The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base. PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley – the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years-the Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military commander negotiations breaking down in October . Due to the sustained military development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely continue through 2022.

China-India Border

Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiations made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials.

Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India.

=========================

Western Theater Command Leadership (2021)

Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong.

Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army DOB: 11/1962

Age: 59

Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou.

Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command DOB: 1958, Age: 63

Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing

Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region DOB: 5/1958. Age: 63

Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province

Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University

The post Recent Developments in China’s Western Theatre appeared first on IMR.

“It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem,” Tshering told Le Libre, referring to the Doklam plateau where there was a face-off between Chinese and Indian troops in 2017 that lasted more than two months until Beijing agreed to withdraw personnel from the eyeball-to-eyeball situation.

“There are three of us. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third,” Tshering added.

His remarks give the impression that the Bhutanese government, as well as its able monarch, are fast arriving at the conclusion that they must resolve their disputed boundary with the huge economic power sooner than later.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in June 2020, China laid claim to the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan. China has also built several villages, allegedly inside Bhutanese territory, but Tshering dismissed the claims in the interview.

The Bhutanese PM’s remarks come in the run-up to the third anniversary of the stand-off between India and China in eastern Ladakh. All this time, 17 rounds of talks have taken place to maintain stability in the area after the unfortunate incident in the Galwan Valley, in which both Indian and Chinese soldiers lost their lives.

Keeping a close watch

For India, Tshering’s remarks are significant. If Tshering is now saying that China has an equal right in the resolution of the Doklam dispute, then it is sure to change perceptions all around.

Remember that in the summer of 2017, Indian troops moved into the Doklam plateau to prevent the Chinese from extending a road it was constructing toward an adjoining hill feature called the Jhampheri ridge. If the Chinese had been able to build their road, they would have been within kissing distance of Chicken’s Neck — the Siliguri Corridor — that connects the Northeast and the Indian mainland.

With the situation in eastern Ladakh having flared up in the last two years, certainly, the Bhutanese next door are closely watching. Even they would have realised that it is not easy for India to deal with China’s rising power and that Beijing, especially after Xi Jinping’s recent consolidation as the supreme leader, is not ready to give an inch to its pesky neighbours.

In fact, with Russia ready to become an able partner in the evolving geopolitical sweepstakes against the United States — the Ukraine conflict being the touchstone — China probably feels that this is the right time to ram through a resolution of its remaining two border disputes. China shares its borders with 14 countries.

Surely, the Bhutanese would have thought that if Delhi, which is a serious rival to China, still hasn’t been able to resolve its dispute with Beijing, what chance did Thimphu have?

Reviving the 1992 agreement?

In the interview with the Belgian daily, Tshering also gave an interesting deadline for the resolution of the dispute with Beijing.

“We are not experiencing major border problems with China, but some territories have not yet been demarcated. After one or two more meetings, we will probably be able to draw a dividing line,” he said.

It seems that the Bhutanese government is considering a return to the 1992 agreement with Beijing, in which, according to reliable sources, it agreed to resolve the disputed borders in the Doklam region in exchange for territories in the north. It also appears that the northern lands also include some grazing areas that belong to the Bhutanese king.

For the last few decades, the Bhutanese king and his elected government have been able to fend off a resolution, probably keeping in mind Delhi’s sensitivities.

With the India-China dispute remaining unresolved, and, in fact, becoming more implacable — to the extent that the Chinese have actually attempted incursions, especially in eastern Ladakh — Delhi would have advised Thimphu to ‘go slow’ with Beijing, in the hope that it could come to some sort of face-saving agreement with China.

But Tshering’s interview clearly indicates that the Chinese are losing patience with Bhutan. We know that they are pressing for the 25th round of border talks with Thimphu, and that in January this year, the Bhutanese and the Chinese held a meeting in the southern Chinese city of Kunming where they discussed a “three-step roadmap” to settle the border dispute.

We also know that the very close relationship between India and Bhutan implies that the latter is keeping Delhi fully briefed on the evolving talks between Beijing and Thimphu.

Lotay Tshering’s public remarks have cast a ripple in the still waters. Certainly, they will have an impact on how India looks at its northern neighbourhood.

The post Bhutan does a U-turn on boundary dispute with China; India alarmed appeared first on IMR.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 1)

The Galwan Clash

A border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted on 5 May 2020. The face-off escalated after the Galwan Valley clashes.

On 15 June 2020, Chinese troops, estimated to be more than 250, attacked a group of 50 Indian soldiers who were inspecting the progress of the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley. The encounter ended in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undeclared number of Chinese troops, and led to a prolonged standoff between the two sides.

There had not been a single death from hostilities at the LAC in over 45 years — since 1967 – despite several hundred Chinese LAC violations annually.

The Current Situation is not promising.

The 16th Border Meeting was held on 17 July 2022, a step-by-step de-escalation was agreed but very little progress has been made.

The stated Indian position has been that until and unless there is peace and tranquility on the border, overall China-India relations cannot much progress. So far, India has remained reluctant to engage China normally in the bilateral context.

Beijing has repeatedly said that border standoff does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, while New Delhi has maintained that peace along the frontier is essential for the two countries to work together.

Chinese violations the LAC in all sectors are growing in frequency – up to 660 LAC violations by the PLA in 2019. There is an uncommon level of hostility, including fist-fighting and rock throwing that were rare prior to 2017.

The trends suggest LAC standoffs are growing more hostile, more frequent, longer in duration, and are receiving more media coverage and international attention, potentially restricting both sides’ room for manoeuvre.

There is a substantial massing of military forces in Ladakh to positions near the LAC.

Why Did China Resort to Aggression?

Some of the likely reasons are discussed below

Infrastructure Development. There has been an acceleration of Indian infrastructure development near the LAC in an attempt to close a substantial deficit with China there.  In April 2019, India completed work on the critical Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road running parallel to the LAC in Ladakh, stretching all the way to its northernmost outpost at Daulet Beg Oldi. More recently, India began building east-west feeder roads from DSDBO to its forward outposts near the LAC. This year, India was also reportedly engaged in efforts to improve road infrastructure at Pangong Lake.

China has attempted to pressure India to halt infrastructure activities. India refused to heed China’s calls; the PLA applied military pressure. Only this time with more troops, more equipment, more locations, more pressure, and one potentially bold attempt to change the status quo at Pangong Lake.

India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022.

Galwan River area has now become a hotspot because it is where the LAC is closest to the new road India has built along the Shyok River to DBO – the most remote and vulnerable area along the LAC in Ladakh.

Major Power Diplomacy. China tried to woo India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative. India declined.

China’s Neighborhood Strategy. China wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties.  It wants to have a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region.

Blame for Pandemic. China believed that India was catalyzing resentment against Beijing over poor handling of the pandemic that originated in Wuhan. India took over as the chair of the WHO executive Board on 22 May 2020 and it had a say in the probe into the origins of the pandemic and Taiwan’s participation in the 72nd session of the World Health Assembly.

Internal Dissent. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced one of the biggest crises since the party came to power in 1949 because of dissatisfaction in handling the pandemic and the consequent surge in economic distress. At the NPC plenary, President Xi’s expected message was conciliatory to the domestic audience, while the international assertion was to be robust and defiant.

Restrictions on Chinese investments. The Chinese government took offence to India’s new rule notified in early April 2020 that blocked Chinese companies from acquiring Indian firms without government approval. The Indian government decided that all procurement orders of Rs 200 crore or less could not go to foreign companies. It could discourage cheap exports from China. Since the clash, India has also banned 224 Chinese Apps and a few dozen Chinese companies are facing tax evasion scrutiny including ZTE, Huawei, One Plus, Xiaomi and Vivo.

Change of J&K Status. India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on Jammu & Kashmir, which provided the province special status and autonomy on 5 Aug 2019. J&K was made a Union Territory directly administered from Delhi. China described India’s move as “unacceptable”, undermining its “sovereignty” — even raised the issue at the UN Security Council. Frequent calls have been made by Indians to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit- Baltistan as these territories rightfully belong to India. China is concerned about these demands since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the ‘China Dream’ and the Karakoram Highway passes through these Indian territories to Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea.

India’s Accelerating Partnership with the US. China is concerned with India’s increasing and growing proximity to the US which it belives is aimed at countering China. Some of the developments which have taken place are

•             Major Non-NATO Defense Partner with all basic enabling agreements in place.

•             Over $20 billion in defense sales to India MQ-9B unmanned aerial systems; P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, C-130J transport aircraft, C-17 planes, MH-60R multi mission maritime helicopters, AH-64 Apache helicopters, CH-47 Chinook helicopters)

•             U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative

•             Institutionalised 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (2018)

•             Quad Initiative (March 2021).

•             Exemption from buying the S-400 Triumf AD systems from Russia

•             Malabar joint exercises

•             Close collaboration in Covid-19 response

•             Counterterrorism Joint Working Group

•             Homeland Security Dialogue

•             Counter Narcotics Working Group

The Ukraine War

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis.

The PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

India’s Encirclement By China

New Delhi has numerous other concerns regarding China’s activities in almost all of India’s neighbouring countries.

Today, China with its unmistakable clout in South and Southeast Asia has used its economic-political-military influence, in intensifying its ties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Maldives causing Indo-China political and security discord.

According to the US annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 2020” the Pentagon says that in addition to the Chinese military base in Djibouti, China is seeking to set up military logistics facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, China is considering to base its military logistics and infrastructure in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan.

China is using the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative first announced in 2013, to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

While China finances the developmental projects in target countries, information about its loaning operations are kept secretive and vague. Consequently, governments of BRI countries end up being completely unaware of the amount of money that they owe to China when contracts expire since loans extended to Chinese state-owned companies, banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions. The terms and conditions of the loans give China the right to use the finished projects and land as collateral if the latter were to default on loan repayments.

Potentially, these projects, when taken over could provide a global PLA military logistics network to interfere with military operations against China and support its own offensive operations as the Chinese global military objectives evolve.

Let us look at Chinese inroads into India’s neighbouring countries.

Myanmar

Myanmar is also part of BRI and likely to face the Chinese Debt Trap. There is also a lack of trust on the Myanmar side, due to China’s historical role in supporting rebel groups in Myanmar.

China and Myanmar share a 2,227-kilometer-long border. They have a boundary protocol signed in 1961, to conduct joint inspections every five years. But this has only occurred twice—in 1984-86 and 1992-95. A dispute over the border between Myanmar’s northern Shan State and China has simmered since 2008. Parts of the 200 km fence built by China have been pulled down by locals. The Chinese government is pushing Myanmar to implement the long-delayed Belt and Road Initiative projects and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Chinese townships are coming up inside Myanmar border areas administered by Wa authorities. The expansion of Chinese influence is obvious.

The CMEC will terminate at a new deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Some analysts have raised fears that the port could someday be used as a base or access point by the PLA.

China has a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in Myanmar. The Chinese Army is also building a base on Small Coco Island in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea north of India’s Andaman Islands. These two islands, which have been leased to China since 1994.

Bangladesh

China is considered as an ‘all-weather friend’ of Bangladesh – Their ties cover geopolitical, economic spheres and defence ties form a key area of their relationship.

Bangladesh forms part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative-BRI. But all is not well between their ties. China tends to interfere with Bangladesh’s foreign relations matters.

Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jimming, on May 10, 2021, warned Dhaka against joining the QUAD and said that if Bangladesh did so, it will “substantially damage” bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China.

China accounted for around 74 percent of Bangladesh’s arms imports between 2010– 2019 including submarines.

Bhutan

Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China and the two countries have held over 24 rounds of boundary talks in a bid to resolve the dispute.

Bhutan and China issued a 1988 Joint Communique on the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary and signed agreement on the maintenance of peace, tranquillity and status quo in the Bhutan-China Border areas in Kunming in April 2021.

China is using all tactics available to it for twisting Bhutan’s arms. China has established new villages roads and military or police outposts in disputed Bhutanese territory.

The Chinese game plan is probably to exchange it for another disputed pocket around Doklam, in western Bhutan at the cost of India’s security.

China seems to have managed to effectively lower India’s influence in Bhutan.

Nepal

China is trying to succeed in replacing India as the key economic as well as security partner for Nepal.

China’s main interest in Nepal has always been led by its concerns over Tibet. 25,000 Tibetans live in Nepal.

The Chinese have always considered Nepal the soft underbelly of Southern Tibet and are now determined to keep it under their influence.

Under a Marxist government, Nepal is trying to reshape its ties with China as a possible counterweight to India by proposing extension of their railway network from Tibet to Nepal, infratsructure projects and providing land link to Chinese ports.

Nepal as a buffer is important for India but India is losing its clout in Nepal to China.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka joined China’s BRI with several projects but now Colombo has fallen into the premeditated scheme of a Chinese debt trap, paying off its loans through debt-equity swaps to creating extra-jurisdictional Special Economic Zones.

An often-cited example of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where the local government was forced to sign the port away on a 99-year lease after failing to repay Chinese loans.

For India, Lanka is an island that can be transformed into a veritable enemy aircraft carrier anchored on her doorstep, within strike range. Sri Lanka is also a potential kick-off point for an Antarctica mission at some future point.

Maldives

Maldives is barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy island in India’s Lakshadweep archipelago and 300 nautical miles away from India’s west coast.

Until 2017, Maldives was part of the Indian security grid receiving defence and economic assistance from India.

In 2013, after Abdulla Yameen came to power, Xi visited Maldives. Maldives joined the Maritime Silk Road and the two nations inked a free trade agreement. Chinese infrastructure projects flourished. Maldives accumulated a debt of nearly $3.1 billion (GDP $4 billion). There have been speculations about a possible Chinese naval base in Maldives. However, since Ibrahim Mohamed Solih came to power as president in 2018 after defeating Yameen, India has been prioritized over China.

Pakistan

China’s “irreplaceable, all-weather friend” Pakistan is China’s biggest arms buyer, counting for nearly 47% of Chinese arms exports.

China has established ammunition factories, provided technological assistance and modernised existing facilities.

The Chinese Chengdu J-10B fighter and Low to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (LOMADS) LY-80 has been supplied to the Pakistan Air Force. The Chinese have provided technology to manufacture JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, AWACS systems and Al-Khalid tanks.

China is the largest investor in Pakistan’s Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.

China played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, such as in building the Khushab reactor (for production of plutonium) and the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium reprocessing facility.

China inroads in  Pakistan/Sindh/Baluchistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, under the garb of BRI and strategic importance attached by it to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are an open secret.

India’s Opposition to CPEC. India has not endorsed the CPEC because it passes through the contested Gilgit-Baltistan region that remains, according to India, under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.

It is crucial for China to gain control over the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK), as the region borders the Xinjiang province of China.

CPEC would link Pakistan’s southern Gwadar port in Balochistan on the Arabian Sea to China’s western Xinjiang region. It also includes plans to create road, rail and oil pipeline links to improve connectivity between China and the Middle East.

Gwadar port, located on the Arabian Sea, will allow China to have a say in global energy economics as the country can use a naval base to hold control over the maritime traffic passing between West Asia.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? (Part 3)

The post Can There Be Rapprochement Between The Two? appeared first on IMR.

The G695 national expressway will be only the second national highway through the disputed Aksai Chin region, where China controls 38,000 sq km of land claimed by India, since the controversial construction of the G219 highway in the 1950s, and is expected to be completed by 2035.

The new highway, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on Wednesday, will run even closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than G219 and is likely to broadly run along the course of G219 from Mazha in Xinjiang in the north, through Aksai Chin, which is currently administered under the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, heading south along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan, and down to Lhunze in southeastern Tibet right across the border from Arunachal Pradesh.

While a map of the proposed highway has not been released, the route described by the report will mean the highway will likely cut across Aksai Chin. Its course will bring it close to several disputed areas that have seen recent tensions, the Post reported, from Eastern Ladakh down to near Doklam close to the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. “Details of the new construction remain unclear, but the highway, when completed, may also go near hotly contested areas such as the Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the LAC,” the report said.

The plan for G695 follows long-held discussions to build another border highway to supplement G219 and act as another key artery that could help China mobilise resources rapidly towards border areas. China has also stepped up the construction of secondary highways at the provincial level that will connect the national highways to remote border areas.

This week, Beijing unveiled a new national road network plan that aims to build 4,61,000 km of roads — including 1,62,000 km of national expressways and 2,99,000 km of provincial highways — by 2035. Under the plan, the official China News Service reported, all cities with a 1 lakh population will be connected to a national highway in 30 minutes.

The post China plans another highway in Aksai Chin appeared first on IMR.

On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

The post China building bridges over Pangong Tso appeared first on IMR.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi on 25 March 2022, the first by a top Chinese official after the 2020 clashes. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi made an official announcement about Wang’s visit.

That Wang chose to visit was a surprise, that India agreed to the visit was a bigger one. The visit was considered a diplomatic breakthrough given the slump in bilateral ties since the standoff in Ladakh started in 2020.

Speaking after the visit, Jaishankar no time line was agreed upon for disengagement and de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). A parallel but a separate discussion took place in regard to sorting out the situation in border areas.  He said 15 rounds of talks were held between the Corps Commanders of the two Armies since April 2020 leading to some progress at several friction points.

Wang at OIC

Wang’s visit to New Delhi came just a day after his comments on Jammu and Kashmir at an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, managed to irk New Delhi.

At the OIC meeting before leaving for New Delhi, Wang said: “On Kashmir, we have heard again today the calls of many of our Islamic friends. And China shares the same hope.”

This drew a sharp reaction from the Ministry of External Affairs. The MEA spokesperson said: “We reject the uncalled reference to India by the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his speech at the Opening Ceremony (of the OIC meeting).”

 “Matters related to the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir are entirely the internal affairs of India. Other countries, including China, have no locus standi to comment. They should note that India refrains from public judgement of their internal issues,” he said.

Delegation-level Talks

National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval told Wang Yi that there was a need to push for early and complete disengagement at the LAC for bilateral ties to return to their natural course.

During delegation-level talks at the South Block in the national capital, India made it clear that continuation of the present situation was not in mutual interest.

The Chinese side invited NSA Doval to visit China to take forward the mandate of Special Representatives on border issues. Doval responded positively to the invitation and said that he could visit after immediate issues are resolved successfully.

Disengagement Proposal Rejected

The Indian Express reported that around the time of Wang’s visit, China had sent a proposal for disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point 15 in the Hot Springs area of eastern Ladakh.

“Government sources said China proposed that Indian troops, who have been in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Chinese troops at PP 15 for almost two years now, move back to the Karam Singh Post between PP 16 and PP 17. China said it would withdraw its troops just behind the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as claimed by India in that region,” the newspaper reported.

The proposal was rejected since the Chinese claim line and India’s understanding of the LAC almost intersect at PP 15. If India were to accept the proposal, it would mean that while Chinese troops would move back very little, Indian troops would have to withdraw several kilometres even behind PP 16 which has never been claimed by China earlier.

State of India-China relations

Thousands of Indian troops remain deployed along India’s remote border with China in the Himalayan snow deserts of Ladakh, where hand-to-hand fighting broke out in June 2020.

At least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers were killed during a clash in Ladakh’s Galwan valley – the first deadly encounter between the nuclear-armed neighbours in decades.

Their undemarcated 3,500-km-long frontier has remained largely peaceful since a border war in 1962, and both countries still claim vast swathes of each other’s territory.

After the Galwan clash, senior officers from both militaries held more than a dozen rounds of talks to de-escalate the standoff in Ladakh but progress has been limited.

Last February, after multiple military parleys, Indian and Chinese troops completed a pullout from a lake area in Ladakh. Days later, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar agreed to setup a hotline.

There has been little progress for disengagement from the Depsang Plains in north Ladakh. The Chinese have denied Indian troops access to their traditional patrolling points 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 but the Chinese have moved machinery for roadbuilding behind these patrolling points.

A total of 15 rounds of talks has been held at the level of corp commanders between the two armies on disengagement from various parts of Ladakh. But progress has been slow.

Beijing has repeatedly said that border standoff does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, while New Delhi has maintained that peace along the frontier is essential for the two countries to work together.

New Delhi has numerous other concerns regarding China’s activities in almost all of India’s neighbours.

Aside from the tensions in the Himalayas, India’s mistrust stems from Beijing’s support of old foe Pakistan, the competition for influence in Nepal, and concern over China’s economic clout in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

Chinese Strategy

Unsettling signal from China show that it intends to continue the ‘string of pearls’ strategy to encircle India in South Asia.

By engaging with Afghanistan’s ruthless regime for rare earth and minerals, China is trying to use a vacuum where India has almost no leverage. Sri Lanka and Nepal’s infrastructure investments aim to cut India’s regional standing. Deep seaports in Myanmar extend that envelope. This is a strategy of boxing India in and flies in the face of Wang Yi’s assertion during his meetings in Delhi that China does not seek a unipolar Asia.

Defence Spending

The standoff in the high Himalayas is a costly undertaking. India is not walking the talk with its defence spending. China increased its defence budget by 7.1 per cent to $230 billion in 2022. It is three times that of India’s $70 billion in 2022.

Without spending at the very least three per cent of her GDP on defence, India will find it increasingly difficult to match China’s assertiveness on the borders.

Economic Lever

In the two years of the standoff, India’s trade deficit is a staggering $103 billion in China’s favour. The quality of this trade deficit is also startling. India exports primarily iron ore, aluminium, and agricultural commodities while importing finished products across consumer and industrial categories, like electronics, pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, and infrastructure items from Beijing.

The trade lever is firmly in China’s hands. Apart from banning a few apps, Narendra Modi’s government has been unable to bring structural reforms over two years to dent this relationship.

Investment and App Bans

China is India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade expanding exponentially since the turn of the century to $95.02 billion in 2021/22. Trade remains heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour. India’s trade deficit with China is the largest it has with any county, and the imbalance has been steadily widening.

More than 100 Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises, operate in India, including electronics manufacturers that have come to dominate the country’s mobile phone market.

Since 2020, however, New Delhi has tightened the screws on Chinese players in Asia’s third largest economy by increasing scrutiny of investments or imports and banning some mobile apps.

The Indian government had previously held up investments worth billions from Beijing, but last week said that approvals for 66 proposals from neighbouring countries – including China – totalling $1.79 billion had been approved.

In February, India also blocked access to dozens of Chinese apps over security concerns, increasing the tally of such restricted mobile apps to more than 300.

Comments

The India-China relationship has been at its lowest point in three decades since Beijing tore up a decade’s worth of agreements for maintaining peace and tranquility at the border and sent troops into India’s side of the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

If the Chinese intention was to gauge if India was ready to normalise ties, then the visit was structured inauspiciously. Wang, who is also a state councillor, arrived via Islamabad and Kabul. In Pakistan, he aired pro-Pakistan views on Kashmir at the foreign ministers’ conference of Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). In Afghanistan, he engaged the globally-slighted Taliban regime as it regresses to its old behaviour. A cold reception in New Delhi was thus expected. South Block judged correctly that the China’s obduracy required a riposte as the China’s need for de-escalation was now greater than India’s.

In 2017, China had similarly shown flexibility to resolve the Doklam stand-off after the BRICS meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg. Subsequently, not only China has dug deeper at positions near Doklam but showed no hesitation in widening the confrontation three years later in Ladakh.

The onus of normalisation of ties lies with Beijing. The presence of a large number of troops, in contravention of agreements, denotes an abnormality and is a clear signal that border disengagement and de-escalation remain non-negotiable for any restoration of ties.

No breakthrough or major announcement came out of Beijing’s outreach. The conversation in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times veered around the need for New Delhi to change its attitude and play down the border clashes for a positive thrust, given the two neighbours’ relations with Russia, a line taken by Wang Yi himself. Both Jaishankar and NSA Ajit Doval, though, responded to the call for taking a ‘long-term view’ by sticking to the stance that the overall development of ties was intrinsically linked to resolution of the border issues.

The new escalatory cycle now can be broken. India’s neutrality over Ukraine addresses Chinese worry about Indian proximity to the United States, after the Quad meetings were raised to the summit level. But China’s tactical moves must not be mistaken for a strategic shift. India will continue to be seen as a potential rival.

The post Chinese Foreign Minister’s Visit to India appeared first on IMR.

The tension between the two sides at LAC escalated after the violent face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at Galwan Valley on the intervening night of June 15-16 that left 20 Indian soldiers dead. At least three rounds of Corps Commander talks were held between the two in an attempt to de-escalate tension in eastern Ladakh and finalise modalities for disengagement of troops from the sensitive region.

On July 6, the Chinese military withdrew its forces, including tents and vehicles by almost 1.5 km from three friction points — Galwan Valley, Gogra and Hot Spring sectors. Chinese’s PLA reportedly removed their tents and structures at Patrolling Point 14. Rearward movement of vehicles of the PLA was also removed at General area Galwan, Hotsprings and Gogra Post, official sources had added.

However, Army sources had on July 6 informed that Chinese heavy armoured vehicles were still present in the depth areas in the Galwan river area. “The Indian Army is monitoring the situation with caution,” Army sources had informed.

On July 7, a reduction of the PLA at the Pangong Tso Lake of eastern Ladakh took place. The sources had added that the disengagement in Patrolling Point 15 will finish by July 8 and that in Patrolling Point 17 Alpha in will finish in the next two days. In a bid to avoid accidental friction, patroling has been suspended in the disengaged area temporarily but both sides have not given up the right to patrol.

The Indian Army is also concerned that each step of disengagement process is easily reversible by Chinese PLA as long as they remain deployed in strength from Finger 4-8, which is around 8 km, patrolled by both India and China until now, along LAC.

In the last round of military talks held between the two-nation at Chushul sector on the Indian side of the LAC, India reiterated its demand for the pullback of Chinese troops from friction site along the LAC. According to sources, India had asked the Chinese side to return to pre-May 4 military positions along the LAC.

Source link

The post India, China disengage at Gogra, Galwan and Hot Springs – Indian Military Review appeared first on IMR.