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		<title>After Pakistan&#8217;s Removal From FATF’s Grey List, Attacks May Rise</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/after-pakistans-removal-from-fatfs-grey-list-attacks-may-rise/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2022 05:36:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATF Grey List]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Action Task Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Grey List]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jaish-e-Mohammad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JeM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lashkar-e-Taiba]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LeT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sajid Mir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN Counter-Terrorism Committee]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=14694</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Indian intelligence officials, on 28 October, highlighted to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) that Pakistan’s inclusion in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” in 2018 had reduced attacks on “hard targets” in India and resulted in a 75% drop in terrorist bases on Pakistani soil. The officials also exposed the role of Pakistan-based [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/after-pakistans-removal-from-fatfs-grey-list-attacks-may-rise/">After Pakistan&#8217;s Removal From FATF’s Grey List, Attacks May Rise</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian intelligence officials, on 28 October, highlighted to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) that Pakistan’s inclusion in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” in 2018 had reduced attacks on “hard targets” in India and resulted in a 75% drop in terrorist bases on Pakistani soil.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The officials also exposed the role of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in the 2008 Mumbai attacks before the CTC by playing an audio clip of top LeT operative Sajid Mir, in which he can be heard giving instructions to the attackers at Chabad House, a Jewish outreach centre where several Israeli citizens were killed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The officials were briefing the members of the CTC during an informal session held at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, one of the main targets of the attacks carried out in November 2008 by a 10-member LeT team.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mir was arrested by Pakistani authorities and convicted of terror financing earlier this year, just ahead of a plenary meeting of the FATF. This followed years of claims by Pakistan that Mir was dead, an issue highlighted by one of the two intelligence officials who made the briefings. The terror-financing watchdog removed Pakistan from its grey list last week after more than four years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his presentation before the CTC, senior Intelligence Bureau officer Safi Rizvi said without naming Pakistan: “The FATF grey-listing of a troublesome jurisdiction and UN designation of Jaish-e-Mohammad [in 2001] and Lashkar-e-Taiba [in 2005] as well as nine India focused terrorist individuals have been able to create an impact by bringing down attacks on hard targets in Kashmir, reduction of terror bases across the border, open raising of funds and open terror activity between 2018 and mid-2021.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He specifically mentioned the FATF listing of Pakistan, saying it provided India “a window of relative peace”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The FATF, in the last 10 years, has been a very effective tool to implement those very [UN] designations. While there were intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations, Balakot airstrikes [after the Pulwama attack of 2019] and removal of Article 370 from Kashmir which pushed the terror infrastructure in a troublesome jurisdiction [Pakistan], a large portion of the credit goes to FATF grey listing and the UN designation,” Rizvi said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“In the mid of 2018, there were 600 terror bases across the border, which went down by 75% during FATF listing. This, we think, is the most important success, on account of which the counter-terrorism community should take a deeper look at as to how effective designations are,” he added.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He, however, expressed concerns that Pakistan’s removal from the grey list has already led to an increase in terrorist activity in India. “The moment talks started that grey listing [of Pakistan] is about to end, things have started to slide back. There is an increase in terror bases by 50% and we are expecting more scalable attacks on hard targets, and much more trouble,” Rizvi said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By hard targets, the officer meant well-defended government establishments and military camps in Kashmir.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Earlier, in a presentation on terrorism, Pankaj Thakur, joint secretary in the home ministry, said the Mumbai attackers were trained in Muzaffarabad in June-August 2008 and were given motivational speeches by LeT chief Hafiz Saeed and operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The attackers were also trained at Muridke near Lahore for two months in matters such as hostage-taking. In September 2008, they received marine training, including GPS-based navigation. When they infiltrated Mumbai, the attackers remained in constant touch with their LeT handlers through VoIP phone. Among the key conspirators was an ISI official identified only as Major Iqbal, Thakur said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thakur played the audio of Sajid Mir, in which the LeT operative responsible for surveillance of the targets in Mumbai, can be heard giving instructions to terrorists who were at Chabad House. He said a proposal for sanctioning Mir at the UN Security Council was on hold.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/after-pakistans-removal-from-fatfs-grey-list-attacks-may-rise/">After Pakistan&#8217;s Removal From FATF’s Grey List, Attacks May Rise</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Regime Change in Pak and Prospects of Better Indo-Pak Relations</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/regime-change-in-pak-and-prospects-of-better-indo-pak-relations/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:21:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[al Qaeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Action Task Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gen Bajwa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Imran Khan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan's Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistani Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shehbaz Sharif]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tehrik-i-Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TTP]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=13550</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Maj Gen Deepak K Mehta Imran Khan, who was elected as the 22nd prime minister of the country, on 18 August 2018, lost a no-confidence vote in the parliament and, on 11 April 2022, Shehbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan&#8217;s new prime minister. Pakistan’s general elections are due in 2023. Hence, Sharif has just a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/regime-change-in-pak-and-prospects-of-better-indo-pak-relations/">Regime Change in Pak and Prospects of Better Indo-Pak Relations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Maj Gen Deepak K Mehta</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Imran Khan, who was elected as the 22nd prime minister of the country, on 18 August 2018, lost a no-confidence vote in the parliament and, on 11 April 2022, Shehbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan&#8217;s new prime minister. Pakistan’s general elections are due in 2023. Hence, Sharif has just a year in office.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since its formation 75 years ago, the country has had democratically elected governments for only 53 years. In these 53 years, 19 men and one woman have been prime minister, two of them more than once, and not a single one has ever completed a five-year term. The first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, lasted the longest—four years and 63 days—before he was assassinated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his first speech at the national assembly as prime minister, Sharif brought up Kashmir. Claiming that the valley was red with the blood of the Kashmiri people since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, he said that Pakistan would continue to “raise its voice for Kashmiri brothers and sisters at every forum…they will be provided diplomatic support, we will give them moral support”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is as per formula. No Pakistani prime minister can start off without making some belligerent noises about Kashmir. He cannot afford to be seen as being moderate on this issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No matter how hard Pakistan’s politicians try to equate India and Pakistan, India is light years ahead of Pakistan economically, technologically, and on every sociological parameter. If the world ever thinks of Pakistan, it is as a hub of Islamist terrorism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan’s army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who allegedly played a big part in Khan’s removal, also seems pragmatic, if one goes by his public utterances. “Pakistan will benefit if we improve ties with India,” he said recently. In February last year, he agreed to a ceasefire on the Line of Control and the ceasefire has held. He perhaps realizes that a military engagement with India makes no sense for Pakistan, given the many other problems the country faces.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan&#8217;s powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability. India is aware of the dynamic of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan and the risk of blowback from the military establishment against India whenever there is momentum for bilateral cooperation.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-pakistan-s-economy">Pakistan&#8217;s Economy</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan&#8217;s current account deficit is around 4 per cent of GDP. Pakistan owes $122 billion—a third of its GDP—to various multilateral organisations and nations like China and Saudi Arabia. Foreign currency reserves, already depleted, seem to be now in free fall—in March, they dropped 30 percent from $16.2 billion to $11.3 billion. Interest rates are 12.25 per cent.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Terrorism</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The number of terror attacks—and attacks on security forces—by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, has actually increased since Imran Khan, the army and the ISI celebrated the (original) Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August last year.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The TTP has strong links with the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has the tacit support of the Afghan Taliban.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan remains on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money-laundering and terrorist-financing watchdog, precariously perched above the black list. After the 2+2 meeting between the defence and external affairs ministers of India and the US, on 12 April, the two countries issued a joint statement asking Pakistan to take “immediate, sustained, and irreversible action” to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and the 2016 Pathankot attack to be brought to justice.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Afghanistan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ties between Pakistan&#8217;s ISI and the Afghan Taliban have loosened in recent years. The Taliban government is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan&#8217;s military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Imran Khan, who was less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders, is no longer there to support the Taliban.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">China-Pakistan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The only piece of good news for them seems to be that China has reiterated that it considers Pakistan an “all-weather strategic cooperation partner” and “iron-clad brother” and praised Sharif’s commitment to the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The CPEC was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan&#8217;s two established political parties, both against Khan. Shehbaz Sharif struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab. Sharif will defend and push the corridor.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">United States-Pakistan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan is not a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India. Since the military calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S. Khan had blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of his Moscow trip.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">India-Pakistan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Imran Khan’s ambition was to normalise relations with India and play cricket. Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa also spoke about burying the past and focusing on geo-economy. Kashmir is a core issue in its National Security Policy, though Pakistan has tied itself in knots over it, especially after India annulled Article 370. In August 2019, following the approval of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill in Parliament, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, further tension resulted between the two countries, with Pakistan downgrading diplomatic ties, closing its airspace, and suspending bilateral trade with India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan, today, is desperate to begin a formal dialogue with India which ceased in January 2013 after the beheading of an Indian soldier in J&amp;K. Islamabad is also pressing New Delhi to participate even virtually in the SAARC summit, in abeyance since 2016. India is not budging. India is inflexible and has taken the position &#8220;no talks till cross-border terrorism stops.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When Khan became the prime minister, while speaking at the United States Institute of Peace, he admitted to Pakistan having 40-50,000 terrorists who had fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In 2021, after Khan had called the Modi government ‘fascist, unleashing Islamophobia’, India rebutted: ‘The neighbour is an arsonist disguised as a fire-fighter…’</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The current cease-fire on LoC — which does not preclude a two-front situation — is the result of one of the many effective back channels.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Siachen, speaking at the Army Day 2022 media conference, Army Chief Gen Naravane said that demilitarisation of Siachen was possible once Pakistan agreed to marking the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map. In 1988, 1992 and 2006, the two countries came within a whisker of demilitarisation.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Past Attempts at Normalisation</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After inaugurating the new Afghan parliament building in Kabul on 25 December 2015, prime minister Narendra Modi, on the way back, unexpectedly landed in Lahore—the political bastion of prime minister Nawaz Sharif &#8211; for Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding. The symbolism of an Indian leader setting foot in Pakistan for the first time in 11 years, was unmissable. It riled the military establishment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India, under Modi, has vigorously pursued a ‘neighbourhood first’ foreign policy. Modi’s vision is to integrate South Asia into a cooperative common space. The deep state in Pakistan pushed back against the attempted normalization of relations with India. Sharif had been ousted once before in a military coup in 1999 for being a ‘traitor’ who came under Indian pressure to withdraw Pakistani troops during the Kargil War. It was clear that the military-intelligence complex in Pakistan calls the shots and reins in politicians who try to cooperate with India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had also undertaken a bus journey from Amritsar in India to Lahore in February 1999 and was welcomed with open arms by prime minister Sharif. Vajpayee had hailed it as ‘a defining moment in South Asian history,’ but soon thereafter, the Pakistani military infiltrated into Kargil without Sharif’s knowledge and in the two-and-half-month war that followed, India lost 500 of its troops to throw out the infiiltrators.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2020, Sharif was in self-imposed exile. He blamed it on the deep state in Pakistan</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Pakistani jihadi attack on the IAF base at Pathankot, on 1 Januray 2016, was undertaken to derail the nascent Modi–Sharif peace process.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Future Prospects</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India and Pakistan announced, in February 2022, an agreement to renew the 2003 ceasefire. India’s escalating military confrontation with China provided reason to try and stabilise the Pakistan frontier. But the continuation depends on Islamabad addressing Delhi’s core concerns on cross-border terrorism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While Kashmir remains at the top of Pakistan’s agenda, it seems open to reviving commercial ties. It announced an intent to import sugar and cotton from India, but the Commerce Ministry’s decision was ostentatiously reversed by Imran Khan by declaring that “Pakistan can’t trade with India when Kashmir was bleeding”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Islamabad is stuck with preconditions — reversing India’s constitutional changes in Kashmir — it has set for a renewed dialogue with Delhi.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not talking to Pakistan has few domestic political costs to Delhi. Pakistan will have to lift the preconditions for engagement with India. Gen. Bajwa’s second term as army chief ends in November 2022 amidst sharpening civil-military differences. A lot will depend upon his successor.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/regime-change-in-pak-and-prospects-of-better-indo-pak-relations/">Regime Change in Pak and Prospects of Better Indo-Pak Relations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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