In the armed forces around the world, not much time is allowed to grieve over the loss of one’s friends and colleagues as the exigencies of service demand that the life must continue unhindered by feelings of remorse and without any interruption. It is more so in case of the air forces. The commanders around the world encourage their aircrew to get airborne almost immediately after an unfortunate event. Whilst in periods of wars and conflicts, this is an operational necessity; the probable rationale in peacetime for such an action is to avoid any adverse psychological impact of the tragedy on individuals. Normal life continues, as it should, and though the departed colleague is missed but he/she goes into the background and soon becomes a mere memory. I have no qualms about this practice as this is the way the air forces around the world operate and behave. I, however, have always felt that there is a need to remember these departed souls in some form or the other and pay our tribute to them every once-in-a-while. This could be in the form of a memorial either at a central location or at each of our flying stations where on one day in the year, say Air Force Day, we remember these colleagues who passed away often in the prime of their youth. There are some air forces which have memorials with the names of the aircrew colleagues who made the supreme sacrifice both in peace time accidents and during conflict situations. There are a few stations in the Indian Air Force that have memorials for those who laid down their lives during various wars and conflicts. Unfortunately, the contributions of those who died in peacetime accidents is less recognized and there is not even a single memorial for those lost during peace time in various accidents.

When one visits a flying unit, one normally notices two prominent displays either in the office of the commanding officer or in the air crew room and sometimes in the squadron museum; firstly, list of commanding officers and, secondly, names of those who have been conferred various honours and awards. The names of those lost in aircraft accidents while serving in that unit do not find any place! Should these colleagues be forgotten or should they be remembered in some form? Do we want these aircrew to remain unknown and unsung and should we wipe them off our memory? I strongly feel that their contribution to the service, whatsoever be the extent, should not be forgotten. We must respect their memory.
While one can debate how these departed air warriors should be remembered, the first step is to collate data and identify those that were lost in aircraft accidents. Preferably the list should begin right from the inception of the Service. This work is the first such humble attempt.

I have been mooting the idea of compiling such a data bank for more than 30 years and though the proposal was accepted in principle but the project failed to get off the ground for one reason or the other. Let me narrate the story of how this project finally fructified.

It was in 2007 that Directorate of Flight Safety agreed to let me have the data of accidents. But what I got was the statistical data from 1971 to 2007. I was told that the records for the period prior to 1971 were either not available or were incomplete. This was rather discouraging news but all the same I decided to follow other research methods. One of these was “crowd sourcing” wherein I expected individuals to recall various accidents involving their course and squadron mates. This method had some inherent lacunas but I was convinced that I would be able to find out about most of the accidents at least post 1960 and fewer prior to that era. I also thought of going through squadron diaries of every unit in the air force – a time consuming and costly process but the biggest hindrance was their non-availability as some of these had been lost and some units had been number plated or did not exist anymore. I had not contemplated the problems that I was going to face regarding the data prior to independence as I was more than sure that I would be able to get the requisite information from the British Museum which is the repository of all British WWII records. The project, however, went into limbo as I got involved in researching for my other books.

Eight years later, i.e., late 2015, when I was deciding on my next project, a number of events occurred almost simultaneously. I discovered that Air HQ did have the data about accidents from 1947 onwards and that I could have access to the same. At about the same time, Lieutenant General PK Singh, Director, United Service Institute of India asked me if I could take on such a project. (Flight Lieutenant Shailendra Kumar Singh, his brother and a winner of the President’s Plaque of Honour, the Dasgupta Trophy for being Best in Transport Flying and the Chief of Air Staff Medal was lost in an accident in 1973). Around the same time, a new chair was established in the USI Center of Excellence and funded by Colonel PS Gill in memory of his son, Flying Officer Amandeep Singh Gill, who was killed in a MiG-21 in 2001. The project was to be sponsored by this Center. There was no way I could turn down the request.

Every journey in life is not smooth sailing and there are many hurdles to be crossed. This project was going to be no different. The first hurdle that I faced was the realization that there were anomalies in the data on accidents furnished by Air Headquarters in that there were either accidents which had not been included or there were no fatalities in some of the accidents that figured in the list. I went through operational record books (Form 1500s) of all the units for that period and was able to correct some of the anomalies. However, to my disappointment, I found that the data in some of these operational record books was not complete and I found entries like “there was an accident this month in which all onboard were killed” – no names or details of the accident were recorded. There were also instances where the entire crew composition or full particular of the crew members were not mentioned. The unit diaries did not prove to be very helpful either. I then went in for crowd sourcing and many veterans narrated various accidents but did not have exact dates or full crew details. These inputs had to be corroborated and further authenticated. This finished work is the result of that effort though it is quite possible that I have missed out an odd fatal accident or name of an individual.

The next problem was getting the data about the accidents during the pre-independence period. I tapped three sources to get this data. Firstly, “The Memorial Book” – an Air HQ publication – that has the names of all IAF personnel buried in various cemeteries around the world. Secondly, various publications that dealt with the role of IAF/RIAF and the units during WWII. Thirdly, and most importantly, the contribution of my friend, an IAF history enthusiast and a well-known author – Jagan Mohan Pillarisetti. Notwithstanding extensive research, there is a possibility that I have missed out one odd accident but this deficiency should be accepted and I am open to any correction in this regard.

The Chronicle includes names of all the aircrews who were killed in IAF aircraft during the period from 1st April, 1932 when the first flight of No.1 Squadron was formed till 31st March, 2012 – a total span of the first 80 years of the Indian Air Force. It has personnel from the Indian Army and the Indian Navy as well as foreigners while serving with the IAF, those IAF personnel on Deputation to the Hindustan Aerodynamics Limited and the Aviation Research Center as well as erstwhile Helicopter Corporation of India (now Pawan Hans). An American test pilot serving with the HAL and a civilian instructor also figures in the book. Air Observation Post units were part of the IAF till 1987 and the names of the Indian Army aircrew who lost their lives in AOP aircraft have been also included. The Chronicle also lists those Indian aircrew who were killed while serving with the Royal Air Force or when they were doing some course abroad.

This Chronicle includes only those who were on board the aircraft as aircrew, including supernumerary aircrew, but does not include the ones flying as passengers. For example, the name of legendry Commanding Officer of No I Squadron, Squadron Leader Henry Runganathan, does not figure in my list as in October 1942, the Lockheed Hudson in which he was travelling as a passenger was hit in the tail by an escorting Hurricane of his Squadron. On the other hand, I have supernumerary aircrew like Group Captain JB Lal, then posted as Air II at HQ Western Air Command and who was killed in an An-12 aircraft in August 1971. The crew were involved in night bombing trials at armament range near Pune airfield when the aircraft hit a hillock killing all personnel on board.

As far as possible, I have tried to include the full complement of aircrew in transport aircraft and helicopters including warrant officers and SNCOs. Regretfully there were many cases where their names were missing from records and thus could not been included in this work.
In the data that I got from various sources, I found that the service numbers of individuals were missing in some cases. The best source of finding the service numbers are the Air Force Lists of the years gone by. Unfortunately, the old Air Force Lists for the first five decades, barring for three or four years, were not available even with Air HQ. The alternative was to go through the Gazette of India as well as London Gazette and see various notifications that promulgated the commissioning of the aircrew. Prior to independence, the commissioning notifications used to be promulgated in London Gazette and thereafter were reproduced in the Gazette of India. However, these notifications did not have the service numbers of the individuals but just the names – the same procedure was followed in case of personnel from the Royal Air Force. I noticed that in some cases, the service numbers of RAF personnel appeared in London Gazette when the notifications for their promotions and grant of awards were published. However, such entries did not appear both in the London Gazette and the Gazette of India in respect of the Indians. There must have been some other document to which I am not privy to where the promotion and postings of the IAF personnel were notified.

I was lucky to lay my hands on some Air Force lists for the period between 1941 and 1949 viz. 1941, 1942, 1944, 1947 and 1949. The Air Force lists of 1941 and 1942 did not have the service number of individuals. However, in the Air Force Lists of 1944 onwards, the service numbers did appear in the index. Apparently, the practice of allotting service numbers to the Indian Air Force personnel was started sometimes in 1941-42. Personnel recruited into the IAF during 1941-42 must have been allotted service numbers but these are not available in the records which I could access. I could not find any notification for those who were commissioned into the IAF Reserve list.

This practice of not including service numbers in the Gazette notifications continued to be followed till 1949 after which these formed an integral part of any notification both for grant of commission and for promotion and retirement etc.
Because of above mentioned problems, there are a few individuals, mostly those who died between 1941 and 1943 in respect of whom I could not ascertain their service numbers and their names thus appear without the same.

In most service documents, only the surname of the individual is mentioned and in some cases initials are also included. How does one ascertain which individual one is referring to when names like B Singh appear – are we referring to Bhagwan Singh, Balwant Singh or Balwinder Singh and so on? Hence, the necessity of including full name of every individual. In this work, as far as possible, full names of individuals have been included though there are very few exceptions where these could not be ascertained. My main sources for full names were Gazette notifications. Unfortunately, there were no documents in respect of airmen where their full names were available and thus in these cases only their initials have been given and not the full names.

I expanded my area of research to include photographs of the individuals. It is well-nigh impossible to get the photographs of individuals over the entire period of 80 years. Air Headquarters were kind enough to provide quite a few of them from the service records. I wrote to the next of kin of the individuals at their last recorded addresses but with the passage of time, most individuals had either passed on or had moved away and I got the response only from about 5% of the families. I was not very sure of the reaction of the families to my request for the photographs but I found that in each and every case, the families were more than happy and went out of their way to find suitable photographs and send them to me. “Crowd sourcing” proved extremely beneficial as most officers willingly gave me photographs form their individual collections. Quite a few individuals had photographs from their course mates either at the time of joining the IAF or institutions like CTU and JTW. With memories fading with age, it was not easy to identify various individuals but I have reproduced whatever I was able to obtain. There are some photographs of less than desirable quality but there was no alternative other than including the same.
Most units had their unit albums which I thought of for sourcing the photographs. The main problem I faced was that of identification as the normal practice in vogue was that no names were annotated in the squadron albums in most cases. National Defence Academy has photograph of every individual who joined it from 1955 onwards. I managed to obtain photographs of some ex-NDA officers. Unfortunately, none of the training institutions of the IAF follow this practice and were not able to provide me with a single photograph. Air HQ needs to look at this aspect and should seriously consider preserving photographs of every individual as and when he/she joins any training institution. The case of SNCOs/WOs was even more difficult as AFRO used to destroy all records in respect of individuals 25 years after their discharge. In any case, the procedure did not call for inclusion of photographs of the individual in the service records. Army Headquarters were also requested to provide photographs of the concerned Army officers but for reasons not known to the author, there was just no response. Naval Headquarters could locate and provide just two photographs. Those photographs of Army and Naval officers included in the book have been obtained from ‘other sources.’
One question that many of my friends have asked me is why did I stop at 2012 and did not continue right into 2016. The decision to have the data for the first 80 years was taken as soon as I embarked on the project and hopefully somebody would update this data when the IAF celebrates its centennial anniversary. Air HQ has already ruled that henceforth all court of inquiries into fatal aircraft accidents would have photograph of all fatalities.

I have included silhouettes of all aircraft that figure in this work. These are included inside the cover pages.

I feel privileged and blessed that Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh has written the “Message” for the book in his own hand. I could not have asked for anything more.

My thanks to Air Marshal Sumit Mukerji for composing on my request “A Verse to Fallen Air Warriors.” Group Captain Deb Gohain’s paintings adore various institutions in the IAF including Air Headquarters. He was very kind with his offer to paint a scene depicting “Missing Man Formation” which is at the cover of this work. To the uninitiated, the missing man formation shows three aircraft flying with one slot for the fallen aircrew being left vacant. Traditionally, this formation is flown at the time of the funeral of an aircrew.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge all the individuals who were kind enough to let me have photographs for this work. It is not possible for me to mention all of them individually. However, I must thank three individuals: Air Marshal Subhash Bhojwani and Jagan Mohan Pillarisetti for helping me get a large number of photographs. Flying Officer Nando Kumar Mukerjee served with 6 Squadron from 1943-1947. His son was kind enough to let me have three valuable photographs of that era.

A work of this nature is not possible without extensive support form Air HQ. My special thanks to Air Marshal S Neelakantan for providing constant support. I also thank other officers from Air HQ (especially Wing Commander PS Gujral), who were kind enough to provide the necessary inputs for this work.
Finally, my thanks to the United Service Institute for their support.

This work is my humble tribute to all the aircrews listed in this work and who made the supreme sacrifice often in the prime of their youth. I respect their memory. May their souls rest in peace and may their memory spur the future generations to do better and help make the IAF the best Air Force in the world.

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The IAF’s Mirage-2000s struck a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot on February 26, 2019, in response to the Pulwama suicide bombing attack in Kashmir in which 40 Central Reserve Police Force men were killed twelve days earlier.

The CAS flew a MiG-21 Type 69 aircraft of 51 Squadron in a formation comprising of one MiG-21, two Mirage-2000s and two Sukhoi-30 MKIs.The 51 Squadron was activated following the Balakot Airstrike in 2019, and Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman was a part of the 51 Squadron.

Speaking at a seminar in New Delhi, on 28 February, Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria said that the IAF was enhancing its weapon capabilities, sensor and network capabilities and enhancing ability for secure communication.

He said the air force could have struck Balakot with twice the number of warplanes and launched four times the weapons but it didn’t do so to ensure there was no collateral damage and India could take the moral high ground.

He said Pakistan’s response on February 27 to the Balakot air strikes was tailored to seek de-escalation as the neighbouring air force didn’t strike any targets and its action was aimed only at the domestic Pakistani audience. The air chief said the PAF was in a “hurry to disengage” and the IAF’s engagement surprised them.

In an interview to a newspaper, Bhadauria said the Balakot airstrike redefined the use of air power and marked a tectonic shift in government’s policy on national security.

He added that while there has been a “battle of narratives” over the event, and the subsequent air operations, the airstrike was one of the most important military operations undertaken by India. “The fact remains that the Balakot airstrikes were the most significant air action by the IAF in over four decades, when our fighters penetrated deep into Pakistan airspace, executed a precise attack on the terror camp and returned home unchallenged.”

At the time of the airstrike, Pakistan said there were no casualties, while New Delhi called the attack a pre-emptive strike that hit a terrorist training camp and killed “a very large number” of militants. Pakistan had countered India’s claim that it destroyed a Jaish-e-Mohammad madrassa, alleging that only a few trees had been felled in the Indian Air Force strike, and took representatives of some international media houses and foreign diplomats to the site in Balakot.

The air chief said that India was also able to use different channels to de-escalate the conflict and bring things back to normal, something that was not thought to be possible after the use of air power. He lauded the political and diplomatic efforts to quickly de-escalate the situation.

Weapons Edge

One crucial lesson from the Balakot air strike and air skirmishes that followed, was that India should not allow weapon edge over Pakistan to “slip back” once it is achieved with the induction of Rafale fighter jets and other weapon upgradation including indigenous missiles.

“It (weapon edge) did not materialiseat the time of Balakot and it will soon materialise with the induction of Rafale,” said Air Force chief. He said that IAF had an edge over Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in terms of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile capability at the time of Kargil. “We allowed that to slip and, thereafter, it took a decade and half in our struggle to acquire similar or better capabilities,” he said.

Pakistan Air Force F16s, which had come to target Indian military installations on 27 February 2019 were armed with the Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile AMRAAM which has higher range than that of the R-77 on IAF’s Su 30MKI. However, 36 Rafale fighter jets, which India has purchased come with Meteor air-to-air missiles that have a range of 150 kms. Presently, PAF does not have missiles to counter Meteor missiles.

“With Rafale we will recover the edge, but we can’t depend only on Meteor. This capability on Rafale has to be complemented with similar capability on our other platforms…The indigenous Astra missile is required on Sukhoi-30s, MiG-29s and the light combat aircraft,” he said.

Developed by the DRDO, the Astra BVR air-to-air missile has a range of more than 100 km. User trials of the missile have been completed and the IAF is expected to place orders soon. The missile is expected to be the standard long-range weapons across the air force’s fighter fleet.

Air Power in Sub-conventional Conflicts

The air chief said the decision to use air power in a sub-conventional scenario was a paradigm shift. It was a clear message to Pakistan that terrorist attacks on Indian soil were unacceptable and would draw a military response.

He said that Balakot air strike showed there exists a space below the conventional conflict boundaries, where IAF can be utilised for targeting, yet have controlled escalation.Air chief, Fali Major had proposed aerial strikes against terror pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks but the government did not take that route.

Bhadauria said the use of air power was considered taboo in sub-conventional conflict until the government took the “tough and bold call” to strike at the very heart of terrorist training infrastructure located deep across the Line of Control (LoC). “It [the Balakot operation] was a very clear demonstration that there exists a space below the conventional [war] boundary wherein IAF can be utilised for targeting and yet have escalation control.”

Bhadauria said: “We have instituted measures covering the entire spectrum of induction of new capability, operational training and tactics, which will further enhance the Indian Air Force’s operational capability to undertake any such mission at short notice.”

Defence Minister’s Take

Defence minister Rajnath Singh said India’s “out-of-the-box response” forced the rewriting of many doctrines across the LoC and an adversary would think a hundred times before any future misadventures. He said the surgical strike of 2016 and Balakot air strikes were not just military strikes but a strong message to Pakistan that terror infrastructure across the border cannot be used as a safe haven to wage low-cost war against India.

“Our approach to terrorism was and will remain a judicious combination of clinical military action and mature and responsible diplomatic outreach,” he said.

 “We have recently seen the impact of collective diplomatic and financial pressure on Pakistan. Terrorists like Hafiz Saeed who were treated like VIPs and heroes, have been put behind bars. We realise that this is not enough and unless Pakistan is made accountable, it will continue with its previous policy of duplicity and deceit. All attempts are being made to work in this direction,”Rajnath said.

CDS on Balakot Strike

Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat said it was important for the military to have credible deterrence to execute the tasks assigned to it. “Credible deterrence comes from the will of the military leadership and intent of the political class while taking tough decisions. This was amply shown after Kargil, Uri and Pulwama.”

Rawat said the Indian armed forces should stay prepared to get “launched again and again” should acts of terrorism be perpetrated on Indian soil.”If the defence forces have to be prepared to execute the roles and tasks assigned to them, it is important we maintain credible deterrence at all times… on land, at sea and in the air. The capabilities of the three services must run concurrently so that together they become a force to reckon with,” he added.

Former Air Chief Dhanoa

Former IAF chief BS Dhanoa, too, described the attack as a paradigm shift in Indian military operations. “The other side never believed that we could carry out an [air] strike inside Pakistan to take out a terror training camp that we successfully carried out,” he said on Wednesday. “After Balakot air strike, there was no major terrorist attack throughout the Indian elections because they were scared that we will respond again in the same manner or even more devastatingly.”

Army Chief on Naravane

At a media interaction on January 3, army chief General MM Naravane stated that the cross-border surgical strikes’ in 2016 and Balakot had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.

Gen Naravane said the strikes had shown the fact that terrorist camps, infrastructure and launch pads all can be taken down and that you cannot operate with impunity’. This statement prompted a response from Pakistan’s nuclear establishment.

At a February 3 seminar at the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies on February 3, Lt General Khalid Kidwai (retired), a former head and now an adviser to Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division and one of the most influential voices in the strategic establishment, issued a note of caution. Indian authorities, he said, were drawing dangerously wrong conclusions about what they are referring to as Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.’

Comments

On the first anniversary of the Pulwama terrorist attack, the question is how does the road ahead look with regard to India-Pakistan relations. As far as India is concerned, the onus remains on Pakistan to recognise the danger that terrorism poses to stability.

The question that arises is first, whether the objectives of the attack were met? And if yes, can or should it be done again? As in all military operations, actual objectives operate at many levels. The official stated objective was ‘self-defence’, given that terrorists at the facility were planning further attacks on India. The unstated one was sending a message both to a domestic audience and to the world at large, and Pakistan, in particular.

What mattered, and which Pakistan realised instantly, was that a Rubicon had been crossed as India shook free of its self-imposed ‘restraint’ despite the nuclear overhang. That has changed the situation for good. The desperation of the Pakistani establishment was more than apparent, as its Prime Minister used any and every podium to warn of nuclear war. The fact that no one paid much attention only worsened Islamabad’s desperation.

But infiltration continues to rise, though terror attacks have reduced. Balakot did not stop terrorism in its entirety, but then it was never expected to. The objective was to raise the issue to a new level. Today, Pakistan is under a severe threat due to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) questioning its every move.

Whether Delhi will choose to escalate or not next time round is the ultimate and crucial question for Rawalpindi planners.

Balakot gave the military the boost in morale that it badly needed after years of ‘restraint’. It gave the country, long tired of other Pulwamas going without retribution, a certain righteous belief in itself, and signalled to the world that Delhi was no longer going to play possum in the long battle against terrorism. A significant lowering of India’s threshold to terrorist attacks is what the aftermath of Pulwama, thus, represents in strategic terms.

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Strike and Counter-strike

Operation Bandar

The IAF’s mission to bomb the terrorist hideout in Balakot, Pakistan, was given the codename ‘Operation Bandar’. It was a rare operation in which the IAF crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and dropped bombs on targets in Pakistani territory. Balakot is a small town located in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.  On February 26, 2019, Indian Air Force’s Mirage-2000 fighter jets took off from airbases across India. The Indian Air Force jets crossed the LoC in J&K and bombed Jaish terror camps in Balakot with precision-guided missiles.

Pakistan’s Retaliation

Pakistan retaliated a day after. The Pakistan Air Force attempted an airstrike on Indian soil. The Indian Air Force launched its fighter jets in response, leading to a rare dogfight between the Indian and Pakistani jets. In the skirmish, an IAF MiG-21 Bison fighter jet shot down a Pakistani F-16 during the conflict. Indian Mig-21, which was being flown by Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman, was also shot down and he was captured by the Pakistani forces. After much deliberation, Wg Cdr Abhinandan was released two days later from Pakistan’s hold. This development calmed the tensions between the two nations after two weeks of heightened conflict.

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Defence minister Rajnath Singh (3R), CDS General Bipin Rawat (3L), Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria (2R), Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh (R), Chairman of DRDO, G Satheesh Reddy (2L) and Air Marshal KK Nohwar (retd), DG, Centre for Air Power Studies, at a seminar in New Delhi on 28 February 2020.

The JeM training camp at Jabba Top, Balakot

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Pulwama-Balakot Timeline

Feb 14, 2019. Forty CRPF jawans killed in Pulwama terror attack as suicide bomber rams a car laden with explosives into a CRPF bus

Feb 19. Jaish-e-Mohammed claims responsibility

Feb 20. NIA takes over Pulwama case

Feb 26. IAF bombs Jaish base in Balakot, Pakistan

Feb 27. IAF jet shot, Pakistan captures the Indian pilot, Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthaman

Feb 28. India gives proof of Pak aggression

March 1. Wg Cdr Abhinandan returns home after being released from captivity by Pakistan

June 26. No intelligence failure in the case of Pulwama attack, Centre tells Lok Sabha

July 3. Four of five terrorists involved in Pulwama attack killed and one arrested, Centre tells Parliament

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Orders of 40 Tejas aircraft had been placed with HAL in initial configurations. The deal for the 83 Mk-1A jets will take the total number of Tejas variants ordered to 123. The procurement of 83 of the more advanced Mk-1A version of the aircraft would provide a significant boost to the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Make in India initiative.

Tejas aircraft is locally designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), a laboratory under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and manufactured by HAL.

The LCA Mk-1A will come with additional improvements over the final operational clearance (FOC) aircraft, making it the most advanced Tejas variant so far. It is expected to have digital radar warning receivers, external self-protection jammer pods, active electronically scanned array radar, advanced beyond-visual-range missiles and significantly improved maintainability.

HAL is expected to deliver the first Mk-1A jet to the IAF three years after the deal is signed. The first LCA Mk1A will be in the air by 2022, with series production starting a year later, a full squadron delivered by 2025 and, with sustained manufacture rate of 16 aircraft or more per year, deliveries completed by or before 2029.

The deal was earlier expected to be worth around Rs 50,000 crore but it turned out to be cheaper as the IAF reduced its requirements for spares and support facilities for the fighter jets. The price tag is at least $1.3 billion lower than the cost proposed when the IAF and HAL began sanction paperwork in 2016. Unsurprisingly, it was cost that held the deal up, with the lower unit rate helping ease the deal through.

The IAF is struggling with a shortage of warplanes. The Mk-1A jets will form the bulk of the IAF’s combat squadrons as it attempts to make up the shortfall in its fighter fleet. Compared to an optimum strength of 42-plus units required to fight a two-front war, the count of the IAF’s fighter squadrons has shrunk to 31.

In a report tabled in Parliament in December 2019, the Parliamentary standing committee on defence said “all-out steps” should be taken to ensure that the “order book position” of defence public sector units such as HAL improved in the coming years and the ministry should extend full cooperation to achieve that.

Final Operational Clearance

The Indian Air Force’s 45 Squadron ‘Flying Daggers’ began inducting LCA Tejas Mk.1 jets in 2016 in the initial operational clearance (IOC) configuration. The first FOC configured jet – SP-21 – which includes an aerial refueling probe and beyond visual range missile (BVRAAM Derby) capability, flew for the first time, on 17 March, in Bengaluru. Both capabilities have been proven since 2016.

SP-21 incorporates all the FOC configurations plus one suggested at a later stage and HAL has put efforts to make sure that from SP-21 to SP-36 all come with the same equipment (and do not have minor deviation as seen in the aircraft of first squadrons) and maintains the same production quality so that upgraded Tejas Mk1A production line will be smoother and faster.

HAL will produce 16 FOC Tejas plus eight trainers before the reverse integration of IAF’s Tejas in initial configuration is taken up.

Lifeline for HAL

The deal will prevent a complete halt of production at HAL’s facilities. HAL’s order books are empty beyond 2021-22 and new orders from the armed forces – especially for the 83 jets – are critical for continuity in production. The Mk-1A jets will also serve as a stepping stone for the Tejas Mk-2 fighters.

HAL has faced a crunch following its near completion of licenced production of the 272 Russian-origin Sukhoi Su-30MKI at its Nasik facility and the BAE Systems’ Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) at its Bengaluru facility. HAL badly awaits the singing of the Tejas contract and to receive the advanced payment of 15 per cent of the contract amount to replenish its depleting finances. A year ago, HAL had to borrow money from banks to pay its employees.

Tejas For Export

The government has previously informed Parliament that it was ready to offer the Tejas combat jets for exports to friendly foreign countries and has also sent the jet to air shows abroad for flying displays and static displays to potential buyers.

HAL is developing a new variant of India’s Tejas Mk1 fighter jet to cater to the export market which will be marketed as TejEx. While HAL has not revealed what will be replaced or substituted in TejEx, it is expected to come with non-Israeli and Russian weapons and systems customized as per interested countries.

TejEx will have local or substitute option for each of these sensors and weapons starting with Indo-Israeli developed MMR Radar based on ELTA’s ELM-2032 and substituting its main AAMs like I-Derby and R-73 with Astra and ASRAAM or vice a versa as per export customer requirement.

Tejas Mk 2

The Mk 2 will have double the range of its predecessor and fitted with Astra II BVR air-to-air missiles with a range of at least 150 km. While Tejas MK I is for combat air patrol within the Indian territory, MK II will have the capacity to conduct Balakot-like surgical strikes in enemy territory as it will carry heavy standoff weapons like Crystal Maze and Spice missiles.

For the Mk 2, ADA in collaboration with its parent DRDO is developing the indigenous active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which is not only difficult to detect but also has high resistance to jamming by the enemy during engagement.

While work on Mk 2 is proceeding apace, ADA, in consultation with IAF, will also freeze the design of its twin-engine advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) by July. In November 2019, the IAF gave a written commitment to DRDO that it would buy the fifth-generation AMCA to strengthen its strike capabilities.

AMCA is expected to roll out in 2024 and take to the skies the following year. The Tejas Mk 2, fitted with heavier GE 414 engine, will be a 4.5 generation aircraft. It will roll out in 2022 and take to the skies in 2023 to join IAF by 2026.

India will soon be taking up Artificial intelligence (AI) driven unmanned LCA-Tejas Concept shortly so that technology can be developed for the development of the next-generation fighter jets in the future. Development of the Unmanned LCA-Tejas for proposed wingman concept was considered to be taken up after the development of Tejas Mk1 as a low-cost option to be deployed alongside a manned aircraft to either act as a complementary asset or as a decoy to protect the crewed system from offensive air defence.

There will be two phases of the program if approved by the Government. In the first phase, network-enabled Unmanned LCA-Tejas will be developed so that it can act as a force multiplier to the manned aircraft and be used as a wing man in dangerous missions with inputs from ground controller and the crew of the manned aircraft. The second phase is more AI-driven where inputs from the human crew will be minimal and can be used.

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MUM-T operations provide diverse and varied uses and advantages. Some of them are:

• Enhancing situational awareness of the manned platform by increasing the number of sensors looking into the target volume of space or providing inputs from the airspace not visible to the manned platform but from where threats can emanate suddenly.
• Placing a variety of arsenal in the hands of the pilot, far beyond the capacity of his platform (guided missiles, rockets, guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and more).
• Scout, early warning or dead zone look out role.
• Taking on the targets synched to the pilot’s sight in real time.
• Searching and selecting the targets and taking them on, based on pre-fed instructions.
• On authorization from the manned platform taking on a ‘repeat hit’ on the designated targets/auto re-firing (pro-active firing on its own) on targets perceived to be a miss on first strike.
• On instructions, leaving the MUM-T mission and branching off to take on a target located elsewhere(independent tasking, which can either be preplanned or impromptu).

MUM-T in China

China has a very strong and a high-end military drone force covering various ranges, altitudes, weapon carrying capabilities etc. Since most of its programmes have remained largely obscured from the public eye, full technical prowess of its machines is not really known to the extent desired. Most of it is assessed/inferred.

China has been working actively to develop drones that can not only communicate amongst themselves, but also, with the manned platforms in the MUM-T missions. The drones being developed will have one or both the capabilities, namely, surveillance or surveillance and combat. The Chinese developers are also actively building the ‘stealth muscle’ in their drones so that these remain undetectable by the adversary’s radar systems, also ensuring that there is enough usable space in these machines to load up substantial quantity of warheads.

One such Chinese drone – Sky Hawk also called the Tianying stealth combat drone – has the capability to communicate and collaborate with the fighter pilots in typical MUM-T missions.

During the National Day Parade held on 1 October 2019, China revealed a number of MUM-T enabled unmanned platforms that were under the veils of secrecy for years and not much was known of their developmental journey. One of them was Gongji-11 (GJ 11). This stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) is capable of undertaking autonomous missions deep inside enemy territory, or take part in MUM-T mode. Experts believe that GJ 11 (earlier referred to as Sharp Sword) is a most technologically impressive UCAV with a combat radius of over 1000 kms with 2×500 kg bombs or 8×100 kg bombs.

Another platform worthy of note was the WZ 8 supersonic reconnaissance vehicle. In a possible MUM-T mission with a strike force, such a machine will be able to keep pace with the force in time and space providing valuable and real time situational awareness.

China is known to possess the entire continuum of UAS both in reconnaissance, as well as, combat roles. For instance, in the category of Medium Range Long Endurance (MALE) drones category, (service ceiling up to 9000 metres, endurance up to 24 hours) it has three main types viz, BZK 005, GJ 1 and GJ 2. In the High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones category (service ceiling 18000 metres, endurance 24 hours+), it has two main types – EA 03 and WZ 7.

Obviously with such a unmanned aerial system (UAS) arsenal at its command MUM-T will be very much a practiced concept with China, as will be the autonomous attacks using UAS, swarm attacks, etc.

India is likely to see Chinese MUM-T operations unfold in any future conflict. Short of conflict, the MUM-T role for reconnaissance and creating situational awareness data is highly likely.

Pakistan’s MUM-T Capability

Staring from its humble beginnings in 1997-98, Pakistan has built a significant base of UAS over the years. Most of its machines are for reconnaissance and surveillance roles. Some known names are Ababeel, Bazz, Uquab, Bravo, Bravo+, Mukhbar, Flemingo, Vector, Shadow, Vision, Nishan Mk II, Border Eagle and Hornet, etc.

Pakistan also holds small numbers of UAVs from several countries (ASN 105A and ASN 206 from China, Luna from Germany, Snipe Mk II and Streak from UK, Falco from Italy and Seeker from South Africa).

Pakistan tried for a long time to get UCAVs staring with the American Predator during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) from 2001 but never succeeded.

During 2009-2015, Pakistan tried to develop an indigenous UCAV called Burraq (range 1000 km, maximum speed 215 km/h, service ceiling 7500 meters). Burraq is claimed to be a state-of-the-art UCAV similar in capability to the US Predator or the Chinese Rainbow CH-3.

In October 2018, it was reported that Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and Chengdu Aircraft Corporation entered into a contract to co-produce 48 Wing Loong-II UCAVs for Pakistan. Wing Loong-II is a state-of-the-art export version of GJ-1 and GJ-2 drone capable of MUM-T role. It is suitable for surveillance and combat roles. It can carry a payload of 480 kg which may include a variety of munitions (FT7 130 kg bomb with planner wing, FT9 50 kg bomb, FT10 25 kg bomb, BRM 1 guided rocket, AKD10 missiles suitable for targets like bunkers, fortifications and vehicles or laser-guided air-to-surface missiles or YJ9E anti-ship missiles, etc.) It has a maximum speed of 370 kmph.

Overall, Pakistan’s reconnaissance and surveillance UAS are not generationally advanced to have MUM-T capabilities.

Live videos of Burraq’s first firing in September 2015 on a terrorist hideout in the Shawal Valley (where it reportedly killed 17 terrorists) and, later on, other terrorist hideouts in the Tirah Valley in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province as a part of Operation Khyber, do indicate smooth flow of communication between the UCAV and its controllers

Whether this capability has been upgraded to adapt Burraq in a typical MUM-T mission is not known. Since it is likely, it would be wiser to accept that it has been done.

The Wing Loong-II is a top-end MUM-T player. There is no doubt that the MUM-T capability of Wing Loong will be fully exploited by Pakistan Air Force in any future conflict.

India’s MUM-T Capabilities

India started acquiring UAVs in 1997-98 with the acquisition of Searcher Mk1 UAS from Israel. This was followed by the addition of Searcher MkII and the Heron UAS.

These were first and second-generation machines suitable for traditional roles like surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, target acquisition, target support, direction of fire, etc.

The Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) also began development of a whole range of UAVs – Abhyas, Aura, Eagle, Kapothaka, Lakshya, Netra, Nishant, Panchi, Rustom, Ulka, Gagan and others. None of them are MUM-T capable.

On 25 June 2016, the Defence Acquisition Council cleared the procurement of 22 Sea Guardian surveillance drones for the Indian Navy for surveillance tasks in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) from General Atomics. Sea Guardian is the naval version of the Predator drone. The number of Sea Guardians was later reduced from 22 to 12.

In February 2020, it was reported that India was looking for the MQ9 Predator B (Reaper) with Hellfire missiles. The plan is to purchase 30 drones, 10 each for the three Services.

Reaper drone with Hellfire missiles is the top-of-the-line UCAV. This is the same drone which killed Maj Gen Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds on 3 January 2020.

The MQ9 has a speed of 313 kmph, 1900 kms range with 4x Hellfire missiles (or bombs). MQ9 is a high-end MUM-T player.

A $3 bn deal signed was signed on 28 September 2015 for the purchase of 22 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters from Boeing. 17 Apaches have since been delivered while the remainder 5 will arrive by end-March 2020. During US President Donald Trump’s visit to India on 25 February 2020 another deal was signed for an additional six Apache helicopters for the Indian Army. Hellfire missiles are the basic weapons with Apaches.

Apache is a tested platform for the MUM-T role. The MUM-T combination of Apache 64 E paired with MQ1-C Grey Eagle unmanned aircraft has already been tried out and tested by the US Army.

The crew of Apache 64E can control the sensors and the flight path of RQ7 Shadow and MQ1-C Grey Eagle drones – something which had not been tried earlier.

With Apaches already in the IAF inventory and the MQ9 Reaper drones in the pipeline, India will be surely move towards MUM-T capability.

The new platforms will have to knitted into common data links after addressing hundreds of compatibility and connectivity issues. Since MUM-T paired has been achieved with the MQ1-C and Grey Eagle drones, teaming the Apaches with MQ9 Reapers should be possible.

For effective MUM-T concepts have to be evolved. Network-centric communications riding on the current lifeline of BMC2 structures ( built on Air Force net or AF Net) have to be developed as common data links, critical skill-sets have to be identified and crews have to be trained, both in the manned, as well as, unmanned domain. In addition, specific battle drills have to be perfected.

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China’s Sky Hawk stealth drone has capability to ‘talk’ to fighter pilots, according to developers

China unveiled its stealth attack drone, Gongji-11 (GJ-11), at the National Day parade, on 1 October 2019, indicating it is in active Chinese military service

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Price negotiations are over. The deal is expected to be signed by April. The deal was earlier expected to be worth around Rs 56,500 crore. The over Rs 17,000 crore reduction in overall cost came after hard-nosed negotiations spread over a year. The defence ministry and IAF were initially shocked at the “exorbitant price” being demanded by HAL to produce the 83 Tejas Mark-1A jets along with the maintenance and infrastructure package.

With the contract price now settled at Rs 39,000 crore, the procurement file is being sent to the Cabinet Committee on Security for final nod. It should be cleared before this fiscal ends on March 31. Once the contract is inked, HAL promises to begin deliveries of the Mark-1A jets in three years.

The MoD placed an order for 40 Tejas LCA Mk I with HAL, including eight tandem two-seat LCA trainer aircraft, divided into two batches of 20 aircraft each in 2006 and 2010 respectively. To date, the IAF has taken delivery of 17 Tejas LCA in initial operational configuration or capability (IOC), which means the fighter jet meets the minimum requirements for operational deployment by the IAF.

The Tejas LCAs are operated by No 45 Squadron (Flying Daggers) at Sulur in southern India. The squadron is expected to receive three more Mk I aircraft in the summer months of 2020. The remaining 20 Mk Is are scheduled for delivery by 2022 in final operational clearance (FOC) configuration. The Tejas Mark I LCA was awarded FOC status by the Indian Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in February 2019.

In February 2019, the LCA was given final operational clearance by Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC).

Crucial for HAL’s Order Books

Only two fighter production lines were open at HAL – one for Sukhoi-30s and the other for LCA Tejas. The Sukhoi-30 line is expected to shut after HAL delivers 12 fighter jets to IAF as part of an order likely to be signed later this year.The Tejas order was crucial for the HAL to prevent a complete halt of production at its facilities. HAL’s order books are empty beyond 2021-22 and new orders from the armed forces are critical for continuity in production. In a report tabled in Parliament in December 2019, the Parliamentary standing committee on defence said “all-out steps” should be taken to ensure that the “order book position” of defence public sector units such as HAL improved in the coming years and the ministry should extend full cooperation to achieve that.

Another order that HAL is eyeing is the supply of 70 locally produced basic trainers to the IAF. If it gets the order for the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40), HAL could begin production of the trainers by early 2021.

Improved Tejas

The LCA Mk-1A will come with additional improvements over the FOC aircraft, making it the most advanced Tejas variant so far. The IAF has listed several technical deficiencies found on the Tejas LCA Mark-I variant in 2017. These flaws will purportedly will be addressed in later variants of the aircraft, which will include 43 improvements over the existing version.

The Mk-1A variant is expected to come with air-to-air refuelling, digital radar warning receivers, external self-protection jammer pods, active electronically scanned array radar, advanced beyond-visual-range missiles and significantly improved maintainability.

HAL and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) subsidiary Elta Systems signed a contract for the purchase of 83 ELM-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and ELL-8222WB electronic warfare (EW) suites to be integrated with the Mark-IA in October 2018.

The Mk IA variant, powered by a General Electric F404-GE-IN20 turbofan engine, will be around 1,000 kg lighter than the Mk I. The newer variant will purportedly also have less maintenance requirements.

The flight testing for Tejas Mark-1A will hopefully be completed by 2022. After these 123 fighters, the IAF is also looking to induct 170 Tejas Mark-2 or the MWF (medium weight fighter) jets with more powerful engines and advanced avionics.

But the Tejas Mark-2 and the indigenous stealth fifth-generation fighter aircraft called the advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) will take several years to fructify. For now, IAF is keeping its fingers crossed the Tejas Mark-1A does not get delayed any further.

Comments

It was in November 2016 that the Defence Acquisitions Council had first approved the procurement of 83 Tejas jets at a cost of Rs 49,797 crore. But HAL had responded with a quote of around Rs 56,500 crore, which led to protracted cost negotiations. HAL, for instance, was even charging profit on imported components. Item by item, the cost was brought down. IAF also cut down some of its support requirements.

Down to just 30 fighter squadrons (each has 18 jets) when at least 42 are required for the requisite deterrence against Pakistan and China, the IAF is banking upon the long-delayed light combat aircraft Tejas to make up the free fall in numbers.

The first four Rafale fighters will touch down at Ambala airbase in May, with the remaining 32 following in batches by April 2022 under the Rs 59,000 crore deal inked with France in September 2016. But the slow production rate of the home-grown Tejas fighters by HAL, much like its protracted development saga, remains a major concern for IAF.

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A theatre command will provide all assets for war under a single commander. One of the key objectives behind jointness, or jointmanship, is the setting up of theatre commands for the best use of military resources to fight future wars. Theaterisation refers to placing specific units of the army, the navy and the air force under a theatre commander. Such commands come under the operational control of an officer from any of the three Services, depending on the function assigned to that command.

“There can be a number of theatre commands, including the Peninsular Command (for the southern part of the state), an Air Defence Command, a Joint Logistics Command, a Space Command, a Training Command and other theatre commands in the eastern, northern and western commands, which take care of China and Pakistan. The commands could be divided into more than one theatre commands,” Gen Bipin Rawat, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and head of the newly created DMA, said on 4 February.

The aim is to cut costs and right-size manpower, in the backdrop of the ballooning pay and pension bills of the almost 15-lakh strong armed forces, as well as build an integrated land-air-sea machinery for wars of the future. With the annual defence outlay unlikely to register a major jump, Gen Rawat said there must be better utilization of resources.

During the transitional phase the current command & control structures will continue with the theatre commanders reporting to their respective service chiefs.

CDS’s Brief

In a landmark decision, the government, on 24 December 2019, had approved the creation of a CDS in the rank of a four-star general who acts as the principal military adviser to the defence minister on all matters relating to the tri-services.

The government also decided to create a new Department of Military Affairs (DMA) under the defence ministry, which is headed by the CDS as its secretary.

The CDS has been given three years for the creation of theatre commands. It will require a firm push due to bitter turf-wars among the three Services, institutional resistance and strong objections in the past from the IAF.

The CDS said a complete analysis of the threats is underway and there would be inter-theatre or intra-theatre re-allocation of resources on that basis, which would also result in cutting costs.

The process to set up joint theatre commands will kick off from next year onwards, after first integrating air defence, drone operations, logistics, medical services and the like among the Army, Navy and Indian Air Force (IAF).

The CDS has a key role in ensuring optimum utilisation of allocated budget, ushering in more synergy in procurement, training and operations of the services through joint planning and integration.

Another major mandate of the CDS is to facilitate indigenisation of weapons and equipment to the maximum extent possible while formulating the overall defence acquisition plan for the three Services.

Geographical Theatre Commands

The setting-up of “geographical” theatre commands, where all assets and manpower of the Army, Navy and IAF will be placed under one operational commander in a region, along with “functional” tri-Service commands for air defence, logistics and training, will be the biggest-ever military restructuring in India’s history. At present, the Army, Navy and the Air Force have separate commands.

The proposed plan is to establish one or two commands (a northern one west of Nepal and an eastern one east of Nepal) to handle China, one or two commands on the western front with Pakistan (one in J&K and the other to include Punjab, Gujarat and Rajasthan) and a southern command for peninsular India.

Air Defence Command

In his first official directive after stepping into the new role of CDS, Gen Rawat directed top officers of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), in January, to prepare a proposal to create an Air Defence Command to enhance military synergy.

“In order to become the armed forces of the Union, we need to start working on some of the aspects where we think immediate integration can happen. There, we find that air defence is one area, which according to me, is a low hanging fruit and can happen in a time-bound manner,” the CDS said.

A team headed by Vice Chief of the Indian Air Force is conducting a study to set up the air defence command and it has been told to complete the study by March 31. The report was expected by March 31. It would integrate all air-defence assets under the IAF, including the coastal guns of the Navy and ground-based air-defence missile launchers of the Army.

The responsibility of the management of the airspace is that of the Air Force, therefore, the security and safety of the airspace must rest with that one Service. To be headed by an IAF officer, the it will include air defence resources of all the three Services. While the air defence is primarily the responsibility of the IAF, every Service has its own air defence systems, which Rawat said, should integrate under one Service so that the command and control issues are simplified.

 “While air assets will be integrated,” and put in the Air Defence Command, those with very specific duties such as fighters with the Indian Navy or air elements with the Strike Corps of the Indian Army will continue to be with the respective forces, he explained. Integrating the logistics units of all three services “has great potential” in increasing “efficiency”, and cutting costs through “common contract management”, the CDS said.

Peninsular Command

India is looking at integrating the western and eastern naval commands to create a Peninsular Command, which will look to merge the eastern and western naval commands. The Navy has been sounded out and a formal study is being ordered. The idea being that the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has to be the responsibility of a single commander. He will be given air assets and Army troops (for carrying out amphibious operations), according to Gen Rawat.

The existing tri-Services command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands would remain as it is, he said. There is a plan to upgrade the three runways available on the island chain.

“The Navy Chief looks at the entire Indian Ocean region from east coast of Africa to Australia,” Rawat explained. Therefore, with the creation of the Peninsular Command, the Navy Chief can disinvest himself from the closer Indian Ocean region and look at the bigger picture. While the peninsular theatre commander will deal with the maritime boundaries, the Navy HQ at New Delhi would look at the “big picture” of the Indian Ocean Region to safeguard India’s interests stretching from East Africa to Australia and Malacca Strait.

Rawat said a study to create the Peninsular Command, responsible for securing India from seaborne threats, will be ordered by March 31, with a report to be submitted three to four months thereafter. He said the Peninsular Command was likely to be functional by 2021-end with army and air force elements under it. The Port Blair-based Andaman & Nicobar Command, India’s first tri-Services command, would remain as it is.

The peninsular command will integrate the existing Western Naval Command (HQs at Mumbai), Eastern Naval Command (Vizag), Southern Naval Command (Kochi) and Southern Army Command (Pune).

IAF’s Reservations

The IAF believes it would be operationally irrational to divide the country’s “limited air assets” among different theatre commands. IAF stands to lose the most with the proposed restructuring. Both the 1.4-lakh IAF and the over 12-lakh Army have seven commands each, headed by three-star Air Marshals or Lt-Generals, with the 59,000-strong Navy restricting itself to just three commands.

When the joint commands do come up, IAF is likely to be left only with the Air Defence Command, along with commands to handle space and training in the future. Though IAF headquarters will retain some air assets, each theatre command will also be given some integral fighter jets and helicopters.

Procurement System

The prioritisation of military purchases to be made by the three Services also comes under CDS’s purview. He indicated that he prefers a procurement model that involves buying weapons and systems in a staggered way so that the requirement of the three Services can be met within the available budget.

“I believe we should not go in for a large number of procurements at one time. If you have a requirement for, say, 10 submarines, 100 fighter jets and 1,000 tanks, you can either buy the submarines or the jets or the tanks. You can’t buy all three together. But you can spread out the purchases over 10 years and buy that equipment in four or five tranches,” said Gen Rawat.

He said buying equipment in one go would also result in all of it becoming due for repairs and overhaul at the same time. He added that he would prefer the IAF’s requirement for 110 new fighter jets to be met in phases.

Gen Rawat said the newly created Department of Military Affairs will handle revenue procurement while the capital procurement will continue to be looked after by the defence secretary.

Logistics Command

The armed forces are likely to create a Logistics Command. The CDS said “There is a great scope of logistics issues being integrated. Giving the example of medical resources, Rawat said among all three Services, surpluses and deficiencies need to be better managed so that the doctors are neither overworked nor under-utilised.

The Joint Logistics Command would look at common contract management for the three services and be responsible for common inventories for maintaining reserves. He said a countrywide analysis of surpluses and deficiencies of resources is underway and there is a scope of jointmanship for better optimisation and utilisation of facilities.

Gen Rawat said the medical arm of all the services should begin operating jointly and not in silos, and hospitals of individual services should operate as tri-service hospitals such as the R&R Hospital in Delhi.

In military stations, where services are co-located, there is scope for management of resources, he said. “For example, in Delhi, we are looking at a common transport management,” he said.

Comments

The 17-single service commands, which lack the requisite coordination among them, has led to needless wasteful expenditure and silo-mentality. The only two tri-Service commands are the geographical Andaman and Nicobar Command and the functional Strategic Forces Command to handle the country’s nuclear arsenal.

The US Department of Defense has 11 combatant commands, while China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has five theatre commands.

The IAF has in the past opposed the setting up of theatre commands as many in the service believed the air force had the speed and reach to project military power across geographies without being confined to theatres. However, all the three service chiefs have extended their full support to the CDS in creating new military structures.

The CDS is focusing on creating avenues that allow the officers of the army, navy and air force to interact more with each other at different stages of their careers to have a better understanding of the three services. Theatre commands are required since no single force is capable of discerning and countering growing threats alone. India’s strategic frontiers are expanding, it is time to look at the bigger picture and not be confined to silos. The threats from other countries need to understood and prepared for.

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Nirmala Sitharaman, herself a former defence minister, allocated to defence Rs 471,378 crore, an increase of Rs 22,558 crore over the current year’s revised estimate of Rs 448,820 crore. This includes the outlay for revenue and capital expenditure, as well as military pensions. It works out to be 15.4 per cent of the country’s entire budget. If pensions are excluded, the defence budget was increased to Rs 3,37,553 crore, up from Rs 3,18,931 crore for the present fiscal ending March 31, 2020. This is a meagre 5.8 per cent hike.

Indian Army, Air Force and Navy which are facing a combined challenge from Pakistan and China, got just Rs 10,300 crore hike in funds to buy new arms and ammunition in the Union budget which could adversely impact their modernisation plans.

The salaries of the three Services and the civilians concerned work out to be Rs 1,34,989 crore, which now form 39.99 per cent of the budget. In other words, salaries and pensions take up more money than what is allocated for modernisation.

The forces have been demanding an increase in funds allocation to buy new weapons.  The Union budget has kept Rs 10,532 crore for defence research &development.

Army

The army has got the largest hike in capital spending, but this 8 per cent rise of Rs 2,669 crore will be insufficient to pay for the artillery guns, tanks and air defence systems the army badly requires.

Indian Army was also forced to cut some expenditures to ensure that it has ammunition for at least 10 days war.

The budget has allocated Rs 32,392 crore to the Indian army for its modernisation plans against Rs 29,666 crore given in the revised budget last year.

Navy

There is disappointment for the navy. Indian Navy has been given just Rs 26,688 crore in 2020-21 budget for modernisation against Rs 26,156 crore in the revised budget last year, despite public statements from senior admirals, including navy chief Admiral Karambir Singh, seeking a larger share of the defence budget.

Without that, the navy says it will be in no position to process important procurements – such as the production of six advanced submarines under Project 75I and the building of a second indigenous aircraft carrier to follow INS Vikrant, which Cochin Shipyard Ltd is likely to deliver next year.

A shortage in funds is forcing Indian Navy to curtail its plan to be a 200 ships fleet by 2027 as per maritime capability perspective plan. It has already cut some of the acquisition including Mine Counter Measure Vessels and P8i maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

Air Force

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has again been allocated the lion’s share of the capital budget – Rs 43,282 crore, much of which will go towards instalments on earlier procurements, such as the 36 Rafale fighters that will begin delivery this year. However, this is lower than the IAF’s allocation of Rs 44,869 crore in the current year’s revised estimates.

IAF, which is in the process of buying new Rafale aircraft and also needs more fighter jets to replace its ageing aircraft, has actually seen a slight decrease in its  capital outlay for modernisation.

Capital Expenditure

The capital allocation used for purchase of new weapons, aircraft, warships and other military hardware like guns and new UAVs is Rs 1,13,626 crore. This means modernisation gets an increase of Rs 10,316 crore over this year’s allocation of Rs 1,03,310 crore.

Despite the large number of weapons systems due for procurement, the capital allocation has been raised only marginally in 2020-21. That rise of less than three per cent is insufficient to even cover inflation and forex exchange rate slippages. The military will, therefore, have less buying power next year.

The government has allocated Rs 32,392.38 crore ($4.5 billion) for meeting the Indian Army’s capital expenses, of which Rs 4,000 crore ($560 million) has been earmarked for buying military aviation assets for the land forces.

The Indian Navy has got Rs 26688.28 crore ($3.73 billion) for new purchases, of which it is expected to spend Rs 12,746 crore ($1.78 billion) for building its naval fleet.

The IAF has got lesser capital allocation for the next fiscal at Rs 43,281.91 crore ($6 billion), which is already Rs 1,587.23 crore ($222 million) less than the current fiscal’s revised estimates. A major chunk, Rs 26,909.88 crore (3.76 billion), will go towards aircraft and aeroengine purchases in 2020-21.

Revenue Expenditure

The rest of Rs 209,319 crore (over $29.3 billion) will go towards revenue expenses, which is usually for meeting recurring expenses such as on maintenance of infrastructure, replenishment of existing weapons and equipment, and for capacity building. In the 2020 fiscal, under revised estimates.

Major Purchases

The Indian Army is already in the process of acquiring six Boeing Apache gunships and is negotiating the purchase with the global vendor under a follow-on order for the 22 Apaches bought by the Indian Air Force.

The Modi government had in 2016 ordered 36 Rafale combat jets from France and the deliveries of the aircraft began last October. The budget for the aircraft will go towards committed liabilities such as the Rafale purchase.

Pensions

The budget for pensions has been hiked by Rs 21,742 crore and is now pegged at Rs 1,33,819 crore. This year, a sum of Rs 1,12,077 crore is earmarked for pensions.

Worryingly, the only appreciable rise in spending is in defence pensions, for which the allocation has risen by almost 14 per cent to Rs 133,825 crore for 2020-21. This raise comes on the back of a an even larger 16 per cent raise this year, over the 2018-19 pension allocation.

Since the grant of “one rank, one pension” in 2015-16, the military pension budget has more than doubled from the level of Rs 60,000 crore in 2015-16.

To put this in perspective, India spends more on its defence pensioners than Pakistan’s defence budget (Rs 1 lakh crore this year). India has approximately 26 lakh defence pensioners and each year it adds 55 lakh pensioners to this total. Five-yearly revisions in pension – the One Rank One Pension (OROP) – granted by the government in 2015 – means that the pension burden is only set to increase.

Comments

The MoD is looking at “right-sizing” the forces and also at cutting costs within. The Army has already started the restructuring process.

The defence budget amounts to 15.5 per cent of the government’s total spending of Rs 3,042,230 crore next year. That share of government spending is significantly lower than this year’s share of 16.6 per cent, the 17.4 per cent share in 2018-19 and the 17.7 per cent in 2017-18.

With this, the plans of the armed forces for modernising their weapons and equipment with new acquisitions can take a backseat for the next fiscal at least.

In a tell-tale sign of how this defence budget is perceived, defence minister Rajnath Singh had not a single word to say about the allocation for the armed forces in his eight-paragraph statement on the annual budget itself. The statement came in the form of a text message to the media from the ministry’s official spokesperson.

The three Services have been pressing for higher allocations to carry forward their long-pending modernisation plans and go for big ticket acquisitions in view of fast changing security matrix in the region including China further boosting its military might.

The expectations for higher allocation rose after last year’s Balakot strikes. Military experts said though the allocation was inadequate in view of the demands of the three forces, the outlay was satisfactory considering the state of the country’s economy.

The military was hoping for healthy increase in defence funding as several modernization programmes have to be implemented – ranging from artillery guns and helicopters to fighters and submarines. The armed forces will have to prioritise their purchases given that the available resources are inadequate.

A parliamentary panel has asked the defence ministry to “strongly press” for additional funds from the finance ministry to enable the military to buy new equipment and also pay for weapons and systems it has already contracted to purchase, at a time when the armed forces projected a combined requirement of almost Rs 1 lakh crore more under the capital head for 2019-20.

The Army accounts for a lion’s share of the budget – over 56%. This year’s defence budget saw an increase of Rs 2,500 crore in the Army’s capital budget (when compared to revised estimates of last year’s defence budget). The IAF, in sharp contrast, saw capital budget slashed by Rs 1,200 crore.

For a nation that allocates 15.49 per cent of federal government’s total annual expenditure, India’s bid to strengthen its defence exports is rather an expectation than innovation. It only serves the country well to foresee itself excel in defence exports, especially when our net exports stands at a negative trade balance of $184 billion in 2018-19.

Taking pride in its defence capabilities, India can aspire for a larger role in defence export on the global front. Developing artillery guns, aircraft carriers, light-combat aircraft, submarines and combat helicopters will make India a manufacturing hub in defence on the global scale. The prime minister spoke of expanding the export of defence equipment to Rs 35,000 crore, at Defexpo show in February, mentioning how it had risen from Rs 2,000 crore in 2014 to Rs 17,000 in the last two years.

Boosting the Make in India sentiment for defence equipment not only decreases India’s imports in defence but also pushes its exports – which will help reduce the negative export balance. A call for defence investors is also a plus for India in the current economic outlook. Defence remains a lucrative sector and investor sentiment will be favourable despite dull economic growth that has played a pivotal role in shooing away investors and further adding to the misery of the investment-starved economy. A conducive business environment, efficient supply-chain and logistics supported by state-of-the-art infrastructure is perhaps the package which will put India in a position of advantage. Defence, then, can become a trump card. Expanding its defence exports will be a major plus for India. It will help reduce the net exports negative balance.

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Defence, Aerospace Got Rs 1,800 cr FDI in 5 Years

Defence and aerospace sectors, the corner stones of the government’s ambitious Make in India programme, garnered relatively miniscule foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last five years.

While the country attracted FDI valued around $286 billion in the past five years across sectors, defence and aerospace, which were projected as high potential sectors under ‘Make in India’, could grab only a measly Rs 1,834 crore, according to government data released on 10 February.

The government had also announced two defence corridors – in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. While launching the Tamil Nadu Aerospace and Defence Industrial Policy at the Global Investors Meet in Chennai in January 2019, the then defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman had said: “…by announcing the corridor, we have invited quite a lot of manufacturers from abroad to come, choose the location where they want to establish their unit and start producing defence equipment”. But the investments are still nothing worth writing home about.

As per the data furnished by 79 companies operating in Defence and Aerospace sector, so far, FDI inflows of over Rs 1,834 crore have been reported after 2014 under both government and automatic route.In May 2001, the defence sector, until then reserved for the public sector, was opened up for 100 per cent Indian private sector participation and foreign direct investment up to 26 per cent.

Further, the government later allowed FDI up to 49 per cent under the automatic route and above 49 per cent through the government route wherever it is likely to result in access to modern technology or for other reasons to be recorded.

The government had envisaged that by allowing higher FDI in the defence sector, the global companies having high-end technologies can be encouraged to set up their manufacturing base in India in collaboration with Indian companies, thereby, resulting in creation of employment opportunities, saving foreign exchange and increasing indigenisation.

The post Defence Expenditure : Defence Budget 2020-21 appeared first on IMR.

History of Development

The history of air defence artillery in India began in 1939, during the Second World War, when the British Government was forced to raise air defence units in India to counter the Japanese air threat in south east Asia. Few Indian troops were trained in the use of the three-inch ack-ack gun and later the 40mm L/60 gun, as part of the anti-aircraft batteries of Hongkong and Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) and Indian Artillery.

From 1941 onwards, the anti-aircraft units and training establishments began to be raised in India with Indian officers and men being posted into these establishments from the regiment of artillery and infantry units and later through fresh commission and enrolment.

In July 1940, the Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defence Wings were established at Karachi for training of Indian officers, JCOs and NCOs in the anti-aircraft techniques. In August 1940, an important decision was taken by the British War Office to create an anti-aircraft branch of Indian Artillery on the concept of tank artillery. On 14 September 1940, one Indian anti-aircraft Technical Training Battery was raised at Colaba, Bombay. It included nucleus of the first anti-aircraft unit of Indian Artillery – the R (Royal) HAA Regiment. In January 1941, Light anti-aircraft unit called the U LAA Regiment was raised at Malir Cantt (now in Pakistan) and was equipped with L/60 guns. In April 1941, both of these units were re-named and thus R HAA became the 1 Indian HAA Regiment IA and U LAA became 1 Indian LAA Regiment IA.

The post-1971 war period saw rapid modernization and mechanization of AD Artillery. Many a state-of-the-art and latest weapon systems were introduced into service during this period, such as:

•             The Tiger Cat Misisle System (1972): The ZSU-23-4B Shilka (1973) a fully integrated, self-propelled, anti-aircraft system with four liquid-cooled 23mm automatic cannons mounted on the front of a large, flat, armored turret.

•             The ZU-23-2B guns (1976) anti-aircraft gun system comprises twin 23mm cannons on a towed two-wheel carriage.

Subsequently the Igla SAM and the Strela-10M missiles were introduced during 1988-89.

The Corps of AD Artillery came into its own on 10 January 1994. The Directorate General of Air Defence Artillery (AAD) started functioning from the same day. Likewise, the AD Artillery branches at the various command HQs were also formed. The Air Defence and Guided Missile (ADGM) School at Gopalpur started functioning as an autonomous entity and the AD Wing at Artillery Centre, Nasik Road Camp became the ADGM Centre.

The Corps of Air Defence Artillery has been re-designated as Corps of Army Air Defence with effect from 18 April 2005.

Current AD Systems

These are following air defence systems currently used by Indian armed forces:

Anti-aircraft Gun Systems

L-70 AD Gun: The L-70 AD gun forms the backbone of the air defence system of the Indian Army. In 2007, India’s Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) signed for the second upgrade of the 40mm L-70 guns inducted by the Indian army in the early 1960s. The guns are currently produced by ordnance factories under license from the Swedish company. Over 600 such guns are currently in the army’s inventory. Though India’s armed forces are increasingly opting for missile-based AD systems, the army wants to retain gun-based systems as well. The 40-mm single-barrel weapon, the original version of which dates back to the World War-II has been in service with the Indian Army for about 45 years.

Zu-23-2B Guns. This anti-aircraft gun system comprises twin 23mm cannons on a towed two-wheel carriage. The Soviet origin ZU-23 has been in service for over 30 years. Though primarily an AD weapon, these twin-barrel rapid firing guns have been consistently used by Indian Army in border conflicts.

These vintage anti-aircraft guns that form the mainstay of the Army’s air defence network are soon to be replaced. The Indian Army wants its new guns to have an effective range of at least 3,500 meters with the ability to engage targets flying at speeds more than 300 meters per second. The guns should have the capability to engage targets with or without a fire-control radar.

Besides the L-70 and ZU-23, other anti-aircraft systems like the OSA-AK, SA-9, ZSU-23-4 Schilka have been around for about three decades and only some cosmetic modifications to these systems have been undertaken.

Anti-aircraft Gun and Missile Systems

Schilka: A self-propelled weapon system and designed to fight primarily tactical aircraft and helicopters.

Igla: A short-range man-portable air defence [missile] system. Igla 19K310 (SA-16 Gimlet). A further development from the SA-14 and SA-7 series of man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

Tunguska-M: A gun missile system. The advent of tactical precision-guided weapons (PGW) called for the introduction of a missile channel to fight aircraft and helicopters before they could fire PGW. As a consequence, the renowned Tunguska AD gun-missile system was designed by Russia and acquired by Indian Army. It can engage targets while stationary and on the move, using missiles for long-range targets and guns foreclose-in defence.

These AD systems were all acquired from the Soviet (now Russian/Ukrainian) companies.

The Army has indicated to the defence ministry that the AD area is an area of critical concern and the current armoury should be replaced with advanced systems immediately from companies overseas.

Surface-to-air (SAM) Missiles

ZRK SD Kvadrat (SA-6 Gainful): The SA-6 Gainful is a two stage, solid-fuel, low-altitude surface-to-air missile. It has a range of 3,000 to 24,000 meters.

OSA AKM (SA-8b Gecko): It is a single-stage, solid-fuel, short-range, low-altitude, all-weather surface-to-air missile. Four command-guided missiles are carried ready to launch.

Strela-10M3 (SA-13 Gopher): The SA-13 Gopher is a short-range, low altitude surface-to-air missile. The SA-13 missile has a maximum speed of Mach 2 and carries a five kg high explosive warhead.

Strela-2M (SA-7B Grail): It is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude SAM similar to the US Army’s Redeye SAM. The missile had a HE warhead and passive infrared homing guidance. They are a tail-chase missile system.

The surface-to-surface missile that form the tactical artillery of Indian Army include the Brahmos cruise missile, the Prithvi missile which comes in four variants and the Agni missile with six variants.

Ongoing Programmes

Gun and Missile System. After almost three years of industry discussion between Indian Army and defence industry over procurement of 428 self-propelled air defence gun missile (SPADGM) system costing around Rs 16,000 crore, Ministry of Defence has finally formalized the roadmap for kick-start the project. In October 2018, Indian Army officially declared Hanwha Defence Systems of South Korea as the only qualified company for the gun and missile system programme.

In the 2013 global tender, the Indian Army shortlisted three companies – Hanwha Defense Systems, which offered its Hybrid Biho system and Russian companies Almaz Antey, which offered its upgraded Tunguska system and KBP Tula, which offer its Pantsir system22. The weapons of shortlisted companies were evaluated throughout 2015 and tested in 2017. However, both the upgraded Tunguska system fielded by Almaz Ante and Pantsir by KBP Tula systems were not fully compliant during the trials. The program entitled for the procurement of five regiments, or 104 systems of gun missiles systems.

The Indian Army is looking for a mix of both gun and missiles mounted on one or separate high mobility vehicles. In addition, the gun as well as the missile should be able to engage aerial targets both with and without the fire control radar, either independently or simultaneously. The SPADGM systems will eventually replace the army’s 1360 obsolete Bofors L-70 (40mm) single barrel and Soviet-era Zu-23-2 towed 23 mm twin-barrel weapon systems.

Replacement of L-70 Guns. In September 2013, the tender issued in 2009 for replacement of L-70 air defence guns, had to be cancelled as only Rosoboronexport of Russia responded, leading to a single vendor situation. The tender had gone to Rosoboronexport of Russia, Bumar of Poland, Thales of France and the Doosan Group of South Korea. The 2009 tender (cancelled in 2013) was also a re-bid of an earlier tender of 2007, which was cancelled because only the OFB in partnership with Rheinmetall Air Defence had submitted the bid which led to a single vendor situation.

Very Short-Range Air Defence Programme

Indian Army had initiated the process to acquire Very Short-Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) missiles in 2010. It went through several rounds of trials before Rosoboronexport’s Igla-S qualified in January 2018 as it was emerged lowest bidder with $1.47 billion. The other two bidders were Swedish SAAB’s RBS70 NG ($2.6 billion) and France’s MBDA Mistral ($3.68 billion). VSHORAD program was initiated to replace Russian Igla-M Systems that have been used by Army since the 1980s. Under this program, Indian Army issued Request for Proposal (RFP) for 5,175 missiles and associated equipment, out of which around 2,300 missiles will be bought in fully formed condition, 260 will be in semi-knocked down (SKD) condition and 1,000 missiles will be completely knocked down (CKD) and 600 missiles will be produced in India under Make in India initiative.

Igla-S (SA-24). Igla-S is the latest model of Russian MANIPADS (man-portable air defence system) technology as it offers superior performance over earlier supplied SA-18 missiles to India. It is designed for use against visible aerial targets at short range such as tactical aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs), cruise missiles and countermeasures. As per the requirement of Indian Army, it will have maximum range of 6 kms, altitude of 3 kms along with all-weather capability.

National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System. The programme was initiated in 2018, when Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the acquisition of National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II). India has begun the process of acquiring the NASAMS-II from the US to fully secure its airspace against aerial threats ranging from drones to ballistic missiles. NASAMS-II will be used along with indigenous, Russian and Israeli systems to establish a multi-layered missile shield over the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

NASAMS-II is an upgraded version of the Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace/Raytheon National Advanced Surface to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and features new 3D mobile surveillance radars and 12 missile launchers for quicker reaction. The new air-defence system will eventually supplement the long-delayed indigenous two-tier ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield that is in an advanced stage of development by DRDO.

Comments

If the enemy is acquiring and is equipped with ‘first-look, first-shoot, first-kill’ capabilities with smarter sensors, longer stand-off weapons and stealthy platforms, it is imperative that our aerial and ground-based weapons are a step ahead. Manual, second or even third-generation systems are becoming redundant, given that the sensor-to-shooter loop is getting shortened by the day.

Automation of responses also calls for greater diligence in air space control and Identification of Friend and Foe (IFF) to avoid fratricide or ‘blue-on-blue’ kills.

The IAF is equipped quite satisfactorily to generate the big situational picture using various radars and sensors and to share it with the Army and Navy. The Navy is also well on its way in strengthening its maritime AD capabilities. The Army, however, is struggling with delays to modernise its Air Defence Corps with ground-based air defence weapon systems (GBADWS) to safeguard the Army’s integral assets and manage surface coordination.

Research projects must be user-led to ensure they do not suffer time and cost-overruns, which force the Services to meet their requirements through imports after considerable funds and efforts have been sunk in foreclosed projects.

A common AD weapon systems thread must run across all the three Services, not only to ensure smooth inter-service integration and interoperability of weapon and support systems, but also for driving the economy of scale, keeping in mind the high cost of GBADWS. Such commonality can be achieved in many operational areas such as a common successor gun system or a common Very Short Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) system, which can be mounted on different types of platforms as suited to each Service (shoulder fired/ pedestal/ vehicle/ ship-mounted, etc). Also, commonality can be achieved in fielding a similar genre of short-, medium- and long-range SAMs (SRSAMs, MRSAMs and LRSAMs) for the Services, which can have different ranges and launch platforms suited to specific Service needs.

Except for the successor guns (close-in weapon system or CIWS), action towards achieving commonality is being progressed in terms of VSHORADS, SRSAMs (Akash), MRSAMs (Barak) and LRSAM (Barak variant) besides ADC&RS. Even CIWS must follow suit.

The post An Overview of Indian Air Defence Programmes appeared first on IMR.

The overall responsibility of thwarting an enemy air invasion will continue with IAF, while the Ground-based AD resources need better synergy. Integrating AD assets will assist in avoiding ‘fratricide’ during heightened security conditions. The incident of shooting down of a Mi-17 helicopter at Budgam on 27 February 2019, during the Balakot strike was an avoidable loss. Further, the shooting down of Ukranian passenger aircraft on a routine flight by Iranian forces, on 8 January, was also attributable to Iran’s Air Defence Command and Control problems. Even though transponders for Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) were installed onboard the aircraft and warships for target classification, this may not be a fool-proof method.

The AD Command is meant to integrate AD verticals of the three armed forces, while retaining the uniqueness of each Service to execute its own AD operational role in its own single service battle space. Each service has different assets to defend and must maintain weapons special to its requirements.

It makes sense to have a common AD command, since the common aim of all three armed forces is to defeat the air threat from the enemy. The enemy will not differentiate between the vulnerabilities or assets of one Service or the other.

Existing Tri-services Air Defence Effort

All the three Services – Indian Army, IAF and Navy so far have maintained their own AD resources to counter specific threat perceived by each, sometimes even having overlapping areas.

Indian Army has it’s ground-based Army Air Defence (AAD) Corps, responsible for the protection of air space for Army’s operations from enemy aircraft and missiles. Plans are afoot to upgrade the existing vintage AD equipment and to create a responsive AD for Army’s strike formations in plains and tactical AD in mountains. Also, the procurement and upgrades of AD guns and equipment are being pursued as part of the modernization of the army.

The IAF has been on a technology pursuit to get superior surface-to-air guided weapons (SAGW) and AD radars to bolster its operational capability, and to integrate all sensors, weapon systems and command and control structures to create an Integrated AD Command for its operations. Surface-to-air weapon systems are planned to be interfaced with IAF’s indigenous C4I system viz. Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) using Software Defined Radios (SDR). Integration of IACCS with surveillance network of civil aviation is also underway in a phased manner. Further, IAF also plans to deploy an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system to support AD and offensive strike missions over the tactical battle area and for this, one AEW&C aircraft was inducted in IAF in 2018.

To meet their immediate AD requirements, IAF has procured Israeli Spyder low level quick reaction missile (LLQRM) System, equipped with Python 5 and Derby missiles. This system is meant to provide AD against aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs.

On the other hand, Indian Navy maintains its AD assets mainly on the sea platform, in the expected lines of its operational role. For detection of air targets including missiles, modern naval warships are fitted with advance phased array radars with specialized radar beams to search and track multiple aircraft and missiles simultaneously.

On naval ships, two SAM complexes in fore and aft configuration give complete 360-degree air engagement capability. Ships are also fitted with Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) like rapid-fire AK-630 systems for engaging air targets a couple of kilometres away. On the high seas, carrier-launched fighter jets provide the key AD cover to deter any battlespace air threat. All high-value naval units at sea are provided at least two layers of AD cover by other ships part of the formation.

AD Integration

An AD Command will have all AD resources of all three Services at its disposal and will seamlessly address the issue of resource allocation. The battle theatres can at times overlap especially among the Army and the Air Force. This leads to duplication of weapons procurement and excessive spending. Hence, AD Command can ensure appropriate resource allocation for its optimal utilization.

AD is intrinsically linked to every Service command with a prime responsibility to protect the nation from threat as large as nuclear threat to small ones such as drone incursions. In these situations, rather than seeking which Service’s resources will be more apt to nullify the threat, an integrated command will have at its disposal all available resources and its deploy the resources corresponding to the threat.

For the nation, the overall AD threat perception in military terms means evaluation of its ‘susceptibility and vulnerability’ against the enemy’s offensive capabilities. India routinely has skirmishes on its borders with nuclear-armed neighbours – Pakistan and China. These two hostile nations perpetually maintain a ‘minimum credible deterrence’ against India by strategic deployment of various ballistic and cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear capable.

From assessing air threat perception to creating a common integrated air defence shield over land, sea and air, all factors have to be looked into by the office of the CDS. Any shortcoming in the concepts and doctrines document at this stage shall lead to irrecoverable damage and can be fatal for AD during hostilities.

Indigenization of AD Capability

India has an ambitious Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) for the development of the two-layered programme to defend vital assets against ballistic missile attacks. The capability was demonstrated in 2018 by intercepting two kinds of missiles – endo-atmospheric interceptor missile mission against long-range simulated targets and an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile (PDV04) tested against two-stage ship launched target missile.

Anti-satellite missile test (Mission Shakti) was completed in 2019 in which BMD interceptor missile engaged Indian target satellite in low earth orbit (LEO) in a ‘Hit to Kill’ mode. It gave India the capability to defend its assets in outer space and was significant against inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missile (QRSAM), a system capable of engaging multiple targets at ranges of up to 30 km is under development. An Indigenous AD Fire Control Radar (ADFCR) ‘Atulya’ with its associated anti-aircraft guns for point air defence system at short and very short ranges. And, Indian Army is indigenizing an AD Tactical Control Radar (ADTCR) as a successor to existing Indian Doppler Radar (INDRA) and P19 radars.

Control & Reporting

The prime responsibility of the AD of the national air space lies with the Air Force. That does not mean that the Air Force can go it alone. The execution of its function depends on the type of threats being faced and in what way to respond. The main responsibility of the AD Command would now be to provide a structure to the command & control (C&C) of AD. The C&C of AD, ie, the AD Control and Reporting System (ADCRS) exists with all the three Services. If a weak ADCRS operates even the best weapon system will operate sub optimally.

The ADCRS system is responsible for:

•             Surveillance of air space.

•             Detection of aerial threat.

•             Cancelling out duplication of inputs from multiple radars.

•             Identification of aerial vehicles into friend or foe.

•             Prioritization of air threat.

•             Selection of most suitable weapon to take  on the threat.

•             Designation of target in auto mode.

•             Successive firing from guns to missiles in a seamless manner.

•             Maintain minute to minute control of the air defence battle.

The IAF has an integrated C&C that rides on the Air Force Net (AFNET). It has national level linkages from national command (source) down to the weapons. The Army has its own AD C&C – Akash. The Navy too has one of its own called Trigun. The latter two work perfectly but unilaterally and, hence, there are serious voids. A proper integration of these three C&C systems is required.

Responsibilities

The AD Command will have multiple responsibilities, viz:

•             To wipe out voids in the AD C&C and shape it properly.

•             Ensure inputs on air threats are available from the three Services and other national agencies on a 24×7 basis and maintain updated data on air threat.

•             Prioritise multiple AD assets to be deployed for the defence of vulnerable assets identified by the three Services and also national strategic assets. The AD Command will have to steer each Service’s perspective into a national perspective.

•             AD Command will allocate weapons to each Service according to the vulnerabilities it deals with so that it can manage it better.

•             Optimize training value through optimal use of training resources with each Service and give training a national identity

•             Collaborate and coordinate with civil aviation authorities and resources for better effect.

Comments

There is a falacy that there is a turf war among the three Services and an integrated AD Command would bring them together. This is far from true. The three Services are very clear about each other’s domain of operations.

In a nut shell, an AD Command will help in integrating the hardware of the three Services, bring in economy in their procurement, prioritise their employment to effectively neutralise aerial threats, use the operational core competencies of each Service to report threats, bring in commonality of procedures, optimise training, prevent fratricide and brig in efficiencies on the battlefield. It is expected that CDS under its ambit shall be able to ensure exploitation of these S-400 complexes as part of an Air Defence Command.

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