A trilateral defence pact signed in Islam’s holiest city promises collective security. History, and the pact’s own first weeks, suggest a more modest and more complicated story

Seventy years ago, a Pakistani prime minister looked at the parade of Arab and Muslim unity pacts passing through his region and delivered a verdict that has outlived every one of them: “Zero plus zero plus zero still amounts to zero.” Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was not being cynical for its own sake. He had watched, or would go on to watch, a succession of grand regional groupings rise on ceremony and dissolve on reality. The United Arab Republic, Egypt and Syria’s federation founded in 1958 as the high-water mark of pan-Arab ambition, collapsed in 1961. The Baghdad Pact lost Iraq within a year of its founding, limped on as the Central Treaty Organisation, and expired quietly in 1979. The Regional Cooperation for Development, launched in 1964 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan — then, as now, the region’s three major non-Arab Muslim states — was rebranded the Economic Cooperation Organisation in 1985 and achieved little of consequence. Even the Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981 explicitly to present a united front against Iran, remains today visibly split on how to handle Tehran.

That history is the essential backdrop against which to read the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey at Al-Safa Palace in Islam’s holiest city. The headline provision is simple and dramatic: an armed attack on any one of the three is to be treated as an attack on all. It is language borrowed, consciously or not, from NATO’s Article 5, and it arrived amid genuine regional alarm — a war between the United States, Israel and Iran that began on 28 February 2026 and has since drawn missiles and drones onto every Gulf Cooperation Council state, a revived conflict in Yemen, and a Strait of Hormuz that no longer feels like open water. Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara have spent the past week insisting the pact is defensive, not conspiratorial. Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, put it bluntly: there is no common threat that the three states have put into writing, and any country that does not attack a signatory has nothing to fear from the agreement. Pakistan’s foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, called it “purely defensive in nature” and said the door remains open to other states willing to resolve disputes peacefully — a hint that Egypt, among others, has been sounded out.

Solidarity this quickly assembled, however, sits on genuinely recent estrangement. Only a few years ago, President Erdogan was campaigning to make Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman an international pariah over the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a campaign inseparable from Ankara’s patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood — an organisation Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo all regard as an existential threat to their own systems of rule. Pakistan’s own loyalties have been tested before, too: Islamabad’s parliament voted unanimously for neutrality rather than troops when Saudi Arabia went to war in Yemen in 2015. None of this makes the Mecca pact meaningless. It does mean the coalition of convenience gathered in Mecca has less inherited trust to draw on than its signing ceremony suggested, and Suhrawardy’s arithmetic — that regional solidarity pacts have a long history of adding up to less than the sum of their announced ambitions — is exactly the test this one now has to pass.

What the Text Does and Does Not Commit Anyone To

Strip away the ceremony and the pact is a single operative sentence: an attack on one is an attack on all. What it does not yet contain is almost as important as what it does. There is no standing joint command, no integrated planning staff, and no publicly specified list of what military action a signatory would actually be obliged to take if another were struck. Officials on all three sides describe committees, a permanent secretariat and a push toward interoperability, intelligence-sharing and joint training as the next steps — which is another way of saying the substance is still being built, not already in place. Nor, despite a wave of early commentary, does the pact appear to extend Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent over Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Islamabad has historically reserved its nuclear capability for the threat it perceives from India, and nothing in the public text or in officials’ own statements suggests that calculus has changed.

What each partner actually brings to the table is more prosaic, and arguably more telling: Pakistan supplies a combat-tested military and the Muslim world’s only nuclear arsenal; Turkey brings NATO’s second-largest standing army and an increasingly formidable drone and defence-industrial base; Saudi Arabia brings capital, religious-diplomatic weight and the setting itself. Combined, the three countries field close to 1.4 million active personnel, roughly 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and more than 340 naval vessels — a formidable roster on paper, assembled from three militaries that presently run on incompatible equipment, doctrine and command culture, a mismatch analyst have flagged as the pact’s first practical obstacle to becoming anything more than a declaration.

Against Whom, Really?

Every signatory insists the pact targets no one. The circumstantial evidence points elsewhere. Turkey has the most active live confrontation of the three. Ankara has accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, joined South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice. Watched an Istanbul court indict Prime Minister Netanyahu, and clashed diplomatically with Israel over Turkish military activity in post-Assad Syria, to the point that Erdogan and Netanyahu have traded open insults. Saudi Arabia’s friction with Israel is milder and runs through its now-familiar refusal to normalise relations absent real progress toward Palestinian statehood.

 Iran is the more obvious backdrop. Riyadh has absorbed repeated Iranian and Iranian-proxy strikes since February — yet Tehran’s own reaction to the pact has been dismissive rather than alarmed. The Iranian parliamentarian has mocked the idea that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan would deliver Saudi Arabia any more security than years of hosting American forces did.

The most honest test of the pact’s real solidarity, though, is not rhetorical but empirical, and it has already happened. Pakistan has been fighting an actual, bloody war along its Afghan border since October 2025, a conflict its own defence minister has called open war. United Nations has recorded hundreds of Afghan civilian deaths in a single quarter. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Turkey has lifted a finger, militarily or diplomatically, to help Pakistan there — the mediating role, such as it exists, has come from China instead. A pact tested this early against a live conflict involving one of its own members, and found wanting, tells you more about its current operational weight than any joint statement does.

The View From New Delhi

Indian commentary has been unusually engaged, and unusually candid about the stakes. The Hindu’s international affairs editor, Stanly Johny, described the pact plainly as a new triple alliance taking shape in West Asia — a characterisation more assertive than the “just a hedge” framing favoured by some Western analysts. The Week went considerably further, calling the pact’s implications for India “ominous” and laying out the logic bluntly: it dilutes American and Israeli influence in a region where India has built substantial business and military ties of its own. It says that the pact hands Pakistan a louder strategic voice and the promise of potential military backing in any future confrontation with India. It goes on to state that all this by binding together, in one bloc, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power, NATO’s second-largest army and the traditional custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has pushed back hard on those inclined to dismiss the pact as symbolic, asking pointedly which other defence pact besides NATO contains a provision quite like this one, and warning that if Pakistan succeeds in building a narrative of shared regional threats, India could eventually find itself cast as a target within that narrative. A more measured note has come from Takshashila’s Aishwaria Sonavane, who points out that the three militaries simply lack the institutional foundations for NATO-style interoperability given how differently each is equipped and trained — a caution echoed in a Hindu editorial analysis that flagged the same interoperability gap as the pact’s most immediate practical constraint.

India’s official response, by contrast, has been carefully unhurried. The Ministry of External Affairs said it was closely following developments and would study the implications for India’s national security, language nearly identical to what New Delhi said about the Saudi-Pakistan bilateral pact a year earlier. That calibration looks justified on the narrow nuclear question, where the evidence does not support alarm. It looks less complete on three other fronts that deserve sustained attention rather than a one-off statement. First, Turkey’s entry meaningfully widens the circle of states with a formal defence relationship to Pakistan, at a moment when Ankara’s own ties with New Delhi have cooled over Turkey’s vocal support for Islamabad during recent India-Pakistan tensions. Second, the pact adds fresh urgency to an old vulnerability: as Saudi-Pakistani military interoperability deepens, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a chokepoint critical to Indian energy imports and trade — could increasingly fall within the orbit of a bloc in which India has no seat. Third, China’s shadow role deserves closer watching than it has received. Chinese-origin air defence systems already sit inside Pakistan’s contribution to Saudi security, and any formal deepening of that relationship, especially if Iran’s pressure on the Gulf continues, would be a development India could not treat as peripheral to its own two-front planning. None of this argues for alarm. It argues for the kind of patient, specific monitoring that India’s own commentators, rather than its official statements, have so far done best.

What It Could Mean for Washington

Washington’s own position in this story is awkward. The pact was signed without American blessing and, more strikingly, without an American reaction. More than a day after the signing, the Trump administration had issued no formal response at all. A silence regional analysts read as its own kind of statement. Analysts at the Baker Institute and the Center for International Policy have both framed the pact less as a rejection of the United States than as a hedge. Gulf states diversifying their security options after more than a decade of accumulating doubt about American staying power, doubt the 2026 Iran war has sharply intensified rather than created. That distinction matters, but it may matter less over time than the pact’s practical effect. A Gulf security architecture in which Washington is no longer the only, or even the first, port of call. For a United States already stretched between the Iran conflict, its own domestic debates over troop commitments abroad, and a Gulf increasingly willing to hedge its bets, the Mecca pact is less a challenge to American power than a quiet vote of diminished confidence in it — delivered, pointedly, by three of Washington’s own longstanding regional partners.

A Pact Still Being Written

The days since the signing have brought a steady trickle of detail rather than a single clarifying moment. Islamabad’s police marked the agreement with a flag march; Saudi landmarks lit up in celebration; Turkish officials have floated Egypt as a possible future member, which would turn a trilateral pact into something closer to a standing Sunni-majority security caucus. None of this settles the deeper question. Suhrawardy’s old arithmetic was never really about the sincerity of the leaders signing such pacts — it was about the gap between declared solidarity and the institutional machinery needed to make that solidarity mean anything under pressure. The Mecca pact has, for now, more declared solidarity than machinery. Real capability on paper, a genuine and understandable shared anxiety about American reliability, and a founding trio whose most serious quarrels are barely a few years old. Whether it becomes the exception to seventy years of regional pacts that added up to less than they promised, or simply the latest entry in that list, will be decided less by what was signed in Mecca on 7 August than by how the three governments behave the next time one of them is actually attacked.

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When adjusted for Israel’s population size, this attack by Hamas was worse than what 9/11 was for the United States. The attack, on a Jewish holiday, was the darkest day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. Hamas murdered Israeli civilians in cold blood, raped and beheaded victims, and took at least a hundred Israeli hostages to Gaza. Hamas fighters killed babies and parents in their homes. Partygoers at a music festival were slaughtered.

After an estimated 2,000 Hamas fighters breached the Israel-Gaza border in 29 different places, the Israeli security establishment allowed a narrative to form that it had very little or no intelligence about the invasion.

A full reckoning will require months if not years of investigation. Meanwhile, Intelligence failures can arise in at least four different ways:

•             Through a breakdown of intelligence collection

•             Through a failure of analysis

•             Failure on the part of decision makers to listen to intelligence provided.

•             When sufficient distance is not maintained between intelligence and policymaking, so that intelligence becomes politicised.

Before Hamas’s attack on Israel, there was, self-evidently, a failure of Israeli intelligence collection. Israeli intelligence, principally Shin Bet and Israeli military intelligence, failed to discover Hamas’s plot from their human intelligence or technical intelligence sources in Gaza. This is surprising since Gaza is one of the most intensely surveilled places on earth.

Hamas resorted to low-tech, old-fashioned, tradecraft that foiled Israeli high-tech capabilities. Its attack was only known to a small number of commanders, who gave orders by word of mouth avoiding live feeds of the border. Israel did not detect whispers of the attack beforehand. Movement near the border zone was a daily occurrence. Use of bulldozers and civilian trucks was common in Gaza. Hamas snipers took out Israeli electronic sensors. Hamas also apparently used electronic cyber capabilities to jam communications of Israeli commands.

There may have also been a failure of analysis. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was a textbook example of intelligence failure. This time there was a similar analytical failure before Hamas’s assault.

Political Failure

It is not known how much or what intelligence, if any, Israel’s premier, Benjamin Netanyahu, was given before the attack. If it is true that Egyptian intelligence provided the Israeli government with a warning, was it overlooked? Or did Israel’s divided domestic politics contribute to intelligence being ignored?

On October 9, Egyptian intelligence said publicly that it had given Israel repeated high-level warnings of a pending attack before the Gaza-based Hamas struck, including a direct phone call from Cairo’s intelligence minister to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in late September. US intelligence also warned its own policymakers of unusual Hamas activity and of a general increased threat from Hamas based on multiple streams of intelligence.

Underestimating Hamas’s Capabilities

The assessment about Hamas appears to have been dismissed for three key reasons. First, a belief that Hamas did not have the capabilities to carry out the attack, nor the intention to do so because it would fall outside of their historic pattern of behaviour.

Second, these beliefs about Hamas were not thoroughly challenged within Israeli intelligence nor through sharing the assessment with international partners who might have had useful intelligence on this.

ALSO READ: ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Leadership, Setup and Capabilities

Third, Israeli defences, be they deeply buried sensors, walls, or automatically defended sections of the border, were considered to be too strong for Hamas.

Israel’s feeling of military superiority could have led to complacency, assuming Hamas would not launch a major attack because Hamas could not defeat Israel. Israel miscalculated both Hamas’s capabilities and its intentions-and its own defense capability.

However, Israeli leaders and other observers were well aware that Tehran had been increasing aid to support Hamas for years. Israel nevertheless very clearly underestimated how much such resources boosted Hamas’s current military capabilities and command and control.

Misunderstanding Hamas’s Intentions

Israeli leaders may have calculated that Hamas would not wage such an attack in part because Israel was providing economic incentives for peace (eg, the transfer of Qatari funding to Gaza).

Hamas has been identified as a religious terrorist group with an antisemitic and millenarian mission of jihad to destroy Israel and kill Jews. Hamas’s rise represents the “Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”

Rather than peace, it is likely that Hamas (and its backers in Iran) wanted war, anticipating a major Israeli military response to its October 7 attack, which it could weaponize in information war against the Israelis to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause internationally and erode support for Israel.

Hamas very likely wanted to provoke an overreaction by Israel that would impair Arab-Israeli “‘normalization’ in the Middle East,” including the ongoing US-brokered talks for a Saudi-Israeli peace deal that had made progress in 2023.

Hamas’s Denial and Deception

Hamas deceived Israel by giving a public impression that it was not willing to go into a fight or confrontation with Israel while preparing for this massive operation. Second, small cell of Hamas operatives communicated for two years via hardwired phones embedded in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza; avoided using cells phones and computers in order to evade detection.

Preparations for War Concealed

A CNN investigation analyzed propaganda video and satellite imagery that showed expansion of and increased activity at multiple Hamas training camps in Gaza over the past two years.

It is believed that Israeli military intelligence had collected specific information on how Hamas could invade. From observing rehearsals they also had information about the level of violence Hamas terrorists were willing to inflict.

ALSO READ: EDITORIAL – The Hamas Terrorist Attack of 7 October

Evidence suggests that about a year ago Israeli analysts had a copy of the Hamas attack playbook, the Jericho Wall document, which detailed how Hamas fighters would breach the border using paragliders, drones and rockets, and what they would seek to attack.

Comments

This Israeli failure will be relatable for intelligence agencies around the world. Intelligence analysis is difficult to do accurately, and failures can have huge consequences.

There are two elements of an intelligence assessment: the first is what people, skills, finance and equipment does the adversary possess (capabilities) and, second, what does the adversary want to do with these assets (intentions).

If analysts believed that Hamas could not behave in this way, they would tend to look for intelligence that reinforced that view, and exclude intelligence that refuted it. Assumptions and biases need to be constantly challenged.

Intelligence failures can show where agencies have invested too much resource, while under-investing in human intelligence or analytical techniques. These lessons are hard won, and it is a sad reality of intelligence history that strategic failures often act as drivers of reform and improvement.

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China

“The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is also investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world.

“At the same time, the PRC is also central to the global economy and has a significant impact on shared challenges, particularly climate change and global public health. It is possible for the United States and the PRC to coexist peacefully, and share in and contribute to human progress together.

“Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. The first two elements— invest and align— are described in the previous section and are essential to out-competing the PRC in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains.

“Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly global. Around the world, the contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships that govern global affairs is playing out in every region and across economics, technology, diplomacy, development, security, and global governance.

“In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade. We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.

“Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity. We will support their ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled investment, development assistance, and markets.

“Our strategy will require us to partner with, support, and meet the economic and development needs of partner countries, not for the sake of competition, but for their own sake. We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues – from untrusted digital infrastructure and forced labor in supply chains and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We will hold Beijing accountable for abuses – genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into silence. We will continue prioritizing investments in a combat credible military that deters aggression against our allies and partners in the region, and can help those allies and partners defend themselves.

“We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.

“Though allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC, our diplomatic approach, and the PRC’s own behavior, has produced significant and growing opportunities to align approaches and deliver results. Across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, countries are clear-eyed about the nature of the challenges that the PRC poses. Governments want sustainable public finances. Workers want to be treated with dignity and respect. Innovators want to be rewarded for their ingenuity, risk-taking, and persistent efforts. And enterprising businesses want open and free waters through which their products can be traded.

“While we compete vigorously, we will manage the competition responsibly. We will seek greater strategic stability through measures that reduce the risk of unintended military escalation, enhance crisis communications, build mutual transparency, and ultimately engage Beijing on more formal arms control efforts. We will always be willing to work with the PRC where our interests align. We can’t let the disagreements that divide us stop us from moving forward on the priorities that demand that we work together, for the good of our people and for the good of the world. That includes on climate, pandemic threats, nonproliferation, countering illicit and illegal narcotics, the global food crisis, and macroeconomic issues. In short, we’ll engage constructively with the PRC wherever we can, not as a favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from our principles, but because working together to solve great challenges is what the world expects from great powers, and because it’s directly in our interest. No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues like the climate crisis because of bilateral differences.

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Sanctions usually take the form of:-

• Trade sanctions.
• Energy sanctions.
• Financial sanctions.
• Sanctions on Individual companies.
• Travel sanctions.

The sanctions enforced in 2014 had caused a 5 per cent drop in Russian GDP. What were the specific economic sanction threats that were held out to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine? These were :-

• Close Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline. This new gas pipeline has been constructed from Russia to North Europe (primarily to supply Germany). It was designed to bypass Ukrainian territory (where existing gas and oil pipelines were routinely being pilfered). America has been very clear to block this pipeline so that it could sell its own gas to Europe. The economics were stark. Nord Stream 2 gas would cost the Germans $270 per 1000 cubic feet. Gas from the USA would cost them almost five times at $1000 per cubic feet. Stopping Nord Stream 2 would hurt Europe badly, especially Germany and France. Germany had invested heavily in the construction this pipeline and stood to benefit the most, as in spatial terms Russian gas is closest to Germany and Western Europe. Though this pipeline was complete, it had yet to be certified. The threat was that certification would be withheld.

• Impose Full Blocking Sanctions on large Russian banks, energy companies, defence companies and oil projects.

• Freeze Russian Foreign Exchange Reserves in American and European banks (Some $300 billion worth of Russia’s total Forex reserves of $630 billion was parked in US and European banks). In a blatant breach of global trust, US and the West would simply seize these Russian Forex reserves.

• Sanction Key Russian Leaders. Key Russian leaders, Oligarchs and their families would be targeted individually for sanctions. This was supposed to hurt key decision makers in a pointed manner and ostensibly spare the ordinary Russian citizens.

• Exclude Russia from SWIFT. SWIFT – Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications – headquartered in Brussels has 11,000 banks as members globally. Swift is the global electronic payment system based in Belgium. This step was deemed the equivalent of an economic nuclear strike and was deemed a last resort option. China has developed its own equivalent of Swift. It may not want to opt out of SWIFT, but if forced out or thrown out, it would not mind as it has its own viable options to supplant SWIFT. So has India, which has developed the Rupay as an option.

China as Ally for Economic War

In anticipation of these sanctions, Russia had built up huge foreign exchange reserves ($630 billion) based on the export of natural gas and oil at elevated prices and its very favourable balance of trade position. Russia had been under sanctions since 2014 and had worked out its slew of countermeasures. Putin had visited Beijing for the Winter Olympics in December 2021. The two leaders had detailed discussions and worked out a formula of “Friendship without limits”. Russia would rely heavily on China for bailing it out from the application of harsher financial sanctions. This could entail Chinese purchase of Russian oil and gas and a concerted attempt to replace the Dollar as the international currency of oil trade. China had a platform similar to SWIFT accepted in 180 countries. India has Upland and Rupay. The threat of Western sanctions, however, completely failed to deter Russia from its projected invasion of Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, President Putin announced the launch of a Special Operation with the stated aim of De-militarisation and De-Nazification of Ukraine.

The West was taken by complete surprise. Most European nations seemed convinced that Putin was merely posturing and bluffing and he would not actually cross the Rubicon. The German Intelligence Chief had to hastily flee Kiev and the French Chief of Intelligence lost his job. Surprisingly, the very first sanction came from Germany when it refused to certify the Nord Stream-2 pipeline. The UK put some Russian individuals and entities under sanctions (which the US and other countries had already done so). Most people felt that it was too little too late and the economic sanctions had failed in the primary task of deterring Russia from invading Ukraine.

Initially, the economic sanctions did seem to be making a huge impact. The Russian stock market tumbled dangerously and the Russia had to stop the trading in the stock markets and flight of capital from the country. The Rouble plummeted dangerously against the Dollar. It fell from 80 Roubles to a dollar to over 160 Roubles to a dollar. A number of Western multinational firms shut shop in Russia and moved out causing large scale dislocation and loss of jobs. The US claimed that a large number of highly qualified Russians also began to flee the country with this exodus of Western firms.

The West had weaponised its banks and financial systems to hit hard at Russia. It was a virtual act of war. It also seized over $300 bn of Russian Forex reserves in American and European banks. Inflation rose sharply in Russia from 9 per cent in February 2022; it was expected to rise to 17% by the end of the year.

 Russian Response to Economic Sanctions

Russia today is the most sanctioned country in the world. It is very certain that before the launch of the Ukraine offensive, Russia must have war-gamed the economic war scenarios and come up with some response options.

Defensive Measures. Normal defensive measures against economic sanctions include:-

• Building up a Large War Chest of Forex Reserves. Russia had a built up a huge forex reserve of $630 billion.

• Capital Controls. Prevent flight of capital from the country.

• Increase Interest Rates. Russia increased these up to 20 per cent.

• Forced Capital Conversion. Force gas payments in Roubles. This was a master stroke that stopped the steep fall of the Rouble and, in fact, it came back to 80 Roubles to a dollar.

Russia well understood that Europe was badly dependent as Russian natural gas and oil, not just for heating homes but also for running its metallurgical industries like Aluminium and Copper smelting plants, etc, but also for power generation.

Russia was supplying almost 13 per cent of the global crude oil exports. Taking it out of the global markets suddenly was bound to have huge implications in terms of oil availability and prices. This could easily have been foreseen but strangely was not. For a time, oil prices shot up to $130 a barrel before sliding back to $100 a barrel. In fact, the steep rise in oil and gas prices themselves helped to pay Russian costs of the war. It was Europe that kept buying Russian oil and gas on the sly and contributed the most to Russia’s war chest during this conflict.

Europe imports nearly a fourth of the world’s crude oil imports. However, what is astounding is the sheer level of Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Consider this:-

• 50% of Russia’s crude is exported to Europe.
• 65% of its petrol products are sold to Europe.
• 90% of Russian piped gas is exported to Europe.
• Transportation costs are lowest for Russian gas and oil due to geographic proximity to Western Europe.

Economically, therefore, it makes no sense for Europe to impose such sanctions on Russia which would, first and foremost, hurt Europe the most.

It is just that Europe lacks the autonomy to defy American political pressure. The pain of these sanctions will hurt Europe the most. This will increase as the war drags on and one can already see an erosion in the French and German positions on conflict termination.

The American led efforts to ban all imports of Russian oil and gas suddenly has removed some 3 million barrels per day (bpd) from the global supply of crude. This was bound to have a huge adverse impact on the price of oil. For a time, oil prices shot up to $130 per barrel, before they came down to $100 and started inching upwards again. At this rate, it is feared they could shoot up to $150 a barrel and induce a severe global recession. Petrol prices started going up in the USA to over $5 per gallon. The last time they had crossed $4 a gallon was in the toxic Subprime Crisis of 2008 when the world had hit a recession.

Double Whammy. The world was emerging out of the Covid pandemic induced economic shock. The US had given a huge stimulus package and pumped in so much money that ports could not handle the ships catering to the consequent rise in demand. This was leading to huge pileup of shipments and overcrowding in ports. Now the shock of the Ukraine war is pushing the US and global economy into a stark recession. Inflation in US is at a 40-year high. $7 trillion worth have been lost on the US stock markets, which are bleeding badly.

• Nasdaq is down 28 per cent.
• Dow Jones down 12 per cent.
• S&P is down 16 per cent.

The technical companies in the US have taken a big hit and lost $3 trillion. By the ill thought through economic sanctions, the US economy itself has now taken a major hit but inflation is up at 10 per cent and GDP is down at 1.4 per cent in the first two quarters of 2022.

Impact of Biden’s Switch to Renewable Energy. It is noteworthy that Biden had stopped oil and gas extraction/production in the US to switch to renewable energy in a bid to check global warming. Thus, oil and gas supplies were already going down and prices were rising in the US even before the war in Ukraine started. Europe today stands to lose the most in this economic war. Structurally, it is very heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas. As stated, 50 per cent of Russian crude, 65 per cent of petrol products and 90 per cent of its piped gas goes to Europe to keep it warm in winter and run its power plants and factories. To delink from Russian oil and gas, Europe will need to create infrastructure that could take a number of years to come up.

Despite all talk of sanctions, European countries have continued to buy Russian gas and oil on the quiet. Russia has offered to sell oil to India and China at discounted prices. India has rightly rebuffed all Western moralising and hypocrisy on this subject and purchase of Russian energy has gone up six times. Sanctions have pushed up the prices of oil and gas and paradoxically increased Russian earnings during this war despite all sanctions. The Russian reaction to American seizure of their Forex reserves was to demand all payment for their oil and gas in roubles. This one step immediately shored up the steeply falling price of the rouble. It had fallen from 80 roubles to a dollar to some 160 roubles to a dollar. The rouble has now not only recovered and come back to its earlier value but made gains despite the lauded sanctions. In fact, today the rouble is amongst the strongest performing currencies against the dollar. The global economy was too deeply integrated and the disruption caused by sanctions on Russia has equally disrupted the Western economies also.

It is virtually a butterfly effect. A sudden attempt to put some 3 billion barrels per day (bpd) of Russian oil out of circulation has sent oil prices skyrocketing.

This steep rise in energy prices has caused high inflation in the US and Western economies. Russia has gained from this rise in the value of its oil and gas exports and has actually profited in this war.

Saudi Arabia was callously snubbed by Joe Biden for Its proximity to Donald Trump. It, therefore, refused to follow American diktats to over produce and lower the price of oil. The US now seems hoist with its own petard of sanctions.

Energy Prices Wind Fall

• Phil Rosen wrote on 16 May 2022 that soaring oil and gas prices have helped Russia more than triple its current account surplus, to $96 billion (its largest in 28 years).

• Russia today has a current account surplus of $95.8 billion in the past few months of 2022 as per Central Bank data.

• This is more than triple the $27.5 billion from the same time span last year.

• Russia oil exports revenue is up 5 per cent since the start of 2022. (As per reports of International Energy Agency) revenue from oil and gas sales as well as Moscow’s strict capital controls have helped prop up Russian rouble to the world’s top performing currency against the dollar.

So much for the disastrous impact of Western economic sanctions! Highly adverse consequences are equally visible in USA and Europe in the form of steeply rising prices of oil, gas and food stuffs and runaway inflation in America. Joe Biden is facing a crucial mid-term election with this self-induced economic shock. For all the shrill propaganda and media hype, there is now a slow and inexorable reality check that will soon be evident to this world.

Food Grains

Russia and Ukraine are both major producers of food grains (wheat, barley and maize) as also of fertilisers. Ukraine also used to export major quantities of sun flower oil.

Ukraine is the fifth largest exporter of wheat. However, today all its sea coasts are blockaded. It has lost the key ports of Sevastopol, Mariuropol and Kherson. Odessa port, from where bulk of food grains are exported, is under Russian naval blockade.

Ukraine also used to export Phosphate and Nitrogen based fertilisers. This fertiliser supply has also been disrupted. Fertiliser prices are now above $60 per 1000 cubic feet. Reduced supply of food and fertilisers could affect some 6 billion people globally. It could create severe malnutritionin the Middle East, Africa and South America. Especially countries like Somalia, Egypt, Algeria and countries in Latin America would be severely impacted. Some 2 billion humans could face malnutrition as a result of this war.

Summary of Economic Impacts

A major long term economic impact of the Ukraine war will emerge from the complete erosion of trust in global financial Institutions and global economic governance.

By grabbing some $300 bn (out of Russia $630 Forex reserves) which were parked in American and European banks, the US has severely eroded trust at the global level. This will lead to a sharp polarisation. China, India, Russia and other major economies will now think twice before putting forex reserves in American or European banks. This could spell the end of globalisation as we know it.

Impact on Russia. The cost of the Ukraine war has been almost a billion dollars per day. Paradoxically, this has been offset by European purchase of Russian oil and gas at virtually a billion dollars a day. Since the war began, Europe has contributed over $60 bn to the Russian war chest by its continued import of Russian oil and gas. The simple fact is that infrastructurally, Euopre cannot de-link itself from Russian energy supplies for at least 3-5 years more. There is also the cost of new infrastructure that will have to be created. Russia has put in place strict currency control, heightened interest rates and stopped flight of capital. Due to elevated energy prices and continual exports of oil and gas, Russia today has a current account surplus of $95.8 billion in the past four months of 2022. The Russian rouble today is the best performing currency against the dollar. The sanctions have dismally failed to deter the Russia Invasion or even slow down its prosecution of the war. The sanctions on Russia will bite only in the long term. In the short term, the US and European economies are also paying a steep price in terms of inflation caused by elevated oil and gas prices, services disruption in global food and fertiliser supply and disruption of value chains. In the long term, Russia may face a GDP drop of 15 per cent if the sanctions continue unabated. The short-term impact, however, has been quite the reverse of what was expected.

Impact on Ukraine. The toll in terms of human lives and civilian and military infrastructure has been horrific indeed. No amount of Western propaganda can paper over this painful reality. Ukraine’s basic infrastructure has been destroyed. Some 40 of its cities and towns have been razed to the ground. The war has diverted human resources from labour to the military. 6-7 million Ukrainians have been displaced internally and some 5 million have gone out as refugees to the rest of Europe. The most severe consequence has been the loss of 80 per cent of Ukraine’s coast line and all its major ports – Sevastapol, Mariupol and Kherson. Besides, the Russian Navy has blockaded Odessa. This has led to a severe choking of 90 per cent of its wheat and food grains exports and 50 per cent of its energy supplies. Ukraine has become a landlocked country and the total loss of its seaports will lead to a collapse of 40-50 per cent of its GDP.

The US and Europe have fought Russia virtually to the last Ukrainian soldier without soiling their hands. By engaging in direct combat.

Impact on Europe. The sanctions seem to have backfired rather badly on Europe. These severe consequences can be listed as:-

• Inflation. This is at 8 per cent. It had briefly touched 10 per cent. Due to Covid the fiscal space to deal with this inflation is badly restricted.

• Price of Food. This has created a global crisis that could lead to famines in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. This is steeply pushing up inflation.

• Price of Energy. Europe is inextricably linked with Russia, as it’s most proximate source of energy. Europe has ended up paying for the Russian cost of this war due to elevated prices of oil and gas.

• Asylum Costs. There is the direct cost to ensure the housing, feeding and welfare of some 5-6 million refugees from Ukraine.

• Defence Costs. The USA has pumped is some $40 billion worth of arms aid already and more is in the pipeline. Europe is also supplying weapons, equipment and ammunition.

• Reconstruction Costs. Once the war is over there will be the huge costs of recreation of civilian infrastructure and rebuilding of devastated cities and towns.

Global Impact

• Erosion of Trust in Global Financial Governance. Severe erosion of trust in global financial Institutions and governance will lead to a collapse of globalisation or at best a sharp polarisation between East and West.

• Possibility of De-Dollarisation of Global Oil Trade. As countries are forced to pay in local currencies or in Yuans. China is paying in Yuans and India in Rupee-Rouble terms.

• Elevated Energy Prices will cause a High Level of Inflation. (6% or more). This in turn could induce a recession at the global level. Chinese economy is taking down the Asian economy (due to Covid) and the US economy could drag the global economy into a recession.

• Food Crisis & Famines. Russia and Ukraine, between themselves, were exporting the bulk of food grains (wheat, barley, maize) as also cooking oil (sunflower oil). The prices of fertilisers will also impact food prices. Due to the heat wave, India has been forced to temporarily halt food grains export. The countries of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America could be severely impacted. Somalia receives almost all food grains imported from Ukraine and Russia and will soon face a disaster. This and other countries could face famines and severe food shortages – especially in Egypt, Algeria and some Latin American countries.

• Double Whammy. Covid and Ukraine have delivered a double whammy to the global economy. Covid induced financial stimulus packages have severely curtailed the fiscal space to now deal with any global recession. The reckless eastward expansion of NATO has entrained a disastrous series of unintended consequences, which are now clearly threatening the global economy not just with recession but severe stagflation.

The post Sanctions Against Russia and Russia’s Counter-Attack appeared first on IMR.

World politics and eco-nomics at present seems to be dictated by the Russian-Ukraine conflict. A war that no one thought would last this long is continuing despite sanctions, and the US, European Union (EU), China, Russia and India seem to be combatting the common conundrum of planning their next move. While it would be unfair to the devastating wars and humanitarian conflicts plaguing the global south, it would still not be wrong to say that the Russia–Ukraine War has put the perceived prowess and influence of international institutions to the test. The complete refusal by Russia to buckle under international pressure and, later, the sanctions imposed on the country is emblematic not just of the need to re-assess the working of international institutions but also a greater geopolitical shift in the accepted standard procedures of global politics.

The economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia had a two-fold objective. While the foremost aim was to disrupt Russian economy and destabilise its logistical support to the troops, the additional aim was to deter nations from toeing the Russian line and send a message to countries, who continue to maintain a working relationship with Russia. Russian aggression against the erstwhile Soviet nation of Ukraine and the western reaction to it is being translated by some scholars as return to Cold War politics; however, the romanticisation of that bygone era fails to take into account some pertinent realities of the present geopolitical scenario.

The world that has so long been governed by the political and economic systems of the West is now witnessing and acknowledging a world that has multiple poles of power. This shift has led to a feeling of a relative levelling of the proverbial playing field. As the dynamics of geopolitics register a change, the reaction to the Russia–Ukraine conflict by the rest of the world is not all that the US had hoped it would be.

India’s abstentions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and later in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the Russia-Ukraine conflict have not gone unnoticed by the US and the EU. Earlier, in April 2022, India played host to the foreign ministers of the UK and Russia along with a surprise visit by their counterpart from China, as well as dignitaries from the US. Such a reaction was elicited by India’s choice to continue their relationship with the Russians. While the US and EU want a democracy like India to openly condemn the aggression and invasion by Russia, it is in India’s strategic favour to continue a cordial working relationship with Moscow.

If one was to take lessons from history, India has been a non-aligned country and a move against the Russians could be viewed as a step towards the US and its allies. More importantly, the Indian armed forces depend primarily on Russia and Russian technology for their arms, vehicles, helicopters and frigates to mention a few. Conventional knowledge, which would be derived from instances in the past would also lead one to believe that Russia has proven to be a better strategic partner of India than the US. There is also the issue of geographical propinquity – Russia and India are geographically proximate countries that can potentially play a role in border disputes in the region. At the same time, it cannot be disregarded that Russia and India are also a part of multilateral platforms like Russia-India-China (RIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), which play a pivotal role in evening the keel of global politics.

The Indian decision to abstain from voting against Russian aggression is a decision quite congruent with RealPolitik. The proverb about all politics being domestic holds true for the current scenario as India is holding its national interest supreme. As Russia and India come to an understanding that India would be able to import crude oil and gas from Russia at pre-war prices. it is in Indian strategic interest to continue energy trade with the country.

To circumvent the sanctions, India and Russia and the rest of the world are also exploring options of trade based on alternative currencies in place of the US dollar (USD). A similar agreement is being attempted between India and Iran to reduce the dependency upon the USD; it is also indicative of the greater shift towards a post-dollar world.

However, as the Indian stance has been condemned by the US and the EU; it has also been postulated that there could be rifts within the Quadrilateral Security Organisation (QUAD) as a repercussion of the Indian refusal to toe the American line. The QUAD is a derivative of the multinational group that was formed to lead the Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster R operations in the Indian ocean after the 2004 tsunami. The QUAD however, has evolved from a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) group to a strategic grouping in the Indian ocean primarily focused on containing the growing presence of China in the region.

Out of the four countries that make up the QUAD, the US, Japan, and Australia are allies and tend to follow a similar pattern when it comes to geopolitical decisions; however, for India there are no security guarantees from the US and, therefore, very little incentive for India to prioritise its national interests below the US diktat.

It is also imperative to understand that the purpose of the QUAD has no direct relation with Russia and the fact that its primary objective of containment of the Chinese expansion is a very real concern for QUAD member countries. The compulsion of reducing Chinese sphere of influence is the diving force behind the joint QUAD exercises and summits. Hence, the scenario of the threat of sanctions against India or a definitive rift in the QUAD seems like a distant possibility. It has been argued that the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) could replace the QUAD; however, that also has limited feasibility. India is an extremely important nation in Asia and its economic and military prowess outweighs that of Japan and/or Australia. India also has a network of well-established and long-term relationships in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and is a major player in the Indo–Pacific. The recent sale of the BrahMos missiles by India to Philippines and the interest that it has garnered from other countries of the region are emblematic of India’s significance in the Indian Ocean.

While the US would have liked an unequivocal denunciation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a complete debilitation of the Russian economy due to their sanctions, the reality is that nations have found ways to circumvent sanctions and continue international trade by moving on from the American dollar. As the world becomes more multi-polar, nations have begun to prioritise their national interests, and the US is now stuck in the reactionary cycles of an extremely globalised world where straightforward and uncomplicated actions have ceased to exist. The exigency of limiting China’s growth is as important as stopping Russia at the moment for the US. To balance the two, it must move in ways that forces Washington to make more concessions to nations as the “with us or against us” approach has become redundant.

The dynamics at play between the US, Russia, India and China are a precursor to what can be expected from global politics in the near future.

The post India’s UN Abstentions and Their Impact on the QUAD appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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In a joint statement, on 26 February, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, Germany, France, and Canada agreed on restrictive measures that will prevent the Russian central bank from using its foreign exchange reserves to undermine the impact of the sanctions. They also decided to cut off some Russian banks from the SWIFT inter-banking system, a move meant to isolate Russia from global trade.

Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication or SWIFT is a messaging system that facilitates cross-border transactions in a timely manner and has become the backbone of international financial trade.

Further sanctions were be imposed on Russia by more countries, including the US in the days that followed. The sanctions imposed this time are huge and unprecedented. These are far tougher sanctions than ever before with far more participation by countries.

The United States banned Russian oil imports and Britain said it will phase them out by year end, decisions expected to further disrupt the global energy market, where Russia is the second-largest exporter of crude.

The Indian government has been reviewing the sectors likely to be hit hardest by the sanctions imposed by the USA, NATO allies, EU countries and others against Russia for its invasion of Russia and devising mechanisms to deal with the blow. The sanctions will have a harsh impact on strategically important sectors in India, especially defence.

The government has been assessing the impact on a regular basis internally through an inter-ministerial dialogue, listing out all Russian entities that are covered under American, European as well as UN sanctions.

India and Russia — and its predecessor, the Soviet Union — have long maintained a strategic relationship centred on five main aspects: political, counter-terrorism, defence, civil nuclear energy, and space. 

Bilateral trade between India & Russia

India’s bilateral trade with Russia during 2020-21 amounted to $8.1 billion. Indian exports totalled $2.6 billion, while imports from Russia amounted to $5.5 billion, according to the commerce ministry.

While India exports electrical machinery, pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, iron & steel, apparel, tea, coffee, and vehicle spare parts to Russia, it imports defence equipment, mineral resources, precious stones and metals, nuclear power equipment, fertilisers, electrical machinery, articles of steel and inorganic chemicals, from the country.

Russia is a storehouse for all kinds of natural resources and Europe heavily relies on Moscow for imports of oil and gas, aluminium and copper and other such items. Strong sanctions are intended to achieve objectives quickly, so that they can be lifted as soon as possible.

The sanctions will not only “deeply impact” India’s defence trade with Russia, they will “adversely impact” New Delhi’s trade with Moscow when it comes to other commodities such as engineering goods, automobile components, pharmaceuticals, telecom equipment and agricultural products.

Several Russian banks have opened branches in India. These include VTB, Sberbank, Vnesheconombank, Promsvazbank and Gazprombank. Similarly, the Commercial Bank of India LLC, which is a joint venture of two major Indian banks — SBI and Canara Bank — is providing banking services in Russia.

India-Russia payment mechanism

This is not the first time that economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia. In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the US and other western nations imposed economic sanctions, limiting the dollar trade between Russia and the rest of the world.

In 2019, India selected Chennai-headquartered Indian Bank for transacting with Russian bank VTB for payments for their imports. The idea was that these banks would have the least exposure to the US currency. It is unclear whether Indian Bank will be used for transacting with Russia under the current sanctions.

The move to oust Russia from SWIFT may disrupt trade with India, particularly that for fertilisers, which are crucial for the country’s agriculture sector.

There is already a rupee-ruble arrangement that exists for government-to-government transactions. Therefore, that is unlikely to be affected by these sanctions and may continue for most payments.

Even in the aftermath of Western sanctions on Iran in 2012 because of its nuclear programme, India had designated Kolkata-based UCO Bank as the payment bank for Iranian oil. The account maintained deposits in euros, avoiding exposure to the US banking system.

The crisis will have an immediate effect on defence deliveries in the absence of a new payment mechanism. India has a longstanding cooperation with Russia in the field of defence.

India may consider alternative payment mechanisms for exporters if the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues for a long time and critical trade sectors such as gems and jewellery face a problem in international cash transfer. Diamonds account for about 50 per cent of India’s gems and jewellery exports. Many manufacturers have made payments in euros.

Traders could also explore using the BRICS bank for routing the bilateral trade. One public sector bank could be a nodal bank to monitor the debits and credits. 

Secondary Sanctions

If secondary sanctions are activated, India will be hit the hardest. Secondary sanctions are generally imposed by the US on non-American citizens who are found to be involved in dealing with certain activities such as “assisting, sponsoring or providing financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of persons blocked pursuant to the Executive Order”, notes US-based law firm Holland & Knight. CAATSA is an example of secondary sanction.”

Secondary sanctions carry the potent threat of cutting off the company from all business with the US or US companies. No company would ever run the risk of ever attracting secondary sanctions.

Impact on Energy Supplies

The current Russian invasion of Ukraine — unlike previous wars in Iraq and Libya or sanctions against Iran — has had an impact not just on energy prices. The effects of shipping disruptions through the Black and Azov Seas, plus Russian banks being cut off from the international payments system, are extending even to the global agri-commodities markets.

Russia is not only the world’s third biggest oil (after the US and Saudi Arabia) and the second biggest natural gas (after the US) producer, besides the No. 3 coal exporter (behind Australia and Indonesia). It is also the second largest exporter of wheat. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA), in its most recent report on February 9, estimated the country’s shipments for 2021-22 (July-June) at 35 million tonnes (mt), next only to the 37.5 mt of the whole of European Union.

At No. 4 position in wheat exports, after EU, Russia and Australia (26 mt), is Ukraine, at 24 mt. Ukraine, moreover, is the world’s third largest exporter of corn/maize, with a projected 33.5 mt in 2021-22, after the US (61.5 mt) and Argentina (42 mt). Ukraine and Russia are also the top two exporters of sunflower oil, at 6.65 mt and 3.8 mt, respectively in 2021-22, as per USDA. If that weren’t all, Russia and its next-door ally Belarus are the world’s No. 2 and No. 3 producers of muriate of potash (MOP) fertiliser, at 13.8 mt and 12.2 mt in 2020, respectively, behind Canada (22 mt).

It should not surprise, therefore, that Russia’s war on Ukraine did not stop at driving up Brent crude to $110-15/barrel and international coal prices to unprecedented $440/tonne levels. The shutting down of ports in the Black Sea also sent prices of wheat and corn traded at Chicago Board of Trade futures exchange soaring to their highest since March 2008 and December 2012, respectively.

Coal imports

India’s coal imports from Russia in March could be the highest in more than two years as Indian buyers continue buying the fuel from a market that is now increasingly isolated by sanctions.

Russia, usually India’s sixth largest supplier of coking and thermal coal, could start offering more competitive prices to Chinese and Indian buyers as European and other customers spurn Russia because of sanctions. Trade could also be boosted by a rouble-rupee trading arrangement.

Russia has urged India to deepen its investments in the sanction-hit country’s oil and gas sector, and is keen on expanding the sales networks of Russian companies in Asia’s third-largest economy.

Russia’s oil and petroleum product exports to India have approached $1 billion, and there are clear opportunities to increase this figure

Indian state-run companies hold stakes in Russian oil and gas fields, while Russian entities including Rosneft own a majority stake in Indian refiner Nayara Energy. Some Indian companies also buy Russian oil.

What does that mean for India?

Skyrocketing global prices have made Indian wheat exports very competitive and in a position to at least partially fill the void left by Russia and Ukraine. Wheat from Gujarat, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were being delivered by rail wagons or trucks at warehouses near Kandla port at Rs 2,400-2,450 per quintal, as against Rs 2,100 hardly 15 days earlier. This was above the government’s minimum support price (MSP) of Rs 2,015/quintal for the new crop that will arrive in the markets from mid-March.

The Ukraine crisis has also led to prices of vegetable oils and oilseeds skyrocketing. That includes not just sunflower and its immediate competitor, soyabean. Palm oil in Malaysia has hit all-time-highs, even scaling 7,000 ringgits-per-tonne levels. The benefits of it should flow to mustard growers in Rajasthan and UP, who are set to market their crop in the coming weeks. Mustard prices are ruling at Rs 6,500-plus per quintal, which is again above the MSP of Rs 5,050.

Brent at $110-115/barrel is also helping lift the prices of cotton (because of synthetic fibres becoming costlier) and agri-commodities that can be diverted for production of ethanol (sugar and corn) or bio-diesel (palm and soyabean oil). High prices (above MSP) and a good monsoon (hopefully) can act as an inducement for farmers to expand acreages under cotton, soyabean, groundnut, sesamum and sunflower in the upcoming kharif planting season. That will serve the cause of crop diversification – especially weaning farmers away from paddy, if not sugarcane.

But there is a flip side. The ongoing Black Sea tensions are impacting fertiliser prices as well. Take MOP, a nutrient that India wholly imports. Out of the total 5.09 mt that was imported in 2020-21, nearly a third came from Belarus (0.92 mt) and Russia (0.71 mt). With supplies from there virtually choked, more quantities would have to be procured from other origins such as Canada, Jordan and Israel.

International prices of other fertilisers (urea, di-ammonium phosphate and complexes) and their raw materials/intermediates (ammonia, phosphoric acid, sulphur and rock phosphate), too, have gone up in the past one month and more. These commodities essentially track crude and gas prices. It doesn’t help when China is also India’s largest supplier of urea (Ukraine was No. 3 in 2020-21, after Oman) and second largest of DAP (after Saudi Arabia).

In short, the challenges that Ukraine will present in the coming days are going to be vastly different from those in the aftermath of Corona. And this war and the associated sanctions are also different from those experienced vis-à-vis Iraq, Libya and Iran. The effects are not confined to oil.

Space Cooperation

India’s dependence on Russian space technology has reduced over the past few decades, but the two countries continue to collaborate through the Indian space agency, ISRO, and its Russian counterpart, Roscosmos. 

ISRO’s first group of four astronaut candidates for the planned crewed Gaganyaan mission completed their training for spaceflight in Russia in March 2021. It’s unclear how the war in Ukraine will affect ISRO’s plans.

The four candidates underwent their year-long training at Gagarin Research & Test Cosmonaut Training Center (GCTC) in Moscow, beginning in February 2020. Their training continued through the pandemic, concluding in 2021. Subsequently, they returned to Russia for spacesuit prototype testing. 

In 2019, ISRO also announced a Technical Liaison Unit (ITLU) in Moscow to “enable effective technical coordination for timely interventions on diversified matters with Russia and neighbouring countries for realisation of the programmatic targets of ISRO”. ISRO ITLUs already reportedly exist in Washington DC and Paris. 

Nuclear Power

In 2009, the two countries entered into a major nuclear deal, with Russia agreeing to install four nuclear reactors at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, and one in West Bengal. Two units at Kudankulam are currently operational, and the third and fourth units are being prepared for installation. Russia is also aiding with the ongoing construction of the fifth and sixth units.

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has already shown how unexpected shocks can drive the international situation in unexpected directions. Moreover, China has serious liabilities that could impair its ability to compete with the United States. Some of these have been posited by Chinese analysts and commentators, but others can be deduced by analysis. The most-important vulnerabilities highlighted by Chinese leaders center on the country’s domestic situation.

China continues to face severe economic imbalances, problems of corruption, regional unrest, and daunting demographic challenges. In terms of international attributes, China suffers from a position of disadvantage as the rising power. It has a weaker leadership role in multilateral venues and an inferior influence on global discourse than the incumbent power, the United States. China’s defense strategy has drawbacks as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an unattractive partner for many countries, especially in Asia. And the military’s lack of power-projection capabilities limits its ability to provide the public security goods that helped make U.S. global leadership so successful. These vulnerabilities suggest advantages for the United States, but they also underscore areas that China could address in coming years if it hopes to improve its competitive position. One final point deserves emphasis. The most-critical factors that will determine the outcome of U.S.-China competition are fundamentally domestic.

Which side can build the more technologically innovative and prosperous economy, flourishing and well-governed society, and durable and responsive politics will likely be the side to gain a decisive advantage in competition. A thorough analysis of the potential trajectory of U.S.- China competition would examine such variables closely, but such a task lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The importance of domestic policy should nonetheless be borne in mind when analyzing the international and defense dimensions of competitive strategies.

The research carries several implications for U.S. decision-makers and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first is the enduring importance of strengthening America’s network of alliances and partnerships. China recognizes this network to be a tremendous strategic advantage for the United States, one that Beijing has struggled to match. This analysis has underscored the importance of initiatives undertaken by the past two presidential administrations to shore up U.S. influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific remains a critical domain of U.S.-China competition, and its importance for the broader global competition merits emphasis. U.S. policies that facilitate China’s consolidation of influence and leadership in the Indo-Pacific could simply accelerate Beijing’s efforts to challenge U.S. leadership at the global-systemic level.

The importance of areas outside the Indo-Pacific and of developing countries as constituencies for international leadership deserves emphasis as well. China’s cultivation of client states and influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could directly affect the ability of the United States to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As one example, Chinese success in consolidating influence with vital energy suppliers in the Middle East could affect the ability and willingness of countries like Japan and India to support measures that constrain Chinese power. The need to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo- Pacific may need to be balanced by the need to uphold U.S. credibility as a global leader. At the very least, closer coordination between competitive strategies both within and outside the Indo-Pacific will be imperative. In terms of developing countries, China’s lack of allies leaves it in a weak position to challenge the United States. Washington could strengthen its hand further by bolstering its relationships with those states that have only recently experienced substantial growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Given the long-term trends favoring the rise of the “non-West,” cultivation of support in the developing world appears prudent in any case.

While multilateral organizations and institutions for global governance have endured considerable criticism for their many failings and inefficiencies, this research has concluded that engagement with those entities will remain an important component of U.S.-China competition. Greater U.S. investments in shaping and reinvigorating international institutions and multilateral venues can help consolidate U.S. influence and restrain Chinese challenges. In some cases, this may involve initiatives to grant China more influence and extend cooperation. The goal here, as in other areas, is to weaken the force of Chinese criticisms by demonstrating responsive, effective U.S. leadership, thereby reducing the incentive for other countries to back Beijing’s efforts to renovate those organizations in ways that harm U.S. interests. In terms of defense strategy, the posited strategy has emphasized the importance of deterrence, crisis management, and military diplomacy in the competition. As presented in this report,  China’s defense strategy could expand the geographic range of potential crisis situations and contingencies. Along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes and as part of the effort to expand a network of client states worldwide, China has a strong incentive to offer arms sales, military training, and other forms of assistance. Such transactions have been increasing in recent years. In coming years, China may take on even more security responsibilities to protect its BRI investments. An imperative to demonstrate its credibility as a patron to client nations could incentivize PLA forces to carry out more-frequent acts of military diplomacy that coerce U.S. allies or partners, or even to contemplate the development of alliance-like obligations.

These possibilities suggest that the U.S. military faces a compelling need to bolster conventional deterrence and invest in capabilities to ensure the superiority of the armed forces in the future. A focus on traditional deterrence through conventional military superiority remains the bedrock of any security strategy to counter China. A robust U.S. military capability to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners provides a critical source of U.S. credibility as a leader in the Indo-Pacific. A strong conventional military capability is also essential for incentivizing regional powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, and others, to resist Chinese coercion and demands. By contrast, clear evidence that the United States had lost the military advantage could persuade other countries to either adopt a position of tacit submission and accommodation to Chinese demands or step up a potentially destabilizing arms race to shore up their defense.

Ensuring the capability to deter China in the short term will remain critical, but investment to ensure long-term advantage will be critical as well. Sustaining investment in the future capabilities of the U.S. military will be essential not just for ensuring the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence, but also for bolstering America’s position in the broader competition. Finding ways to better protect U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific but also in the cyber, space, and other domains can backstop broader competitive efforts. DoD may need to maintain a significant presence in the Middle East and other theaters to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities and investing in a technologically advanced future force remain critical tasks. But military diplomacy could assume greater importance, too. The diplomatic struggle for influence and leadership suggests that the U.S. military could play an important role in incentivizing cooperation with the United States and helping countries resist unreasonable Chinese demands. U.S. experience in military advisory missions and assistance can help strengthen diplomatic partnerships and counter Chinese influence efforts. The provision of public goods, such as security for key shipping lanes and humanitarian aid in the face of disaster, can help maintain the appeal of the United States as the global leader.

As the competition intensifies, U.S. military planners may need to expand the portfolio of possible contingencies involving China. The flashpoints between the United States and China today may not be flashpoints in the future, or they may coexist alongside new ones. Scenarios involving Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and cyberspace tend to occupy the concerns of military planners today, but these issues may be augmented by new ones that arise from China’s efforts to exert greater leadership, especially along its BRI routes and with client states on other continents. As just one illustration, China’s willingness to court Iran despite U.S. sanctions raises the possibility over time of proxy conflicts between forces backed by China and those by the United States in the Middle East. The more that China assumes the role of patron for client states, the higher the likelihood that, at some point, PLA forces or Chinese-backed host nation forces could engage in hostile acts against parties aligned with the United States.

The appeal and feasibility of Chinese military efforts to resolve longstanding issues, such as Taiwan, may need to be reexamined through the lens of the broader competition as well. From Beijing’s perspective, the potential cost and risk of escalation in war increase the more the competition with the United States intensifies. Thus, it is in China’s interest to delay the resolution of Taiwan’s status and that of other disputed regions until it has prevailed in its competition with the United States. This might mean that Beijing tolerates a stable cross-strait relationship premised on Taiwan’s rejection of formal independence so long as the United States retains the international upper hand and a credible military intervention option. Other PLA missions may be more pressing for the near term. However, the calculus could change, should China succeed in gaining a decisive competitive advantage in international and regional leadership and in its military posture near Taiwan. Similarly, China may regard as satisfactory a continued reliance on gray-zone tactics that incrementally change the status quo within the first island chain in a low-risk manner while it prioritizes efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere. To maximize deterrence and the protection of U.S. interests, the defense and foreign policy dimensions of any U.S. competitive strategy may need to be even more closely coordinated.

Any Chinese deliberation on how to tailor the controlled use of force in any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces would carry serious risks, of course. The dangers of escalation and miscalculation paradoxically underscore the importance of finding ways for both countries to cooperate and ease tensions as a component of successful competition. The development of a strategy that includes some degree of reassurance and cooperation could help stabilize the competition and reduce risks of miscalculation and dangerous incidents. Moreover, as the international security environment experiences more fragmentation and breakdown, collaboration between the world’s two largest powers could prove nearly unavoidable in any case.

The return of great-power competition after decades of unchallenged U.S. global primacy has introduced new challenges and risks. Washington enters the contest burdened by fiscal strains, domestic political polarization, and competing international and domestic priorities. These constraints raise the imperative of developing effective strategies that allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The derivation of a Chinese strategy can, hopefully, provide a useful tool for that important task.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

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