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“It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem,” Tshering told Le Libre, referring to the Doklam plateau where there was a face-off between Chinese and Indian troops in 2017 that lasted more than two months until Beijing agreed to withdraw personnel from the eyeball-to-eyeball situation.

“There are three of us. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third,” Tshering added.

His remarks give the impression that the Bhutanese government, as well as its able monarch, are fast arriving at the conclusion that they must resolve their disputed boundary with the huge economic power sooner than later.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in June 2020, China laid claim to the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan. China has also built several villages, allegedly inside Bhutanese territory, but Tshering dismissed the claims in the interview.

The Bhutanese PM’s remarks come in the run-up to the third anniversary of the stand-off between India and China in eastern Ladakh. All this time, 17 rounds of talks have taken place to maintain stability in the area after the unfortunate incident in the Galwan Valley, in which both Indian and Chinese soldiers lost their lives.

Keeping a close watch

For India, Tshering’s remarks are significant. If Tshering is now saying that China has an equal right in the resolution of the Doklam dispute, then it is sure to change perceptions all around.

Remember that in the summer of 2017, Indian troops moved into the Doklam plateau to prevent the Chinese from extending a road it was constructing toward an adjoining hill feature called the Jhampheri ridge. If the Chinese had been able to build their road, they would have been within kissing distance of Chicken’s Neck — the Siliguri Corridor — that connects the Northeast and the Indian mainland.

With the situation in eastern Ladakh having flared up in the last two years, certainly, the Bhutanese next door are closely watching. Even they would have realised that it is not easy for India to deal with China’s rising power and that Beijing, especially after Xi Jinping’s recent consolidation as the supreme leader, is not ready to give an inch to its pesky neighbours.

In fact, with Russia ready to become an able partner in the evolving geopolitical sweepstakes against the United States — the Ukraine conflict being the touchstone — China probably feels that this is the right time to ram through a resolution of its remaining two border disputes. China shares its borders with 14 countries.

Surely, the Bhutanese would have thought that if Delhi, which is a serious rival to China, still hasn’t been able to resolve its dispute with Beijing, what chance did Thimphu have?

Reviving the 1992 agreement?

In the interview with the Belgian daily, Tshering also gave an interesting deadline for the resolution of the dispute with Beijing.

“We are not experiencing major border problems with China, but some territories have not yet been demarcated. After one or two more meetings, we will probably be able to draw a dividing line,” he said.

It seems that the Bhutanese government is considering a return to the 1992 agreement with Beijing, in which, according to reliable sources, it agreed to resolve the disputed borders in the Doklam region in exchange for territories in the north. It also appears that the northern lands also include some grazing areas that belong to the Bhutanese king.

For the last few decades, the Bhutanese king and his elected government have been able to fend off a resolution, probably keeping in mind Delhi’s sensitivities.

With the India-China dispute remaining unresolved, and, in fact, becoming more implacable — to the extent that the Chinese have actually attempted incursions, especially in eastern Ladakh — Delhi would have advised Thimphu to ‘go slow’ with Beijing, in the hope that it could come to some sort of face-saving agreement with China.

But Tshering’s interview clearly indicates that the Chinese are losing patience with Bhutan. We know that they are pressing for the 25th round of border talks with Thimphu, and that in January this year, the Bhutanese and the Chinese held a meeting in the southern Chinese city of Kunming where they discussed a “three-step roadmap” to settle the border dispute.

We also know that the very close relationship between India and Bhutan implies that the latter is keeping Delhi fully briefed on the evolving talks between Beijing and Thimphu.

Lotay Tshering’s public remarks have cast a ripple in the still waters. Certainly, they will have an impact on how India looks at its northern neighbourhood.

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His comments come days after Indian and Chinese military commanders held a fresh round of talks on December 20 to resolve the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh – the first high-level talks after troops of the two sides clashed in Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh on December 9.

Addressing a symposium on the international situation and China’s foreign relations in 2022, Wang said: “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military-to-military channels, and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas… We stand ready to work with India in the direction toward steady and sound growth of China-India relations.”

Wang, along with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, is the Special Representative of the India-China boundary mechanism which has remained dormant in the current standoff.

India and China have held 17 rounds of talks so far to resolve the standoff. A joint statement issued last Thursday after the 17th round, said the talks were “frank and in-depth” and “in line with the guidance provided by the leaders of the two countries to work for the resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest”.

 “In the interim, the two sides agreed to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the Western sector,” it said, referring to the eastern Ladakh region.

In September, Indian and Chinese troops disengaged in the Gogra-Hot Spring area, the last of the acknowledged “friction points” that were discussed over 16 rounds of Corps Commander level talks that began in June 2020, after Chinese incursions at several points weeks earlier.

Tensions in Ladakh continue over the presence of Chinese troops in Depsang, intrusions in Demchok and the rapid Chinese infrastructure build-up, including two bridges over Pangong Tso that will reduce Chinese mobilisation time on the lake’s southern bank.

Indian and Chinese troops clashed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector in the early hours of December 9, assaulting each other with sticks and canes in their closest encounter since the deadly Galwan incident in eastern Ladakh in June 2020.

Asked whether the incident in Arunachal Pradesh was raised during the talks, the MEA spokesperson had refrained from giving a direct response. “We can all speculate but since I don’t have a confirmation, I am not going to be able to confirm that. We did talk about, to be honest, the Western sector. So if it has not been raised, I wouldn’t be surprised. Let me not make a comment either,” he had said.

 “We have been emphasising that our soldiers will stand firm to guard our frontiers. So I don’t want to say anything beyond that,” he had said.

In his lengthy address on China’s diplomatic work, Wang, who was elevated to the ruling Communist Party of China’s (CPC) political bureau during the recent party Congress, focused more on China’s troubled ties with the US and burgeoning relations with Russia, despite the Ukraine war.

“We have deepened good-neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation with Russia, and made China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination more mature and resilient,” Wang said. “Over the past year, China and Russia have firmly supported each other in upholding respective core interests, and our political and strategic mutual trust has been further consolidated,” he said.

Wang also spoke about China’s opposition to “bloc confrontation”. Beijing has always opposed the Quad grouping comprising the US, India, Australia and Japan, as well as the AUKUS alliance of the US, Australia, and the UK.

“We have continued to reject bloc confrontation and zero-sum competition, and maintained strategic stability in relations with other major countries,” Wang said.

He said the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have projected a resounding voice for global equity and justice, and injected strong impetus into global economic recovery and development.

Wang also briefly touched on China’s ties with Pakistan, saying the two countries have “continued to firmly support each other, uphold the invaluable all-weather strategic partnership, and consolidate the iron-clad friendship”.

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Throughout its standoff with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Chinese officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasising Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India, the Pentagon said in a report on 29 November.

“The PRC (People’s Republic of China) seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India,” the Pentagon said in its latest report to the Congress on Chinese military buildup.

In a section on the China-India border, the Pentagon said throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiation made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border, it said.

Beginning in May 2020, Chinese and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the border. “Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions,” it said.

 “The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory,” it added.

Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years, the report said. On the June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in the death approximately twenty Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials, it said.

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On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

Disengagement at Pp15

In the Chang Chenmo sector, where the LAC and the 1959 Claim Line coincide, there were no areas of differing perception as such. This sector is the gateway to the three southern approaches that lead to Aksai Chin. One approach to the east leads to Lanak La, through which the Tibet-Xinjiang highway passes. Two approaches are to the north via the Changlung Nala – PP17A and Kugrang River – PP15, which lead to the upper reaches of the Galwan River.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has its main post at Karam Singh Hill at the junction of Kugrang and Chang Chenmo rivers and an outpost at Gogra. PPs 15, 16 and 17A were patrolled but not physically held. Alarmed at the rapid development of roads by India to PP15, PP17A and towards Kongka La, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded 3 to 4 km across the LAC between PPs 15 and 16 and PPs 17A and 17.

These intrusions were contested by Indian forces and a stalemate ensued. During negotiations, the Chinese gave a new version of the 1959 Claim Line up to their intrusions, running along the middle as opposed to the well-established LAC, which runs along the crest of the ridge to the north of the Kugrang River.

Disengagement with respect to the Changlung Nala intrusion took place between 4-5 August 2021, after the 12th round of military talks on 31 July.  However, China refused to budge on the intrusion between PPs 15 and 16. It insisted on a buffer zone of 30-35 km along the entire length of the Kugrang River up to Karam Singh Hill. This proposal was also mooted during Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi earlier in March 2022.

PLA enjoyed the terrain advantage in both the intrusion areas in this sector. Due to terrain configuration, the Chanchenmo sector, dependent on a tenuous 100 km long road from Lukung which can be cut off at several places, is untenable in war unless disproportionate forces are deployed.

Depsang and Demchok Next

India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

Negotiations for disengagement in Depsang Plains and Demchok will be arduous and prolonged.

Comments

Considering that it took nine years to restore the status quo post the Sumdorong Chu confrontation of 1986-87 which began during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure and ended under the Narasimha Rao government, it is clear that border negotiations with China are a long and arduous process.

The withdrawal of soldiers and dismantling of temporary infrastructure took place less than two months after the two sides took part in the 16th round of high-level military talks. India’s insistence on a sustained dialogue to thrash out issues and settle differences has borne fruit.

The India-China standoff has been continuing since May 2020; its impact on bilateral ties cannot be overestimated. The situation reached a flashpoint in June 2020 when rival troops were involved in a bloody clash in the Galwan valley. Since then, an uneasy calm has prevailed in Ladakh, with India trying to keep pace with China in terms of troop build-up, round-the-clock surveillance and raising of infrastructure.

Even as the PP-15 breakthrough is welcome, the Indian defence forces cannot rule out the possibility of another misadventure by the People’s Liberation Army. Indian troops have to remain on their toes to ensure that peace and tranquillity are maintained on a long-term basis along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Now that PP-15 has been successfully dealt with, the next logical step should be to resolve the stalemate in Demchok and Depsang regions. Doing the needful will prepare the ground for talks on the long-festering boundary dispute. It is imperative to clearly delineate and demarcate the nearly 3,500-km LAC by mutual consent and establish it as permanent international border so as to preclude future imbroglios. New Delhi has been asserting that normalcy in bilateral relations is not possible unless sincere efforts are made to ensure a friction-free border.

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Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The map alongside shows the major sea routes between East and West and the choke points on the Sea Lanes of Communications. India, with its unique peninsular shape jutting into the Indian Ocean makes it the biggest player in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Ocean Region stands out for its economic potential and riches, as follows:

•   28 states (21 are members of the IOR Assn)

•   17.5% of global land area

•   35.0% of the world’s total population (2.6 bn of which 1.3 bn Indian)

•   16.8% of all oil reserves

•   27.9% of all natural gas reserves

•   35.5% of global iron production

•   17.8% of world gold production

•   28% of global fish capture

•   Major sea routes connecting East and West

•   50% of world’s sea-borne oil

•   23 of the world’s top 100 container ports

China seems to be on its way to building a global alliance system of its own.  China aspires to equal and eventually surpass America.

It is well known that China has increased strategic engagement and military exchanges with Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.

Next are South-east Asian nations including Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos as well as states further afield such as Egypt and Brazil.

However, China has a formal mutual defence treaty only with North Korea. Pakistan is like a client state. Compared to China, US alliances involve mutual defence clauses, extensive troop-basing agreements, and joint military capabilities.

Many friendly countries also fear China’s rise. There is a trust deficit. Except Russia, most have deepened ties with China primarily for economic reasons including New Zealand.

From Brown to Blue Waters

The establishment of a naval logistics facility in Djibouti in 2017 was justified by the Chinese government claiming that it will support peacekeeping operations, the protection of overseas citizens, anti-piracy operations, and protection of regional BRI-related investments.

The PLAN commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, its second and third aircraft carriers are afloat. Since then it has deployed Type 55 guided-missile cruisers, Type 52C/D destroyers and Type 54A frigates for anti-piracy operations.

It is also expanding its fleet of replenishment and auxiliary vessels, including oilers, salvage and rescue ships, hospital ships, and transport vessels.

China has increased its military-related engagements with countries in the IOR. Its aggregate number of outbound naval port calls and international military exercises began rising dramatically in 2013.

Both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines have undertaken patrols in the Indian Ocean and made port calls at friendly countries.’

Chinese Navy Buildup

The Chinese have other priorities such as Taiwan and Japan before they can come to Indian Ocean. And if they try to deploy a carrier, India is capable enough to handle them.

Nevertheless, China has been constructing aircraft carriers at a fast pace with a projected plan to operate 10 carriers by 2050. At present their third and most advanced aircraft carrier is being built with the first one, Liaoning, being commissioned in 2012 and second, Shandong, in 2019.

Similarly, Currently, PLANSF operates a fleet of 66 submarines which include nuclear as well as conventional submarines. 7 Ballistic missiles submarines are in service (8 more are planned).

Future Prospects

So, Can China and India come to an understanding on the territorial disputes between them?

Will India and China accommodate each other’s spheres of interest and spheres of influence?

Finally, Can India and China get along in the future?

When it comes to territorial claims, the problem with China is that it conjures up the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty to show all of Tibet, parts of J&K and Arunachal Pradesh. But that is the Chinese version of history and Chinese maps.

However,  findings of a project report presented on 23 Jun 2022 at the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China conclude that Tibet was never a part of China before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded it in 1950. Maps from the Ming and Qing dynasties were presented to prove that Tibet was never part of a Chinese empire.

On the question of territorial disputes, the first requirement is to restore the status quo ante on April 2020. India has been consistently maintaining that peace and tranquillity along the LAC were key for the overall development of the bilateral ties.

India and China have held 15 rounds of military talks so far to resolve the eastern Ladakh row. As a result of the talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year on the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

In September 2022, before the SCO summit in Samarkand on 16 September 2022, both sides agreed to further disengagement.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the sensitive sector.

China seems to be exploring a new India strategy that rests on exhibiting its strength advantage (by normalizing border conflicts like the Galwan Valley clash) alongside tactical cooperation (by ensuring that there isn’t a complete breakdown in bilateral ties and keeping the door open for working together when it is in Chinese interest).

At the same time, escalation of tensions or a full-scale conflict is carefully averted so that the United States, whom China considers its principal adversary, does not get to reap a benefit from the situation.

It must be noted that since 1962, the Indian Army is deployed on the Chinese borders vary of any land grab by the Chinese as happened in Sumdorong in 1986. Despite 22 rounds of talks between the SRs no progress worth its name has been made in resolving the territorial disputes.

In the Western Sector, ie, Aksai Chin, the Chinese have made the Sinkiang highway and have planned another one. All creeping forward actions in Ladakh are to protect the new highway from Indian threats. They are unlikely to give up their claims in this area at all.

China is in possession of the Shaksgam Valley ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963. This was also done at China’s request to give depth and for the security of the Karakoram highway.

In fact, the Chinese would like to destroy the road infrastructure and the landing strips made close to the LAC in Ladakh to deny it to Indian forces.

In Southern Ladakh, the Pangong Tso area provides avenues for the Chinese advance to Leh. For tactical reasons, the Chinese will never agree to give up their claims in that area.

In the Eastern Sector, China claims the whole of Arunachal province as Southern Tibet. They have never recognised the McMahon Line as the border between India and Tibet. But indications have been given that they could be amenable to a trade off based on settled populations. It remains to be seen what they mean by settled populations since when residents of Arunachal apply for visas to visit China they issue them on separate paper slips and not on their Indian passports claiming that residents of Arunachal are citizens of China.

Expanding the scope of China’s interests further, Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, its BRI or Two Oceans Strategy, that is, China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, aimed at connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies under Chinese leadership and opening up a dedicated Indian Ocean exit for China, rests heavily on India.

India’s cooperation can secure Chinese gains of vital geopolitical and economic consequences, and its non-cooperation can pose the biggest hurdle to China’s South Asia strategy and advancement of its Indian Ocean footprints.

But to solicit this Indian cooperation, China is unwilling to pay a strategic cost or make any real tradeoff, such as accommodating India’s concerns or aspirations on the disputed border or South Asia or concerning its membership of international organizations.

Deep down, China recognizes India as a key threat that can intercept its energy lifelines, has the potential to replace it in global supply chains, and can compete with China in various international bodies, thereby challenging China’s ability to achieve an “overwhelming power advantage in Asia.”

China may well ask, “What if India manages to get these concessions from China, but still chooses to cooperate with the United States?”

India’s membership of the QUAD, with its political, military, and economic implications also makes China vary of India.

India will never approve of China’s BRI initiative since it has become clear that the real purpose is to help China gain access to strategic infrastructure and potential bases in India’s neighbourhood.

India’s Options

India would do well to come to terms with and perhaps leverage its increasing strategic value to China.

By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in influencing Chinese strategic outcomes Indian policymakers can potentially extract greater concessions and conciliation.

The Tibetan govt-in-exile, the Dalai Lama’s succession, Taiwan, QUAD, BRI, its naval power projection in the South China Sea, its leadership role in global organisations, US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) (aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative in low and middle-income countries), India’s own growing bilateral relations and relevance with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Iran, SAARC countries and the clout offered by a growing economy and market size are levers that India can use against China.

India must also consider the following steps to dissuade China from precipitating problems for India: –

• Improvement in geopolitical, cultural. and military relationships with BIMSTEC and other Countries in IOR.

• Make tangible investments in the countries in IOR,  for strengthening their infrastructure and meet their military needs, to mitigate their overdependence on China.

• Appreciate the importance of India’s relationship with Russia and initiate measures to reassure Russia to fortify that relationship.

• Upgrade capabilities of its defence forces and Coastguard on priority.

Conclusion

My conclusion is that:

The on-going Sino-Indian border crisis has revealed that China has little respect for India’s long-standing efforts to freeze the status quo along the two countries’ disputed frontiers or for New Delhi’s cautious efforts to avoid the appearance of balancing against Beijing.

Rather, it has chosen to expand its control over new parts of the Himalayan borderlands through brazen actions that confront India with the difficult choice of either lumping its losses or escalating through force, if the negotiations presently under way yield meagre returns.

It has forced India to join the rest of Asia in figuring out how to deal with the newest turn in China’s salami-slicing tactics, which now distinctively mark its trajectory as a rising power.

Over the centuries China looked up to Buddhist India. A millennium later, India held Imperial China in great regard. Today, China does not see India as a fellow great power. From a position of strength China does not see the need to accommodate India.

The opposite applies to India. From a position of weakness India feels it cannot afford to accommodate China without loss of standing and strategic autonomy.

Compared to the enormous disparities in economic strength, India and China are not as far apart in military strength. Given the stopping power of the Himalaya and the maritime distances, the imbalance is less daunting.

There will be more Ladakhs. China is likely to be more aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh, which is strategically more important because it’s rich in resources.

China’s comprehensive national power is about seven times that of India. Until India substantially closes the power gap, there’s little prospect of a lasting rapprochement.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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“Both sides have completed disengagement at PP15 in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of the troops of both sides to their respective areas,” one defence source said. Verification was carried out to ensure compliance including aerial surveillance, another source added.

However, details and modalities of the disengagement were not available. In the past, buffer zones were created at the friction points as per the understanding at the Corps Commanders level with no patrolling to be undertaken by either side till overall disengagement and de-escalation is achieved, after which the two sides are to work out new patrolling norms.

On 8 September, the two countries announced that their armies had begun to disengage from PP15 in Gogra-Hot Springs, marking a step forward to end the standoff ongoing since May 2020. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said that the two countries will take up remaining issues along the LAC once the ongoing disengagement at PP15 is complete.

However, while India maintains that friction points at Demchok and Depsang remain, China has refused to accept them as legacy issues pre-dating the 2020 standoff. Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is one of the eight friction points in the area. In Demchok, while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala.

Beijing had welcomed the disengagement at PP15 as “a positive development”, but reiterated that it would not accept India’s demand for restoration of status quo ante prior to the standoff saying that “the status quo of April 2020…was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”.

As reported earlier, since the beginning of the standoff there has been heavy Chinese presence in the Depsang plains, at a crucial area called the Bulge and PLA troops have also been blocking Indian Army patrols from reaching the PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, located on the Limit of Patrolling which lies much before the LAC. As reported by The Hindu, according to senior officials, Indian Army last accessed the PPs in Depsang in January/February 2020.

The Chinese build-up threatens Indian positions at Burtse and Raki Nala well inside Indian territory and further Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) by bringing Chinese troops closer to the 255 km long crucial Darbuk-Skyok-DBO road. Depsang is also close to the Karakoram pass overlooking the very strategic Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.

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READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 1)

The Galwan Clash

A border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted on 5 May 2020. The face-off escalated after the Galwan Valley clashes.

On 15 June 2020, Chinese troops, estimated to be more than 250, attacked a group of 50 Indian soldiers who were inspecting the progress of the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley. The encounter ended in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undeclared number of Chinese troops, and led to a prolonged standoff between the two sides.

There had not been a single death from hostilities at the LAC in over 45 years — since 1967 – despite several hundred Chinese LAC violations annually.

The Current Situation is not promising.

The 16th Border Meeting was held on 17 July 2022, a step-by-step de-escalation was agreed but very little progress has been made.

The stated Indian position has been that until and unless there is peace and tranquility on the border, overall China-India relations cannot much progress. So far, India has remained reluctant to engage China normally in the bilateral context.

Beijing has repeatedly said that border standoff does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, while New Delhi has maintained that peace along the frontier is essential for the two countries to work together.

Chinese violations the LAC in all sectors are growing in frequency – up to 660 LAC violations by the PLA in 2019. There is an uncommon level of hostility, including fist-fighting and rock throwing that were rare prior to 2017.

The trends suggest LAC standoffs are growing more hostile, more frequent, longer in duration, and are receiving more media coverage and international attention, potentially restricting both sides’ room for manoeuvre.

There is a substantial massing of military forces in Ladakh to positions near the LAC.

Why Did China Resort to Aggression?

Some of the likely reasons are discussed below

Infrastructure Development. There has been an acceleration of Indian infrastructure development near the LAC in an attempt to close a substantial deficit with China there.  In April 2019, India completed work on the critical Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road running parallel to the LAC in Ladakh, stretching all the way to its northernmost outpost at Daulet Beg Oldi. More recently, India began building east-west feeder roads from DSDBO to its forward outposts near the LAC. This year, India was also reportedly engaged in efforts to improve road infrastructure at Pangong Lake.

China has attempted to pressure India to halt infrastructure activities. India refused to heed China’s calls; the PLA applied military pressure. Only this time with more troops, more equipment, more locations, more pressure, and one potentially bold attempt to change the status quo at Pangong Lake.

India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022.

Galwan River area has now become a hotspot because it is where the LAC is closest to the new road India has built along the Shyok River to DBO – the most remote and vulnerable area along the LAC in Ladakh.

Major Power Diplomacy. China tried to woo India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative. India declined.

China’s Neighborhood Strategy. China wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties.  It wants to have a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region.

Blame for Pandemic. China believed that India was catalyzing resentment against Beijing over poor handling of the pandemic that originated in Wuhan. India took over as the chair of the WHO executive Board on 22 May 2020 and it had a say in the probe into the origins of the pandemic and Taiwan’s participation in the 72nd session of the World Health Assembly.

Internal Dissent. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced one of the biggest crises since the party came to power in 1949 because of dissatisfaction in handling the pandemic and the consequent surge in economic distress. At the NPC plenary, President Xi’s expected message was conciliatory to the domestic audience, while the international assertion was to be robust and defiant.

Restrictions on Chinese investments. The Chinese government took offence to India’s new rule notified in early April 2020 that blocked Chinese companies from acquiring Indian firms without government approval. The Indian government decided that all procurement orders of Rs 200 crore or less could not go to foreign companies. It could discourage cheap exports from China. Since the clash, India has also banned 224 Chinese Apps and a few dozen Chinese companies are facing tax evasion scrutiny including ZTE, Huawei, One Plus, Xiaomi and Vivo.

Change of J&K Status. India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on Jammu & Kashmir, which provided the province special status and autonomy on 5 Aug 2019. J&K was made a Union Territory directly administered from Delhi. China described India’s move as “unacceptable”, undermining its “sovereignty” — even raised the issue at the UN Security Council. Frequent calls have been made by Indians to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit- Baltistan as these territories rightfully belong to India. China is concerned about these demands since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the ‘China Dream’ and the Karakoram Highway passes through these Indian territories to Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea.

India’s Accelerating Partnership with the US. China is concerned with India’s increasing and growing proximity to the US which it belives is aimed at countering China. Some of the developments which have taken place are

•             Major Non-NATO Defense Partner with all basic enabling agreements in place.

•             Over $20 billion in defense sales to India MQ-9B unmanned aerial systems; P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, C-130J transport aircraft, C-17 planes, MH-60R multi mission maritime helicopters, AH-64 Apache helicopters, CH-47 Chinook helicopters)

•             U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative

•             Institutionalised 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (2018)

•             Quad Initiative (March 2021).

•             Exemption from buying the S-400 Triumf AD systems from Russia

•             Malabar joint exercises

•             Close collaboration in Covid-19 response

•             Counterterrorism Joint Working Group

•             Homeland Security Dialogue

•             Counter Narcotics Working Group

The Ukraine War

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis.

The PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

India’s Encirclement By China

New Delhi has numerous other concerns regarding China’s activities in almost all of India’s neighbouring countries.

Today, China with its unmistakable clout in South and Southeast Asia has used its economic-political-military influence, in intensifying its ties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Maldives causing Indo-China political and security discord.

According to the US annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 2020” the Pentagon says that in addition to the Chinese military base in Djibouti, China is seeking to set up military logistics facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, China is considering to base its military logistics and infrastructure in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan.

China is using the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative first announced in 2013, to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

While China finances the developmental projects in target countries, information about its loaning operations are kept secretive and vague. Consequently, governments of BRI countries end up being completely unaware of the amount of money that they owe to China when contracts expire since loans extended to Chinese state-owned companies, banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions. The terms and conditions of the loans give China the right to use the finished projects and land as collateral if the latter were to default on loan repayments.

Potentially, these projects, when taken over could provide a global PLA military logistics network to interfere with military operations against China and support its own offensive operations as the Chinese global military objectives evolve.

Let us look at Chinese inroads into India’s neighbouring countries.

Myanmar

Myanmar is also part of BRI and likely to face the Chinese Debt Trap. There is also a lack of trust on the Myanmar side, due to China’s historical role in supporting rebel groups in Myanmar.

China and Myanmar share a 2,227-kilometer-long border. They have a boundary protocol signed in 1961, to conduct joint inspections every five years. But this has only occurred twice—in 1984-86 and 1992-95. A dispute over the border between Myanmar’s northern Shan State and China has simmered since 2008. Parts of the 200 km fence built by China have been pulled down by locals. The Chinese government is pushing Myanmar to implement the long-delayed Belt and Road Initiative projects and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Chinese townships are coming up inside Myanmar border areas administered by Wa authorities. The expansion of Chinese influence is obvious.

The CMEC will terminate at a new deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Some analysts have raised fears that the port could someday be used as a base or access point by the PLA.

China has a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in Myanmar. The Chinese Army is also building a base on Small Coco Island in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea north of India’s Andaman Islands. These two islands, which have been leased to China since 1994.

Bangladesh

China is considered as an ‘all-weather friend’ of Bangladesh – Their ties cover geopolitical, economic spheres and defence ties form a key area of their relationship.

Bangladesh forms part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative-BRI. But all is not well between their ties. China tends to interfere with Bangladesh’s foreign relations matters.

Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jimming, on May 10, 2021, warned Dhaka against joining the QUAD and said that if Bangladesh did so, it will “substantially damage” bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China.

China accounted for around 74 percent of Bangladesh’s arms imports between 2010– 2019 including submarines.

Bhutan

Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China and the two countries have held over 24 rounds of boundary talks in a bid to resolve the dispute.

Bhutan and China issued a 1988 Joint Communique on the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary and signed agreement on the maintenance of peace, tranquillity and status quo in the Bhutan-China Border areas in Kunming in April 2021.

China is using all tactics available to it for twisting Bhutan’s arms. China has established new villages roads and military or police outposts in disputed Bhutanese territory.

The Chinese game plan is probably to exchange it for another disputed pocket around Doklam, in western Bhutan at the cost of India’s security.

China seems to have managed to effectively lower India’s influence in Bhutan.

Nepal

China is trying to succeed in replacing India as the key economic as well as security partner for Nepal.

China’s main interest in Nepal has always been led by its concerns over Tibet. 25,000 Tibetans live in Nepal.

The Chinese have always considered Nepal the soft underbelly of Southern Tibet and are now determined to keep it under their influence.

Under a Marxist government, Nepal is trying to reshape its ties with China as a possible counterweight to India by proposing extension of their railway network from Tibet to Nepal, infratsructure projects and providing land link to Chinese ports.

Nepal as a buffer is important for India but India is losing its clout in Nepal to China.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka joined China’s BRI with several projects but now Colombo has fallen into the premeditated scheme of a Chinese debt trap, paying off its loans through debt-equity swaps to creating extra-jurisdictional Special Economic Zones.

An often-cited example of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where the local government was forced to sign the port away on a 99-year lease after failing to repay Chinese loans.

For India, Lanka is an island that can be transformed into a veritable enemy aircraft carrier anchored on her doorstep, within strike range. Sri Lanka is also a potential kick-off point for an Antarctica mission at some future point.

Maldives

Maldives is barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy island in India’s Lakshadweep archipelago and 300 nautical miles away from India’s west coast.

Until 2017, Maldives was part of the Indian security grid receiving defence and economic assistance from India.

In 2013, after Abdulla Yameen came to power, Xi visited Maldives. Maldives joined the Maritime Silk Road and the two nations inked a free trade agreement. Chinese infrastructure projects flourished. Maldives accumulated a debt of nearly $3.1 billion (GDP $4 billion). There have been speculations about a possible Chinese naval base in Maldives. However, since Ibrahim Mohamed Solih came to power as president in 2018 after defeating Yameen, India has been prioritized over China.

Pakistan

China’s “irreplaceable, all-weather friend” Pakistan is China’s biggest arms buyer, counting for nearly 47% of Chinese arms exports.

China has established ammunition factories, provided technological assistance and modernised existing facilities.

The Chinese Chengdu J-10B fighter and Low to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (LOMADS) LY-80 has been supplied to the Pakistan Air Force. The Chinese have provided technology to manufacture JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, AWACS systems and Al-Khalid tanks.

China is the largest investor in Pakistan’s Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.

China played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, such as in building the Khushab reactor (for production of plutonium) and the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium reprocessing facility.

China inroads in  Pakistan/Sindh/Baluchistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, under the garb of BRI and strategic importance attached by it to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are an open secret.

India’s Opposition to CPEC. India has not endorsed the CPEC because it passes through the contested Gilgit-Baltistan region that remains, according to India, under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.

It is crucial for China to gain control over the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK), as the region borders the Xinjiang province of China.

CPEC would link Pakistan’s southern Gwadar port in Balochistan on the Arabian Sea to China’s western Xinjiang region. It also includes plans to create road, rail and oil pipeline links to improve connectivity between China and the Middle East.

Gwadar port, located on the Arabian Sea, will allow China to have a say in global energy economics as the country can use a naval base to hold control over the maritime traffic passing between West Asia.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? (Part 3)

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Maj Gen Deepak Mehta

A Chinese ship able to track ballistic missiles and satellites headed for Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, in early August, raising security concerns in India. The move coincided with the Chinese build-up off Taiwan coast that started with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit.

After first denying reports of its expected arrival at Hambantota port, Sri Lanka’s defence ministry confirmed, on 6 August, that Yuan Wang 5, which can track satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles, would be docking at the port between 11 and 17 August.

Under pressure from the Indian government, the Sri Lankan government asked the Chinese government to defer the visit of its space-satellite tracker ship Yuan Wang 5 at Hambantota port “until further consultations” were made between the two governments. It was finally cleared to enter port on 12 August. It finally docked on 16 August and left on 22 August.

India has stood shoulder to shoulder with Sri Lanka to tide over the present economic crisis faced by the island nation and has given more than $3.5 billion in aid in terms of petrol, diesel, natural gas, foodstuffs, and medicine.

Yuan Wang 5 was also potentially violating innocent passage requirements in territorial seas as per UNCLOS. The vessel has a capability to snoop on a coastal state. By tracking Indian ballistic missile tests, China will be able to glean information on the performance of missiles and their exact range. The ship is controlled by the China National Space Administration but has very significant military applications.

The Sri Lankan government maintained that that they would allow the ship to dock since it was a non-nuclear platform but were aware of India’s concerns.

Hambabtota May Become Chinese Base

India remains suspicious of China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka, which owes large amounts of money to Beijing for infrastructure projects, including the $1.4-billion Hambantota Port. Sri Lanka defaulted on its $51 billion in foreign debts in April and has since opened bailout talks with the International Monetary Fund.

Sri Lanka gave a Chinese company a 99-year lease on the port, located along the main East-West international shipping lanes, in 2017 after being unable to keep up with debt repayments on the facility.

Sri Lanka formally handed over commercial activities in its main southern port to a Chinese company in 2017 on a 99-year lease after struggling to repay its debt. The port is near the main shipping route from Asia to Europe.

US and Indian officials have been concerned that the $1.5 billion port could become a Chinese military base.

In 2014, a Chinese submarine had docked at Hambantota Port, sparking security concerns for the Indian Navy. No such Chinese submarine visits to Lankan ports took place since.

About the Chinese Spy Ship

Yuan Wang 5 is the third generation tracking ship of the Yuan Wang series, and entered service in 2007. Built by Jiangnan Shipyard, Yuan Wang 5 has a displacement of 25,000 tonnes and can withstand wind scale up to 12. The Yuan Wang class is not a single class of identical design, but instead, a group of different designs grouped under the same series that share one name.

The ship with a crew of 400, was equipped with a large parabolic tracking antenna and various sensors.

Military Implications

The military and strategic implications of Chinese spy ship ‘Yuan Wang 5’ in the Indian Ocean Region are manifold and will have major consequences for the Indian security architecture. The ship has a distinct role in missile and satellite tracking.

The aerial reach of the ship is more than 750 km and that would indirectly mean that Kalpakkam, Koodankulam, and the atomic research centre within Indian borders can be snooped upon. The ship can track ports of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. As many as six South Indian ports will be under China’s focus and the ship can gather information about vital installations along Southern India.

India’s concerns over Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka has welcomed Chinese investments. China is one of Sri Lanka’s biggest lenders and has also funded airports, roads and railways, unsettling India.

As Sri Lanka now battles its worst economic crisis in seven decades, India this year alone has provided it financial support.

The Indian Ocean Region has been an area of traditional influence for New Delhi and an area where New Delhi has legitimate strategic interests. The Chinese have been trying to make inroads from Myanmar to Eastern Africa.

Since it came to light that a Chinese military vessel, the Yuan Wang 5, was to call at Hambantota Port, India had been pressing its grave concern over this to Colombo. After a tense week of negotiations between the two South Asian neighbours, Sri Lanka told the Chinese that the visit of the ship “be deferred until further consultations are made on this matter”.

A Chinese vessel of its surveillance reach has never before sailed in the waters that Yuan Wang wishes to access. The Sri Lankan attempt to pass it off as a “research vessel” on an innocuous refuelling stop was either naive or disingenuous, but in either case, self-defeating.

This was the second time in 19 months that Colombo tried to make light of India’s security concerns on account of the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka. Last January, the Sri Lankan government awarded a renewable energy project on three islands close to the Tamil Nadu coastline, to a Chinese firm. It took much diplomatic energy on India’s part, and a commitment to develop the same project through a grant, to have that decision reversed.

Instability in any country in the region, whether that is Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan or Afghanistan, tends to impact India adversely and in unexpected ways. The Chinese ship apparently got its clearance from the foreign ministry on July 12. This was a time of political vacuum in Sri Lanka. It may have been an attempt at political sabotage.

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READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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