The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base. PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley – the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years-the Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military commander negotiations breaking down in October . Due to the sustained military development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely continue through 2022.

China-India Border

Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiations made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials.

Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India.

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Western Theater Command Leadership (2021)

Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong.

Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army DOB: 11/1962

Age: 59

Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou.

Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command DOB: 1958, Age: 63

Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing

Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region DOB: 5/1958. Age: 63

Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province

Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University

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This is part of China’s strategy of aggressively constructing new villages in disputed border areas to extend or consolidate its control over these areas that India, Bhutan and Nepal maintain to be within their national territories, Tibet media reported.

As per a recent report in Hong Kong-based publication quoting a Chinese government document, China intends to build 624 border villages in disputed Himalayan areas.

This new measure is part of China’s larger strategy, launched in 2018 by the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist Party Committee, designed to relocate the Tibetans living in very high altitude regions throughout Tibet, defined as 4,800 meters high or above under its so-called ‘very high-altitude ecological relocation plan.

Although China claimed that its move was to conserve the environment but there is no scientific evidence as to how relocation would have a positive impact on the environment.

According to the publication, the actual reason was to end the Tibetan traditional way of life. Notably, Tibetans in these regions have been nomads for generations who have been living ‘cordially with nature’ high on the Tibetan Plateau for centuries.

It is estimated that the forced relocation and settlement would lead to the displacement of about 2 million Tibetan nomads, who would lose their livelihood and be pushed into, poverty and get marginalized.

And therefore, under China’s so-called ‘Poverty Alleviation’, ‘Ecological Migration’ and now the ‘Very High Altitude Ecological Migration’ plans, the Tibetans were uprooted and instantly altered to achieve Beijing’s plan to dilute Tibet’s identity, control and enforce their assimilation into the Chinese cultural and economic world.

The relocation plan imagined that as many as 130,000 people would be displaced from the Autonomous Prefectures of Shigatse (Rikaze), Nagchu and Ngari (Ali) in the TAR, to be carried out between 2018 and 2025.

According to the publication, over 100,000 of the 130,000 Tibetans will be re-settled along the Yarlung Tsangpo River with plans to develop a core economic zone with industrial corridors along the river.

Under the 2018 plan, the first relocation site was established in Gachong village, Gurum (Gurong) township, Toelung Dechen (Duilong Deqing) District, Lhasa prefectural city. According to a Xinhua report, published on October 21, 2020, 1102 residents were relocated from Gurum Township Jialing Jiadong Village, Rungma (Rongma Township), Nima County in Nagchu prefecture in the Jangthang (Qiangtang) Nature Reserve area.

Recently, the Chinese government has been implementing relocating 26,304 people mostly from Tsonyi County, Amod County and Nyima County to Lhoka prefecture within the TAR.

According to the Tibet Press citing Xinhua’s August 2022 report, about 17,555 Tibetans from Nagqu city (North East of Tibet) – which has more than 1000 towns and villages are relocating to Sinburi (Senburi) village, Gongkar (Gongga) County, Lhoka in southern Tibet. Lhoka (Shannan), with the relocation destination of the population about 400 km away from their home.

Behind the relocation plan, China also planned to spur innovation in key sectors and leverage dual-use technologies for military end-uses. China sees Military-Civil Fusion as a strategy to use civilians and dual-use technologies and facilitates its national defence, reported Tibet Press.

Under this strategy, the Chinese government has been giving training to civilian and military personnel to achieve an organic, powerful, and comprehensive national system of strategies.

It is therefore important to understand the Chinese hidden objective of these policies due to its strategic importance for Tibet and in the context of the Chinese strategy of forced mass relocation of Tibetans, from different parts of Tibet to Lhoka, which aimed at strengthening the ‘Border Defense Villages’ or ‘Xiokang Villages’ which is Beijing’s way of ‘Military-Civil Fusion (MCF)’.

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In his nearly three-hour “candid” talks with visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, external affairs minister S Jaishankar asserted that restoration of normalcy in ties will require restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Wang flew into Delhi from Kabul on 24 March evening in an unannounced trip in the first highest-level visit to India by a Chinese leader after the border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted nearly two years ago.

At a media briefing shortly after his talks with Wang, Jaishankar said: “If we are both committed to improving our ties then this commitment must find full expression in the ongoing disengagement talks.”

Describing the current situation as a “work in progress”, he also said that relations between India and China have been “disturbed” as a result of the Chinese actions in April 2020.

“So long there are very large deployments, border situation is not normal. We still have ongoing friction areas, have made progress in resolving some friction areas including Pangong Tso. Our discussion today was how to take this forward,” he said.

The border issue is understood to have figured prominently in the meeting between Wang and Doval too. Both sides agreed on the importance of early and complete disengagement in remaining areas to allow bilateral ties to take their natural course. They also stressed the need to continue positive interactions at diplomatic,military levels for restoration of peace, sources said.

Wang also met National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who pressed insisted on an early and complete disengagement of troops in Ladakh, a source with knowledge of the discussions said. “The continuation of the present situation is not in our mutual interest,” the source quoted Doval as telling Wang.

“Restoration of peace and tranquillity will help build mutual trust and create enabling environment for progress in relations,” Doval added.

New Delhi has made it abundantly clear that it cannot be “business as usual” with China until the border stand-off is resolved on mutually acceptable terms.

‘Allow Indian students to return’

Jaishankar also raised with his Chinese counterpart the issue of return of Indian students to China to resume their studies and hoped that Beijing will adopt a “non-discriminatory approach” on it.

“I took up strongly the predicament of Indian students studying in China who have not been allowed to return, citing Covid restrictions. We hope that China will take a non-discriminatory approach since it involves the future of so many young people,” Jaishankar said.

“Minister Wang Yi assured me that he would speak to the relevant authorities on his return on this matter. He also recognised the particular concerns that medical students have in this difficult situation,” he said.

A large number of Indian students had come back to India when China has closed down all universities following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. China had restricted travel by suspending visa and residence permits from March 27, 2020, in view of the pandemic.

‘There should be immediate ceasefire in Ukraine’

The two ministers agreed on the need for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue to defuse the war in Ukraine.

“Wang Yi presented the Chinese understanding, the Chinese view of the situation developed there and the developments pertaining to it, and I presented the Indian view,” Jaishankar said.

The external affairs minister said both sides discussed their respective approaches and perspectives and agreed that diplomacy and dialogue must be the priority.

“I think, the Indian view, many of you may have heard me speak about it yesterday in Parliament as well. And obviously, what he said was his view and what I said was my view, but where we had a common element was that both of us agreed on the importance of an immediate ceasefire as well as a return to diplomacy and dialogue,” he said.

The external affairs minister said in Parliament on 24 March that India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been “steadfast and consistent” and that it wants resolution of the conflict through talks.

India has not criticised Russia yet for its invasion of Ukraine and also abstained from voting at the UN platforms in condemning the Russian attack.

China has close ties with Russia and it has been giving signals about its willingness to assist Moscow in offsetting the impact of economic sanctions announced by the US and other Western countries following the Russian attack on Ukraine.

Wang’s Kashmir remarks at OIC meet discussed

The external affairs minister said that the remark made by Chinese foreign minister at the OIC meet, which had sparked a strong response from New Delhi, featured in their talks.

Jaishankar said he conveyed to Wang that India hopes that China would follow an independent policy in respect to New Delhi and will not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries.

“Did the issue of what Minister Wang Yi said at the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) Conference come up? Yes, it did. I referred to it. I explained to him, why we found that statement objectionable. It was a subject discussed at some length. There was a larger context as well,” Jaishankar told reporters.

“I conveyed that we hope that China would follow an independent policy in respect of India and not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries and other relationships,” said Jaishankar.

3,500 km long border, varied perceptions

The India-China border, stretching from Arunachal Pradesh in the east to Ladakh, is largely undemarcated. Both sides claim vast swathes of each other’s territory, primarily due to differences in perception about the exact location of the Line of Actual Control.

The border remained largely peaceful since the war of 1962, barring occasional skirmishes- until June 2020.

A violent clash erupted over a Chinese incursion into Indian territory and preventing Indian border patrols. 20 Indian soldiers were martyred when PLA troops attacked with hand-held weapons. Several reports said the Chinese side also suffered at least 35 casualties. However it has never been officially acknowledged by China.

Both sides deployed large number of troops and heavy weaponry in the region following the Galwan clash. The resulting stand-off has not been fully resolved, even after 15 rounds of military-level talks.

Growing trade, and the imbalance

Trade remains heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour. India’s trade deficit with China is the largest it has with any county, and the imbalance has been steadily widening.

The exports from India to China have increased from $10.17 billion in 2016-17 to $21.19 billion in 2020-21. The imports from China have increased from $61.28 billion to $65.21 billion during the same period.

More than 100 Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises and electronics manufacturers that have come to dominate the country’s mobile phone market, operate in India.

Since the Galwan clash of 2020, New Delhi has tightened the screws on Chinese players by increasing scrutiny of investments or imports and banning some mobile apps.

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Provisions of China’s New Border Law

This law points out major focus areas in border management.  It is a “… new law on protection and exploitation of country’s land border” as reported by Xinhua news.

1. To Safeguard Territory At Any Cost

The law puts the responsibility for border management on the Chinese military and military police. It states that the forces can take any measure to safeguard territorial integrity. Thus, is tries to justify any aggressive military action taken by China under the name of safeguarding territorial integrity.

2. Combining Military Defence of Land Border With Social And Economic Development

The law formalises the process of combining military defence with the social and economic development of the border areas. It aims to “strengthen PLA’s policy to work closely with civilians staying in border areas. These areas include Tibetan villages bordering India and Bhutan.

It actually tries to cover China’s attempts to put forward local civilians as their first line of defence. This is because of the already known difficulties that are being faced by Chinese troops in this terrain.

3. Powers To Close And Open Borders

The law authorises forces to block borders against any potential threat. As per the reports, the law allows creating blockades and using “police apparatus and weapons against illegal crosses”. It is aimed at checking “illegal crossers”.

The biggest reason behind this anti-infiltration move is the fear of spill over effect from Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Afghanistan has once again become a hotbed for radical Islamist ideology and terrorism. China doesn’t want these to enter its territory especially the Xinjiang province which shares a border with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Another reason can be checking the spread of Covid-19 from South-East Asia into China. What can be more ironic than the country that itself originated this pandemic is putting barricades against it?

4. Upgrading Border Infrastructure

China has built a vast network of road, rail and air transport in border areas. This law brings a renewed focus on infrastructure development. It also aims to upgrade is border villages. China has already established more than 600 such villages in Tibet.

General Officer commanding of eastern command of Indian Army recently stated that China is establishing such “dual villages” in border areas. These can act as military bases for China in times of war. The law talks about states nurture and improves their “supporting capacity”. This clearly shows that these villages are actually Chinese military camps under the disguise of a civilian settlement.

5. Resolving Border Disputes

The new law says that long-standing border disputes will be resolved through negotiations. The principles of “equality, mutual trust and friendly consultations” would be followed.

The real Chinese intentions are exactly the opposite especially with respect to borders with India and Bhutan. China has signed border agreements with most of its neighbours except India and Bhutan. The Doklam standoff in 2017 and the ongoing standoff in Ladakh since last year shows that China wants to settle these borders with the use of force and not through negotiations.

Impact On India

The timing of this law is important. It came within two weeks of breaking down of 13th round of corps commander level talks. Thus, it is another attempt to blame India and show Chinese “sincerity” towards solving border dispute.

The law also shown China’s growing aggression. China has given extensive powers to its forces. It is also accelerating use of civilians and civil infrastructure for military use which is a cause of concern.

As per some observers, the law formalises China’s recent actions on disputed territories with India and Bhutan. As we discussed above, China is yet to finalise border agreements with these two nations. Thus, it can be a new step by China to solve these disputes the way it wants.

According to India’s former ambassador to China Gautam Bambawale the law will not change the realities on the ground. The law has a lot of verbiage and a lot of hot air.

When it comes to infrastructure development, social and economic development, India has the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

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India and China “agreed”, on 18 November 2021, to hold the next round of the Senior Military Commanders meeting at an early date and to achieve the objective of complete disengagement from all the friction points along the LAC in the Western Sector in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements and protocols, said the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement.

The 23rd meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), which was held virtually, also agreed that in the interim, both sides would also continue to ensure a stable ground situation and avoid any untoward incident.

The Indian delegation was led by MEA’s Additional Secretary (East Asia) and the DG of Chinese MFA’s Boundary & Oceanic Department of the Chinese led the other side.

The two sides recalled the agreement between External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during their meeting in September in Dushanbe that military and diplomatic officials should continue their discussions to resolve the remaining issues along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh.

Accordingly, they had “candid and in-depth” discussions on the situation along the LAC in Western Sector of India-China border areas and also reviewed the developments since the last meeting of the Senior Commanders of both sides which was held on October 10.

They agreed on the need to find an early resolution to the remaining issues along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh while fully abiding by bilateral agreements and protocols so as to restore peace and tranquility, said the MEA readout.

October 10 Meeting

The last military commanders meeting on October 10, which was the 13th,  had ended in a stalemate with both Foreign Offices accusing each other of insincerity. The MEA said The Chinese side was not agreeable to India’s constructive suggestions and also could not provide any forward-looking proposals.

The PLA resorted to half-measures to resolve the disengagement in Hot Springs area by refusing to move back to permanent bases or restoring status quo ante as existed in April 2020. In May 2020, the PLA using huge volume of troops unilaterally changed the ground positions on north banks of Pangong Tso, Galwan, Gogra and Hot Springs in East Ladakh in a bid to impose rejected 1959 line along the 1597 kilometre Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.

The talks also failed as the Chinese had replaced Gen. Xu Qiling, who was promoted in July, with Gen. Wang Haijiang, and that as a result a “comfort level” had not been achieved. Gen. Wang is the fourth commander to head the Western Theatre Command since the stand-off began. 

Channels of Communication

Ever since the LAC stand-off began in April-May 2020, both sides have mainly followed a three-tier approach — regular talks at the diplomatic and military levels, along with a dialogue track between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. Talks were also held between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi. It was Doval and Yang who agreed to a disengagement plan in 2020.

India and China have six to seven hotlines but there has been little progress in the talks. A larger plan to resolve the issue with the establishment of a hotline at the DGMO level remains unfulfilled.

Sticky Issues

While disengagement has taken place in the Pangong Tso area and at the Gogra Post, a stand-off continues over Patrolling Point 15 (PP15) in Hot Springs, the Depsang Plains and in the Demchok area.

Hot Springs and Demchok continue to pose challenges. The Chinese have now made it a sovereignty issue. Earlier they said this was just a territorial issue.

China watchers believe that the PLA will continue to drag its feet over disengagement in Hot Springs and will require a whole lot of persuasion from the Indian side to restoring patrolling rights in Depsang Bulge and CNJ area south of Demchok. The Indian side, on its part, is also in no hurry with its formations matching the PLA build-up across the LAC. Rather than seeking compromise solutions as in the past, the Modi government will not back down from enforcing its just legal claims on the LAC. The Indian Army is also closely watching the Central and Eastern sector to counter any transgression from the PLA along the full 3488-km LAC.

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