On 31 August, a statement from the Army said that on the night of August 29-30, “PLA troops violated the previous consensus arrived at during military and diplomatic engagements…and carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo.” However, the Indian troops “pre-empted this PLA activity on the Southern Bank of Pangong Tso Lake, undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change facts on ground.”

A few hours later, the social media was abuzz with news that a Tibetan officer had died. Company Leader Nyima Tenzin lost his life on a landmine in the theatre of operations.

This news turned the spotlight on the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and its predominantly Tibetan soldiers. The deployment of the SFF emerged as a source of pride for India’s Tibetan community. A video from 4 September showed Tibetans in Shimla gathering, singing and tying their traditional khatas (white scarves) to a departing convoy as they waved goodbye to SFF personnel headed for the Ladakh front.

ALSO READ: INDIA-CHINA: Indian Troops Occupy Key Heights North of Pangong Tso

The SFF serves in the Directorate General of Security (DGS) – a wing of India’s external intelligence agency R&AW. With help from the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) – the air wing of the DGS and superior reconnaissance capabilities, the Tibetan refugees-dominated SFF can conduct covert operations behind Chinese enemy lines at will.

The SFF has mostly operated in the shadows since its creation in 1962. When Tibetan resistance fighters began crossing over into India with the 1956 uprising. More followed in the wake of the failed uprising three years later and the Dalai Lama’s exile to India. Most of the resistance fighters were from the Kham region of eastern Tibet, which was one of the major sites of rebellion against the Chinese.

Earlier they were used in a covert manner, but now, it’s against China. It’s a clear message, even to the people in Tibet.

Raising of the SFF

The fighters did not lack passion but needed weapons and training. The CIA was roped in for training the SFF recruits, though no written agreements existed. This suited the Americans well, as their own agenda in Tibet got bolstered through this involvement. They were smuggled into East Pakistan and flown to the island of Saipan in the Pacific, where for four months they were trained in communication and guerilla warfare. In July 1957, they were air-dropped into Tibet and started supplying intelligence to Washington.

By 1958, 23 units had completely driven the Chinese from Tibet’s south, but were in dire need of arms and ammunition. There were 25,000 fighters, but most poorly equipped. The CIA support failed to deliver.

The 6,000 or so fighters who remained in India would be given a new opportunity in 1962. Encouraged by Biju Patnaik, a World War 2 veteran and Bhola Nath Mullik, the then chief of Intelligence Bureau, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave the green light to recruitment of Tibetan refugees. Mullik had the support of leaders of the Tibetan resistance movement.

India, perhaps, wanted China to know that Tibetan nationalism could and would be weaponised against the PLA, should push come to shove again?

Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, who had earlier commanded the 22 Mountain Regiment and was a Second World War veteran was chosen to raise the force. An old Gurkha training centre at Chakrata (Uttarakhand) was lying vacant. The unit was raised on 14 November 1962. A week later, China announced its “unilateral ceasefire”, so the unit did not see any action in the war.

The outfit was called Establishment 22, named after Gen Uban’s old mountain regiment. They would be all paratroopers — an elite unit capable of high-altitude warfare, special operations, and fighting behind enemy lines. They would report to the Cabinet Secretariat, and were not part of the Army. A women’s wing was also created. In 1967, Establishment 22 was expanded and renamed the Special Frontier Force.

They would finally see action in the 1971 war. They were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and fought with extraordinary valour. More than 50 would lay down their lives, a sacrifice that was, given the secrecy of the outfit, never given its due recognition.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans used hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW’s legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban’s forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

ALSO READ: PLA troops vacate Finger 4 area in Pangong Tso

The SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges at the cost of 56 dead and 190 wounded. They ensured that Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Indira Gandhi deployed the SFF, once again, during the Operation Blue Star in Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar.

The SFF also played a key role during the Kargil conflict. It is rumoured that the capture of Tiger Hill was made possible because of the SFF deployment.

New Attention

The new attention on the SFF holds implications both inside Tibet and for the Tibetan community in India. Tibetan people in the diaspora and refugee community are now showing their patriotism. The limelight might provide the opportunity for the SFF’s warriors to get long overdue recognition from the government.

The use of the SFF against China has renewed attention towards the Free Tibet movement.

China Nervous

Two days before the Tibetan lost his life in Ladakh, on 28-29 August, the Seventh Tibet Work Forum (TWF) was held in Beijing. For the first time, the TWF was given large publicity. The TV report lasted more than 14 minutes, mostly quoting XiJinping. In his speech, he emphasised that Beijing’s objective was to build a new socialist modern Tibet that is “united, prosperous, civilised, harmonious and beautiful.”

Seventy years after the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet, has no ethnic Tibetan been made Party Secretary in Tibet? No Tibetan has ever made it to the Politburo? The reason is that the Han still do not trust the Tibetans, though Xi is fond of mentioning his theory: “Governing border areas is the key to governing the country and stabilising Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”

China has been quietly militarising the Tibetan plateau for over 60 years under the pretext of development and modernisation. For Tibet, this has only led to an influx of soldiers, Han (Chinese) settlers, and weapons. The militarisation of the Tibetan plateau has led to the recent Galwan incident.

China’s renewed attempt in crushing any form of Tibetan dissent is complementary to its advances along the Indo-Tibetan border. China’s control over Tibet is not only highly questionable, the vast number of cultural, socio-political, and humanitarian atrocities it has carried out has made it constitutionally immoral.

The PLA has been trying hard to recruit Tibetans in the Army and in militia outfits.

The two ‘coincidental’ events – India taking control over the ridge south of Pangong Tso and the Tibet Working Forum in Beijing – are linked to the ‘stability’ of the borders. Tibetans are ready to give up their lives to protect India’s from China. Clearly, Beijing is troubled by the happenings in Ladakh.

Commemts

The very fact that India has allowed the deployment of the SFF to go public suggests that New Delhi has just one message to give – India hardly cares about what China thinks. Gone are the days when pro-China policymakers in India would desist from taking steps that would ‘annoy China’. India is least bothered if border infrastructure in Ladakh antagonises China or if the ‘22 Establishment’ instils a sense of fear in the Chinese psyche.

India does not care if New Delhi’s support to the Dalai Lama irks China or if Xi Jinping is worried about Tibet and wants to curb ‘splitism’ in the occupied territory. If China does not turn to status quo ante in Eastern Ladakh, India will force the real facts on the ground dating back to the pre-1950 era when Tibet was an independent Buddhist nation, because if the SFF can help raise the Mukti Bahini for the liberation of Bangladesh, it can also free Tibet from Chinese occupation.

The Vikasi of the SFF have not forgotten how Tibet was coerced to become a part of China in 1951 when a Tibetan delegation was made to accede the Buddhist nation to China even without an approval from the Dalai Lama. Nor have the Tibetan fighters forgotten how the Dalai Lama was insulted in 1959 when Mao Zedong’s PLA forces shelled the Potala Palace.

Tibetans have not forgotten the thousands of monks who were either murdered by China or driven to immolate themselves. By sending Tibetans on the front-line, India is reminding China that the land it is fighting from is not even Chinese land.

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India and China have been engaged in a standoff in East Ladakh beginning early May that flared up on June 15, leading to the bloodiest clash between soldiers from ṭwo sides in 45 years. Three weeks later, both sides agreed to start the disengagement and de-escalation of troops at the standoff points after a conversation between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

There has been thinning of troops at the standoff points but the disengagement is still work in progress.

Simultaneously, Indian military officers in Ladakh noticed a huge effort by Chinese troops to bolster its strength in the depth areas, and give infrastructure projects on its side a hard push. Chinese troops have augmented its presence on its side of the LAC elsewhere too.

“There has been accretion of PLA troops across the LAC at Lipulekh Pass, parts of North Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh,” a top military commander said.

Lipulekh Pass, which falls on the Mansarovar Yatra route, has been in the headlines for the last few months after Nepal objected to a 80-km road built by India to the Himalayan pass. The Lipulekh Pass is also used for annual barter trade during June-October between tribal populations living on either side of the Indo-China LAC.

Kathmandu escalated tensions with India this year after it changed its political map to count the Kalapani area including Lipulekh – which lies close to the tri-junction of India-China-Nepal – as its own.

At Lipulekh Pass, PLA has moved a battalion – approximately a 1,000 soldiers – at some distance from the border.

“It is a signal that the Chinese troops are prepared,” a second army officer said. He added that India has matched the strength of the PLA troops and is keeping a close watch on Nepal in context of its recent border claims.

“The situation on the Line of Actual Control remains dynamic with the PLA trying to emphasise its presence beyond Ladakh by building infrastructure on their side of the LAC,” the top military commander quoted above said.

In Ladakh and elsewhere, the troop movements and the mistrust has led the army to prepare to station soldiers in the icy heights of Ladakh through the winter irrespective of how the disengagement and de-escalation efforts pan out.

“It looks unlikely that we would be able to take our eyes off the border,” said an army commander. Underscoring that this could be the only way for now to make Indian territory off-limits for an expansionist China and hold peace on the border.

“After the PLA aggression, we don’t trust the Chinese and fear that they will come back again north of Pangong Tso as summer arrives in 2021,” said a military commander.

Although the PLA has disengaged from patrolling points 14 (Galwan), 15-16 (Hot Springs), a smattering of adversary troops are still on forward location at patrolling point 17 A (Gogra) and withdrawal from all contested finger features is a distance away at the Pangong Tso.

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Sometime before 15 June 2020 the Chinese attempted to come up to PP 14. In fact, they created a tented camp below it a few days earlier. This camp was forcibly removed by Indian troops on 12/13 June 2020. The Chinese did not take too kindly to it. Again they set up a new tented camp on 14 June. This was detected by Indians on 15 June 2020 and it led to a deadly scuffle. 

Patrol Point 14 at the LAC had been under Indian control since 1962. A road through this area could join the Chinese road and further to the Western Highway (G219) passing through Aksai Chin. Moreover, if PP14 remains in Chinese hands, it provides a tactical overview of the Shyok river and DBO road. The Chinese had pitched tents a few hundred meters from Pp14. 

On 6 June 2020, an agreement was reached between the Indian corps commander Lt Gen Harinder Singh and Maj Gen Liu Lin Commander of South Xinjiang Theatre to withdraw from present locations. India was to fall back 1.5 km westward and China by 2.5 km eastward. The disengagement was to be completed by 15 June 2020. 

Before pulling out, the Indian troops wanted to ensure that the Chinese too had pulled out. Information available suggested that a patrol of 10 men under a major from 4 Mahar/ 16 Bihar was sent to ascertain the Chinese withdrawal. They found the tent and burnt it. As they were returning they were surrounded and captured by fully armed Chinese soldiers. 

As soon as CO 16 Bihar, Col Santosh Babu, learnt about it, he rushed to the spot with 30 men to negotiate with the Chinese. The Chinese were on higher ground and the Indian patrol party was slowly climbing. The altitude was around 15,000 feet. The track was narrow, movement was possible only in single file — one man behind the other.

As Col Santosh‘s party was some 60-100 meters from Chinese tent, they shouted at him to come alone if he wanted to negotiate about the patrol. Col Santosh agreed and moved up with two men. He and his party was unarmed, as is the usual practice in flag meetings. After reaching they had heated exchange for 4-5 minutes but the Chinese agreed to withdraw.  As soon as CO and his men turned, the Chinese attacked him with nailed clubs and all three were badly wounded. 

Seeing this, the CO’s party radioed to the base and charged towards the Chinese. A hand-to-hand fight began. Indians had bayonets fixed to rifles to retaliate against Chinese nailed clubs and iron rods.

Chinese reinforcements of 400 men joined but so did 200 men from 16 Bihar and adjoining units. Thus, it became a joint operation of mixed troops also from 3 Medium Artillery Regiment, 181 Field Regiment, 4 Mahar and 3 Punjab battalions. The Ghatak platoons of other battalions joined in.

This account has been gathered from some of the servicemen who accompanied the mortal remains of the soldiers killed in action at Galwan.

In the melee a Chinese bulldozer caused a land slide and with it many PLA soldiers went hundreds of feet into the icy cold waters of the Galwan river and probably died. 

Though India suffered 20 dead including Col Santosh Babu,  China suffered heavier casualties. China did not give out the number of casualties. Global Times claimed that it did not give out number of casualties because it did not want to escalate sentiments.

Some Indian estimates put the Chinese casualties at 43. The estimate was based on the number of helicopter trips to collect the casualties, which India allowed. American intelligence reports suggests that there were 35 dead, possibly a few officers including colonels and majors.

Media reports said that the Indian soldiers taken captive were released on 18 June in exchange for a Chinese colonel held by India. This could not be verified since it was officially denied that any Indian soldier had gone missing or taken captive.

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The stand-off between India and China started near Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, in May, after India started construction of new roads on its side of the border. New Delhi’s decision to boost up road and other infrastructure near the LAC did not go down well with Beijing and the latter upped the ante by sending more troops at four locations near eastern Ladakh and three in the Galwan Valley and one near Pangong Lake. Responding to Chinese aggression India had also moved an equal number of high-altitude warfare troops to these areas closer to the LAC to prevent intrusion of Chinese forces inside Indian territory.

The first official acknowledgment of tensions on the border came on May 10, when the Army issued a statement about clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at two places. In Naku La in Sikkim, on May 9, a Chinese patrol on the Indian side of the LAC was confronted by an Indian patrol which led to a clash.

The Army also acknowledged a more serious incident that took place on the night of May 5-6 in the Pangong Tso lake area, during which soldiers from both sides were injured. On May 14, Army Chief Gen MM Naravane said that “both these incidents are neither co-related nor do they have any connection with other global or local activities”.

Chinese build-up began immediately after clashes between border troops in Ladakh and Sikkim on May 5-6 and May 9.

On May 29, President Trump announced that he had spoken to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who he claimed was “not in a good mood about what’s going on with China,” with regard to the “raging border dispute”. Trump also offered to mediate. India denied the talk had taken place, but both did, however, speak on June 2. The Indian readout mentioned that the two leaders had discussed “the situation on the India-China border”.

Extent of Intrusion

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said, in an interview to a TV network, on June 2, that “Whatever is happening at present… It is true that people of China are on the border. They claim that it is their territory. Our claim is that it is our area. There has been a disagreement over it. A sizeable number of Chinese people have also come. India has done what it needs to do”.

The most serious issue was in the area of Pangong Tso and its northern banks, where Chinese soldiers had moved up to the line they perceived to be the LAC. Satellite images showed that they had also undertaken some construction activities in the areas that were claimed by India.

In the area of Hot Spring, Chinese soldiers moved into three areas – PP14, PP15, and Gogra –  backed by a large number of troops and heavy equipment on their side.

There were similar reports of a massive Chinese deployment on their side in the Galwan river valley area.

At each of these places, around 800-1000 Chinese soldiers had reported to have crossed over to the Indian side of the LAC, at distances of around 2-3 km. Tents were pitched by the Chinese soldiers in the area, along with a fleet of heavy vehicles and monitoring equipment. Chinese helicopter movement close to the LAC was also monitored by the Indian side.

Indian soldiers in equal numbers were deployed in the area, separated by a distance of 300-500 metres from the Chinese.

The Indian side was certainly taken by surprise. Chinese soldiers mobilised into areas where there has historically been no dispute. The Covid-19 pandemic led India to cancel its annual training exercise in Ladakh, which brings a brigade to the area to react quickly.

The Chinese, too, conduct a training exercise in the area every summer, and they diverted their troops for this mobilisation while the Indians had to scramble troops from elsewhere to respond.

There were reports of physical clashes and injuries to soldiers of both sides, which is in violation of various agreements and standard operating procedures (SOPs). But no shots were fired.

Military Level Talks

There were multiple rounds of talks at the level of local military commanders (Colonel- and Brigadier-level), and three rounds of talks at the level of the division commanders (Major General). Five meetings had been held between local military commanders of the two sides by 24 May, but the situation remained unresolved.

After these talks were inconclusive, Corps Commander-level talks were held on 6 June. The Ministry of External Affairs said that “the two sides will continue the military and diplomatic engagements to resolve the situation and to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas”.

Lt Gen Harinder Singh, XIV Corps Commander, led the Indian delegation to the Chinese border meeting point at Moldo near Chushul. The Chinese army team was led by Maj Gen Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang Military District, which is responsible for the border with Ladakh.

The Indian agenda for the meeting centred around restoration of the LAC status quo ante — before China diverted its forces from an ongoing military exercise towards the Indian side. The Indian side planned to raise the issue of the limits of patrolling by both sides, as conducted hitherto, and seek restoration. In the Pangong Tso area, Indian troops are not being allowed by the Chinese to patrol up to Finger 8, the LAC point on the northern bank of the lake.

India was also for a mutually agreed progressive reduction of heavy military equipment, such as artillery guns and tanks, from the rear areas of both sides.

Simultaneously, talks took place at the diplomatic level in Beijing and New Delhi.

Army delegations, led by Maj Gen Abhijit Bapat, commander of the Karu-based HQ 3 Infantry Division and his Chinese counterpart, met again on 10 June again to resolve the standoff. It was the fifth meeting between the two major generals.  The two officers last met at Patrolling Point 14 near the Galwan area on 8 June as part of continuing efforts to resolve the confrontation.

The focus was on resolving the situation on the northern bank of Pangong Tso, which had been at the centre of the ongoing border scrap and where troops were still locked in a face-off.

Even in earlier instances of standoffs – Depsang in 2013, Chumar in 2014, and Doklam in 2017 – multiple rounds of talks took place at diplomatic and military levels before the deadlock could be broken.

Army Chief, Gen Manoj Naravane visited the Leh-based HQ 14 Corps to review the situation on 23 May. The top military brass briefed prime minister Narendra Modi on 26 May about the situation in Pangong Tso lake, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldi where the Indian and Chinese troops were engaged in aggressive posturing.

Chinese President Xi Jinping ordered the military to scale up the battle preparedness, on 27 May, visualising worst-case scenarios and asked them to resolutely defend the country’s sovereignty.

The Bloody Clash at Galwan

On the evening of June 15, in the first deadly conflict in at least 45 years, 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of an infantry battalion, lost their lives and possibly 43 casualties were suffered on the Chinese side. China’s foreign ministry expressed ignorance, deliberately or otherwise about fatalities on either side. (See next article).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi convened an all-party meeting on June 19 where he said that though India is a peace loving country, it can give befitting reply if provoked.

A significant change in Rules of Engagement (ROE) by the Indian Army followed the Galwan Valley skirmish giving “complete freedom of action” to commanders deployed along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) to “handle situations at the tactical level,”

Post-Clash Meetings

Maj Gen Abhijit Bapat, and his Chinese counterpart held talks, on 18 June, at Patrol Point 14, which witnessed the seven-hour-long clash. This was the seventh meeting between the military officials. Since then meetings have taken place regularly as part of a phased de-escalation strategy to ease tensions that have persisted.

Corps Commander level talks were held again on June 22 at Moldo. There was a mutual consensus to disengage. Modalities for disengagement from all friction areas in Eastern Ladakh were discussed.

Gen. Naravane travelled to Ladakh for his second visit since the standoff began on 5 May.

Another round of talks was held, on 30 June, between Lt Gen Harinder Singh, GOC HQ 14 Corps and Maj Gen Liu Lin, Commander of the South Xinjiang Military District at Chushul. There was no breakthrough, but two sides agree to sustain tempo of dialogue to maintain peace and tranquility at border.

There had been no progress on the consensus and modalities of disengagement agreed on 22 June. A consensus had been reached on 6 June was well but was breached with the violent clash at Galwan valley on 15 June.

Discernable Pullback

The two sides agreed to a phased pull back in a three-step process. They would focus on de-escalating the present deployment of war-waging weapons and thousands of troops. Before entering the second stage, the two sides would physically verify the ongoing process of creating a 3-km buffer zone at the LAC between the troops of both sides. The process started on 6 July.

By 10 July, disengagement had successfully been completed in the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Gogra areas. While the PLA pulled back 2km from Patrolling Point 14 (Galwan Valley) and PP-15 (Hot Springs), a similar retreat was completed at PP-17 (Gogra). The Indian Army, too, pulled back proportionately in these friction areas.

The Finger Area at Pangong Tso was where negotiations were dragging on as the Chinese troops had dug in their heels in Finger 4. The Finger Area, which refers to a set of eight cliffs jutting out of the Sirijap range overlooking the Pangong lake, remained the biggest test and hardest part of the disengagement process.

The army was keeping a strict vigil along the contested border in the Depsang sector where the PLA’s forward presence was a matter of serious concern and where a 2013 Chinese intrusion blocked the access of Indian soldiers to several patrolling routes, including the ones leading to PPs-10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13.

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Implications of 15 June Clash

With the very lethal Chinese attack of 15 June there has been a paradigm shift in India-China relations. In one fell stroke, China has trashed the Peace and Tranquility accords of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013. The entire concept of not using firearms within 2 kms of the LAC is now moribund. We have spent crores of rupees in constructing the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road. We now have to defend it by tactically holding heights on either side of this vital artery. It can no longer be done by just patrolling under the benign aegis of the tranquility accords. China trashed them by killing our soldiers. Much as the foreign ministry mandarins may want it – we cannot go back to bonhomie and business as usual. The primary threat is from these two divisions offensively postured against us in Eastern Ladakh. These must go back to Xinjiang whence they came and restore status quo ante.

Roots of Rage

So why is China doing all this? Its actions stem from a deep sense of insecurity and a siege mentality. It perceives itself as being cornered from multiple directions – from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet and from the South China Sea (SCS). The US Navy has four carrier battle groups in the Pacific, two forward deployed now in the SCS to contest the Chinese amphibious exercise in the strategic Bashi strait. The USA is engaged in a trade war with China and has lined up the Quad alliance against it. The whole world rightly blames China for the Wuhan virus and pandemic. China is, therefore, lashing out in a very offensive manner designed to warn all comers not to mess with China.

Covid-19: A Preemptive Biological Warfare Strike?

So was Covid-19 Pandemic a proactive, premeditated and pre-emptive biological warfare strike by China to destabilize all its perceived tormentors? Was it a biological Pearl Harbour, which China has tried to exploit for economic and military gains? In hindsight , the scale and extent of the aggressive posturing by China’s armed forces from January along its entire periphery stretching from East China Sea, Taiwan to SCS and now Eastern Ladakh is cause for serious concern. It indicates a level of foreknowledge of the epidemic? The aggressive posturing along its entire periphery seems to be a defensive reaction.

War Zone Concept

China’s strategic culture talks of only one strategic direction at a given point in time. Currently, this is clearly towards China’s east coast, where its wealth creation and industrial centres are located. The War Zone Concept talks of China focusing all its military resources against one combat target country at a time. So why is it deliberately opting for a two front scenario? Maybe it thought that mere posturing would be enough to bring India to its knees.

India’ options

What then are India’s options? Must we go by the Chinese script? Will the game be played only by the Chinese rule book? Can China bully us year after year and refuse to settle the boundary dispute? 15 June was a significant turning point. India is trying to resolve the issue peacefully but we have a whole host of credible military options short of full scale war. The international climate could not be more favourable to us than it is now. The whole world has lined up against China. Most people do not know that right now India has the military advantage, in air power and mountain warfare ready formations deployed forward. We have the edge in combat experience and should not hesitate to safeguard our interests by limited kinetic action if push comes to shove. The problem is not safeguarding nibbles of territory here and there but the threatening posture of two Chinese mechanized divisions poised on our borders. This issue compares our military forces.

The Quad Dynamics

If push comes to shove what can the Quad do to help us? First of all, no one expects the Quad countries to put boots on the ground. India is big and strong enough to defend itself. What the Quad does is to tie down huge amounts of Chinese military resources in far away theatres and prevent their use against us. India is not a small country like the Philippines and China should be made to think twice before it tries to bully us.

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Indian government sources say PLA troops are reinforcing their posts in large numbers, increasing their patrolling and stepping up violations of the Indian border, which in Arunachal Pradesh runs along the McMahon Line.

The two sectors that are seeing the most PLA activity are Tawang and Walong — both of which bore the brunt of the Chinese offensive in 1962.

In the Tawang area, PLA patrols have come up to India’s Old Khinzemane post on two occasions, and accosted the Indian troops there.

Khinzemane is right on the McMahon Line and was the point at which the Dalai Lama entered India after escaping from Lhasa in March 1959.

Khinzemane is located close to the Namka Chu river, where the Chinese launched the 1962 war with their first massed attacks on thinly held Indian defences.

Also in the Tawang sector, the PLA has reinforced its base camp at Tsona Dzong, the main Tibetan border town located across the McMahon Line from Tawang.

In the Walong sector, which is at the eastern-most tip of India, sources report aggressive activity from Chinese patrols at the Indian border post of Kibithoo.

The PLA patrols, which have been coming right up to the border, are far more frequent and now include more than 40 soldiers in each — almost twice the number in normal times.

The PLA camp at Old Tatu, across the border from Kibithoo, has also been heavily reinforced.

There are also reports of heavy reinforcements being moved to Rima, the border town across the McMahon Line from Walong.

There is also aggressive Chinese activity in the Asaphila sector, which the Chinese attacked and captured in the 1962 War.

Over preceding days, there have been multiple PLA incursions across the McMahon Line here, say sources. The Chinese have established temporary camps, just across the border from the Kepang La and Sying La passes.

In the Upper Siang border district, where the Tsang Po river flows into India and becomes the Siang, and then the Brahmaputra, there have been a large number of border transgressions in recent days.

India’s military intelligence is assessing whether the PLA is reinforcing the sector to guard against the eventuality of an Indian attack, or whether the Chinese have plans to occupy Indian territory here as it did in Ladakh.

While there has been no occupation of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh yet, as there has in Ladakh, the army is taking the Chinese activity seriously.

In Ladakh, in April, the army misread PLA activity as routine training. It is determined not to make the same mistake in Arunachal Pradesh.

The seven areas in Ladakh that have Chinese troops squatting on Indian territory are: Bottleneck in the Depsang area; Jeevan Nullah, the Y-Nullah in the Galwan River valley; Patrolling Point-15 in Galwan; Gogra Heights at PP-17; Chushul, and the north bank of Pangong Lake up to Finger 4.

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The deployment, perhaps one of the biggest in the recent years, comes at a time when India and China are locked in a hitherto unprecedented standoff – for eight weeks now – at multiple points along their border.

Sources said that Indian Army has deployed three more divisions in eastern Ladakh region to bolster its position on the Line of Actual Control.

Apart from tanks and artillery, the Army has deployed their advanced very quick-reaction surface-to-air missile defence systems, including Akash missiles which have the capacity to take down very combat aircraft and drones.

It was stated that four weeks ago an important division had started acclimatising for high-altitude warfare and two weeks later, parts of it were deployed at the 18,000-foot-high Depsang plains, a plateau located north of the Galwan valley. Similarly, reserve forces have been moved to forward locations to match up the Chinese deployments.

Asked whether it is full deployment, a senior Indian Army officer said: “It is a mirror deployment.”

Indian Army spokesperson, Colonel Aman Anand was, however, unavailable for comments.

In a separate domain, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force are also on full operational alert. The IAF has deployed a number of SAGW systems to Ladakh.

The movement of additional men and material to the border comes when talks between military commanders at the Chushul-Moldo in Ladakh have ended in a stalemate.

The situation at the four flash points — Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Depsang and Pangong Lake — in eastern Ladakh is tense. At Pangong Lake, Chinese troops have moved upto Finger 4 where they have brought over 120 vehicles and dozens of boats.

The Chinese Army has also opened up a new front in the area near the Depsang Bulge, north of Galwan. They have built camps and deployed vehicles and troops.

At Patrol Points 14 at Galwan, Patrol Points 15 at Kongka La and Patrol Points 17 at Hot Springs, the Chinese Army has been deployed to a large extent.

In response, the Indian Army has also upped the deployment in these positions.

Chinese People”s Liberation Army troops have even returned to Patrolling Post 14 in Galwan Valley where the barbaric June 15 attack, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed, occurred. The clash was on the south bank of Galwan river, which flows in an east-west direction before its confluence with Shyok river.

The killing of the 20 soldiers became the first fatalities faced by the Indian Army in a clash with the PLA since 1975 when an Indian patrol was ambushed in Arunachal Pradesh.

The Indian Army said that its soldiers went to the spot where the clashes happened without any animosity to check if the de-escalation agreement was being followed as promised and were displaying friendly gestures to the Chinese side when they were attacked. “It was the deadliest attack carried on Indian Army personnel by the Chinese military personnel to our memory,” a government source said.

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