The judgement inflamed these tensions, and led to protests and clashes between the Meitei community and the hill tribes, which resulted in at least 73 deaths. The Supreme Court stepped in and stayed the Manipur High Court’s judgement, but the violence continued.

The Meitei community has long sought to be included in the Scheduled Tribes list, which would give them a number of benefits, including reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. However, the hill tribes have opposed this move, arguing that the Meiteis are not a tribal community and that their inclusion in the list would unfairly disadvantage them.

Underlying Factors

There are a number of reasons for the strife in Manipur today. Among them are political tensions, economic problems, drug trafficking, religious conversion and inter-tribal rivalry.

Manipur is a state with a long history of political instability. There are a number of different ethnic groups in the state, and there is often tension between them. This tension has been exacerbated by the fact that Manipur is a border state, and it is often caught up in the conflicts between India and its neighbors.

Manipur is a poor state, and there is a lot of poverty and unemployment. This has led to frustration and anger among the people, which has been exploited by some groups who are trying to incite violence.

Manipur is a major transit point for drug trafficking from Southeast Asia to India. This has led to the growth of drug addiction and crime in the state, which has further exacerbated the tensions.

Religious conversion is one of the factors. Manipur is predominantly Hindu. A number of groups in Manipur are opposed to Christianity and conversions in the state. These include some Hindu groups who argue that Christianity is a foreign religion that is incompatible with Manipuri culture, Meitei Inpi a socio-cultural organization that represents the Meitei community, and the United Naga Council, which represents the Naga people, the majority ethnic group in the hill districts of Manipur.

Tribal Rivalries

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas in Manipur is a complex and long-standing one. Land disputes, political and cultural differences have contributed to the rivalry. In 1992-1994, there was a major outbreak of violence between Kukis and Nagas that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people. There have also been smaller-scale incidents of violence between the groups in recent years.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas all have competing claims to land in Manipur. This has led to conflict over land ownership and resources. They have different political goals. The Kukis want to create a separate Kuki state, the Meiteis want to maintain the status quo, and the Nagas want to create a greater Nagalim state that would include parts of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas have different cultures and customs. This has led to misunderstandings and mistrust between the groups.

The Kuki people are an ethnic group native to Northeast India and Burma (Myanmar). They are one of the largest ethnic groups in Manipur, accounting for about 20% of the state’s population. They are believed to have migrated to the area from the Chin Hills of Burma in the 16th or 17th century. In the 18th century, the Kuki people were forced to flee their homes in Burma due to persecution. They migrated to Manipur and other parts of Northeast India. In the 1990s, there was a major conflict between Kukis and Nagas in Manipur. The conflict was caused by land disputes and political differences. The Kuki people have long demanded a separate Kuki state.

The Kukis were originally animists, but they were converted to Christianity by British missionaries in the 19th century.

In 1901, the Kuki population in Manipur was 150,000, accounting for about 25% of the state’s population. By 1941 it was 250,000, (30%). In 2011, it was 600,000 (20%) and by 2022 it was estimated to be around 750,000 (22%).

The Meitei population has also grown in the last 100 years, but not as significantly as the Kuki population, due to lower birth rate, out-migration of Meiteis to other parts of India and Conversion to Hinduism and Islam.

The Meitei population has remained at about 60% of the state’s population.

Drugs Trade

The cultivation of poppy is illegal in India, but poppy plant is a major source of income for many people in Manipur. The poppy plant is a key ingredient in the production of heroin. The drug trade in Manipur is controlled by a number of criminal gangs and mafias. These gangs are often armed and violent.

The drug trade has a number of negative impacts on the Manipur society. It has led to an increase in crime in Manipur and degradation of the social fabric in Manipur because drug addiction can lead to family breakdown, unemployment, and poverty.

Kuki militant groups, Rohingya refugees and Manipuri gangs are involved in the drug trade. Kuki militants are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who offer them money or weapons in exchange for their involvement. Rohingya refugees are often forced into the drug trade by traffickers who take advantage of their vulnerability through threat of deportation. Manipuri gangs are often involved in the cultivation and production of poppy, as well as the trafficking of heroin.

The Manipur government has taken a number of steps to stop poppy cultivation and limit the drug trade in Manipur. These include law enforcement, social programmes and economic development.

In 2019, the Manipur Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB) department reported that 963 drug traffickers, including 768 men and 195 women, were detained under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. Law enforcement agencies have also destroyed large swathes of poppy cultivation. In 2020 and February 2021, law enforcement agencies destroyed 1,420 acres of poppy plantation.

In 2019, the Manipur government reported that the area under poppy cultivation had decreased by 20% compared to the previous year. However, the drug trade remains a serious problem in Manipur.

In 2021, the Manipur government rewarded total cash of Rs 10 lakh to a village in Ukhrul district for voluntarily destroying poppy plants grown in the village. In 2022, the Manipur government launched a “War on Drugs” campaign, which aims to destroy poppy cultivation and bring drug traffickers to justice. As of March 2023, the Manipur government has arrested over 2,500 people for drug-related offenses and has destroyed over 15,496 acres of poppy cultivation.

Religious Conversions

Manipur has a history of missionaries working for conversions since 1900. The first missionaries to arrive in Manipur were from the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society (ABFMS), who began their work in the state in 1894. The ABFMS missionaries were initially focused on providing education and medical care to the people of Manipur, but they soon began to evangelize as well.

In the early 1900s, the ABFMS missionaries were joined by missionaries from other Christian denominations, including the Church of England, the Salvation Army, and the Presbyterian Church. These missionaries also focused on education and medical care, but they were also more aggressive in their evangelism efforts.

As a result of the work of these missionaries, the number of Christians in Manipur grew steadily in the early 20th century. By the 1950s, Christians made up about 20% of the population of Manipur.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of conversions to Christianity in Manipur accelerated. This was due in part to the work of indigenous Christian leaders, who began to organize their own evangelistic campaigns. It was also due to the fact that the Indian government began to provide financial support to Christian missionary organizations.

In the 1970s, only about 30% of the population of Manipur was Christian. However, by 2011, this number had risen to 45%. This growth has been particularly rapid among the Meitei community, who are the majority ethnic group in Manipur.

The perceived threat that Christianity poses to the traditional culture and values of Manipur, has come to the fore in Manipur recently. Some people have accused missionaries of using coercion and financial inducement to convert people to Christianity, and this has led to anger and resentment among some Hindu groups.

In 2014, the Manipur government passed a law that made it illegal to convert people by force or inducement. However, the law has been criticized by some for being too vague and for not doing enough to protect religious freedom.

Peace Measures

The central government and the state government has taken a number of steps to bring normalcy in Manipur in the last two months. These include deploying additional security forces to help restore law and order, initiating dialogue with the Kuki and Meitei communities, providing relief to the affected people and launching a peace campaign

Comments

There is a need for greater understanding and dialogue between the different religious communities in the state, in order to find a way to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The drug trade in Manipur is a complex issue with no easy solutions. The drug trade has also damaged the social fabric of the state and has made it more difficult to address other problems, such as the conflict between Kuki and Naga groups.

In order to address the problem, it is important to address the root causes of the involvement of these groups, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity.

It is important to take a comprehensive approach that includes law enforcement, social programs, and economic development. Law enforcement needs to be strengthened to crack down on the drug trade and to bring traffickers to justice. Social programs need to be implemented to help people who are addicted to drugs and to prevent people from becoming addicted in the first place. Economic development needs to be promoted to create jobs and opportunities for people, so that they do not feel the need to turn to crime or the drug trade to make a living.

The rivalry between Kukis, Meiteis, and Nagas is a serious problem that has had a negative impact on the state of Manipur. It has led to displacement, loss of life, and a general atmosphere of fear and mistrust. There is no easy solution to the rivalry, but it is important for the different groups to find ways to live together peacefully and respectfully.

The growing Kuki population has been a source of tension in Manipur. Some Meiteis have expressed concerns about the Kuki population growth, and there have been some incidents of violence between the two groups. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of Kukis and Meiteis live peacefully together.

The Indian government and the Manipur government have made some progress in bringing normalcy to Manipur. However, the situation remains tense, and there is a risk that violence could break out again. It is important for the two governments to continue their efforts to resolve the underlying tensions between the Kuki and Meitei communities.

The post Underlying Causes of the Strife in Manipur appeared first on IMR.

The clashes began on May 3, 2023, after a Manipur High Court verdict directed the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status. The tribal communities, who are already classified as Scheduled Tribes, protested the Meitei demand, arguing that it would give them an unfair advantage.

The violence quickly escalated, with both sides resorted to arson, looting, and violence. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police were deployed to restore order, but the clashes continued.

The violence has had a devastating impact on Manipur. The economy has been crippled, and schools and businesses have been forced to close. Thousands of people have been displaced from their homes, and many have lost their livelihoods.

The central government called for an end to the violence, and the Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities. However, sporadic incidents of violence continued.

Historical Causes for Enmity

The enmity between the Meitei and Kuki people in Manipur has a long and complex history. There are a number of factors that have contributed to the conflict, including:

Land and resource disputes. The Meitei people are the majority ethnic group in Manipur, and they have traditionally controlled the most fertile land and other resources. The Kuki people are a tribal group, and they have often been displaced from their traditional lands by the Meitei. This has led to resentment and conflict between the two groups.

Political and economic marginalization. The Kuki people have often felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Cultural differences. The Meitei and Kuki people have different cultures and customs. This has sometimes led to misunderstandings and conflict between the two groups. For example, the Meitei people are Hindu, while the Kuki people are mostly Christian. This has led to clashes over religious issues.

Historical grievances. The Meitei and Kuki people have a history of conflict, dating back to the 19th century. In 1917, the Kuki people rebelled against the British Raj, which was then ruling Manipur. The rebellion was suppressed, but it left a legacy of bitterness between the two groups.

Recent Events

Some more recent events contributed to the tensions between the Meitei and Kuki people. In 2015, there were a series of clashes between the two groups in Churachandpur district. These clashes were sparked by a land dispute, but they also highlighted the deep-seated mistrust and resentment that exists between the two groups.

The immediate causes of the violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur are complex and multifaceted. However, some of the most significant factors include:

The Manipur High Court’s order directing the state government to make a decision on whether to grant the Meitei people Scheduled Tribe status mentioned above.

The Tribal Solidarity March organized by the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) in the ten Hill Districts of Manipur on 3 May 2023. The march was in protest against the Manipur High Court’s order and the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status.

The spread of misinformation and rumors on social media. Misinformation and rumors about the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status spread rapidly on social media, fueling tensions between the two communities.

The failure of the state government to address the grievances of the Kuki people. The Kuki people have long felt marginalized by the Meitei-dominated government of Manipur. They have argued that they have been denied their fair share of political representation and economic opportunities. This has led to further resentment and conflict.

Mitigating Measures

The state and central governments took a number of actions to control the situation in Manipur, including:

Deploying security forces. The Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and the Manipur Police have been deployed to the state to restore order and protect civilians.

Imposing curfews. Curfews have been imposed in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Prohibiting public gatherings. Public gatherings have been prohibited in some parts of the state to prevent further violence.

Launching investigations. The state government has launched investigations into the violence to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

Providing relief to victims. The state government has provided relief to the victims of the violence, including food, shelter, and medical care.

Appointing a mediator. The central government has appointed a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution.

The state and central governments have also taken steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people, including:

Setting up a committee to look into the grievances of the Kuki people.The committee will be headed by a retired judge and will have representatives from both the Meitei and Kuki communities.

Providing more political representation to the Kuki people. The state government has said that it will increase the number of seats reserved for Kukis in the Manipur Legislative Assembly.

Promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas. The state government has said that it will invest in infrastructure and other development projects in the Kuki-dominated areas.

It is too early to say whether these measures will be enough to end the violence and restore peace to Manipur.

Long Term Solutions

Some of the important steps that need to be taken for the long-term include:

Addressing the root causes of the conflict. This includes addressing issues such as land and resource disputes, political and economic marginalization, cultural differences, and historical grievances.

Building trust and understanding between the two communities. This can be done through dialogue, education, and cultural exchange.

Creating a more equitable and just society. This includes ensuring that all communities have equal access to political representation, economic opportunities, and social services.

Promoting peace and reconciliation. This includes supporting initiatives that promote forgiveness, healing, and coexistence.

Here are some additional suggestions for long-term solutions to the conflict:

Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission. This would be a body that would investigate the violence and its causes, and would recommend measures to promote healing and reconciliation.

Creating a more decentralized government. This would give more power to local communities, and would help to address the feeling of marginalization that many Kuki people feel.

Promoting inter-community dialogue and understanding. This could be done through education, cultural exchange, and other initiatives.

Ensuring that all communities have access to justice. This would include ensuring that the police and judiciary are fair and impartial, and that victims of violence have access to compensation and other forms of redress.

Recommendations

For a peaceful resolution to the conflict:

The state government should take steps to address the grievances of the Kuki people. This includes providing more political representation to the Kuki people, promoting economic development in the Kuki-dominated areas, and ensuring that the Kuki people have access to justice.

The central government should appoint a mediator to help the two communities reach a peaceful resolution. The mediator should be someone who is respected by both communities and who has the skills and experience necessary to help them find a mutually agreeable solution.

The media should be more responsible in reporting on the conflict. The media should avoid spreading misinformation and rumors, and should focus on reporting the facts in a balanced and objective way.

Comments

There have been a number of political controversies that have erupted in preventing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Some political parties have used the conflict to their advantage, stoking tensions between the two communities in order to gain votes.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process. The violence in Manipur is a reminder of the deep-seated ethnic tensions that exist in the state. It is also a reminder of the challenges that the Indian government faces in maintaining peace and order in its northeastern states.

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Events in Manipur

May 3, 2023: Clashes broke out between Meitei and Kuki communities in Churachandpur district.

May 4, 2023: The Indian Army was deployed to Manipur to restore order.

May 5, 2023: The Manipur government imposed a curfew in Churachandpur district.

May 6, 2023: The violence spreads to other parts of Manipur.

May 7, 2023: The central government announced a compensation package for the victims of the violence.

May 8, 2023: The Manipur government announced a series of measures to address the grievances of the tribal communities.

June 1, 2023: The violence subsided, but sporadic incidents continued.

July 14, 2023: The situation in Manipur remained tense, but there were no major incidents of violence.

The post Violence in Manipur appeared first on IMR.

The Popular Front of India (PFI) was registered at Delhi under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 with the purpose to establish a classless society in which freedom, justice and security are enjoyed by all. The PFI has its headquarters in New Delhi, is present in almost 23 states and is prominently active in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

The organisation was using passive methods to attain larger goals and objectives which run against India’s social fabric. It was found to be involved in several transnational terror activities and many social and political conflicts in India.

PFI members were exposed as ‘ISIS sympathiser’ on Facebook and linked with Harkat Ul Jihad al- Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Al Qaeda.

The PFI was regarded as a reincarnation of the National Development Front (NDF) set up in 1994 in Kerala. In 2006, the NDF was dissolved and re-emerged with the name of PFI, presumably to focus on socio-economic issues ailing minorities – in particular the Kerala-based Muslim community.

The PFI is not just a reincarnation of the NDF – instead there exist multiple shells of organisations within organisations out of which the PFI has emerged.

In 1948 the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) came into existence. The IUML is a political party in Kerala, recognised by the Election Commission of India, which later became the leading party as a part of the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by the Indian National Congress in Kerala since the 1970s.

Next came in line was the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) established in the state of Kerala in 1992 so as to counter the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – which was also a pan-Islamic movement in nature claiming to be superficially working for the welfare of minorities.  

However, the ISS came into limelight during the Babri Mosque demolition in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in the year 1992. It was eventually banned by the government of India. It was discovered that ISS leaders had connections with the ISI in Pakistan. 

As the government proscribed the ISS, it made way for another organisation called the National Development Front established in 1994 in Kerala and intending to focus on socio-economic issues of minorities, especially on Muslim communities in Kerala. NDF’s modus operandi is Da’wa – which means it is missionary in nature, propagating Islam to other communities as well.

The NDF came into limelight only after some among the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) started getting noticed for their extremist jihadi activities and for their call for the liberation and Islamic conversion of India.

One of the members of the SIMI, Prof. P. Koya, began to attend mosque prayers and sponsor post prayer gatherings interactions with the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kerala. He formed another group called the National Democratic Front (NDF). 

After the SIMI was banned in 2001 (after 9/11), the NDF reincarnated itself as the Popular Front of India in 2006.

Interestingly the PFI’s preamble also mentioned that it worked towards socio-economic, cultural and political empowerment of the deprived. Its goals included working for the welfare of Dalits; tribal peoples; religious, the linguistic and cultural minorities; backward classes and women. With these objectives, the PFI justified its existence under the Societies Registration Act (PFI, Constitution).

The PFI’s Modus Operandi

Even though the organisation came into existence aiming for Muslim empowerment, the PFI’s modus-operandi has been to showcase the Muslim agenda as a side show. Instead they kept the issues of vulnerable societies (Women, labours, farmers, Dalits, Adivasi) at the forefront. 

This provided them with the cover of a charitable organisation working for the welfare of minorities and the weaker sections of the society. This was meant to fool the government.

Security agencies alleged that the SIMI ideology influenced its leaders. The PFI’s ultimate goal was to replace the democratic system of India with an Islamic State styled government. The PFI, which calls India its enemy and asks for ‘total Muslim empowerment’, was under scanner in Kerala for its alleged anti-India ideology.

The PFI ran projects like ‘School Chalo’ to encourage education for all up to the secondary level, as well as the ‘Sarva Siksha Gram’ and ‘Adopt a students’ campaigns. These campaigns and projects not only provided them legitimacy to function openly but also provided them cover over their actual missionary work. The PFI’s members believed that India was a democratic country. The doctrine was that slowly they (government of India) were reaching for their necks because of (political and social reasons). PFI members believed that if their rights were breached, then they would be left with no choice but to react – and their holy text provided for a jihad, which they would not be reluctant to utilise and justify their acts. 

PFI maintained the image of a charitable organisation and worked for the ultimate goal establishing an Islamic state by converting and spreading fear through terror acts.

The organisation very ingeniously used one of the features of its preamble on the Dalit and Tribal upliftment and protection of their political rights. This helped the PFI to gain the support of the Bhim Army led by Chandrashekhar Azad, which worked for Dalit Welfare and who also joined the anti-CAA and NRC protests.

The PFI pursued a strategy aimed at communalising Indian polity (Jain, 2017), enforcing Islam, heightening existing social divisions and maintaining a trained bank of volunteers for carrying out actions in the field.

The “PFI had consistently been indulging in actions detrimental to overall national security,” the NIA declared while blaming the outfit for seeking to impose religious orthodoxy on Muslims and using sister outfits like the Sathya Sarani based in Malappuram so as to carry out “forceful conversions” (Jain, 2017).

The outfit seeks the opportunity to enforce religious obscurantism on Muslims and uses its sister organisation Sathya Sarani to perform “forceful conversions” (Gupta, 2020). The PFI has been linked with alleged cases of love jihad in Kerala. In 2017, the NIA, which was then investigating 94 ‘love jihad’ cases registered by the Kerala Police, held four PFI-linked men for forced conversion of Akhila Ashokan in the Hadiya case (Swamy, 2019).

Even though the PFI does not have faith in the constitution of India or its judicial system, its members did not hesitate to use some constitutional powers for their benefit. The PFI believed that the constitution gave them the right to protest. And if the government of India seized such rights, they would be left with no choice but to turn to jihad. In truth, the organisation neither has a true understanding of Islam nor respects the Indian democratic system.

The group also sponsors pronouncedly anti-Zionist and pro-Palestine protests in various parts of country. In July 2014, they started a campaign with nationwide solidarity in favour of Palestinians. The campaign was called “I am Gaza” and was inspired by a series of rallies that took place in several parts of the world (YouTube, 2014).

Cadres of the banned outfit SIMI fast regrouped under the banner of the PFI. This outfit has expanded its tentacles to the north after carrying out the initial recruitment in South India. The spreading tentacles of the PFI and Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), the political wing of the PFI, came to light only when its members became influenced by the taqreer (speeches) of Zakir Naik.

Previously, the members of Kerala-based PFI were arrested on charges of instigating violence in UP, Assam. It was also accused of fanning flames in Karnataka (Swamy, 2019) against North-Eastern peoples, resulting in a mass exodus.

The Popular Front of India protested across the country against the CAA, NRC, and NPR. Its epicentre is located in Shaheen Bagh, New Delhi. It successfully exploited the sense of insecurity created within the Muslim community through various policies and misled the people massively through distorted narratives.

Soon after a few members of the PFI were arrested in connection to the Jafarabad riots, it was found by the Enforcement Directorate that the PFI was receiving funding from various sources.

In 2012 PFI members organised a march to parliament, demanding 10 per cent reserved seats for Muslims (Staff Reporter, 2012). The reasons given in favour of the reservation were as follows:

1) the Constitutional Right of the individual to seek equal opportunity for self-growth and

2) the fight against the backwardness of the Muslim community (confirmed through a quoted minute of a high-level government committee meeting).

In 2012, the PFI launched a promotional campaign ‘why the Popular Front of India?’ where it reiterated upon its mission to restore the rights of the depressed and marginalised sections of the Indian society (Staff Reporter, 2012).

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) has found that some radical organisations, including the Kerala-based PFI, made efforts to send messages to countries in West Asia about the ongoing updating of the NRC (Ranjan, 2017).

Linkages with Terror Outfits and Transnational Activities

Since its inception, PFI’s linkages were found in numerous cases under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the Arms Act and the Explosives Act. While it had a strong foothold in Kerala, the PFI has expanded across the country and included similar-minded groups into their fold such as the Tamil Nadu-based Manitha Neethu Pasarai and the Karnataka Forum for Dignity, among others.

In India, the PFI has been suspected of being involved in several political killings and religious conversions.

The investigation agency also claimed that the PFI and its members had been involved in sending the youth of Kerala to Afghanistan, Syria, and Turkey so as to join Daesh and ISIS. 

On March 25, 2020, in Gurudwara Har Rai Sahib in Kabul, Afghanistan, an attack took place, killing 25 people and injuring approximately 80 more. One of the suicide bombers in the Gurudwara attack was a 29-year-old man called Muhammad Mushin – alias ‘Abu Khalid Al- Hindi’. He was from Kerala, and an active member of the PFI. The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) took the responsibility and shared the image of the Kerala boy in their magazine Al Naba – whose caption stated that ‘he avenged the atrocities on the Muslims in India’.

The PFI’s role has been established in the Easter bombing case. PFI’s actions were also found in the Pune German Bakery case – support was provided to the Indian unit of the LeT.

The NIA busted an Islamic State (IS) module in Kerala and Tamil Nadu which was allegedly planning to carry out major strikes in several parts of south India; the probe revealed that one of the module’s senior members — Mujeeb alias Omar Al Hindi– was associated with the PFI and inclined towards the ideology of the so-called ‘caliphate’ led by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. 

Financing of the PFI

The financing of the PFI was mostly achieved through its membership schemes and also through a donation from individuals in the name of Zakat, which is one of the five main pillars of Islam.

PFI members travelled to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia for fundraising. Also, people living in the Southern part of India and enjoying Gulf connections due to their family working in that region also came back for festivals and made large donations. Several people in Iran and the Middle East also sent donations.

These donations mostly came in the name of social welfare – sometimes for girl child education, mosque construction or madrasa (religious school) establishments. However, they were used for unethical activities. Several such organisations and societies had their licence cancelled under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) after being found to be involved in certain illegal activities.

The Muslim Relief Network (MRN), an NGO started by the PFI, was another entity through which it organised funds – particularly from West Asia – in return for raising voices for the Palestine cause and pressure Indian government.

The post Structure, Aim and Activities of PFI appeared first on IMR.

In the largest terror operation of its kind, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) carried out wide nationwide searches, on 22 September, at the premises of people involved in terror-related activities. Nearly 100 people, including top leaders of the Popular Front of India (PFI), have been arrested following midnight raids.

The searches were carried out by the NIA and Enforcement Directorate (ED) at several locations across 13 states including Bihar, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, and Telangana.

Searches were conducted in the residential and official premises of people involved in terror funding, organizing training camps, and radicalizing people to join proscribed organizations.

The maximum number of arrests were made in Kerala (22) followed by Maharashtra and Karnataka (20 each), Andhra Pradesh (5), Assam (9), Delhi (3), Madhya Pradesh (4), Puducherry (3), Tamil Nadu (10), Uttar Pradesh (8) and Rajasthan (2).

39 locations were raided in Kerala. Searches were also conducted at one location in each in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Manipur.

Director general of the NIA supervised the operation which included around 300 officers.

Chargesheet Filed

The NIA has earlier investigated over a dozen cases linked to PFI in which 355 persons have been charge-sheeted and 46 convicted.

According to the charge sheet filed by the ED, PFI has formed District Executive Committee in UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and other places to raise funds. Targets are given to individuals to collect cash and transfer the same through Hawala or camouflaged as genuine business transactions.

Shocking revelation of the Popular Front of India (PFI) planned to liquidate several RSS-BJP leaders came to light when Special Investigation Team arrested PFI activist Sirajjuddin on September 17 in connection with the brutal murder of RSS leader Srinivasan on April 16. A list of 12 RSS-BJP leaders to be assassinated from Malappuram was seized from him. Several incriminating documents were also seized from him, a Malappuram native.

The ED, during the investigation, analyzed more than 600 domestic contributors and their bank accounts and also looked at accounts of more than 2,600 beneficiaries. The agency has found that many of these accounts were bogus and people on the ground were not found during physical verification, the agency stated.

Second Round of Raids

The second round of searches was carried out at 93 locations in 15 states, including Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Goa, West Bengal, Bihar and Manipur. Earlier in September, the NIA had raided 38 locations in Telangana and two in Andhra Pradesh and seized digital devices, documents, weapons, and cash.

Meanwhile, PFI members staged protests in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka against the arrests.

Ban on PFI

The Centre declared the PFI and its associates or affiliates and fronts as an ‘unlawful association’ under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). A ban has also been imposed on these outfits for five years.

According to a government notification issued 27 September, PFI and its associates or affiliates and fronts have been indulging in unlawful activities that are prejudicial to the integrity, sovereignty and security of the country. It further added that these organisations have the potential to disturb public peace and communal harmony of the country and support militancy.

The notification added that though the PFI had been operating openly as a socio-economic, educational and political organisation, it has been pursuing a secret agenda to radicalise a particular section of society, thereby undermining the constitution.

The order said there have been instances where the PFI members were found to have links with terrorist groups. Some of its members have even joined ISIS and participated in terror activities in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Rise and Fall of PFI

The PFI’s formation was announced in 2006 in Bengaluru. It had since spread to Manipur, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, and West Bengal. PFI also has a strong presence in Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu.

PFI has links to proscribed organisations like the  Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, the centre’s notification said some of PFI’s founding members were the leaders of the banned organisation Students Islamic Movement Of India (SIMI).

The affiliate organisations of the PFI include Rehab India Foundation (RIF), Campus Front of India (CFI), All India Imams Council (AIIC), National Confederation of Human Rights Organization (NCHRO), National Women’s Front, Junior Front, Empower India Foundation and Rehab Foundation.

In the late 1980s, K.T. Mammu, a copra businessman from Vadakara in the Kozhikode district of Kerala, started an organisation named Muslim Cultural Centre as a “defensive move” against intimidation from the late A. Kanaran, a CPI(M) strongman from Nadapuram. This resulted in sporadic clashes between cadres of the Muslim League and CPI(M)—a fight that eventually earned a communal colour.

Mammu’s MCC was centred around kalaris (training centres for the martial art form, Kalaripayatt). He took the help of certain personalities associated with the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)—which came into existence originally as the student wing of Jamaat-i-Islami and was banned in 2001, immediately after the September 11 attack on the United States—to run the centre.

E. Abubacker, P. Koya and E.M. Abdurahiman – all former office-bearers of SIMI—were the core team of the National Development Front (NDF), formed on November 14, 1993, inspired by Islamist reactionary movements that emerged in different places in India because of the Mandir-Masjid dispute. Thirteen years later, NDF, along with two similar outfits that emerged in the post-Babri Masjid period—Karnataka Forum for Dignity of Karnataka and Manitha Neethi Pasari from Tamil Nadu—would form the Popular Front of India.

Since its formative years, NDF figured frequently in political and communal killings in the state. In May 1997, they organised a conference on human rights, which decided to form an umbrella body of various human rights and civil liberties organisations. Thus was formed the Confederation of Human Rights Organisations (CHRO). In the early days, the organisation’s activities were restricted to Kerala. However, in 2007—after the formation of PFI—CHRO also became national. NCHRO was also banned on September 28 as a front organisation of PFI.

The PFI leaders played crucial roles in building several such NGOs, trusts and socio-cultural organisations in the last 15 years. These organisations were used by PFI to gain more acceptance in the community. PFI maintained that all these organisations were independent entities. Many of these front organisations also have been banned now. Their non-profit charity, Rehab India Foundation, claimed to have worked in poverty reduction and educational segment; their think tank Empower India Foundation’s flagship project was ‘India 2047’, which envisaged “ameliorating the current socio-political-economic-cultural-educational status of Muslim community in India by 2047.”

All India Imams Council, their organisation for religious scholars, Imams and madrasa teachers was floated in 2013. In 2009, The year 2019, the PFI launched its political outfit Social Democratic Party of India—with Abubacker as the founder president—its student organisation Campus Front of India and its women’s organisation National Women’s Front. Both CFI and NWF are banned now. Darul Khuda, another organisation they set up in 2009, allegedly acted as a “parallel judiciary” settling family problems, land and property disputes and other grievances under ‘Shariah’ at certain pockets.

Satya Sarini charitable trust, a missionary centre supported by the PFI, imparted religious lessons to persons who convert to Islam from other religions. The centre was in the eye of controversy when the Hadiya religious conversion case of 2017-2018—in which PFI defended the allegations that it is catering “forced” conversions—became a talking point.

Ashraf Moulavi, state president of SDPI, maintains that the SDPI has a different ideology and existence than PFI. Moulavi adds that because SDPI and PFI are two separate entities, the ban against PFI will not affect the SDPI. SDPI is a party registered with the Election Commission, however, without the Union government initiating actions, EC will not be able to make any major steps against SDPI.

If NDF was primarily a phenomenon in northern Kerala, PFI-SDPI had built a pan-Kerala presence in the last 15 years.

It was in the late 2000s that the IUML and other Muslim organisations openly started coming up with measures to isolate the NDF and PFI. A crucial incident that led to this was when the PFI activists chopped off the right hand of professor T.J. Joseph on July 4, 2010, accusing him of blasphemy.

In 2009, the Union home minister wrote a letter saying that there are certain pockets in Kerala where the police do not have any access and that it should not be allowed. So, the governments knew that they are developing such Sharia-ruled pockets. There are hundreds of such pockets in Kerala now.

On December 4, 2019, the home ministry sought information from all states about cases registered against PFI activists from November 2016 to November 2019. The maximum number of cases registered against PFI activists was in Kerala. In those three years, the maximum number of cases (104) was registered in Kerala. This was primarily for stoking communal tension, violent clashes, attempts to murder, provocative sloganeering, possession of arms, illegal assembly and sedition. The PFI activists were allegedly involved in at least five murder cases.

Political observers cite that a lenient attitude shown towards these extremist elements by the successive governments in Kerala catered for their transition from one form to another.

Over the years, the PFI built its money power also. The NIA estimates that it received over Rs120 crore as foreign funds.

PFI tried to portray themselves as the protectors of poor Muslims. They used to run a propaganda in Kerala that they are the only force to fight RSS in north India. In certain high-profile cases, they could manage to get their people out of jail. Showing this, they created an image that they can protect anybody which is a bluff. They also spread propaganda about their so-called ‘charity works’ in north India.

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India said in a UN Security Council (UNSC) debate, on 25 January,  that member states are fully aware that Pakistan has a long history of harbouring, helping, and actively supporting terrorists during a UNSC debate on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict.” Underscoring the threat of terrorism to civilians, Counsellor in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN, R Madhu Sudan said that the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror attack continue to have Pakistan’s support.

The Indian Counsellor made these remarks after a Pakistani diplomat misused the platform provided by the UN to “propagate false and malicious propaganda” against India. “This is not the first time that a Pakistani representative has used a UN platform to spread false and malicious propaganda against my country, attempting in vain to divert the world’s attention away from the sad state of his country where terrorists have free reign and the lives of ordinary people, particularly minorities, are turned upside down,” he said.

“This is a country that has been identified as a global terrorist sponsor and holds the world record for hosting the most terrorists sanctioned by the Security Council.” So much so that today’s terrorist attacks all around the world have their origins in Pakistan in some way or another,” he claimed.

Madhu Sudan reminded the Security Council that Pakistan’s prime minister and foreign minister had been chastised for aiding terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, but they continue on their merry way.

“Today, we’re talking about civilian protection. Terrorists pose the greatest threat to civilians. As we previously stated, the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror incident continue to enjoy the support of the state she represents,” he continued.

The Indian Counsellor reaffirmed that “the entire Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh were, are, and always will be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representation feels… We call upon Pakistan to promptly quit all regions under its unlawful occupation.

“Madhu Sudan stated that India wishes to have normal and friendly ties with all countries, including Pakistan, and that it is committed to amicably resolving any unresolved concerns, as per the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

“However, any genuine debate can only take place in a free of terror, animosity, and violence environment. Pakistan is responsible for creating such an environment. India would continue to take robust and decisive action until then.

On the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Madhu Sudan reiterated that the entire J&K and Ladakh were, are and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representative believes. “We call upon Pakistan to immediately vacate all areas under its illegal occupation,” the Indian Counsellor said. .

“However, any meaningful dialogue can only be held in an atmosphere free of terror, hostility and violence. The onus is on Pakistan to create such a conducive atmosphere. Till then, India will continue to take firm and decisive steps to respond to cross border terrorism,” he added.

No Common Definition of Terrorism

The United Nations member states have failed themselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism, India has said, voicing concern that the global body has neither agreed on a common definition of terrorism nor crafted a well-coordinated policy to tackle the global scourge and dismantle its enabling networks.

Speaking in the UNGA meeting to consider the Report of Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation, Second Secretary in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN Dinesh Setia, on 24 January, said: “Our inability to seriously address terrorism, the most dangerous of scourges faced by states and societies since the World War II, casts doubt on the relevance of the organisation for the very people whom the Charter of the United Nations obliges us to protect”.

“The United Nations has yet to agree on a common definition, let alone craft a coherent well-coordinated policy to tackle terrorism and dismantle its enabling networks. We have failed ourselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism,” he said.

India proposed a draft document on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN in 1986 but it has not been implemented yet as there is no unanimity on the definition of terrorism among the member states.

The Indian diplomat further said that the effectiveness, relevance and longevity of any institution lie in its dynamic character and ability to adapt itself to the changing times.

“As long as the key organs of the organisation remain anchored in a governance structure frozen in the past, the crisis of legitimacy and performance will persist,” Setia said.

Lamenting that four decades have gone by since the inscription of the item on the reform of the Security Council on the agenda of the General Assembly, Setia called on member states to strive to ensure that this year is the one that finally delivers some concrete progress with regard to a Security Council and a United Nations that reflect the realities of the contemporary world.

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Some of the civilians died when villagers, alarmed by the gunfire and death of their brethren, clashed with the troops. At least two vehicles of the Army Special unit were set on fire.

Following the incident, protests erupted across Nagaland on 5 December with a mob of about 500 men attacking and vandalising a camp of the paramilitary Assam Rifles in district headquarters Mon. At least two persons were killed during the attack.

Soon after the violence in Mon, Section 144 of the CrPC was imposed in the district to prevent gatherings and restricting the movement of vehicles.

Official Version

The official version is that, based on intelligence inputs about the movement of insurgents, the Army laid an ambush. An approaching vehicle was signalled to stop but it tried to flee, which aroused suspicion. The Army personnel thereupon opened fire, which resulted in the death of eight persons. The villagers, thereafter, reportedly surrounded the Army unit and attacked them with daos and firearms. The forces again opened fire — this time in self-defence — killing six more civilians. Army personnel also suffered injuries.

The key Naga group negotiating with the Centre, NSCN(I-M), has declared it a “black day” for all Nagas and termed the incident “unprecedented in recent history”, while the Naga National Political Group (NNPG) has blamed the continued implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958 for such incidents.

Armed Forces Special Powers Act

After the Mon incident, there was renewed clamour for the repeal of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which has been in force in the state since 1958. Large-scale protests and even a 16-year-long hunger strike by Irom Chanu Sharmila in Manipur for the repeal of the law have not moved the governments over the past several decades.

Counterinsurgency operations are full of uncertainties. Intelligence may be right, it may be false. Sometimes you walk into a trap. It is not easy to distinguish friend from foe. To fire or not to fire is always a difficult decision. A split second makes all the difference. In such a situation, mistakes and even blunders happen. It need hardly be said that the US generally takes no action in such cases which are dismissed as “collateral damage”. We have much better institutional arrangements for such lapses.

Government has already, during the last few years, been gradually withdrawing AFSPA from different areas. The Act was withdrawn from Tripura in 2015 and Meghalaya in 2018 while in Arunachal Pradesh it is now restricted to the three districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding. The whole of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur (except the Imphal municipal area), however, continue to be under AFSPA. The Jeevan Reddy Commission had, in 2005, recommended the repeal of the Act. The matter could be examined again in consultation with all stakeholders and a well-considered decision taken, keeping in view the requirements of national security.

Peace Talks

The NNPG, which comprises seven insurgent groups that have so far supported the peace talks process, rescinding many of its earlier demands such as separate flag, said in a statement that the actions of the military have “belittled the commitments made by the Indian Prime Minister and Home Minister”. It said, “The draconian laws in Nagaland and military atrocities over many decades have made Naga people very aware that they are not and will never be Indians.”

The killings could be exploited by certain insurgent groups to recruit and even strengthen the hands of the NSCN(I-M), which will likely push for its demands with greater vigour given that the government is on the back foot. Even groups seen being in favour of signing the deal quickly will have to reflect the public anger to remain relevant, sources said.

The Framework Agreement (FA) itself is turning out to be the biggest roadblock before a final deal. Government officials say the wordings are so vague that both sides have interpreted them according to their own convenience.

The NSCN(I-M) has argued that the FA is clear that India and Nagaland would share “sovereign power” and coexist as “two entities”. This, it has argued, is affirmation that India accepts the desire of Naga people for sovereignty and staying within India as a separate entity. It has said this simply means India had agreed to a separate flag and constitution for Nagaland. The Centre has said there is no question of granting sovereignty to a state within India and so both the flag and the constitution are out of the question.

Way Ahead

Not many people in the country know that the rebel Nagas have gone back on every agreement that the Government of India negotiated with them in the past. The Naga People’s Convention held in 1957 demanded that the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) be merged into a single unit. The demand was conceded and the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) was formed. Another Naga People’s Convention, held in 1959, demanded the creation of a separate state of Nagaland. This was also conceded and Nagaland was carved out in 1963. Then there was the Shillong Agreement in 1975 whereby the underground groups agreed to deposit their arms while the government agreed to release the rebels held in detention and give liberal grants for their rehabilitation. The hardcore elements, however, did not abide by the terms of the agreement.

The Centre would have to assuage public anger arising out of the mistaken killings through an impartial and quick probe, followed by action on those responsible. Only after the government can convince people that it means well, despite the killings, can the Centre can resume discussions.

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Since the fall of the Ghani Government in Afghanistan and the exit of the US forces from the war theatre, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has exploited this opportunity to attempt its dominance, monopolize Jihad in the Indian subcontinent and turn its low intensity asymmetric warfare into a virtual blitzkrieg approach in the region.

Over the years, IS-K has managed to build an intricate network amongst the locals in the regions where is operates. It has been seen effectively providing support to the Muslim Chinese jihadists and was lately employing Afghan soldiers, intelligence and law enforcement officers, as also the ex-Taliban recruits. Given that the outfit’s aspirations are not only limited to Afghanistan but also to additional plans which may not be aligned with its parent ISIS Central but its own, we have been witnessing an influx of recruits from India joining the IS-K in Afghanistan.

Recruitment Drive in India

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has probed over 37 terror attack cases directly linked with the IS, out of which 31 have been charge-sheeted with 27 accused convicted.

It is clear that IS targets individuals through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The individuals, whose ideologies resonate with the outfit, are contacted by the international handlers and are brainwashed into spreading and uploading IS-related content, knowledge on improvised explosives device (IED) making and terror funding. Even translating the IS-related texts to the regional languages is promoted.

In August 2021, an IS recruiter from Bhatkal (Karnataka) was arrested for radicalizing the youth through the ISIS published magazine “Voice of Hind (VOH)”. The magazine was conceived through the collaboration of Al-Qitaal media centre (pro ISIS media outlet) and Junudul Khilafa Al Hind in February 2020. It has, in the past months, elaborately detailed the plans on how to wage Gazwa-e-Hind (part of Pakistan`s plan to bleed India with a thousand cuts), preparations for Jihad and also praised IS terrorists killed as martyrs. Since 2020, the magazine has gained traction by stirring fear or working as a call centre to tap educated and qualified individuals for its propaganda machine.

Earlier, in July 2021, three individuals were arrested from Anantnag, who had close links with the IS. They were responsible for dissemination of false propaganda against India and for radicalizing the youth in Kashmir on the lines propagated by VOH. A large number of digital devices were seized such as mobile phones, secure digital (SD) cards, etc. Fake identities were created and the individuals responsible used several virtual private networks (VPN) to avoid tracking.

Then, in August 2021, VOH edition displayed the newsclips of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) searches, while its editor made a defiant proclamation to increase the circulation “all the more” in the face of probes carried by all investigation agencies. It became evident when the Voice of Hind mentioned the raids in Anantnag, Jammu & Kashmir, that the right targets had been hit. Prior to this, it was assumed that the magazine was circulated from Afghanistan. After the raids it has been confirmed that it has its links in South Kashmir. It is also confirmed the content editors were being recruited from Maldives and Bangladesh.

Content Collation

it is confirmed that the material is “processed, edited and approved in Pakistan.” Region specific content lacing subnational ideologies imbibing Jihad are also part of the propaganda, a philosophy IS-K uses to participate in the local conflicts and to radicalize one actor against the other, if not the whole state. In order to promote the propaganda, area specific content and material is also being made available in Tamil, Bengali and Malayalam.

Campaign Against Idolatry

The IS propaganda thrives on the success of increased sub-nationalism in the Southern States in India and caters to the likes of all those in favour of the caliphate and an all-Muslim state, marginalizing all Hindus. In a recent issue published by VOH, an image of a decapitated Shiva with the ISIS black flag on its cover went viral in the social media. The VOH captioned it as “It is time to break the false Gods.”

The idol on the cover resembles the idol of Shiva statue in the Murudeshwara temple in Karnataka and has raised concerns. ISIS has been notorious for attacking and destroying various archaeological and heritage sites. The idea to erase history or existence of a culture has been a part of their jihadist plans or of what they view as their narrative of Jihad. For years, ISIS has made efforts to go through extreme selective theological lengths to define their narrative on iconoclastism (destruction of idols).

This could be discerned from one such narrative it spread after destruction of the Palmyra features in Syria. The ISIS magazine Dabiq carried a double spread of the images of the destroyed Palmyra site, while its French edition, Dar-al-Islam, quoted the text “Baal is a false divinity for which people sacrificed their children as indicated in the Old Testament. But, by the Grace of Allah, soldiers of the Caliphate destroyed it.” The entire act of destruction of the heritage sites was justified as combating “shirk” – the sin committed by practicing polytheism or worshipping idols other than Allah. ISIS views its approach as cleansing of Islam through the establishment of the caliphate, while returning to the roots of Islam (a view which is contested worldwide by the Muslim community). However, it does not eliminate the threat and the “built in brutality” it inflicts towards the non-Muslims. The recent attacks on the mosques in Kandahar, Kabul and Kunduz are a clear indication of the extremist attitude ISIS is maintaining towards its narratives, where it refuses to even identify with the beliefs of Shias or Muslims, who remain different from them. It prefers to eradicate them.

Given the pictures of decapitated Shiva statue have gone viral on social media platforms, this comes as no surprise but as confirms the ISIS aspirations in India. It is imperative to exercise caution in face of this looming and persistent threat. It is expected that IS-K, like its parent IS Central, will replicate a common strategy to wipe out other religious iconography and heritage sites. This can exacerbate communal tensions in India.

Hate-filled Newsletters

In December 2021, VOH has upped its antics and has published another inflammatory hate-filled propaganda in its Vol 23 issue – Hinduism, In the Mire of Delusion. The issue attacks Hinduism as the nullifier of Islam, calls to take back Babri Masjid, makes suggestions to kill and terrorize Hindus calling it the verdict of Allah “Jihad for the sake of Allah.”

The 15-page newsletter reiterates its hate for Hindus and killing of all Kuffars worldwide. An excerpt from the magazine reads “on the mainland of India, the sons of Ghaznavi and Ibn Qasim, who subjugated the subcontinent to the rule of Islam. Whose swords chopped the heads of the Somnaths, the idols in the temples trembled and fell face down at the sound of their footsteps.”

The issue furthers urges its readers to carry Dawah activities on social media as “internet is cheap,” to raise the flags of jihad on streets, spread the word by uploading through USBs and use necessary security means to remain untraceable online.

Amidst these nefarious suggestions, an entire page is dedicated to “O Muwahhid take back Babri Masjid from the Hindus.” The entire section directly attacks the Jews and the Hindus, stating the “unholy alliance” between the Jews and the Hindus must be attacked. It talks of genocide and brute force to be utilized against the non-Muslims. While the entire section uses derogatory slander for non-Muslims, it provokes its readers to fight against the sons of “Khilafah” by painting a sorry picture of the jihadists, a bait easily to be bitten by the ISIS sympathizers.

It is not hard to foresee a radicalized youth playing into the hands of such inflammatory narratives, which not only spread hate but dispels the notion of secularism or diversity of India and seeks to ignite communal hatred and riots.

George Orwell said “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Hence, it is not farfetched to think the ISIS modus operandi relies heavily on its propaganda warfare while executing its plans physically. While conventional war may or may not be on the horizon, the war of perception continues to be waged daily. The proof lies in the virulent content of this IS propaganda organ, VOH.

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Notwithstanding statements from mainstream political parties and separatist organisations condemning the violence, many Kashmiri Pandit and Sikh employees abstained from work or took leave temporarily, worried about their security. This is an unfortunate outcome. News reports suggest serious attempts to target businessmen, aimed at sending a message to non-Muslims who have been staying here peacefully for decades. Targeted killings of prominent citizens belonging to the minority communities in the Kashmir valley during October created an atmosphere of panic and fear.

The Resistance Front (TRF), which draws its cadre from the Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility for the attacks.

In Kashmir, 25 unarmed and innocent people have been killed in a similar pattern this year including off-duty policemen and security personnel on leave. Of them, ten were in Srinagar and four each in Pulwama and Anantnag, with the rest being spread across the valley. Six of the seven killed in October were from the minority community, adding to concerns and triggering debates on migration.

More civilians than security forces’ personnel have been killed in terrorist-related incidents this year in Jammu and Kashmir, reversing a six-year trend, pointing towards concerted efforts by Pakistan-backed Islamist terror groups and handlers to create a communal situation that could trigger an exodus of Hindus and Sikhs.

Despite the intelligence inputs, it is once again proving difficult for the state in Kashmir to provide protection for minorities.
The purpose of these attacks is to draw a response from the state. There can be two responses. The first is a wider and deper combing for terrorists inside Kashmir. The second is to go after groups supported by Pakistan and inside Pakistan.

Enemy Tactics

Pakistan’s ISI has been compelled to devise a new approach. J&K Police describe these targeted shootings as ‘hybrid warfare’, a new approach adopted by militants who according to the police are employing overground workers to kill ‘soft targets.’

This form of killing is gaining ground as, in comparison, known terrorists are identified, located and eliminated at a fast pace. With few successful infiltration attempts, Pakistan-based terrorists are reduced in numbers. With better human intelligence and electronic monitoring their locations are being detected, resulting in successful encounters. With local support waning, Pakistani terrorists are forced into hiding in jungles and hills. Locals who join militant ranks lack training and motivation; hence they have very short life spans once they pick up the gun.

In this changed strategy the weapons employed would change from long range AKs to pistols and grenades.

Current attacks in cities are based either on shooting from close range or throwing grenades on security force pickets or in crowded areas. An added aim is that such incidents could enhance communal divide, initially in the valley, subsequently spreading across the nation. For such operations, the modules created would be small with limited inter-connectivity. In case one is neutralized, others continue. Finally, India cannot blame Pakistan directly as incidents involve locals, mainly Over Ground Workers (OGWs).

Pakistan is exploiting the current Indian security policy in the valley, where security forces hesitate to act arbitrarily, to prevent youth from going astray and joining militant ranks. While crackdown on OGWs continue, there are many who remain below police radars. These are now being employed as killers.

This change in strategy necessitates a change in approach by security forces. The intention should be to locate and break these modules. The first stage must include increased monitoring including enhancing local intelligence networks. Secondly, random patrolling must be increased. Third should be to exploit informational space to convince the public of Pakistan’s designs and also seek inputs on possible suspects with promises of rewards. This needs care as in some cases individuals would pass information based on personal grievances.

Operations in such scenarios are intelligence driven and led by the police with other forces acting on tip offs. Human intelligence will play a critical role.

Every new approach by terrorists succeeds in initial stages. They possess the advantage as they have chosen the direction as also the date, time and place of killing innocents. With passage of time, these networks will be located and broken down.

Reactions from Administration and Society

Beyond the condemnation from the polity, civil society in such situations must take the initiative to foster communal amity and to mobilise people across communities against hatred. Appeals by some masjids in Srinagar requesting the public to show solidarity with the victims and to prevent the furthering of fear among Kashmiri Pandits is a welcome step indicating an intention to not let the situation deteriorate to what happened in the early 1990s.

The UT administration followed up with a strong crackdown on the insurgency seeking to isolate and quell the militant network that is allegedly responsible for the attacks. While the reactions from the polity and civil society and the administrative actions by the Government are necessary, they are not sufficient to restore normalcy in the Valley.

The suspension of the polity with the absence of an elected Assembly, and the stasis and alienation that had set in since the abrogation of J&K’s special status, its bifurcation and designation as a Union Territory would make the job of administration even more difficult. An immediate renewal of political dialogue to address this along with the restoration of Statehood and the complete resumption of political and press freedoms will help create the environment to isolate and tackle terror in the region.

Comments

The security establishment and the civil administration have a huge task on their hand to instil a sense of security and calm. Amid the gloom, the strong condemnation of the brutal acts of violence, cutting across political, religious and ideological lines, is the balm Kashmir needs badly. Kashmir has seen too much blood and tears to allow any repeat of the horrors of the past.
As there is a reset on strategy to hunt down the terror groups and a review of the threat perception of the vulnerable, there is a paramount need to involve political leaders, community representatives and the civil society to ensure communal harmony, and dispel anxieties. A political dialogue — difficult as it surely is after the scrapping of Article 370 and the events that followed — may still be a work in progress, but active engagement can be quite handy in effective public messaging, given the circumstances.

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The move to place 19 LeT terrorists in the list apparently came following the Paris-based global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) decision to retain Pakistan on its grey list till February 2021.

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Making the information about the 19 most wanted LeTterrorists public for the first time, the FIA says Amjad Khan of Multan was a crew member of LeT for the 26/11 attack (boat Al-Hussaini and boat Al-Fauz).

The FATF made the decision after Islamabad failed to fulfill its six key obligations, including failure to take action against two of India’s most wanted terrorists – Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed and Jaish-e-Mohammed head Masood Azhar.

The security agencies have prepared a list of over 1,200 most wanted/high profile terrorists in Pakistan to enable more coordination among authorities to go after them.

The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Pakistan’s top investigating agency, has been probing the Mumbai terror attack case since 2009 and is looking for the 19 “most wanted terrorists” involved in the deadly terror assault that sent shockwaves across the country and even brought India and Pakistan to the brink of a war.

In November 2008, 10 LeT terrorists sailed into Mumbai from Karachi and carried out coordinated attacks, killing 166 people and injuring over 300. Nine of the attackers were killed by police while lone survivor Ajmal Kasab was caught and hanged after trial in India. Its mastermind Hafiz Saeed, Lashkar-e-Taiba founder and a UN-designated terrorist whom the US has placed a $10 million bounty on, was arrested on 17 July 2019 is in jail in Lahore, serving a collective over 21-year sentence under terror financing charges. He is not being held in prison but at his Johar Town house in Lahore from where he runs the terror group, according to information available with Indian intelligence agencies.

Saeed-led JuD is the front organisation for the LeT. The LeT operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi has been operating with impunity in the country after securing bail in the Mumbai terror attack case over five years ago.

The other six accused – Abdul Wajid, Mazhar Iqbal, Hamad Amin Sadiq, Shahid Jamil Riaz, Jamil Ahmed and Younis Anjum – who are facing charges of abetment to murder, attempted murder, planning and executing the Mumbai attack, are lodged at the high-security Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi.

The Pakistan government says it has recently introduced a number of fresh legislations to enable security forces to confront terrorist groups more effectively.

The FIA claims that the proceedings have come to halt after India refused to send its 24 witnesses to Pakistan for recording of their statements and other evidence.

Designated Terrorists Under UAPA

The government, on 27 October, declared 18 more Pakistan-based individuals as designated terrorists under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, for their involvement in the acts of terrorism on the Indian soil at different periods of time.

The list included the name of Sajid Mir, who was one of the main players in the Mumbai 26/11 attack, and has been described as a Pakistan based LeT’s top commander.

The other prominent names among those designated as terrorists include India’s most wanted terrorist Dawood Ibrahim’s right-hand man, Chhota Shakeel, and the Bhatkal brothers of the Indian Mujahideen.

FATF Mandate

Pakistan’s failure to fulfil six key obligations of the FATF, including action against two of India’s most wanted terrorists Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed, and the sudden disappearance of more than 4,000 terrorists from its official list led to its continuation in the “grey list” of the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The virtual plenary of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), held on 21-23 October, took the final call on Pakistan’s continuation on its grey list after a thorough review of Islamabad’s performance in fulfilling the global commitments and standards in the fight against money laundering and terror financing.

The FATF had given Pakistan a total of 27 action plan obligations for completely checking terror financing of which so far it has cleared 21, but has failed in some of the key tasks. The FATF had issued the action plan after placing Pakistan on the grey list in June 2018. In February, the FATF gave Pakistan a four-month grace period to complete the 27-point plan. It extended the deadline by three months due to the postponement of its plenary following the Covid outbreak.

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The decision was announced by FATF president Marcus Pleyer after the virtual plenary session. “To date, Pakistan has made progress across all action plan items and has now largely addressed 21 of the 27 action items. As all action plan deadlines have expired, the FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2021,” the FATF said in a statement.

Pakistan also needs to work on four areas to “address its strategic deficiencies”, it said. Listing the deficiencies, the FATF said that Pakistan needs to:

•             “Demonstrate that law enforcement agencies are identifying and investigating the widest range of terror financing activity which target designated persons and entities, and those who act on the behalf/direction of the designated persons or entities”.

•             “Demonstrate that terror financing prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions”.

•             “Demonstrate effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions against all…designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf; preventing the raising and moving of funds including in relation to non-profit organisations; identifying and freezing assets; and prohibiting access to funds and financial services”.

•             “Demonstrate enforcement against violation of terror financing sanctions…of administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases”.

The mandates which Pakistan failed included action against all UN-designated terrorists like JeM chief Azhar, LeT founder Seed and the outfit’s operational commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.

Besides, the FATF strongly noted the fact that there was sudden disappearance of the names of more than 4,000 terrorists from its original list of 7,600 under Schedule IV of its Anti-Terrorism Act.

The four nominating countries – the US, Britain, France and Germany – are also not satisfied with Islamabad’s commitment to taking strong action against the terror groups operating from its soil.

Azhar, Saeed and Lakhvi are most wanted terrorists in India for their involvement in terrorist acts, including the 26/11 Mumbai terror strikes and the bombing of a CRPF bus at Pulwama last year.

In August, Pakistan imposed financial sanctions on 88 banned terror groups and their leaders, including 26/11 Mumbai attack mastermind and Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed, Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar and underworld don Dawood Ibrahim.

Balakot Terror Camps Reactivated

Even after India’s surgical airstrikes in Bakalot on terror camps in 2019, Pakistan’s notorious spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has resumed training of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists in the area with the aim to launch attacks on Indian soil.

A newly made control room has also been found functional in Balakot camp. The control room is used by JeM and other terror groups to help in the infiltration of terrorists inside India. After crossing the LoC, the handlers of these terrorists constantly instruct them through code words from Pakistan.

MFN Status

India revoked Pakistan’s ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status only after the Pulwama terrorist attack in 2019, by invoking Article 21 of the WTO, which deals with security exceptions, the Domestic Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act that allows it to impose any import restriction. India had granted the MFN status providing non-discriminatory access to its domestic market to Pakistan in 1996 as under the WTO norms, member countries are mandated to give this status to each other on a reciprocal basis. Pakistan, however, never accorded the MFN status to India.

State Sponsor of Terrorism

In the 17th Lok Sabha session, on 19 November 2016, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, an Independent Rajya Sabha Member of Parliament, introduced a Private Members’ Bill to declare Pakistan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. He had promised that after the 18 September 2016 Uri attack. The bill besides officially seeking to declare Pakistan as a hostile, enemy state, also provided for imposing legal, economic and travel sanctions on citizens of the neighbouring country.

Since 1994, when Parliament passed a resolution against Pakistan, it had never passed any resolution against it. Curiously, the Bill didn’t receive an enthusiastic response on the floor of Parliament either. Just four months later, on 10 March 2017, Rajeev Chandrasekhar withdrew his Bill.

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Terrorists Notified Under UAPA on 27 October 2020

Sajid Mir with various aliases is the top LeT commander and was one of the main planners of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.

Yusuf Muzammil with various aliases is the commander of LeT operations in Jammu & Kashmir and accused in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.

Abdur Rehman with various aliases is the brother-in-law of Hafiz Saeed – the chief LeT commander and head of LeT political affairs – and served as the head of LeT’s foreign relations department.

Shahid Mehmood, alias Shahid Mehmood Rehmatullah, is the deputy chief of proscribed organisation Falah-i-lnsaniyat Foundation (FIF), a frontal organisation of terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

Farhatullah Ghori, with various aliases, was involved in the attack on Akshardham Temple (2002) and suicide attack on the Task Force office in Hyderabad (2005).

Abdul Rauf Asghar, with various aliases, was involved in setting up of training camps in Pakistan for recruitment and militant training and was the key conspirator in the terrorist attack (December 13, 2001) on the Indian Parliament House, New Delhi.

Ibrahim Athar, with various aliases, was involved in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight no. lC-814 on December 24, 1999, (Kandhar hijacking case) and was also the key conspirator in the Indian Parliament terrorist attack (December 13, 2001).

Yusuf Azhar, with various aliases, was involved in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight no. lC-814 on December 24, 1999 (Kandhar hijacking case).

Shahid Latif, with various aliases, is the JeM’s commander of the Sialkot sector and was involved in the launching of JeM terrorists into India. He is also involved in planning, facilitation and execution of terror attacks in India.

Syed Mohammad Yusuf Shah, with various aliases, is the supreme commander of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and the chairman of the United Jihad Council (UJC). He was involved in fundraising and routing finances to India for the furtherance of terrorist activities by the HM cadres.

Ghulam Nabi Khan, with various aliases, is the deputy supreme of the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM).

Zaffar Hussain Bhat, with various aliases, is the deputy chief of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and also handles financial affairs of the terrorist organisation. He was responsible for sending funds for the HM operatives in Kashmir Valley.

Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri, with various aliases, is the founder member of terrorist organisation Indian Mujahideen. He was involved in various terrorist acts in India, including German Bakery (2010), Chinnaswami Stadium, Bangalore (2010), Jama Masjid (2010), Sheetlaghat (2010) and Mumbai (2011).

Mohd Iqbal, with various aliases, is the Pakistan based co-founder of the terrorist organisation Indian Mujahideen. He was involved in terror financing and various terrorist acts, including Jaipur serial blasts (2008), Delhi serial blasts (2008), serial blasts of Ahmedabad and Surat (2008), German bakery blast, Pune (2010) and Chinnaswami Stadium, Bengaluru blasts (2010).

Shaikh Shakeel, alaisChhota Shakeel, is the associate of Dawood Ibrahim and looks after all criminal and underworld operations of the D-Company. He also handles the finances of the D-Company operatives of India. He was involved in the smuggling of firearms to Gujarat during 1993.

Mohammad Anis Shaikh was involved in the Bombay bomb blast 1993 and is also responsible for the supply of arms, ammunition and hand grenades.

Ibrahim Memon, alias Tiger Memon, and other names, hatched the criminal conspiracy of the Bombay bomb blast.

JavedChikna, alaisJaved Dawood Tailor, is the associate of Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and was involved in the Bombay bomb blast of 1993.

The post Pakistan Continues to Support Terrorists 12 Years After 26/11 appeared first on IMR.

In a major accomplishment for the security forces, four Pakistan-based terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), were wiped out in an encounter near NagrotaBan Toll Plaza in Jammu & Kashmir on 19 November. The terrorists were trying to reach Srinagar in a truck. One police constable was injured in the encounter.

According to the J&K Police, the terrorists crossed the International Border in Jammu and were met by a courier in a truck at a pre-designated spot on the national highway south of Samba. The truck was supposed to ferry them to Kashmir but was stopped at the Ban toll naka in Jammu, based on specific inputs generated by intelligence agencies. When the police tried to check the truck, the terrorists opened fire, leading to two injuries among the policemen. In the gunfight that followed, all four terrorists were killed.

The 19 November encounter was a huge setback for the terror group, given how heavily Asghar had invested in their training and infiltration.

Tunnel Used to Infiltrate

Border Security Force said professional engineering expertise had gone into digging the 200-metre tunnel under the border fence the tunnel in Pakistan’s Shakargarh area was a surprise. What surprised investigators was the engineering detail that went into construction of the tunnel used by the Nagrota attackers to reach the pick-up point at Jatwal, 12 km from the international border. The tunnel, probably constructed with the help of Pakistani Rangers, was 200 metres long with enough space for terrorists to walk upright and cross the border. The tunnel was 40 metres long on the Pakistani side.

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The terrorists had been receiving their orders the top commanders of the terror outfit, Mufti Rauf Asghar and QariZarar. Asghar is the younger brother of UN designated global terrorist Masood Azhar who leads the terror group.

Smartphones manufactured by Q Mobile, a Pakistani company recovered from the killed terrorists revealed that they had been receiving updates and messages from their handler in Pakistan.

J&K Police investigations have revealed that the Jaish terrorists had been sent with the specific task of carrying out a large attack ahead of the District Development Council (DDC) polls to derail the entire election process.

Police recovered 11 AK assault rifles, 24 magazines and 7.5 kg of RDX along with 20 m of IED wire and six detonators. Recoveries include one Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL), 29 grenades, five rifle grenades, three pistols with six magazines, a wireless set and a GPS. The four were also carrying 6.5 kilograms of nitrocellulose mixed with fuel oil, an explosive used in shaped charges.

Medicines recovered from the terrorists include painkillers, antibiotics to fight diarrhoea, Unani medicines, injections and surgical gauze. They have all been manufactured by Pakistani companies such as Lahore Medical Instruments Pvt Ltd (Kasur), Qarshi Industries (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Sami Pharmaceuticals (Karachi), Rehman Rainbow Pvt Ltd (Lahore) and Sanofi-Aventis Pakistan Ltd (Karachi).

Since August 2019, over 200 terrorists have been gunned down, including over 30 foreigners, in intelligence-driven precise operations by security forces in Jammu & Kashmir.

Terrorists Facing Problems

Mufti Rauf Asghar, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operational commander, who had coordinated the infiltration of the heavily-armed operatives into India told Jaish terrorists in Kashmir that it was becoming difficult to supply them the necessary “items”, a reference to explosives and weapons. Asghar sent the message soon after the gun battle at Ban toll plaza.

Mufti Asghar is the younger brother of JeMchief and UN designated global terrorist Masood Azhar who is reported to have been under treatment for a life-threatening spine aliment. Asghar is considered the terror group’s de facto chief in his elder brother’s absence and had overseen the infiltration of the four terrorists from Bahawalpur in Pakistan’s Punjab province.

ALSO READ: Digital Footprint of Terrorism in Kashmir

Investigations into the encounter revealed the involvement of JeM operational commander Kasim Jan, the principal accused in the 2016 Pathankot air base attack. Jan is one of the main launch commanders of Jaish terrorists into India and has links with underground workers all over South Kashmir. He reports directly to Mufti Rauf Asghar, the de-facto chief of the UN designated global terrorist group.

According to intelligence reports, terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is also mobilising cadres from its Chelabandi camp in Muzaffarabad to fresh locations in Neelum Valley across the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. And the Hizbul Mujahideen training nearly 400 cadres at a newly constructed facility in the forest area of Oghi in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).

The Jaish, intelligence reports indicate, is not the only one feeling the heat. According to one input, the Al Badr group is exploring ways to infiltrate into India from Bangladesh after security forces tightened the security grid across the LoC in Kashmir.

Pakistan Under Pressure

Indian intelligence officials suspect the attempt to carry out terror strikes at high-value targets could be a diversionary tactic by the Pakistani army and ISI chiefs, under pressure from Opposition parties in the country, to bring the focus back on Kashmir.

With the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and resurgence of the Taliban, its Deobandi ideological brother Jaish has got hyperactive across the Jammu & Kashmir border with no less than 14 specially trained terrorists waiting at Gujaranwala to infiltrate into India.

“Nearly 200 terrorists of mixed tanzeems are waiting at launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC) to infiltrate into India. We are picking up revival of Al-Badr group as well as creation of another terror front Lashkar-e-Mustafa, headed by one Hidyatullah Malik, and other Pakistani based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group training another 23 terrorists at Jangal-Mangal camp in Khyber-Paktunkhwa,” said another security official.

Pakistan-based terrorist groups have become especially active after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and have been preparing for a major drive in Jammu and Kashmir, according to intelligence reports. The Al Badr group is exploring ways to infiltrate into India from Bangladesh after security forces have turned the heat on infiltration across LoC in Kashmir.

Diplomatic Offensive

Soon after the Nagrota encounter of 19 November, prime minister Narendra Modi held a review meeting with home minister Amit Shah, national security advisor (NSA) AjitDoval, foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and top intelligence establishment. It had been found that the terrorists were planning a “major attack” on the anniversary of the 26/11 terror attack. It was decided to step up its diplomatic campaign to hold Pakistan accountable.

The ministry of external affairs (MEA) summoned an official of the Pakistan high commission in Delhi over the encounter, on 21 November, and conveyed India’s strong concern to Pakistan over terror attack planned by JeM in J&K. A protest was lodged demanding Pakistan stops supporting terrorists operating from their territory.

Diplomats Briefed

Foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla informed a select group of Heads of Missions on 23 November about the discovery of a cross-border tunnel that was allegedly used by the militants to reach the Indian territory. They were provided with a detailed information docket giving the details of the incident as it transpired as well as a list of items and munition that were recovered from the terrorists clearly indicating their Pakistani origins.

Shringla said the attackers were clearly planning the biggest terror attack in India since the Pulwama strike in February 14, 2019. The diplomats were told that the attack appeared to be part of efforts to sabotage the DDC elections in Jammu & Kashmir and was designed to “coincide with the anniversary of 26/11 Mumbai terror strikes”.

ALSO READ: Will Pakistan Escape FATF’s Black-listing?

The Indian side highlighted the secret tunnel unearthed beneath the International Border in Jammu’s Samba Sector on Sunday and said the four militants who were killed in the encounter on November 19 used the tunnel to carry out their plans.

Shringla briefed the envoys about the past attacks by the Jaish-e-Mohammad in Jammu and Kashmir, saying that “…in the year 2020 itself we have seen 200 incidents of terrorist violence and neutralisation of 199 terrorists”.

The briefing was the first in a new series of interaction with foreign diplomats which will consist of small groups in view of the COVID-19 concerns.

Multi-pronged Strategy

Indian missions were also instructed to pass on details of the “information docket” handed over, which included details of the encounter in Nagrota between the suspected terrorists hiding in a truck and security forces, as well as the AK-47 rifles, 29 grenades and 7.5 kg of RDX explosive material the men allegedly had. That this was no ordinary encounter was evidenced from the prime minister’s statement, calling it a “nefarious attempt to target grassroots level democratic exercises in Jammu and Kashmir”, a reference to the District Development Council elections due to start on November 28.

By apprising the international community, it would seem the government has a multi-pronged strategy. The first imperative is to ensure that the full implications of the aborted attack and what could have occurred are understood worldwide, and the threat India continues to face from cross-border terror is acknowledged. In addition, any actions India takes against terror threats the Army perceives along the LoC this point on will be considered retaliatory. The second is to put Pakistan, which has itself been making allegations about a terror threat from India, squarely on notice. Pakistan still faces the final FATF decision in February 2021 on whether it will be blacklisted for its inability to curb terror financing and to shut down groups such as the JeM and the LeT, and the Imran Khan government would be better positioned in fulfilling the action plan it has been tasked with rather than flashing unsubstantiated dossiers with counter-claims against India.

Eventually, India’s success lies in protecting its borders, as done in Nagrota, and by providing a peaceful and stable environment in J&K so as to restart the much-delayed democratic process there, despite all attempts to derail it.

Vice-President M Venkaiah Naidu has called upon the world community to come together to isolate nations that sponsor terrorism and impose sanctions against them. Observing that no country was safe from terrorism, he said the days of platitude were over and it was time for concrete action.

The post TERRORISM – Pak Terrorists Killed in Nagrota Encounter appeared first on IMR.