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• M777 155mm towed howitzer provided by the United States and Canada. It has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles) and can fire GPS-guided shells.

• M119 105mm towed howitzer was also provided by the United States. It has a range of up to 18 km (11 miles) and can fire a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds.

• 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm self-propelled howitzer manufactured in Ukraine. It has a range of up to 20 km (12 miles) and can fire a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds.

• BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launcher manufactured in the Soviet Union. It can fire a salvo of 40 rockets in just 20 seconds, and has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles).

• HIMARS high-mobility artillery rocket system provided by the United States. It can fire a variety of rockets, including guided and unguided, with a range of up to 80 km (50 miles).

Performance of Ukrainian Artillery

The performance of Ukrainian artillery in the war so far has been mixed. On the one hand, Ukrainian artillery has been effective in disrupting Russian operations and inflicting heavy casualties. For example, in the Battle of Kyiv, Ukrainian artillery played a key role in repelling the Russian advance on the capital.

On the other hand, Ukrainian artillery has also suffered significant losses. As of July 2023, Ukraine has lost an estimated 4,717 field artillery cannons and mortars. This is due to a number of factors, including Russian artillery strikes, Ukrainian ammunition shortages, and the difficulty of transporting and operating artillery in the contested battlefield environment.

Overall, the performance of Ukrainian artillery in the war has been impressive. However, the Ukrainian military will need to continue to receive Western support in order to maintain its artillery capabilities.

Here are some of the factors that have contributed to the success of Ukrainian artillery:

• Effective use of Western-supplied artillery: The United States and other Western countries have donated a significant number of artillery pieces to Ukraine, including the M777 howitzer, the M119 howitzer, and the HIMARS. These weapons have given the Ukrainian military a significant edge in terms of range and accuracy.

• Decentralized command and control: Ukrainian artillery units are organized in a decentralized manner, which allows them to respond quickly to changing battlefield conditions. This has made it difficult for Russian forces to suppress Ukrainian artillery fire.

• Effective use of drones: Ukrainian drones have been used to great effect in spotting and targeting Russian artillery positions. This has allowed Ukrainian artillery units to fire with greater accuracy and lethality.

Challenges Faced

Despite these successes, Ukrainian artillery has also faced a number of challenges.

Russian forces have a significant advantage in terms of the number of artillery pieces and the amount of ammunition available. This has made it difficult for Ukrainian artillery units to maintain a sustained fire.

Ukrainian forces have been facing ammunition shortages for some time. This has limited their ability to use artillery to its full potential.

The Donbas region, where much of the fighting is now taking place, is characterized by difficult terrain. This has made it difficult for Ukrainian artillery units to manoeuvre and fire effectively.

Russian Artillery

The main artillery systems that have been used by the Russians against Ukraine are mentioned below.

• BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launcher that is capable of firing a salvo of 40 rockets in just 20 seconds. It has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles).

• 2S19 MSTA-S 152mm self-propelled howitzer, Both the MSTA-S and MSTA-B have been used by the Russians in Ukraine. These are both 152mm self-propelled howitzers that are capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds. They have a range of up to 24.7 km (15.3 miles) and 22 km (14 miles) respectively. The MSTA-S is the more modern of the two howitzers and is equipped with a digital fire control system that allows it to fire more accurately and rapidly. The MSTA-B is an older model, but it is still a capable weapon system.

• 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzer that is the heaviest artillery piece in service with the Russian military. It is capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, cluster, and nuclear rounds. It has a range of up to 50 km (31 miles).

• D-30 122mm towed howitzer that is a standard weapon in the Russian artillery inventory. It is capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds. It has a range of up to 17.5 km (10.9 miles).

• 2S3 Akatsiya: This is an older self-propelled howitzer that is still in use by the Russian military. It has a range of up to 20 km (12 miles).

155mm is a standard NATO caliber, and many countries use 155mm artillery guns.

The use of these howitzers by Russia in Ukraine is a sign that the Russians are taking the war seriously and are willing to use heavy firepower to achieve their objectives.

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Artillery Donated to Ukraine

United States: The United States has provided Ukraine with the most artillery, including 185 M777 howitzers, 72 M119 howitzers, and 20 HIMARS.

Canada: 45 M777 howitzers and 20,000 rounds of ammunition.

Australia: 14 M777 howitzers and 10,000 rounds of ammunition.

United Kingdom: 20 M777 howitzers and 4,000 rounds of ammunition.

Poland: 18 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers.

Slovakia: 8 Zuzana self-propelled howitzers.

Lithuania: 18 M101 howitzers.

Estonia: 72 D-30 towed howitzers.

Czech Republic: 20 DANA self-propelled howitzers.

The exact numbers of artillery pieces provided by each country vary, and it is likely that more countries will provide artillery to Ukraine in the future.

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The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) has been the most effective against Russian targets. HIMARS is a mobile, self-propelled artillery system that can fire a salvo of six rockets up to 80 kilometers away. The rockets are guided, meaning they can hit their targets with a high degree of accuracy. This makes HIMARS ideal for targeting Russian command centers, supply depots, and other critical infrastructure behind the front lines.

Since the arrival of HIMARS in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military has been able to inflict significant damage on the Russian military. In June 2023, for example, Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy a Russian ammunition depot in the Donbas region.

HIMARS has also been credited with helping to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, the Russian military was able to make significant gains. However, the arrival of HIMARS has given the Ukrainian military the ability to strike back at the Russians from a distance forcing them to focus on defending their own positions.

Characteristics of HIMARS System

The HIMARS is a light multiple rocket launcher developed in the late 1990s for the United States Army. It is mounted on a standard United States Army Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck frame. The HIMARS carries one pod with either six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets or one Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile. It is capable of launching all rockets specified in the Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions (MFOM).

Mobility: The HIMARS is mounted on a wheeled vehicle, which gives it a high degree of mobility. It can be transported by C-130 aircraft, which allows it to be rapidly deployed to any theater of operations.

Accuracy: The HIMARS can fire guided rockets with a high degree of accuracy against command centers, supply depots, and other critical infrastructure.

Range: The HIMARS can fire its rockets up to 80 kilometers away. This gives it the ability to strike enemy targets from a distance, which reduces the risk of its own forces being exposed to enemy fire.

Survivability: The HIMARS is a relatively small and lightly armored vehicle. However, it is equipped with a fire suppression system and other features that help to protect its crew from enemy fire.

The HIMARS system has been used in combat by the United States Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ukrainian Tanks

The most effective tank used by the Ukrainians against the Russians has been the T-72. The T-72 is a Soviet-era main battle tank that has been in service with the Ukrainian military since the 1970s. It is a relatively simple and reliable tank, and it is well-suited for the conditions in Ukraine.

The T-72 has been upgraded by the Ukrainians with a number of features, including improved armor, a new fire control system, and a more powerful gun. These upgrades have made the T-72 a more effective tank against the Russian T-72s and T-80s.

In addition to the T-72, the Ukrainians have also used other tanks, such as the T-64 and the T-80, against the Russians. However, the T-72 has been the most effective tank used by the Ukrainians.

Here are some of the reasons why the T-72 has been so effective against the Russians:

Numbers: The Ukrainians have a large number of T-72s in their inventory. This means that they have a lot of tanks to throw at the Russians.

Reliance on old technology: The Russians have relied on older technology in their tanks, such as the T-72. This has made them vulnerable to the newer Ukrainian tanks, such as the T-72M1R.

Tactics: The Ukrainians have been using the T-72s effectively in combined arms operations. This means that they have been using the tanks in conjunction with other weapons systems, such as artillery and infantry, to achieve success.

Characteristics of T-72 Tank

The T-72 has been upgraded by the Ukrainians with a number of features, including improved armor, a new fire control system, and a more powerful gun. These upgrades have made the T-72 a more effective tank against the Russian T-72s and T-80s.

Armor: The T-72 has a well-sloped armor that provides good protection against enemy fire. The armor is made up of steel and composite materials, and it is designed to defeat HEAT, APFSDS, and HE rounds.

Armament: The T-72 is armed with a 125mm smoothbore gun that can fire a variety of ammunition, including HEAT, APFSDS, and HE rounds. The gun is mounted in a turret that can rotate 360 degrees.

Fire control system: The T-72 is equipped with a fire control system that includes a laser range finder, a thermal sight, and a ballistic computer. This system allows the tank to engage targets accurately at long range.

Engine: The T-72 is powered by a V-12 diesel engine that produces 780 horsepower. This engine gives the tank a top speed of 50 kilometers per hour and an operational range of 450 kilometers.

Crew: The T-72 is crewed by three people: a commander, a gunner, and a driver. The commander is responsible for commanding the tank and directing the fire of the gun. The gunner is responsible for firing the gun and operating the fire control system. The driver is responsible for driving the tank and operating the engine.

Ukrainian Anti tank Weapons

The most effective Ukrainian anti-tank weapon against Russians has been the Javelin. The Javelin is a portable, fire-and-forget anti-tank missile system that can be used by a single soldier. It is guided by infrared, meaning that it can lock onto and pursue a moving target up to 4 kilometers away. The Javelin has a tandem warhead that can penetrate even the most heavily armored tanks.

The Javelin has been used to great effect by the Ukrainians against the Russians. In the early stages of the war, the Javelin was credited with helping to slow the Russian advance. More recently, the Javelin has been used to destroy Russian tanks and other armored vehicles in the Donbas region.

Other effective Ukrainian anti-tank weapons include the Stugna-P and the NLAW. These weapons have also been used to great effect against Russian tanks and other armored vehicles.

Characteristics of Javelin ATGM System

The Javelin is a portable, fire-and-forget system that is easy to use and can be operated by a single soldier. The Javelin has a tandem warhead that can penetrate even the most heavily armored tanks. It weighs 22 kgs and has a max range of 4 kms. It has high accuracy with IR guidance.

Fighter Jets

The Ukrainian Air Force has two main fighter jets: the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Su-27 Flanker. Both of these jets have performed well against the Russians, but the MiG-29 has been particularly effective.

The MiG-29 is a lightweight fighter jet that is well-suited for close-quarters combat. It is also relatively maneuverable, which makes it difficult for Russian jets to shoot down.

The Su-27 is a larger and more powerful fighter jet than the MiG-29. It is also more heavily armed, with a larger cannon and more missile hardpoints. However, the Su-27 is not as maneuverable as the MiG-29, which makes it more vulnerable to Russian air attacks.

Ukrainian Arsenal at the Start of the War

Some of the key Ukrainian land weapon systems at the start of the war included:

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs): Ukraine operates several types of MBTs, including the T-84 and its variants.

Artillery: Self-propelled howitzers like the 2S3 Akatsiya and 2S1 Gvozdika, multiple rocket launchers like the BM-27 Uragan, and towed artillery pieces.

Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs): ATGMs like the Skif, Korsar, and Stugna-P to engage armored vehicles at longer ranges.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs): IFVs like the BMP-2 and BMP-1.

Fighters, Bombers, and Helicopters

The Ukrainian Armed Forces operate a variety of fighter aircraft, bombers, and helicopters. Here are some of the main platforms used by Ukraine at that time:

Fighter Aircraft:

Sukhoi Su-27: A twin-engine air superiority fighter.

Mikoyan MiG-29: A multirole fighter for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

Sukhoi Su-24: A variable-sweep wing bomber with a secondary air-to-air capability.

Bombers:

Sukhoi Su-24: In addition to its role as a fighter, the Su-24 can also perform bombing missions.

Sukhoi Su-25: A close air support and ground attack aircraft primarily used for targeting enemy ground forces.

Helicopters:

Mil Mi-24 “Hind”: A heavily armed attack helicopter used for close air support, anti-armor operations, and troop transport.

Mil Mi-8 “Hip”: A versatile helicopter used for transport, reconnaissance, and search-and-rescue operations.

Mil Mi-2: A light utility helicopter primarily used for training, transport, and surveillance.

Ukrainian Artillery

Here are some of the types of artillery employed by the Ukrainian forces:

Towed Howitzers:

2A36 Giatsint-B: A 152 mm towed howitzer with a range of approximately 30 kilometers.

D-30: A 122 mm towed howitzer with a range of around 15 kilometers.

D-20: A 152 mm towed howitzer with a range of about 17 kilometers.

Self-Propelled Howitzers:

2S3 Akatsiya: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer with a range of up to 18 kilometers.

2S1 Gvozdika: A 122 mm self-propelled howitzer capable of engaging targets at a range of approximately 15 kilometers.

2S19 Msta-S: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer with an extended range of up to 29 kilometers.

Self-Propelled Artillery:

2S1 Gvozdika: A 122 mm self-propelled howitzer used for indirect fire support.

2S3 Akatsiya: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer capable of providing heavy artillery fire.

Rocket Artillery:

BM-21 Grad: A multiple rocket launcher system utilized for long-range indirect fire support.

BM-27 Uragan: A multiple rocket launcher system with a larger caliber and extended range compared to Grad.

Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs):

BM-27 Uragan: A 220 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of around 35 kilometers.

BM-21 Grad: A 122 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of up to 40 kilometers.

BM-30 Smerch: A 300 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of up to 90 kilometers.

Air Defense Weapon Systems

Some of the types of air defense systems used by Ukraine were:

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems:

S-300: Long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system capable of engaging targets at a range of up to 150 kilometers.

Buk-M1/M2: Medium-range SAM system with a range of approximately 40-50 kilometers.

Tor-M1/M2: Short-range SAM system designed to engage aircraft, helicopters, and precision-guided munitions at a range of up to 15 kilometers.

Osa-AKM: Short-range SAM system used for defense against aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems):

Igla-S: Portable SAM system capable of engaging low-flying aircraft and helicopters at ranges of up to 6 kilometers.

Strela-10: MANPADS mounted on a tracked vehicle with a range of approximately 5 kilometers.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:

ZU-23-2: A twin-barreled, 23 mm anti-aircraft autocannon used for low-level air defense.

ZSU-23-4 Shilka: Self-propelled anti-aircraft system armed with four 23 mm autocannons.

Armoured and Mechanized Forces

Some of the key armored and mechanized units within the Ukrainian Army were:

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs):

T-64: Ukrainian Army operated different variants of the T-64 MBT, including the T-64BV and T-64BM “Bulat.”

T-72: Some older T-72 MBTs were still in service with the Ukrainian forces.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs):

BMP-1 and BMP-2: These Soviet-designed IFVs were extensively used by the Ukrainian Army to transport infantry and provide fire support.

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs):

BTR-80 and BTR-4: The Ukrainian Army utilized these wheeled APCs for troop transport and other support roles.

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The New Relevance of High-Tech and Mass

In the dynamic between offense and defence, between tank and anti-tank weapons, between aircraft and air defence (AD) systems, we have seen a new equilibrium that clearly favours defence over the offense. Tanks, the primary instruments of offense, have taken particularly heavy casualties and the sheer lethality of surface-to-air missiles (S-300, S-400/500) have forced Air Forces to stay away from battle areas and restrict sortie generation rates (to just 250-300 a day). These were over 1600 a day in Gulf War I, some 600/day in Yugoslavia and 460/day in the 1971 Bangladesh War). This is a new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and mass. Any armed forces that fail to cater for this new order of lethality and the consequent need for mass, will be making a fatal mistake. Given the scale of casualties, we will have to focus hard on force–preservation, re-constitution of badly battered units and quick replacement of casualties in all future wars. Towards that end, the Indian Army’s move to cut manpower by two lakhs is very inopportune and ill-timed.

Col Jhonson writes, “What we are witnessing is a pivotal moment in military history, the re-ascendence of defence as the decisive form of war. We had seen it in World War and then we saw the same dynamic re-assert itself again by the end of World War Two. The power of the offensive had been restored at the start of that war by the brilliant German doctrine of Blitzkrieg, (which had created a lethal combination of tanks and Stuka dive bombers), to restore mobility on the battlefield. By the end of World War Two, defensive fire power had caught up once again, defeated the German Blitzkrieg and made attrition supreme on the battlefield once more. Stalin had said correctly “Artillery is the God of War.” In Ukraine, we have simply re-learnt the lessons of World War I and II. That is why the Russians chose to go on the defensive in 2023 and have so far inflicted some 70,000 personnel casualties and destroyed almost 7000 armoured vehicles.

Unprecedented Battle Field Transparency

What has favoured the defender and made the task of the attacker even more difficult is the near total level of battle field transparency in Ukraine. The US satellites, UAVs, AWACs, JSTARS, etc, can pick up virtually every single tank, truck and even soldiers that move on the battlefield. Surprise in the attack has, thus, become virtually impossible to achieve. Concentrations can be picked up immediately and even intentions can be discerned through electronic surveillance of enemy communications. What has made Russia’s task even more difficult is the proxy nature of the war. Had it been a direct clash between US and Russia, the latter could have shot down US spy satellites, AWACS and even drones loitering in Poland or Romania. These are now totally safe from any Russian counter-action. In a direct clash the attacker can take prophylactic action to shoot holes in the sky over the projected area of the offensive by downing enemy satellites with ASAT missiles. The proxy nature of this war has kept the surveillance assets of US and NATO totally unmolested and free to snoop on Russia. The levels of battlefield transparency, thus, available to Ukraine have simply been unprecedented in the annals of warfare.

Return of the Stalemate

The new equivalence or equilibrium between defensive and offensive systems has led to brutal stalemates on the battlefields of Ukraine and unprecedented levels of attrition that are reminiscent of the First World War and its sheer carnage. Once again, as in the two World Wars, medium and heavy artillery has proved to be a decisive, war-winning factor. An Austrian Army Operational Research Statistical Analysis (ORSA) study of the last seven years of combat in the Donbas region, has clearly highlighted that 45% of the tank kills, 65 % of artillery guns and 57 % of the vehicles destroyed were by medium artillery – especially of the 152/155 mm calibre.

Despite all the media hype, the total number of tanks destroyed by Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) – Javelins, TOWs, etc, – were just 13%. A major media hype was created that Javelins, Stingers (and later the HIMARS) were singular war winning factors – the US silver bullets that by themselves would win the war single-handedly. There are no silver bullets in war. People said the tank was now a dinosaur – no longer relevant on the modern battlefield. As Capt Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted earlier, the tank has been pronounced dead so many times in recent military history. Each time it reasserts its relevance. It is still the only viable instrument of shock and offensive action. So even though defence has regained primacy over offense in overall terms, the tank remains the sole instrument of offense on the land battlefields. Like at the end of World War II, tanks may have to be used in mass to overcome lethal defenses. Massive artillery barrages have to pave the way for tanks as we saw in the Donbas. We may need more tanks, not less. Top attack is a new vulnerability for tanks but it is certainly something that can and will be countered by simple expedients like canopies and more sophisticated Active Protection System (APS). Besides, despite all this media hype – actual casualties inflicted by the ATGMs on tanks have just been 13%. The real tank-killer was medium artillery (45% tank kills). As such, earlier lessons of the Second World War have simply been revalidated today.

Drones

Drones – unmanned aerial, ground and sea vehicles – have created a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). We have loitering Kamikaze drones that are able to inflict heavy casualties and yet cost so little. Drones are very useful for gaining tactical and contact intelligence and vector in artillery fire and air strikes and launch missiles and bombs. They have brought about a paradigm shift in the nature of war. The Russians have recently retrofitted Iranian Shahed drones with the Glonass navigation system and used them in mass to mask lethal attacks by their cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and saturate Ukrainians air defences.

Wrong Lessons from Low Intensity Conflicts

In fact, the world has learnt some patently incorrect lessons from the era of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The levels of asymmetry between the opponents was inordinately high in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and also in Iraq and even Yugoslavia and Syria. Due to the sheer asymmetry, patently wrong lessons were learnt which cannot withstand the shock of high intensity conflict between evenly matched opponents. No lessons from Afghanistan or Libya can be applied to any Western conflict with peer group competitors like China or Russia. Given the accuracy of precision guided munitions (PGMs), the levels of lethality have gone up by several orders of magnitude. What the Russia-Ukraine war clearly highlights is the need to graduate quickly beyond the era of LIC entailing inordinately high levels of asymmetry between the two sides. The world is rapidly entering into the era of long duration High Intensity Conflicts between evenly matched opponents, where the levels of attrition will be inordinately high.

Nuclear Backdrop

All such future conventional wars will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. So far, the nuclear threat had served to constrain the levels of combat below the nuclear threshold. However, we are increasingly seeing nuclear red lines being completely ignored on the modern conventional battlefield. So far, the USA and NATO have refrained from direct combat with Russia and China. Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy war that has been bled white. The Americans have certainly fought Russia to the last Ukrainian in the current conflict. Either by deliberate design or by sheer accident, the world is careening towards a dangerous Armageddon, a Third World War that may see limited or full-scale use of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Restraints are fast eroding at a rate that spells serious danger for mankind.

An Economic War Coup de Grace?

In hind sight, it is quite apparent that the US and NATO (by the uncalled for eastward expansion of NATO) had deliberately pushed and provoked Russia into the Ukraine War. With some reflection (and purely in hindsight) it appears that a grand design of waging unrestricted economic war against Russia had already been prepared in the US. The aim was, perhaps, to repeat 1991 – when unrelenting economic war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse. That, however, had been the result of a carefully-calibrated, long term, economic war strategy to bring a nuclear power to its knees. It had been triggered by the American induced oil glut of 1986 in which the US had persuaded its surrogate – Saudi Arabia – to flood the world with cheap oil. In that year (1986) itself, petrol prices had plummeted from $30 a barrel to just around $10 a barrel. This unprecedented fall in oil prices had torpedoed and seriously wounded the Soviet economy. It went into a negative tailspin from which it never really recovered. In 1991, the USSR simply vanished without a shot being fired. The USSR splintered into 15 states and simply ceased to exist.

Was that the design that Joe Biden was trying to replicate? If so, the Second Economic War against Russia seems to have floundered rather badly till now. The outcome of this economic war will be far more consequential than the shooting war in Ukraine. At first the Russian Rouble had fallen rather steeply from 80 roubles to a dollar to over 160 roubles to a dollar. Russia, however, took strong and energetic counter measures. They asked for all payments of oil and gas to be made in roubles. Europe was hopelessly dependent upon Russian gas and oil. Creating alternative infrastructure would take minimum four to five years. Despite all brave talk of sanctions, Europe had no option but to keep buying Russian oil and gas on the sly. The cost of the war in Ukraine has been estimated at a billion dollars a day. It is noteworthy that Europe by itself has paid a billion dollars a day to Russia for its oil and gas and this has financed the Ukraine war for Russia.

Economic War and Europe. The Boomerang?

Europe, however, has been hit the hardest. Structurally its energy linkages with Russia were far too deep and comprehensive to be severed in such a hurry. The sudden removal of 3 million barrels a day of Russian oil has caused energy prices to skyrocket. From $70 a barrel they shot up to $125 a barrel. Russia and Ukraine are also the biggest exporters of food grains and sun flower oil. Energy inflation has now combined with food inflation to give a body blow to the global economy that was still reeling from the disastrous impact of the Covid pandemic. Today, the world is staring at a dangerous recession and stagflation. In hindsight, the economic war offensive against Russia has clearly boomeranged. What has clearly been destroyed beyond repair is the trust that was the basis of globalisation. America’s weaponsation of its banking system and economic institutions has destroyed this trust. Russia had a forex reserved $630 bn. Of this $300 billion was invested in US and European banks. America simply seized this money. Will Russia, China or India or other major economies ever put their money and trust in US banks again?

Impact on India

This military conflict is of overwhelming relevance to India. That is simply because over 70% of our cutting-edge military equipment is still of Russian origin. The Americans have tried to ridicule the performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine. It was not incompetence but a shift in the power of the defence over offense that has resulted in the stalemate. Had the US or NATO armies been attacking, they would have found the going as tough, if not tougher. This campaign is, therefore, being closely studied in all armed forces. Let me summarise some primary lesson in the Indian context:

Military Demographic. Demographics is the key to the outcome of any prolonged conflict. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It has a dire shortage of manpower and it is showing badly. Russia had fielded an Army of 1,50,000 against Ukraine, which has fielded some 2,50,000 (now almost 7,50,000 by some estimates) due to complete mobilization. The Russian constraints are painful and showing. It has had to recycle and use the same forces again and again. Due to embarrassing reverses in Kharkiev, Putin was finally forced, in Sep 2022, to order partial mobilization of 3,00,000 reservists. Had he done this at the outset the war would have been long over. He has now conscripted 2,70,000 fresh troops for his impending counter-offensive in winter. This has painful and obvious lessons for India. India has no dearth of manpower but it is cutting down its manpower and switching from a regular full ‘colour service’ Army to short terms inductees (Agniveers). Russian short term inductees (conscripts) have performed poorly in the Ukraine War. We need to draw immediate lessons from this war and take a fresh look at the Agniveer scheme. We may have to increase service tenures from 4 to 7 years and retention levels from 25% to 50%. Future wars will not just be high-tech but high-tech and mass. Seeing the grim realities of the modern battlefield we simply cannot afford to downsize.

The Tank is Dead. All notions that the tank has been turned into a dinosaur by drones, Javelins and TOWs is highly misplaced and premature. Tanks will continue to be the prime platform for offensive action for decades to come.

Medium Artillery. Artillery of the heavy and medium calibres has proved to be a decisive and war winning factor in the new wars of intense attrition. Artillery has inflicted 45% of the tank kills in Ukraine. Before the Kargil War, India had planned to standardize its Artillery around the 155mm caliber. The Bofors scandal badly derailed this plan. We now need to accelerate the mediumistaion of the Artillery with rapid induction of at least 1800 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) of indigenous manufacture at the earliest.

Air Power. Despite near total air superiority, the Russian use of air power was curiously restrained. Perhaps, this has been due to the vastly enhanced lethality of the AD systems (the S-300 and Buk SAMS and the shoulder-fired Stingers). Russian sortie generation rate at its peak was confined to 250-300 per day. In Gulf War I, the USAF was mounting 1600 sorties per day but against a much weaker and outdated air defence system of Iraq. India needs a 45-squadron Air Force to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. Today, we are down to just 30. This is an alarming situation. We must accelerate our induction of fighters like Tejas and at least a 115 more in the Rafale class. Pending this, 155mm gun induction must be rapidly accelerated to make up for short falls in fire power. We may have to increase reliance on tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to much higher levels.

Drones. Drones have become the new war winning factor. Given their low cost the damage they can inflict on enemy tanks and equipment is formidable. They will have to be fielded in massive numbers.

Retrofitting Russian Tanks. Russian T-72 tanks make up 60% of India’s tank fleet. The war has shown ergonomic design flaws, wherein ammunition is stored in the turret which tends to blow up. We will have to retrofit these tanks with overhang compartments for ammunition stowage behind the turret.

Objectivity and ORSA. It is vital that this seminal conflict in Ukraine be studied dispassionately and objectively. There has been an unprecedented barrage of disinformation and propaganda. A military analyst must sift fact from fiction and discern the truth from post-truth. Only an objective (preferably ORSA-based) analysis will help in separating fact from fiction and draw up accurate lessons learnt. Over 3500 Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) to include Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskandars and Cruise missiles (like Yakhont, Klub and Kalibir) were fired. We need to analyse their accuracy and impact on various types of targets.

Nuclear Backdrop. Another impact of overwhelming import is the nuclear backdrop. We find this aspect being recklessly ignored in the hope of snatching some limited advantage on the conventional battlefield. The nuclear threshold has proved to be rather elastic and flexible in the Ukraine War. Despite repeated Russian threats and nuclear sabre rattling, not a single nuke has been used so far. In fact no nuke has even been moved into firing position. What does that tell us about an India-Pakistan or an India-China war? Are nuclear weapons becoming an unusable resource? Or are we heading for an accidental or deliberate nuclear escalation that could prove to be catastrophic?

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