The second group led by the Belgian Baron de Caters with four bi-planes and two monoplanes reached Calcutta on 12 December 1910. Jules Tyke, the pilot of the group, made a 12-minute flight at Tollygunge Golf Club, a Calcutta suburb. On 21 December 1910, Baron de Caters took off with a lady passenger, Mrs. NC Sen, daughter-in-law of great social reformer Keshav Chandra Sen. This was followed by a rally on 28 December, which was attended by thousands of Calcuttans.

The third group was the Bristol and Colonial Aeroplane Company that arrived last and was led by Faranell Thurstan, along with well-known French pilot, Henri Jullerot with three aeroplanes of “Boxkite” variety (Humber-Sommer Biplane). On 6 January 1911, Jullerot made an impressive flight in front of a mammoth crowd at Calcutta Turf Club that included General O’Moore Creagh, C-in-C Indian Army, Sir Douglas Haig, the Chief of Staff in India and other principal military officers. These demonstration flights made these officers think about the relevance and potential of military aviation. According to Flight magazine dated 4 March 1911, over two million people witnessed the demonstration (Calcutta’s population in 1901 was nine million) giving an exhibition flight over the Calcutta Maidan Racecourse on one of the Bristol biplanes. The racecourse was specially lent to the British and Colonial Aeroplane Co’s Commission for flying demonstrations, and this is the only occasion upon which flying exhibitions have been given upon it. The Viceregal Party, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Norman Baker, the Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, and a crowd of about half a million people were present to witness the display.

 India in the Great War

Indian Army, including the British Army units, were just sufficient for maintenance of law and order within and on the borders of India as well as the provision of a field army capable, should the necessity arise, of undertaking a campaign beyond the borders for purpose of defence against external aggression. The Army in India was in no sense maintained for meeting the external obligation of an imperial character. It can be said that the force was not a potential reserve to the armed forces of the British Empire.

It was for the first time that an Indian corps of two divisions was formed to strengthen the British Expeditionary Force (Indian Expeditionary Force ‘A’) and was sent to Europe. Massey and his three colleagues, along with Captain Duncan Le Geyt Pitcher (39th Horse), happened to be at Farnborough and were attached to various RFC squadrons. Pitcher and Reilly were attached to No.4 Squadron and were involved in operational flying. Massey was appointed in command of No. 1 Reserve Aeroplane Squadron at home (UK), the other two were made flight commanders in two other squadrons. It was practically the end of aviation in India but only temporarily.

Nearer home, the Turks threatened Suez and an Indian Expeditionary Force (Expedition ‘B’) was dispatched to Egypt. Massey, Reilly and a party of RFC personnel embarked for Egypt, where they were joined by a detachment drawn from Indian Central Flying School to form an aviation unit intended to support the Indian Expeditionary Force defending the Suez Canal. A second detachment was formed from personnel drawn from India, Australia, and New Zealand to support British Expeditionary Force (Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’) in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). These detachments were used to support Indian Army operations in the field. The funds for both these detachments came from the Indian Exchequer though these operations did not take place in India itself.

An Air Force for India

Simultaneously, along with aircraft for defence of North West Frontier, the Viceroy had suggested the establishment of an aviation school in India for flying training of Indian Army officers. Both these suggestions were rejected by the War Office on 2 October 1915. War Office expressed its inability to spare instructors and aircraft for the school as well as difficulties in procuring spares and equipment. It ruled that training requirements would continue to be met by the existing training institutions in the UK. It, de facto, also led to the demise of the Indian Central Flying School at Sitapur, which had become inactive from August 1914 onwards.

Though the Government of India had surrendered to the Air Ministry, it tried to retain some control over Indian Army officers sent for flying training to the UK. It wanted that these officers should either return to India on completion of training or be replaced by a suitably experienced officer from the UK. To facilitate this exchange, the Government of India once again argued for ‘the establishment of an aviation school in India’ at which Indian Army officers could be trained.

The British Government rejected both these proposals. The War Office informed the Under Secretary of State for India on 2 October 1915 that: “It will not be possible for the War Office to supply instructors and aeroplanes to establish a Flying School in India, as every available instructor is already fully occupied in the training establishments. Should there be any officers on the Indian establishment who are desirous of, and recommended for, employment in the Royal Flying Corps, they could be sent to the United Kingdom for training.” Further, it stated: “As soon as the total number of trained pilots in the Indian Army exceeds the number required in India, with (Indian Expeditionary) Force D, and with Indian troops elsewhere, it would be necessary to ascertain in each case whether, having regard to the exigencies of the Service, it would be possible to provide a relief. Until then, however, the Council lay stress on the principle that every officer who graduates as a pilot must entirely be at their disposal, irrespective of the establishment from which they are drawn.

At the end of the Great War, the Government of India did not try to resurrect its pre-war proposal for the formation of Indian Flying Corps although Royal Flying Corps (later the Royal Air Force) had absolutely no objection to the formation of an Australian Flying Corps (established in 1912 but commenced training in 1914), Royal Canadian Flying Corps (established in 1917) and Royal New Zealand Air Force (established in 1923) and recruiting Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders directly into the RFC/RAF during the War and even thereafter. The only exception was India, this in spite of fairly good showing by the few Indians who had served with the Royal Flying Corps with one of them being awarded Distinguished Flying Cross. The after-effects of the Great Mutiny of 1857 still clouded the British mind and they could not just accept the Indians to be in the technical arms of the army like artillery and engineers and, of course, the Royal Flying Corps.

Indians in the First World War

The second Indian and the first Sikh to be commissioned in the RFC was Lieutenant Hardit Singh Malik. A student at Balliol College at the beginning of the war, Malik sought immediately to join the British Army but his application was turned down because of his being a non-European. After graduating and obtaining his degree in 1915, he applied once again but his application was rejected this time, too. Having failed to get his commission, he joined the French Red Cross as an ambulance driver in 1915 and served there for a year. While in France, he was accepted for the French Aéronautique Militaire (French Air Service). On learning this news, his former tutor at Oxford wrote to Major General Sir David Henderson, Director General of Military Aeronautics, who set the matter right.

The London Gazette of 6 April 1917 records “3rd Cl (class) Air Mechanic Hardit Singh Malik” was commissioned as a Temporary Honorary Second Lieutenant with the RFC on 16 April 1917. After training, he served with Nos. 28 and 11 squadrons on the Western Front and No. 141 Squadron in the UK flying Sopwith Camels, probably the most iconic British aircraft type of the War. He obtained his first kill on his very first operational mission on 18 October 1917. On 26 October 1917, he was a member of formation that raided the home aerodrome of Manfred von Richthofen, the legendary “Red Baron”. The formation was attacked by vastly numerically enemy formation. Malik managed to drive one enemy aircraft out of control – he was not granted this kill.  But four other aircraft were onto him and at least one of them shot at him. His aircraft had as many as 450 bullet holes, two of them entering Malik’s leg. Malik crashed in friendly territory and lost consciousness. Pulled out from the wreckage and carried to the hospital, he recovered but lived with those two bullets in his leg for the rest of his life. Malik described the episode as “a most foolhardy operation.” After his convalesces, he rejoined 28 Squadron in January 1918 and saw action in Italy. He, thereafter, was transferred back to England where he flew Bristol Fighters on Home Defence duties from Biggin Hill airfield that became a legend during WWII. He returned to France in mid-1918 for a brief tenure with No. 11 Squadron. After the Armistice, he returned to India hoping to join Royal Air Force but had to forgo this choice as he was told that Indians were not welcome in the Royal Air Force.

The longevity of pilots during the First World War was just 4-6 weeks. Malik was the only one of the four to beat this aircrew survival odds in that he survived more than this period of intensive operation.

Malik qualified and joined Indian Civil Service and went on to serve as free India’s first High Commissioner to Canada and later as ambassador to France.

Malik never flew without his turban. In the latter part of his career, he used a specially designed helmet that fitted over the turban and was accordingly nicknamed “Flying Hobgoblin.”

Royal Air Force in India

The move of No. 31 Squadron from the UK to India heralded the arrival of Royal Air Force in India (RAFI) and the beginning of military aviation in the country. By September 1917, the Squadron had 34 Henri Farmans, 26 BE2Cs and 2Es, one Maurice Farman and some FE2Bs. With so many aircraft that were well over its establishment, it was not surprising to see that in the same month, No. 114 Squadron was raised at Lahore with D Flight of No. 31 Squadron along with its several BE2Cs, 2Es  and Maurice Farmans. Were two squadrons sufficient to meet the task of looking after North West Frontier? It would be but interesting to see the evolution and build-up of Royal Air Force in India till its departure on India getting its independence on 15 August 1947.

One important and significant facet of work done by Nos. 31 and 114 squadrons was that throughout 1916-1918 they had been to locate, photograph, and report on the suitability of a variety of landing grounds along the frontier region; resulting in the adoption of several ‘airfields’ for forward operations. By 1919, a number of these landing grounds possessed basic necessities like fuel, ammunition and some basic equipment required for emergency operation of aircraft. These landing grounds were guarded by local army units.

Nos. 31 and 114 squadrons were tasked for reconnaissance and army cooperation basically in the North West Frontier.

Operations in North West Frontier

The Indian Government had asked for aircraft for this purpose in 1915 and No.31 Squadron arriving in India by the end of the year. It was July 1916, when the Squadron had its full compliments of three flights and had settled down in Indian operating conditions, it was deployed for watch and ward duties in the North West Frontier.

‘The Pathans, who were used to leisurely shooting at British troops from safety of the mountain tops, fled from these deadly machines that soared over their hiding places, cutting down the tribesmen with bombs and machine guns,’ wrote Barry Renfrew.

Further success followed in 1917 when the aircraft bombed villages that the army had never been able to reach in parts of Waziristan. The political officers felt the positive impact of these air actions. These early bombing raids devastated Pathan villages and did massive damage to the impoverished tribes’ meagre possessions. The Squadron’s reconnaissance and bombing effort was duly appreciated by the Northern Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sir AA Barrett. In his report on the operations undertaken against Mahsuds during the period March to August 1917, he referred to ‘the valuable work performed by the aeroplanes of the 31st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, both in reconnaissance and bombing the enemy’ during an operation ‘to destroy the village of Nanu, at the head of the Splitoi Valley.’ Subsequently, ‘several raids were carried out by aeroplanes of 31st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. Shingai villages in the Takhi Zam and others in the Badda Toi were bombed and in a particularly successful raid on 26th June, nine hits were scored on Makin and six on Marobi, the home of Mulla Fazl Din, the titular chief of the tribe. These raids involved considerable risks. Engines were liable to failure in the high temperature prevailing, distances from the base at Tank were long and hills up to 8,000 feet had to be crossed. These risks were well repaid by the results obtained which undoubtedly contributed largely to the general desire for peace displayed by all sections of the tribe.’

Birth Pangs of the Indian Air Force

The unwritten policy of recruitment to the British Army, and that included Royal Flying Corps and subsequently Royal Air Force, was that the applicant for entry must be of pure European descent and the son of natural-born or (except for a boy) naturalized British subject. This policy was formalized vide Air Publication 958 Kings Regulations (First Edition, HMSO, 12 August 1924). However, the sudden outbreak of the First World War forced the British to relax their policies. The War Council in 1917 decided “to allow ten places each year at Sandhurst to natives of India, as well as granting of the permanent King’s Commission to the twenty Indian officers on Viceroy commissions and temporary commission to further 200 Indians.”  A few Indians, though not of European descent, saw service with the Royal Flying Corps. These officers performed as well as their British counterparts. It was clarified by the War Office in December 1918 that: “We are taking Indians into the Royal Military College for training for commissions in the Indian Army only. It is not correct to say that “there is no position in His Majesty’s Army from which the Indians will in the future be debarred by reason of his race”, for we are not going to let Indians command white men in British Regiments. A similar stance was also adopted by the Admiralty. The only exception was grant of commission to the medical officers who did serve the British and Gorkha units (these were considered at par with the British Army units) during the First World War and thereafter.

The First Taste of Actual Operation

The outbreak of trouble in 1937 in Waziristan gave the new force its first chance in active operations. Initially, the pilots were employed in ferrying and inter-communication duties between Peshawar and the operational stations of Miranshah and Manzai, but by September. ‘A’ Flight was ordered to move to Miranshah for actual operations. Flight Lieutenant Haynes led the Flight with other pilots being Mukerjee, Awan, Engineer and Narendra. Harjinder Singh recalled that on “reaching Miranshah, the RAF Squadron (5 Squadron) eyed us with ridicule and suspicion. However, it was not long before they realized that we were made of sterner stuff than they had imagined and the only difference between us was one of colour. Our pilots started flying as many sorties as were humanly possible between sunrise and sunset. The result of these sorties proved outstanding.”  The fact that the Flight flew 337 hours in one month – the feat had not been matched by any of the RAF flights till then – speaks volumes of intensity of effort and hard work of all Indians. The Flight flew a total of 1400 hours during the period of three months that it was at Miranshah. Hancock flew down to Miranshah to personally congratulate the Flight’s personnel for stupendous flying effort and maintaining 100% serviceability. This was in stark difference to the state of affairs in No. 5 Squadron which went through a very difficult phase during the period that Indians were at Miranshah. ‘Every Indian felt that the hour of trial had come and “this was our golden opportunity.’”

In the first week of December 1937, orders were received for the Flight to return to Peshawar. ‘A’ Flight wanted to continue their good work but were over-ruled by Air Headquarters. The other news that really brought cheers to the Indians was that the airmen’s scale of pay was to be doubled. Perhaps one of the greatest mistakes made during the creation of the Indian Air Force related to the pay of airmen in the various trade groups. These rates of pay were at first in general much too low for the standard of education and culture expected of a recruit, and many of the men could have earned far more in civilian life. Dissatisfaction with the conditions of service arose and many men had to be discharged in the earlier years. With this increase of pay and the improvement of living conditions to an equitable level ensured that any reasons for dissatisfaction immediately disappeared.

India’s Coastal Defence

The deployment for coast defence was not restricted to Nos. 27 and 60 Squadrons. No.1 Squadron had already been briefed on 20 August regarding the high possibility of a war breaking out. The Squadron got down to intensive practice in dive-bombing and front machine-gun attacks. On 26 August 1939, orders were received by the Squadron to deploy a flight of six Harts and Audaxes at Drigh Road, Karachi for operational duties in cooperation with the Royal Indian Navy in case Germany declared war on Britain. This Flight was named as ‘Q’ Flight. Simultaneously, No.27 Squadron RAF deployed four Wapitis at Juhu, Bombay as ‘V’ Flight; four more to St Thomas Mount, Madras as ‘Y’ Flight. No.60 Squadron, now equipped with Blenheim bombers at Ambala, sent two aircraft to Dum Dum, Calcutta as ‘Z’ Flight and another three to Drigh Road, Karachi, as ‘H’ Flight.

Expansion of the Indian Air Force From 1 to 10 Squadrons

The War had nearly bankrupted Britain and its military strength had started winding down. The situation in India was no better. By mid-1920s, Britain had nearly 1/3rd of its infantry numbering around 60,000 deployed in India. In 1927, the War Office conceded that India could not provide enough troops to meet the ‘minor’ and ‘major’ threats on its North West Frontier. The War Office prepared a plan for dispatch of eleven divisions from Britain. It was manifest nonsense, for such a force could only have been raised by conscription.  The Government of India could not pay for their deployment with the defence budget reducing every year. Until 1933, the cost of all troops stationed in India was paid by the Indian taxpayer and nearly one-third of the Indian government revenue was spent on defence. However, in 1933 in an attempt to quiet nationalist objectors, the British government began to subsidize the Indian defence budget – a subvention amounting to two million pounds annually under what was known as Garran Award. The RAFI also got a one-time grant of six hundred thousand pounds for re-equipping four squadrons.

If India had agreed to the offer of 12 Squadrons, then the capital expenditure for raising these squadrons would have come out of the Indian exchequer; the operating cost was to be in any case was India’s responsibility. Further, as per the terms accepted by the Indian Government when Britain agreed to deploy RFC/RAF in India in 1915, the operational control of all RAF units in India was to be with the RAF and not with the Government of India and these assets could be deployed even outside India, if so required. It is a little-known fact that Britain wanted India to pay 40 million pounds for deployment of elements of Indian Army abroad for the defence of Empire during WW1, in which over a million Indians were deployed. The War Office would not relent claimed payment from India for the Indian troops sent to China in 1927.

The Japanese Invasion of Burma and the Role Played by the Indian Air Force

Just before the occupation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands by the Japanese on 23 March 1942, a Lysander of No. 28 Squadron made a trip to its lone airstrip at Port Blair – airstrips at Nicobar and Campbell Bay were constructed by the Japanese through forced labour a little later.

Japanese had stationed 13 flying boats at Port Blair for reconnaissance in the Bay of Bengal. Port Blair had also a few fighters. As the ground situation in Burma deteriorated, Calcutta became within range of the Japanese bombers and the orders were given for the port to be cleared and the ships spread over the Bay of Bengal, irrespective of the proximity of the Japanese fleet. The situation was such that, if reconnaissance could be prevented, this immediate tonnage of shipping might reach other harbours. The RAF sent two of its three Hudsons to attack Port Blair. It was a hazardous mission, likely to be disastrous to the crews, but essential because so much depended on it. The gallant aircrew in a determined low-level attack strafed the seven flying boats moored in one line and left two of them burning, one sinking and the rest damaged. Neutralization of the remaining flying boats was a necessity as it was imperative that the remaining surviving aircraft remained on or under water. The mission was even riskier than the first one as Japanese would be expecting the attack and would be ready to tackle the same. During the repeat attack, one Hudson was shot down and the second damaged by the Japanese fighters. The attack ensured that the Japanese remained unaware that seventy of the Allied vessels were making their passage to safety in the Bay of Bengal.

The next flight to Nicobar Island, a reconnaissance mission, took place only in early 1944 when Mosquitoes of Photo Reconnaissance Force flew a round trip of just 2,300 miles.

Operation Buccaneer was planned for taking over of Andaman and Nicobar Islands by an amphibious force. These islands would have provided a base for future amphibious landings on the Burma mainland and for bombing the new Bangkok-Moulmein railroad, which gave the Japanese in Burma direct overland connections with the Gulf of Thailand.  However, with Operation Overlord getting priority for resources, this operation was put on the black burner and was never proceeded with.

Though JAAF maintained considerable air activity over the immediate battle area, combined with attacks on Maymyo, Toungoo and Bassein, Rangoon area was left alone enabling the first stages of military evacuation to proceed unhindered. Akyab had its first heavy raid on 23 March and seven days later, Toungoo fell followed by Prome on 2 April. It was like dominos falling one after another.

The Japanese carrier-borne aircraft bombed Kakinada and Vishakhapatnam on 20 April 1942 leading to mass exodus of the population from the cities.

The Reconstitution of the Royal Indian Air Force into Two Independent Air Forces

On 25 April 1947, in the third Defence Committee meeting Mountbatten, circulated Liaquat’s paper on the bifurcation of the Armed Forces along with comments by Auchinleck and Sardar Baldev Singh. Mountbatten justified the presentation of paper over-riding the views of the C-in-C and the Defence Member as he required the Committee’s views on the future form of government in India. Baldev Singh emphasised that division of the forces should follow the political decision in favour of Pakistan and if it preceded such a decision, it might have serious consequences. Liaquat agreed with Baldev Singh’s suggestion but he insisted and stated that “there must be a plan in readiness to go ahead with the separation if Pakistan was accepted.” The Committee also discussed the likely administrative complications that might arise due to partition. Mountbatten expressed the opinion that the Armed Forces could either complete nationalisation by June 1948 or complete separation by the same date without undue risk. Any attempt to carry out both by that date would invite trouble. He suggested that Hindustan and Pakistan should pool their forces under a Federal General Headquarters until their separation was completed. He agreed that there must be a plan to divide the Armed Forces. Auchinleck stated that there were certain uncertain factors which might arise due to separation of the country and it was not possible to plan the division of the armed forces till the situation became clear.

The decisions of the Committee are of special significance in that it was the first time that the issue of division of the Armed Forces was discussed and there was, thereby, acceptance of the principle of such a division. More importantly, by discussing the division of the Armed Forces, the Defence Committee had de-facto prejudged the issue of partition of the country.

June 1948 was still far away and the debate on the division of the armed forces, perhaps, would have carried on for some more time. But with announcement, on 3 June 1947, of Mountbatten Plan to partition the country and fixing the date the very next day for transfer of power to be 15 August 1947 – a period of just 72 days – caused a lot of frenzy with the realty striking hard on everyone.

“A History of Military Aviation in India 1901-47” by Air Marshal Bharat Kumar will be published in March 2020 by IMR Media.

The post MILITARY HISTORY : A History of Military Aviation in India 1901-1947 appeared first on IMR.

While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division HQ were located. There the GOC Maj Gen BM Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lt Col Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Col Wajid Ali Shah present.

The General planned to defensively hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmer; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmer; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view. Lt Col Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmer had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be discussed with anyone. In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan.

A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Mshl Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan, where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support. A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited.

I considered the operation. Jaisalmer was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti. I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines. The GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements. The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lt Col Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border – Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border – without telling them that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming operations. About the middle of November, the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad. With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmer and neutralise the airfield.

I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the Division HQ, there was no preparations for the very imminent operations. On 1 December, Col Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters. On 2nd December, I received orders to report to the Division HQ and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening, that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade up to Laungewala and proceed to Jaisalmer to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the Division orders but to organise my force.

I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out. I next went to the AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol. The AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available. After a discussion with the Colonel Staff, the AA&QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.

When the 18 Division ‘O’ group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander, informed the ‘O’ Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to cancel or postpone the operation. The GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air. After the discussion, he informed the ‘O’ Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the ‘national interest’.

The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the ‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because, if he did not, he would be labelled as a General who had lost his nerve. The plan made by Maj Gen BM Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty miles to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations) and 22 Cavalry, by passing Laungewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division, which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan.

I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metalled road to Jaisalmer, 20 miles inside India, and then continue to Jaisalmer. 206 Brigade, leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions), was to follow my force and secure Laungewala to form a firm base. After these orders were issued, 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmer with mechanically unsound tanks. The GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch, the Divisional Reconnaissance & Support Battalion less a company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade.

I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December. The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer, a total march of 120 miles in one night. On the evening of 2 December, I went to the 51 Brigade HQ. Lt Col Akram Syed was already there. He told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve. A little later, the brigade commander came to the tent, where the ‘O’ Group had assembled. He appeared shaken. The GSO-3 laid out the maps of the operational area. The maps covered our territory, but Indian territory was blank squares. The brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the Division HQ.

I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table. From the ensuing discussion, it became apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11, whereas, it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated, I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Laungewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Laungewala and by passing Laungewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Laungewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade. No one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan. When the ‘O’ Group dispersed, the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border. On 3 December, 38 Cavalry tanks moved on tracks for 25 miles and entrained at Sadiqabad and arrived at Reti railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours.

I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train. I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railways about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and, after a lot of shouting and threatening, the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station, a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line. There was no ‘power’ available at Reti. We were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through. I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train.

At about 9 o’clock, the tank train with 14 tanks, whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters, arrived and were unloaded. We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule. From Reti, the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank. At Khenju, my second-in-command, Major Zia Uddin Javed, was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju, the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border. Thirteen out of fourteen tanks arrived at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar, I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC, who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived.

At 0400 hours, the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On 4 December, the Indian Air Force did not show up. On checking up, I found that the lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki. I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion’s 6×6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down. It was a few miles from Khenju. The Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju. That put an end to my engine replacement plan. During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders, the attack on the Jaisalmer airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light, a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry, mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.

At about 2100 hours, six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit. 22 Cavalry was refuelling. Lt Col Akram Syed told me that Brig Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Laungewala. I met Brig Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Laungewala. At about 2300 hours, 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brig Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.

The operation, so far, was a movement fiasco. Civilian requisitioned 4×2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand. 20 Frontier Force, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert. At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brig Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lt Javed Iqbal, with the reconnaissance troop, to lead, followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain.

About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared. I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire).

Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles. Four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Laungewala luckily on the highest ridge in the area. At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Laungewala and columns of smoke started rising. I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my Rover and, from a ridge overlooking the Laugewala-Jaisalmer metalled road, we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and an Indian tank burning. Four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets, etc, they flew away.

A little later, a helicopter took off. Later, I learnt that the GOC had come to 51 Brigade as it was out of communication with the Division HQ and ordered Lt Col Akram Syed to capture Laungewala. I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade HQ, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know. I then drove to the base of the hill on which Laungewala was located. Two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack. 22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Laungewala defences at about 0200 hours. In the absence of the brigade commander, 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Laungewala before advancing to Ramgarh.

At 0700 hours, a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks. One AMX was knocked out; then six Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out five tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to strafing.

Half an hour later, 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours. 22 Cavalry formed up again but, after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Laungewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmer. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade HQ, re-opening the Indian communications to Laungewala. In subsequent air attacks, 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.

Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Laungewala from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres. After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry, I returned to where my tanks were. There I found Brig Jahanzeb Arbab. I told him of the state of affairs at Laungewala and he asked me to accompany him to Laungewala.

We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Laungewala. While we were at the 51 Brigade HQ, a helicopter, flown by Capt (later lt gen) ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Laungewala and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmer. On receiving the orders Brig Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for the brigade to attack.

While we were witnessing the brigade commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders, Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brig Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench. There we discussed what we had seen and I told Brig Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier. He hesitated and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.

After the Indian aircraft departed, Brig Jahanzeb informed Brig Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Laungewala and he ordered Lt Col Shah, CO 28 Baluch Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Laungewala-Jaisalmer and capture Ghotaru.

The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road. Brig Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped. His brigade had concentrated there. He made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December. He gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brig Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the forming up place (FUP) and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack.

I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours. I met Lt Col Akram Syed and explained the plan. He told me that Brig Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade HQ and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander, who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it. At about 1900 hours, the brigade started moving back. The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar, a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped. Brig Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge. At about 1130 hours the next day, the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry.

The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position. Later, the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the Division HQ at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order. I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other. The GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion.

By the morning of 7 December, 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar. My Quartermaster, Capt Bhatti, kept us supplied with food, meethi roti and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad. 38 Cavalry squadron, left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan. The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation. I told him I would see what the problem was.

I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade HQ to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break. My signal JCO could not find the reason. After the ceasefire, an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division HQ, switched off. On the night 8/9 December, 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade. 38 Cavalry, after firing all the HE ammunition, destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit.

On 9 December, after taking over the front, Brig Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade. 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank. The two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.

A little distance from my regimental HQ, the divisional gun area was located. The IAF attacked the gun area and my HQ. A cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School, which fired single shots but kept the IAF away. On the night 11/12 December, the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar. On the morning of 12 December, when my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ (FDLs) were, I found Maj Gen BM Mustafa standing there. Someone whispered that the General had been sacked and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.

I met the General and asked his GSO-2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were. The General heard me and indicating the GSO-2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day, ordered a ‘general withdrawal’ – both brigades took off in the ‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.

On the night of 12/13 December, I established my HQ at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December, ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone’s surprise. We ceased firing. After Operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation, though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation.

The mission assigned to 18 Division was “Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission.

It was a classical spoiling attack, which put the Indians off balance and the Division’s mission was achieved.

If the allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task? Because the GOC Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal to be disclosed to the Awan Committee.

How would you rate the various committee reports which studied the 1971 war like the Awan Committee, Akbar Committee and the Hamood Commission?

I was present when the Awan Committee investigated the 18 Division fiasco. The commanding officers and brigade commanders were divided into those who were allowed to speak and those who were ordered not to speak. I was in the “not” category. The effort was to cover up the shortcomings of Brig Tariq Mir and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan’s “Gabbar gallop” with GHQ and Maj Gen BM Mustafa as handy scapegoats.

I have not seen the report but it must have been a farce. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report was prejudicial. It showed a lack of understanding of tactics and seemed to deliberately malign the performance of the army by its criticism of corps, division commanders and some brigade commanders. Examples are the criticism of Lt Gen Irshad and Maj Gen Zahid for tactical withdrawal and Maj Gen Mustafa for his spoiling attack. I am not aware of the contents of the Akbar Committee report.

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