On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

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Chinese and Indian troops on the northern and southern shores of Pangong Tso began “synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between Corps Commanders when they met on January 24.

According to the disengagement agreement, announced by the two countries, Chinese troops will move back to Finger 8 and Indian troops will pull back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post between Finger 2 and 3 of the northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake. Further, there would be a temporary moratorium on military activities, including patrolling to the traditional areas.

Defence Minister’s Statement

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 11 February, about the “present situation in eastern Ladakh.” A statement was issued by the Chinese Defence Ministry a day before.

He said “I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the north and south bank of the Pangong Lake.”

As per the agreement, both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner in these areas, he said.

The defence minister assured the House that India has not conceded anything while entering into the disengagement process, adding there are “some outstanding issues” with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in eastern Ladakh.

Giving details of the pact, the Minister said, “The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8. Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3,” he said.

“A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both north and south bank area will be removed,” Singh said.

He also informed the Elders that for the time being patrolling by both the armies in that area will not take place till the outstanding issues were addressed in the future military and diplomatic level parley.

“These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas,” the defence minister said.

Based on this agreement action started from 10 February, he said, on the north and south bank. “It is expected that this will restore the situation to before the standoff of last year,” Singh said. Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed. Singh also mentioned that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

•             LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.

•             Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.

•             All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”.

Chinese Statement

Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, had said in a written statement on Wednesday: “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10.”

“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the Chinese statement said.

Importance of the Region

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

Further, it was on the south bank of the lake that Indian forces had gained strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, in an action in late August 2020, outwitting the Chinese. Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier. Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap, which is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector. However, India had been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.

The PLA has vacated the features of Helmet and Black Top, South of Pangong Tso Lake, while the Indian Army has come down from the dominating features of Point 5167, Bump and Magar Hill that India seized at the beginning of August.

The disengagement agreement covers only the Pangong Tso Lake sector in Central Ladakh, but makes no mention of Depsang sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Northern Ladakh, where PLA troops have crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and established themselves 15-18 kilometres inside territory that India has always claimed and patrolled. Since April, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from accessing Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13 on the LAC.

The Indian Army regards Depsang as a critical sector, since controlling this would provide the PLA with a springboard to capture DBO, cut off India from the Karakoram Pass, and progress operations towards India’s vital Siachen Glacier sector.

While the start of disengagement involves the troops in contact on the front lines in Ladakh, there remain close to 100,000 troops from the PLA and the Indian Army that were deployed behind the front lines as reserves in case fighting broke out. It is likely that these would only be withdrawn after successful disengagement by the troops in contact.

Verification of Disengagement

The Indian Army used drones and high-resolution cameras to check and record dismantling of the Chinese infrastructure at the Pangong Tso Lake in Eastern Ladakh as part of the agreement for disengagement. The process at both northern and southern banks of the lake was completed by 20 February.

China had created a military garrison at Finger 7 where 13 jetties were stationed, long range guns were positioned, bunkers were constructed and permanent structures built to accommodate thousands of troops.

Field commanders of both sides met almost on a daily basis to take forward the disengagement process.

Lessons Learnt

India’s intelligence agencies and Armed Forces must remain geared for any adverse development and keep plans ready to prevent China from surprising us, be it occupation of any strategic feature along our Northern borders extending from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh or a repeat of a Galwan like situation proactively.

Back in July 1962, ‘partial’ withdrawal of Chinese troops from Ladakh was a treachery. Barely three months later, China invaded Indian territory.

Restoration of status quo ante on LAC will not only add to Indian Army and Modi government’s military credibility but also persuade President Xi Jinping to restrain his Western Theatre Commander to undertake any military misadventure in future.

China will continue to follow the strategy of engaging the Indian forces on the northern borders in controlled standoffs to create a major dilemma for a possible two-front confrontation and distribution of resources between land and maritime borders.

The Chinese would prefer to keep India engaged in small wars and engagements hampering India’s ambition of rising to the level of a world power from the regional power.

China may also employ hybrid warfare techniques to create internal turbulence in India. It may target India’s ethnic, regional and religious diversity. India must prepare itself against grey zone warfare.

India must continually exercise full strategic autonomy based upon its identified interests and diversify its partnerships while keeping China engaged.

The military has to be modernized through self-reliance and India’s economy has to rise to higher levels of growth.

National and political unity is required to neutralise the Chinese threat, strengthening hard and soft power, internal stability, mature politics, and national resolve.

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