1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE is yet another masterpiece in the galaxy of books on military history being brought out every second or third year by the Dehra Dun-born acclaimed military historian Shiv Kunal Verma. It is by far the most eloquent account of the 1965 War and “it sets the bar in military writing,” say some of the critics. 

While India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous 1962 War against the Chinese, a belligerent and somewhat overconfident Pakistan decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, it launched its initial military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May of 1965; India strongly responded. However, by the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN, and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch ‘skirmishes’.

Pakistan then launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 imagining it to be its Brahmastra. It deployed nearly 12,000 trained Mujahids in multiple groups, each named after historical plunderers of the sub-continent. Confident that it had the superior armour like M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and better fighter planes such as F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, and better submarines than India, the Pakistanis expected that in the event of an expanded war, the Indians would collapse just as they had against China in NEFA three years previously,” Verma writes in the Introduction.

Focus shifts to International Border

However, contrary to the Pakistan’s expectations, India firmly repulsed the attack and cut off its entry and exist points into the Kashmir Valley by capturing the Haji Pir Bulge. Operation Gibraltar thus fizzled out. Stung by its reverses, Pakistan then launched Operation Grand Slam in September 1965 in Chhamb and Jaurian. The resultant Indian counter-attack saw the focus shift to various other sectors – Lahore, Barki, Kasur [Khem Karan], Fazilka, Sialkot, and Barmer – on the international border. With the rival Air Force formations getting involved almost simultaneously, the Armed ‘Skirmishes’ turned into a full-scale war.

Continuing the narrative, Verma writes, “As they had in 1962, the junior officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces admirably acquitted themselves despite the on-the-fly reorganization of Forces, lack of intelligence, obsolete equipment, and lackluster military leadership. What could have ended in victory instead culminated in a stalemate. Official Indian figures put the total number of causalities at 12,714, out of which 2,763 were killed, 8,444 wounded, and 1,507 missing. An estimated 2,000 casualties occurred after the Ceasefire, raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN as a global Peacekeeping body. Neutral observers put the Pakistani deaths at over 5,000. The conflict ended when the Tashkent Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 10 January 1966, agreeing to observe the ceasefire lines and withdraw their respective armed personnel to positions that they had held before 5 August 1965.”

However, the Tashkent agreement was not without an accompanying tragedy; within hours of its signing, India’s diminutive Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

A scion of an Army family, Shiv Kunal together with his better half Dipti Bhalla,  enjoys the unique distinction of having worked in conjunction with all the three Wings of the Indian Armed Forces over the past two-and-a-half decades producing short films on military-related issues. Their documentary ‘The Standard Bearers’ on the National Defence Academy (NDA) turned out to be a classic in its own genre. 

I wonder why Shiv Kunal and others of his ilk attribute the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as the culmination of the ‘skirmishes’ that had continuously taken place in the Runn of Kutch between the two countries during April to September 1965. On the contrary, these so called ‘skirmishes’ in the Kutch region were meant to test India’s preparedness, and were a prelude to a well planned strategy aimed at completing the half-finished job in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortuitously, Shiv Kunal’s 1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE by virtue of its rich content has emerged as an excellent text book for the students of military history. Propitiously, the incumbent Commandant at the Shimla-based Army Training Command Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, a ‘man of letters’ himself, would gladly consider prescribing it as a text book for the entrance examinations of the various Courses as also at the military training institutions like Indian Military Academy, National Defence Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College et al.  

The Book running into 557 pages including 48 pages of colour photographs and maps with hardcover weighs about a kilogram. Its entire content is in a small font that is not easy on the eye. It would, perhaps, be better in two volumes.

1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE undoubtedly provides a definitive account of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Raj Kanwar

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A new book authored by Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, who was a young fighter pilot during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, says that while the Official History of the Ministry of Defence admits that the 1965 war with Pakistan resulted in a stalemate, the IAF came out as the winner. Bharat Kumar’s assessment is based on the fact that Pakistan’s thrust in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector to capture the vital bridge on the River Chenab at Akhnoor, was stopped in its tracks due to the timely intervention of the Indian Air Force.

The book titled “The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle – The First Indo-Pak Air War (1-22 September 1965) was released by the Vice President, Hamid Ansari, at a Tri-Service Joint Seminar on the 1965 War at the Manekshaw Centre here today.

The book, published by Gurgaon-based IMR Media, was commissioned by the Indian Air Force. The author was given access to squadron diaries and official records. Bharat Kumar also relied extensively on personal accounts of the Wing and Squadron commanders as well as fighter and bomber pilots who took part in the missions during the war.

The book has disclosed some hitherto unknown facts and brought them in the public domain.

Having emerged with a beating in the 1962 war with China, India was in the process of expanding its armed forces and buying modern equipment but was nowhere near ready to face the challenge from second and third generation aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory. Pakistan had joint SEATO and CENTO and had been armed by the United States with F-86 Sabre jets and Sidewinder-missile armed F-104 Lockheed Starfighters along with Martin Canberra bombers. On the other hand, the Indian Air Force had the Vampire, Gnat, Hunter, Mystere and Toofani jets. MiG-21s were in the process of being inducted.

Operations in the Kutch Sector

The IAF was not used in any offensive manner during the Kutch crises. It was a political decision not to escalate the conflict unnecessarily.

During Operation Desert Hawk launched by Pakistan, on 19 April 1965, Point 84, Biar Bet, Chhad Bet and Guli Talao were attached. On 20 April, Biar Bet was attacked by a brigade sized force and 30 tanks. Pakistanis suffered heavy casualties and Point 84 and Biar Bet were vacated but they did not occupy them.

On 24 June 1965, Flt Lt RLC Sikka, flying a Toofani, was intercepted by a PAF F-104 Starfighter. One fighter says Sikka surrendered (lowering his undercarriage to show intent) and landed in an open field in Pakistan. Another version says that he ran out of fuel, avoided ejecting and belly landed there.

Operation Gibraltar

Pakistan infiltrated 40,000  specially trained irregular forces into Kashmir on 5 August 1965, led by regular officers, Razakars and Mujahids. They were discovered  and rounding up commenced the same day. The PAF was pressed in to support the trapped infiltrators by dropping supplies to isolated bands.

The Army retaliated by occupying some Pak posts across the Ceasefire Line in Kargil, Tithwal and another in Haji Pir Pass. Logistics support was extended by the IAF. From 18 August to 20 September 567 sorties were flown in 433 hours over 36 days

To take on infiltrators entrenched at some posts, Mi-4 helicopters were modified to fire 0.5” Browning gun and drop bombs. The 1949 Ceasefire agreement prohibited the stationing of combat aircraft in J&K.  Beginning 31 August, 79 offensive missions were flown to drop 1,131 bombs and fire 5,458 rounds.

Concept of Operations

Pakistan wanted the air superiority battle to be fought at Sargodha-Peshawar, well to the rear for Canberra bombers. It planned on carrying out bomber raids of IAF airfields after having attacked IAF airfields as soon as hostilities commenced.

On the other hand, the IAF was essentially employed in support of the Army. Attacks against Pak airfields were to be carried out only in retaliation. The IAF mainly took on the PAF in the air. Strikes inside East Pakistan were prohibited.

Operation Grand Slam

Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on 1 September 1965 at 0600 hrs with an attack in the Chhamb Jaurian sector to capture Akhnur and cut off the life line to the Kashmir Valley. The offensive force consisted of 7 Infantry Division supported by two regiments of armour and Corps Artillery. A diversionary attack was also launched at Jhangar, 56 km north-west of Chhamb. This is how IAF support was provided in world-record time.

The Army asked for air support at 1100 hrs. The COAS, Gen JN Choudhri, who was on a tour in Srinagar, landed in Delhi and proceeded to the office of the Defence Minister where he apprised Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Cjief of Air Staff, about the situation and requested for air support. Chavan took the political decision at 1650 hours. The first of 26 aircraft got airborne at 1709 hours, an unprecedented record when combat aircraft are launched within 29 minutes.

Pakistan lost ten tanks, two ack-ack guns and 30-40 vehicles in one day. Pakistan advance halted and for all practical purposes Grand Slam defeated.

India’s First Air-to-Air Kill

Flt Lt Trevor Keelor shot down the first Pak F-86 Sabre of the 1965 war. But there was a sad story as well. Sqn Ldr (later Air Marshal) BS Sikand got separated from his Gnat formation, lost contact with his mates and also his bearings. Strangely, at the end of his fuel state, he landed at Pasrur, a disused airfield in Pakistan, which lies in the direction opposite to Adampur, where he was to return. He was taken prisoner.

Attack on Pathankot Air Base

10 Sabres of 19 PAF Squadron from Peshawar, under Sqn Ldr Sayed Sajid Haider, took off on 6 September 1965 while two F-104 Starfighters covered them in the air. They struck Patahnkot airfield at 1715 hrs for over 10 mins.  In this raid the IAF lost 6 Mysteres, 2 MiG-21s, 1 Gnat, 1 Packet (all in the open) No airctaft inside the blast pens was damaged. In addition 2 Gnats and 1 Mystere was damaged. Three airmen were injured. Pathankot base had early warning about the attack but it was disregarded.

The whole the attack was going on four Mysteres (led by Flt Lt VM Raina) and two Gnats (led by Flt Lt MR Murdeshwar) were in the process of landing on return from a mission in the Chhamb sector against Pakistani vehicle columns. Two MiG-21s had landed and were being refueled.

Attack on Adampur

Four F-86 Sabres, under Sqn Ldr MM Alam, took off for Peshawar to attack Adampur but missed it and overshot. They spotted three Dakotas (led by Sqn Ldr Dhillon of 43 Squadron flying from Sarsawa to Amritsar) near Phagwara but let them go. Near Taran Taran, the Sabres got involved in a fight with a 4-Hunter formation led by Wf Cdr T Zachariah (and Sqn Ldr MM Sinha, Flt Lt SK Sharma and Sqn Ldr AK Rawlley). The entire engagement was fought out at 150-200 feet AGL and tree-top heights. During the manoeuvres, Rawlley impacted the ground. Alam claimed Rawlley’s Hunter. All three Hunters fired at the Sabres but missed them. Adampur was spared the task of defending itself from the Sabres’ attack.

Attack on Halwara

Four Hunters led by Wg Cdr T Zachariah had landed at 1725 hrs, on 6 September 1965, after a mission and were taxiing back.  Meanwhile four Hunters were already airborne providing a combat air patrol (Fg Offr PS Pingale, Fg Offr AR Ghandhi, Flt Lt Rathore and Plt Offr VK Neb). Two out of three Sabres led by Sqn Ldr SA Rafiqui (who had shot down two Vampires on 1 September) struck the Hunters taxiing back. They claimed two Hunters. Soon they got into a fight with Pingale’s combat air patrol. One of the Sabres was shot down by Fg Offr AR Ghandhi. Ghandhi himself was hit by Flt Lt Cecil Choudhary and had to eject. Flt Lt GS Thapa shot down another Sabre with a 20mm aircraft gun being used as a ack-ack gun from the ground.

The Failed Pakistani Air Drop

Pakistan’s plan called for drop of para commandos around three key Indian airfields – Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara.

On the night of 6/7 September, coinciding with B-57 bomber raids, each group of 3 officers, 1 JCO and 60 other ranks, were dropped with auto weapons, mortars, explosives, wireless sets, torches and wire cutters.

At Pathankot, they were dropped at 0230 hours, landed in marshy ground. Villagers discovered them. Sub Area HQ mustered a force of 200 transients and rounded them up by 1000 hours including Maj Khalid Butt.

At Halwara, 60 paratroopers were dropped. Villagers from Rajoana started looking for them and casptured Capt Hassan and two other ranks by morning. A thorough search by Sqn Ldr SK Singh of the Accounts Branch and his men led to the capture of all other para troopers but their commander Major Hazur Hussain managed to get back to Pakistan.

At Adampur, the paratriopers hid in a corn field but were surrounded by the villagers. Some of the paratroopers who were hiding in the sarkanda grass surrendered when they were strafed.

Devayya Gets a MVC after 28 Years

Sqn Ldr AB Devayya, flying a first generation Mystere fighter shot down a third-generation F-104 Lockheed Starfighter. The ‘kill’ was confirmed 28 years later and Devayya was awarded a Maha Vir Chakra, posthumously when a Pakistani pilot confirmed the event.

Flying Officer Dara Chinoy Treks 25 km in One Night

Dara Chinoy’ aircraft, part of four Mystere aircraft formation, was hit by ground fire, caught fire and the engine flamed out. Dara ejected in Pakistan. He managed to evade Pakistani troops and initially moved in Easterly direction. He was followed by Pakistani soldiers. He changed his direction and hid in sugarcane fields for the day. He later trekked 25 km that night and arrived near Amritsar next morning. Had been without food and water for nearly 24 hours.

Dara was interrogated by the Army personnel and after some time his identity was established. He passed out during this journey back to Adampur due to exhaustion but was back to flying the very next morning.

Chief Minister of Gujrat is Shot Down

The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Balwant Rai Mehta, flying in a civilian Beechcraft aircraft, with family, piloted by Jehangir Engineer, one of the famous Engineer brothers of the IAF,  was shot down by a Pakistani Sabre jet on 19 September 1965. This was confirmed by the Pakistani pilot, Qais Hussain in August 2011, when he wrote to the Beechcraft pilot apologizing for his mistake.

IAF Raids Badin Radar

Badin had one of the two high-powered radars overlooking the entire southern sector. PAF aircraft were located at Badin and Mauripur airfields. Wing Commander Pete Wilson was nominated to lead strike against the radar.

Six Canberra get airborne from Agra. Fly at height till Bikaner and then ultra-low level to Badin. The first four Canberras bombed Badin with a view to neutralize anti-aircraft defences. The fifth Canberra flown by Wilson flew at extremely low level and attacked the radome from below with rockets and blows up the radome.

The last Canberra was to perform dual role. First to act as decoy if Wilson encountered any enemy aircraft and secondly to be standby to Wilson if something happened to Wilson. In this case, no such action required. All aircraft return to base. Badin put out of action.

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