Immediately after the great International Fleet review that Japan hosted on November 6 at Sagami Bay, four Quad partners – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – will commence the Malabar naval exercise off Yokosuka on Tuesday (November 8). This exercise will conclude on November 18.

The Navy chiefs of the four Quad countries met in Tokyo on November 5. They exchanged views on “further enhancing inter-operability” in future editions of the Malabar multilateral naval exercise.

The timing of both the IFR and Malabar exercise is significant, coming as they do in the wake of China’s increasing aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific and North Korea firing record numbers of missiles.

Incidentally, the IFR marked the 70th anniversary of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) founding. Around 40 warships from 13 countries came together in Sagami Bay, off Tokyo.

The naval parade involved 38 vessels, 18 from friendly countries such as the United States, South Korea, Britain, Australia, Singapore, India, and Thailand. Thirty-three aircraft flew overhead, including submarine-hunting patrol planes and helicopters. India’s two frontline warships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta were in this parade.

Overseeing the parade, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said that Japan and like-minded nations must be prepared for situations in which “some countries trample on the peace and security of others through the use or threat of force.”

In a speech aboard the MSDF helicopter carrier Izumo, Kishida reiterated Tokyo’s plans to “fundamentally strengthen” Japan’s defense capabilities within five years.

His assertion that “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent invasion of Ukraine, must never be tolerated in any region of the world” is also aimed at China, which is threatening to take over Taiwan Kishida forcibly and is staking territorial claims on the Japanese islands in the East China Sea.

However, it should be noted that the IFR, by its nature, is a symbolic and friendly gesture in which the host countries invite even the navies of the countries with which it has adversarial relations.

In this context, it was significant that China declined the Japanese invitation to send its vessels to the IFR. And equally substantial was Japan’s withdrawal of its invitation to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

It was clear that by hosting the IFR, Japan signaled that it is firmly committed to the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Tokyo would like the international community to cement trust in its Self-Defense Forces as a proactive, reliable security partner, particularly in the maritime domain, where the power balance appears to be shifting toward China’s advantage of late.

That explains why Japan now consistently sends MSDF ships to similar events overseas, dispatches forces for engagements under its Indo-Pacific Deployment operations, and is one of the biggest supporters of exercises hosted by organizations such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus.

QUAD At The Malabar Military Drills

In contrast, however, the Malabar exercise is a proper military exercise. Over the next ten days, it will see the four Quad navies in action. Reportedly, the exercise will witness “high-tempo” drills in multiple domains and complex surface, sub-surface, and air operations, including live firing drills.

Apart from the ships (Shivalik and Kamotra), the Indian Navy is deploying other naval assets, including P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, in this exercise.

It may be noted that INS Shivalik is a multi-role guided missile stealth frigate, and INS Kamorta is an anti-submarine corvette. Both of them are indigenously produced, reflecting thus the growing capability of India to build its warships. And both of them are part of the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet based at Visakhapatnam.

Incidentally, this will be the 26th edition of the Malabar naval exercise. It started in 1992 as a bilateral drill between the Indian Navy and the US Navy in the Indian Ocean. Japan became a permanent member of the exercise in 2015. And Australia joined in 2020. It is an annual war game taking place in various parts of the Indo-Pacific.

Unmistakably, the continuous rise of the Chinese Navy (PLA Navy) in the Indo-Pacific binds all four countries in joining hands and bringing their armed forces together to develop joint strategies through military exercises. In the maritime domain, it is realized that they must act in unison individually; it is becoming tough to catch up with China’s growing naval prowess.

According to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (2022), China now ranks second after the United States on the Global Naval Powers Ranking 2022 (India ranks seventh). China also has the largest number of major surface combatants of any navy globally, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 surface ships and submarines. The rate of its annual addition of naval vessels and frigates is the highest in the world.

This policy of acting together by the Quad partners, all concerned over the growing hegemony of China in the Indo-Pacific, was also manifested last week, with India and Australia conducting a bilateral maritime exercise off the Indian coast of Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal.

Australia’s flagship regional engagement activity, Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE), arrived in Visakhapatnam on October 30. It comprised two ships (HMAS Adelaide and Anzac), helicopters, and 1,500 personnel. The Indian contingent in the exercise included INS Ships Jalashwa and Kavaratti. The exercise concluded on November 5.

Terming India and Australia as the guardians of the flanks of the Indian Ocean, visiting Australian Navy Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Jonathan Earley said that since the Indo-Pacific is marked by the ongoing “big power muscle movement,” it is vital that India and Australia must train together to build trust and confidence while stressing on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the region.

He said good progress had been made on MDA and the exchange of information on the movement of military vessels in the region, a growing area of cooperation among the Quad countries. “There is an opportunity for that to grow in more classified domains.

That is ongoing… The enthusiasm and the motivation to share more are certainly there,” Earley added, adding that expanding surveillance in the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and India’s recent acquisition of MH-60R helicopters build commonality.

He highlighted how the Quad countries have several common military platforms, with India acquiring more and more military hardware from the US. “The recent reciprocal exchange of P-8 aircraft exercises between the two countries had gone “exceptionally well,” said the Australian Admiral.

India’s Shifting Focus From Land To Maritime Power

Incidentally, the Indo-Australian exercise was taking place during India’s second Naval Commanders’ Conference in New Delhi (October 31  to November 3), which, among other challenges in the Indian Ocean region, is of vital concern to India, did focus on Chinese maritime activities.

The conference, addressed by India’s defense minister Rajnath Singh, new Chief of defense staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, and the Navy Chief Admiral Hari Kumar, focused on how the Indian Navy would remain “a combat-ready, credible, cohesive, and future-proof force.”

Admiral Hari Kumar is on record to have stated that China remains a formidable challenge and has increased its presence not only along India’s land borders but also in the maritime domain by leveraging anti-piracy operations to normalize its naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

“At any point, we have anything between five to eight Chinese Navy units, be it warships or research vessels, and a host of Chinese fishing vessels operating in the IOR. We keep an eye on them and see how they are undertaking their activities in the IOR”, according to the Indian Navy Chief.

The IOR, which includes the Middle East, the eastern coast of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, is a significant region of interest for the Indian Navy. More than 70% of the country’s imports and exports pass through sea lanes in this region. Therefore, the growing Chinese naval presence in the IOR seriously threatens India’s vital security interests.

In recent years, Indian strategic planners have rediscovered the importance of maritime power for the country’s security. Empires have risen and fallen as they lost command of the seas, whether the Persian, Napoleon, or Great Britain.

India was a global player as long as it had maritime interactions from Zanzibar off the coast of Africa to the shores of the Arabian Peninsula, all the way through the Andaman Sea to the mainland and islands of SouthEast Asia through people, faiths, ideas, mythologies, art, architecture and goods. India’s decline started when it became land-centric under the Mughal rule.

Even after independence in 1947, because of the wars with China and Pakistan, this land-centric or the “continentality-mindset” prevailed, with the Indian Navy getting scant attention in the security outlook.

Interestingly, China, like India, also had this continentality – mindset not long ago. But China now has become a foremost maritime power. Therefore, India’s stand is also shifting, as Admiral Arun Prakash, a former Indian Navy Chief, says, from pure ‘Continentality’ to the requisite mix of ‘Continentality-Maritimity.’

Accordingly, the Indian Navy is also growing. As Admiral Hari Kumar highlighted during the Naval Commanders’ conference, the Indian Navy has been strengthened by the recent commissioning of the second carrier INS Vikrant, acquiring of more missile power, two ALH squadrons, and the launch of platforms like Surat, Udaygiri, Dunagiri, Nistar, Nipun, and Nirdeshak.

He further pointed out that the maiden concurrent deployment of Indian Navy ships across six continents on August 15 this year served as valuable signaling to underscore India’s credibility – at home, in the region, and worldwide.

In the last six months, operational deployments have also emphasized India’s credibility, with a footprint covering all major oceans of the world, he added.

All this is said to be India’s signal that it will challenge China’s hegemonistic activities in the Indo-Pacific and the IOR in particular. And in this, India is not alone. India has solid support from Australia, Japan, and the United States in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

The post India, Japan, US & Australia Take A Collective Stand To Counter China appeared first on IMR.

The IN, under the command of Rear Adm Ajay Kochhar, Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet, participated with indigenous guided missile destroyer, INS Kochi (with Sea King MK 42B helicopter) and the Guided Missile Frigate INS Teg (with search-and-rescue capable Chetak helicopter). The IN also fielded a P8I, a shore-based maritime reconnaissance aircraft and MiG 29K fighters. The JMSDF was led by Rear Adm IkeuchiIzuru, Commander, Escort Flotilla Three comprising of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier Kaga and the guided missile destroyer Murasame. Both ships participated with integral SH60K helicopters.
Setting the operational tempo from the start, the units exercised war-at-sea scenario with P8I (IN) providing maritime reconnaissance support to both navies. The units practised replenishment at sea approaches and undertook fuel rig connect-up between Kaga and Kochi. The exercise also involved complex over-the-horizon targeting exercises and surface gun shoots on an expendable target. An advanced coordinated anti-submarine exercise involving an underwater target deployed by JMSDF saw surface units and IN’s P8I aircraft exercising with seamless coordination. Flag officers of the two forces also met on the flight decks of Kochi and Kaga during flying operations, in keeping with the true spirit of military friendship.

The air domain operations included advanced anti-aircraft firing exercises on expendable aerial target launched from the deck of INS Kochi and ship controlled beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat drills by IN’s MiG 29K fighters. The exercise involved a high tempo of flying operations with MiG 29K fighters coming in for multiple simulated air strike on surface units, shepherded by the IN’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Dornier. The inclement weather did little to hold back IN and JMSDF helicopters from undertaking cross-deck landings, showcasing a high level of interoperability.

The precision, coordination and the high level of interoperability reflected the high standards of professionalism and preparedness the two navies maintain to counter threats at sea, and also high level of trust and understanding that they have built over the years. The complex maritime exercises undertaken will enable the two navies to further strengthen their already wide-ranging strategic partnership and, when required, to jointly safeguard their maritime interests and ensure peace, security and stability in the region.

Meanwhile, both the Indian and Japanese naval forces had been active outside of JIMEX as well. The Indian Navy conducted the fourth edition of AUSINDEX, between the Indian Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. During the exercises from September 6-10, the Indian contingent included INS Shivalik and Kadmatt, the most recent indigenously designed and developed guided missile stealth frigate and anti-submarine corvette respectively, part of the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet based in Visakhapatnam in southern India. The Australian side was represented by the Anzac-class frigate HMAS Warramunga, which also took part in the Malabar exercises. According to an Indian press release, the 2021 edition of AUSINDEX included complex surface, sub-surface, and air operations between ships, submarines, helicopters, and long-range maritime patrol aircraft of the participating navies, with the goal of strengthening interoperability and developing a shared understanding of processes and procedures for maritime security operations.

The JMSDF, too, had a busy schedule. There was a major naval exercise in the waters off the southeast of Okinawa involving six participating navies – the U.S. Navy, the U.K. Royal Navy, the JMSDF, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy – with a total of 17 surface ships, including four aircraft carriers. According to a press release issued by the JMSDF, the exercise was meant to bolster the Japanese forces’ “tactical skills and interoperability with the participating navies.” The exercise involved anti-submarine warfare, air defense warfare, tactical movement, and communications training.

The post JIMEX – 5 Japan – India Maritime Exercise appeared first on IMR.

Given this aggressive behavior, US-China competition has escalated sharply. In December 2017, the US published its latest “National Security Strategy,” and, in 2018, Vice President Mike Pence detailed the administration’s China policy at a speech at the Hudson Institute, both of which indicated a strong US stance toward China. In addition to imposing tariffs, the US has excluded Chinese products and 5G technologies from government procurement in a so-called “high tech war.” To deal with China’s challenging attitude during the COVID-19 crisis, the US has already deployed three aircraft carrier battle groups, as well as B-1 and B-2 strategic bombers, in the Indo-Pacific region.

Against this backdrop, it is important to examine the role of Japan, India, and Australia with regard to the US-China competition. To understand their role, this article first analyzes features of current rivalry between China and the US.

I. Characteristics of the China-US Relationship

Three features of China’s territorial expansion

China’s recent territorial expansion has three features. The first involves the flouting of international law. In the South China Sea, China has expanded its claim and ignored the verdict of an international court. On Senkaku Island of Japan, China is asserting historical rights to an island it has not claimed before 1971. In the case of the India-China border, where 20 Indian soldiers sacrificed their lives in a clash with China this year, the Tibetan exile government stated that these areas belong to India. China has ignored current international law and expanded its territorial claim in all three areas.

ALSO READ: Implications of Japan’s Policies in the Indo-Pacific

The second feature of China’s territorial expansion is timing. It has exploited the situation whenever it finds a “power vacuum.” For example, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands just after France withdrew in the 1950s, and expanded its presence to all of the Paracel Islands after the US withdrew from South Vietnam in 1970s. China occupied six features of the Spratly Islands after the Soviet Union decreased its military presence in Vietnam in the 1980s. And China laid claim to Mischief Reef after US troops withdrew from the Philippines in the 1990s. Recently, China has tried to expand its territorial claims not only in the South China Sea, but also in the East China Sea and the India-China border. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, from 2010-19 China increased its military expenditure by 85 per cent, compared with India’s 37 per cent and Japan’s 2 percent. There is a strong possibility that China is doing so because it believes there is a power vacuum in these areas.

A third feature of China’s territorial expansion is its insistence on excluding outsiders. In issues surrounding the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the India-China border, China has blamed the involvement of non-regional powers as contributing to the problem. China wants to solve these territorial issues on a bilateral basis without the involvement of the US or of the international community.

Analysis of the US stance toward China

To deal with China’s provocation, the US has chosen a tough stance toward China that has two aspects. Militarily, the US has tried to maintain a balance, but economically, the US has tried to decouple from China and make it poorer.

In June 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explained why the number of US troops in Germany has been reduced, and why US troops had also withdrawn from Syria and Afghanistan. He said, “This is going to dictate that in certain places there will be fewer American resources. There’ll be other places-I just talked about the threat from the Chinese Communist Party, so now threats to India, threats to Vietnam, threats to Malaysia, Indonesia, South China Sea challenges, the Philippines. We’re going to make sure we’re postured appropriately to counter the PLA. We think that’s the challenge of our time, and we’re going to make sure we have resources in place to do that.” To counter China’s territorial expansion, the US has increased its military deployment to maintain balance in this region. Because China tends to expand its territorial claim when it finds a power vacuum, maintaining a military counterbalance is the proper way for the US to respond.

Economically, the US strategy is more aggressive. Both its trade war and its high tech war have excluded China’s participation in the US economy. As a result, US experts have started to use the word “decoupling” when referring to relations with China, and the US president himself has indicated the possibility. Because China’s growth and expansionist tactics include rapid military modernization and loaning money to other countries for infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is dependent on a healthy budget. It is, therefore, a wise strategy for the US to focus on reducing China’s wealth.

ALSO READ: Japan deepens intelligence sharing with India, Australia and UK

Indeed, there is a strong possibility that such tough policies toward China will remain long-term policy for three reasons. First, the US became a superpower because it defeated all rivals including Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union and during these conflicts it developed long-term policies that prepared for all scenarios, even unlikely ones. For example, between the two World Wars, the US had an “Orange Plan” to defeat Japan and implemented it during WW II. Similarly, it had a “Black Plan” against Germany. But when these plans were declassified in 1974, the world was surprised to learn that there was also a “Red Plan” to defeat Britain and Canada. (Canada was very upset.) Because the US designated China as a “competitor” in the “National Security Strategy” in 2017, one can assume that it has a contingency plan to defeat China as part of its long-term policy.

Secondly, the tough stance toward China is not the product of the Trump administration alone. For example, the high tech war, which excluded products of Huawei and ZTE, started when the “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE” was published in 2012, during Barack Obama’s presidency. Thus, Republicans and Democrats share many similar goal toward China.

Third, now is the proper time for the US to act if it wants to win the competition with China. The “National Security Strategy” was published in December 2017. At that time, according to the “Military Balance 2018,” published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the US defence budget was $603 billion compared with China’s $150 billion. However, from an economic perspective, according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for 2018, US GDP was at $19.39 trillion, compared with China’s $12.24 trillion.  Compared with the defense budget, the economic gap is narrow. And technologically, according to UNESCO Institute for Statistics figures published in 2018, the US invested $476 billion for research and development and China invested $370 billion. That gap is very small. If the US acts now, it will have the advantage over China. But without such efforts, there is a possibility that US advantages will decline one by one.

II. The Role of Japan, India, and Australia

Three policies toward China

What should Japan, India, and Australia do in dealing with China? In short, they should do the opposite of what China wants. First, if China ignores current international law, other countries should uphold the law strongly and refuse China’s new territorial claims. For example, the US and Australia have already refused China’s territorial claim in the South

China Sea. Second, Japan, India, and Australia need to fill the power vacuum militarily by increasing their military expenditures. Infrastructure cooperation to build strategic road projects is also useful. And these countries should also support countries, including Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, that face Chinese intimidation. Third, Japan, India, and Australia should continue to enhance security cooperation with the US and other like-minded countries.

III. How should Japan, India, and Australia cooperate with the US?

Currently, the US is requesting cooperation from Japan, India and Australia, both militarily and economically. Militarily, the US wants these partner countries to share the security burden by increasing their defense budgets, participating in military activities and importing American weapons. Economically, the US is requesting that Japan, India, and Australia adopt the same tough policies against China. For example, when the US banned the products of Huawei and ZTE, it asked US allies and friendly countries to do the same. Japan and Australia have already banned such products. And India has banned more than 100 apps made in China, including TikTok. The US is also requesting that its allies impose sanctions against government officials and companies that trade with China. For example, the US asked Canada to arrest executives of Huawei.

Japan, India and Australia should not think of this as a burden but a chance. To deal with China, these countries need to fill the regional power vacuum. The US request for increased military spending is not only in the US interest, but in the interest of Japan, India and Australia. Recently, Japan decided to purchase limited offensive capabilities, including small aircraft carriers, F-35 stealth fighter jets and stand-off weapons. India is importing airlift equipment such as heavy and middle transport planes, heavy transport helicopters and air-liftable howitzers from the US in order to establish air-mobile offensive capability against China. Australia also recently published its plan to possess long-range strike capabilities. These offensive capabilities will give these countries more flexible choices when they need to deal with China.

Economic requests are more complicated because China is the first or second-rated trading partner for Japan, India and Australia. However, if Japan, India and Australia depend too heavily on trade with China, the economies of these countries will be like passengers of a sinking ship. Therefore, decoupling or risk diversifying is necessary. Indeed, Japan has already begun to do so. Because Japan has relocated its factories from China to Southeast Asia and South Asia, the number of Japanese citizens living in China has decreased from 150,399 in 2012 to 120,076 in 2018. At the same time, the number of Japanese living in the US has increased from 410,973 in 2012 to 446,925 in 2018. In addition, Japan earmarked $2.2 billion of its record economic stimulus package to help local manufacturers shift production out of China in April 2020. That same month, India adopted a new rule which requires prior government approval on foreign direct investment from the countries that share a land border with it, to deter opportunistic acquisitions.

China’s aggressive territorial expansion spurred the US to take a tough stance toward it. And US allies like Japan, India and Australia need to reevaluate their role. The security situation will demand that these three countries make drastic changes. This will also give them an opportunity to cooperate more deeply with the US and to form a new partnership. Now is the time for the “Quad” to do so.

The post INDO-PACIFIC – What is Japan, India, and Australia’s Role? appeared first on IMR.

Amid growing mil-itary tensions in East Asia and in other parts of the Indo-Pacific, Japan has made sound and steady development with India at an unprecedented pace over the past half a decade that involves a wide and multifaceted areas of cooperation. Notably, in the security domain, the initiation of the minister-level “2 plus 2” dialogue in November 2019 has facilitated the development of the critically important partnership and contributed to the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in early September 2020. The ACSA is expected to enhance interoperability between the defense forces of the two countries, enabling them to share supplies, such as food and fuel and reciprocally provide communications and transportation services during joint drills and rescue operations in case of disasters.

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Equally important, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and has, in addition, taken on a more active international role in line with its region-wide initiative – the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. The FOIP is expected to reinforce the alliance as well as strengthen Tokyo’s international commitment to promote fundamental principles, strengthen regional connectivity and ensure peace and stability in the region. In July 2020, the Ministry of Defense of Japan refined the Vientiane Vision-related initiatives of 2016 and 2019 and released a new document, Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision: Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach, which stresses the need to enhance its defense cooperation and exchanges with countries not only in Southeast Asia, but also in South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Tokyo has specifically listed India, along with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK and France, with which Japan would further strengthen its partnership in harmony with the FOIP vision.

ALSO READ: INDIA-JAPAN: A Dependable Partnership

Yet, the India-Japan security cooperation is not without challenges. The first issue is related to the new U.S. defence posture – the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) – outlined in the summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The DFE is expected to ensure that the U.S. forces would be “strategically predictable” in demonstrating the U.S. commitment to deterring aggression against its allies and partners, and, at the same time, be “operationally unpredictable” forcing the opponents such as China and Russia to “fear when, where and how the U.S. forces might appear rather than being able to anticipate when, where and how they will perform.” Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has officially shifted its primary security priorities from tackling the prolonged international terrorism to engaging in the various types of challenges in the Indo-Pacific notably posed by China, as highlighted in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 NDS. This is an encouraging move for both India and Japan as it implies that the core of the U.S. global military posture will now shift to the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is not yet clear how the U.S. forces will be strengthened in the Indo-Pacific. Issues include, for example, the extent and locations which the level of troops would be expanded as well as the likelihood of the U.S. forces maintaining its current permanent forces or shifting them to rotational forces. Moreover, the operational unpredictability element of the DFE may in fact raise doubts about the reliability or the U.S. commitment to and its presence in the Indo-Pacific. As a practical matter, the positions of the U.S. forces will move away from the region with the DFE as demonstrated by the movement of the U.S. bombers in Guam to mainland U.S. in April 2020. The movement has been carried out to allow the U.S. bombers to have more operational flexibility as it is now easier for the bombers to operate in other parts of the world by taking off from mainland U.S. The move also enables the U.S bombers to stand out of range of foreign missiles such as China’s DF-26, the Guam Killer, which has an operational range of 4,000km. Similarly, there may also be radical changes to how and where the U.S. aircraft carriers would be deployed in the future, with a possible shift in their operational cycles as well as their power projection capabilities. Given the growing strategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific, which has become more evident with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to coordinate deeply with Washington on the presence of the U.S. forces and ensure that the U.S. military commitment to the region remains intact. At the same time, the two countries would also need to ensure that the DFE does not send misleading signals that a power vacuum has emerged to the surrounding countries including China and Russia.

Security Orientation

Second is the issue related to how both New Delhi and Tokyo would deal with a possible pressure from Washington to transform their respective development-driven FOIP into highly security-oriented initiatives. To be sure, India and Japan’s FOIP are not identical. Tokyo’s FOIP primarily aims to strengthen regional connectivity via quality infrastructure development. Admittedly, Tokyo has evolved its FOIP into a more comprehensive initiative by strengthening the linkage between the development and security elements of the FOIP in light of the recent changes in the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, but has been cautious not to transform it into a security-oriented initiative. India’s FOIP, on the other hand, is purely an economic-oriented initiative, and does not include any security element. While both India and Japan’s FOIP are not security-oriented, New Delhi and Tokyo may be forced in not-so-distant future to transform their respective Indo-Pacific initiatives into a more security-oriented one, similar to that adopted by the U.S. given the increasing U.S.-China strategic competition. However, such a transformation would most likely affect the level of support in a negative way towards their respective initiatives especially from the AEAN countries which do not want to take sides with either of the U.S. or China. Moreover, transformation could force the ASEAN countries to distance themselves from India and Tokyo’s FOIP or even worse to openly oppose to their respective initiatives, fearing the danger of losing the ASEAN centrality. New Delhi and Tokyo would, therefore, need to reaffirm that their respective development-driven FOIP initiatives remain inclusive and non-security-oriented and that the ASEAN centrality remains at the core of their FOIP to maintain their legitimacy.

Role of Quad

Closely related, some observers have speculated that the foundation of Tokyo’s FOIP rests with the Quad given ex-Prime Minister Abe’s preference for a quadrilateral security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., Australia and India as highlighted with his “Democratic Security Diamond” concept declared in 2012. The four countries resumed the Quad consultations in November 2017 after a 10-year interruption and held a ministerial-level meeting in November 2019. More recently, in early October 2020, the ministers of the Quad countries met in Tokyo with an aim to establish, promote and secure the free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific principles. Importantly, the four countries have been cautious not to develop the Quad into an explicit military initiative or a formal institutional structure that would contain/target countries such as China. They have also intentionally avoided delivering a joint statement. Given the increasing distrust in all four countries due to China’s continuous military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as well as Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong and its initial response to the COVID pandemic, however, the four countries would need to work together in developing a mechanism such as the Quad to offset gains which Beijing could take advantage from enhancing unilateral changes to the status quo from its development and security efforts. Yet, the ASEAN leaders have expressed concerns that the Quad may supplant ASEAN’s role in the region. New Delhi and Tokyo, along with Washington and Canberra, therefore, would need to exercise discretion over the Quad, and ensure that the developments of the Quad would not endanger the principle of ASEAN centrality. Furthermore, India and Japan need to ensure that the Quad would not be embedded with their respective FOIP. Simply put, New Delhi and Tokyo’s development-driven FOIP initiatives need to be pursued separately from the Quad.

ALSO READ: India, United States and Japan: Strategic Convergence in the Indian Ocean

The third issue is related to how India and Japan would address China’s, and to a lesser degree Russia’s, continuous military assertiveness in the region given the differences in India and Japan’s strategic and geographic priorities. For Japan, the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the central pillar in Tokyo’s foreign and security policies, and its primary geographic priorities rest in the East China Sea and subsequently the South China Sea in light of the imminent challenges posed by China and North Korea. Undoubtedly, the Indian Ocean is also key to Japan’s security with the growing significance of maintaining the sea lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific, but it is of secondary importance compared to the two seas listed above. In the case of India, New Delhi has recently expanded and strengthened its partnerships with the regional countries including Japan and the U.S. but maintaining the strategic autonomy remains the foundation of its foreign and security policies. Meanwhile, India’s main areas of geographic interest remain along the territorial borders with Pakistan and China, as well as the Bay of Bengal in the eastern Indian Ocean. That is to say, neither the East China Sea nor the South China Sea is of primary importance for India compared to the regions noted above, although New Delhi has recently expressed, according to the Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana, its intent to carry out navigation activities in the South China Sea in line with its efforts to expand the strategic partnership with Manila.

Importantly, the differences in strategic and geographic priorities between New Delhi and Tokyo, as well as their limited power projection capabilities, affect the level of expectations towards their respective partners. Specifically, it would be unrealistic for New Delhi to expect that Tokyo could give sufficient military assistance along the Line of Control or the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, it would be unpractical for Tokyo to expect that New Delhi could give ample military support in the East and South China Seas. Given such circumstances, it would be important for both Tokyo and New Delhi to contemplate measures other than giving direct military assistance to their respective partners. For example, giving full, timely and firm diplomatic support for the security stance and measures of their respective partners by delivering both official and non-official statements, along with the strengthening of ties between their respective FOIP initiatives, would be beneficial. In addition, holding countries responsible for their authoritative and threatening behaviors at multilateral settings such as the United Nations and the ADMM-plus will also be of great value for further developing the India-Japan partnership.

Military Cooperation

The fourth issue is related to whether to allow foreign military forces including Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) to use the Indian military facilities such as the strategically significant Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). In recent years, Chinese military, which once focused on territorial defense, has expanded its geographic focus of attention as far beyond China’s borders as possible. According to the 2019 report to the U.S. Congress, Chinese state-owned companies either owned equity in or had an operating lease at approximately 70 ports outside China, which could be converted into duo-use military functions or become strategic strongpoints. India’s concerns over China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the Ladakh stand-off with Beijing have spurred New Delhi’s interest in strengthening its military presence at the ANIs. In its relationship with Tokyo, New Delhi examined a joint project to upgrade infrastructure in the ANIs earlier in 2016. It has also been reported that the two countries discussed the possibility of building a region-wide undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) at the ANIs to improve India’s underwater domain awareness. Furthermore, the newly signed ACSA would, with prior approval from New Delhi, enable the SDF to overcome, albeit partially, the lack of power projection capabilities with the use of the ANIs as well as the U.S. base in Diego Garcia for maritime and air operations. However, opening up the islands to foreign militaries including the SDF could increase security concerns among countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, the militarization of ANIs including its use by foreign militaries could eventually lead to a reckless arms race in the littorals, spurring Beijing to take countermeasures such as militarizing key maritime outposts of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota, Bangladesh’s Chittagong as well as Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu. Moreover, there are also ecological concerns associated with the militarization of the islands. New Delhi, therefore, needs to give full consideration of both the short-term and the mid-to-long term implications in allowing the use of its military facilities by foreign militaries including the SDF.

The final issue is related to how India and Japan would cope with China’s geo-strategically ambitious economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Given the strategic and economic implications, Tokyo has been more accommodating towards the BRI than New Delhi. Despite the difference, it would be counterproductive for both India and Japan to counter the BRI since the two countries, as noted above, would most likely lose support for their FOIP from the regional countries including the ASEAN member states. Therefore, India and Japan should instead develop alternatives so that the recipient countries would not become overly dependent on and/or exploited by the BRI. Importantly, the alternatives need to complement rather than compete with the BRI, given the vast development needs in the Indo-Pacific. It has been reported that the level of infrastructure demand is higher than the capacities which the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are capable of covering. Participation of India to initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network could be a good case in point. The network was announced by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in November 2019 with an aim to promote sustainable, high-quality, private sector-led infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the increasing complexity and uncertainty of the international security environment in the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo has deepened and broadened the scope of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership with New Delhi. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the relations are still at an early stage and have yet to become institutionalized. There are also many uncertainties regarding the U.S.-China strategic competition. Furthermore, domestic politics in both Japan and India, as well as in the U.S., including the change in leadership may affect their foreign and security priorities, resulting in a change of pace, if not the overall direction, in developing the India-Japan partnership. Tokyo and New Delhi, therefore, need to take due consideration to the key issues listed above, and develop their relations steadily over time rather than expeditiously rushing toward establishing an alliance-like partnership.

The post Implications of Japan’s Policies in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on IMR.

So far, one or the other of the Quad countries has been reluctant to ruffle Beijing’s feathers at different times. After participating in joint exercises with India in 2007, Australia pulled away, wary of evoking Chinese displeasure. India, too, had been reticent about participating in a grouping directed against China. China’s belligerence in recent months has forced the Quad countries to shed such inhibitions.

The coronavirus, concerns over Chinese government actions in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, military incursions into the South China Sea and political interference have all given an impetus to strengthen the Quad.

The Quad

In response to China’s aggressive policies, the Quad – a strategic coalition of the Indo-Pacific region’s leading democracies (US, India, Japan and Australia) – is solidifying its alliance. Following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four countries in Tokyo, on 6 October, the four countries are now actively working toward establishing a new multilateral security structure for the region.

There are efforts to develop a close security partnership founded on shared values and interests, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free markets, and free trade.

China represents a growing challenge to all these principles.

European Support

The Quad’s focus also extends to ensuring a stable balance of power within a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While all of the Quad partners agree in this principle, Chinese expansionism that has accelerated their recent actions. Even United Kingdom, France and Germany view it (rules-based Indo-Pacific) as essential for international peace and security.

France has appointed an ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, after unveiling a new strategy affirming the region’s importance in any stable, law-based, multipolar global order.

In September 2020, Germany, Europe’s largest economy, which has long enjoyed close ties with Beijing, released its first Indo-Pacific strategy focused on increasing diplomatic pressure on China.

Germany has sought to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy for the European Union. It has released policy guidelines, which call for measures to ensure that rules prevail over a “might-makes-right” approach in the Indo-Pacific. Germany currently holds the European Council presidency.

France

Apart from the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan in addition to the US, India has been exercising regularly with France. The last one was conducted at French Reunion Island in the expanded Indian Ocean waters. India has discussed conducting similar exercises with the UK and Russia.

Giving up its reluctance to offend China which whom it has business interests, French president Emmanuel Macron has appointed Christophe Penot, his ambassador to Australia, to the new post of ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, realising the danger of Chinese hegemony.

During Macron’s visit to India in March 2018, addressing a French gathering in New Delhi, he reminded his countrymen: “France is a power of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; we are present at Reunion, we are also there in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. And we are a maritime power, it is often forgotten but France is the second maritime power in the world. We have a strong navy, we have nuclear submarines equipped like few other powers in the world; a maritime surveillance capability through our own satellites and technologies; it is obvious we are a military and intelligence power ranking us among the first nations in the world.”

C. Raja Mohan and Darshana Baruah wrote for Carnagie India, in 20028,on Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership, thus: “As maritime security acquires greater salience in India’s foreign policy, New Delhi is increasingly looking to leverage its strategic partnerships, particularly with Paris. Although India and France have joined forces on a number of issues since 1998, regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has never risen to the top of the agenda. However, this may be about to change.”

New Multilateral Security Arrangement

The Quad was resurrected in late 2017, but in late-2019, it gained momentum, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level. It had been lying dormant for nine years.

Since the US, Japan and Australia are already tied by bilateral and trilateral security alliances among themselves, the future of the Quad hinges on India. India is also directly facing Chinese territorial aggression besides having a large border with it. This aggression has changed the strategic equation. With India having taken a confrontational position, the Quad is now more likely to shift from consultation and coordination to a strategic alliance for a new multilateral security arrangement for the region.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

The US has been working on getting India into a “soft alliance” devoid of any treaty obligations. On October 26-27, Pompeo and US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited New Delhi for the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts. The meeting concluded with India signing the last of the four foundational agreements, under which both countries are committed to providing reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities, securing military communications, and sharing geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors.

When India invited Australia to the “Malabar” naval war games in November 2020, with the US and Japan, the Chinese communist mouthpiece Global Times, said “it would signal that the Quad military alliance is officially formed.”

During a visit to Malaysia, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that Washington aimed to build an “Indo-Pacific NATO” through the Quad.

The Quad’s consolidation is evidence that the Xi regime’s aggressive policies have started to backfire. International views of China have reached new lows this year.

The Quad symbolises an emerging international effort to establish a check on Chinese power.

India’s Initiative

India took the lead in banning Chinese apps. It was India’s decision that had elevated the Quad dialogue to ministerial-level in 2019. India shed its reticence and decided to welcome Australia to the Malabar 2020 exercise.

India pulled out from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2019. China’s actions have since led to the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) involving India, Japan and Australia, focussed on key sectors such as semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and telecommunications.

US Role

The US has played a key role in the region’s stability and prosperity since Second World II. US military presence prevented Japan from re-arming itself. It has stopped China from risking military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait and kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula. But, China, which is the biggest beneficiary of the trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, does not see it that way.

The US position on the South China Sea, which is in alignment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal award of 2016, boosts the morale of disputants such as the Philippines, who are routinely bullied by China.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

China is maintaining a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region, under the cloak of anti-piracy deployments, with bases in Gwadar and Djibouti for penetrating South Asia, the Gulf region and littoral Africa.

Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI and as an “encirclement” strategy.

Comments

Would the US stand by India if its own ties with China improve? In the event of a war with China, others may not be willing to risk their own relations with Beijing to support India, other than with intelligence support. India’s security challenges are primarily continental. Quad countries may not be may not be able to deal with the kind of challenges that a border war with China entails.

The Quad holds potential for India in the economic and technological domains rather than its value in the military domain by way of building up an alternative global supply chain and reducing trade dependency on China. Tokyo is already seriously exploring such collaboration with India. Similarly, India could take this further with the US and Australia, rather than focus on the military dimension alone.

In the future, the Quad could gradually be elevated to the level of vice minister and minister.

There are no limits to the number of active and possibly participating friends that can be added to the Quad, in the Indian Ocean.

South Asia as a whole has ceased to be the ‘traditional sphere of Indian influence’, a title we may have to share with others.

From left to right, external affairs minister S Jaishankar, Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo pose for a picture before a four Indo-Pacific nations’ foreign ministers meeting at the minister’s office in Tokyo 2020.

The post INDO-PACIFIC – The Quad is Getting Stronger appeared first on IMR.

The Malabar exercise aims at interoperability with emphasis on humanitarian assistance, surface war manoeuvres, anti-submarines warfare, counter-terror operations and aerial surveillance. Classically, it is enhancing capabilities of operating jointly in an adverse scenario if the situation so demands.

The invitation by India went out to the Australian Navy two weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad countries held extensive talks in Tokyo, on 6 October, with a focus on enhancing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, a region that has witnessed increasing Chinese military assertiveness.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

In the Quad meeting, foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar stated, “We remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes.” Jaishankar also emphasized that Quad was aiming for ‘maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.’

In her reaction, Australian defence minister Linda Reynolds termed the participation of her country in the exercise a “milestone opportunity” and said it would showcase the “deep trust” between four major Indo-Pacific democracies and their shared will to work together on common security interests.

“High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia’s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Reynolds said.

Growing Ties

Defence and security ties between India and Australia have been on an upswing in the last few years. In June, India and Australia elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a landmark deal for reciprocal access to military bases for logistics support during an online summit between prime minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison. India has already inked mutual logistics support deal with the other two Quad members.

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) allows militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

In September, the navies of India and Australia carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.

The last time Australian naval ships joined Malabar was back in 2007, when it was a five-nation exercise involving India, US, Japan, Singapore and Australia. Until 2007, Malabar was an annual bilateral exercise with the US Navy that was launched in 1992.

Military Strategy

The military strengthening of the Quad raises the possibility of India countering a China offensive in the Himalayas by exercising its option of opening the maritime front. Opening the third front is not impossible since India’s geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean provides the potential to project a potent maritime threat. It involves a measure of risk and the call would have to be taken by the political leadership. Indian military strategy based on defending the land borders and launching an offensive in the maritime domain is only possible with the support of Quad nations acting in concert.

Australia-China Equation

China continues to be Australia’s largest trading partner and accounts for 32.6 per cent of its exports. Besides, China sources iron ore, coal and gas from Australia because of its geographical proximity. India was sceptical about Australia doing anything to jeopardise this mutually beneficial relationship and risk China hitting back.

India’s announcement of Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise was, thus, significant geo-politically because four of the biggest democracies with stakes in the region are collectively committed to preserving open waters and hold off China’s misadventures to monopolise them ruthlessly.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

When virus-hit Australia spearheaded a petition for a neutral, global investigation into Covid-19’s origins and China’s role in it, it was immediately hit by China, which imposed an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley and ban on beef imports. Ever since, Australia had been looking to find allies where it could diversify markets and find support. One of the results was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreed upon by prime minister Scott Morrison and prime minister Narendra Modi on 4 June 2020.

Quad Plus

The current Quad plus which includes South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam, though aimed at China, is more than just a consultative or possibly future military grouping or alliance. It also has an economic component which could benefit India, as all countries within the group seek decoupling from China.

The broad objectives of its participants are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture.

Comments

The move to invite Australia to participate in the Malabar 2020 naval exercises marked an important inflexion point not only in India’s bilateral relations with Australia but also in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.  The naval exercise imparted a military dimension to the Quad.

The main reason behind Delhi’s hesitation so far was the concern that including Australia into the Quad might offend China’s political sensitivity. Clearly, India’s calculus on China has changed as China’s undermined India’s territorial integrity and regional and multilateral interests. The aggression in Ladakh was possibly the last straw.

Administratively, rather than geopolitically, having separate exercises with each of the partners was not logical. It was more sensible to combine them into one. But the multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal produced vehement protests from China, which dubbed it as an “Asian NATO”.

Rather than bringing the Quad partners into India’s territorial battles against Beijing, the strengthening of the Quad is more about expanding India’s bilateral security ties with Australia, whose potential is immense.

India would not desire to be sucked into operations in the South China Sea unless they are of specific concern to India. India would also be careful not to allow its diplomatic ties with Russia, Iran and other nations, where the US has differing perceptions, to deteriorate by joining a US-led alliance.

The full-fledged military alliance gives an emboldened Quad the robustness to act together against Chinese assertiveness and debt-trap diplomacy. So far, only the US had directly dared to call out China. Over time, if mutual interests and concerns converge, the Quad could become what the US calls a NATO-like presence in Asia that could contain China’s expansionist designs. It could lead to the establishment of an economic coalition of sorts, with a Quad Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to reduce the dependence on China.

The Quad consolidation can make it difficult for Beijing to monitor the entire South China Sea, which it claims as its own.

The international order is evolving quickly, mainly due to a consensus amongst every major liberal democracy in the world, that China is a threat – to political systems and open societies, economic self-reliance, and a rules-based regime, particularly in the international seas. Chinese aggression against India makes it incumbent on New Delhi to explore and deepen every international alliance which can serve as a source of symbolic and substantive support, including in the maritime domain where China has obvious vulnerabilities.

One view is that cementing the Quad will alienate China further and make reconciliation difficult. India has realised that China tends to respect power and strength. Economic strength and partnerships such as the Quad can broaden India’s options with China.

The post INDO-PACIFIC – With Australia Joining The Quadrilateral is Complete appeared first on IMR.

There is a long history of politics and strategic moves behind the continuing validity of fascination for the Western world in Asia. We will have to see how, with unnatural ease, India and Japan both have accommodated many of the values and lifestyle patterns of the West in their social-cultural behavior while at the same time, they see difficulties in overcoming the mindset gap between themselves.

This year, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up the New and Emerging Strategic Technologies (NEST) Division because a realism-based approach tells that, no matter how sharp the mind of Kautilya or edgy the sword of Samurai is, to win in the realities of the 21st Century, they will have to embrace the power of emerging technologies.

Special Moves

In the book ‘The Art of War’, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote: “Do not repeat tactics which gained you victory in the past but let your tactics be modeled by the infinite variety of circumstances.” These words summarize the popular approach of the power players and the Internet has added more variations to this. Today, to conquer a country or to damage its morale, the physical movement of the troops is not necessary as the sieges of narratives (through digital and social platforms) are proving more effective. In such an environment, can we afford to continue pursuing a straight and traditional approach to defending our interests and priorities? Both countries will have to seek their answers soon.

In the Special Strategic and Global partnership of India and Japan, the Government to Government (G2G), Government to Businesses (G2B) and Business to Business (B2B) exchanges are going well but it is our People to People (P2P) exchanges that need a serious push.

Joint Production of Video Games

The Japanese sword saint Musashi wrote “When you have attained the Way of Strategy there will be not one thing that you cannot understand” and “You will see the Way in everything.” Japan is known for its world-class video game industry and the country should be applauded for keeping the spirit of its Samurai warriors alive, in the minds of young Japan through video games/animation characters. From the Way of Samurai (2002) to Ghost of Tsushima (July 2020) Japan has a track record of consistent perfection in producing strategy, action and adventure games. Today, a majority of Japanese youth follow the Western lifestyle/trends but, at the same time, they enjoy the Samurai spirit, too.

An Idea that needs to be developed

The reach and influencing power of technology is real and the two technologically advanced nations like India and Japan will have to start exploring the possibilities of leveraging these capabilities for enhancing the bond between our people.

WYSIWYA Strategy

In computing, the What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG) approach has dominated the system designs for many years. Today, we will have to think about designing our strategy with ‘What You See is What You Aim (WYSIWYA)’ kind of approach.

How will kids, who are growing up seeing Superman/Spiderman (and now Avengers), believe that the problems of the Earth can be solved by the Kautilyan approach and Samurai spirit, too? For Kautilya and Samurai to capture the imaginations of our kids, the Japanese video game developers will have to join hands with the Indian technical creative community. Together, the two can design artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality (VR) and simulation-powered game series, in which, say the two animation characters – a Guru (Kautilya) and a Warrior (Samurai) – can be shown working on a joint mission, such as defending the ancient treasure, culture and other civilizational assets of the region. And they can be shown applying a combination of manoeuvres involving mind, strategy and the spirit of swordsmanship (in well-defined levels of the game). Such close to real-life experiences will make our kids comprehend how the finest minds of the two sides can work together.

ALSO READ: INDIA-JAPAN: A Dependable Partnership

It is certain that the 21st Century smartphone generation cannot grasp the ideas through text and books are not enough to satisfy their curiosity and creative hunger. With the production of such video games, the complex ideas of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, i.e., the elements of sovereignty, six-fold foreign policy (Rajamandala theory), Peace and Wartime scenarios, Adoption of Double policy, marching with the combined powers, different vices and calamities scenarios of a nation, acts of an invader and powerful enemies, consideration about an enemy in the front and rear, strategic means to capture a fortress and secret means to protect the state kind of ideas can be introduced in a simple and understandable way. Kautilya is one of the most successful gurus in our history; he fought the foreign invaders with the power of the mind, knowledge of polity and well-crafted strategies. Our future generations have a right to learn from his teachings.

These moves, when planned on a large scale, can give a much-needed boost to the Japanese video game industry too, which is facing some difficulties since the last few years. With the growing interest of Chinese and American investors in video game markets, it seems that this industry in Japan is struggling with a similar “iPod/iPhone shock” that electronics/mobile phone companies have gone through. Japan’s domestic video game developers, who were once leading the ‘golden age of video game industry’, are now left with only two choices – either adopt the Western ideas/strategies or directly join hands with the foreign producers. Since the last few years, there have been talks regarding the revival of the Japanese video game industry, while the major Japanese video game companies (the leaders of the industry in the past) are selling their stakes to foreign investors. But, at the same time, a community of indie developers (independent video game developers) and hobbyist is also taking shape in Japan, on which hope rests.

The idea of the joint production of video games portraying the Kautilyan approach and Samurai spirit can not only give a different kind of boost to this bilateral partnership but is also productive in the commercial sense.

Superheroes are replacing Samurais

According to the 2015 report of Parrot Analytics (a media analytic firm), Gotham, Arrow, Agent of S.H.I.E.L.D, The Flash, Supergirl, Daredevil, iZombie, Constantine, Ultimate Spiderman and Agent Carter are the top ten most in-demand superheroes in Japan. Gradually, the tricky acts of Daredevils, Spiderman, Supergirls and Agents are replacing the sagas of Samurai Warriors in the land of Samurais. India is in a quite worse position here, we have not provided anything beyond Captain Vyom, Shaktimaan and Baalveer to our kids and now we have a whole generation growing up watching the fantasies of Captain America, Superman, Batman, Hulk, Thor, Wolverine and Ant-Man kinds of conceptions. From the long-term perspective, with the continued absence of an image about our heroes, we will not be able to instill the winning spirit in our future.

The Participation of Women Power

During prime minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Japan in September 2014, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe shared his vision of achieving a society in which the women can shine and he said that in this Japan must advance the cooperation with India. Modi echoed the sentiment and he also proposed the idea of establishing a parliamentary association of Indian and Japanese women. The active participation of women from both sides could give a much-needed push to people-to-people (P2P) exchanges.

In the social-cultural environment there are several similarities between the Indian and Japanese women while in the religious context, India and Japan worship the same goddesses with different names such as Maa Saraswati, who is recognized in Japan as the goddess Benzaiten and Maa Laxmi as the goddess Kichijoten. Our women can add the elements of desire, dedication and depth to the vision of the two countries, which is crucial at this stage. To shape their engagements, a Joint Women Forum can be initiated which will act as a platform to represent the voice of the Asian women at large. Unlike other women forums, here the participants will not restrict their discussions to their community issues alone, rather the women of India and Japan will discuss the broader vision related to national interests and how Asian societies can come closer at different levels.

Later, the women belonging to different walks of life and from other ASEAN members can also be encouraged to take part. When women come together, families and societies will naturally draw closer.

Traditional Sector

In traditional sectors, the current status of India-Japan’s Special Strategic and Global Partnership can be defined with three Ds – Dialogues, Delegations and Deliberations. In the recent exchanges between the foreign ministers of India and Japan, on the sidelines of the Quad meet, some encouraging developments have taken place, such as the finalization of the Memorandum of Cooperation in Cyber-security and discussions regarding the expansion of this bilateral partnership in third countries.

Space Technology

In the Space technology domain since 2012, talks regarding joint missions have been underway and some of these concluded with the finalization of joint missions such as ISRO and JAXA’s joint Lunar Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX), which is expected to be launched in the next 3 to 4 years. In March 2019, the India-Japan Space Dialogue was held in Delhi, in which the delegations consisting of security and space department representatives participated. In 2018, during his Japan visit, Modi initiated the inter-governmental discussions around it and, a few months back, an India-Japan joint study group was formed to explore the technicalities related to the joint lunar mission.

ALSO READ: INDIA-JAPAN: Immense Potential in Post-Covid Partnership

The developments on such joint space missions will carry on at their pace but in parallel to those moves, the two countries can initiate some knowledge exchange activities between the young space enthusiasts of both sides. India has a rich heritage of astronomical discoveries and ancient Indian astronomy is still a matter of research across the world. For centuries, with a consistent curiosity, the Western world and their dedicated faculties are exploring the advanced astronomical findings of ancient India (which are often called the most precise documents of space-related computations). But India never promoted such curiosity among its Asian allies.

To make our kids look beyond NASA and sci-fi movies, the two countries can set up a forum where the young minds (preferably from secondary schools and colleges) would gather and get themselves familiar with the great ancient Indian astronomers and mathematicians like Aryabhata, Varahamihira, Bhaskara, Brahmagupta, Parameshvara, Madhava of Sangamagrama, Sankara Narayana, and Govindasvami and others. Such forums can meet frequently to explore subjects such as the Aryabhata’s ‘Aud Ayaka system’, or Varahamihira’s Pancasiddhantika, Surya-Siddhanta, Vasishtha Siddhanta, and Vishnudharmottara Purana and many other ancient Indian astronomical texts.

There is a general conception that there is no ancient constellation mythology in Japan but Japanese authors like Takashi Katsumata have challenged this notion with various evidences from the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters, 712) and the Nihon Shok (The Oldest Chronicles of Japan, 720) in their papers/ books. Several different interpretations of stars exist in Japanese culture and Japan has produced many brilliant astronomers too. Their discoveries and findings will encourage young minds. This culture, once initiated by India and Japan, can be promoted with other ASEAN partners.

Cyber Security

Similar to space technology, cyber is another area where cooperation talks have been going on for long. In February 2019, the two countries conducted the fourth cyber dialogue. Earlier, in 2012, 2017 and 2018, similar exchanges had taken place mainly centered on knowledge/experience sharing, risk resolution and prevention. It is quite unusual that in cyber security-related interactions between India and Japan, due emphasis has not been given to any proactive measure for the serious cyber challenges that the two countries are facing. The frequency of our cyber exchanges is similar to that of the space domain, only the size of delegations becoming more diverse and large each time.

We need to understand that the security of the critical infrastructure is crucial for a nation. An attack on the critical infrastructure can cause much more severe damage than any conventional terror attack can. Japan is one of the most active partners of many of our critical infrastructure projects and it will be an added advantage if we cooperate in their security. In the recent India-Japan foreign ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, both sides have finalized the text of the cyber security agreement, for promoting cooperation in capacity building, R&D, security and resilience in the areas of critical information infrastructure, 5G, Internet of Things, AI, among others. We need to add active industry participation in cyber security exchanges that can help in evolving some concrete measures.

There are other important sectors of cooperation such as naval engineering, biotech, medicines/pharma, solar energy and the possibility of merging Japanese hard power (electronics/computing parts) with Indian soft power (software system/services) to produce future-oriented products, etc.

The only test of the India-Japan partnership is to end the legacy of hesitation, doubt and unfamiliarity, as Modi often says that “Our past has desired us to stand together. Our present is encouraging us to work together.”

(Note: The first part of this article “India and Japan Can Show the Right Path” has been published in the Sep 2020 issue).

The post INDIA-JAPAN: Kautilyan Approach and Japan’s Samurai Spirit – Part II appeared first on IMR.

For many years, the India-Japan partnership has suffered from a needless hesitation and superficial doubt. The ‘Modi-Abe era’ – one of the most promising phases has passed but the search for a shared ground and the ‘magical’ push is still on. It is unfortunate that how two countries, very much synced in their values, culture, philosophical traditions, moral codes and belief systems, are maintaining a distance from each other, due to reasons outside their environment. There are still many dimensions where the India-Japan partnership is in a state of void. But at the same time, from this void, the real push of this partnership can emerge. As great Samurai Miyamoto Musashi had said: “By knowing things that exist, you can know that which does not exist. That is the void.”

India is the land of Kautilya and Japan is of Samurai; we may have stopped looking ourselves like that but still, a major part of the world views us in that light. An assertive Bhartiya mind and a calm Japanese gesture often give the impression of Kautilya and Samurai to the rest of the world. The curiosity with which a western strategist explores ‘Arthashastra’ and ‘The Book of Five Rings’ (Go Rin No Sho) itself reflects that somewhere a Machiavellian mind is still cautious about the Kautilya and Samurai way. Ironically, we never give a thought to combining this aspect of our potential, the possibilities of which can ignite the curiosity of strategic fraternity.

We must recall that it was an Indian mind that reminded the world community about the true definition of war crimes, peace and humanity and defeated the winners’ propaganda (during the 1946 Tokyo Trials) all alone. In the honor with which the Japanese see Justice Radhabinod Pal, lies the true essence of this partnership.

In his book ‘The India Way’ (Chapter “A Delayed Destiny – India, Japan and the Asian Balance”) Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar writes: “This realization in two nations that they have little choice but to help shape their continent is now an impelling force of a new partnership.”

If we look at the current status of the India-Japan partnership, a good amount of activities are going on in the economic and security spheres and during the last six years, the pace of development has enhanced. In defence and security, although the relations are still non-strategic, the engagements are gradually gaining traction via joint military and naval exercises, by initiating 2+2 Foreign and Defence ministerial-level dialogue (First held in November 2019) and through recently signed logistical exchange agreement based on the reciprocal provision of supplies and services (between Armed Forces of India and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan).

On the economic and business side, one can say that Japan is one of the most active countries in ‘Transforming India.’ Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has invested in several hard and soft infrastructure projects (power, roads and connectivity, high-speed railways, metros, industrial and freight corridors and water management, etc.) in different parts of the country through traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) facilities. The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail project, Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, and Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor are some of the notable examples. Japan is the first country which is allowed to invest in the infrastructure in North East India along with other strategically important parts of the country like Jharkhand and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. And the currency swap agreement signed in 2018 was a sign of maturing economic partnership between the two countries. These moves are significant but the real potential of this combination is yet to be leveraged.

For a quantum leap in this partnership, both sides will have to reflect some dare in their imagination such as visualizing the Kautilya with an army of Samurai warriors or Samurai warriors with master strategists like Kautilya with them.

Kautilyan Approach and Samurai Spirit Complement Each Other

Western strategist reads Kautilya to understand India’s military-strategic culture and foreign policy approach and their understanding generally revolves around: the six-fold of foreign policy (Rajamandala theory), defined elements of sovereignty (Saptanga theory), Kautilya’s comprehensive vision of statecraft, his political-military, socio-economic frameworks, etc, as documented in the classic text of ‘Arthashastra’, which is regarded as one of the ancient and foundational sources of strategic thinking. Some see his works as the tested contrivances applied to power politics and found them useful in dealing with the vices, calamities and internal/external troubles related to even the modern-day States.

For Bharat, Kautilya is the symbol of a Guru, a master strategist, who was determined to protect the motherland from the foreign invaders and to reclaim the ancient glory of Bharat. He defeated the western invaders’ ambitions with the combination of physical and intellectual strength, raised a call for unity, freedom and national security at a time when many of our kings/lords were indulged in satisfying their narrow and greedy aspirations. We remember Kautilya for his great efforts in rebuilding our national character and for reestablishing an environment where a Guru can remind the Kings and his courtiers about their obligation towards the Nation.

Kautilya visualized the approach of a Conqueror, his all possible alliances with friends and enemies, and possible war/peace time scenarios that a country navigates through. He emphasized on the elements of sovereignty and the knowledge of power, place, time, strength, and weakness as he asserted that “a wise king, trained in politics, will, though he possess a small territory, conquer the whole earth with the help of the best-fitted elements of his sovereignty and will never be defeated.” Our experiences of the Kautilya era tell that when the interests of the Nation placed above everything else and when a strategist with such a deep understanding of sovereignty and its political craft guides the path, then even the troops of mercenaries (the least form of the army) can yield surprising results.

The curiosity with which the West reads Kautilya, they read Samurai warriors of Japan too, the popularity of English versions of all important writings of Japan’s popular master warriors speaks a lot about this continuing fascination. The Samurai represents a warrior for whom the swordsmanship is not just a skill to be learned and applied in combat but it is much beyond that. In the martial culture of Japan, the swords were not seen as a tool of warfare alone but as a vehicle of personal growth too. For them, the swordsmanship was like art in which the focus was more on intent and spirit. It is interesting to note that Japan’s master Samurai (master of samurai strategy or way) gave importance to cultivating mental discipline, intuitive abilities and development of internal factors involving mind and spirit.

There are schools of thought developed by practitioners of the ‘Samurai’s way’ which rejects the perspectives of viewing swordsmanship simply as a collection of techniques and physical moves. Their writings have advocated the use of strategy as a craft, becoming ‘formless’ in approach, the principle of emptiness (reading opponents intention), and attaining the state of ‘Mushin’ (the state of no-mind) before any move. Some popular stories of martial arts, written around the 18th-19th centuries, talk about these aspects, such as the story ‘The Mysterious Skills of the Old Cat’, in which the old cat (who caught a powerful rat with natural ease while no other well-trained cat was able to do that) on responding about her mysterious skill of catching that rat which amazed everyone, says: “It’s simple, think of nothing, do nothing. When I move with intuition I’m formless, when I have no form there is no one in the world who can oppose me.”

The advanced writings of swordsmanship have mentioned the spirit of Aiki (a harmonious contest), the spirit of Uchiadachi (attacker) and the Spirit of Winning, etc. One can say that in the true spirit of swordsmanship, the aim is to respond freely to changes in the situation (improvisations), with a controlled anger and killing spirit. But at the same time, there exists a little contradiction as well. We find the master warriors of Japan saying all that is mentioned above (mind, spirit, calmness, strategy, etc.) but the lords of that era seem advocating loyalty, devotion and desperateness kind of elements. Lord Naoshige once said: “The way of the Samurai is in desperateness. Ten men or more cannot kill such a man. Common sense will not accomplish great things. Simply become insane and desperate.” However, these arguments must have been said in a particular context and their meaning should be seen in that light.

Code of Honor

In between all these views, Japan saw the emergence of some codes for Samurai warriors, called the code of honor (such as Bushido) and the ritual of Seppuku (a ritual of suicide originally propagated among the Samurais) as well. Such practices went to an extent that during the Edo Period (1600-1867) the rituals such as Seppuku became more detailed and standardized particularly when Bushido – the set of codes for honor and ideals for Samurai – were developed. In the book Hagakure written by Yamamoto Tsunetomo, which is called the book of the Samurai, it is has been put that “the Way of the Samurai is found in death. When it comes to either/or, there is only the quick choice of death.”

Without commenting on the basis and intent behind those practices and from a fair calculation about the effect of them on Japan’s position, it appears that Japan lost many brilliant minds, brave warriors and precious lives not for the call of duty to the motherland but under the name of honor, guilt, shame, failure kind of emotions, documented as codes of honor for Samurai. Unfortunately, Japan – the land of Samurai – was embracing those practices and values at a time when a larger part of the world was on a Machiavellian ride.

ALSO READ: INDIA-JAPAN: A Dependable Partnership

While Kautilya represents a Guru and Samurai an ideal Warrior, it is crucial to see that the spirit of the warrior always needs the guidance/strategy of a guru like Kautilya, thus in many ways, both complement each other.

India is the land of Gurus and Warriors both. Our cultural heritage spanning across continents is itself the witness of the implementation of this combination. In the ancient scriptures of Bharat, the role of Guru in the life of a warrior is illustrated beautifully. From Ramayana, Mahabharata to the Kautilya era, one will always find a Guru (and sometimes many gurus), equipped with the knowledge of advanced military and political science, both directing and channelizing the energy of the warriors in the right direction. It is this aspect of Bharat with which Japan needs to get familiar with.

Today, it seems that India is again emerging as the Kautilya in the world of diplomacy and, in many ways, Japan’s economic progress has the reflection of the Samurai spirit. By combining these aspects of their heritage, India and Japan can put an end to the legacy of choreographed patterns of engagement.

Miyamoto Musashi once said: “Strategy is the craft of the warrior” and in his book ‘The Book of Five Rings,’ he perfectly described that the Spirit of the Warrior or Fighting Spirit is like the Fire which needs Ground (strategy), Wind (traditions) and Water (methods). And there always exists some space for the ‘Void’ too, which helps in perceiving the things on a wider sense.

By starting on this note, India and Japan can sow the seeds of a new strategic culture in this continent.

India, Japan Ink Military Logistics Agreement

After years of negotiations, India and Japan inked a landmark agreement, on 10 September, that will allow their militaries to access each other’s bases for logistics support, a key development that comes in the backdrop of growing concerns over China’s military muscle flexing in the region.

The agreement provides for creation of an enabling framework for closer cooperation and interoperability, besides allowing militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases and facilities for repair and replenishment of supplies.

The signing of the agreement comes at a time India is locked in a bitter border row with China, and rising concerns among countries in the region over increasing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region.

A statement by Japanese foreign ministry said the agreement will promote closer cooperation between the militaries of the two countries, and enable them to actively contribute to international peace and security.

“It is expected that the agreement will facilitate the smooth and prompt provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces,” it said.

The defence ministry said the pact will enhance the interoperability between the armed forces, resulting in further expansion of bilateral defence engagement under the Indo-Japan special strategic and global partnership.

“The agreement establishes the enabling framework for closer cooperation between the armed forces of India and Japan in reciprocal provision of supplies and services,” it said.

India has already signed similar agreements with the US, France, Australia and Singapore.

India has been signing military logistics support agreements (MLSA) with countries primarily eyeing deeper maritime cooperation which is important considering China’s rapid military expansionism in the Indo-Pacific, Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

The pacts signed with the US and France provide for accessing various crucial bases by Indian military in Djibouti, Guam and the Reunion Islands among others.

ALSO READ Part 2: INDIA-JAPAN: Kautilyan Approach and Japan’s Samurai Spirit – Part II

The post INDIA-JAPAN: Kautilyan Approach and Japan’s Samurai Spirit Part 1 appeared first on IMR.

India and Japan have a deep sense of spiritual affinity ad this was documented when historically a direct contact with Japan was traced to Todaiji Temple in Nara where the consecration or the eye-opening of towering statue of Lord Buddha was performed in 752AD by Bodhisena, an Indian monk. In the beginning of 1870’s, Indians arrived in Japan for business and commercial interests in Yokohama and Kobe, the two major open ports centres and later during the First World War too, many Indians entered Japan to fill the gaps and demand for the Japanese products. In the contemporary times, many of the prominent Indians are associated with Japan like Swami Vivekananda, Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, JRD Tata, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and Judge Radha Binod Pal. In 1903, the Japan-India Association was formed and has been the oldest international friendship body in Japan. After the 1923 Kanto Earthquake, most of Indians in the community moved to Kansai region consisting of Osaka and Kobe and city has the largest migrant Indian population in Japan. The old Indian community was involved in trade of textiles, commodities, electronics and jewelry. Japan had welcomed the Indian community with open arms and the cultural and spiritual ties only paved way for stronger historical and cultural relations between the two countries and aimed for a dependable bond.

ALSO READ India holds naval exercise with Japan amid stand-off with China

The dependable relations continued between these two nations even after the Japan had surrendered to the U.S. and in 1949, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru donated an Indian elephant to Japan at the Ueno Zoo in Tokyo which was a ray of hope in the lives of the Japanese people who were still trying to recover from the defeat in the war. On 28 April 1952, India and Japan signed a peace treaty and established diplomatic relations and this peace treaty signed with India was first of a kind after the Second World War. This gesture by both the countries was yet again a signal of dependability amongst each other.

A major highlight was in 1958 when Japan provided yen loans to India and later in 1983; Suzuki Motor Corporation began to manufacture cars in India. In August 2000, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India and strengthened the momentum of the relationship and with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee established the ‘Global Partnership between Japan and India. India became important for Japan in 2000 due to its common concern over China. China emerged as a reason for security cooperation between India and Japan as the issues on the Indo-China border and Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and this started a whole new level of dependable relations between India and Japan.

Another major change was in 2007, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Indian Parliament gave his speech ‘Confluence of Two Seas was aiming at Japan’s Broader Asia with its focus on the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean’ and this also paved way for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). On 25 April 2007, for the “first time, the Indian Navy, JMSDF and the U.S. Navy conducted their first multilateral exercise called Trilatex-07 in the Pacific region” and this was followed by the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan” and “Recognizing that Japan and India share common interest in the safety of sea lines of communications” in 2008. All this paved a new stage of ‘maritime relations’ which was yet again a result of dependable ties along with China as a common cause of security cause for both.

In January 2014, Japan had asked India to gorge a team to thwart Chinese expansionist in the regions of the East China Sea and the Himalayas. Japan had called for a united opposition to Chinese activities and moves which came in the backdrop of China’s unilateral move to change the status quo in the East China Sea and imposed the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Itsunori Onodera, the Defence Minister quoted “Both Japan and India should ask for a dialogue with Chinese side and tell China not to change status quo by force. These issues should be solved through dialogue and following international rules.” This was yet gain a stage where India an all-weather friend of Japan proved its friendship and dependability in their ties.

ALSO READ INDIA-JAPAN: Immense Potential in Post-Covid Partnership

Indo-Pacific

The other major change was in the ‘Indo-Pacific realm’ in 2015, when the “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World” and the “vision was for a deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership and also aimed for a peaceful open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” and later in 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (FOIPs) in Kenya and spoke about the two continents, Asia and Africa and the two oceans, Indian and Pacific Ocean and the need to develop a free and open Indo-Pacific region. This was a major decision as India was already working on its ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) and soon with the Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific Vision’, India’s Act East Policy aimed towards Indo-Pacific as China was a major threat in the Indo-Pacific region whether in the Indian Ocean, East China and the South China Sea and yet again, it paved the way for dependable relations.

In 2017, the Doklam Issue, India had asked China to respect the 2012 understanding where “no country would alter the status quo unilaterally in the eastern sector of India-China border.” It was then that the Japanese Defence Minister quoted “For both India and Japan, China is an important neighbouring country. Both countries have important economic linkages with China. However, after the recent Chinese provocative actions, entire international community will have to send a message to China.” Also, around the same, the then Japanese Ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu quoted “no country should try to change the status quo in Doklam. China has been insisting on constructing a highway through Doklam area of Bhutan claiming it to be its own territory.” This support to India proved that yet again the relations between these nations are dependable and keep moving in greater direction.

2+2 Ministerial Meeting

On 30 November 2019, the First Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held New Delhi and this meeting aimed to enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defence cooperation. They also welcomed the second “Dharma Guardian-2019” and the second “Shinyuu Maitri-2019” which was followed by the coordination for the first Japan-India joint fighter aircraft exercise in Japan. They also aimed to further strengthen the defence equipment and technology cooperation and looked forward to productive discussions in the fifth Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC) and also welcomed the progress on cooperative research in the area of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)/Robotics. It is important to understand that this kind of meeting has taken place as India and Japan feel that they both can trust and depend on each other in the realm of defence cooperation which is yet again a major milestone in this relationship.

The recent stand-off between India and China in the region of Ladakh where Chinese tried to aggressively take and claim a part of Ladakh, which is a territory of India, created a major problem. Japan proved its friendship and dependability as an all-weather friend as the Japanese Ambassador to India Satoshi Suzuki quoted that “the country opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo”. Also, in a rare briefing on 25 June 2020, the Japanese Defence Minister Taro Kono opined that “the Chinese military capabilities and intentions needed to be watched closely across Asia”. On 27 June 2020, “JS Kashima and JS Shimayuki, the JMSDF Training Squadron, conducted an exercise with INS Rana and INS Kulish, Indian Navy at the Indian Ocean and this exercise was aimed to promote mutual understanding, tactical training and communication training”. “The Japanese Navy and the Indian Navy have been instrumental in paving the way for stronger relations between the two countries and this exercise is the 15th exercise in the last three years.” This exercise gained a lot of importance as India and Japan supported one another in the Indian Ocean and was a clear answer to China to back off as China has been trying to take control of the Indian Ocean.

Maj Gen GD Bakshi in a personal interview quoted “we should make a commitment that if any country uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons against Japan, India will take steps to counter the threat”. Maj Gen Bakshi further quoted that “India and Japan need to deepen the security ties and we could jointly manufacture next generation stealth fighters, tanks and anti-submarine frigates and mine sweepers.”

Conclusion

India and Japan have always proved to a dependable set of friends who support each other and voice each other’s concern regionally and globally. India and Japan is in my opinion the only friendship between two democracies successful and even with vested interests both the nations mutually respect and maintain the trust and goodwill amongst one another. Also, this dependability is realist world is rather impossible but they still provide their friendship as an example of an exemplary bond undeterred by even superpowers like China.

The post INDIA-JAPAN: A Dependable Partnership appeared first on IMR.

Japan seeks to expand cooperation in sharing defense intelligence with partners such as India, Australia and the U.K., broadening the scope of its state secrets law to include exchanges with countries beyond the U.S. The expansion came in last month’s revision of standards for the legislation, which already covers Washington, Tokyo’s closest ally. The law — enacted in 2014 amid controversy — sets penalties of up to 10 years in prison for leaking secrets deemed to risk “causing severe damage to Japan’s national security,” covering areas such as defense, diplomacy and counterterrorism.

Classifying information from a foreign military as a state secret will facilitate joint exercises and tie-ups for developing equipment. It also becomes easier to share data on Chinese troop movements, an increasingly crucial issue as it has grown harder for Tokyo to track Beijing’s activities in the region on its own.

Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed through waters in the East China Sea around the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China as the Diaoyu, for a record 80th consecutive day on Thursday. Beijing has tightened its effective control over the South China Sea, a critical sea lane, as well.

The law change is geared toward the U.K., Australia, India and France, with which Japan has signed agreements that obligate both sides to keep classified defense information secret. Reducing the risk of leaks should encourage these countries to share confidential data.

The revision also serves to promote broader cooperation under security legislation that took effect in 2016, letting Tokyo exercise the right to collective self-defense and supply fuel and ammunition to other militaries in situations that pose a threat to Japan. Carrying out such tasks requires information on the size, capacity and operating areas of these forces, which can include highly secret data.

The move reflects the trend of Tokyo branching out in defense partnerships during recent years. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the Australian military conducted joint drills involving fighter jets in Japan for the first time last fall, and the Maritime Self-Defense Force has participated in the U.S.-India Malabar naval exercise every year since 2015.

The tie-ups also include joint development of defense equipment, which often requires sharing powerful and classified technology. Japan and the U.K. have created a prototype air-to-air missile, and Tokyo is teaming with Paris on technology to detect underwater mines using unmanned craft.

Japan plans to involve the U.K. in development of its successor to the F-2 fighter jet, slated for deployment in the mid-2030s. Though Tokyo picked Washington over London as its main partner, Japan looks to share stealth technology with the U.K., which is working on its own next-generation fighter.

Source link

The post Japan deepens intelligence sharing with India, Australia and UK appeared first on IMR.