with IAF, utilises several high technologies for offensive and defensive roles in one platform. All three Services must be involved in the project at this stage of evolution, especially since the system identifies surface targets.

•  Possible Naval Role for ISTAR. Inclusion of additional sensors like anomaly detector, pollution detector and AIS in ISTAR will broaden its employment potential in naval role.

•   Broader Exploitation of ISTAR. ISTAR should have seamless integration with other national intelligence networks for gauging the intent and moves of the adversary. The potential of ISTAR for broader exploitation should be examined.

•   Use of Aerostats. Aerostats have been used by the IAF for surveillance. Other Services can examine their employment with due consideration of disadvantages like vulnerability, blind zone, limited employment in mountains, shorter life and endurance.

•  AWACS. It provides immense force multiplier capability. However, it remains a lucrative target using LR SAMs and LR Anti radiation missiles. The number of AWACS required would depend on the expanse of op area needing coverage.

•  C4I2 Requirement for the TBA. To implement the C4I2, we need robust, secure, high bandwidth wireless communication for formations particularly in the TBA due to requirements of mobility. Apart from the common standards, formats and protocols, joint encryption, mission specific applications, the bandwidth requirement of the communication is vital and must be ensured. Systems with self healing capability are required for the TBA.

•  GIS, AI and Robotics. Common Geographic information for the three Services is vital and should be prioritised.

•   Wargaming and Simulation. The robustness and the reliability of the communication systems can be tested in realistic wargaming and simulation exercises.

•   Situational Awareness Model for the Indian Navy. DRDO has developed Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the Indian Navy, followed by Indian Navy Situational Awareness System (INSAS) and finally by 2027, Navy aims to develop Indian Navy Common Operating Picture (INCOP) with many more analytic features using new technologies and communication systems. With these developments DRDO and Indian Navy have shown the way for indigenisation for the other Services to emulate.

•   In TBA, three services besides their inherent conceptual variances use varied types of legacy and IP based modern communications. The communications are static, deployable and mobile. It is recommended to check the efficacy and status of integration in operations and test bed to identify variances and then find solutions to integration challenges.

•   Info, Data and Big Data Challenges. The big tech companies while serving our communication needs, also pose challenge to our security since the data collected by them is stored beyond the national boundaries, thus, beyond the purview and jurisdiction of national law. This opens possibilities of its misuse which is inimical to our sovereignty, national and security interests. Hence, the data sourced with in the country must be stored with in the country so that these remain under the purview of our law enforcement agencies.

•   Security. With increase in digitisation in defence, the threats too proportionally have increased in this domain. Therefore, communication products and contents must be sourced from the trusted sources only.

•   Space Domination. Space situational awareness is vital for collision avoidance as well as to keep an eye on developing threats in the space domain. While collision avoidance would be ensured by ISRO, the threatening satellite or anti-satellite activity is the domain of the defence. Optimum solution for generating required warning / data is vital for both. The first step towards this is building of robust SSA.              .

•   Space Observation/Surveillance. To enhance security, we need to enhance our observation in the area of interest with dedicated capabilities at LEO.

•   Vulnerability of Satcom. Satellite communication is vulnerable to external interference at various levels i.e., at satellite level, in command-and-control link as well as its ground infralstructure. Such attacks/ interferences are difficult to attribute to an adversary. Hence, the diversity and robustness of satellites and its infrastructure is vital.

•   Quantum Comn. Unlike other forms of comn, which remain vulnerable, the quantum communication will ensure secure military communication. Several countries are engaged in the research in the field, eg, China and US have achieved considerable success. Indian defence forces, too, should not lag behind. DRDO (young scientist laboratory) is following a road map and is moving ahead with research in this new area comprising several applications.

•   Relevance of 5 GTechnology in the Armed

contd on page 48

contd from page 46

Forces. 5G will enable monitoring, collation and present relevant data of all activities for better coordination and informed decision taking of high order. Thus, it acts as a force multiplier. It will facilitate transition from old archaic procedures to new processes, increasing efficiency of the defence systems. Armed forces require low to high frequency bands from below 3GHZ band to above 6GHZ band to cover all operations. Dedicated specialist teams should be established to interact with the industry and monitor progress of rolling of 5 G in the armed forces for various facets of its use.              

•   Reducing Cost of Military logistics through IOT. The use of the emerging technology will overcome challenges and bring in transparency, reliability efficiency and decision making with use of less man-hours. Following actions will help to implement use of technology in logistics:-

(i)            Institute inhouse system studies to explore potential use of IOT and Blockchain.

(ii)           Standardize protocols for data sharing.

(iii)          Nominate lead agencies as per domain expertise.

(iv)         Earmark test beds and evaluate.

(v)          Expand scope throughout the organisation.

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Electronic attack (EA), electronic defence (ED) and electronic surveillance (ES), electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic protective measures (EPM) and electronic support measures (ESM) are some of terms that are indicative of the total environmental action. Besides EW, other EM operations include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Each country has an EW policy and doctrine.Primary EW activities are in electro-optical; infrared and radio frequency countermeasures; and involves EM compatibility and deception; radio jamming; radar jamming and deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (or anti-jamming); electronic masking, probing, reconnaissance, and intelligence; electronic security; EW reprogramming; emission control; spectrum management; and wartime reserve modes.

EW Operations

EA and ECM involve the offensive use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability including human life. In the case of anti-radiation weapons, many times this includes missiles or bombs that can home in on a specific signal (radio or radar) and follow that path directly to impact, thus destroying the system broadcasting.ED or electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) involves protecting friendly forces from enemy use of ECM. Flares and chaff are often used to distract IR and radar guide missiles to miss their target. Other examples are spread spectrum technologies, use of restricted frequency lists, emissions control, low observability (stealth) technology and DRFM decoy systems.

Electronic Warfare Support

Electronic warfare support (ES) to detect, intercept, identify, locate, and/or localize sources of intended and unintended radiated electromagnetic (EM) energy. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) are the terms used. The purpose is to provide immediate recognition, prioritization, and targeting of threats to battlefield commanders. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), is related process of analysing and identifying intercepted transmissions from sources such as radio communication, mobile phones, radar, or microwave communications. SIGINT covers electronic intelligence (ELINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT). Analysis parameters measured include frequency, bandwidth, modulation, and polarization.

Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) Hacking

Many people do not realize that unguarded fibre optic cables are often easily accessible, making them a potential targets for hackers looking to tap into the huge amounts of data that travel across these fibre networks. Systemic malignant penetration perpetrated by compromising data quality of the stream on the broadband cable through either OFC or copper medium could be an exponentially augmented hazard There are serious security vulnerabilities that impact operations.

Important EW Operations

During World War II, there was extensive use of EW, also referred to as the “Battle of the Beams”. The first application of EW in WWII was to defeat those navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII. Electronic warfare played a major role in many military operations during the Vietnam War. Operation Mole Cricket 19 was a suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force against Syrian targets on 9 June 1982, at the outset of the 1982 Lebanon War. The operation was the first time in history that a Western-equipped air force successfully destroyed a Soviet built SAM network. The result was a decisive Israeli victory, leading to the colloquial name the “Bekaa Valley Turkey Shoot”. The battle lasted about two hours, and involved innovative tactics and technology. By the end of the day, Israeli forces had destroyed 29 of 30 SAM batteries deployed in the Bekaa Valley, and shot down 82-86 enemy aircraft, with minimal losses of its own. In 2007, an Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site (Operation Orchard) used electronic warfare systems to disrupt Syrian air defences while Israeli jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets, and returned to Israel undeterred.

Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE)

DARE is a laboratory of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), located in Bangalore. It is one of the two DRDO laboratories involved in the research and development of airborne electronic warfare and mission avionics systems. It was established in 1986 as a Project Laboratory, then named “Advanced Systems Integration and Evaluation Organisation” (ASIEO). On 1 June 2001, ASIEO became a full-fledged DRDO laboratory and was renamed as Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE). DARE works on development of electronic warfare systems and mission avionics for aircraft. ASIEO developed the first mission computer for Light Combat Aircraft in 1991. It also developed a self-protection suite for the aircraft that included radar warning receiver, laser warning receiver, jammer, missile approach warning system and countermeasure dispensers under a program named Mayawi in collaboration with Israel’s Elisra.

ALSO READ: India must actively protect its air defense systems’ OODA loop

Sukhoi Su-30MKI uses Tarang Mk 2 radar warning receiver developed by DARE and manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). Its mission computer, radar processor and indication management computer were also developed by DARE and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Hyderabad division. In 2006, DARE partnered with EADS’s defence electronics division to develop a missile approach warning system for the Indian Air Force (IAF) based on the latter’s AN/AAR-60 system. The jointly developed system was put into trials in 2008 and was planned to be co-produced with Alpha Technologies. DARE has also partnered with Elisra to jointly develop electronic warfare systems for Indian and Israeli aircraft. DARE has utilized this partnership to develop an electronic warfare suite for Mikoyan MiG-29 named D-29.

DARE has worked with HAL to develop avionics for upgrade programs for several IAF aircraft. It participated in the development of a mission computer for Jaguar and in the development of navigation and electronic warfare systems for Mikoyan MiG-27M. DARE, in collaboration with Centre for Airborne Systems and Defence Electronics Research Laboratory, developed antennas for electronic warfare support measures and communication systems of DRDO AEW&CS. DARE also developed a unified electronic warfare suite with an integrated radar jammer and a radar warning receiver for HAL Tejas.

Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL)

DLRL is a laboratory of the DRDO, located in Hyderabad, to design and development of integrated Electronic Warfare systems for the Indian Armed Forces. For testing and evaluation of EW systems ELSEC, an extension of DLRL, was established in 1998. EW system simulation and modelling facilities are located inside ELSEC to carry out simulation of complex systems. DLRL works on COMINT/ ELINT/ ESM/ ECM systems covering radar and communication frequency bands. It also conducts systems integration and evaluation of these technologies on various platforms, like aircraft, ships, helicopters, vehicles, etc. DLRL also conducts specialized training courses in Electronic Warfare and technology management for DRDO Scientists and officers of the Indian Armed Forces. DLRL is involved in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), providing ground electronic support for IGMDP, and expertise in the design and development of various components, antennas and sub-systems for HF to microwave and millimetric wave frequencies. DLRL has designed, developed and produced a large number of ruggedised EW Systems. These systems have been inducted into the Services after rigorous field evaluation and user testing.

SPECTRA – Rafale’s internal “Electronic Warfare” (EW) System

SPECTRA (Self-Protection Equipment Countering Threats to Rafale Aircraft) was jointly developed by Thales Group and MBDA for the Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft. The full SPECTRA integrated electronic warfare suite provides long-range detection, identification and accurate localisation of infrared homing, radio frequency and laser threats. The system incorporates radar warning receiver, laser warning and Missile Approach Warning for threat detection plus a phased array radar jammer and a decoy dispenser for threat countering. The SPECTRA system consists of two new-generation infrared missile warning sensors. The new infrared array detector enhances performance with regard to the range at which a missile firing will be detected. With two sensors, each equipped with a fish-eye lens, it provides a spherical field of view around the aircraft. It also offers improved rejection of false alarms and gives an angular localisation capability which will be compatible with the future use of Directional Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM). Dassault claims that stealthy jamming modes of SPECTRA actually reduce the aircraft’s apparent radar signature, perhaps using active cancellation technology. SPECTRA ensures Rafale’s outstanding survivability against the latest airborne and ground threats. The system carries out reliable long-range detection, identification and localisation of threats, allowing the pilot to instantly select the most effective defensive measures based on combinations of radar jamming, infrared or radar decoying and evasive manoeuvres. The angular localisation performance of the SPECTRA sensors makes it possible to accurately locate ground threats in order to avoid them, or to target them for destruction with precision guided munitions. The SPECTRA’s airborne threat localisation, gives Rafale superior situational awareness.

French AREOS – Recce Pod

For both strategic and tactical reconnaissance missions, the French Armed Forces have been using the new generation Thales AREOS reconnaissance system on the Rafale. The equipment has been operationally used in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Iraq and Syria. To shorten the intelligence gathering cycle and accelerate the tempo of operations, the AREOS pod is fitted with a data link which allows high resolution images to be transmitted back to military decision makers in real time.

Current and Future Trends in Military EW Systems

Modern warfare has made impressive strides in the areas of communications, radar and surveillance. Military SIGINT platforms are trying to cover the spectrum from HF to Ka band, sometimes over an enormous dynamic range. All efforts are on for improving EW technologies through means such as machine learning. While cognitive EW is a work in progress, the miniaturization and density of electronics components continue to increase, and if cooling technology keeps up, this will drive radio frequency (RF) system functional consolidation and enhance sensor performance.

The future will see multispectral, multimode and multifunction capability, said Chris Rappa, product line director for RF, EW and advanced electronics with BAE Systems’ FAST Labs research and development organization. Active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) are already multimode but over a narrow band, he said. The aim is to build large or small totally digital arrays, where the electronics behind every element in the array are digital and the array can be controlled in every aspect at the element level. Ten years from now Rappa expects to see very large, all-digital, precisely controlled arrays that are multifunction, multimode and capable of learning on the fly to be cooperative or disruptive, whenever they need to be. He expects they will be highly flexible – able to do signals intelligence, ESM, EA, radar, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), and communications, all from one array and one box, and all cognitively and adaptively controlled.

Major Driving Factors – Global EW Market

As per Global Newswire report of December 10, 2019, the global Electronic Warfare market was US$ 25.813 Billion in 2018 and is projected to grow at a CAGR of 4.58% from 2019 to 2026. A major factor for the growth of the market will be the increasing focus on cognitive electronic warfare technology. The increasing rate of change in electronic, cyber, and optical domains will involve a perceptible shift in war-fighting techniques. Since the avenues of technological advancement in these fields are limitless, new generations of equipment will emerge at a rapid rate. The challenge would be to integrate them into the physical domain of war-fighting and achieve the desired effect on the adversary. The relatively new field of Quantum Computing has the potential of creating a new generation of satellites. Trends like these will help drive the market further over the forecast period.

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Equipment like the Russian Krasukha-4 or the Turkish KORAL ground-based jammer can generate very high power output over a broadband of frequencies that can be effective at distances up to 300km, which is a big jump from the previous generation of jammers. Truly multi-role aircraft operating in high threat AD environment will be more effective than single mission electronic attack legacy aircraft. There is a greater emphasis on information superiority and situational awareness, and this is expected to be a major factor driving spending in this sector.Aerial Platform is predicted to be the second-largest segment in the market, with a global market share of over 30% in 2026.

Jon Harper wrote in National Defense in July 2019, that Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that EW is the No. 1 functional area where investments need to be made in the coming years. “Being in a position to achieve superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely critical,” he said. “If you take a look at what China and Russia are doing in terms of their war-fighting strategy, they emphasize being able to operate effectively in the electromagnetic spectrum,” said Mark Gunzinger, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. That includes being able to deny an enemy’s ability to control the spectrum. It is a domain where wars can be won or lost, he said. New offensive and defensive capabilities that could be useful include directed energy weapons such as high power microwaves that are capable of destroying electronic components, and new unmanned systems with EW weapons, he said.

Way Ahead for India

South Asia is becoming a place of EW action, including its coupling with cyber warfare (CW). Chinese armed forces have been going through major reforms since 2015. Armed forces technical functions have been consolidated under the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Forces (PLASSF). Clearly indicating greater focus on intelligence and information warfare. The Chinese recognise the complementarities between the electronic and cyber warfare. The theatre commands are tailored to exploit the unified information warfare service in the form of the PLASSF.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has acquired advanced electronic warfare capabilities and airborne warning and control system aircraft to conduct electronic warfare and to support the command and control. Another area that Pakistan has been pushing is the Software Defined Radio (SDR). These ensure clear or encrypted voice and data communication in VHF and UHF frequency band as well as fully automatic integration with tactical and strategic networks to provide “cellular phone” services to tactical users. A Chinese made JY-27A counter-very-low-observable radar has been seen at Mianwali airbase in Pakistan as per a Jane’s report.

India’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, clearly speaks of enhancing the capabilities in network centric and electronic warfare. India now has a Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) that is already active. IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) greatly enhances the network warfare capability. The Rafale brings a state of the art EW suite. All other combat aircraft of IAF already have electronic self-protection suites, and many have offensive ECM pods. Indian Naval ships have a powerful EW complement. Indian armed forces are pushing to improve network centric and electronic warfare capabilities. Notwithstanding, India is still highly import dependent on high end EW systems. Joint Venture route may be the best option initially. Israel and DRDO have been working closely on many radar and EW projects, including for the LCA ‘Tejas’. There is thus a need to push for indigenous technologies.

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