MILAN is a biennial multi-national naval exercise which started in 1995 with participation of four foreign countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand) in consonance with India’s ‘Look East Policy’. The exercise flourished under the aegis of Andaman and Nicobar Command till its tenth edition. With the growing stature of the exercise and requirement of a larger staging and hosting base, Vishakhapatnam, the city of destiny was chosen as the preferred venue for future MILAN exercises. The city is ideal to host the event owing to various aspects, namely major commercial hub, large port, steep coastal gradient closer to its shores enabling Ships to operate closer to the shore and long coastline offering excellent viewing experience for the public. The scenic view from RK Beach in particular, coupled with excellent infrastructure is conducive to host various events planned during MILAN for the local populace along the shore, such as Operational Demonstration and International City Parade.

MILAN 24 exercise would comprise two phases – ‘Harbour phase’ and ‘Sea phase’. The harbour phase, aimed to promote cultural sharing amongst the participating nations, would comprise of International Maritime Seminar, International City Parade, Maritime Tech Exhibition, Subject Matter Expert Exchange, Milan of Young Officers and various sporting events. During the Sea phase, ships along with Maritime Patrol aircraft and submarines of Friendly Foreign Countries would participate along with the Indian Navy’s Aircraft Carriers and other units. It will involve large-force manoeuvres, advanced air defence operations, anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface operations.

The MILAN exercise is an exemplary demonstration of India’s commitment towards promoting maritime cooperation and security in the Indian Ocean region. In a world where maritime security is of paramount importance, the MILAN exercise stands as a shining example of nations coming together to address common challenges and create a more secure and prosperous maritime environment. India’s growing strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region has further elevated the significance of MILAN exercise. It has become attractive platform for nations to build partnerships, exchange ideas, and enhance maritime security reflecting India’s commitment to being a responsible maritime power.

ALSO READ: India, US in talks to manufacture sophisticated, modern equipment in India

Among the countries invited to MILAN 24 are Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, UAE, United Kingdom, United States of America, Vietnam and Yemen.

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Brig Arvind Dhananjayan

India’s Submarine Development Plan (SDP)-2030 is quantitatively focused on development of Diesel-Electric Attack (DEA) submarines (SSKs) and Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSNs). It is complimented with the development and induction of SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles), which is imperative for nuclear deterrence on a regional and global scale to counterbalance the threat of China’s fast-paced naval modernization.

The Indian Navy currently operates two nuclear-powered attack submarines – INS Arihant and INS Arighat. INS Arihant was commissioned in 2016, and INS Arighat in 2022. The Indian Navy plans to build six SSNs of the Arihant class. The third and fourth submarines in the class, INS Aridhaman and INS Arighot, are under construction. The fifth and sixth submarines are still in the design stage.

The Indian Navy’s future plans for its SSN fleet include the construction of the Scorpene-class SSNs as explained in this article.

Acquisition of DEA Submarines/SSNs

Being largely oriented towards regional operations, the Indian Navy is predominantly focused on efforts towards safeguarding India’s territorial waters and deterring any inimical act of aggression by a potential adversary, either off the Eastern/Western Seaboards and the avenues of ingress into these waters or in the Northern Indian Ocean, which is traversed by favourable Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Concomitantly, China and Pakistan would have to set aside substantial naval resources to offset a surface and sub-surface threat from the Indian Navy to its naval patrols and mercantile shipping in these waters. The Indian Navy would also be tasked to effectively blockade Pakistan Navy’s attempts at any maritime misadventure off the peninsula. These tasks make it essential to have capabilities, among others, for maritime deterrence and sea denial.  While the former is a fallout of the combined operational capability of the Indian Navy, the latter would largely constitute the responsibility of the submarine arm.

Such an argument, among other financial and temporal considerations, would have influenced the decision to persevere with acquisition of modern SSKs and SSNs as part of the SDP.

Apart from the SSBNs mentioned, the acquisition of SSNs would significantly enhance the reach and stealth quotient of India’s sub-surface fleet, as SSNs have the capability to carry out fleeting attacks on an adversary’s static and sea-based assets, while staying submerged for protracted periods.

Growing Submarine Arm

Following the decision to introduce submarines into the Indian Navy six decades ago, imports and collaborative submarine-building ventures with foreign firms have effectively maintained a credible sub-surface fleet. In the aftermath of the Kargil War, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved a 30-year SDP to enable acquisition of 24 conventional submarines. Thus came into being a two-phase plan, with Project-75 and Project-75 (I) [75 (India)] constituting the initial phase, each envisaging development of six SSKs. The subsequent phase of 12 SSKs was envisaged to be undertaken indigenously. However, in keeping with the rapidly expanding maritime threat from China, the Indian Navy approached the CCS in early 2021, with a proposal to replace six of the balance 12 SSKs with SSNs, under the moniker of Project-75A/76.

Project-75, in collaboration with the French Naval Group (formerly DCNS), has now fructified, with five Kalvari Class (Scorpene) submarines having been commissioned and the sixth undergoing sea-trials.

Project 75A/76 

Project 75A/76 envisages the indigenous development of six SSNs over the present and next decade, with 6000-ton displacements and an overall projected cost of Rs. 96,000 crores. These vessels will be designed by the Indian Navy’s Directorate of Naval Design (DND) and manufactured at Vishakhapatnam.

Advanced Technology Vessel

In order to enhance the Indian Navy’s strategic reach, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme was commissioned, envisaging development of four SSBNs (INS Arihant, commissioned in August 2016 and INS Arighat undergoing sea-trials, with two more larger vessels under development). These submarines would provide practically unlimited range, with intercontinental strike capability, as a component of India’s nuclear triad. These developments were spurred on by the void created due to termination of a brief three-year lease of INS Chakra-I, a Soviet SSN, which ended in 1991; and the subsequent expiry last year of a 10-year lease of INS-Chakra-II, an Akula-II Class SSN from Russia. A further addition to these ranks will come in the form of another Akula Class Russian submarine, INS Chakra-III, slated to be leased in 2025 for 10 years.

Project-75 (I)

Project-75 (I) could not be progressed concurrently as envisaged under the 30-year plan due to various reasons. Hence, the Naval Staff Qualitative Requirements for the project were modified to include procurement of SSKs with state-of-the-art Air-Independent-Propulsion (AIP) systems, enabling them to stay submerged for longer durations and substantially increasing their operational range and lethality. 

In October 2014, India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) decided that all six submarines would be constructed in India, and in June 2017, it was reported that the contract for construction would be awarded under the “Strategic Partnership” Model (SPM). This referred to participation of Indian firms along with foreign manufacturers under the ‘Make in India’ paradigm of Defence Acquisition Procedure-2020. The DAC subsequently approved an enhanced budget in January 2019.

Concurrently, an Empowered Project Committee (EPC) was constituted to steer the project till contract conclusion and Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the project was accorded.  In January 2020, the EPC shortlisted Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and MDL as the two Indian firms that would collaborate with one of five shortlisted foreign manufacturers for the project. On 20 July 2021, the CCS allowed issuance of Request for Proposal (RFP) under the SPM to both Indian firms for a total amount of ?43,000 Crores, making this the first project under the SPM and India’s largest defence acquisition project!

The SPM envisages the setting up of manufacturing lines in India along with Transfer-of-Technology. Consequently, three of the five shortlisted foreign vendors exited, citing unfavourable contract clauses. Acceptance of the RFP by the balance two foreign firms saw MDL signing a pre-emptive agreement with German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in June 2023, while L&T had signed a Teaming Agreement with Spanish shipbuilding company Navantia on 11 April 2023 – both for the purpose of submitting a techno-commercial bid for the project. As per these pre-emptive agreements, Navantia would, if shortlisted, design and develop these submarines based on its Isaac Peral S-80 Submarine (due to be delivered to the Spanish Navy by end 2023), which boasts the most advanced AIP system in the world today. TKMS is, meanwhile, reported to be offering its Type 214/218 DEA submarines with AIP. Induction of Project-75 (I) submarines is expected to commence by the end of this decade.

Recent Developments

As part of the SDP, the DND, assisted by the DRDO, is reportedly working on the design of an indigenous DEA with AIP, soon envisioned to become the mainstay of India’s future SSK fleet. The DAC, in its meeting on 13 July, discussed the acquisition of three more Kalveri Class (Scorpene) submarines with AIP, as outlined in Project 75 (I), to be built at MDL and validated by France’s Naval Group, likely via a Government-to-Government contract. The Naval Group had earlier set up a 100% owned subsidiary, Naval Group India, with presence in New Delhi and Mumbai, to oversee the ‘Make in India’ commitment of Project-75, with an investment of over Rs 100 crores for establishment of three workshops for maintenance, spares and future refit of the Project-75 submarines. These workshops are also involved in validating the DRDO-developed AIP system for installation on existing submarines and those proposed for acquisition. An MoU between Naval Group and MDL was also reportedly signed, on 6 July 2023, for collaboration on the proposed acquisition of the additional submarines, which would include fitting of indigenous AIP and other onboard systems, resulting in a significantly higher indigenous content than before. Naval Group India would also oversee the fitting of indigenous AIP on existing Project-75 submarines as they commence their refit, beginning with INS Kalvari in 2024. The fitting of the indigenous AIP plug would require certain modifications to the hull of the submarines, including extension in length and subsequent integration, which would also be overseen by the Naval Group.

The revised Indo-French Joint Statement, issued on 14 July at the end of prime minister Narendra Modi’s visit to France to mark the 25th anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership, omits specific mention of these submarines but reiterates the joint readiness of both nations to explore development projects for expansion of India’s submarine fleet. This may be construed as a positive indicator for fruition of such acquisition by India.

Presently, design work for the SSNs is underway at the Submarine Design Group (SDG) under the DND, with the preliminary design phase having been completed in early 2020. The SDG, assisted by DRDO, is presently involved in the detailed design phase of the project. Construction of SSNs is expected to commence in 2023-24. with the first submarine expected to enter service in 2032.

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Surveillance over India’s vast 7,500 km coastline, a 2 mn square Exclusive Economic Zone, and island territories off the eastern/ western coasts is a colossal mandate. Add to this the onerous responsibility of being a ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and India’s Navy and Coast Guard are landed with the unenviable charge of protecting India’s waters/seaboards from all forms of economic/military intrusion. Both China and Pakistan have viable navies capable of choking India’s maritime trade and denying operational sea-space for military or mercantile movement. Apropos, the Indian Navy on the cusp of metamorphosing into a genuine blue-water force, needs to be able to project maritime power, control sea-space for furtherance of own operations and deny the same to India’s potential adversaries. It is therefore imperative that India looks at self-reliance and indigenization to consolidate and enhance the effectiveness of its surface and sub-surface arsenal.

With 18 operational submarines at present, the Indian Navy’s Submarine Development Plan constitutes a much-needed fillip, in addition to the existing sub-surface fleet undergoing regular planned refit, refurbishment and modernization, to maintain its submarine arm as a potent and lethal sub-surface force.

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“The Indian Ocean is a very complex area, because it is very important for almost the entire world. So much traffic goes through it. Therefore, while we are the largest resident navy in the region, we have to ensure there is peace and stability, because the oceans are the global comms,” he said.

At any point in time there are about 65-70 extra regional navies operating in the region, said Admiral Hari Kumar. “We as a resident naval power in this region keep track of all activities that are happening. There are Chinese naval ships operating…Chinese warships, Chinese research vessels and fishing boats in large numbers. And prosperity at sea is dependent upon peace, tranquillity, and ability to use the ocean freely and openly in compliance with the rule of law…That is what we try to achieve,” he said.

But this cannot be achieved alone, added the Navy Chief, maintaining that it has to be done in cooperation and collaboration.

“We have our outreach programmes. We have activities along with friendly foreign countries. We help them. We train them. We have multilateral exercises,” he said.

Speaking about the Navy’s future plans, he said the force has a capabilities development programme, which takes into consideration what are the possible challenges.

“I can tell you that we already have 43 ships under construction. Out of these, 41 are being built in Indian shipyards only. We have nearly 49 ships, the AON is being processed. And so, by about 2035, we anticipate that we will have about 170-175 ships that we will be able to meet challenges with,” he said.

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“The unmanned carrier can be controlled remotely and navigate autonomously in open water. It will undertake marine scientific research and other observations,” the Global Times reported. Assessments here suggest the drone carrier will revolutionise the PLA Navy capabilities multifold including long range strikes on forces beyond the ranges of conventional weapons.

The Chinese official daily reported that the autonomous drone carrier is capable of operating on its own. The unmanned carrier can be controlled remotely and navigate autonomously in open water. It will undertake marine scientific research and other observations.

The carrier, officially put into use after a year and a half of construction, is the world’s first unmanned system and scientific research ship with autonomous navigation and remote-control functions, and has been awarded the first intelligent ship certificate by the China Classification Society (CCS).

Its power systems, propulsion systems, intelligent systems, power positioning systems and investigation support systems have been independently developed by Chinese research teams, the report claimed.

“This is the first professional sea trial of the Zhu Hai Yun, which aims to test its autonomous navigation performance and the launching of the unmanned craft,” the report quoted Chen Dake, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and director of the Southern Marine Science and Engineering Guangdong Laboratory, as saying.

The ship can carry out comprehensive marine survey tasks such as ocean surveying and mapping, ocean observation, sea patrol and partial survey and sampling, the report claimed.

The primary assessments by Indian experts suggest this drone carrier may be operated remotely and utilised for a variety of tasks, including environmental monitoring, oceanography, maritime security, search and rescue, and more.

Geopolitical analyst Dr Rituraj Mate told The Pioneer, “The carrier enables the remote operator to send and receive data. There are many different payloads installed, such as cameras, sensors, and sampling tools. They can also break through ice and work in bad weather. It may be used for long-term monitoring and research projects in addition to short-term missions like search and rescue operations combined with other nautical vessels, such ships or submarines, to expand their range and capabilities. The carrier is likely to induce more confrontations in the countries in the South China Sea region.”

“Such remotely operated drone carriers will bring more confidentiality to the Navies and also decrease human involvement and expenditure enabling that nation to use the same resources in other areas. The chances of the accidents will also decrease,” Dr Mate said.

Introduction of the drone carrier will enhance the PLA Navy’s capacity and capability in a variety of ways, including through increased battlefield awareness, detailed and real-time view of the battlefield with the help of modern sensors and cameras, he added.

This is likely to enhance naval electronic warfare gadgetries by regional navies.

Trainee defence analyst at security research firm Kawach, Sai Priya Arukonda said the latest addition to the Chinese PLA Navy will give a straightforward edge in combat and it can restrict access to enemy soldiers, discover and track submarines as well as being able to quickly recognize and track enemy forces.

“The drone carrier will improve the situational awareness for the PLA Navy in the region, allowing them to gather and transmit real-time information about Indian Navy forces and the surrounding areas in IOR. The launch of the drone carrier will propel the Chinese navy to attempt and create anti-access and anti-denial zones for the regional navies,” Arukonda added.

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India has come out with a notice to airmen (NOTAM), announcing that it would be needing 5,400 km of the air space starting from APJ Abdul Kalam Island off the coast of Odisha in a southerly direction over the Bay of Bengal. The 5,400-km-specific NOTAM indicates that an ‘Agni-V’ series missile could be test-fired, a source who tracks missiles said. But nothing could be speculated on the nature of the missile, he added.

 ‘Yuan Wang 5’ is a missile-tracking ship and it is in the international waters. Last month, another vessel ‘Yuan Wang 6’ had entered the Indian Ocean, coinciding with a planned Indian missile launch which was then deferred.

In August, ‘Yuan Wang 5’ was slated to visit Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. When India protested with the neighbouring country, Colombo deferred the visit of the Chinese vessel.

Built at Jiangnan shipyard in China, ‘Yuan Wang 5’ entered service in 2007. Termed as a “research vessel” by the Chinese, it is a spy ship equipped with a tracking technology on board for transoceanic aerospace observation. It has an effective range of almost 700 to 750 km radius, which means that the vessel can spy on the India’s planned missile test.

A US Department of Defence report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” released on November 30 describes how the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Space Systems Department (SSD) of China operate such assets.

“The SSF operates tracking, telemetry and command stations in several locations worldwide. The SFF and the SSD operates Yuan Wang space support ships that track satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches,” read the report.

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While outlining the situation in the Indian Ocean Region and the Indo-Pacific, the Navy chief also said the Ukraine conflict has taught India to be self-reliant in Defence production. The nearly 10-month-old war has not impacted the Navy’s procurements.

Giving a low down on the increasing Chinese visibility in the strategically important Indian Ocean, Admiral Kumar said there are a lot of Chinese ships in the region including research vessels, warships and merchant ships. The Indian Navy is keeping a close watch, he said adding there are more than 60 other extra-regional forces also present in the ‘vital region.’

Elaborating upon the importance of the Indian Ocean, Kumar said large amount of trade transits through the sea lanes of the region besides energy supply of several nations. The Indian Navy keeps track of the ships and will not allow vessels inimical to the country’s interest, the Navy chief said.

Informing that Chinese fishing vessels operate all over the world including the Indian Ocean Region, Admiral Kumar said, “our job is to track them through robust surveillance and not allow them to fish in India’s exclusive economic zone.”

On the issue of the Quad formation, the Navy chief said it is not a military treaty.  Like-minded countries having democratic traditions have come together to form the grouping, Admiral Kumar said.  China has all along criticised the Quad grouping claiming it will lead to the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific Region.  US, Japan, India and Australia are part of the Quad grouping and regularly hold the Malabar series of naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific.

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These comments could cause deep tremors in New Delhi, which is already alarmed by Chinese antics at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, stated that despite the Himalayan conflict that “cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future,” New Delhi shouldn’t view Beijing as a threat to its interests in the Indian Ocean.

Speaking at a King’s College seminar, Zhou further argued that India must understand that Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean will increase in frequency.

“To safeguard China’s growing interests in the Indian Ocean and maintain the security of strategic sea lanes, the Chinese Navy must maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean,” he said.

“It is only a matter of time before a Chinese carrier strike group appears in the Indian Ocean.” If New Delhi views the Indian Ocean as the “Great Ocean for Hindus” or India as the “Net Security Provider” for the Indian Ocean, friction and even violence between the two sides are likely, Zhou said.

These statements are in stark contrast with the Chinese position that its Navy is only used to protect its national sovereignty, unlike the US Navy, which uses its carrier battle groups for achieving “world hegemony.”

Earlier, Chinese state-run Global Times had stated that its newest carrier Fujian would only be deployed in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea.

Besides hinting at PLAN’s enhanced presence in the Indian Ocean Region, especially by its carrier battle group deployment, Zhou pitted the United States against India. According to the Chinese military strategist, the United States, not China, is the true threat to India’s rights and interests in the Indian Ocean.

He cited the USS John Paul Jones guided missile destroyer passage into the waters that India claimed as its exclusive economic zone last year. These comments come when India is going through heartburn at the US decision to provide F-16 maintenance support to its arch-enemy Pakistan.

 Jabin T Jacob, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, told EurAsian Times, “The Chinese arguments follow a common pattern – play up differences between India and the US, including recent ones on issues related to Russia, stressing that China and India share common interests and at the same time try to socialize India into accepting China’s presence and dominance in the Indian Ocean.

However, India will perceive China as a threat to Indian interests given the record and refuse to accept any Chinese dominance of the IOR. At the same time, it is also essential for New Delhi and other members of the Quad to now reconsider their approach of not having an explicitly military focus against China. Lack of clarity hurts the Quad’s ability to deal effectively with the Chinese threat.”

The Chinese military strategist further urged his country’s Asian neighbor to manage their disagreements better and stabilize relations and that the relationship could suffer dire consequences if mismanaged. “If left to fate, such an attitude is irresponsible and can also push China-India relations in a deleterious direction,” said Jacob.

These comments are significant for the policymakers in India and the Indian Navy, which has embarked on a new journey that could entail future engagements and even a stand-off with China as the dispute between the two sides shifts from the mountain to the sea.

China’s CBG Entry Into The IOR

Earlier, EurAsian Times had analyzed the works of Chinese strategists and specialists on China’s plans for developing a modern fleet and their potential application in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In essence, they support a protectionist and non-interventionist approach focused primarily on defending its sea lines of communication (SLOCS).

According to a previous analysis, there have been hints of a tough stance toward dealing with the US and India. However, nothing to suggest an aggressive stance that may endanger the core of Indian security from the sea.

However, a carrier battle group in the IOR may depart from this position.

Further, Zhuo’s assertion that India must not try to assume the role of a “net security provider” in the region indicates that there could be a challenge to the status quo in the IOR, as well as to India’s policy objectives in the region that it regards as its backyard.

A glimpse of that has been visible with a Chinese spy ship Yuan Wang 5 docking at Sri Lanka in August.

According to Ye Hailin, Vice-President of the Institute of Asia Pacific and Global Strategy in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), China has never considered India as the key concern; whether it is a partner or an opponent, it is always on a secondary level.

The PLAN is already far bigger than the Indian Navy and is expanding rapidly because it is reorienting and growing to challenge the US Navy.

Beijing might use excessive maritime power against the IOR in the short term. The logistical difficulties of conducting operations in the IOR will be significantly reduced by the presence of an overtly military facility in Djibouti and proximity to numerous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ports.

It is important to note that China already has about 15 frontline replenishment ships. The PLAN’s ability to undertake out-of-area operations is no longer as constrained with the Y-20 strategic airlifter in service, quickly rising numbers.

Further, it has three aircraft carriers in its inventories with state-of-the-art vessels like the Type 054 and the Type 055 in its inventory.

Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor in Chinese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, decoded the comments for EurAsian Times.

According to Kondapalli, “The Chinese argument for India is that the latter should not go with the United States, but if you put things in perspective, India does not have a dispute with the US except for marginal yet manageable issues.

On the contrary, Chinese troops killed 20 Indian soldiers in Galwan not too long ago. China is essentially taking the same line as the US when it says it wants to expand its presence to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS).

With PLAN in the IOR, it is an entirely different ballgame because there’s an active dispute and rivalry between India and China. It is, in fact, provocative for China to sail its carrier in the Indian Ocean waters.

“Chinese surveillance ships have been mapping the Bay of Bengal (BoB) and trying to mine the area for minerals. With India’s expanding economic growth needs, the prospect of having China mine these minerals from its maritime backyard would be seen as a threat.

The US does sail these waters, but like China, it is not putting pressure on Sri Lanka or the Maldives to grab islands or on Pakistan and Bangladesh to take their ports to balance India. The real challenge to India can never be the United States despite their differences, and there’s absolutely no comparison between Chinese and US presence in the IOR.”

The Western Pacific and the Northern Indian Ocean (from the Middle East and East Africa to the Strait of Malacca) are identified as the core zones for the PLAN.

The PLAN will not challenge the Quad nations in this area as it can only spare three to four ships in the northern IOR and is engaged in an “away game” with inadequate logistical support.

However, with the expansion that the PLAN is undertaking now and going by the statements made by an influential military strategist, this could be in for a significant change.

– Sakshi Tiwari

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Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The map alongside shows the major sea routes between East and West and the choke points on the Sea Lanes of Communications. India, with its unique peninsular shape jutting into the Indian Ocean makes it the biggest player in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Ocean Region stands out for its economic potential and riches, as follows:

•   28 states (21 are members of the IOR Assn)

•   17.5% of global land area

•   35.0% of the world’s total population (2.6 bn of which 1.3 bn Indian)

•   16.8% of all oil reserves

•   27.9% of all natural gas reserves

•   35.5% of global iron production

•   17.8% of world gold production

•   28% of global fish capture

•   Major sea routes connecting East and West

•   50% of world’s sea-borne oil

•   23 of the world’s top 100 container ports

China seems to be on its way to building a global alliance system of its own.  China aspires to equal and eventually surpass America.

It is well known that China has increased strategic engagement and military exchanges with Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.

Next are South-east Asian nations including Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos as well as states further afield such as Egypt and Brazil.

However, China has a formal mutual defence treaty only with North Korea. Pakistan is like a client state. Compared to China, US alliances involve mutual defence clauses, extensive troop-basing agreements, and joint military capabilities.

Many friendly countries also fear China’s rise. There is a trust deficit. Except Russia, most have deepened ties with China primarily for economic reasons including New Zealand.

From Brown to Blue Waters

The establishment of a naval logistics facility in Djibouti in 2017 was justified by the Chinese government claiming that it will support peacekeeping operations, the protection of overseas citizens, anti-piracy operations, and protection of regional BRI-related investments.

The PLAN commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, its second and third aircraft carriers are afloat. Since then it has deployed Type 55 guided-missile cruisers, Type 52C/D destroyers and Type 54A frigates for anti-piracy operations.

It is also expanding its fleet of replenishment and auxiliary vessels, including oilers, salvage and rescue ships, hospital ships, and transport vessels.

China has increased its military-related engagements with countries in the IOR. Its aggregate number of outbound naval port calls and international military exercises began rising dramatically in 2013.

Both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines have undertaken patrols in the Indian Ocean and made port calls at friendly countries.’

Chinese Navy Buildup

The Chinese have other priorities such as Taiwan and Japan before they can come to Indian Ocean. And if they try to deploy a carrier, India is capable enough to handle them.

Nevertheless, China has been constructing aircraft carriers at a fast pace with a projected plan to operate 10 carriers by 2050. At present their third and most advanced aircraft carrier is being built with the first one, Liaoning, being commissioned in 2012 and second, Shandong, in 2019.

Similarly, Currently, PLANSF operates a fleet of 66 submarines which include nuclear as well as conventional submarines. 7 Ballistic missiles submarines are in service (8 more are planned).

Future Prospects

So, Can China and India come to an understanding on the territorial disputes between them?

Will India and China accommodate each other’s spheres of interest and spheres of influence?

Finally, Can India and China get along in the future?

When it comes to territorial claims, the problem with China is that it conjures up the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty to show all of Tibet, parts of J&K and Arunachal Pradesh. But that is the Chinese version of history and Chinese maps.

However,  findings of a project report presented on 23 Jun 2022 at the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China conclude that Tibet was never a part of China before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded it in 1950. Maps from the Ming and Qing dynasties were presented to prove that Tibet was never part of a Chinese empire.

On the question of territorial disputes, the first requirement is to restore the status quo ante on April 2020. India has been consistently maintaining that peace and tranquillity along the LAC were key for the overall development of the bilateral ties.

India and China have held 15 rounds of military talks so far to resolve the eastern Ladakh row. As a result of the talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year on the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

In September 2022, before the SCO summit in Samarkand on 16 September 2022, both sides agreed to further disengagement.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the sensitive sector.

China seems to be exploring a new India strategy that rests on exhibiting its strength advantage (by normalizing border conflicts like the Galwan Valley clash) alongside tactical cooperation (by ensuring that there isn’t a complete breakdown in bilateral ties and keeping the door open for working together when it is in Chinese interest).

At the same time, escalation of tensions or a full-scale conflict is carefully averted so that the United States, whom China considers its principal adversary, does not get to reap a benefit from the situation.

It must be noted that since 1962, the Indian Army is deployed on the Chinese borders vary of any land grab by the Chinese as happened in Sumdorong in 1986. Despite 22 rounds of talks between the SRs no progress worth its name has been made in resolving the territorial disputes.

In the Western Sector, ie, Aksai Chin, the Chinese have made the Sinkiang highway and have planned another one. All creeping forward actions in Ladakh are to protect the new highway from Indian threats. They are unlikely to give up their claims in this area at all.

China is in possession of the Shaksgam Valley ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963. This was also done at China’s request to give depth and for the security of the Karakoram highway.

In fact, the Chinese would like to destroy the road infrastructure and the landing strips made close to the LAC in Ladakh to deny it to Indian forces.

In Southern Ladakh, the Pangong Tso area provides avenues for the Chinese advance to Leh. For tactical reasons, the Chinese will never agree to give up their claims in that area.

In the Eastern Sector, China claims the whole of Arunachal province as Southern Tibet. They have never recognised the McMahon Line as the border between India and Tibet. But indications have been given that they could be amenable to a trade off based on settled populations. It remains to be seen what they mean by settled populations since when residents of Arunachal apply for visas to visit China they issue them on separate paper slips and not on their Indian passports claiming that residents of Arunachal are citizens of China.

Expanding the scope of China’s interests further, Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, its BRI or Two Oceans Strategy, that is, China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, aimed at connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies under Chinese leadership and opening up a dedicated Indian Ocean exit for China, rests heavily on India.

India’s cooperation can secure Chinese gains of vital geopolitical and economic consequences, and its non-cooperation can pose the biggest hurdle to China’s South Asia strategy and advancement of its Indian Ocean footprints.

But to solicit this Indian cooperation, China is unwilling to pay a strategic cost or make any real tradeoff, such as accommodating India’s concerns or aspirations on the disputed border or South Asia or concerning its membership of international organizations.

Deep down, China recognizes India as a key threat that can intercept its energy lifelines, has the potential to replace it in global supply chains, and can compete with China in various international bodies, thereby challenging China’s ability to achieve an “overwhelming power advantage in Asia.”

China may well ask, “What if India manages to get these concessions from China, but still chooses to cooperate with the United States?”

India’s membership of the QUAD, with its political, military, and economic implications also makes China vary of India.

India will never approve of China’s BRI initiative since it has become clear that the real purpose is to help China gain access to strategic infrastructure and potential bases in India’s neighbourhood.

India’s Options

India would do well to come to terms with and perhaps leverage its increasing strategic value to China.

By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in influencing Chinese strategic outcomes Indian policymakers can potentially extract greater concessions and conciliation.

The Tibetan govt-in-exile, the Dalai Lama’s succession, Taiwan, QUAD, BRI, its naval power projection in the South China Sea, its leadership role in global organisations, US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) (aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative in low and middle-income countries), India’s own growing bilateral relations and relevance with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Iran, SAARC countries and the clout offered by a growing economy and market size are levers that India can use against China.

India must also consider the following steps to dissuade China from precipitating problems for India: –

• Improvement in geopolitical, cultural. and military relationships with BIMSTEC and other Countries in IOR.

• Make tangible investments in the countries in IOR,  for strengthening their infrastructure and meet their military needs, to mitigate their overdependence on China.

• Appreciate the importance of India’s relationship with Russia and initiate measures to reassure Russia to fortify that relationship.

• Upgrade capabilities of its defence forces and Coastguard on priority.

Conclusion

My conclusion is that:

The on-going Sino-Indian border crisis has revealed that China has little respect for India’s long-standing efforts to freeze the status quo along the two countries’ disputed frontiers or for New Delhi’s cautious efforts to avoid the appearance of balancing against Beijing.

Rather, it has chosen to expand its control over new parts of the Himalayan borderlands through brazen actions that confront India with the difficult choice of either lumping its losses or escalating through force, if the negotiations presently under way yield meagre returns.

It has forced India to join the rest of Asia in figuring out how to deal with the newest turn in China’s salami-slicing tactics, which now distinctively mark its trajectory as a rising power.

Over the centuries China looked up to Buddhist India. A millennium later, India held Imperial China in great regard. Today, China does not see India as a fellow great power. From a position of strength China does not see the need to accommodate India.

The opposite applies to India. From a position of weakness India feels it cannot afford to accommodate China without loss of standing and strategic autonomy.

Compared to the enormous disparities in economic strength, India and China are not as far apart in military strength. Given the stopping power of the Himalaya and the maritime distances, the imbalance is less daunting.

There will be more Ladakhs. China is likely to be more aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh, which is strategically more important because it’s rich in resources.

China’s comprehensive national power is about seven times that of India. Until India substantially closes the power gap, there’s little prospect of a lasting rapprochement.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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China’s base in Djibouti is its first overseas military base, built at a cost of $590 million and has been under construction since 2016. It is located by the strategic Bab-El-Mandeb Strait which separates the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea and guards the approach to the Suez Canal, one of the most critical channels of international commerce.

China’s Djibouti base “is built in a fortified way, with layers of defences which appear almost medieval, like a modern day colonial fort. It is clearly designed to withstand direct assault,” says Naval Analyst HI Sutton of Covert Shores.

 Significantly, the images from imagery provider Maxar show a Chinese Yuzhao-class landing ship (Type 071) docked along a 320-metre-long berthing area located near an apron that supports helicopter operations.

“The base appears fully operational though there is more construction work likely to take place,” says Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retired). “They can positively dock ships on both sides of the breakwater. Though the width of the jetty is narrow, it is large enough to take on a Chinese helicopter carrier.”

The ship, identified as the Changbai Shan, is a large 25,000-tonne vessel designed to embark up to 800 soldiers and a combination of vehicles, air-cushioned landing craft and helicopters. It is thought to have been accompanied by a frontline Chinese destroyer when it entered the waters of the Indian Ocean this year.

“The Type-071 landing ship is very large and can carry many tanks, trucks and even hovercraft,” says HI Sutton. “A fleet of these form the backbone of China’s amphibious assault forces, although even more impressive ships are now joining the fleet. Its size and capability means that it is also used for logistics missions, transporting vital supplies.”

 Yuzhao-class ships are designed to operate as flagships of a Chinese task force engaged in a range of operations from amphibious assaults to humanitarian support. The Chinese Navy has inducted five ships of this class with three more in various phases of fitting-out before they are commissioned.

Images of the fully operational base in Djibouti come at a time when China has docked the 25,000-tonne satellite and ballistic missile tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 in the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. Sri Lanka belatedly allowed China to dock the ship for replenishment after initially asking Beijing to defer its arrival after concerns voiced by New Delhi.

“With a robust tracking, sensing and communication relay system the Yuan Wang 5 is certainly capable of detecting foreign satellites, aerial assets and missile systems. This allows the vessel to support Chinese military missions far from home,” says Damien Symon, a senior researcher with The Intel Lab who has been tracking the movement of the ship as it entered the Indian Ocean.

“The presence of the vessel in the Indian Ocean region allows it to monitor space events located away from the Chinese mainland while possibly providing an extended real time communication network to its overseas bases and ground assets, such as deployments in Djibouti, peacekeeping forces in Africa and anti-piracy maritime missions.”

 For India, there is a possibility of China being able to directly to track key satellite assets. “With the current India-China border crisis seeing no immediate resolution, the deployment of the vessel could possibly allow for monitoring of Indian reconnaissance assets that were reportedly tasked for surveillance missions around border surveillance, terrorist infiltration detection and anti-terrorist operations.”

China’s presence in both Sri Lanka and Djibouti are closely linked to its economic investments in both countries under its long-term ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Beijing holds the majority of Djibouti’s debt which is reportedly more than 70 per cent of the gross domestic product, or GDP, of the African nation. And has effectively taken possession of the Hambantota port through the creation of a joint entity with Sri Lanka for a lease of 99 years. This is after Colombo was unable to repay $100 million annually for the $1.7 billion loan that it had taken for the construction of the port, the first phase of which was completed in 2010.

Former Indian Navy Chief Admiral Arun Prakash says New Delhi should be under no illusion about China’s maritime intentions or capabilities. “It’s now been 14 years since they established a standing patrol off the Horn of Africa. Initially there was a lot of scepticism of their ability to maintain a distant presence. But they have shown that they can do this. They have kept ships on station for six to nine months.”

China’s presence in Djibouti is part of a detailed plan to establish its presence in the Indian Ocean, directed not just at the US Navy which has major bases in the Persian Gulf but also at the Indian Navy, the next largest in the region. The port of Gwadar in Pakistan will also be key to any further expansion in the region.

“What we see happening today is a manifestation of a well-planned, deliberate strategy of spreading their maritime influence,” says Admiral Prakash.

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