Operation Sindoor, the Tri-Services joint operation, was launched in the early morning hours of May 07, 2025, in response to the dastardly, heinous and religiously provocative terrorist attack on innocent Indian civilians at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025. Op Sindoor was a stupendous success and achieved its laid-down military objectives in less than four days. While the success of Op Sindoor should be celebrated for its decisiveness, highly professional and integrated execution, the Indian Armed Forces also need to do a comprehensive, honest, and unbiased analysis of the entire operation to draw the correct lessons and prepare for future more challenging battles. During Op Sindoor, a disturbing facet was noticed; there was significant military collaboration between Pakistan and its all-weather friend China. Turkey also provided military support to Pakistan not only in the run-up to Op Sindoor but even during the conflict. India needs to be cognisant of the increasingly collaborative approach of China and Pakistan and the possibility of a full-fledged two-front war. A few enduring takeaways from Op Sindoor are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs

Defence Budget Enhancement

The defence budget of India for financial year (FY) 25 is approx. USD 79 billion (fourth largest in the world), which is slightly less than 2% of our GDP. However, it is significantly smaller than the defence budget of our Northern adversary (China) for FY 25, which is USD 245 billion. It needs to be enhanced to approximately 2.5% of GDP as there are several critical capability gaps in the technological upgradation and modernisation of our Armed Forces. This enhanced commitment of funds for external security is absolutely essential for expeditiously developing our military capabilities and capacities to deter our adversaries to our West and North. We need to develop disruptive or asymmetric capabilities for credible deterrence. ’Deterrence is costly, but wars are even costlier’ is a well-known military adage. Presently, India cannot afford to get embroiled in an unnecessary conflict that diverts our focus from our nation’s economic growth.  India needs to ensure that national security is embedded into the edifice of financial security, implying that economic growth cannot be achieved in an unstable geopolitical environment.  India has to achieve its goal of becoming a high-income nation before we become old. We need to wisely utilise our demographic dividend to accelerate our technological, economic and military development and achieve our goal of becoming ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047.

Joint and Integrated Operations

Whenever the three Services have planned their operations jointly and executed their plans in an integrated and synergistic manner, they have achieved sensational victories. The only previous example of synergistically executed operations by the Indian Armed Forces has been the 1971 war. One of the most heart-warming features of Op Sindoor was the precise articulation of the national and military objectives and complete synergy was achieved not only amongst the three Services but the Civil-Military fusion as well. Op Sindoor was a jointly planned and synergistically executed operation, wherein the core strengths of the three Services were individually applied towards attaining the common overall military objective. Another feature of Op Sindoor that needs to be stressed is that the overall integrated plans were made under the aegis of the CDS while the individual Service plans were executed under the skilful and professional tutelage of the three Service chiefs. The strengths of this highly successful joint and integrated operations should be thoroughly analysed while finalising and implementing the impending Integrated Theatre Commands. Op Sindoor’s success was also attributable to the ‘whole of nation’ approach – wherein all the diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) measures were synergised to achieve the stated military objective of dismantling the Pakistan military-supported and sponsored terrorist infrastructure and establishing credible deterrence for the future. Any terrorism-related misadventure by Pakistan in the future would incite an even stronger response from India (costs would be higher for Pakistan) is the point that has been made amply clear to Pakistan.

Primacy of Air Power

Op Sindoor’s success has once again very empathetically reiterated the undisputed primacy of air power, which implies that a nation needs to succeed in the air operations to win the war. The same is however not true for land or naval operations. During any conventional or even sub-conventional contingencies, air power is always the fastest to respond and can hit the enemy’s Centres of Gravity simultaneously. In Op Sindoor, air power was used by India in an offensive, unrestrained, precise and calibrated manner for the first time after the 1971 war, and it produced exceptional results wherein the shock and awe of the sustained IAF air strikes forced Pakistan to ask for a ceasefire in slightly less than four days. Op Sindoor is the shortest military operation executed either by India or any other country, wherein the laid-down military objectives were achieved, and operations ceased within a total of 90 hours. The Balakot air strike in the aftermath of the Pulwama incident was the first time that India offensively used air power in pursuit of the national interests in a sub-conventional contingency.  In Op Sindoor, the use of air power in a sub-conventional contingency was taken to the next level with the simultaneous air strikes on nine terrorist training camps/infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Op Sindoor emphatically demonstrated that calibrated, deliberate and focused use of air power in sub-conventional contingency is non-escalatory. Air power can be utilised offensively in both conventional and sub-conventional operations, even under the nuclear overhang. Op Sindoor also unequivocally emphasised air power’s ability to produce strategic effects using long-range precision weapons with minimum collateral damage without crossing the international borders (IB) and remaining within the bounds of escalatory control.

Equipping IAF Appropriately

Op Sindoor demonstrated the precision, lethality and coercive impact of IAF offensive air strikes. The offensive air strikes had a profoundly demoralising effect on Pakistan’s national morale and war-waging capability. It forced the Pakistanis to throw in the towel and ask for a ceasefire. The IAF is presently grappling with an acute shortage of fighter aircraft due to the repeated extended timelines in the indigenous fighter aircraft development programme and the time-consuming, cumbersome and inefficient defence acquisition procedures (with the delays in procurement of 114 x MRFA aircraft). IAF is also facing a crippling shortage of force multipliers (AWACS and AARs) for supporting offensive air operations. IAF’s fighter squadron strength has dropped to a precarious level (31 Squadrons), the lowest level in the past five decades. These shortages of fighters and force multipliers need to be addressed on a war footing, which has also been recommended by the high-powered defence committee led by Defence Secretary in March 2025. There is an urgent need to build up IAF capabilities expeditiously so as to bridge the large capability gaps with our Northern adversary and also be able to cater for a two-front conflict.

Offensive Air Power – Fighter or UAV Dilemma?

The self-defence capabilities of the modern-day manned fighters combined with the precision, lethality and load-carrying capability; better Situational Awareness and decision-making ability in complex situations mandates that manned fighters would remain the primary aerial offensive platforms in the foreseeable future. In spite of the rapidly increasing capabilities and ranges of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (FPV drones, loitering munitions, swarm drones and UCAVs), UAVs still have problems of survivability in contested air spaces and are capable of carrying out only limited damage to the adversarial weapon systems. UAVs would increasingly take on a lot of roles of manned aircraft but aerial offence would continue to be predominantly the preserve of manned fighters. UAVs would complement manned fighters in offensive aerial operations rather than replace them in the foreseeable future.

Space Based Capability (ISR, PNT & Communication) Enhancement

The limited number of Indian electro-optical and radar imaging, communications, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellites performed creditably and provided accurate targeting data and other support services for the air operations during Op Sindoor. However, we were forced to utilise commercial imagery data (Maxar, etc.) to beef up the layered targeting imagery provided by our domestic satellites or for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). India needs to accelerate the proposed timelines for the launches of our Space-based Surveillance network (SBS-3) satellites to shorten the revisit times to approximately 2 hours (Chinese ISR satellites presently have a revisit time of approximately 30 mts). India also needs to replace the old life-expired NavIC satellites with new satellites expeditiously, strengthen the ground segment and upgrade the NavIC services to NavIC 2.0.

Focus on Defence R&D and Induction of State-of-the-art Technologies

The mil-technological edge of India vis-a-vis Pakistan that was amply visible during Op Sindoor needs to be further enhanced while making all endeavours to narrow down the mil-technological edge that China presently enjoys with regard to India. This needs to be achieved through a dedicated focus on the development of cutting-edge technologies like high-power jet engines, hypersonics, long-range precision weapons and Artificial Intelligence and their rapid induction into the Services. A holistic approach towards technology development must be fostered wherein failure must be accepted as a stepping stone to success. The MoD’s defence R&D budget needs to be enhanced significantly, and guidance and hand-holding must be provided to the private defence industry and start-ups. MoD must encourage and foster collaboration amongst the DPSUs, the private defence industry, the start-ups and the academia.

Strengthen Atmanirbharta

Op Sindoor demonstrated the stupendous success of India’s Atmanirbharta initiatives. The sterling performance and contribution of the indigenous weapon systems and weapon platforms to the success of the operations was indeed commendable and needs to be sustained. Though the gestation period for indigenous development of weapon systems is always much longer, the services must continue to encourage and support the indigenisation process. All the players – the DPSUs, the three services, the private industry, the start-ups and the academia need to be fully involved and supportive of the indigenisation process. The Atmanirbharta initiative needs to be further strengthened with a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach and be made more broad-based. The indigenous development programs of Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk II, AMCA, the 110 kN high-performance jet engine, long-range precision weapons, larger range BVR AAMs (Astra- II, III), Ghatak UCAV, swarm drones, larger range DEW C-UAS systems and the CATS air warrior program need to be focused upon and speeded up.

Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC)

The IACCS and Akashteer were a huge success, the backbone of the Integrated Air Defence network centricity, and they were crucial enablers for air defence operations during Op Sindor. The IACCS and Akshteer Integrated Air Defence System endowed its numerous users with an unmatched Situational Awareness that significantly reduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop, the Sensor-to Shooter time-lag and ensured the protection of the Indian air space. India mus further enhance this network by integrating the naval sensors and their C&C network (Trigun) with IACCS. Simultaneously, India needs to start working on upgrading the integrated Tri-Service C&C network to the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADCC), which would be capable of coordinating and controlling all the sensors and shooters in multiple domains (all five domains) – Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyberspace.

Information Warfare/Cognitive Warfare

Information/Cognitive Warfare has become increasingly critical in shaping the strategic narrative as the perception battle is being intensely monitored and commented upon by the international media. The briefings done by the DGMOs of the three services were comprehensive and done professionally. They were very well received not only by the national but also by the international media. They helped in shaping the strategic narrative. In all future operations, this system of briefings by the DGMOs of the three services should be followed, with interim briefings  by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and MoD representatives.

Conclusion

India needs to prepare for the future and expeditiously build up the capabilities of our Armed Forces as future battles/wars would be appreciably more intense, more widespread (probably two-front) and multi-domain (encompassing Land, Sea, Air, Space, Cyberspace and the Cognitive domains.)  Future wars would have a greater infusion of technology and artificial intelligence and would be increasingly fought in the digital and shadowy grey zones of cyberspace, space and cognitive domains. It would need an integrated ‘Whole-of-Nation’ approach with even greater Civilian Military Fusion for ensuring success.

Courtesy: Centre for Air Power Studies

The post INDIA-PAKISTAN Op Sindoor’s Enduring Takeaways appeared first on IMR.

The 1994 parliamentary resolution which Rajnath Singh referred to read, “On behalf of the people of India we firmly declare that the state of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means…. India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and demands that Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression and resolves that all attempts to interfere with the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.’ 

Many would describe this as adventurism of the kind Russia has engaged in to capture areas in Ukraine.

Gilgit-Baltistan is right in the north of the Ladakh part of united Jammu & Kashmir. The Corps Commander of 15 Corps in Srinagar was asked to react to what the defence minister said. He said if orders came to march North, all forces are ready. We are refining our forces’ conventional capabilities. When it is required there should be no looking back.

This was not the first time when India had said that in its efforts to push towards Akhand Bharat “We will reclaim Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).” As recently as in September 2019 the foreign minister said, “POK is part of India and we expect one day that we will have physical jurisdiction over.” Removal of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution has sent an unambiguous signal that J&K is not negotiable and all that has to be settled is PoK and Baltistan, he added.

All this is happening when Pakistan looks extremely feeble with a round of political infighting.

Sometimes politicians need to make statements which will boost the morale of the country but this was not something that was happening in isolation over the last few days or years, rather the prime minister and his ministers’ statements have been coming out with quite regularity.

Strategic Opportunity

If you go by a geostrategic precedent. In 1962 – Russia and the United States were teetering on the brink of a nuclear war.

If India were to choose a geostrategic window for carrying out this operation, it could not have had anything better.

When Shahbaz Sharif took charge in Pakistan, we had a segment in the Indian establishment that felt that he was Nawaz Sharif’s brother. India thought there was a window to improve relations with Pakistan and had reached out to Nawaz Sharif. He had reciprocated very well before Gen Musharraf torpedoed that peace initiative. But on the ground, Pakistan’s military establishment and ISI complex – the Deep State – calls the shots. It matters very little who is the political face in Islamabad. It is just a democratic facade.

The Pakistan Army and ISI have been making a concerted effort to revive the terrorist movements both in J&K and Punjab. This is not a friendly act. India agreed to a ceasefire when they needed it most, when they were trying to take over Afghanistan. It was, perhaps, geostrategically rather short-sighted.

India has given Pakistan full opportunity to show if they would be interested in peace. Their economy is collapsing, the ethnic fault lines are most exacerbated and the political turmoil does not make it wise for Pakistan to have India on the wrong side.

Does India Have the Capacity?

If India were to execute the march north to Gilgit-Baltistan, the armed forces would realise that mountains eat up troops. The Indian Army is already stretched with its deployment in Northern Command on the LAC versus China. on the LOC and the AGPL. Huge number of troops are deployed but they are stretched to control the area in their possession.

Military operations of attack require the forces to have at least a 3-to-1 superiority with a lot of fire power to be able to capture an objective like a hill or a dominating ground the ration goes up. If a battalion is holding a feature, then a brigade level attack goes in, if a brigade is holding it, then at least a division is required. In the case of mountains even higher troop levels are required.

The idea to capture Skardu-Gilgit was first mooted by Gen Sunderji as the Army chief while planning exercise Brasstacks. Ravi Rikhi in his book “1984 The Fourth Round”, suggested that operational model but it never happened for a variety of political reasons.

Pakistan may be in political turmoil but the Army is still capable of holding its own in a defensive scenario. That territory is a conjunction between China’s steady in roads into the Northern Areas where the Chinese have invested at least $26 billion in four or five dams. They are going to invest more because water is part of China’s strategy for global dominance.

At the time of the Kargil War, prime minister Vajpayee in his wisdom did not allow the armed forces to cross Line of Control. Gen Musharraf went in to Kargil to divide the sanctity of the LoC. With these actions, the LoC got sanctified. World opinion will go against India if we cross the LoC at a time when prime minister Modi himself has maintained that this is not the era of wars. He said so about Chinese expansionism and he told Putin publicly on his actions in Ukraine.

Wars cost money and basic calculation is about Rs 5,000 crores upwards every week. Military operations are not only expensive, they have the knack of escalating out of control, no matter what the results of war gaming say. This operation is not going to finish in three days. Gen Sunderji told prime minister Rajiv Gandhi that Indian forces could finish off Sri Lanka’s problems in three days but the armed forces got stuck there for almost two years.

Echoing the views of the defence minister is fine, but the Corps Commanders, the Northern Army Commander and the Army Chief should privately and professionally caution the political leadership that rhetoric apart, a situation like 1962 must be avoided until the forces are fully prepared.

The Folly of War

The Pakistani Army have a tight grip over the entire POK and Northern Areas. There is no real political freedom in either of the two regions and the military establishment calls the shots. Although liberation of Kashmir is a misnomer, Pakistanis are made to believe that they will fight for Kashmiris and their ‘freedom’.

If the Indian armed forces are to carry out any operations in Pok or in Gilgit-Baltistan, it would be a declaration of war. It will not be a Limited War but an all-out war under a nuclear overhang. We cannot adopt a cavalier approach.

With the kind of involvement and involvement the Chinese have made in Pakistan, it will effectively mean a very active two-front situation. No general in any army ever wants to fight on two fronts simultaneously. A two-front war can only be a defensive one.

The defence minister has, perhaps, rattled the cage, not so much because of some domestic political dividend but to put the Pakistanis on the defensive. In the past the Pakistanis kept talking about and threatening to wrest Kashmir from India. India was always seen to be on the defensive.

It will put the Pakistanis on the backfoot and rattle them into thinking that India might do something like that However, seen in the larger context, the defence minister statement was incongruent to what the prime minister Modi told the Russian president that “this is not an era of war.”

India should not fight a war, which it has not won already. In the 1971 War, India had already won the world when it started fighting. It is also important to enhance comprehensive National Power before engaging in any aggressive action.

India is rising but it has a multitude of problems. While there is no need to keep quiet and show that we have the prowess, and put the enemy on the defensive, it is quite another to start exercising that voice. It must be considered that the enemy’s economy will sink but what happens to your own economy at time must also be considered.

Initiating war under a nuclear environment, with a two-front situation, when the when the world is in a flux would be a folly, which is best avoided.

Voids Must Be Made Up

In the last two years of Covid pandemic, India armed forces stopped all recruitment. Sixty thousand men go out every year on pension. We are about 1,50,000 to 2,00,000 lakh troops short in the Indian army right now. Recruitment of Agniveers has opened up. The first step that is required is to speed up getting manpower, otherwise like Russia, we would start the conflict and then start mobilizing. In India, we have a major manpower versus equipment debate. Russia is not short of weapons but because of shortage of manpower they have been hit hard. There are clear lessons for us here.

War is the domain of risk. If you go back to the initial operations of the Second World War, when Hitler’s generals told him you cannot go. With the Blitzkrieg tactics he was able to bluff his way through.

If the armed forces are ordered to get the whole of POK, of course they have to prepare. The Air Force will have to come up to 45 squadrons, the Army will have to get the medium artillery induction speeded up. All shortages have to be made up.

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Grand Strategy

India had a clear Grand Strategy. A Treaty of Peace & Friendship was signed with USSR to stave off American and Chinese intervention. A concerted information war campaign was launched at the global, regional and local levels to highlight Pakistan’s brutal genocide in Bangladesh. India showed strategic patience and restraint, prepared methodically for eight months and only then launched the coup de main operations in the East. This too was done after Pakistan attacked our forward air bases. Hence, it was a just war of last resort.

The Eastern Theatre was designated as the Schwerpunkt or decisive theatre of operations. A holding posture was adopted in the West. The Indian Navy blockaded both wings of Pakistan and entirely isolated East Pakistan. The Indian Air Force (IAF) ensured air supremacy in the East. Resources were milked from the Western and Northern theatres to create an over-matching military equation in Bangladesh. Meticulous logistics preparations were made to support three and then a fourth thrust line. Operations were deliberately launched in winter, when the Himalayan passes would be closed and chances of Chinese intervention virtually ruled out. Great risks were taken to ensure superiority in the Eastern Theatre where decisive results were sought. A classical Blitzkrieg was launched in a highly defensible riverine terrain. Pakistani strong points were bypassed as a dash was made to Dacca, the core command and control node. The results of methodical planning and preparation paid off in a spectacular fashion. In just 13 days Indian advancing formations drove over 550 kms deep into Bangladesh and captured the capital city of Dacca. To speed up their advance they used heliborne operations to bounce major rivers over five miles wide and a paradrop at Tangail to cut off the retreat of Pakistani formations into the Dacca triangle. Pakistan was broken in two and a new nation state created with the force of arms. Indian armed forces had changed the map of South Asia forever.

Leadership

India’s military and political leadership had excelled in this war. Mrs Gandhi proved to be a great war leader in the Churchillian mould. The charismatic Fd Mshl Sam Manekshaw provided brilliant leadership along with the Admiral SM Nanda, the Navy chief and the Air Mshl PC Lall, the IAF chief. Then prime strategic planners were Lt Gen JFR Jacob and the DGMO Lt Gen Inder Gill. Perhaps, our best field commander was Lt Gen Sagat Singh, who used heliborne operations to such good effect. In a brilliant and innovative use of missile boats the Indian Navy struck the Pakistani home base of Karachi twice, sank six ships and set the oil farm at Karachi on fire with concerted strikes with the IAF.

Kautilyan Way of War

Very unconsciously India had revived the Kautilyan paradigm of war, which calls for a long and concerted asymmetric campaign to destabilize and break the balance of the enemy state before delivering the coup de grace operations in a short swift attack using massed elephants to generate shock and awe. The Mukti Bahini launched an eight months long campaign to tire out the Pakistani Army. The brutal response of the Pakistan Army thoroughly alienated the population of Bangladesh. Indian air power delivered shock and awe (including precision attacks on the Governor’s house) and, in just 13 days, the Army columns marched 550 kms to capture the capital, Dacca. This was a classic ‘Expanding Torrent’ campaign that bypassed enemy centres of resistance and raced for the key command and control target of Dacca to induce an organisational collapse of the Pakistani Army in the East.

A Tribute to Gen Bipin Rawat

I had the privilege of being Gen Rawat’s instructor at Indian Military Academy Dehradun. He had won the Sword of Honour there and never looked back. He served extensively in various combat environments and gained valuable experience which was to serve him in great stead as the Army Chief. He went on to be the first Chief of Defense Staff (CDS). To his credit, he revolutionised India’s highly lethargic and red tape mired arms acquisition system. In fact, he brought a paradigm shift in this archaic process. He was in a great hurry to reduce 17 single Service commands to just 4 Tri-Service commands. People felt this would generate great organizational turbulence at a time when external and internal threats were at their maximum. He tenaciously held on to his vision. He was a great change agent in a military set up which is highly traditional and averse to change. His untimely death has been a tragic loss for the nation and the Armed Forces.

The post EDITORIAL: The Decisive 1971 War With Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

Sweeping the Eastern and Western Fronts

I was then posted in Odisha, and after dispersing our own aircraft I was airborne in the ELINT at about 2200 hours to reconfirm the radar orbat as had been painstakingly recorded during the preceding months. It was full moon with terrific visibility, We flew at about 28000 feet charting a course from Kolkata northwards, turning East around East Pakistan keeping a good 20 kms inside India till we reached Agartala. We had no idea of any fighters to cover us because we heard no other RT transmissions.

It was quite eerie knowing that hostilities had been declared and here we were carrying out the first passive operations against the adversary. Surely, all Indian radars were active looking out for enemy aircraft. If anything, the ELINT platform is a most precious and extremely expensive piece of airborne equipment, and critical for knowing what the enemy radars are doing, where they are and are they mobile or static. If there had been any threat to the ELINT mission, I was sure help was close by. I was wrong. Later, I learnt that not one IAF fighter was airborne and all our aircraft on Operational Readiness Platforms (ORP) were for intercepting PAF bombers. We were unprotected and alone. This was to be repeated two days later on the Western front. I landed back at about 0200 hours on 4 December, exhausted and tense, yet excited by the events that must follow the declaration of hostilities. How many would perish in this war I wondered? Many did.

By nightfall on 4 December, I was at an airfield in Western UP. The next morning I was tasked to fly a lengthy sweep starting from somewhere near Jammu flying South just inside the border. Many thoughts went through my mind, and I talked it over with the other pilot and navigator. How close to the border would be safe, how should we position ourselves near Jammu, would we have fighter cover close by, in case of a threat what procedure would we follow, and how do we get into a safe zone?

Losing the ELINT aircraft would be unacceptable and disastrous. I was at 30,000 feet by 0730 hours. In our aircraft the navigator was extremely busy logging his position every two minutes. The special operators were recording their findings. Later, the two data would be correlated and enemy radar dispositions would be confirmed. We had flown this path many times during the last six months. Most surely the adversary was aware of our intent and took counter measures. But today, 5 December, he dare not shut down even one radar and give us that opening to enter. It was a very good day to revalidate their radar orbat. Were they not doing the same thing we asked each other?

Were We Vulnerable to Interception?

In the cockpit we talked about the possibility of being intercepted by Mirage III, F-86 or F-104s. Could not one of these enter Indian airspace very low, then climb rapidly with afterburners to about 30,000 ft, fire missiles at us and scoot back? What had the IAF done to ensure that such an attack could not happen? We had no inkling about this. Our job was to sweep, record, return, collate, compare, and then to do it again. The reader should be amazed at this mind-set in December 1971. I know today that fighter cover was never planned for ELINT operations during peace. But we were now at war, fighters were flying thick and fast, our air defence environment was fully loaded and the ELINT aircraft was the only electronic eyes & ears we had. Did it not need super protection? Forget about the crew, what about the aircraft with its irreplaceable equipment? By the time we had talked about all this we were well past Jaisalmer heading towards Jamnagar, from where we returned to our base intact.

I often ruminate as to whether the PAF ever considered intercepting the Indian ELINT aircraft even with a suicide mission. You may speculate how the IAF would intercept Pakistani ELINT aircraft today. You will recall that on 10 August 1999, a Pakistan Navy Atlantique was shot down by IAF MiGs from Bhuj as the Atlantique had transgressed into Indian airspace on what appeared to be ELINT mission. A month earlier in July 1999, India had destroyed and evicted Pakistani intrusions in Kargil.

The next day, 6 December, another sweep was flown by another crew, and yes, this time fighter escorts were actually positioned close by. The value of our ELINT missions had dawned on us.

Across East Pakistan Unarmed

Maintain 090 Degrees. It is asserted that the PAF ceased to exist as a fighting force in East Pakistan by 6 December, and that not a single PAF fighter got airborne after that date. True or false, I do not know, but I flew right across East Pakistan on 9 December. I was on a routine flight in an An-12 from Sarsawa in Western UP to Kumbigram or Silchar. Just short of Katihar, where we normally turn North towards Kishanganj, we got a radio call from one of our radars, advising us to continue on a heading of 090. Both of us (pilots) looked at each other in surprise, and discussed it with the navigator who was senior to us. Nonsense we concluded. This must be a Pakistani controller luring us into his trap. No way were we going 090 degrees and dutifully turned North. Immediately, the same radar called up and once again asked us to turn back onto 090. We maintained silence convinced that though the call signs and frequency were correct, this has to be a devious trap. Why should the IAF make an unarmed An-12 fly into East Pakistan at the height of armed hostilities? This is “pucca gadbad” we agreed, and remained North-bound.

Authenticate Yourself. Very soon a stern message came across, a different voice, I clearly recollect, demanding why we were disobeying instructions. On the flight deck we decided to authenticate the credentials of the radar unit. You will know that all aircraft and ATC units have authentication sheets which have a ‘Challenge & Answer’ system. It is used to ascertain the identity of an approaching aircraft. The challenge is given by ATC and answered by the aircraft. The authentication sheet has alpha-numeric combinations and it is a secret document. So we decided to challenge the radar unit and, lo and behold, he answered correctly. Considering we were being asked to enter East Pakistan we decided to do it again with another set of codes. The reply was correct. The option of not turning East onto 090 direct for Kumbigram was no longer available. Very reluctantly we banked right and got onto a course direct from Kishanganj to Kumbigram. I do not think any IAF aircraft had done this since 1947 and here we were in an An-12 crossing East Pakistan at about 28,000 feet flying at 400 kms/hr in the middle of a hot shooting war. What a juicy target we must have been for the PAF.

What was Achieved? Do place this moment in perspective. The IAF was still pounding targets in East Pakistan. The Indian Army was far away from Dhaka. The brilliant helicopter aero-bridge across the Meghna river was being launched on this very day by Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC IV Corps and the para-drop at Tangail would happen two days later. On board the An-12 there was silence and all eyes peeled outside as if our stern looks would frighten an attacking F-86. Were we bait? Why this method to lure PAF fighters into the sky for battle? And what if our Gnats/ MiGs did not show up? What if we had actually been enticed into East Pakistan and the Authentication Sheets had been compromised? Our radar spoke with us once or twice and our route took us between Dinajpur and Rangpur, past Meymensingh close to Sylhet and then onto Kumbigram. Were we relieved when we entered Indian air space?

I tried very hard to find out why this was done but never got an answer for 21 years between 1972 till I retired in 1993.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: In the Air Over East Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

During the conflict, East Pakistan’s naval ports were left defenseless as the Eastern Military Command of Pakistan had decided to fight the war without the navy and faced with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, the navy planned to remain in the ports when war broke out.

In the eastern wing, the Pakistan Navy had heavily depended on her gun boat squadron. Pakistan’s Eastern Naval Command was in direct command of Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff who also served as the right-hand of Lieutenant-General Niazi. The Pakistan Navy had 4 gun boats (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, and Sylhet). The boats were capable of attaining maximum speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors. Having known as Pakistan Navy’s brown water navy, the gun boats were equipped with various weapons, including heavy machine guns. The boats were adequate for patrolling and led anti-insurgency operations. But they were hopelessly out of place in a conventional warfare.

Operation Jackpot had severely damaged the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. Before the start of hostilities, all the naval gun boats were stationed at the Chittagong. As the air operations began, IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sank on 4 December. On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired. Rajashahi managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16.

Covert Naval Operations

The Indian Navy started the covert naval operations, which were executed successfully. The Eastern Naval Command of Indian Navy had coordinated, planned, and executed these covert naval operations. In the end months of 1971, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan’s Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. The Pakistan Army’s Combatant High Command, The GHQ, insisted and pressured Pakistan Navy to deploy PNS Ghazi and to extend its sphere of naval operations, into East-Pakistan shores.

In the Eastern wing of Pakistan, the Navy had never maintained a squadron of warships, despite the calls were made by Eastern Naval Command’s Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff.[citation needed] Instead, a brown water navy was formed consisting a gun boats riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, in eastern wing, repair and logistic facilities were not developed at Chittagong. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command virtually faced no opposition from the Eastern theatre. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.

On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF’s capability to retaliate.

The Pakistan Navy responded by deploying her aging long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, to counter the threat as the Naval Command had overruled the objections by her officers. The PNS Ghazi, under the command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, was assigned to locate the INS Vikrant, but when it was not able to locate, decided to mine the port of Vishakapatnam the Headquarter of Eastern Naval Command. The Indian Navy’s Naval Intelligence laid a trap to sink the submarine by giving fake reports about the aircraft carrier. At around midnight of 3-4 December, the PNS Ghazi began its operation of laying mines. The Indian Navy dispatched INS Rajput to counter the threat.

The INS Rajput’s sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.

The sinking of Ghazi turned out to be a major blow and setback for Pakistan Naval operations in East-Pakistan. It diminished the possibilities of carry out the large scale of Pakistan naval operations in Bay of Bengal. It also eliminated further threat possessed by Pakistan Navy to Indian Eastern Naval Command. On reconnaissance mission, the Ghazi was ordered to report back to her garrison on November 26, and admitted a report Naval Combatant Headquarter, NHQ. However, it was failed to return to her garrison. Anxiety grew day by day at the NHQ and NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the submarine failed to produce results.

On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. On December 7/8, the airfields of PAF were destroyed, and the campaign continued until 9 December. On December 12, Pakistan Navy laid mines on amphibious landing approaches to Chittagong. This proved a useful trap for some time, and it had denied any direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed. The Indian Navy therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox Bazar with the aim cutting off the line of re-treat for Pakistan Army troops. On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier. After fighting for days, the human cost was very high for Pakistani forces, and no opposition or resistance was offered by Pakistani forces to Indian forces.

The successful Indian Air Operations and Operation Jackpot, led by the Bengali units with the support of Indian Army, undermined the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. By the time Pakistan Defences Forces surrendered, the Navy had suffered the most damage as almost all of the gun boats, destroyer (PNS Sylhet), and the long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, were lost in the conflict, including their officers.

On December 16, at 16:13hrs, Deputy Command of Eastern Command and the Commander of Eastern Naval Command, Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff surrendered his Naval Command to Vice-Admiral R.N. Krishna Eastern Naval Command.

The Sinking of PNS Ghazi – Pak Version

In his book, “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”, written in 1972 soon after the war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 337)

“The submarine Ghazi was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The Ghazi’s task was to carry out offensive mine laying against Visakhapatnam.

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in the area.

“On 14 November 1971, PNS Ghazi, under the command of Cdr Zafar Mohammad Khan, sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol.

“The first indication of Ghazi’s tragic fate came when a message by NHQ India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December but issued strangely enough on 9 December, was intercepted. Both the manner of its release and the text quoted below clarified very little: “I am pleased to announce that Pakistan Navy Submarine Ghazi sunk off Visakhapatnam by our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and other conclusive evidence floated to surface yesterday – 091101 EF”… As it happened, the release of the message on 9 December also served to divert attention of their public from the sinking of Khukri on this very date even though the claim of sinking Ghazi was apparently made a few hours before the loss of Khukri”.

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2 Corps

In the southwestern sector 2 Corps, under Lt Gen TN Raina, launched its thrust with 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division. It was well supported by a regiment plus a squadron of armour and was headed towards Kushtia and Jessore. By 6 December the well-entrenched Pakistani garrison in Jessore had apparently panicked and had pulled out. By 7 December the advancing columns had moved 30 km further up to Zenida. Magura, the next objective, was taken the next day. By 9 December, the leading elements were on the banks of the Madhumati river and preparations were underway for the capture of Kushtia. Contrary to the 2 Corps assessment, defences of Kushtia proved to be a tough nut to crack. The defenders held their ground for two long days before extricating themselves. By 12 December both Kushtia and the Hardinge Bridge, with some of its spans demolished, were in the bag. By then Indian forces were being concentrated for an assault on Daulatpur, a town close to Khulna. Operations for reducing Daulatpur were still in progress when the cease-fire came into effect. With hindsight, it appears that 2 Corps may have achieved more spectacular results if it had made a push towards Dacca once Jessore and Zenida had fallen.

33 Corps

Lt Gen ML Thapan, commanding 33 Corps, had 20 Mountain Division and two independent brigade groups. He was also permitted to commit one brigade of 6 Mountain Division, located in the Siliguri corridor, with a rider to ensure that it would be reverted within 48 hours if necessary. The Corps plan in a nutshell was to launch two brigades from the north towards Dinajpur and Rangpur. The divisional thrust from the west was to bypass Hilli from the north and then swing south to capture Bogra. The northern thrusts made spectacular progress. Their dash and determination totally surprised the defenders. By 9 December, Dinajpur had been contacted. Garrisons at Saidpur and Rangpur had been tied down. The divisional thrust also made steady progress. By 4 December, it had captured Charkai, 11 km inside. While positions immediately to the north of Hilli were still being fought for, advancing columns had moved further towards Nawabganj. It was captured mainly by the Mukti Bahini. By 7 December road Rangpur – Bogra had been severed. The same day, Maj Gen Shah, GOC 16 Pakistan Infantry Division, and his party were ambushed. However, the General managed to avoid capture. The thrust was, thereafter, developed due south towards Gobindganj and Bogra. In the meantime, Hilli had finally been captured on 11 December. It was one of the hardest fought battles of the eastern theatre. By 14 December, a roadblock had been established south of Bogra and parts of the township had been captured. Fierce fighting continued as the defenders shrank into the inner core of the built up area. However, all of them surrendered on 16 December 1971.

101 Communication Zone

Further to the east of 33 Corps was the area of operations of 101 Communication Zone. Both sides had assigned the lowest priority to this sector. Maj Gen GS Gill had just about two brigades to launch his thrust against a weak enemy brigade holding Jamalpur and Mymensingh strong points. His main effort was to head towards Jamalpur. The Pakistani outpost at Kamalpur surrendered on 4 December. Bakshiganj further south withdrew soon on being attacked. On 5 December Maj Gen GS Gill sustained injuries as his jeep went over a mine. He had to be evacuated and was replaced by Maj Gen GC Nagra. By 9 December, one more brigade, had been allotted to this sector and all was set for the capture of Jamalpur. That is when the Pakistani garrisons of Jamalpur and Mymensingh were ordered back for the close defence of Dacca. Thus, both these towns were in Indian hands on 11 December. That very evening a para drop took place at Tangail further south of Jamalpur towards Dacca. A link up was established on 12 December and the final push was made for Dacca. As it transpired, it was through this least priority sector that Dacca was entered first.

4 Corps

4 Corps in the east was under Lt Gen Sagat Singh and had 8, 23 and 57 Mountain Divisions on its order of battle. The Corps plan envisaged three Divisional thrusts to liberate all areas east of Meghna river, cut off rail and road communications to Chittagong, and force a crossing across Meghna to head for Dacca.

In the very opening stages, in the battle of Gangasagar near Akhaura, Lance Naik Albert Ekka of 14 Guards proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. During the attack he got wounded while single handedly silencing an enemy machine gun. Unmindful of his injuries, he charged on to clear yet another machine gun post by bayoneting the crew. He later succumbed to his wounds. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra for most conspicuous bravery and became the only one to be so honoured in the eastern theatre during the war.

Akhaura fell on 5 December. By 7 December Brahmanbaria had been taken and the troops were racing towards Ashuganj. By then, in a daring heliborne operation, a battalion had been landed in Sylhet — a move that completely unnerved the Pakistanis. Comilla and Laksham were captured by 9 December. Efforts to hustle out the defenders from Ashuganj did not succeed and the bridge there could not be secured before it was blown by the Pakistanis in panic. However, using helicopters in the moonlit night, Meghna was ‘airbridged’. By 14 December more forces had got across Meghna using river craft. That day the first artillery shells were fired on Dacca. 4 Corps formations were on the outskirts of Dacca and Mynamati was still being fought for, when the Pakistani forces surrendered unconditionally.

Unconditional Surrender

Independent of these Corps thrusts, the air borne assault by 2 Para on 11 December near Tangail hastened the proceedings and the fall of Dacca. Lt Col KS Pannu, commanding the Para Group, was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra for his determined combat leadership. On 12 December, a sea borne assault by a battalion group was launched towards Cox’s Bazar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping into Burma. Both the Navy and the Air Force had achieved complete mastery of the sea and the air space and had supported the operations of the Eastern Command admirably.

After 12 December 1971, Gen Manekshaw had been sending messages to Niazi to surrender. Later, leaflets urging the same were also dropped. Radio frequencies on which HQ Eastern Command could be contacted were also made known. The deadline of 0900 hours on 16 December 1971 set for an unconditional surrender was extended to 1500 hours the same day at Niazi’s behest. That morning, Maj Gen Gandharva Nagra had already reached Niazi’s HQ and was soon joined by Maj Gen JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command. The Pakistani General was soon convinced that surrender was the only option.

In a hurriedly organised surrender ceremony at the Dacca Race Course, Lt Gen AAK Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender and handed over his revolver to the victorious Indian commander before thousands of cheering and delirious crowds. Shouts of “Joi Bangla” rent the air. Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, accepted history’s greatest surrender since the end of the Second World War. Later that evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced to an ecstatic Lok Sabha that Dacca was the free capital of a free nation and offered a unilateral cease-fire in the western theatre with effect from December 17, 1971.

The audacity and speed of operations had kept the opponents off balance throughout. Over 90,000 personnel were taken prisoners of war. The Indian Army had achieved a stunning and memorable victory.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: The Lightening Campaign appeared first on IMR.

Though the East provided 75 per cent of the foreign earnings and exports, the reins of power were almost exclusively in the hands of West Pakistanis. Initially, Pakistan called itself a democracy, but effectively the country was run by the army, the President from 1958 to 1969 being Field-Marshal Ayub Khan.

The arrest, in 1966 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League and the outstanding political figure in East Pakistan, convinced his supporters that limited autonomy was no longer a realistic aim and that total separation was the only answer. In March 1969, Ayub Khan, having lost all semblance of popular support, gave way to General Yahya Khan, who, in December, 1970, held an election in which the Awami League won a clear majority, whereupon Yahya announced the indefinite postponement of the opening of Parliament. Rioting broke out in East Pakistan; on 25 March, 1971, the Sheikh was again arrested and the following day the unofficially styled ‘Bangladesh’ seceded from the Government of Pakistan by unilateral declaration. Yahya then sent Lt Gen Tikka Khan to East Pakistan with orders to ‘sort them out’. Thereafter, the army went on the rampage and some estimate that as many as a million civilians were murdered.

Refugees poured into India and those who remained, having nothing to lose, flocked to join the Awami League’s militant resistance organization, the Mukti Bahini, including most of the 70,000 locally recruited members of the armed forces. By August, six million refugees had fled to West Bengal, an intolerable burden for the Indian Government, whose armed forces were now actively preparing to come to the aid of the Mukti Bahini. This was not practicable until November when the monsoon would be over and the ground hard enough to allow large-scale operations, while the onset of winter would close the Sino-lndian frontier and inhibit interference from China.

There were several clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the East Pakistani border in October and November, when the latter crossed the frontier in ‘hot pursuit’ of the Mukti Bahini, finally leading, on 3 December, to the outbreak of open warfare on two fronts.

Save for the hilly tracts of Chittagong, East Pakistan was a riverine country. The river Brahmaputra flows through the centre to divide the country into two. Both these halves are further dissected by the Ganga river in the west and the Meghna river in the East. Besides, there are many other water channels and rivulets in between. On the few arterial roads which exist there are only two bridges across these mighty rivers – the Hardinge Bridge over the Ganga and the bridge across the Meghna at Ashuganj. Inland waterways cater for most of the surface communications within. All in all, East Pakistan terrain was excellent for defensive operations.

 Towards the end of April 1971, the Indian government gave the first indication of a possible military intervention in East Pakistan to Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, the Chief of the Army Staff. For a variety of sound strategic military reasons he advised the government against a hasty and indecisive military venture. The government too had other political compulsions and better sense prevailed. Consequently, the Army Chief set in motion a well-conceived plan to prepare for an all out war. To avoid getting bogged down in the riverine terrain, it had to be well after the monsoons and to preclude possible Chinese intervention, it had to be nearer the winter by when the passes on the high Himalayas close.

Shortages in manpower and equipment were made up steadily. The army’s resources, particularly the engineer effort and the bridging equipment, were judiciously allotted to the two widely separated western and eastern theatres. Formations were affiliated to the newly raised HQ 2 Corps. Territorial Army units were embodied and reservists were called up. Additional communication zone units were also raised to ensure better logistics support.

All this while Eastern Command was abuzz with hectic activities. In April 1971, it had only one division earmarked for a possible role in East Pakistan. Two more divisions were pulled out from their counter insurgency commitments. Three divisions were milked out from those having their role in Sikkim and in Arunachal Pradesh. One more division, otherwise intended for the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border, was also placed under the Command. Operational control of all Border Security Force units deployed along the East Pakistan border was handed over to Eastern Command. All formations, operationally oriented either for a role in the mountains or for counter-insurgency operations, were trained and prepared for the impending riverine operations. Measures to create the necessary logistics infrastructure, to support the operational contingencies, were initiated. Operational plans were evolved, coordinated with the Navy and the Air Force and were finalised.

 In the event of war, Pakistan had apparently visualised an Indian offensive attempting a shallow penetration, to install the Provisional Bangladesh Government. They had also counted on American support and Chinese intervention to restrain India. Hence, Pakistan’s overall defensive philosophy was to cause maximum delay by holding fortress like strong defences on all routes of ingress along the border. In consonance with their threat analysis, deployment towards the west and the north was to be heavier. For this defensive plan, Lt Gen AAK Niazi had a strength of about four divisions and seven wings of paramilitary forces. 9 Pakistan Infantry Division, with its HQ at Jessore, was to guard the western approaches. 16 Pakistan Infantry Division was responsible for the Dinajpur-Rangpur salient towards the northwest and had its HQ at Nator. The northern sector of Mymensingh was considered the least threatened and had only about a brigade deployed to defend it. Wary of the preparatory activities in Tripura, the eastern approaches to Dacca were being guarded by 14 Pakistan Infantry Division located at Comilla. Rings of defences had also been prepared around Dacca. Thus, hoping to fight set piece defensive battles of attrition, Niazi had opted for orthodox positional warfare and could be faulted for rigidity.

 In contrast, Lt Gen JS Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, had a plan that was bold and had streaks of originality. It sought to defeat the very premises of the defender’s strategy. In essence there were to be three thrusts by 2, 33 and 4 Corps from the west, north and the east, respectively. Each Corps was to contain the enemy strong points with small forces while the larger components were to bypass these for objectives in depth. All three Corps had planned to maintain speed of action, without tactical pauses, for a dash to Dacca before the defences around it could be occupied. The enemy was to be forced to react to Indian moves throughout. That is where superior generalship lay.

Mukti Bahini

After Lieutenant General Tikka Khan’s crack down, many officers and men from the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the police, had tried to raise an armed rebellion. Their disjointed efforts did not create the desired impact and they gradually trickled into India. Many of them had come with their weapons. They provided the nucleus for the Mukti Bahini. Trained and equipped by the Indian army, they were meshed into the operational plans of the formations of Eastern Command. Till August 1971, motivated bands of Mukti Bahini had operated along the border or had ventured only a few kilometers across. By October 1971, however, the Mukti Bahini had stepped up its activities to tie down sizeable Pakistani forces along the border and on many static duties well in depth.

Tension mounted further as the Pakistani forces resorted to unprovoked firing on Indian posts and civilian targets alike. Between November 20 and 23, 1971 fierce battles were fought at Garibpur, around Hilli, and at Atgram. The commanding officers of all the three battalions which fought these actions – 14 Punjab, 8 Guards and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles – went on to earn Maha Vir Chakras.

War broke out on December 3, 1971. On that day the Eastern Command was also responsible for the northern borders with China and for the ongoing counter-insurgency operations in many eastern states. The total forces under the Eastern Army nearly touched the half million mark.

Eastern Front Timeline

3 December       Pakistan Air Force attacks Agartala airfield.

4 December       India launches integrated ground, air and naval offensive. Aircraft from the carrier Vikrant bomb airfield at Cox’s Bazar. Dacca bombed every 1/2 hour.

5 December       Indian Army links up with Mukti Bahini and enters E. Pakistan from five directions.

6 December       India announces recognition of independent state of Bangladesh.

5-14 December Indian troops occupy East Pakistan towns on:

5th – Akhaura, Laksham

6th – Feni

7th – Sylhet, Jessore

8th – Magura, Comilla, Brahman-baria

9th – Chandpur, Daudkandi

10th – Bhairab Bazar

11th – Noakhali, Nasirabad, Kushtia

12th – Narsingdi

14th – Bogra

14 December Indian artillery starts shelling Dacca. Garrisons now still holding out only at Dacca, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Khulna, Barisal, Chittagong and Mainamati (a fortified cantonment outside Comilla).

15 December     Indian forces close on Dacca from all sides.

16 December     General Niazi signs surrender document for Pakistan, though fighting continues in the Khulna and Sylhet areas until 17 December. Excerpted from yet-to-be-published “The Fighting Spirit: An Illustrated Account of the Indian Army’s Operations in the Twentieth Century” by Maj Gen RK Arora.

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By the end of November, the Pakistani high command must have realised that the Indian Army had deployed in full strength on the west, its infantry divisions backed up by a number of armoured brigades—besides the formidable 1st Armoured Division. As for its own forces, the two divisions that Pakistan had begun to raise in May 1971 to replace the divisions sent to the eastern wing were still below strength and not fully operational. No one but an incurable optimist would, in those circumstances, hope for the cherished breakthrough to materialise. And yet that is exactly what they attempted—and with incredible ineptitude.

Pakistan launched a pre-emptive strike on a number of Indian airfields—Srinagar, Avantipur, Pathankot, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra – at 5.45 pm on 3 December 1971. The strikes were clumsy. Not a single Indian aircraft was lost on the ground. Within 24 hours the Indian Air Force (IAF) had broken the back of the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) through counter-strikes.

The Indian Air Force went into action later that night and continued mounting operations till they reached the peak of 500 sorties per day — a world record. The IAF attacked Chanderi, Shorkot, Sargodha, Muri, Mianwali, Marur (Karachi), Risalwalla (Rawalpindi) and Changa Manga (Lahore). Over 25 aircraft were hit.

After the first abortive series of strikes the PAF ceased to be a serious air threat. By the evening of 4 December, the IAF had established air superiority.

Land Forces

The Pakistan Army in the West consisted of about ten infantry divisions (two of them newly raised) a few independent brigades, two armoured divisions and an independent armoured brigade. The grouping was as follows:

Kashmir Sector

•             12th Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK) Division in the northern sector

•             23 POK Division on the Kotli-Poonch front.

•             II Pak Corps, HQ  In the Sialkot sector: Sialkot

                8,15 and 17 Infantry Divisions

                6 Armoured Division.

•             IV Pak Corps, HQ Lahore, in the Central sector

                10 and 11 Infantry Divisions

                8 Independent Armoured Brigade.

•   I Pak Corps, HQ Mooltan, in the Mooltan sector

                7 and 33 Infantry Divisions,

                25 Infantry Brigade

                1 Armoured Division.

• 18 Infantry Division, in the Southern sector

• Two armoured regiments

From these dispositions, it was appreciated by our high command that the most likely sectors where the Pak army-would attempt offensives would be, firstly, on the Sialkot front, with the aim of cutting either the Jammu-Poonch or the Pathankot-Jammu road links to isolate our forces: and secondly, a thrust by I Pak Corps in the southern Punjab. The latter could be the much vaunted “deep Israeli-type thrust”.

  Indian Forces, only marginally superior, were grouped as follows:

• Western Command (Lt Gen K.P. Candeth).

• Three army corps (Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, Lt Gen N.C. Rawlley and Lt Gen K.K. Singh).

•   Army HQ reserve.

• Southern Command (Lt Gen G.G. Bewoor), responsible for the Rajasthan front.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

The first Pakistani offensive was launched at 8.30 pm on 3 December, against the Indian Army’s Poonch and Chhamb sectors. The aim was to capture a piece of Kashmir territory by a pincer movement. It failed miserably.

An “Azad” Kashmir infantry brigade launched an attack against Poonch from the direction of Kahuta in the north-west, while commandos infiltrated behind the Poonch area to cut the road link.

The attack was launched with determination but the IAF pounded them in the forests north-west of Poonch. The enemy decided to call off the attack.

The second attempt on the night of 9/10 December, was pre-empted by the IAF – it strafed them in their assembly areas.

The Indian forces now launched the counter-offensive. A brigade column was moved towards Hajiian to dominate the Poonch-Kotli road. By 16 December, most parts of the road had been secured.

In the Chhamb sector, the Indian forces were at a slight disadvantage. The Indian defences, based on the line of the Munnawar Tawi river, had covering positions to the west — only 50 miles from the Pak Army’s base at Kharian. In 1965, the Pakistani forces had scored a major success here.

The story of the Battle of Chammb Jaurian will be covered in a later issue of IMR.

In the rest of the J&K theatre, Gen Sartaj Singh, the Corps Commander, aimed at removing the tactical disadvantages of the alignment of the Ceasefire Line (CFL), by capturing dominating heights and denying the enemy easy routes for infiltration.

In the Kargil sector, this entailed the capture of about 15 enemy posts located at heights of 10,000 feet and more in severe weather and terrain conditions.

In the Tithwal sector, the threat to the Indian lines of communications from a large salient of Pak-held territory on the east bank of the Kishenganga river, west of Tut Mari Gali pass, was cleared.

Similarly, in the Uri sector, where the Haji Pir salient provides easy infiltration access to Gulmarg, Indian forces captured posts in the Tosh Maidan and neutralised the threat.

Punjab Sector

The Pakistanis made limited gains in small enclaves of Indian territory located on the far side of rivers or obstacles. So did the Indian forces.

Of the three bridges over the rivers Ravi and Sutlej where they form the Indo-Pak boundary, the only one that lay in Indian territory was the Hussainiwalla bridge near Ferozepur.

A small Indian enclave on the far bank of the river was attacked by the Pakistani forces on the night of 3/4 December. Fighting a delaying action, in which the Pakistanis lost 18 tanks, the Indian garrison made a pre-planned withdrawal to the east bank of the river — during which the bridge itself was heavily shelled and damaged by the enemy.

In response, Gen NC Rawlley, the Corps Commander, ordered an offensive to capture the Sehjra salient, northwest of Ferozepur. This salient posed a threat not only to Khem Karan but also to the Harike bridge further up the Sutlej.

The attack was to go in on the night of 5/6 December. The attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Indian troops took an approach along the open and sandy river-bed leading to a twenty-foot escarpment behind which the Pak defences were located, which was unexpected, with the result that Sehjra was soon captured and the threat to Khem Karan and Harike removed.

Indian forces also attacked and captured the Pak enclave on the eastern side of the Ravi guarding the Dera Baba Nanak bridge on December 6/7. This enclave was strongly fortified with concrete pillboxes and bunkers along the bund, mortar positions and high observation towers. The Indian assault from an unexpected flank, after several feints from a different direction, unbalanced the enemy. By the morning of 7 December, the enclave was in Indian hands with control over the bridge.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

Pakistan’s II Corps (Sialkot), the heaviest of the Pak Army Corps, posed a threat to the Pathankot-Jammu road and to Pathankot itself. It was important to capture the Shakargarh salient and reduce the crucial tactical disadvantage.    

The offensive was launched along three axes

•             Two striking southwards from the general direction of the Kathua-Samba stretch of the main Pathankot-Jammu road; and

•             A third, subsequent thrust from the Gurdaspur area striking west-ward.

The operation started on the night of 5/6 December and lasted till the Ceasefire, culminating in the biggest tank battle of the war.

The two northern thrusts reached the outskirts of Shakargarh and Nurkot by 8 December —a very slow rate of advance due to extensive caution about enemy minefields laid in great depth.

The Pakistani forces had been expecting an attack in the Chawinda-Phillaura area. The enemy strength in the area was about one infantry brigade supported by a squadron of armour. As soon as the Pakistanis realised what the Indian were up to in the Shakargarh salient, they quickly and sent two armoured regiments (Pattons) from 6 Armoured Division to re-inforce the brigade in Shakargarh.

The Indian attack from the eastern side went in on the night of 8/9 December, across the River Ravi—supported, as were the other two, by armour and artillery. The western-most column reached the outskirts of Zafarwal. The Pakistanis reacted strongly and sent in an armoured counter-attack by two regiments of Pattons. However, the Indian Centurions quickly proved the superiority of Indian tank-gunners over those of the Pakistanis.

The 1965 story of Khem Karan was repeated in this battle — 45 Patton tanks being knocked out during the day and night long battle on 15 and 16 December. Indian Army’s losses were only 15 tanks.

Poona Horse, the Indian armoured regiment involved in this battle, had also fought here in 1965 (under the command of Colonel Tarapore, who was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra) did well in the I Corps battle on the Phillaura front. The nick-name the enemy had given this regiment was “Fakhr-i-Hind,” the Pride of India.

After the tank battle, the three columns moved forward till they were in contact with the defences of both Zafarwal and Shakargarh. Here again, the Ceasefire came just in time to save the enemy from losing those two towns.

Rajasthan Sector

A Pakistani infantry brigade supported by a regiment of armour (mixed T-59s and Shermans) launched an attack on Indian positions at Longewala (Jaisalmer sector) — probably to disrupt an anticipated of a thrust by Indian forces – towards the road and rail link at Rahim Yar Khan. The soft vehicles of the supporting troops bogged down soon after crossing our border. The ranks too got stuck in the soft sand, providing easy targets for the IAF aircraft. One of the IAF Hunter pilots described it as a duck shoot. More than 20 enemy tanks were destroyed on the first day.

The next day the targets were the long columns of soft vehicles.

Southern Command Theatre

The intention in the Southern Command’s area of responsibility in Rajasthan was to force the enemy to commit his strategic reserve, ie, Pak I Corps, which included Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division and an infantry division. It entirely succeeded in this aim.

Following the enemy’s failed attack at Longewala, Gen GG Bewoor, GOC-in-C Southern Command, struck out from the Jaisalmer sector to capture Islamgarh and, further south, along the old Bombay-Sind-railway axis, a more determined thrust towards Gadra.    

Gadra was taken easily, while along the railway axis a brigade struck out for Khokrapar and beyond. At the same time, a whole series of long-range raiding columns were sent out into the salient between Nagar Parka and the railway axis. Special Forces dominated the area, liquidating Pak outposts and within a few days the whole salient was under Indian control. Meanwhile, the column along the railway axis forged ahead and laid sieging to Naya Chor, which was saved only by the Ceasefire.

The enemy reacted by sending 33 Infantry Division down from Pak I Corps to reinforce the Rahim Yar Khan-Hyderabad sector. The offensive-defensive strategy paid off.

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The dam will be constructed on the River Indus in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) region. When completed in 2028, the Diamer Bhasha dam, China’s first major civil engineering scheme in Kashmir, will have a 272-metre-high barrage, making it the tallest roller-compacted concrete dam in the world. The project will be part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), itself part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

It will have a generating capacity variously given as 4.8GW and 6GW, and will be situated in the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, about 320km from the Chinese border. As well as power, the dam will create a 200 sq km reservoir, greatly increasing Pakistan’s water security.

The first phase of the dam, worth $2.8bn, has been awarded to a team made up of China’s Power Construction Corporation and FWO, with 70% going to the Chinese company.

Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda), announced the project on 20 May. Pakistan government will provide 30% funding and “the rest will be arranged by the Wapda” – understood to be a reference to loans from China. The total cost of the project is expected to be US$8.8bn, but earlier a figure of $14bn had been quoted.

In 2016, the project was named as one of the projects in the China-Pakistan Economic corridor. However, in 2017, Pakistan backed out when the Chinese demanded 100% ownership of the completed asset.

The eight million acre feet (MAF) reservoir with 272-metre height will be the tallest roller compact concrete (RCC) dam in the world. It will have a spillway, 14 gates and five outlets for flushing out silt. The diversion system involves two tunnels and a diversion canal — all three having one kilometre length each. The bridge — a box girder structure — under the contract will be constructed downstream of the dam structure while the 21MW power plant will be built to meet energy requirements of the project during construction.

India’s Objections

India has raised objections to the project, partly on political and partly on engineering grounds. The engineering objection is based on the safety of such a tall roller-compacted dam in an earthquake zone. The political protest is over India’s claim that the project legitimises Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Pakistan’s sovereign territory.

India said that undertaking such projects in territories under Pakistan’s illegal occupation was not proper. The Ministry of External Affairs said, “Our position is consistent and clear that entire territory of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh have been, are and will continue to be integral and inalienable part of India.”

“We have consistently conveyed our protests and shared concerns with both Pakistan and China on all such projects in the Indian territories under Pakistan’s illegal occupation,” it said.

China defended the contract to build the Diamer-Bhasha dam in POK despite objection from India, saying that it was part of a “win-win” bilateral cooperation to promote the well being of the local population.

According to WAPDA, “In the event that the dam bursts at its proposed height of 272m during a routine seismic movement, 10 cubic kilometres of water, with the destructive power of a hydrogen bomb, will wipe out everything on the Indus all the way down to Sukkur.”

Roller-compacted dams use a blend of concrete in which fly ash is substituted for Portland cement, reducing the risk of thermal cracking during construction. The highest dam built so far using the method is the Gilgel Gibe III Dam in Ethiopia, at 250m.

Kohala Hydropower Project

China will also set up a 1,124-MW Kohala hydropower project in POK under the multi-billion-dollar CPEC despite India’s objection to it. The details of the project were presented in the 127th meeting of the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) on 1 June.

A tripartite agreement has been finalised among China’s Three Gorges Corporation, the authorities in PoK and the PPIB to implement the project under the CPEC framework.

The project will be built on the Jhelum River and aims at annually providing more than five billion units of clean and low-cost electricity for consumers in Pakistan. The paper further reported that this marked one of the largest investments of $2.4 billion in an independent power producer (IPP) in the region.

The 3,000-km-long CEPC is aimed at connecting China and Pakistan with rail, road, pipelines and optical cable fiber networks. It connects China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan Gwadar port, providing access to China to the Arabian Sea. The CPEC passes through PoK, over which India has conveyed its protests to China.

WAPDA has awarded a consultancy contract of the project to Diamer Basha Consultants Group (DBCG) worth 27.182 billion rupees ($168.8 million). DBCG joint venture comprises 12 top-ranked national and foreign consulting firms — Nespak (Pakistan), Associate Consulting Engineers (Pakistan), Mott MacDonald Pakistan, Poyry (Switzerland), Montgomery Watson and Harza (MWH) International-Stantec (USA), Dolsar Engineering (Turkey), Mott McDonald International (England), China Water Resources Beifang Investigation, Design and Research Company (China), Mirza Associates Engineering Services (Pakistan), Al-Kasib Group of Engineering Services (Pakistan), Development Management Consultant (Pakistan) and MWH Pakistan, with Nespak as the lead firm. These firms have a vast experience of providing consultancy services for mega water projects the world over.

The Council of Common Interests (CCI) had approved the project for construction in 2010, but it suffered delays because of international lending agencies which remained associated with the project but later backtracked because of opposition from India. The government has already spent about Rs170 bn on the project since then on land acquisition and other expenses. In view of the lenders’ resistance, it was decided about four years ago to divide the multi-purpose project into two major components — Rs650 bn worth of dam project to be constructed with the public sector funds and Rs750 bn worth of power project most probably to be developed in independent power producer (IPP) mode at a later stage.

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Satellites Detect Chinese Naval Base Plans at Gwadar

Recent satellite images shows that several new complexes have been built in the last few years in the Gwadar port complex. One of them, identified as being used by a Chinese company involved in port development, has unusually high security. These are considered the first signs of a long-expected Chinese naval base at Gwadar in Pakistan.

The high-security compound has been identified as being used by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC Ltd). This is a majority state-owned company that is heavily involved in many Chinese civil engineering projects. While some degree of security is normal in the region, the level of security seen here is extensive.

It has anti-vehicle berms, security fences and a high wall. Sentry posts and elevated guard towers cover the perimeter between the fence and the inner wall. This suggests armed guards with rifles.

China has good reason to focus on security. The region, near the border with Iran and Afghanistan, is facing a long-standing insurgency. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) seeks an independent state for the Baloch people. They carried out an attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi on November 23 2018, and on a hotel in Gwadar on May 11 2019. The latter attack targeted the Zaver Pearl-Continental 5-star Hotel, which is another centerpiece of Chinese investment in the town.

The high security compound is not alone. There are also two smaller sites built in the last year with rows of blue-roofed buildings. It has been suggested that these might be barracks for a Chinese Marine Corps garrison. China was reported to be deploying marines there back in March 2017. But the sites lack the level of security that would be expected. Whatever their exact purpose, their location and timing suggests that they are connected to the port expansion.

Located at the western end of Pakistan’s coast, Gwadar is expected to be a major port in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This will allow Chinese goods to shortcut through Pakistan, instead of sailing all the way around South Asia. China was first reported to be planning a naval base there in January 2018. While the plan has never been confirmed officially, it would be a natural path.

The base, to complement an elaborate one in Djibouti, would strengthen China’s foothold in the Indian Ocean.

Whether the Chinese naval base materializes remains to be seen. But these new sites, including the heavily defended compound, may indicate that the next phase of port construction is imminent. And if the Chinese Navy does begin using the port it will strengthen their capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

The post INDIA-PAKISTAN: China to Construct Dam on Indus River in POK appeared first on IMR.

Farzana Shah is a Peshawar based journalist. This is an abridged extract of an article which was first published in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020. The views expressed do not reflect the views of IMR

On August 5th, 2019 India unilaterally revoked Article 370 of its Constitution which promised autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, i.e., Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJK). This unlawful decision with its dire pending consequences has triggered an outrage, not only in the region but also at the global level. The entire state has been put under siege with total communication blackout, enforced by deploying thousands of fresh troops. Over 3000 political figures including former chief ministers of the state were arrested under so-called Public Safety Act (PSA).

India also divided the state into two; an act through which she changed the geography of the disputed land, hence practically ending the 1971 Simla Agreement. This agreement has remained a critical milestone for both Pakistan and India, as it was this agreement based upon which both countries established what the world later on recognized as Line of Control (LoC). Not only that, August 5th action also undermined the very foundation of Indian constitution, as Article 370 was obliterated without the essentially required consent of state government and that’s why this action was not a constitutional reform, but a blatant coup in total disregard to the pending UNSC resolutions /UN Charter.

Modi government with full backing from hardliner Hindu groups, abolished IOJK’s autonomous status under a fabricated security threat perception to conceal the real intent. Pak-US peace overtures in Afghanistan had made Delhi very nervous because of the simple fact that any settlement between the US and Taliban would have enabled Pakistan to move almost 200,000 of its troops or at least a large number of these to its eastern borders in Kashmir and elsewhere. Indian desperation to counter Pakistan and limit her growing role in Afghan peace process led to such an abrupt abrogation of special status of IOJK and this timing was no coincidence.

Media reports suggest the Indian intelligence agencies were desperately waiting for this opportunity to strike. Delhi had sensed that a possible deal managed by Pakistan for US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan could eventually renew US military assistance for Pakistan.

Reportedly, to scuttle Afghan peace deal and legitimize Indian stance over Kashmir, Indian spy agency RAW’s new chief Samant Goel called on Narendra Modi on July 5th, 2019 and apprised him of the plan to abolish the Article 370 for IOJK. Preparations for the move were already in place in Delhi as a number of high profile military and intelligence visits were made to IOJK including those by RAW’s chief Goel, Indian NSA Ajit Doval and Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat in the months preceding August 2019. On July 24, Doval also held a meeting with Indian military chiefs and heads of all three intelligence agencies including National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), in the same context.

Media also reported that India had flown Israeli Heron drones across the Pir Panjal range to rehearse controlling mob in case of protesteruption3; military aircrafts made a number of sorties flying relief supplies including food, water and medicines into the Valley for the Indian troops.

After Indian decision of obliteration of Article 370, LoC has become potential conflict with Pakistan under the nuclear overhang because of the simple fact that Delhi has changed the goalpost for future talks on Kashmir. According to Indian leadership, now talks will be on Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Post August 5th environment suggests that India with obliteration of Article 370 actually risked a high intensity insurgency in an already volatile state of IOJK; something India could not have done alone without external backing.

Pakistan’s Current National Security

Predicaments Developments in IOJK are neither random nor isolated as far as their impact on Pakistan’s national security is concerned. It is a dilemma imposed by our geography that Pakistan cannot stay isolated from regional developments. Even in some cases, extra regional developments also impact Pakistan’s security milieu; fast evolving situation in Middle East and ongoing trade war between US and China, are cases in point.

United Nations on April 21, 1948 adopted Kashmir resolution after India took the issue to the UN under article 35 of Chapter VI. Kashmir was declared disputed territory and call for a plebiscite was made as the said chapter outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes. The shadowy annexation of IOJK by India and insistence upon

its fabricated history has resulted in 3 out of4 Indo-Pak wars. With current clampdown on basic human rights in IOJK, there is a clear and present danger of yet another round of conflict. LoC is already red hot; both countries are already exchanging artillery fire. Earlier, in February 2019,both sides deployed air power. India lost 2 fighter jets on 27/2 with one pilot becoming POW; who was immediately returned by Pakistan as a goodwill gesture.

India is desperate to get a role in the region, belittling what Pakistan has been doing for regional stability. This is critical for India to present Pakistan as a perpetrator of global terror, while fact is Pakistan has been the biggest victim of non-state actors’ actions within and without.

Two most important strategic goals of India are:

•             Bigger role, both in the region and world.

•             Solving Kashmir through UNSC resolutions, but after changing its demography to ensure a win. Solving Kashmir will pave the way for permanent UNSC seat; vital prerequisite for India to embark on Akhand Bahart agenda of RSS.

Indian threat has been intensified even more after August 5, 2019. Kashmir has dominated the security debate as it’s going to impact both internal and external security dynamics. How things will unfold in coming weeks and months, depends on how Pakistan formulates and executes its strategy on Kashmir.

Apart from the traditional foe in the east, the country has been fighting an endless war on the west, which despite clear gains, remains a perpetually bleeding front albeit with reduced fatalities.

Notwithstanding these obvious kinetic threats, Pakistan’s security landscape is inevitably affected by certain other factors as well, like peaceful rise of China and her ensuing trade war with the US, culmination of US’ longest war in history in Afghanistan and growing strategic competition around various parts of Asia including South China Sea, Indian Ocean, North Korea, and stand-off between US allies in Strait of Hurmuz against Iran. All these geopolitical development swill directly or indirectly impact Pakistan. Hence, it is likely to continue to be in the eye of global security storm due to its geography and may continue to suffer if not steered wisely.

Pakistan’s Significance to China

Chinese trillion-dollar Belt & Road Initiative(BRI) is pivotal for turning China into a world commercial empire. The region of Azad Jammu and Kashmir gains unprecedented importance in the wake of US-China emerging geopolitical competition worldwide. US wants to hit CPEC just like India for almost similar reasons; CPEC has in fact comprehensively demolished the US envisaged strategic encirclement of China in South China Sea, notwithstanding US quadrilateral alliance with Japan, Australia, and India. Idea was that CPEC brings global connectivity to China, so that Beijing can invest hundreds of billions of US dollars in its reserves to reignite the growth engine, which has slowed down during last 5-7 years (from10% annual to 6.5%). Beijing has plans to expand BRI to 70 countries and CPEC remains a critical part of this Chinese enterprise. Road to China’s strive for challenging American dominance passes through CPEC.

Apart from this economic dimension, the north eastern region of IOJK is attractive due to its close proximity to Russia, China and Pakistan. The Indian action in IOJK gives the US deep state an opportunity for furthering its own scheme of geopolitical maneuvering in Afghanistan, which is instrumental in containing Russia-China-Pakistanat the same time.

While US has remained stranded in Afghan quagmire, China’s BRI has been helping Beijing in positioning China to rise peacefully as a peace broker to the conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq in near future through trade compulsions. These very aspects substantiate the growing geostrategic prominence of Pakistan /Kashmir.

The changing geopolitics has forced Pakistan to adopt a more robust offensive maritime policy, apart from safeguarding its interests attached to land component of CPEC. Pakistan Navy has embarked on an ambitious project of acquiring eight submarines along with multiple advanced naval ships. All these may help restore some balance of power in South Asia /IOR.

China – India – Pakistan Paradigm

Recent, Sino-India skirmishes in Doklam went full circle in locking both the nuclear powers into a possible warlike situation. India has recently expressed her envisioned two front war strategy, which basically relies on the premise of preventing Chinese ingress across the LAC amid a high intensity short lived Indo-Pak conflict adopting Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). After initial denial, the top Indian military brass has not only publically acknowledged its presence, but has also hinted at considering unleashing CSD against Pakistan.

Indian aggressive attempts to outmaneuver Pakistan’s nuclear threshold forced it to adopt a full spectrum deterrence posture, while retaining/displaying the resolve to adopt policy of first use. Though it carries a great promise of strategic stability, but still there is a sizeable Indian defense intelligentsia that conceives this as a weakness in conventional balance of power, hence sees an opportunity of a limited, high-intensity conflict aimed at shallow gains across LoC/IB. This community of India is of the view that such gains will serve a devastating blow to Pakistan’s national morale. Indian strategy is to choke Pakistan economically, while raising cost of its deterrence by triggering an arms race.

Adding current volatile situation in IOJK into above discussed strategic contest between conventional Indo-Pak militaries and growing US-China wrestling for dominance, it would be safe to assume that the probability of an armed conflict in this region was never this high in last 72 years, as it is now.

Critical Appraisal of Pakistan’s Response Strategy

Let us begin with the most critical question, i.e., if all these preparations as highlighted in earlier part of this discourse were underway in India, why Pakistan remained oblivious to these developments about IOJK or was it caught totally unaware /surprised like rest of the World? A critical and candid appraisal is needed.

It would be safe to assume that Pakistan missed the opportunity to preempt and did very little or nothing before August 5th on diplomatic and media fronts to expose and pressurize India. Whatever and wherever it reacted, it did once unilateral annexation of IOJK by Modi had already occurred.

In the wake of Indian move over IOJK, Pakistan repeatedly reiterated its intention to undertake preventive measures to counter threats hurled by India. Such a move had always been seen by the US and her allies as jeopardizing War on Terror, a metrics which puts Pakistan at a crucial position with regard to peace in the region. The equation exhibits importance of Kashmir conflict and consequences of Indian attempt of redrawing map of erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir for the world peace and stability.

On international fora, India always presented Kashmir as a bilateral issue, supposed to be solved under Simla Agreement at bilateral level without any third party intervention. While on the bilateral level, Indian policy on Kashmir is immoveable as it always maintains that Kashmir is an integral part of Union, hence no bilateral dialogue is possible. On the contrary, India showed willingness to discuss Azad Jammu Kashmir and Northern Areas(parts of heretofore Kashmir state) of Pakistan for which nation gave blood in 1947-48 to liberate from the clutches of Dogra Raj; putting added pressure on our diplomacy.

Despite the fact that since 9/11 Pakistan’s security challenges have grown manifold, it has made abundantly clear that Pakistan cannot and will not remain oblivious from what goes on inside the Kashmir valley; any undertakings however, demand a comprehensive understanding of the total security paradigm. Pakistan will have to work pro actively and diplomatically support the indigenous KFM, else the state will be dragged into yet another regional conflict with India, giving her the advantage to choose time and place of her liking.

Notwithstanding initial surprise, post August 5th Pakistan’s political leadership has repeatedly and quite forcefully warned the World at large about the potential threat to global peace emerging from regional conflict in Kashmir in near future; it’s a nuclear flashpoint that has the latent potential to engulf the entire world.

Geo-Strategic Implications

Strategically speaking, the clash of interests among big powers alone makes Kashmir a bone of contention; contested directly by three nuclear powers (intrinsically linked are the strategic interests of two extra regional nuclear powers i.e. US, Russia).

Gilgit-Baltistan region has for centuries been the most vital part of Jammu and Kashmir. It is now a key part of CPEC, the cornerstone of China-Pakistan axis and the flagship project of China’s BRI for global trade domination; it aims at connecting South Asia with Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East /Africa; the shortest route from Arabian Sea ports of Karachi and Gwadar.

The growing competition in different fields(fanning economies and military insecurities) is forcing China and India to gain access to energy rich CARs. International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was envisioned by India as alternative to CPEC. This corridor connects CAR to Iran and to India through Arabian Sea. Obviously, the route is not only much costlier due to its length, but also tremendously insecure as it goes through Iran and Persian Gulf, regions far from stable for long term investments and economic activities. The only alternative short and direct route for India passes through Azad Kashmir and Pakistan’s northern areas. Sooner or later, India will make a move to extend its jurisdiction over this area; current overture in IOJK may have this latent desire imbedded in it.

Apart from economic and strategic dimensions, Kashmir issue has become a cultural and social question as well.

Modi is planning to change the religious demography of IOJK, through ethnic cleansing and Hindu settlements in disputed territory on the lines of Jewish settlements by Israel. This drive itself is being fueled by right-wing Hindutva gangs, who have taken over India and have completely distorted her secular face. Hindutva ideology, much like Hitler’s Nazism, believes in supremacy of their own faith and considers all minorities in India as impure and hence, must be culled from Indian soil.

Modi appealed to the Indian society to”embrace Kashmiris” on Independence Day. It was sensible from both the domestic and international perspectives. But the news coming out of IOJK and even from mainland India, indicates that Hindutva’s control over Indian society has put Indian minorities in grave danger. Lynching of Muslims and Kashmiri students even within Indian cities has become new normal. This explains why Modi was compelled to ensure a complete media clampdown in the IOJK. Apart from that, Modi is now faced with severe internal pressure to act against Pakistan on AJK.

Apropos, it is beyond any doubt that the current fascist regime in India has nefarious designs against Pakistan /Muslims. Ruling RSS/ VHP/BJP has built anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistan sentiment so hard in Indian mainstream media and public discourse that BJP will have to continue undertaking some sort of anti-Pak overtures every now and then, to stay in power; hence current misadventure should not be taken as last.

Possible Emerging Scenarios and their Impact on Pakistan’s National Security

It is evident from the analysis so far that an Indo-US-Israel nexus is at play against Pakistan at multiple levels to close the Kashmir chapter once and for all. Hence, it is now prudent to examine the possible outcomes of Indian political discourse vis-à-vis Pakistan (Table Opposite).

A critical appraisal of the above scenarios suggests that Pakistan will have to walk a very thin line to fight for the Kashmir cause. Biggest challenge is that Pakistan will have to take the initiative and yet not to be seen as an aggressor as per international law. Having tested Pakistan’s response in February 2019, India may not escalate the situation along LoC any further than routine ceasefire violations, without consolidating control over IOJK. India’s best bet in current scenario is to maintain status-quo with a complete information and media control on developments inside IOJK particularly in the valley. This is where Pakistan will have to respond along with aggressive, non-apologetic and bold diplomacy. Proactive Foreign Office (FO) will produce results. If Pakistan keeps waiting for Indian action to react; Islamabad will be playing a losing game from the very onset.

Policy Recommendations

So far, Pakistan has given a standard response to Indian action of August 5th. Prevailing security crisis however, demands a robust and out of box solution, and that too in quick time. International community at best, will not go beyond condemning India over human rights violations in IOJK. In order to do that Pakistan will have to take the war into non-kinetic domains:

•   Information / Cyber Warfare

•   Electronic Warfare (EW) Spectrum

Relevant establishments must provide support to diplomatic efforts being done by government through operations in these two domains with focused goal of extracting authentic information from stakeholders in IOJK most importantly from general public facing the brutalities of Indian oppressive forces. Once information gathered, FO must disseminate it with proper narrative of the state of Pakistan.

A single video clip or picture can change the perception of India, which it has built so painstakingly over the years. Pakistan needs to keep world attention on IOJK and in order to do that communication links inside the valley must be established. Indian decision of communication blackout in IOJK was not random, but part of the planning. Pakistan’s response in these two domains will be purely non-kinetic, denying any involvement of arms. If executed properly anda local uprising occurs inside IOJK, it will make it extremely difficult for India to keep selling the terrorism card on IOJK. Burhan Wani was a local hero, India could not blame his action on Pakistan. Only a native uprising will be just and politically defendable for Pakistan on international forums. Even such an uprising will need support in the information domain.

EW Spectrum would be critical as it will enable Pakistan to keep Indian preparation in check. There is a possibility that India creates a deception in IOJK and opens war across IB on a spot like Pakistan’s soft-belly (Rahim Yar Khan – Kashmore) to sever Karachi from rest of Pakistan. There are rumors suggesting similar planning going on in Indian military headquarters; Pakistan must take requisite safeguards.

Pakistan must also keep refining standard diplomatic response along with taking into consideration above mentioned suggestions. Few areas where improvement can be made are mentioned below:

•             Pakistan, according to UN charter, can openly help Kashmiris in their fight. Indian intervention in East Pakistan and recent Syrian conflict between Russia and the US are clear examples.

•             India may try to capture areas 5 to 7 km inside AJK to make claim on the area. Pakistan army must have own similar plans and be executed preemptively.

•             Question of Kashmir must be debated among legislators on regular basis so that policy can be kept proactive rather than calling session of parliament on special occasions. Kashmir’s importance as vital strategic national interest must be seen by whole nation. Kashmir demands and deserves more pragmatism than emotional outburst.

•             Pakistan’s foreign policy needs more consistency, more inclusiveness of security institutions and constant review of emerging developments around the world particularly in South Asia.

•             Kinetic intervention from Pakistan has proven counter-productive as far as larger goals of Kashmir’s freedom is concerned. It created problems locally as well. State must adopt transparent policy in this regard. Proscribed organizations must remain ineffective and immobile.

•             Pakistan must establish a dedicated and permanent desk at FO focused on human rights violation in India against minorities. These efforts must be driven not by shallow patriotism, but true humanitarian grounds. In this regard, contacts must be established with oppressed groups within Indian society. This desk must be tasked to constantly arranging seminars and programs for this single purpose. Kashmir Committee must work along with this desk.

•             Especial efforts must be put on proactive diplomacy on Kashmir in P-5 nations. Pakistan embassies must conduct seminars, conferences and round tables with local intellectuals about Indian oppression in the valley.

Conclusion

Indian government has gravely endangered the global peace by unilaterally changing the status of disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to RSS/BJP actions in IOJK, future of 8 million Kashmiri Muslims is at stake with a probability of their systematic genocide or forced exodus from their native land. The subsequent strategic situation demanded an appraisal to assess the way forward for the state. This paper is an attempt in the same direction. It argued and examined various vertices of Kashmir’s geography, its linkage with national security and impacts of various policy options. Pakistan will have to act proactively. Standard diplomatic response will not be enough and a delay in decisive line of action will be suicidal.

Pakistan must ensure regional peace by adopting an aggressive and just policy on Kashmir, while also ensuring that state must not be seen as aggressor till the time an armed conflict with India becomes inevitable. Information and EW Spectrum domains must be explored for non-kinetic operations against Indian political and military leadership so that Pakistan can expose Indian atrocities and can achieve higher moral ground before any open conflict.

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