Taking collective action against terrorism and globally banned terror entities was among other significant topics discussed during the wide-ranging talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Anthony Albanese amid their first annual India-Australia Summit.

“They called upon all countries to work together to root out terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupt terrorist networks and their financing channels and halt use of terrorist proxies and cross-border movement of terrorists,” the joint statement said.

Both PMs have also condemned North Korea’s destabilising missile launches violating the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. They also reaffirmed their commitment to complete denuclearisation of North Korea.

Both countries further assured each other’s support in the candidacies for non-permanent seats on the UNSC for terms 2028-2029 (India) and 2029-2030 (Australia). The Australian PM also confirmed its support for India’s permanent membership candidacy at UNSC.

They also expressed their concerns over the deteriorating situation in Myanmar and called for ‘immediate cessation of violence’.

PM Modi earlier said in a statement that he took up the matter of temple vandalism incidents in Australia with PM Albanese. Calling it a ‘matter of regret’, PM Modi said that reports of attacks on temples have been coming regularly from Australia over the past few weeks and that it is natural that such news worries everyone in India.

Both Prime Ministers also talked about topics ranging from economic and trade cooperation; climate, energy, science, technology and research cooperation; people-to-people ties; Covid-19 cooperation; regional and multilateral cooperation.

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Military Partnership

Since the 2000s, dialogue partnerships between India and Australia have seen a new phase of engagement. The signing of several bilateral agreements — such as the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation in 2006 and the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2009 — culminated in the binding 2020 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Regular defence engagements range from frequent prime ministerial visits to tri-service staff-level military dialogues, indicating political will for a future military partnership.

Militarily, in addition to the multilateral maritime Exercise Malabar, both countries participate in AUSINDEX, an exercise which ensures mutual interoperability. India and Australia have jointly taken part in 10 bilateral exercises and 17 multilateral exercises as of 2022, facilitated by the 2020 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement that enables reciprocal access to military bases — as exemplified by India’s recent deployment of P8 surveillance aircraft to Darwin.

There is also institutional crossover between both countries, with Indian institutes training army personnel from Australia and vice versa. This remains significant in forging genuine friendships and trust for strategic partnerships. The recent summit also announced the establishment of the General Rawat India–Australia Young Defence Officer Exchange Programme. This will increase shared understanding of working culture and issues of strategic importance among military personnel.

Collaboration in defence-sector research and development is crucial — a joint working group between India’s Defence Research Development Organisation and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group has been in motion since 2018.

Increasing bilateral investment in the ongoing Australia–India Strategic Research Fund and the Australia–India Innovation and Technology Challenge is yet another positive development for defence, technological and commercial cooperation.

While India is focussing on defence manufacturing to better balance imports and domestic manufacturing needs, India’s modernisation demands will continue to outstrip domestic supply. This opens the scope for cooperation, with India expressing interest in Australian defence equipment — such as the Bushmaster and Hawkei armoured light mobility vehicles, radar technologies and undersea applications.

Economic Cooperation

On April 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and and his Australian counterpart, Scott Morrison presided virtually over the signing of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement, negotiated in torturous detail over the last decade. The ECTA is expected to give a fillip to bilateral economic ties.

The INDAUS ECTA (India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement), reflects PM Modi’s vision of the essential unity of the two countries and of their future being as strong, steadfast and resilient as the mighty Indus. While the second phase of the agreement will be in place by the end of the year, the ECTA deal is apparently fully in compliance with WTO rules and Article 24 of GATT which, inter alia, allows countries to grant special treatment to one another by establishing a free-trade association, provided that “(1) duties and other trade restrictions would be eliminated on substantially all the trade among the participants, (2) the elimination of internal barriers occurred within a reasonable length of time….”

India–Australia cooperation on economic and strategic fronts can also be promoted by ‘polylateral’ actors — such as non-governmental organisations, academic institutions, businesses and think tanks. This includes cooperation between Indian and Australian private sectors and the incentivisation of multinational projects to engage Indian enterprises.

The deal with India removes tariffs on more than 85% of Australian goods exports to India, worth A$12.6 billion, rising to almost 91% over 10 years. Tariffs will be scrapped on sheep meat, wool, copper, coal, alumina, fresh Australian rock lobster, and some critical minerals and non-ferrous metals to India. It will see 96 per cent of Indian goods imports enter Australia duty-free.

The ECTA should give a boost to India’s labour-intensive manufacturing sector, with a considerable leg-up to the pharma, textile, gemstone and jewellery sectors. Indian students in Australia will find an easier pathway to employment, and there will be greater ease of visa for a range of skilled human capital from India in demand in Australia, including chefs and yoga instructors. No less important, Australian coal will probably get relatively unfettered access to India.

Quad and ECTA

Defence linkages seem to be a natural way forward, given the common threats both countries face in their maritime space. Apart from cooperation through the Quad and ASEAN frameworks, greater security cooperation in Indian Ocean littorals can be fostered through forums and partnerships such as the India Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the Australia–India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership.

Critics are busy predicting the demise of the Quad because the central theatre of conflict has moved to Europe, and because of India’s perceived “neutrality” over the war in Ukraine, but the ECTA signals that India’s relations with Australia — two central pivots of the Quad — are as strong and resilient as ever.

Comments

The India–Australia relationship is not without its challenges. For example, the perception gap between India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ and Australia’s conceptualisation of national independence is a potential hurdle to deepening future security cooperation. The current trajectory of India’s foreign policy — especially in defence relations — is more focussed on issue-based partnerships than comprehensive relationships, limiting the scope of relationships with partners. What is clear is that the relationship has the backing of the leadership at the highest levels.

It is time for India–Australia cooperation to go beyond ‘cricket, commonwealth and curry’ to form a stronger relationship that transcends nascent cooperation initiatives. The potential for the recently-signed ECTA should be considered in this larger context. India–Australia friendhip is off to a good start, but it should never be solely reactionary to an ever-changing geopolitical landscape in the neighbourhood and beyond. Rather, it must continue in a self-sustaining manner.

Two multicultural, federal democracies that share concerns about stability in the Indo Pacific, are apprehensive about Chinese hegemonic designs, and are increasingly coordinating their policies, are natural partners of the future.

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The inaugural 2+2 ministerial level meeting between India and Australia was held, on 11 September, a fortnight ahead of the first Quad in-person Summit in Washington DC. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajanth Singh met Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton in New Delhi for an in-person meeting. That the two countries have kickstarted this new format of engagement suggests the growing trust and comfort level between India and Australia.

The meeting completed the set of such engagements the members of the Quad are having bilaterally with one another. The first such exercise India had was with Japan later on with the United States and now with Australia, all of whom are also working closely in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taking forward the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of both countries drew a roadmap encompassing political, economic, security and defence-related issues underscoring the importance of “advancing their shared objectives of an open, free, prosperous and rule-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India increased engagement” in this sphere.

Some of the major takeaways from the Australia-India Ministerial Dialogue include enhancing supply chain resilience and strengthening cooperation in the maritime domain. The latter that would enable deeper partnership between the two countries on a range of maritime-related themes such as maritime domain awareness, broadening linkages between maritime agencies, combating challenges like marine litter, and focusing on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The ministers also appreciated the presence of a liaison officer from Australia at the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region, based in Gurgaon.

The ministers used the opportunity to reinforce “their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region” and emphasized the need for the South China Sea Code of Conduct, currently under negotiations between China and ASEAN, to be consistent with international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ministers reiterated their commitment to strengthen their work through a number of trilateral and other minilateral platforms in the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad. Other areas that found prominent mention in the press statement include defense trade cooperation, including continued dialogue between the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of India and Defense Science and Technology Group of Australia, information sharing, and strengthening interoperability through augmented number of bilateral and multinational exercises.

Prime Ministers Meeting

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison met for a virtual summit in June 2020, at which the two sides elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The Australian foreign minister during a recent statement to the press said that the 2+2 dialogue is a direct result of the elevation of the relationship.
During their meeting, the joint statement noted, the four ministers reiterated “their commitment to fully implement the CSP based on mutual trust and understanding, common interests and shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further they highlighted “the importance of advancing their shared objective of an open, free, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India’s increasing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region through the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative and Australia’s Indo-Pacific approach and Pacific Step-Up.” The 2+2 dialogue will be held at least once in two years to maintain the traction in the relationship.

Modi and Morrison met agian, on 23 September, in Washington, a week after they spoke over phone and reviewed the rapid progress in the India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including through the ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue, and exchanged views on regional developments and the forthcoming Quad meeting.
It was the first meeting between the prime ministers of India and Australia since the AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) security partnership was unveiled, on 15 September, by US President Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Morrison.

Comments

A crucial factor in India-Australia bilateral relations that witnessed a quantum leap is in the area of defence. After the country pulled out from Malabar five-nation naval exercise in 2007, Australia was readmitted and took part in the first phase of the exercise hosted during August by the United States off the coast of Guam. This war-game exercise allows the Navies of India, Australia, Japan and the United States to demonstrate, coordination, synergy and inter-operability of the four countries on the high seas.

With India assiduously working on its Atmanirbhar plan and promoting defence manufacturing in the country, the move to further research in this strategic field through India’s Defence Research Development Organisation and Defence Science and Technology Group of Australia would allow both countries to explore new frontiers in critical technology amid India seeking access to source rare earth material from the country.

Given that both New Delhi and Canberra have had to bear the brunt of increasingly belligerent Chinese behavior, including the use of force against India and trade coercion against Australia, these fast-paced strategic developments are understandable.
Australia-India relations have been improving for several years, but relations have seen a dramatic shift in the last couple of years, evident in the number of high-level engagements between the two sides. With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years. After many years, Australia was finally invited back to the Malabar naval exercise last year. For Australia, even as the U.S. security alliance remains central to their security, Canberra has been expanding its Asian partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years.
India, for its part, long avoided taking sides between the U.S. and China. While Sino-Indian relations have been in trouble for several years, the Galwan confrontation in 2020 brought the relationship to an all-time low. The Indian response to Galwan has been very different and much tougher, partly because 20 Indian soldiers died. As a result, India has decided to pursue closer strategic engagements with a number of like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially Australia.

Australia has also seen more than its fair share of bullying behavior from China, much of it because Morrison asked for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic in April 2020. Since then, China has engaged in severe economic and trade coercive practices against Australia, targeting everything from barley, beef, seafood, wheat, and wine to coal, cotton, copper, education, and timber.

Augmented Australia-India ties within bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and other minilaterals and multilateral institutions are a reality that is unlikely to slow down for the foreseeable future. The convergence of strategic interests in ensuring an Indo-Pacific order that is free of hegemonic and muscular policies will bind India and Australia in the coming years. The two will likely also expand their partnership both in pursuing strategic partnerships and thematic ones like supply chain resilience initiative.

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So far, one or the other of the Quad countries has been reluctant to ruffle Beijing’s feathers at different times. After participating in joint exercises with India in 2007, Australia pulled away, wary of evoking Chinese displeasure. India, too, had been reticent about participating in a grouping directed against China. China’s belligerence in recent months has forced the Quad countries to shed such inhibitions.

The coronavirus, concerns over Chinese government actions in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, military incursions into the South China Sea and political interference have all given an impetus to strengthen the Quad.

The Quad

In response to China’s aggressive policies, the Quad – a strategic coalition of the Indo-Pacific region’s leading democracies (US, India, Japan and Australia) – is solidifying its alliance. Following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four countries in Tokyo, on 6 October, the four countries are now actively working toward establishing a new multilateral security structure for the region.

There are efforts to develop a close security partnership founded on shared values and interests, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free markets, and free trade.

China represents a growing challenge to all these principles.

European Support

The Quad’s focus also extends to ensuring a stable balance of power within a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While all of the Quad partners agree in this principle, Chinese expansionism that has accelerated their recent actions. Even United Kingdom, France and Germany view it (rules-based Indo-Pacific) as essential for international peace and security.

France has appointed an ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, after unveiling a new strategy affirming the region’s importance in any stable, law-based, multipolar global order.

In September 2020, Germany, Europe’s largest economy, which has long enjoyed close ties with Beijing, released its first Indo-Pacific strategy focused on increasing diplomatic pressure on China.

Germany has sought to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy for the European Union. It has released policy guidelines, which call for measures to ensure that rules prevail over a “might-makes-right” approach in the Indo-Pacific. Germany currently holds the European Council presidency.

France

Apart from the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan in addition to the US, India has been exercising regularly with France. The last one was conducted at French Reunion Island in the expanded Indian Ocean waters. India has discussed conducting similar exercises with the UK and Russia.

Giving up its reluctance to offend China which whom it has business interests, French president Emmanuel Macron has appointed Christophe Penot, his ambassador to Australia, to the new post of ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, realising the danger of Chinese hegemony.

During Macron’s visit to India in March 2018, addressing a French gathering in New Delhi, he reminded his countrymen: “France is a power of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; we are present at Reunion, we are also there in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. And we are a maritime power, it is often forgotten but France is the second maritime power in the world. We have a strong navy, we have nuclear submarines equipped like few other powers in the world; a maritime surveillance capability through our own satellites and technologies; it is obvious we are a military and intelligence power ranking us among the first nations in the world.”

C. Raja Mohan and Darshana Baruah wrote for Carnagie India, in 20028,on Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership, thus: “As maritime security acquires greater salience in India’s foreign policy, New Delhi is increasingly looking to leverage its strategic partnerships, particularly with Paris. Although India and France have joined forces on a number of issues since 1998, regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has never risen to the top of the agenda. However, this may be about to change.”

New Multilateral Security Arrangement

The Quad was resurrected in late 2017, but in late-2019, it gained momentum, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level. It had been lying dormant for nine years.

Since the US, Japan and Australia are already tied by bilateral and trilateral security alliances among themselves, the future of the Quad hinges on India. India is also directly facing Chinese territorial aggression besides having a large border with it. This aggression has changed the strategic equation. With India having taken a confrontational position, the Quad is now more likely to shift from consultation and coordination to a strategic alliance for a new multilateral security arrangement for the region.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

The US has been working on getting India into a “soft alliance” devoid of any treaty obligations. On October 26-27, Pompeo and US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited New Delhi for the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts. The meeting concluded with India signing the last of the four foundational agreements, under which both countries are committed to providing reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities, securing military communications, and sharing geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors.

When India invited Australia to the “Malabar” naval war games in November 2020, with the US and Japan, the Chinese communist mouthpiece Global Times, said “it would signal that the Quad military alliance is officially formed.”

During a visit to Malaysia, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that Washington aimed to build an “Indo-Pacific NATO” through the Quad.

The Quad’s consolidation is evidence that the Xi regime’s aggressive policies have started to backfire. International views of China have reached new lows this year.

The Quad symbolises an emerging international effort to establish a check on Chinese power.

India’s Initiative

India took the lead in banning Chinese apps. It was India’s decision that had elevated the Quad dialogue to ministerial-level in 2019. India shed its reticence and decided to welcome Australia to the Malabar 2020 exercise.

India pulled out from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2019. China’s actions have since led to the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) involving India, Japan and Australia, focussed on key sectors such as semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and telecommunications.

US Role

The US has played a key role in the region’s stability and prosperity since Second World II. US military presence prevented Japan from re-arming itself. It has stopped China from risking military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait and kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula. But, China, which is the biggest beneficiary of the trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, does not see it that way.

The US position on the South China Sea, which is in alignment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal award of 2016, boosts the morale of disputants such as the Philippines, who are routinely bullied by China.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

China is maintaining a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region, under the cloak of anti-piracy deployments, with bases in Gwadar and Djibouti for penetrating South Asia, the Gulf region and littoral Africa.

Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI and as an “encirclement” strategy.

Comments

Would the US stand by India if its own ties with China improve? In the event of a war with China, others may not be willing to risk their own relations with Beijing to support India, other than with intelligence support. India’s security challenges are primarily continental. Quad countries may not be may not be able to deal with the kind of challenges that a border war with China entails.

The Quad holds potential for India in the economic and technological domains rather than its value in the military domain by way of building up an alternative global supply chain and reducing trade dependency on China. Tokyo is already seriously exploring such collaboration with India. Similarly, India could take this further with the US and Australia, rather than focus on the military dimension alone.

In the future, the Quad could gradually be elevated to the level of vice minister and minister.

There are no limits to the number of active and possibly participating friends that can be added to the Quad, in the Indian Ocean.

South Asia as a whole has ceased to be the ‘traditional sphere of Indian influence’, a title we may have to share with others.

From left to right, external affairs minister S Jaishankar, Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo pose for a picture before a four Indo-Pacific nations’ foreign ministers meeting at the minister’s office in Tokyo 2020.

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The Malabar exercise aims at interoperability with emphasis on humanitarian assistance, surface war manoeuvres, anti-submarines warfare, counter-terror operations and aerial surveillance. Classically, it is enhancing capabilities of operating jointly in an adverse scenario if the situation so demands.

The invitation by India went out to the Australian Navy two weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad countries held extensive talks in Tokyo, on 6 October, with a focus on enhancing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, a region that has witnessed increasing Chinese military assertiveness.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

In the Quad meeting, foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar stated, “We remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes.” Jaishankar also emphasized that Quad was aiming for ‘maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.’

In her reaction, Australian defence minister Linda Reynolds termed the participation of her country in the exercise a “milestone opportunity” and said it would showcase the “deep trust” between four major Indo-Pacific democracies and their shared will to work together on common security interests.

“High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia’s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Reynolds said.

Growing Ties

Defence and security ties between India and Australia have been on an upswing in the last few years. In June, India and Australia elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a landmark deal for reciprocal access to military bases for logistics support during an online summit between prime minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison. India has already inked mutual logistics support deal with the other two Quad members.

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) allows militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

In September, the navies of India and Australia carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.

The last time Australian naval ships joined Malabar was back in 2007, when it was a five-nation exercise involving India, US, Japan, Singapore and Australia. Until 2007, Malabar was an annual bilateral exercise with the US Navy that was launched in 1992.

Military Strategy

The military strengthening of the Quad raises the possibility of India countering a China offensive in the Himalayas by exercising its option of opening the maritime front. Opening the third front is not impossible since India’s geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean provides the potential to project a potent maritime threat. It involves a measure of risk and the call would have to be taken by the political leadership. Indian military strategy based on defending the land borders and launching an offensive in the maritime domain is only possible with the support of Quad nations acting in concert.

Australia-China Equation

China continues to be Australia’s largest trading partner and accounts for 32.6 per cent of its exports. Besides, China sources iron ore, coal and gas from Australia because of its geographical proximity. India was sceptical about Australia doing anything to jeopardise this mutually beneficial relationship and risk China hitting back.

India’s announcement of Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise was, thus, significant geo-politically because four of the biggest democracies with stakes in the region are collectively committed to preserving open waters and hold off China’s misadventures to monopolise them ruthlessly.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

When virus-hit Australia spearheaded a petition for a neutral, global investigation into Covid-19’s origins and China’s role in it, it was immediately hit by China, which imposed an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley and ban on beef imports. Ever since, Australia had been looking to find allies where it could diversify markets and find support. One of the results was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreed upon by prime minister Scott Morrison and prime minister Narendra Modi on 4 June 2020.

Quad Plus

The current Quad plus which includes South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam, though aimed at China, is more than just a consultative or possibly future military grouping or alliance. It also has an economic component which could benefit India, as all countries within the group seek decoupling from China.

The broad objectives of its participants are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture.

Comments

The move to invite Australia to participate in the Malabar 2020 naval exercises marked an important inflexion point not only in India’s bilateral relations with Australia but also in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.  The naval exercise imparted a military dimension to the Quad.

The main reason behind Delhi’s hesitation so far was the concern that including Australia into the Quad might offend China’s political sensitivity. Clearly, India’s calculus on China has changed as China’s undermined India’s territorial integrity and regional and multilateral interests. The aggression in Ladakh was possibly the last straw.

Administratively, rather than geopolitically, having separate exercises with each of the partners was not logical. It was more sensible to combine them into one. But the multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal produced vehement protests from China, which dubbed it as an “Asian NATO”.

Rather than bringing the Quad partners into India’s territorial battles against Beijing, the strengthening of the Quad is more about expanding India’s bilateral security ties with Australia, whose potential is immense.

India would not desire to be sucked into operations in the South China Sea unless they are of specific concern to India. India would also be careful not to allow its diplomatic ties with Russia, Iran and other nations, where the US has differing perceptions, to deteriorate by joining a US-led alliance.

The full-fledged military alliance gives an emboldened Quad the robustness to act together against Chinese assertiveness and debt-trap diplomacy. So far, only the US had directly dared to call out China. Over time, if mutual interests and concerns converge, the Quad could become what the US calls a NATO-like presence in Asia that could contain China’s expansionist designs. It could lead to the establishment of an economic coalition of sorts, with a Quad Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to reduce the dependence on China.

The Quad consolidation can make it difficult for Beijing to monitor the entire South China Sea, which it claims as its own.

The international order is evolving quickly, mainly due to a consensus amongst every major liberal democracy in the world, that China is a threat – to political systems and open societies, economic self-reliance, and a rules-based regime, particularly in the international seas. Chinese aggression against India makes it incumbent on New Delhi to explore and deepen every international alliance which can serve as a source of symbolic and substantive support, including in the maritime domain where China has obvious vulnerabilities.

One view is that cementing the Quad will alienate China further and make reconciliation difficult. India has realised that China tends to respect power and strength. Economic strength and partnerships such as the Quad can broaden India’s options with China.

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They upgraded their strategic ties to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, and signed other science and technology agreements among the nine bilateral cooperation documents following a discussion at the virtual summit.

The ‘Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support‘ (MLSA) will allow militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

The ‘Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defence Science and Technology to the MoU on Defence Cooperation’ was also signed.    

Shared Vision

India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with Australia, Japan, and the US. With these agreements in place it is expected that Australia would be invited for the annual multilateral exercise Malabar comprising of India, US and Japan. The third edition of AUSINDEX-2019 was held in the Bay of Bengal in April 2019.

The other pacts will provide for bilateral cooperation in areas of cyber and cyber-enabled critical technology, mining and minerals, military technology, vocational education and water resources management.

ALSO READ Global Times Warns Australia Over Supporting India

Modi and Morrison also decided to announce a ‘Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region‘ to “harness opportunities and meet challenges together” as ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partners‘.

India has previously signed logistics support agreement, called Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, with the United States in 2016 under which the two nations’ military assets such as warships will receive reciprocal cashless supplies while docked at each other’s port. The two nations have also pursued the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) since 2012 for cooperation on military technology joint development and production.

Bilateral Cooperation

The bilateral economic engagement too has been on an upswing in the last few years. According to official data, the trade between the two countries was around USD 21 billion in 2018-19.

Australia’s cumulative investment in India is about USD 10.74 billion whereas India’s total investment in Australia is USD 10.45 billion. Australian Super Pension Fund has invested USD 1 billion in India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund. In the last few years, both the countries have been focusing on expanding maritime cooperation.

Historical Background

Indian and Australian troops first fought together in 1915 in the trenches of Gallipoli against the Turks and thereafter against the onslaught of the Afrika Korps led by Rommel during the siege of Tobruk in 1941. They have also fought shoulder to shoulder in the jungles of Malaya and in the Far East.

ALSO READ GEOPOLITICS: Indo-Australian Bonhomie Influenced by Chinese Hostility

The two countries also share a common love for cricket and sporting ties are second only to those of war.

Pre partition, both India and Australia were part of the British Empire, while India was ruled by the British, Australia was a self-governing dominion.

Australia prides itself on being a multi-cultural society and in a population of 25 million over 1.2 million are ethnic Chinese whereas Indians are nearly 7 lacs representing over 2.8 % of the population. Indians are, however, the highest growing migrant community.

The Andaman & Nicobar Islands became part of India in 1950. Thereafter, the paths of India and Australia diverged with the cold war. Australia is firmly aligned with the US and India on the path of non-alignment.

In 1990, Australia sold 50 Mirage III aircraft which had been decommissioned by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1988 to Pakistan.

Australia not only condemned India’s nuclear tests conducted in 1998, but also suspended all bilateral defence ties including recalling Australian officers attending courses in India, doubling military aid to Pakistan, which it cancelled after Pakistan conducted its nuclear test and banning the sale of uranium to India because India was not a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This ban was finally lifted after the signing of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in September 2014 during the visit of Prime Minister Tony Abbott to India.

India has no option but to weaponize its nuclear deterrent, whereas Australia, having 31 % of the world’s uranium reserves is protected by being under the US nuclear umbrella.

India and Australia, though located geographically at two extremities of the Indo–Pacific are the largest maritime powers in the region and shoulder the responsibility of its security. Australia would like to India becoming a more assertive maritime power.

Australia depends on the US for its security needs and at the same time China is its biggest trading partner. Chinese–Australian trade in 2018-19 stood at A$ 235 billion, accounting for nearly 26 % of its total trade, with the balance of trade firmly in Australia’s favour whereas with India it is A$ 30.3 billion.

With China’s belligerence increasing and the responsibilities of security of the Eastern Indian Ocean, Australia will need to make a tough choice between trade and security.

Australian officers have been attending courses in India regularly.

A Framework for Security Cooperation was also agreed during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Australia in November 2014.

AUSINDEX, the first bilateral exercise commenced in 2015.

Both countries have also been holding a Two plus Two Defence and Foreign Secretary-level dialogue since 2018.

In March 2019, Australia along with Bangladesh also co-sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council for blacklisting Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM ) Chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist.

The agreements, signed on 4 June, commit both countries to deepening military integration, including joint exercises and grant access to each other’s bases for logistical support. The joint statement issued at the end of the summit stated “as two Indo – Pacific countries, India & Australia have an enduring interest in a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo – Pacific region.”

Today, both nations acknowledge the US as the dominant power to balance China in the Indian Ocean Region.

Comments

It is not unexpected that India moves to invite Australia to the Malabar drills. It will take place sooner or later. India’s strategy is to expand its sphere of influence into the entire Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Wanting to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region, New Delhi seeks to become a greater power.

With restrained naval might and a tight defence budget, Australia would like to enhance its relations with India, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as some South Pacific island countries.

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Malabar Exercises

The Indian Navy (IN) has been undertaking Malabar Exercises with the US Navy (USN) since 1992. Navies of the US, France, UK, etc have been interested in co-operation with IN, primarily due to their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The first ‘Malabar ‘ took place in 1992 but was suspended after three years due to US sanctions imposed after India’s nuclear tests. The exercises were resumed in 2002, when India agreed to join the US campaign on ‘War on Terror’. Malabar exercises, today, are complex naval exercises, encompassing Anti Air Warfare (AAW), Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Weapon firings, Dissimilar Air Combat,  Maritime Interdiction, Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS), Diving and salvage operation, Mine Countermeasure (MCM), Special Forces Operations, etc. 

In 2007 of Malabar became a multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal with USN, IN, Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) and Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The Chinese were not pleased with such a large coalition exercising together. Since then only bilateral exercises have been held. Japan is also a permanent member of the Malabar exercise coalition since 2015.

Malabar Exercises are increasingly being seen as diplomatic exercises to send a strategic message to China particularly as a tit for tat when Chinese intrusions take place along the Indian border with China.

China is aware that IN continuously monitors the Malacca strait choke point through which nearly 80% of China’s trade flows. Hence, China sees Malabar as a ganging up of likeminded navies, which can hurt China in the SCS.

China has remained bitterly opposed to Malabar because it saw the growing relationship as India’s first step on the American bandwagon. Consequently, when Malabar-2007 was enlarged to accommodate Australia, Singapore and Japan, China sent a diplomatic protest conveying its fear and displeasure. It took another eight years before Japan was formally admitted to make Malabar a tri-lateral event in 2015.

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“According to Australian media, Australia has not taken sides in the China-India border disputes since the 1960s, but diplomatic sources said Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade recently decided to clarify its public position,” the paper said.

“It is worth noting what support Australia would offer to India, since it is India that altered the status quo that led to the recent Galwan Valley clashes between Indian and Chinese troops,” the report written by Zhang Yi said.

“It is not surprising that Australia shows a supportive posture to India, especially at a time when China and India are cautiously mending their worsening ties due to the Galwan Valley conflict and when relations between China and Australia are at a historical low ebb. By wooing New Delhi, Canberra seeks to win “friends” to gain leverage in its tense relations with Beijing. From the perspective of values, India has always been the blue-eyed boy among Western countries. India is viewed as a democratic model among developing countries, and supporting India is a politically correct move made by Australia.”

“Moreover, Australia is anxiously waiting for the olive branch extended by India to take part in the trilateral Malabar naval exercise that comprises of the US, Japan and India. Earlier, it was reported that India is favorably considering Australia’s interest in being part of the annual exercise, and a formal decision is likely to be taken in the next couple of weeks. If Australia joins, the exercise will become more of an occasion where all members of Quad flex their muscles to check China’s influence in the region.”

“But the intimacy between Australia and India will not last long. Both are trying to strike a subtle balance between strong economic and trade relations with Beijing and reaffirmed political and security relations with Washington, and both are well aware that they are just one play among others in Washington’s strategy to contain Beijing. Despite the common target, namely China, their own calculations of interests of Australia and India have contributed to the absence of meaningful cooperation between the two so far.”

“Australia sees both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as where it can exert influence, while India views the Indian Ocean as its own. As the two countries ascend in the Indian Ocean, India exhibits some kind of discomfort with Australia’s hegemonic ambition in the region. As both seek a dominant role, they may encounter clashes of interest in the Indian Ocean in the long run.”

“It surprised many when Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne said in Washington on Tuesday, “The relationship we have with China is very important, and we have no intention of injuring it.” Such a position has backfired again and again when Australia took its stance in the South China Sea, Huawei, Hong Kong, the coronavirus pandemic, and to date, the China-India border dispute. Perhaps Australia needs to show something concrete to prove that it is not a model of harming China’s interests, which would cost itself dearly.” the report concluded.

Source

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This move to build on their tactical intent to work closely in the Indo-Pacific region could easily rile a suspicious China.

The two Indo-Pacific nations also announced that they would work together in ensuring “rules-based maritime order” in the region, an euphemism that refers to Beijing disregarding the international laws of the seas and its aggressive posturing on territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Relationship between the two nations was upgraded to a ‘Strategic Partnership’ level in 2009. Since then, both countries have expanded their cooperation in a range of key areas.

In its White Paper on Foreign Policy in 2017, Australia recognised India as the “pre-eminent maritime power among Indian Ocean countries” and a “front-rank partner of Australia”.

Mutual Logistics Support

The ‘Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support‘ (MLSA) will allow militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

The ‘Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defence Science and Technology to the MoU on Defence Cooperation’ was also signed.    

India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with Australia, Japan, and the US. With these agreements in place it is expected that Australia would be invited for the annual multilateral exercise Malabar comprising of India, US and Japan. The third edition of AUSINDEX-2019 was held in the Bay of Bengal in April 2019.

The other pacts will provide for bilateral cooperation in areas of cyber and cyber-enabled critical technology, mining and minerals, military technology, vocational education and water resources management.

Modi and Morrison also decided to announce a ‘Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region‘ to “harness opportunities and meet challenges together” as ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partners‘.

Joint Declaration

The joint declaration by the two countries read as follows:

“India and Australia reiterate their commitment to promoting peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, which is vital for the world…

“India and Australia are committed to supporting a rules-based maritime order that is based on respect for sovereignty and international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

“India and Australia have common concerns regarding the strategic, security and environmental challenges in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. These include activities and actions in the maritime domain that are inconsistent with international law, particularly UNCLOS, including terrorism, piracy, drugs and arms smuggling, irregular migration, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, poaching of marine species, narcotics trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The region’s environmental challenges, such as marine pollution, climate change, ocean acidification, shortage of potable water, loss of habitat due to storm surges and saline water intrusion, are also of shared concern.

“India and Australia share a strong bilateral relationship, underpinned by ongoing cooperation across many areas of mutual interest. This cooperation includes the Australia-India Framework for Security Cooperation, regular dialogues involving Ministers responsible for foreign, defence and trade policy, and a broad range of senior officials meetings, such as the Defence Policy Talks, Australia-India Maritime Dialogue and Navy to Navy Staff Talks.

“India and Australia will work together bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally, and in minilateral arrangements, to support regional architecture in line with their shared values and interests. India and Australia reiterate their commitment to ASEAN centrality and unity and will strengthen their coordination in regional and multilateral fora, such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORS), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to achieve their shared vision for maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. India and Australia welcome the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

“In this context, India and Australia will work closely to develop, with all interested partners, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 14th East Asia Summit on 4 November 2019 at Bangkok. Through this Initiative, they will endeavour to improve the management of the shared oceanic domains, including in key areas of cooperation such as preserving the maritime ecology and reducing the impact of marine pollution (especially plastics); maritime security; sustainable use of marine resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade, connectivity and maritime transport.

“Recognising that India and Australia have a shared interest in promoting maritime security and safety, they will deepen navy-to-navy cooperation and strengthen maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region through enhanced exchange of information. Both countries will also work to enhance civil maritime cooperation between law enforcement agencies and coast guard cooperation.

“Given the importance they attach to ensuring sustainable use of living and non-living marine resources in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with international law, they commit to protecting the Indo-Pacific marine environment and reducing the impact of marine pollution, particularly plastics, and climate change.

“India and Australia will work jointly towards implementation of an Action Plan with specific measures to advance their bilateral maritime cooperation in line with this Vision.”

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Connected by the Commonwealth as well as the Indian Ocean, India and Australia have traditionally enjoyed good relations.

Though China apparently did not figure in the talks, it was clear that the Indo-Australian bonhomie was partly influenced by their not-so-friendly relations with the former. India’s neighbour is keeping it on tenterhooks with brazen muscle-flexing along the Line of Actual Control, while Australia has been vociferously demanding a probe into China’s handling of the Covid pandemic. With China throwing its weight around in the Indo-Pacific, India and Australia have come out with a shared vision for maritime cooperation and stability in the region. Their support for a rules-based maritime order carries a stern message for China: respect sovereignty and international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

India has previously signed logistics support agreement, called Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, with the United States in 2016 under which the two nations’ military assets such as warships will receive reciprocal cashless supplies while docked at each other’s port. The two nations have also pursued the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) since 2012 for cooperation on military technology joint development and production. The two nations, along with Japan, hold an annual trilateral naval exercise, Malabar, in which Australia has previously participated.

The Indian Ocean Region is now becoming the new area of focus after South China Sea and it is imperative for India to augment security so that the blue economy involving fishing, mineral and energy exploration can be supported.

After the South China Sea, the IOR has become an important theatre for activity and national security plans need to cater to this. There has been increasing concern over the past few years on the upswing in Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean Region. Besides creation of infrastructure in nations like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, China has activated its first overseas base in Djibouti and has been conducting regular patrols in the region.

Chinese movement includes nuclear submarine patrols and frequent port visits to Pakistan as well. Officials believe it is only a matter of time before the first Chinese aircraft carrier group sets sail for the region as the PLA Navy has been rapidly expanding its reach.

The bilateral economic engagement too has been on an upswing in the last few years. According to official data, the trade between the two countries was around USD 21 billion in 2018-19.

Australia’s cumulative investment in India is about USD 10.74 billion whereas India’s total investment in Australia is USD 10.45 billion. Australian Super Pension Fund has invested USD 1 billion in India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund. In the last few years, both the countries have been focusing on expanding maritime cooperation.

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