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	<title>India-Ukraine | IMR</title>
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	<title>India-Ukraine | IMR</title>
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		<title>India&#8217;s Defence Cooperation with Ukraine Hit</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/indias-defence-cooperation-with-ukraine-hit/</link>
					<comments>https://imrmedia.in/indias-defence-cooperation-with-ukraine-hit/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 08:03:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Defence Cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antonov-32 spares]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contracts with Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dependence on Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian military hardware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukrainian defense industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukrainian military equipment]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=12677</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Ukraine crisis outcome is uncertain and Russia’s future status as a weapons provider means looking at alternatives. India is carrying out a detailed assessment of its security interests as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War. Prime minister Narendra Modi and the National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have closely monitored the situation and reviewed the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/indias-defence-cooperation-with-ukraine-hit/">India&#8217;s Defence Cooperation with Ukraine Hit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ukraine crisis outcome is uncertain and Russia’s future status as a weapons provider means looking at alternatives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India is carrying out a detailed assessment of its security interests as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War. Prime minister Narendra Modi and the National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have closely monitored the situation and reviewed the situation and options for India with the top security brass.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has been a traditional recipient of the Russian military hardware while in the last few years, it has been buying a large amount of American weaponry too. Ukraine is also a source of a lot of military equipment and spares including the equipment for the Antonov-32 aircraft.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Till a few years ago, India was relying solely on Russia for its military requirements and over 70 per cent of its hardware was of Russian origin. However, with an aim of avoiding putting all eggs in one basket, India started buying American equipment too with over USD 20 billion procurements done in the last 15 years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The more immediate crisis is that diverse Russian materiel is awaiting delivery to India, for which substantial payments have already been made, alongside continually needed spares and components for the in-service kit to keep the military adequately operational.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-dependence-on-ukraine">Dependence on Ukraine</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For India, Ukraine was becoming a vital partner. New Delhi had chosen to increase its reliance on Ukraine in the repair and modernization of Soviet weapons, which constitute a large part of all armaments of the Indian armed forces.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New Delhi’s decision to partner with Ukraine was a consequence of Russia’s inability to fulfill part of its Indian contracts because of the breakdown of technical cooperation between Russia and Ukraine after Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbass. Moscow’s lack of access to the Ukrainian defense industry was costing the Russian defense sector dearly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Kremlin was extremely concerned about this, since the weakening of its position on the Indian market was not only a loss of profitable contracts, but also of geopolitical influence in an extremely important region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia’s reduced presence in India — resulting in part from Ukrainian defence competition —generated a vacuum that would inevitably be replaced by U.S. influence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia failed to increase the quality of its weapons systems and provided regular deliveries of defective products. For example, more than half of the 210 Su-30MK fighter jets bought by Russia are inactive due to maintenance problems.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Kremlin tried to discredit Ukraine as a reliable and honest partner. Russian propaganda and information campaigns were regularly carried out to spread the false narrative that Ukraine and its military-industrial complex produced defective products, were massively corrupt and engaged in illicit arms trafficking around the world.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ukrainian defence industry was steadily expanding its presence on the Indian armaments market — replacing Russia.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Contracts with Ukraine</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There were 400 contracts between India and Ukraine. The most promising areas of cooperation included:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Modernizing of Indian tanks and armored vehicles and equipping them with guided missiles.</li><li>Modernizing Indian radars and air defense assets.</li><li>Designing and manufacturing Indian ships of various classes.</li><li>Supplying components for existing Indian ships and submarines.</li><li>Maintaining Indian aircraft and helicopters.</li><li>Implementing joint Ukrainian-Indian research and development projects.</li></ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A large part of the defence design bureaus and the manufacturing facilities of the erstwhile Soviet Union are now in Ukraine. Ukraine had also shown interest in participating in other hi-tech programmes of the Indian Armed Forces, such as in supply of anti-UAV systems and upgrade programme of tanks which are in the pipeline.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia’s aggression has hit a multiplicity of Ukrainian contracts, like the upgrade of around 60 IAF Antonov An-32 ‘Cline’ transport aircraft, the supply of critical R-27 air-to-air missiles for Su-30MKIs and the transfer of eight Zorya-Mashproekt M7N1EW gas turbines to power the Navy’s four under-construction Talwar-class frigates. Two of these were being built at Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and two at Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), under a transfer of technology pact. The Ukrainian engines for the former two warships had reportedly been transferred to Russia, but not the ones intended for GSL.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the past too, Russia-Ukraine conflicts have led to delays in the modernization of the Indian Air Force’s AN-32 transport fleet. In 2009 India signed a $397.7 million contract with Ukraine for the upgrade of the 105 Soviet Era AN-32 aircraft. However, in 2014, the Crimean crisis ruptured ties between Ukraine and Russia, throwing the contract in jeopardy. India has signed several high profile defence deals with both Russia and Ukraine.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The extent of damage to Ukraine’s military infrastructure is yet to be ascertained. It has to be assessed if the production lines for supply of spares for the various equipment and weapon systems in use with the Indian Armed Forces are operational or have seen damages in the conflict.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some of the critical equipment that get their spares from Ukraine include the 130mm medium guns, spares for T-72 tanks as well as the T-90 tanks, the OSA-AK surface-to-air missile system, and Tunguska anti-aircraft weapon system.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike Russia, payments to Ukraine will not be as affected since the country is paid in dollars and not facing any sanction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ukraine was also aiming to bag a contract from India on the upgrade of Smerch multiple rocket launcher system.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/indias-defence-cooperation-with-ukraine-hit/">India&#8217;s Defence Cooperation with Ukraine Hit</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Could Ukraine crisis cripple the Indian Navy?</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/could-ukraine-crisis-cripple-the-indian-navy/</link>
					<comments>https://imrmedia.in/could-ukraine-crisis-cripple-the-indian-navy/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Feb 2022 04:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[An-32]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antonov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antonov upgrade programme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[indian navy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marine gas turbine engines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian weapon systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zorya Mashproekt]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=12434</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Russian attack on Ukraine has put India in a spot. New Delhi is facing demands from the West and Ukraine to condemn Russia, while needing to preserve its changing, but still vital, relationship with Moscow. The most visible aspect of India&#8217;s relationship with Russia has been arms deals. Russian hardware still accounts for approximately [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/could-ukraine-crisis-cripple-the-indian-navy/">Could Ukraine crisis cripple the Indian Navy?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Russian attack on Ukraine has put India in a spot. New Delhi is facing demands from the West and Ukraine to condemn Russia, while needing to preserve its changing, but still vital, relationship with Moscow.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most visible aspect of India&#8217;s relationship with Russia has been arms deals. Russian hardware still accounts for approximately 70 per cent of India&#8217;s weapons. But not many laypersons know Ukraine also plays a vital role as a supplier to India&#8217;s military, including providing crucial subsystems for Russian weapons.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ukraine and India have been engaged in an arduous process to upgrade the Indian Air Force&#8217;s fleet of over 100 Antonov An-32 transport aircraft. The Antonov upgrade programme was briefly disrupted by the conflict in Crimea in 2014. But Ukraine has, arguably, had primacy in the supply of one type of crucial system to India: Marine gas turbine engines to the Indian Navy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Around 30 ships of the Indian Navy use gas turbines from Ukraine&#8217;s Zorya Mashproekt as their primary source of propulsion. These ships range from the nimble Veer class missile boats (which displace around 500 tonnes) to the ageing Rajput class destroyers to the brand-new Visakhapatnam class destroyers (displacement of around 8,000 tonnes). Four frigates of the Russian-designed Admiral Grigorovich class, which are being built for the Indian Navy at shipyards in Russia and Goa, also use engines from the Zorya facility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Captain D.K. Sharma (retired) warned the conflict in Ukraine could potentially cripple the Indian Navy. Sharma had been spokesperson of the Indian Navy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sharma explained that gas turbines are complicated systems, which cannot be replaced easily. He noted “Warships are designed around their engines. If your ship is meant for anti-submarine warfare, it needs an engine that is quiet. If you need shoot-and-scoot capability, you need an engine that offers speed. These capabilities need specific components for cooling and auxiliary parts. You can&#8217;t replace a gas turbine with a diesel engine.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sharma noted that while the Indian Navy&#8217;s marine gas turbine overhaul centre at INS Eksila in Visakhapatnam could overhaul the existing engines, such a facility would still need parts from the original supplier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In November last year, Zorya Mashproekt signed an agreement with Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) to allow for ‘partially localised’ manufacturing of some components of the marine gas turbines used in India. But it is yet unclear how much progress the venture has made.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-soviet-legacy">Soviet legacy</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Navy&#8217;s relationship with Ukraine is a consequence of its Cold War era dependence on the USSR as its primary source of ships and equipment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Zorya facility was a major supplier to the Soviet and later Russian navies. In fact, two of the Admiral Grigorovich class warships that are being built for the Indian Navy were originally meant for the Russian Navy. However, Russia cancelled the order after Ukraine embargoed the sale of the engines from the Zorya facility, following the invasion of Crimea. For the four ships, India had to separately purchase the gas turbines from Ukraine for installation on the vessels.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sharma pointed out India would have to exhibit diplomatic dexterity to ensure that the flow of spares and parts from Ukraine for the gas turbines would continue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired rear admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande hoped that the Indian government would have found the means to have obtained spares as part of its stocking in earlier months and years of parts from Ukraine. He reiterated the importance of the industrial facility INS Eksila, which was inaugurated in 1991, crediting the Indian Navy leadership of the time for the vision to create a centre in India to service gas turbine propulsion and power generation machinery of several classes of ships, instead of sending them back to Ukraine or Russia.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">CAATSA trouble</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, Shrikhande said that the conflict in Ukraine could, nonetheless, lead to several complications for spares and new construction, including exorbitant costs for even simpler components and small parts. This is a phenomenon, as has been reported in the media, that the Indian armed forces encountered in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“In addition, if Ukraine becomes Russian territory or is under Russian de facto control, then it is possible that Western sanctions could apply to payment and transportation issues for a long time to come. As such, we can expect a renewed push for measures like CAATSA against Moscow that would impact us in several ways,” Shrikhande noted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Shrikhande added that all these risks point to a greater need to be genuinely self-reliant and ‘atmanirbhar’ in so many areas including aero and marine gas turbines for the Navy and Air Force of tomorrow.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/could-ukraine-crisis-cripple-the-indian-navy/">Could Ukraine crisis cripple the Indian Navy?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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