Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has already shown how unexpected shocks can drive the international situation in unexpected directions. Moreover, China has serious liabilities that could impair its ability to compete with the United States. Some of these have been posited by Chinese analysts and commentators, but others can be deduced by analysis. The most-important vulnerabilities highlighted by Chinese leaders center on the country’s domestic situation.

China continues to face severe economic imbalances, problems of corruption, regional unrest, and daunting demographic challenges. In terms of international attributes, China suffers from a position of disadvantage as the rising power. It has a weaker leadership role in multilateral venues and an inferior influence on global discourse than the incumbent power, the United States. China’s defense strategy has drawbacks as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an unattractive partner for many countries, especially in Asia. And the military’s lack of power-projection capabilities limits its ability to provide the public security goods that helped make U.S. global leadership so successful. These vulnerabilities suggest advantages for the United States, but they also underscore areas that China could address in coming years if it hopes to improve its competitive position. One final point deserves emphasis. The most-critical factors that will determine the outcome of U.S.-China competition are fundamentally domestic.

Which side can build the more technologically innovative and prosperous economy, flourishing and well-governed society, and durable and responsive politics will likely be the side to gain a decisive advantage in competition. A thorough analysis of the potential trajectory of U.S.- China competition would examine such variables closely, but such a task lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The importance of domestic policy should nonetheless be borne in mind when analyzing the international and defense dimensions of competitive strategies.

The research carries several implications for U.S. decision-makers and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first is the enduring importance of strengthening America’s network of alliances and partnerships. China recognizes this network to be a tremendous strategic advantage for the United States, one that Beijing has struggled to match. This analysis has underscored the importance of initiatives undertaken by the past two presidential administrations to shore up U.S. influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific remains a critical domain of U.S.-China competition, and its importance for the broader global competition merits emphasis. U.S. policies that facilitate China’s consolidation of influence and leadership in the Indo-Pacific could simply accelerate Beijing’s efforts to challenge U.S. leadership at the global-systemic level.

The importance of areas outside the Indo-Pacific and of developing countries as constituencies for international leadership deserves emphasis as well. China’s cultivation of client states and influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could directly affect the ability of the United States to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As one example, Chinese success in consolidating influence with vital energy suppliers in the Middle East could affect the ability and willingness of countries like Japan and India to support measures that constrain Chinese power. The need to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo- Pacific may need to be balanced by the need to uphold U.S. credibility as a global leader. At the very least, closer coordination between competitive strategies both within and outside the Indo-Pacific will be imperative. In terms of developing countries, China’s lack of allies leaves it in a weak position to challenge the United States. Washington could strengthen its hand further by bolstering its relationships with those states that have only recently experienced substantial growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Given the long-term trends favoring the rise of the “non-West,” cultivation of support in the developing world appears prudent in any case.

While multilateral organizations and institutions for global governance have endured considerable criticism for their many failings and inefficiencies, this research has concluded that engagement with those entities will remain an important component of U.S.-China competition. Greater U.S. investments in shaping and reinvigorating international institutions and multilateral venues can help consolidate U.S. influence and restrain Chinese challenges. In some cases, this may involve initiatives to grant China more influence and extend cooperation. The goal here, as in other areas, is to weaken the force of Chinese criticisms by demonstrating responsive, effective U.S. leadership, thereby reducing the incentive for other countries to back Beijing’s efforts to renovate those organizations in ways that harm U.S. interests. In terms of defense strategy, the posited strategy has emphasized the importance of deterrence, crisis management, and military diplomacy in the competition. As presented in this report,  China’s defense strategy could expand the geographic range of potential crisis situations and contingencies. Along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes and as part of the effort to expand a network of client states worldwide, China has a strong incentive to offer arms sales, military training, and other forms of assistance. Such transactions have been increasing in recent years. In coming years, China may take on even more security responsibilities to protect its BRI investments. An imperative to demonstrate its credibility as a patron to client nations could incentivize PLA forces to carry out more-frequent acts of military diplomacy that coerce U.S. allies or partners, or even to contemplate the development of alliance-like obligations.

These possibilities suggest that the U.S. military faces a compelling need to bolster conventional deterrence and invest in capabilities to ensure the superiority of the armed forces in the future. A focus on traditional deterrence through conventional military superiority remains the bedrock of any security strategy to counter China. A robust U.S. military capability to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners provides a critical source of U.S. credibility as a leader in the Indo-Pacific. A strong conventional military capability is also essential for incentivizing regional powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, and others, to resist Chinese coercion and demands. By contrast, clear evidence that the United States had lost the military advantage could persuade other countries to either adopt a position of tacit submission and accommodation to Chinese demands or step up a potentially destabilizing arms race to shore up their defense.

Ensuring the capability to deter China in the short term will remain critical, but investment to ensure long-term advantage will be critical as well. Sustaining investment in the future capabilities of the U.S. military will be essential not just for ensuring the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence, but also for bolstering America’s position in the broader competition. Finding ways to better protect U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific but also in the cyber, space, and other domains can backstop broader competitive efforts. DoD may need to maintain a significant presence in the Middle East and other theaters to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities and investing in a technologically advanced future force remain critical tasks. But military diplomacy could assume greater importance, too. The diplomatic struggle for influence and leadership suggests that the U.S. military could play an important role in incentivizing cooperation with the United States and helping countries resist unreasonable Chinese demands. U.S. experience in military advisory missions and assistance can help strengthen diplomatic partnerships and counter Chinese influence efforts. The provision of public goods, such as security for key shipping lanes and humanitarian aid in the face of disaster, can help maintain the appeal of the United States as the global leader.

As the competition intensifies, U.S. military planners may need to expand the portfolio of possible contingencies involving China. The flashpoints between the United States and China today may not be flashpoints in the future, or they may coexist alongside new ones. Scenarios involving Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and cyberspace tend to occupy the concerns of military planners today, but these issues may be augmented by new ones that arise from China’s efforts to exert greater leadership, especially along its BRI routes and with client states on other continents. As just one illustration, China’s willingness to court Iran despite U.S. sanctions raises the possibility over time of proxy conflicts between forces backed by China and those by the United States in the Middle East. The more that China assumes the role of patron for client states, the higher the likelihood that, at some point, PLA forces or Chinese-backed host nation forces could engage in hostile acts against parties aligned with the United States.

The appeal and feasibility of Chinese military efforts to resolve longstanding issues, such as Taiwan, may need to be reexamined through the lens of the broader competition as well. From Beijing’s perspective, the potential cost and risk of escalation in war increase the more the competition with the United States intensifies. Thus, it is in China’s interest to delay the resolution of Taiwan’s status and that of other disputed regions until it has prevailed in its competition with the United States. This might mean that Beijing tolerates a stable cross-strait relationship premised on Taiwan’s rejection of formal independence so long as the United States retains the international upper hand and a credible military intervention option. Other PLA missions may be more pressing for the near term. However, the calculus could change, should China succeed in gaining a decisive competitive advantage in international and regional leadership and in its military posture near Taiwan. Similarly, China may regard as satisfactory a continued reliance on gray-zone tactics that incrementally change the status quo within the first island chain in a low-risk manner while it prioritizes efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere. To maximize deterrence and the protection of U.S. interests, the defense and foreign policy dimensions of any U.S. competitive strategy may need to be even more closely coordinated.

Any Chinese deliberation on how to tailor the controlled use of force in any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces would carry serious risks, of course. The dangers of escalation and miscalculation paradoxically underscore the importance of finding ways for both countries to cooperate and ease tensions as a component of successful competition. The development of a strategy that includes some degree of reassurance and cooperation could help stabilize the competition and reduce risks of miscalculation and dangerous incidents. Moreover, as the international security environment experiences more fragmentation and breakdown, collaboration between the world’s two largest powers could prove nearly unavoidable in any case.

The return of great-power competition after decades of unchallenged U.S. global primacy has introduced new challenges and risks. Washington enters the contest burdened by fiscal strains, domestic political polarization, and competing international and domestic priorities. These constraints raise the imperative of developing effective strategies that allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The derivation of a Chinese strategy can, hopefully, provide a useful tool for that important task.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

RAND Corpn completed a research in Aug 2020, sponsored by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense, exploring possible international and defense strategies that China might employ to outcompete the United States and achieve a position of international primacy. The posited strategies, although created by the authors (TIMOTHY R. HEATH, DEREK GROSSMAN, ASHA CLARK), are framed by findings regarding Chinese political processes, concepts, policies, and national goals.

The purpose of the analysis was threefold: to support U.S. planning and decision-making, to educate readers about China’s strategy and policymaking process, and to spur discussion about the stakes and nature of the competition.

Here is an Executive Summary.

U.S.-China relations have entered a new phase characterized by sharpening competition. As the gap in comprehensive national power has narrowed, Beijing’s pursuit of national revitalization has coincided with a deepening of tensions with the United States over long-standing disputes regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the U.S. military presence in Asia. In addition, new points of contention, including China’s crackdown on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and escalating feuds over trade and technology have pushed bilateral ties to their worst condition in decades. Even shared threats, such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, have proved to be occasions for the two sides to trade accusations and compete for influence. The unsettled relationship between the world’s two largest economies has unnerved the international community. More ominously, observers anxiously warn of the risk that the intensifying rivalry could follow a well-established pattern of conflict between rising and status quo great powers.

Chinese authorities frankly acknowledge the inevitability of competition but reject the notion that conflict is inevitable. This perspective suggests that Beijing recognizes the importance of having a

balanced and nuanced competitive strategy that avoids disastrous missteps. No official Chinese document that outlines a strategy for managing competition with the United States is known to exist. If it does exist, its contents have not been made available to the public, nor should we expect Beijing to publish them, given the sensitivity of the topic. Yet the questions that any such strategy might have addressed remain imperative. How should we understand Beijing’s approach to the competition with the United States? What might be Beijing’s desired end state for the bilateral relationship? What does success in the competition mean to China? What foreign policy and defense-related objectives regarding the United States might China have? What might Beijing view as vulnerabilities in its approach? This research aims to shed light on such questions.

Focusing on the foreign policy and defense dimensions of the competition, the authors propose with this research to make three contributions.

First and foremost, we intend the report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Such a tool could facilitate U.S. government efforts to formulate its own strategies and policies to protect U.S. interests. Second, the analysis is meant to educate readers on how the Chinese view the competition with the United States.

In hopes of more closely approximating how Beijing might actually conceptualize the competition, the authors aim to reflect a Chinese perspective as much as possible. Third, we seek to raise awareness and encourage greater public debate about the stakes of a U.S.-China competition that has expanded in scope and complexity.

Because the authors seek to present competitive strategies from a Chinese perspective, we rely primarily on unclassified Chinese documents. U.S.-China relations remains a topic of intense interest among Chinese officials and analysts. An enormous volume of official documents, commentaries, and scholarly writings has examined the relationship from many angles. This literature provides an important resource for discerning key themes and ideas in Chinese policy and debates. As much as possible, the team from the RAND Corporation has sought to adhere to the same authoritative sources and intellectual materials that Chinese officials would draw from to develop any foreign policy or defense strategy document. In addition to these documents, the authors also examined Western reporting and  academic scholarship on issues related to the U.S.-China competition.

As presented by the authors, China’s international strategy aims to establish the country’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. It also seeks to establish Chinese leadership of the international order. However, China’s contest for global leadership need not wait until after it has secured regional primacy. The strategy proposes that China pursue both at the same time, underpinned by the notion that progress toward either regional- or global-level objectives could enable progress toward the other. If successful, China will have surpassed the United States to become the paramount regional power and the leading global power. However, China’s international leadership would bear little resemblance to the forms exercised by previous global leaders such as the United States and Great Britain. Exercising a partial global hegemony centered principally on Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, Chinese international leadership would be characterized by a reliance on finance, diplomatic engagement, and security assistance to exercise influence while maintaining a modest overseas military presence.

As posited by the authors, China’s standard for successful competition with the United States thus entails the following conditions by midcentury:

(1) War with the United States is avoided, although this does not exclude the possibility of militarized crises or conflicts of a limited scope (e.g., proxy wars);

(2) The United States respects China’s authority as the global leader, even as the United States remains a powerful, but clearly inferior, nation;

(3) The United States largely refrains from harming Chinese interests;  

(4) China has established primacy across much of Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, principally through patronage of client states;

(5) U.S. primacy has been reduced to the Americas, although it may still maintain a military, economic, and diplomatic presence worldwide;

(6) The United States and China manage their differences according to norms upheld by China; and

(7) The two cooperate on shared concerns on terms defined largely by the Chinese.

The consequences of Chinese success in strategic competition could be severe for the United States. Sitting astride the heart of the global economy, Beijing would be well situated to privilege its needs and those of its clients over those of the United States and its allies.

This situation would likely entail a deleterious downgrading in the prospects for the United States. Poorly positioned to unseat China or easily reverse its own flagging fortunes, the United States could face dwindling economic prospects, international marginalization, and a diminishing ability to shape global affairs.

The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China’s economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. Regarding major powers, the posited strategy seeks to ensure the United States and Europe remain divided in their approach to China while Russia cooperates closely as a junior partner.

The Asia-Pacific region remains a priority area, and the strategy envisions Beijing weakening U.S. alliances, expanding its own network of client states, renovating and leading regional multilateral institutions, and deepening the region’s integration into a Chinese-led economic, political, and technological order. Beijing regards the developing world as a key constituency for its international leadership, and the strategy posited here aims to build a network of client states across Eurasia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Chinese success in establishing itself as a principal arbiter in Middle Eastern affairs, as the main sponsor of Africa’s economic development, and as a major partner in Latin America could result in a severe weakening in the strategic position of the United States as a global leader and undercut its position in the Indo-Pacific theater as well. In the multilateral domain, the strategy envisions a broad effort to shape rules, norms, and agendas to favor the interests of China and its clients at the expense of the United States.

Beijing’s global governance strategy similarly aims to bolster China’s influence and delegitimize that of the United States in appropriate venues. For each section of this chapter, the authors have proposed objectives for the 2035 time frame that could guide the development of relevant criteria against which China’s progress could be assessed. An appendix offers some sample subobjectives that could be used to evaluate Chinese progress toward relevant objectives.

Defense strategy plays an important but supplementary role to the proposed Chinese international strategy. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington’s ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high in the Asia-Pacific theater. The defense strategy also aims to deter the United States from challenging China in any contingency along its periphery and provide support to gray-zone activities that incrementally change the status quo at the expense of the United States and its allies. A major military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative. The defense strategy also raises the possibility of engaging in proxy or other more-limited conflicts to protect the interests of client states and demonstrate the superiority of Chinese power. To address concerns about the risks of miscalculation and escalation in any incident involving the United States, however, the defense strategy emphasizes the importance of preventing conflict, managing crisis, and strict control of military forces by civilian authorities in any contingency. At the same time, the strategy leaves open the possibility for cooperation with the U.S. military on shared security threats. The strategies depicted in this research should not be construed as predictions of how the competition may evolve. Whether China can prevail is hardly predetermined, and the United States continues to enjoy many strategic advantages. The outlook is further complicated by the sheer variety and types of factors—some of which may not be well understood today—that could affect the trajectory of the competition.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

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China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), on 28 May, adopted a decision to make a national security law for Hong Kong to counter foreign interference and attempts to seek independence of the special administrative region.

The central government’s national security department will also set up an agency in Hong Kong to fulfill its job, while Hong Kong shall also establish a special body and enforcement system to safeguard national security, according to the decision of the NPC.

The document also reiterates China’s “unswerving” principles of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong, meaning the city can still enjoy a different political system from that of the Chinese mainland.

The draft decision was submitted to the NPC after violent protests wreaked havoc in Hong Kong, threatening national sovereignty, security and development interests, the Chinese central government said.

Wang Chen, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, said the draft decision aims to fix the loopholes in Hong Kong’s legislation as the city, after nearly 23 years since its return to the motherland, has not yet fulfilled its legal responsibility of enacting laws on its own to safeguard national security in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law.

Article 23 states that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.”

Background

Article 18 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the territory’s de facto mini-constitution that came into effect after the British handover in 1997  specifically limited Beijing from applying national laws to the territory, except in matters of defence and foreign importance. These rights and laws have protected the territory from Beijing’s despotism since 1997 by guaranteeing Hong Kong an independent judiciary and certain civic freedoms that are not awarded in mainland China, while still being a part of China. The NPC decision changed all that. It not only sanctions the standing committee to draft such a law, it allows the law to be inserted into Hong Kong’s Basic Law by promulgation. The city’s more than 7 million residents saw it as a death knell to the “one country, two systems” model.

Articles 3 and 4 of the draft decision also specifically reiterate the HKSAR’s obligation to enact its own national security law. Hong Kongers, thus, face the dubious prospect of being under the scrutiny of not one but two national security laws. Carrie Lam, the Hong Kong Chief Executive, robustly defended the controversial national security law planned by China.

Successive governments in Hong Kong had previously attempted to enact a national security law as per Beijing’s wish, but with little success. Last year too, Hong Kong saw protests against an extradition law that eventually snowballed into an anti-china demonstration and a larger mass movement for pro-democracy reform. Unnerved by the massive anti-China sentiment on display during the protests last year, Beijing did not want to take any chances. Hence, the possible decision to enact the law for Hong Kong.

What is the Law About

The new law would criminalize any act of:

•             Secession – breaking away from the country.

•             Subversion – undermining the power or authority of the central governing body.

•             Terrorism – using violence or intimidation against people.

•             Foreign interference – activities by foreign powers/forces to interfere in Hong Kong and influence what is going on in the country.

Outrage in Hong Kong

On chat apps and internet threads used by Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, there were calls to resume the protests, which had largely been subdued in recent months on account of pandemic restrictions.

The mood among young Hong Kongers, who largely do not identify as Chinese, was grim: The slogan laamcaau – loosely translated as “If we burn, you burn with us”— has become popular. So, too, have calls for unequivocal, outright independence, which were rare before the authorities’ brutal response to last year’s protests.

Prominent democracy activists such as Joshua Wong said China’s message to protesters seeking to maintain their civic freedoms was clear. “Beijing is attempting to silence Hong Kongers’ critical voices with fear and force,” Wong wrote on Twitter, while expressing defiance.

US & British Response

After its muted response last year, the UK Home Office widened the pool of Hong Kong citizens who would be eligible to apply for UK citizenship, in effect implying that millions may be able to apply if China pressed ahead with the security legislation. UK home secretary Priti Patel said the UK would continue to defend the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong. UK foreign secretary Dominic Raab said his government would open a path to citizenship for 300,000 Hong Kong residents with British National (Overseas) passports, if Beijing did not roll back its decision.

US President Donald Trump said the administration would begin eliminating the “full range” of agreements that had given Hong Kong a special status in its relationship with the US that mainland China lacked, including exemptions from controls on certain exports. US secretary of state Mike Pompeo said the US held out hope the Chinese Communist party would reverse its push for greater control over Hong Kong and move back in line with its international commitments.

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The people of Hong Kong were fearful that the law would likely lead to a  crackdown on free speech, widespread arrests on spurious political charges, and the unleashing of China’s security organs, such as the People’s Armed Police and the Ministry of State Security.

The NPC’s decision also states that bodies such as the Ministry of State Security will be allowed to operate in Hong Kong – which could mean spying on schools, universities, the media and monitoring people’s personal social media accounts for any sign of dissent.

The irony of the security law has not been lost on the world. In their own struggle for power before 1949 that was exactly how Chinese communists used Hong Kong. Since then they have been concerned that their enemies would also use the territory in a similar way, as a “base for subversion” to overthrow the communist regime. It is no wonder, then, that given the domestic and international challenges to President Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime, China sees the Hong Kong protests through a lens of paranoia about the rest of the world.

For businesses, the main value of the city has been its financial and legal systems, which are more transparent and fair than the mainland’s, making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove their credibility in the region. The curbing of freedom of speech and erosion of the rule of law endangers that.

The possibility that the new national security resolution may violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can no longer be relied upon to check China’s intentions. As its dismissal of the Joint Sino-British Declaration has indicated, China feels emboldened to disregard laws it sees as at odds with its national interests. On Hong Kong and elsewhere, Beijing is prepared to challenge the rules-based international order.

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China is accused of mass detentions, religious persecution and forced sterilisation of Uyghurs and others in the resource-rich northwestern province.

Authorities there are thought to have detained about a million people in re-education camps in recent years for “vocational training” to counter radicalism and separatism in Xinjiang.

The three senior officials named by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a statement were: Chen Quanguo, the communist party secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and a member of the powerful Politburo; Zhu Hailun, party secretary of the Xinjiang political and legal committee; and Wang Mingshan, party secretary of the Xinjiang public security bureau.

The US state department warned American citizens on Saturday to “exercise increased caution” in China due to heightened risk of arbitrary law enforcement including detention and a ban from exiting the country. “US citizens may be detained without access to US consular services or information about their alleged crime,” the State Department said.

A border clash has plunged ties between India and China to their lowest point in decades. But one beneficiary looks clear – the US-India relationship. Experts say India could finally end equivocation about openly aligning itself with the long-eager United States, although there will still be disagreements — which, paradoxically, are now mostly due to Washington.

Chen is the highest-ranking Chinese official ever to be hit by US sanctions. He is said to be the architect of China’s harsh policies against minorities, and was previously in charge in Tibet.

Former security official in Xinjiang, Huo Liujun has also been named in the list.

As a result of the US move, they and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into America. It is now a crime in the US to conduct financial transactions with all of them, and they will have their US-based assets frozen.

“The United States is taking action today against the horrific and systematic abuses in Xinjiang and calls on all nations who share our concerns about the CCP’s attacks on human rights and fundamental freedoms to join us in condemning this behaviour,” Pompeo said.
In a separate statement, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the US is committed to using the full breadth of its financial powers to hold human rights abusers accountable in Xinjiang and across the world.

“The United States will not stand idly by as the CCP carries out human rights abuses targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other minority groups in Xinjiang, to include forced labour, arbitrary mass detention, and forced population control, and attempts to erase their culture and Muslim faith,” Pompeo said.

Before ramping up the CCP’s campaign of repression in Xinjiang, Chen oversaw extensive abuses in Tibetan areas, using many of the same horrific practices and policies CCP officials currently employ in Xinjiang, the top American diplomat said.

Responding to the US move, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told media briefing in Beijing that the US decision amounted to “serious interference in China’s internal affairs and grave violation of basic norms guiding international relations.”

“Reacting to this wrong move, China has decided to impose reciprocal measures on US individuals and institutions with egregious behaviours on Xinjiang,” he said.

Asked when the sanctions would come into effect, he said, “you will find soon enough.”

This is the third time this week US and China slapped sanctions and visa restrictions.

China on Monday imposed visa restrictions on US individuals with “egregious conduct” on Hong Kong-related issues as a counter to American sanctions against unnamed Chinese officials deemed responsible for curbing freedoms in the city.

The US action came after China went ahead with the implementation of its new national security law for Hong Kong disregarding international condemnation to quell mass protests opposing growing Chinese interference, marginalising “one country two systems” formula governing Hong Kong.

On Wednesday, Beijing said it would retaliate the US action to impose visa restrictions on Chinese officials involved in restricting access to foreigners to Tibet with visa bans on Americans with “egregious conducts”.

In recent months, the Trump administration has stepped up its actions towards China on all fronts, including clamping down on Chinese media entities, going after Chinese pharmaceutical and research cybertheft. Tensions between the US and China are already high over the coronavirus pandemic with Washington accusing Beijing of covering up the outbreak last year

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He wrote that he was responding to comments by his trade representative Robert Lighthizer, who has been at the forefront of trade war negotiations with Beijing.
Lighthizer told a congressional committee on Wednesday that China so far has been living up to the terms of a “phase one” agreement that eased the dispute, but that decoupling the two economic giants was now impossible.
“That was a policy option years ago, but I don’t think it’s a policy or reasonable policy option at this point,” Lighthizer said.
Lighthizer described himself as a hardliner on China policy, and outlined the Trump administration’s plans to “reset” the World Trade Organization, largely so that it can better rein in Beijing’s policies which he says run afoul of free trade rules.
But his admission that the world’s two largest economies are inextricably linked, despite Trump’s aggressive campaign to push American firms to relocate production to the United States, caused some angst in Republican circles.
Trump tried to let his trade official off the hook.
“It was not Ambassador Lighthizer’s fault (yesterday in Committee) in that perhaps I didn’t make myself clear.”
Trump in January signed the “phase one” of a trade deal aimed at ending a trade war in which he has slapped tariffs on billions of dollars of Chinese products.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that a senior Chinese official also confirmed to him Beijing’s commitment to phase one, which includes China stepping up purchases of US products.
Pompeo met Wednesday in Hawaii with Yang Jiechi, a veteran maker of Chinese foreign policy, in Hawaii to discuss soaring tensions.
Besides trade, the United States has sharply criticized China over its handling of the coronavirus pandemic, an upcoming security law in Hong Kong and its mass detention of Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims.
Senior US diplomat David Stilwell, who accompanied Pompeo, said the United States insisted on a “more reciprocal” relationship but declined to discuss the discussions in depth.
“Whether or not they were productive or not, I will look at what comes up in the next couple of weeks. You’ll see a reduction in aggressive behavior or not,” Stilwell told reporters.
“If they come to the table with a reasonable proposal, the US is obviously going to treat it reasonably and look for ways to work toward a positive outcome.”

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