Lessons Form the Israel-Iran, Ever since the revolution in 1979, there has been a significant shift in Iran’s foreign policy, and it no longer recognizes Israel’s right to exist.

Prior to 1979, Iran and Israel were allies. However, after the Islamic revolution, the new Iranian regime adopted an anti-Israel stance as part of its ideology.

Instead of direct military confrontation, Iran has engaged in proxy conflicts with Israel. It has supported various groups (such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others) in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine, which surround Israel’s borders.

These groups, once considered proxies, now operate with domestic autonomy and coordinate transnationally. They have become partners in Iran’s efforts to counter Israel’s influence in the region.

Israel’s previous strategy failed to ensure its security against Iran and its allies. The 7 October attacks exposed this vulnerability. In response, Israel shifted its approach, targeting key figures within the “axis of resistance” (the network of Iran-backed groups) and Iranian assets across borders.

Iran’s consistent message has been to avoid broader regional conflict, but it needed to restore its deterrence capability. Thus, the April 13 direct drone and missile attack on Israel aimed to redefine red lines and create a new equation with Israel.

Following the attack, several countries (including the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) warned Iran against further escalation. Israel also cautioned that any attack could lead to a direct Israeli military response on Iranian soil.

Israel has employed both covert and overt methods to target IRGC and Hezbollah leaders, impacting the dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict in the Middle East. Some notable attacks carried out by Israel against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah leaders after as follows:

Imad Mughniyeh. Imad Mughniyeh was a prominent Hezbollah leader and a key figure in Iran’s proxy network. He was responsible for numerous attacks against Israel. On February 12, 2008, Mughniyeh was assassinated in a covert operation in Damascus, Syria. His car was targeted with a car bomb, resulting in his death.

Qasem Soleimani. Qasem Soleimani was the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, responsible for Iran’s overseas operations. On January 3, 2020, he was killed in a covert drone strike carried out by the United States in Baghdad, Iraq. Although not directly by Israel, his death significantly impacted Iran’s operations in the region.

Brig Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Zahedi was a senior Quds Force commander within the IRGC. On April 1, 2024, an Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria, targeted the Iranian consulate annex building next to the Iranian embassy. Zahedi was among the 16 people killed in the strike, including Gen Hossein Salami.

In retaliation for Zahedi’s death, on April 13, 2024, the IRGC, Hezbollah, and other Iran-linked groups launched retaliatory attacks against Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The operation involved the use of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

READ MORE – Editorial IMR Feb 2021

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) successfully intercepted most of the threats, but the situation escalated tensions in the region. The attack demonstrated Iran’s willingness to directly engage with Israel, marking a departure from its previous avoidance of direct confrontation.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has the potential to escalate further. Here are some possible scenarios:

Israel Takes Control of the Gaza Strip. Historically, Israel controlled the Gaza Strip militarily until 2005. It’s conceivable that Israel could regain control, but this move would likely provoke new militant attacks and disrupt the regional balance of power. Some voices in Israel have suggested recolonizing Gaza, but such a step would fuel the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Continued Escalation and Ground Offensive. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas. The endgame of their military action remains uncertain.

Power Vacuum and Anarchy. If Israel achieves its goal of eliminating Hamas, a power vacuum must not be allowed to emerge. Rapid withdrawal could lead to anarchy and radical Islamist groups filling the void. The situation in Afghanistan, where the Islamic State exploited state weakness after the Taliban takeover, serves as an example.

International Diplomacy and Mediation. International actors, including the United States, may engage in diplomatic efforts to prevent all-out war. Mediation and negotiations could play a crucial role in de-escalation. However, achieving lasting peace remains challenging given the deep-rooted historical grievances and geopolitical complexities.

Regional Spillover. The conflict could spill over into neighboring countries, affecting regional stability. Escalation might draw in other actors, leading to broader hostilities. Regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, are closely monitor developments.

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It all started with Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Syria on 1 April. Iran retaliated with a massive 320 drone-cum-missile barrage on 13 April, which left the world stunned with its scope and scale. There were fears of a massive war in the Middle East that could torpedo the global economy. For the time being, this threat has abated and the world can breathe a sigh of relief, but for how long remains to be seen.

Missile Power vs Air power

There is a wider professional military debate that has been ongoing since the start of the war in Ukraine. What is the inter-se emphasis that armed forces should place on missile/ drone power vs manned air power? This is a seminal question of allocation of resources that must now be seriously addressed. After Gulf War I & II, where Iraq had used Scud missiles to hit back at USA’s far superior airpower, China had drawn its lessons. Today, it has the largest Rocket Force in the world, which India, Taiwan, Japan and Philippines, etc, must all worry about.

The Israelis have traditionally placed very heavy emphasis on airpower and that has been the key to their technological-military superiority in the region. They could hit any country or non-state actor anywhere in the Middle East without any chance of effective response. Not anymore. We are witnessing a military paradigm shift in the region. Missiles and drones have caused a dramatic escalation of stakes. Even the Russian Air Force, though vastly superior to the Ukrainian Air Force in qualitative and quantitative terms, has been fairly restrained in its operations due to the sheer density of the air defences. Most of its attacks have been stand-off attacks with cruise missiles fired from own side of the border. It is only now that Russian Air Force has become more active over the tactical battle area with its Glide Toss Bombs (FAB- 2000 and 3000).

Density of AD Coverage: Israel vs Ukraine

There is also the aspect of force to space ratio. Israel is a small country with just 27,000 sq kms of area to defend. Ukraine is over 6,07,000 sq kms. Flight times from Russia for drones and missiles are far shorter. They are much longer in the case of Israel and so warning/ reaction times are far greater. Hence, military professionals in India must closely watch these ongoing missile wars and prepare accordingly. We will have to drastically enhance our drone and missile power, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We will have to re-examine our allocation of resources to manned vs unmanned attack platforms. Air defenses are increasingly becoming more lethal. Missile-cum-drone wars are, therefore, the future. The Chinese have a head start in this respect and we have reason to be concerned. That is why, the recent Israel-Iran missile war has serious and pertinent lessons for us and we must examine these in depth. Israeli armed forces are very innovative and we must study the counter-measures they evolve. So let us now analyze the recent Iran-Israel conflict for immediate lessons learnt.

1 April Israeli Strike

On 1 April, Israel’s F-35 jets struck the Iranian consulate in Syria. Technically, under the Vienna Convention, that was sovereign Iranian territory. From their intelligence gathering facility in the Golan Heights, they had been tracking Iranian IRGC commanders on the way to Damascus for a conference. It is noteworthy that they did not attack them outside the consulate, but struck while they were in conference within the building. Some 11 Iranians, including three top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were killed. These included Gen Hossein Salami, top commander of IRGC, and two other Brigadier Generals. There was speculation that the Israeli strike was deliberately designed to provoke Iran into a rash action that would justify Israeli retaliation of far greater intensity at its nascent nuclear capability. If that was the plan, it had apparently worked.

Israeli Miscalculation?

However, subsequent events do not bear out this deliberate provocation narrative. Rather, it now seems that Israel miscalculated. It had assumed that Iran would not react to the consulate strike but evidentially, it was quite mistaken. The recent resignation of the Israel’s Military Intelligence (Aman) chief on 22 April seems to confirm this. Though his resignation letter refers to the failure to predict/ forestall the 7 October strike, the timing of the resignation seems to suggest that the Iran strike was also a possible causative factor. Apparently, the intelligence chief had said Iran would not respond to an attack on its consulate. The timing of his resignation seems to confirm this major miscalculation thesis.

There was a great outrage and angst in Iran. Embassy is sovereign space and it was a direct affront to its sovereignty. Iran now considers itself a strong military power, courtesy its large arsenal of drones, cruise and over 3,000 missiles of various types.

Did Israel warn the US of this attack? It now emerges that this was done just minutes before the strike. In fact, it has been reported that US defense secretary Austin Lloyd called up the Israeli defense minister to complain that lack of adequate warning could have put US installations in Middle East at risk. US and Iran, meanwhile, stepped up backchannel negotiations to ensure that there would be no major flare up and escalation due to Iran’s impending retaliation. But Iran was adamant that it would have to react because its sovereign territory had been hit.

US Dissuasion Efforts

The US now made significant efforts to dissuade Iran from any major escalatory step. It made all efforts to make Iran recalculate and limit its response. In fact, it sent in its massive carrier battle group of the Eisenhower to the Mediterranean. General Korella, Chief of US Central Command, personally went to Israel to coordinate defensive actions to face such a missile attack. The simple fact is that Iran refused to be deterred or cowed down with these menacing preparations. It was desperate to demonstrate that it had the will and resolve to respond in a way that would underline its significant military power. Yet, it took deliberate steps at the same time that would limit the success of its own missile strike. Its aim was to make a strong statement of will and intent and underline its capacity to do deterrent damage, without crossing a threshold that would invite a devastating US-Israeli response.

Iran’s Missile Strike

Iran took 13 days to respond to the consulate provocation. When it did, Iran surprised the United States, Israel and the world with the scale and intensity of its response. This was a significant missile operation and deserves to be studied in detail for pertinent lessons. Unmanned missiles are rapidly overtaking manned air strikes as the weapon system of choice the world over. The Ukraine War bears ample testimony to this trend. The Iranian attack came in three distinct waves:-

•             First Wave. The slower moving Shahid drones, (speed 185 kmph) were launched late at night on 13 April 2024. They were launched from multiple directions from Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These would take about 4 to 5 hours to reach Israeli airspace. US satellites picked up this swarm of drones and alerted Israel and the world. President Joe Biden rushed back to the White House to huddle with his National Security Council (NSC) staff and monitor the operations in real time. Some 200 US, British and French fighters were scrambled to shoot down these drones before they entered Israeli airspace. US naval assets in the Mediterranean and Red Sea provided the sensor data to monitor and shoot down this drone swarm. The Shahid drones were based on GPS guidance. The Israelis simply shut off GPS guidance over Israel to spoof these drones. It is noteworthy that all Shahid drones purchased by Russia and used so extensively in Ukraine, have been retrofitted with GLONASS Russian navigational system, precisely for this reason. The drone swarms seemed headed for Golan Heights, Dimona nuclear facility and Southern Israel, as per initial estimates.

•             The Second Wave. A second wave of some 30 Paveh cruise subsonic cruise missiles with a flight time of 1 to 2 hours were launched by Iran. These had speeds varying between 500 to 600, kmph and a range of some 1000-1500 kms. These had much heavier warheads. Reportedly, some did get through. They were timed to arrive along with the drones. These were designed to strike Israeli AD locating and fire control radars and weapon systems. It is reported that they did hit two Iron Dome launchers and possibly a SAM battery. These have not been confirmed by Israel.

•             Third Wave. This third wave was the most lethal. It comprised of 120 Sahab Medium Range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) of 1500 km range. Their flight time to Israel was just 15 minutes. The Iranians claimed that the drones were largely inexpensive decoys designed to fool and overwhelm the Israeli defences. Most of the drones were based on GPS guidance systems. The Israelis simply switched off GPS guidance over their territory and the Americans spoofed the GPS guidance systems over Iraq and Syria. The Israeli’s layered air defences now came into action. These included Arrow 2 and 3 ABM systems along with Thaad, Patriots, David Sling, MR SAMs and Iron Dome tactical systems. These achieved a formidable 97 to 98 percent kill rate. This is not surprising, as even Ukraine has claimed kill rates varying from 70 to 90 percent using combination of S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Patriots and Stingers.

Analysis of Strike

One fact that has been lost sight of in the hoopla over the near total kill rate of Israeli air defences is that despite their formidable nature, many Iranian ballistic missiles did get through and hit their targets. These targets, especially the Nevatim Air Base were hit. This is Israel’s major air force base in southern Israel. It is claimed that F-35 and/or F-15E fighter jets from the base had carried out the air strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria on 1 April.

Nevatim Air Base is one of the most heavily defended locations on planet Earth. It has an X-band ANTP-Y-2 Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar. This base is linked with the US Anti-Ballastic Missile (ABM) defense architecture with its HQ at Colorado. This in turn is linked to the US early warning satellite network that can pick up missile launches from anywhere around the globe. It is also linked to the US computational and communication systems as also the shooters.

A technical analysis indicates that these ballistic missiles had a booster rocket that propelled the warheads separately. Anti-ballistic missile systems then targeted the body of the missile permitting the explosives to get through. These also released decoys to fool the Iron Dome system. Iran claims that many of these ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) got through. Video recordings do show seven major impacts and blast explosions. It is apparent that some more were perhaps able to penetrate Israel’s formidable air defence system. This is a very significant development.

Overall Drones/Missiles Fired by Iran

Admiral Daniel Hagare, Israel’s official military spokesman stated that Iran had fired a total of 320 drones/missiles. These included 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. This was a formidable strike with huge number of drone swarms to overwhelm the Israeli air defence system and act as decoys. The amazing fact is Iran’s SSM missiles were able to penetrate this formidable and very dense AD cover at all three military targets attacked. It is speculated that Iran’s first wave of drones were designed to make Israel light up its detection and fire control radars. The second wave of cruise missiles then targeted these air defence batteries. It was stated that they were able to destroy two Iron Dome launchers. The third wave of ballistic missiles had separating booster propelled warheads and decoys that enabled the warheads to get through the Israeli air defences.

Iran’s Main Targets

Let us now examine the impact at each of the three bases targeted by Iran.

Iran confined its counter-attacks to three primary military targets that had been involved in the attack on its consulate. A target analysis is essential. The three targets were:-

•             Nevatim Air Base. This is Israel’s major Air force base in southern Israel. Iran claims that F-35 jets from this air base had struck the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. It is one of the most heavily defended places on planet Earth, as mentioned earlier. It has the best layered AD system in the world with Arrow 2 & 3 ABMs, Thadd ABMs, Patriots, David Sling and Iron Dome. Despite this formidable air defence, the shock was that 5 out of 7 Iranian ballistic missiles got through to this most heavily defended target in the world. Two of the war heads hit the runway and caused huge craters. The others hit storage facilities. If some eight such war heads had hit the runway, the air base would have been out of commission for some time. The real surprise was that despite 72 hours warning to the densest air defence target on planet Earth, these missiles (five of them) had managed to hit the primary target. It was part of deterrence signaling by Iran. Yet the Iranians had done it skilfully by giving adequate warning and virtue signaling of their intent not to escalate any further. They deliberately curtailed the amount of physical damage to prevent escalation. There were reports in the media that 72 hours prior to the Iran missile strike, Director CIA Willam Burns had met senior Iranian officials in a third country to work out a kind of deal to prevent escalation spinning out of control.

•             The Ramon Air Base. This is also the most heavily protected place on the planet with dense and layered air defences like at the Nevatim Air Base. Even here, some Iranian missiles were able to get through, leading to shock and concern in both US and Israel.

•             The 8200 Signal Intelligence Collection Unit. This unit in the Golan Heights also has an X-band ANTP-Y2 OTH radar and elaborate signal intelligence equipment jointly manned by Israel and CIA operatives. Once again, this is closely networked with the American anti-ballistic missile defence architecture with its array of satellites, sensors on US Aegis class destroyers and heavily defended by layered air defence systems.

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Key to repelling rockets on the Israeli side is the Iron Dome, a missile defence system that has become a cornerstone of the country’s security since its initial deployment in 2011.

In the months since the Hamas attack and Israel’s retaliatory military ground offensive, the Iron Dome has once again been tested with an attack by Iran on Saturday and Sunday (April 13 and 14).

Around 300 drones, ballistic and cruise missiles were launched by Tehran following a suspected Israeli strike on a Iranian consulate in Syria. Most of these were intercepted by the Iron Dome.

The system is the pivotal lower tier of a triad of systems in Israel’s air defense system.

The “David’s Sling” system covers the middle layer, while the “Arrow” missile system protects Israel from long-range projectiles.

How does the Iron Dome work?

The Iron Dome is a mobile defense system developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries developed, produced and fielded in 2011 to respond to the security threat posed by the bombings of rockets and projectiles shot into Israel, many of which landed in heavily populated areas.

The Iron Dome functions by detecting, analyzing and intercepting varieties of targets such as mortars, rockets, and artillery. It has all-weather capabilities and is able to function night or day and in all conditions, including fog, rain, dust storms and low clouds. It is able to launch a variety of interceptor missiles.

Israel is protected by 10 Iron Dome batteries, functioning to protect the country’s infrastructure and citizens. Each battery is able to defend up to 60 square miles. They are strategically placed around Israel’s cities in order to intercept projectiles headed towards these populated areas. Implementing artificial intelligence technology, the “Dome” system is able to discriminate whether the incoming threats will land in a populated or in an uninhabited area, ignoring them in the latter case, consequently reducing the cost of operation and keeping unnecessary defensive launches to a minimum. However, if the Dome determines that the rocket is projected to land in an inhabited area, the interceptor is fired towards the rocket.

The Iron Dome functions by detecting, analyzing and intercepting varieties of targets such as mortars, rockets, and artillery. It has allweather capabilities and is able to function night or day and in all conditions, including fog, rain, dust storms and low clouds. It is able to launch a variety of interceptor missiles.

A radar steers the missile until the target is acquired with an infrared sensor. The interceptor must be quickly maneuverable because it must intercept rudimentary rockets that are little more than a pipe with fins welded onto it, which makes them liable to follow unpredictable courses. It can be assumed that the launchers of the rockets know as little as the Israelis as to where the rockets would end up landing.

Israeli authorities have claimed that the military technology boasts a 90 per cent success rate at intercepting enemy rockets.

Each Iron Dome battery has three components. The first is a radar that detects incoming rockets. Then there is the Tamir interceptor missile that is launched to intercept the incoming rocket in the air.

Finally, there is a command and control centre which contains the software that creates and sends the message from the radar to the interceptor missile.

The system is designed to intercept rockets with a range of between 4 km and 70 km.

How effective is the Iron Dome?

Iron Dome has proved to be particularly effective over the years.

Bombings into Israel intensified during the 2006 Second Lebanon War when Hezbollah? fired approximately 4,000 rockets from bases in the south of Lebanon. From Gaza to the South, an estimated 8,000 projectiles were launched between 2000 and 2008, mostly by Hamas??. To counter these threats, the Defense Ministry, in February 2007, decided on the development of the Dome to function as a mobile air defense system for Israel. After its period of development and testing, the system was declared operational and fielded in March 2011.

The Israeli government has said is that the effectiveness of Iron Dome is very high. The Iron Dome only intercepts or destroys rockets which are considered to threaten civilian urban areas. If a rocket is sent from Gaza to an unpopulated area in Israel, Iron Dome will not be activated.

READ MORE: Gaza Conflict and the Role of Iron Dome

Biut the Iron Dome system has not deterred Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups from launching rocket attacks targeting Israeli territory. The Iron Dome may be effective operationally, but strategically it does not really deter the Palestinian organisations.

The IDF (Israel Defense Force) claims an 85% – 90% success rate for the “Iron Dome” in intercepting incoming projectiles. Operational in March 2011, to date the Iron Dome has successfully destroyed approximately 1,500 rockets. The destruction of these incoming rockets has saved Israeli lives offering physical protection and shielding property and other assets. In addition, for the Israelis it serves as a psychological safeguard and comfort for the Israeli people.

Regarding the Dome as an asset for Israel’s National Security Strategy, while standing as an undeniable asset, has had mixed results regarding its four major pillars of Deterrence, Early, Active Defense and Decisive Victory as well as some unintended challenges.

How is the Iron Dome financed?

Keeping the Iron Dome operational comes at a high price. Just one of the interceptor Tamir missiles is estimated to cost around $50,000.

Originally Iron Dome funding was undertaken by Israel, but because of the high cost of the system, the country has had to rely on its long-time ally, the United States.

A report from the US Congressional Research Service states that the US has contributed nearly $3 billion to Iron Dome batteries, interceptors, co-production costs, and general maintenance.

Fears of Escalation

In the early days of the current conflict, the sheer number of rockets that Hamas fired towards Israel, estimated to be between 2,200 and upwards of 3,000 (though Hamas claims to have fired 5,000), seemed to succeed in overwhelming the system. Perhaps the biggest concern with respect to Iron Dome’s capability to continue protecting Israeli territory, is the prospect of a regional escalation in the current conflict.

Hezbollah has a much bigger firepower capability than than Hamas. It has hundreds of thousands of rockets. So Hezbollah could very quickly overwhelm Iron Dome.

Future Use

In addition, while the “Dome” suffices for now, it cannot be expected to continue this way forever. Despite the system’s effectiveness, it is just a matter of time before the militants develop tactics or acquire the technology to overcome it.

As technologies develop and are implemented in operations, counter techniques can shift and new tactics can be developed, which is what the militias are only bound to do. Moreover, with the heavy funding available to the militias from their wealthy allies, acquiring more advanced technologies becomes more probable. This is a significant disadvantage for Israel. In order to preserve their upper hand, constant innovation and adaptation is a necessity. Despite these drawbacks, however, in all the positive aspects that the system offers clearly outweighs the negative. The Iron Dome stands undeniably as a critical and outstanding military asset to Israel’s National Security, even while Israel works to address and mitigate some of the unforeseen challenges related to the system.

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