1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE is yet another masterpiece in the galaxy of books on military history being brought out every second or third year by the Dehra Dun-born acclaimed military historian Shiv Kunal Verma. It is by far the most eloquent account of the 1965 War and “it sets the bar in military writing,” say some of the critics. 

While India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous 1962 War against the Chinese, a belligerent and somewhat overconfident Pakistan decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, it launched its initial military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May of 1965; India strongly responded. However, by the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN, and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch ‘skirmishes’.

Pakistan then launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 imagining it to be its Brahmastra. It deployed nearly 12,000 trained Mujahids in multiple groups, each named after historical plunderers of the sub-continent. Confident that it had the superior armour like M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and better fighter planes such as F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, and better submarines than India, the Pakistanis expected that in the event of an expanded war, the Indians would collapse just as they had against China in NEFA three years previously,” Verma writes in the Introduction.

Focus shifts to International Border

However, contrary to the Pakistan’s expectations, India firmly repulsed the attack and cut off its entry and exist points into the Kashmir Valley by capturing the Haji Pir Bulge. Operation Gibraltar thus fizzled out. Stung by its reverses, Pakistan then launched Operation Grand Slam in September 1965 in Chhamb and Jaurian. The resultant Indian counter-attack saw the focus shift to various other sectors – Lahore, Barki, Kasur [Khem Karan], Fazilka, Sialkot, and Barmer – on the international border. With the rival Air Force formations getting involved almost simultaneously, the Armed ‘Skirmishes’ turned into a full-scale war.

Continuing the narrative, Verma writes, “As they had in 1962, the junior officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces admirably acquitted themselves despite the on-the-fly reorganization of Forces, lack of intelligence, obsolete equipment, and lackluster military leadership. What could have ended in victory instead culminated in a stalemate. Official Indian figures put the total number of causalities at 12,714, out of which 2,763 were killed, 8,444 wounded, and 1,507 missing. An estimated 2,000 casualties occurred after the Ceasefire, raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN as a global Peacekeeping body. Neutral observers put the Pakistani deaths at over 5,000. The conflict ended when the Tashkent Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 10 January 1966, agreeing to observe the ceasefire lines and withdraw their respective armed personnel to positions that they had held before 5 August 1965.”

However, the Tashkent agreement was not without an accompanying tragedy; within hours of its signing, India’s diminutive Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

A scion of an Army family, Shiv Kunal together with his better half Dipti Bhalla,  enjoys the unique distinction of having worked in conjunction with all the three Wings of the Indian Armed Forces over the past two-and-a-half decades producing short films on military-related issues. Their documentary ‘The Standard Bearers’ on the National Defence Academy (NDA) turned out to be a classic in its own genre. 

I wonder why Shiv Kunal and others of his ilk attribute the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as the culmination of the ‘skirmishes’ that had continuously taken place in the Runn of Kutch between the two countries during April to September 1965. On the contrary, these so called ‘skirmishes’ in the Kutch region were meant to test India’s preparedness, and were a prelude to a well planned strategy aimed at completing the half-finished job in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortuitously, Shiv Kunal’s 1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE by virtue of its rich content has emerged as an excellent text book for the students of military history. Propitiously, the incumbent Commandant at the Shimla-based Army Training Command Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, a ‘man of letters’ himself, would gladly consider prescribing it as a text book for the entrance examinations of the various Courses as also at the military training institutions like Indian Military Academy, National Defence Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College et al.  

The Book running into 557 pages including 48 pages of colour photographs and maps with hardcover weighs about a kilogram. Its entire content is in a small font that is not easy on the eye. It would, perhaps, be better in two volumes.

1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE undoubtedly provides a definitive account of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Raj Kanwar

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Grand Strategy

India had a clear Grand Strategy. A Treaty of Peace & Friendship was signed with USSR to stave off American and Chinese intervention. A concerted information war campaign was launched at the global, regional and local levels to highlight Pakistan’s brutal genocide in Bangladesh. India showed strategic patience and restraint, prepared methodically for eight months and only then launched the coup de main operations in the East. This too was done after Pakistan attacked our forward air bases. Hence, it was a just war of last resort.

The Eastern Theatre was designated as the Schwerpunkt or decisive theatre of operations. A holding posture was adopted in the West. The Indian Navy blockaded both wings of Pakistan and entirely isolated East Pakistan. The Indian Air Force (IAF) ensured air supremacy in the East. Resources were milked from the Western and Northern theatres to create an over-matching military equation in Bangladesh. Meticulous logistics preparations were made to support three and then a fourth thrust line. Operations were deliberately launched in winter, when the Himalayan passes would be closed and chances of Chinese intervention virtually ruled out. Great risks were taken to ensure superiority in the Eastern Theatre where decisive results were sought. A classical Blitzkrieg was launched in a highly defensible riverine terrain. Pakistani strong points were bypassed as a dash was made to Dacca, the core command and control node. The results of methodical planning and preparation paid off in a spectacular fashion. In just 13 days Indian advancing formations drove over 550 kms deep into Bangladesh and captured the capital city of Dacca. To speed up their advance they used heliborne operations to bounce major rivers over five miles wide and a paradrop at Tangail to cut off the retreat of Pakistani formations into the Dacca triangle. Pakistan was broken in two and a new nation state created with the force of arms. Indian armed forces had changed the map of South Asia forever.

Leadership

India’s military and political leadership had excelled in this war. Mrs Gandhi proved to be a great war leader in the Churchillian mould. The charismatic Fd Mshl Sam Manekshaw provided brilliant leadership along with the Admiral SM Nanda, the Navy chief and the Air Mshl PC Lall, the IAF chief. Then prime strategic planners were Lt Gen JFR Jacob and the DGMO Lt Gen Inder Gill. Perhaps, our best field commander was Lt Gen Sagat Singh, who used heliborne operations to such good effect. In a brilliant and innovative use of missile boats the Indian Navy struck the Pakistani home base of Karachi twice, sank six ships and set the oil farm at Karachi on fire with concerted strikes with the IAF.

Kautilyan Way of War

Very unconsciously India had revived the Kautilyan paradigm of war, which calls for a long and concerted asymmetric campaign to destabilize and break the balance of the enemy state before delivering the coup de grace operations in a short swift attack using massed elephants to generate shock and awe. The Mukti Bahini launched an eight months long campaign to tire out the Pakistani Army. The brutal response of the Pakistan Army thoroughly alienated the population of Bangladesh. Indian air power delivered shock and awe (including precision attacks on the Governor’s house) and, in just 13 days, the Army columns marched 550 kms to capture the capital, Dacca. This was a classic ‘Expanding Torrent’ campaign that bypassed enemy centres of resistance and raced for the key command and control target of Dacca to induce an organisational collapse of the Pakistani Army in the East.

A Tribute to Gen Bipin Rawat

I had the privilege of being Gen Rawat’s instructor at Indian Military Academy Dehradun. He had won the Sword of Honour there and never looked back. He served extensively in various combat environments and gained valuable experience which was to serve him in great stead as the Army Chief. He went on to be the first Chief of Defense Staff (CDS). To his credit, he revolutionised India’s highly lethargic and red tape mired arms acquisition system. In fact, he brought a paradigm shift in this archaic process. He was in a great hurry to reduce 17 single Service commands to just 4 Tri-Service commands. People felt this would generate great organizational turbulence at a time when external and internal threats were at their maximum. He tenaciously held on to his vision. He was a great change agent in a military set up which is highly traditional and averse to change. His untimely death has been a tragic loss for the nation and the Armed Forces.

The post EDITORIAL: The Decisive 1971 War With Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

Sweeping the Eastern and Western Fronts

I was then posted in Odisha, and after dispersing our own aircraft I was airborne in the ELINT at about 2200 hours to reconfirm the radar orbat as had been painstakingly recorded during the preceding months. It was full moon with terrific visibility, We flew at about 28000 feet charting a course from Kolkata northwards, turning East around East Pakistan keeping a good 20 kms inside India till we reached Agartala. We had no idea of any fighters to cover us because we heard no other RT transmissions.

It was quite eerie knowing that hostilities had been declared and here we were carrying out the first passive operations against the adversary. Surely, all Indian radars were active looking out for enemy aircraft. If anything, the ELINT platform is a most precious and extremely expensive piece of airborne equipment, and critical for knowing what the enemy radars are doing, where they are and are they mobile or static. If there had been any threat to the ELINT mission, I was sure help was close by. I was wrong. Later, I learnt that not one IAF fighter was airborne and all our aircraft on Operational Readiness Platforms (ORP) were for intercepting PAF bombers. We were unprotected and alone. This was to be repeated two days later on the Western front. I landed back at about 0200 hours on 4 December, exhausted and tense, yet excited by the events that must follow the declaration of hostilities. How many would perish in this war I wondered? Many did.

By nightfall on 4 December, I was at an airfield in Western UP. The next morning I was tasked to fly a lengthy sweep starting from somewhere near Jammu flying South just inside the border. Many thoughts went through my mind, and I talked it over with the other pilot and navigator. How close to the border would be safe, how should we position ourselves near Jammu, would we have fighter cover close by, in case of a threat what procedure would we follow, and how do we get into a safe zone?

Losing the ELINT aircraft would be unacceptable and disastrous. I was at 30,000 feet by 0730 hours. In our aircraft the navigator was extremely busy logging his position every two minutes. The special operators were recording their findings. Later, the two data would be correlated and enemy radar dispositions would be confirmed. We had flown this path many times during the last six months. Most surely the adversary was aware of our intent and took counter measures. But today, 5 December, he dare not shut down even one radar and give us that opening to enter. It was a very good day to revalidate their radar orbat. Were they not doing the same thing we asked each other?

Were We Vulnerable to Interception?

In the cockpit we talked about the possibility of being intercepted by Mirage III, F-86 or F-104s. Could not one of these enter Indian airspace very low, then climb rapidly with afterburners to about 30,000 ft, fire missiles at us and scoot back? What had the IAF done to ensure that such an attack could not happen? We had no inkling about this. Our job was to sweep, record, return, collate, compare, and then to do it again. The reader should be amazed at this mind-set in December 1971. I know today that fighter cover was never planned for ELINT operations during peace. But we were now at war, fighters were flying thick and fast, our air defence environment was fully loaded and the ELINT aircraft was the only electronic eyes & ears we had. Did it not need super protection? Forget about the crew, what about the aircraft with its irreplaceable equipment? By the time we had talked about all this we were well past Jaisalmer heading towards Jamnagar, from where we returned to our base intact.

I often ruminate as to whether the PAF ever considered intercepting the Indian ELINT aircraft even with a suicide mission. You may speculate how the IAF would intercept Pakistani ELINT aircraft today. You will recall that on 10 August 1999, a Pakistan Navy Atlantique was shot down by IAF MiGs from Bhuj as the Atlantique had transgressed into Indian airspace on what appeared to be ELINT mission. A month earlier in July 1999, India had destroyed and evicted Pakistani intrusions in Kargil.

The next day, 6 December, another sweep was flown by another crew, and yes, this time fighter escorts were actually positioned close by. The value of our ELINT missions had dawned on us.

Across East Pakistan Unarmed

Maintain 090 Degrees. It is asserted that the PAF ceased to exist as a fighting force in East Pakistan by 6 December, and that not a single PAF fighter got airborne after that date. True or false, I do not know, but I flew right across East Pakistan on 9 December. I was on a routine flight in an An-12 from Sarsawa in Western UP to Kumbigram or Silchar. Just short of Katihar, where we normally turn North towards Kishanganj, we got a radio call from one of our radars, advising us to continue on a heading of 090. Both of us (pilots) looked at each other in surprise, and discussed it with the navigator who was senior to us. Nonsense we concluded. This must be a Pakistani controller luring us into his trap. No way were we going 090 degrees and dutifully turned North. Immediately, the same radar called up and once again asked us to turn back onto 090. We maintained silence convinced that though the call signs and frequency were correct, this has to be a devious trap. Why should the IAF make an unarmed An-12 fly into East Pakistan at the height of armed hostilities? This is “pucca gadbad” we agreed, and remained North-bound.

Authenticate Yourself. Very soon a stern message came across, a different voice, I clearly recollect, demanding why we were disobeying instructions. On the flight deck we decided to authenticate the credentials of the radar unit. You will know that all aircraft and ATC units have authentication sheets which have a ‘Challenge & Answer’ system. It is used to ascertain the identity of an approaching aircraft. The challenge is given by ATC and answered by the aircraft. The authentication sheet has alpha-numeric combinations and it is a secret document. So we decided to challenge the radar unit and, lo and behold, he answered correctly. Considering we were being asked to enter East Pakistan we decided to do it again with another set of codes. The reply was correct. The option of not turning East onto 090 direct for Kumbigram was no longer available. Very reluctantly we banked right and got onto a course direct from Kishanganj to Kumbigram. I do not think any IAF aircraft had done this since 1947 and here we were in an An-12 crossing East Pakistan at about 28,000 feet flying at 400 kms/hr in the middle of a hot shooting war. What a juicy target we must have been for the PAF.

What was Achieved? Do place this moment in perspective. The IAF was still pounding targets in East Pakistan. The Indian Army was far away from Dhaka. The brilliant helicopter aero-bridge across the Meghna river was being launched on this very day by Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC IV Corps and the para-drop at Tangail would happen two days later. On board the An-12 there was silence and all eyes peeled outside as if our stern looks would frighten an attacking F-86. Were we bait? Why this method to lure PAF fighters into the sky for battle? And what if our Gnats/ MiGs did not show up? What if we had actually been enticed into East Pakistan and the Authentication Sheets had been compromised? Our radar spoke with us once or twice and our route took us between Dinajpur and Rangpur, past Meymensingh close to Sylhet and then onto Kumbigram. Were we relieved when we entered Indian air space?

I tried very hard to find out why this was done but never got an answer for 21 years between 1972 till I retired in 1993.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: In the Air Over East Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

During the conflict, East Pakistan’s naval ports were left defenseless as the Eastern Military Command of Pakistan had decided to fight the war without the navy and faced with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, the navy planned to remain in the ports when war broke out.

In the eastern wing, the Pakistan Navy had heavily depended on her gun boat squadron. Pakistan’s Eastern Naval Command was in direct command of Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff who also served as the right-hand of Lieutenant-General Niazi. The Pakistan Navy had 4 gun boats (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, and Sylhet). The boats were capable of attaining maximum speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors. Having known as Pakistan Navy’s brown water navy, the gun boats were equipped with various weapons, including heavy machine guns. The boats were adequate for patrolling and led anti-insurgency operations. But they were hopelessly out of place in a conventional warfare.

Operation Jackpot had severely damaged the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. Before the start of hostilities, all the naval gun boats were stationed at the Chittagong. As the air operations began, IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sank on 4 December. On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired. Rajashahi managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16.

Covert Naval Operations

The Indian Navy started the covert naval operations, which were executed successfully. The Eastern Naval Command of Indian Navy had coordinated, planned, and executed these covert naval operations. In the end months of 1971, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan’s Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. The Pakistan Army’s Combatant High Command, The GHQ, insisted and pressured Pakistan Navy to deploy PNS Ghazi and to extend its sphere of naval operations, into East-Pakistan shores.

In the Eastern wing of Pakistan, the Navy had never maintained a squadron of warships, despite the calls were made by Eastern Naval Command’s Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff.[citation needed] Instead, a brown water navy was formed consisting a gun boats riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, in eastern wing, repair and logistic facilities were not developed at Chittagong. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command virtually faced no opposition from the Eastern theatre. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.

On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF’s capability to retaliate.

The Pakistan Navy responded by deploying her aging long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, to counter the threat as the Naval Command had overruled the objections by her officers. The PNS Ghazi, under the command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, was assigned to locate the INS Vikrant, but when it was not able to locate, decided to mine the port of Vishakapatnam the Headquarter of Eastern Naval Command. The Indian Navy’s Naval Intelligence laid a trap to sink the submarine by giving fake reports about the aircraft carrier. At around midnight of 3-4 December, the PNS Ghazi began its operation of laying mines. The Indian Navy dispatched INS Rajput to counter the threat.

The INS Rajput’s sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.

The sinking of Ghazi turned out to be a major blow and setback for Pakistan Naval operations in East-Pakistan. It diminished the possibilities of carry out the large scale of Pakistan naval operations in Bay of Bengal. It also eliminated further threat possessed by Pakistan Navy to Indian Eastern Naval Command. On reconnaissance mission, the Ghazi was ordered to report back to her garrison on November 26, and admitted a report Naval Combatant Headquarter, NHQ. However, it was failed to return to her garrison. Anxiety grew day by day at the NHQ and NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the submarine failed to produce results.

On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. On December 7/8, the airfields of PAF were destroyed, and the campaign continued until 9 December. On December 12, Pakistan Navy laid mines on amphibious landing approaches to Chittagong. This proved a useful trap for some time, and it had denied any direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed. The Indian Navy therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox Bazar with the aim cutting off the line of re-treat for Pakistan Army troops. On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier. After fighting for days, the human cost was very high for Pakistani forces, and no opposition or resistance was offered by Pakistani forces to Indian forces.

The successful Indian Air Operations and Operation Jackpot, led by the Bengali units with the support of Indian Army, undermined the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. By the time Pakistan Defences Forces surrendered, the Navy had suffered the most damage as almost all of the gun boats, destroyer (PNS Sylhet), and the long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, were lost in the conflict, including their officers.

On December 16, at 16:13hrs, Deputy Command of Eastern Command and the Commander of Eastern Naval Command, Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff surrendered his Naval Command to Vice-Admiral R.N. Krishna Eastern Naval Command.

The Sinking of PNS Ghazi – Pak Version

In his book, “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”, written in 1972 soon after the war, Maj General Fazal Muqeem Khan states: (Page 337)

“The submarine Ghazi was despatched to the Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal. The Ghazi’s task was to carry out offensive mine laying against Visakhapatnam.

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in the area.

“On 14 November 1971, PNS Ghazi, under the command of Cdr Zafar Mohammad Khan, sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol.

“The first indication of Ghazi’s tragic fate came when a message by NHQ India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December but issued strangely enough on 9 December, was intercepted. Both the manner of its release and the text quoted below clarified very little: “I am pleased to announce that Pakistan Navy Submarine Ghazi sunk off Visakhapatnam by our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and other conclusive evidence floated to surface yesterday – 091101 EF”… As it happened, the release of the message on 9 December also served to divert attention of their public from the sinking of Khukri on this very date even though the claim of sinking Ghazi was apparently made a few hours before the loss of Khukri”.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: Naval War in the East appeared first on IMR.

In the fourteen-day Indo-Pak War of 1971the Indian Navy came of age, attacked Karachi twice and sank five ships, kept the Pakistan Navy at bay and captured two Pakistani merchant ships, though it lost INS Khukri, which sank to INS PNS Hangor’s torpedo attack with loss of 194 lives just off Diu. An Alize which was on an EW mission was shot down on with Lt Cdr Aku Roy in Kutch sea area. In the East, Navy wrote a new chapter of naval warfare and contributed to the hastened surrender by Pakistani forces.

When prime minister Indira Gandhi gave directions to the three Service chiefs – Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, Admiral SM Nanda and Air Chief Marshal PC Lal – to make preparations for war in earnest, the ‘War Book’ was updated, logistics beefed up and exercises undertaken, with simulated plans of attack in war. The operational orders were put in place and the Armed Forces practiced drills in conjunction. The co-ordination between the Chiefs with Manekshaw and the Government was the best India ever seen. Manekshaw donned and acted like a de facto Chief of Defence Staff. Mrs Gandhi reposed faith in him and this was key to the victory that followed.

The Navy practiced anti-submarine warfare and sent submarines for patrols off the Pakistan coast. It exercised missile attacks against Karachi with the newly acquired Osa-class boats with40 km-range missiles and excellent homing nose radars. The Osas possessed the Rangout radars which when switched on ‘High Power’, could get ranges of over 35 km. The boats lacked range but the Navy devised means to tow them to long distances with nylon tow ropes. The Navy arranged to fuel the boats in forward positions on the West Coast at Porbunder and Okha.

Dawn broke on 3 December like any other, with tension in the air. That evening witnessed the beginning of a new chapter in Indian history. Pakistani Air Force fighters struck at seven major air fields – Srinagar, Avantipur (Kashmir), Amritsar, Pathankot, Ambala (Punjab) Barmer and Jodhpur (Rajasthan) – between 1740 and 1810 hours just after dusk, hoping to cripple the Indian Air Force on the ground. But the Indian aircraft had been well dispersed, and only slight damage was caused. At 1830 hours, the Pakistani armoured forces and infantry crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir in the Poonch sector and 11 border posts in Kashmir and Punjab were heavily shelled. Mrs Gandhi spoke to the nation by radio and announced that the country was at war with Pakistan.

The signal message from Chief of Naval Staff Admiral SM Nanda released at the outbreak of hostilities was clear: “Pakistan has committed an unprovoked aggression against us and our defence services have been ordered to meet this challenge with full courage and determination. My objective is to seek and destroy Pakistani lines of communication and, along with the sister Services, inflict the maximum damage on the enemy war machine.

I expect all officers, sailors and civilians in the Navy to do their duty and act according to the best traditions of our great Service. No sacrifice should be too much for us. Let us write a new and glorious chapter in the history of our Service”.

The Western Fleet was at sea ready for battle. Apparently, the Pakistani Fleet failed to come out which confused the Indian Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Chandy Kuruvilla. The C-in-C Western Naval Command, Vice Adm S.N. Kohli opened his war orders and set in motion the attack on Karachi. The Western Fleet, with a missile boat should have been going towards Karachi as practiced, but the Fleet felt it had been located and got sidetracked into intercepting merchant ships and began a hunt for the Pakistan Fleet. By happenstance, Hunters from the OCU Jamnagar under Wing Cdr Pete Wilson attacked Karachi on 4 December morning and set the Kemari oil tanks on fire.

On 3rd night, INS Kiltan (Cdr Gopal Rao) was given command of a force with INS Katchall (Cdr K.N. Zadu) and ordered to close up with INS Nirghat (Lt Cdr I.J. Sharma), INS Nipat (Cdr Babru Yadav, K-25, Lt Cdr B.N. Kavina) and INS Veer (Lt Cdr O..P. Mehta). They were then put on their way to Karachi under shore control in Operation Trident. C-in-C Kohli was seen in the Maritime Operations Room at Bombay, fingers crossed, having let his killer dogs loose on Karachi with no air cover.

With speed in excess of 28 knots, the Osa missile boats, which offer minimum radar targets, approached Karachi in darkness after releasing tow and launched their Styx missiles on the enemy ships. Pakistani officers on duty in the control room at Karachi failed to realize that it was a seaborne attack. Assuming it was an air attack, the Pakistan defenders were confused, mesmerized and utterly in disarray to arrange for seaward defence. In the biggest naval battle since the Second World War, this Indian Task Force sank the Pakistani destroyers Khaibar (formerly HMS Cadiz) under Capt Naseem Malik, the minesweeper Muhafiz and a merchant ship off Karachi in the late hours of 4 December. One missile was fired landward.

Missile warfare entered the world’s naval vocabulary. All Indian commanding officers were decorated for their heroic sortie, which will long be remembered for it earned the Navy two Maha Vir Chakras and four Veer Chakras. 4 December is celebrated as Navy Day.

Not one of the Indian units which attacked Karachi received the slightest damage in the first major naval battle fought by the Indian Navy since Independence. What largely contributed to the big victory was the “daring and perfectly timed action” of the units of the Western Naval Command. Times London reported “Independent observers with long enough memories have compared the operation of 4/5 December with the sinking of British warships, Prince of Wales and Repulse by the Japanese off Singapore in 1941. The two fleets of the Indian Navy have bagged more than two warships but the kill is not as important as the element of surprise involved in the operations and the sense of shock it must have caused to the enemy”.

Operation Python

On 8 December, whilst the Fleet was still to flex its muscles, the second raid on Karachi was let loose in Operation Python. INS Trishul (F15, Captain K.M.V. Nair) and INS Talwar (Cdr. S.S. Kumar) were ordered to rendezvous with the missile boat INS Vinash (Lt Cdr Vijay Jerath) and proceed for a strike on Karachi. The missile attack sank one ship and set the Kemari oil tanks again on fire. There was euphoria in the Indian Navy, But, on 9 December, while the officers and men on board INS Khukri were tuned in to listen to the All India Radio news at 8.50 pm on the ship’s SRE (Sound Reproduction Equipment), while on an anti-submarine warfare mission to look out for a reported Pak submarine, the ship was hit by more than one torpedo, possibly two, fired from one of Pakistan Navy’s three newly acquired Daphne-class submarines, the Hangor (Cdr A. Tasneem) about 40 miles off Diu Head. Eighteen officers and 176 sailors perished as INS Kirpan nearby in company left the area to return with forces for rescue next day. In command of INS Khukri was Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla a 45-year old tall, strapping royal Navy-trained anti-submarine warfare specialist with earlier command experience of destroyer INS Rana and Second-in-Command of INS Krishna (the Kistna). One can picture him on the bridge of his ship, after realizing that there was no hope and forced to give the order “Abandon Ship’.

A famous broadcaster announced the sinking, saying “Captain Mulla was seen smoking a cigarette and gave his life jacket to another in the highest traditions of navies.”

Admiral SM Nanda issued a signal that officers must not go down with ships but return to fight another day with the experience.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: The Naval War in the West appeared first on IMR.

2 Corps

In the southwestern sector 2 Corps, under Lt Gen TN Raina, launched its thrust with 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division. It was well supported by a regiment plus a squadron of armour and was headed towards Kushtia and Jessore. By 6 December the well-entrenched Pakistani garrison in Jessore had apparently panicked and had pulled out. By 7 December the advancing columns had moved 30 km further up to Zenida. Magura, the next objective, was taken the next day. By 9 December, the leading elements were on the banks of the Madhumati river and preparations were underway for the capture of Kushtia. Contrary to the 2 Corps assessment, defences of Kushtia proved to be a tough nut to crack. The defenders held their ground for two long days before extricating themselves. By 12 December both Kushtia and the Hardinge Bridge, with some of its spans demolished, were in the bag. By then Indian forces were being concentrated for an assault on Daulatpur, a town close to Khulna. Operations for reducing Daulatpur were still in progress when the cease-fire came into effect. With hindsight, it appears that 2 Corps may have achieved more spectacular results if it had made a push towards Dacca once Jessore and Zenida had fallen.

33 Corps

Lt Gen ML Thapan, commanding 33 Corps, had 20 Mountain Division and two independent brigade groups. He was also permitted to commit one brigade of 6 Mountain Division, located in the Siliguri corridor, with a rider to ensure that it would be reverted within 48 hours if necessary. The Corps plan in a nutshell was to launch two brigades from the north towards Dinajpur and Rangpur. The divisional thrust from the west was to bypass Hilli from the north and then swing south to capture Bogra. The northern thrusts made spectacular progress. Their dash and determination totally surprised the defenders. By 9 December, Dinajpur had been contacted. Garrisons at Saidpur and Rangpur had been tied down. The divisional thrust also made steady progress. By 4 December, it had captured Charkai, 11 km inside. While positions immediately to the north of Hilli were still being fought for, advancing columns had moved further towards Nawabganj. It was captured mainly by the Mukti Bahini. By 7 December road Rangpur – Bogra had been severed. The same day, Maj Gen Shah, GOC 16 Pakistan Infantry Division, and his party were ambushed. However, the General managed to avoid capture. The thrust was, thereafter, developed due south towards Gobindganj and Bogra. In the meantime, Hilli had finally been captured on 11 December. It was one of the hardest fought battles of the eastern theatre. By 14 December, a roadblock had been established south of Bogra and parts of the township had been captured. Fierce fighting continued as the defenders shrank into the inner core of the built up area. However, all of them surrendered on 16 December 1971.

101 Communication Zone

Further to the east of 33 Corps was the area of operations of 101 Communication Zone. Both sides had assigned the lowest priority to this sector. Maj Gen GS Gill had just about two brigades to launch his thrust against a weak enemy brigade holding Jamalpur and Mymensingh strong points. His main effort was to head towards Jamalpur. The Pakistani outpost at Kamalpur surrendered on 4 December. Bakshiganj further south withdrew soon on being attacked. On 5 December Maj Gen GS Gill sustained injuries as his jeep went over a mine. He had to be evacuated and was replaced by Maj Gen GC Nagra. By 9 December, one more brigade, had been allotted to this sector and all was set for the capture of Jamalpur. That is when the Pakistani garrisons of Jamalpur and Mymensingh were ordered back for the close defence of Dacca. Thus, both these towns were in Indian hands on 11 December. That very evening a para drop took place at Tangail further south of Jamalpur towards Dacca. A link up was established on 12 December and the final push was made for Dacca. As it transpired, it was through this least priority sector that Dacca was entered first.

4 Corps

4 Corps in the east was under Lt Gen Sagat Singh and had 8, 23 and 57 Mountain Divisions on its order of battle. The Corps plan envisaged three Divisional thrusts to liberate all areas east of Meghna river, cut off rail and road communications to Chittagong, and force a crossing across Meghna to head for Dacca.

In the very opening stages, in the battle of Gangasagar near Akhaura, Lance Naik Albert Ekka of 14 Guards proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. During the attack he got wounded while single handedly silencing an enemy machine gun. Unmindful of his injuries, he charged on to clear yet another machine gun post by bayoneting the crew. He later succumbed to his wounds. He was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra for most conspicuous bravery and became the only one to be so honoured in the eastern theatre during the war.

Akhaura fell on 5 December. By 7 December Brahmanbaria had been taken and the troops were racing towards Ashuganj. By then, in a daring heliborne operation, a battalion had been landed in Sylhet — a move that completely unnerved the Pakistanis. Comilla and Laksham were captured by 9 December. Efforts to hustle out the defenders from Ashuganj did not succeed and the bridge there could not be secured before it was blown by the Pakistanis in panic. However, using helicopters in the moonlit night, Meghna was ‘airbridged’. By 14 December more forces had got across Meghna using river craft. That day the first artillery shells were fired on Dacca. 4 Corps formations were on the outskirts of Dacca and Mynamati was still being fought for, when the Pakistani forces surrendered unconditionally.

Unconditional Surrender

Independent of these Corps thrusts, the air borne assault by 2 Para on 11 December near Tangail hastened the proceedings and the fall of Dacca. Lt Col KS Pannu, commanding the Para Group, was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra for his determined combat leadership. On 12 December, a sea borne assault by a battalion group was launched towards Cox’s Bazar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping into Burma. Both the Navy and the Air Force had achieved complete mastery of the sea and the air space and had supported the operations of the Eastern Command admirably.

After 12 December 1971, Gen Manekshaw had been sending messages to Niazi to surrender. Later, leaflets urging the same were also dropped. Radio frequencies on which HQ Eastern Command could be contacted were also made known. The deadline of 0900 hours on 16 December 1971 set for an unconditional surrender was extended to 1500 hours the same day at Niazi’s behest. That morning, Maj Gen Gandharva Nagra had already reached Niazi’s HQ and was soon joined by Maj Gen JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command. The Pakistani General was soon convinced that surrender was the only option.

In a hurriedly organised surrender ceremony at the Dacca Race Course, Lt Gen AAK Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender and handed over his revolver to the victorious Indian commander before thousands of cheering and delirious crowds. Shouts of “Joi Bangla” rent the air. Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, accepted history’s greatest surrender since the end of the Second World War. Later that evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced to an ecstatic Lok Sabha that Dacca was the free capital of a free nation and offered a unilateral cease-fire in the western theatre with effect from December 17, 1971.

The audacity and speed of operations had kept the opponents off balance throughout. Over 90,000 personnel were taken prisoners of war. The Indian Army had achieved a stunning and memorable victory.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: The Lightening Campaign appeared first on IMR.

Though the East provided 75 per cent of the foreign earnings and exports, the reins of power were almost exclusively in the hands of West Pakistanis. Initially, Pakistan called itself a democracy, but effectively the country was run by the army, the President from 1958 to 1969 being Field-Marshal Ayub Khan.

The arrest, in 1966 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League and the outstanding political figure in East Pakistan, convinced his supporters that limited autonomy was no longer a realistic aim and that total separation was the only answer. In March 1969, Ayub Khan, having lost all semblance of popular support, gave way to General Yahya Khan, who, in December, 1970, held an election in which the Awami League won a clear majority, whereupon Yahya announced the indefinite postponement of the opening of Parliament. Rioting broke out in East Pakistan; on 25 March, 1971, the Sheikh was again arrested and the following day the unofficially styled ‘Bangladesh’ seceded from the Government of Pakistan by unilateral declaration. Yahya then sent Lt Gen Tikka Khan to East Pakistan with orders to ‘sort them out’. Thereafter, the army went on the rampage and some estimate that as many as a million civilians were murdered.

Refugees poured into India and those who remained, having nothing to lose, flocked to join the Awami League’s militant resistance organization, the Mukti Bahini, including most of the 70,000 locally recruited members of the armed forces. By August, six million refugees had fled to West Bengal, an intolerable burden for the Indian Government, whose armed forces were now actively preparing to come to the aid of the Mukti Bahini. This was not practicable until November when the monsoon would be over and the ground hard enough to allow large-scale operations, while the onset of winter would close the Sino-lndian frontier and inhibit interference from China.

There were several clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the East Pakistani border in October and November, when the latter crossed the frontier in ‘hot pursuit’ of the Mukti Bahini, finally leading, on 3 December, to the outbreak of open warfare on two fronts.

Save for the hilly tracts of Chittagong, East Pakistan was a riverine country. The river Brahmaputra flows through the centre to divide the country into two. Both these halves are further dissected by the Ganga river in the west and the Meghna river in the East. Besides, there are many other water channels and rivulets in between. On the few arterial roads which exist there are only two bridges across these mighty rivers – the Hardinge Bridge over the Ganga and the bridge across the Meghna at Ashuganj. Inland waterways cater for most of the surface communications within. All in all, East Pakistan terrain was excellent for defensive operations.

 Towards the end of April 1971, the Indian government gave the first indication of a possible military intervention in East Pakistan to Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, the Chief of the Army Staff. For a variety of sound strategic military reasons he advised the government against a hasty and indecisive military venture. The government too had other political compulsions and better sense prevailed. Consequently, the Army Chief set in motion a well-conceived plan to prepare for an all out war. To avoid getting bogged down in the riverine terrain, it had to be well after the monsoons and to preclude possible Chinese intervention, it had to be nearer the winter by when the passes on the high Himalayas close.

Shortages in manpower and equipment were made up steadily. The army’s resources, particularly the engineer effort and the bridging equipment, were judiciously allotted to the two widely separated western and eastern theatres. Formations were affiliated to the newly raised HQ 2 Corps. Territorial Army units were embodied and reservists were called up. Additional communication zone units were also raised to ensure better logistics support.

All this while Eastern Command was abuzz with hectic activities. In April 1971, it had only one division earmarked for a possible role in East Pakistan. Two more divisions were pulled out from their counter insurgency commitments. Three divisions were milked out from those having their role in Sikkim and in Arunachal Pradesh. One more division, otherwise intended for the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border, was also placed under the Command. Operational control of all Border Security Force units deployed along the East Pakistan border was handed over to Eastern Command. All formations, operationally oriented either for a role in the mountains or for counter-insurgency operations, were trained and prepared for the impending riverine operations. Measures to create the necessary logistics infrastructure, to support the operational contingencies, were initiated. Operational plans were evolved, coordinated with the Navy and the Air Force and were finalised.

 In the event of war, Pakistan had apparently visualised an Indian offensive attempting a shallow penetration, to install the Provisional Bangladesh Government. They had also counted on American support and Chinese intervention to restrain India. Hence, Pakistan’s overall defensive philosophy was to cause maximum delay by holding fortress like strong defences on all routes of ingress along the border. In consonance with their threat analysis, deployment towards the west and the north was to be heavier. For this defensive plan, Lt Gen AAK Niazi had a strength of about four divisions and seven wings of paramilitary forces. 9 Pakistan Infantry Division, with its HQ at Jessore, was to guard the western approaches. 16 Pakistan Infantry Division was responsible for the Dinajpur-Rangpur salient towards the northwest and had its HQ at Nator. The northern sector of Mymensingh was considered the least threatened and had only about a brigade deployed to defend it. Wary of the preparatory activities in Tripura, the eastern approaches to Dacca were being guarded by 14 Pakistan Infantry Division located at Comilla. Rings of defences had also been prepared around Dacca. Thus, hoping to fight set piece defensive battles of attrition, Niazi had opted for orthodox positional warfare and could be faulted for rigidity.

 In contrast, Lt Gen JS Aurora, the GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, had a plan that was bold and had streaks of originality. It sought to defeat the very premises of the defender’s strategy. In essence there were to be three thrusts by 2, 33 and 4 Corps from the west, north and the east, respectively. Each Corps was to contain the enemy strong points with small forces while the larger components were to bypass these for objectives in depth. All three Corps had planned to maintain speed of action, without tactical pauses, for a dash to Dacca before the defences around it could be occupied. The enemy was to be forced to react to Indian moves throughout. That is where superior generalship lay.

Mukti Bahini

After Lieutenant General Tikka Khan’s crack down, many officers and men from the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the police, had tried to raise an armed rebellion. Their disjointed efforts did not create the desired impact and they gradually trickled into India. Many of them had come with their weapons. They provided the nucleus for the Mukti Bahini. Trained and equipped by the Indian army, they were meshed into the operational plans of the formations of Eastern Command. Till August 1971, motivated bands of Mukti Bahini had operated along the border or had ventured only a few kilometers across. By October 1971, however, the Mukti Bahini had stepped up its activities to tie down sizeable Pakistani forces along the border and on many static duties well in depth.

Tension mounted further as the Pakistani forces resorted to unprovoked firing on Indian posts and civilian targets alike. Between November 20 and 23, 1971 fierce battles were fought at Garibpur, around Hilli, and at Atgram. The commanding officers of all the three battalions which fought these actions – 14 Punjab, 8 Guards and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles – went on to earn Maha Vir Chakras.

War broke out on December 3, 1971. On that day the Eastern Command was also responsible for the northern borders with China and for the ongoing counter-insurgency operations in many eastern states. The total forces under the Eastern Army nearly touched the half million mark.

Eastern Front Timeline

3 December       Pakistan Air Force attacks Agartala airfield.

4 December       India launches integrated ground, air and naval offensive. Aircraft from the carrier Vikrant bomb airfield at Cox’s Bazar. Dacca bombed every 1/2 hour.

5 December       Indian Army links up with Mukti Bahini and enters E. Pakistan from five directions.

6 December       India announces recognition of independent state of Bangladesh.

5-14 December Indian troops occupy East Pakistan towns on:

5th – Akhaura, Laksham

6th – Feni

7th – Sylhet, Jessore

8th – Magura, Comilla, Brahman-baria

9th – Chandpur, Daudkandi

10th – Bhairab Bazar

11th – Noakhali, Nasirabad, Kushtia

12th – Narsingdi

14th – Bogra

14 December Indian artillery starts shelling Dacca. Garrisons now still holding out only at Dacca, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Khulna, Barisal, Chittagong and Mainamati (a fortified cantonment outside Comilla).

15 December     Indian forces close on Dacca from all sides.

16 December     General Niazi signs surrender document for Pakistan, though fighting continues in the Khulna and Sylhet areas until 17 December. Excerpted from yet-to-be-published “The Fighting Spirit: An Illustrated Account of the Indian Army’s Operations in the Twentieth Century” by Maj Gen RK Arora.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: Events Leading to the Intervention in East Pakistan appeared first on IMR.

By the end of November, the Pakistani high command must have realised that the Indian Army had deployed in full strength on the west, its infantry divisions backed up by a number of armoured brigades—besides the formidable 1st Armoured Division. As for its own forces, the two divisions that Pakistan had begun to raise in May 1971 to replace the divisions sent to the eastern wing were still below strength and not fully operational. No one but an incurable optimist would, in those circumstances, hope for the cherished breakthrough to materialise. And yet that is exactly what they attempted—and with incredible ineptitude.

Pakistan launched a pre-emptive strike on a number of Indian airfields—Srinagar, Avantipur, Pathankot, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra – at 5.45 pm on 3 December 1971. The strikes were clumsy. Not a single Indian aircraft was lost on the ground. Within 24 hours the Indian Air Force (IAF) had broken the back of the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) through counter-strikes.

The Indian Air Force went into action later that night and continued mounting operations till they reached the peak of 500 sorties per day — a world record. The IAF attacked Chanderi, Shorkot, Sargodha, Muri, Mianwali, Marur (Karachi), Risalwalla (Rawalpindi) and Changa Manga (Lahore). Over 25 aircraft were hit.

After the first abortive series of strikes the PAF ceased to be a serious air threat. By the evening of 4 December, the IAF had established air superiority.

Land Forces

The Pakistan Army in the West consisted of about ten infantry divisions (two of them newly raised) a few independent brigades, two armoured divisions and an independent armoured brigade. The grouping was as follows:

Kashmir Sector

•             12th Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK) Division in the northern sector

•             23 POK Division on the Kotli-Poonch front.

•             II Pak Corps, HQ  In the Sialkot sector: Sialkot

                8,15 and 17 Infantry Divisions

                6 Armoured Division.

•             IV Pak Corps, HQ Lahore, in the Central sector

                10 and 11 Infantry Divisions

                8 Independent Armoured Brigade.

•   I Pak Corps, HQ Mooltan, in the Mooltan sector

                7 and 33 Infantry Divisions,

                25 Infantry Brigade

                1 Armoured Division.

• 18 Infantry Division, in the Southern sector

• Two armoured regiments

From these dispositions, it was appreciated by our high command that the most likely sectors where the Pak army-would attempt offensives would be, firstly, on the Sialkot front, with the aim of cutting either the Jammu-Poonch or the Pathankot-Jammu road links to isolate our forces: and secondly, a thrust by I Pak Corps in the southern Punjab. The latter could be the much vaunted “deep Israeli-type thrust”.

  Indian Forces, only marginally superior, were grouped as follows:

• Western Command (Lt Gen K.P. Candeth).

• Three army corps (Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, Lt Gen N.C. Rawlley and Lt Gen K.K. Singh).

•   Army HQ reserve.

• Southern Command (Lt Gen G.G. Bewoor), responsible for the Rajasthan front.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

The first Pakistani offensive was launched at 8.30 pm on 3 December, against the Indian Army’s Poonch and Chhamb sectors. The aim was to capture a piece of Kashmir territory by a pincer movement. It failed miserably.

An “Azad” Kashmir infantry brigade launched an attack against Poonch from the direction of Kahuta in the north-west, while commandos infiltrated behind the Poonch area to cut the road link.

The attack was launched with determination but the IAF pounded them in the forests north-west of Poonch. The enemy decided to call off the attack.

The second attempt on the night of 9/10 December, was pre-empted by the IAF – it strafed them in their assembly areas.

The Indian forces now launched the counter-offensive. A brigade column was moved towards Hajiian to dominate the Poonch-Kotli road. By 16 December, most parts of the road had been secured.

In the Chhamb sector, the Indian forces were at a slight disadvantage. The Indian defences, based on the line of the Munnawar Tawi river, had covering positions to the west — only 50 miles from the Pak Army’s base at Kharian. In 1965, the Pakistani forces had scored a major success here.

The story of the Battle of Chammb Jaurian will be covered in a later issue of IMR.

In the rest of the J&K theatre, Gen Sartaj Singh, the Corps Commander, aimed at removing the tactical disadvantages of the alignment of the Ceasefire Line (CFL), by capturing dominating heights and denying the enemy easy routes for infiltration.

In the Kargil sector, this entailed the capture of about 15 enemy posts located at heights of 10,000 feet and more in severe weather and terrain conditions.

In the Tithwal sector, the threat to the Indian lines of communications from a large salient of Pak-held territory on the east bank of the Kishenganga river, west of Tut Mari Gali pass, was cleared.

Similarly, in the Uri sector, where the Haji Pir salient provides easy infiltration access to Gulmarg, Indian forces captured posts in the Tosh Maidan and neutralised the threat.

Punjab Sector

The Pakistanis made limited gains in small enclaves of Indian territory located on the far side of rivers or obstacles. So did the Indian forces.

Of the three bridges over the rivers Ravi and Sutlej where they form the Indo-Pak boundary, the only one that lay in Indian territory was the Hussainiwalla bridge near Ferozepur.

A small Indian enclave on the far bank of the river was attacked by the Pakistani forces on the night of 3/4 December. Fighting a delaying action, in which the Pakistanis lost 18 tanks, the Indian garrison made a pre-planned withdrawal to the east bank of the river — during which the bridge itself was heavily shelled and damaged by the enemy.

In response, Gen NC Rawlley, the Corps Commander, ordered an offensive to capture the Sehjra salient, northwest of Ferozepur. This salient posed a threat not only to Khem Karan but also to the Harike bridge further up the Sutlej.

The attack was to go in on the night of 5/6 December. The attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Indian troops took an approach along the open and sandy river-bed leading to a twenty-foot escarpment behind which the Pak defences were located, which was unexpected, with the result that Sehjra was soon captured and the threat to Khem Karan and Harike removed.

Indian forces also attacked and captured the Pak enclave on the eastern side of the Ravi guarding the Dera Baba Nanak bridge on December 6/7. This enclave was strongly fortified with concrete pillboxes and bunkers along the bund, mortar positions and high observation towers. The Indian assault from an unexpected flank, after several feints from a different direction, unbalanced the enemy. By the morning of 7 December, the enclave was in Indian hands with control over the bridge.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

Pakistan’s II Corps (Sialkot), the heaviest of the Pak Army Corps, posed a threat to the Pathankot-Jammu road and to Pathankot itself. It was important to capture the Shakargarh salient and reduce the crucial tactical disadvantage.    

The offensive was launched along three axes

•             Two striking southwards from the general direction of the Kathua-Samba stretch of the main Pathankot-Jammu road; and

•             A third, subsequent thrust from the Gurdaspur area striking west-ward.

The operation started on the night of 5/6 December and lasted till the Ceasefire, culminating in the biggest tank battle of the war.

The two northern thrusts reached the outskirts of Shakargarh and Nurkot by 8 December —a very slow rate of advance due to extensive caution about enemy minefields laid in great depth.

The Pakistani forces had been expecting an attack in the Chawinda-Phillaura area. The enemy strength in the area was about one infantry brigade supported by a squadron of armour. As soon as the Pakistanis realised what the Indian were up to in the Shakargarh salient, they quickly and sent two armoured regiments (Pattons) from 6 Armoured Division to re-inforce the brigade in Shakargarh.

The Indian attack from the eastern side went in on the night of 8/9 December, across the River Ravi—supported, as were the other two, by armour and artillery. The western-most column reached the outskirts of Zafarwal. The Pakistanis reacted strongly and sent in an armoured counter-attack by two regiments of Pattons. However, the Indian Centurions quickly proved the superiority of Indian tank-gunners over those of the Pakistanis.

The 1965 story of Khem Karan was repeated in this battle — 45 Patton tanks being knocked out during the day and night long battle on 15 and 16 December. Indian Army’s losses were only 15 tanks.

Poona Horse, the Indian armoured regiment involved in this battle, had also fought here in 1965 (under the command of Colonel Tarapore, who was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra) did well in the I Corps battle on the Phillaura front. The nick-name the enemy had given this regiment was “Fakhr-i-Hind,” the Pride of India.

After the tank battle, the three columns moved forward till they were in contact with the defences of both Zafarwal and Shakargarh. Here again, the Ceasefire came just in time to save the enemy from losing those two towns.

Rajasthan Sector

A Pakistani infantry brigade supported by a regiment of armour (mixed T-59s and Shermans) launched an attack on Indian positions at Longewala (Jaisalmer sector) — probably to disrupt an anticipated of a thrust by Indian forces – towards the road and rail link at Rahim Yar Khan. The soft vehicles of the supporting troops bogged down soon after crossing our border. The ranks too got stuck in the soft sand, providing easy targets for the IAF aircraft. One of the IAF Hunter pilots described it as a duck shoot. More than 20 enemy tanks were destroyed on the first day.

The next day the targets were the long columns of soft vehicles.

Southern Command Theatre

The intention in the Southern Command’s area of responsibility in Rajasthan was to force the enemy to commit his strategic reserve, ie, Pak I Corps, which included Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division and an infantry division. It entirely succeeded in this aim.

Following the enemy’s failed attack at Longewala, Gen GG Bewoor, GOC-in-C Southern Command, struck out from the Jaisalmer sector to capture Islamgarh and, further south, along the old Bombay-Sind-railway axis, a more determined thrust towards Gadra.    

Gadra was taken easily, while along the railway axis a brigade struck out for Khokrapar and beyond. At the same time, a whole series of long-range raiding columns were sent out into the salient between Nagar Parka and the railway axis. Special Forces dominated the area, liquidating Pak outposts and within a few days the whole salient was under Indian control. Meanwhile, the column along the railway axis forged ahead and laid sieging to Naya Chor, which was saved only by the Ceasefire.

The enemy reacted by sending 33 Infantry Division down from Pak I Corps to reinforce the Rahim Yar Khan-Hyderabad sector. The offensive-defensive strategy paid off.

The post INDO-PAK WAR 1971: War in the West appeared first on IMR.

A new book authored by Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, who was a young fighter pilot during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, says that while the Official History of the Ministry of Defence admits that the 1965 war with Pakistan resulted in a stalemate, the IAF came out as the winner. Bharat Kumar’s assessment is based on the fact that Pakistan’s thrust in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector to capture the vital bridge on the River Chenab at Akhnoor, was stopped in its tracks due to the timely intervention of the Indian Air Force.

The book titled “The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle – The First Indo-Pak Air War (1-22 September 1965) was released by the Vice President, Hamid Ansari, at a Tri-Service Joint Seminar on the 1965 War at the Manekshaw Centre here today.

The book, published by Gurgaon-based IMR Media, was commissioned by the Indian Air Force. The author was given access to squadron diaries and official records. Bharat Kumar also relied extensively on personal accounts of the Wing and Squadron commanders as well as fighter and bomber pilots who took part in the missions during the war.

The book has disclosed some hitherto unknown facts and brought them in the public domain.

Having emerged with a beating in the 1962 war with China, India was in the process of expanding its armed forces and buying modern equipment but was nowhere near ready to face the challenge from second and third generation aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory. Pakistan had joint SEATO and CENTO and had been armed by the United States with F-86 Sabre jets and Sidewinder-missile armed F-104 Lockheed Starfighters along with Martin Canberra bombers. On the other hand, the Indian Air Force had the Vampire, Gnat, Hunter, Mystere and Toofani jets. MiG-21s were in the process of being inducted.

Operations in the Kutch Sector

The IAF was not used in any offensive manner during the Kutch crises. It was a political decision not to escalate the conflict unnecessarily.

During Operation Desert Hawk launched by Pakistan, on 19 April 1965, Point 84, Biar Bet, Chhad Bet and Guli Talao were attached. On 20 April, Biar Bet was attacked by a brigade sized force and 30 tanks. Pakistanis suffered heavy casualties and Point 84 and Biar Bet were vacated but they did not occupy them.

On 24 June 1965, Flt Lt RLC Sikka, flying a Toofani, was intercepted by a PAF F-104 Starfighter. One fighter says Sikka surrendered (lowering his undercarriage to show intent) and landed in an open field in Pakistan. Another version says that he ran out of fuel, avoided ejecting and belly landed there.

Operation Gibraltar

Pakistan infiltrated 40,000  specially trained irregular forces into Kashmir on 5 August 1965, led by regular officers, Razakars and Mujahids. They were discovered  and rounding up commenced the same day. The PAF was pressed in to support the trapped infiltrators by dropping supplies to isolated bands.

The Army retaliated by occupying some Pak posts across the Ceasefire Line in Kargil, Tithwal and another in Haji Pir Pass. Logistics support was extended by the IAF. From 18 August to 20 September 567 sorties were flown in 433 hours over 36 days

To take on infiltrators entrenched at some posts, Mi-4 helicopters were modified to fire 0.5” Browning gun and drop bombs. The 1949 Ceasefire agreement prohibited the stationing of combat aircraft in J&K.  Beginning 31 August, 79 offensive missions were flown to drop 1,131 bombs and fire 5,458 rounds.

Concept of Operations

Pakistan wanted the air superiority battle to be fought at Sargodha-Peshawar, well to the rear for Canberra bombers. It planned on carrying out bomber raids of IAF airfields after having attacked IAF airfields as soon as hostilities commenced.

On the other hand, the IAF was essentially employed in support of the Army. Attacks against Pak airfields were to be carried out only in retaliation. The IAF mainly took on the PAF in the air. Strikes inside East Pakistan were prohibited.

Operation Grand Slam

Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on 1 September 1965 at 0600 hrs with an attack in the Chhamb Jaurian sector to capture Akhnur and cut off the life line to the Kashmir Valley. The offensive force consisted of 7 Infantry Division supported by two regiments of armour and Corps Artillery. A diversionary attack was also launched at Jhangar, 56 km north-west of Chhamb. This is how IAF support was provided in world-record time.

The Army asked for air support at 1100 hrs. The COAS, Gen JN Choudhri, who was on a tour in Srinagar, landed in Delhi and proceeded to the office of the Defence Minister where he apprised Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Cjief of Air Staff, about the situation and requested for air support. Chavan took the political decision at 1650 hours. The first of 26 aircraft got airborne at 1709 hours, an unprecedented record when combat aircraft are launched within 29 minutes.

Pakistan lost ten tanks, two ack-ack guns and 30-40 vehicles in one day. Pakistan advance halted and for all practical purposes Grand Slam defeated.

India’s First Air-to-Air Kill

Flt Lt Trevor Keelor shot down the first Pak F-86 Sabre of the 1965 war. But there was a sad story as well. Sqn Ldr (later Air Marshal) BS Sikand got separated from his Gnat formation, lost contact with his mates and also his bearings. Strangely, at the end of his fuel state, he landed at Pasrur, a disused airfield in Pakistan, which lies in the direction opposite to Adampur, where he was to return. He was taken prisoner.

Attack on Pathankot Air Base

10 Sabres of 19 PAF Squadron from Peshawar, under Sqn Ldr Sayed Sajid Haider, took off on 6 September 1965 while two F-104 Starfighters covered them in the air. They struck Patahnkot airfield at 1715 hrs for over 10 mins.  In this raid the IAF lost 6 Mysteres, 2 MiG-21s, 1 Gnat, 1 Packet (all in the open) No airctaft inside the blast pens was damaged. In addition 2 Gnats and 1 Mystere was damaged. Three airmen were injured. Pathankot base had early warning about the attack but it was disregarded.

The whole the attack was going on four Mysteres (led by Flt Lt VM Raina) and two Gnats (led by Flt Lt MR Murdeshwar) were in the process of landing on return from a mission in the Chhamb sector against Pakistani vehicle columns. Two MiG-21s had landed and were being refueled.

Attack on Adampur

Four F-86 Sabres, under Sqn Ldr MM Alam, took off for Peshawar to attack Adampur but missed it and overshot. They spotted three Dakotas (led by Sqn Ldr Dhillon of 43 Squadron flying from Sarsawa to Amritsar) near Phagwara but let them go. Near Taran Taran, the Sabres got involved in a fight with a 4-Hunter formation led by Wf Cdr T Zachariah (and Sqn Ldr MM Sinha, Flt Lt SK Sharma and Sqn Ldr AK Rawlley). The entire engagement was fought out at 150-200 feet AGL and tree-top heights. During the manoeuvres, Rawlley impacted the ground. Alam claimed Rawlley’s Hunter. All three Hunters fired at the Sabres but missed them. Adampur was spared the task of defending itself from the Sabres’ attack.

Attack on Halwara

Four Hunters led by Wg Cdr T Zachariah had landed at 1725 hrs, on 6 September 1965, after a mission and were taxiing back.  Meanwhile four Hunters were already airborne providing a combat air patrol (Fg Offr PS Pingale, Fg Offr AR Ghandhi, Flt Lt Rathore and Plt Offr VK Neb). Two out of three Sabres led by Sqn Ldr SA Rafiqui (who had shot down two Vampires on 1 September) struck the Hunters taxiing back. They claimed two Hunters. Soon they got into a fight with Pingale’s combat air patrol. One of the Sabres was shot down by Fg Offr AR Ghandhi. Ghandhi himself was hit by Flt Lt Cecil Choudhary and had to eject. Flt Lt GS Thapa shot down another Sabre with a 20mm aircraft gun being used as a ack-ack gun from the ground.

The Failed Pakistani Air Drop

Pakistan’s plan called for drop of para commandos around three key Indian airfields – Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara.

On the night of 6/7 September, coinciding with B-57 bomber raids, each group of 3 officers, 1 JCO and 60 other ranks, were dropped with auto weapons, mortars, explosives, wireless sets, torches and wire cutters.

At Pathankot, they were dropped at 0230 hours, landed in marshy ground. Villagers discovered them. Sub Area HQ mustered a force of 200 transients and rounded them up by 1000 hours including Maj Khalid Butt.

At Halwara, 60 paratroopers were dropped. Villagers from Rajoana started looking for them and casptured Capt Hassan and two other ranks by morning. A thorough search by Sqn Ldr SK Singh of the Accounts Branch and his men led to the capture of all other para troopers but their commander Major Hazur Hussain managed to get back to Pakistan.

At Adampur, the paratriopers hid in a corn field but were surrounded by the villagers. Some of the paratroopers who were hiding in the sarkanda grass surrendered when they were strafed.

Devayya Gets a MVC after 28 Years

Sqn Ldr AB Devayya, flying a first generation Mystere fighter shot down a third-generation F-104 Lockheed Starfighter. The ‘kill’ was confirmed 28 years later and Devayya was awarded a Maha Vir Chakra, posthumously when a Pakistani pilot confirmed the event.

Flying Officer Dara Chinoy Treks 25 km in One Night

Dara Chinoy’ aircraft, part of four Mystere aircraft formation, was hit by ground fire, caught fire and the engine flamed out. Dara ejected in Pakistan. He managed to evade Pakistani troops and initially moved in Easterly direction. He was followed by Pakistani soldiers. He changed his direction and hid in sugarcane fields for the day. He later trekked 25 km that night and arrived near Amritsar next morning. Had been without food and water for nearly 24 hours.

Dara was interrogated by the Army personnel and after some time his identity was established. He passed out during this journey back to Adampur due to exhaustion but was back to flying the very next morning.

Chief Minister of Gujrat is Shot Down

The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Balwant Rai Mehta, flying in a civilian Beechcraft aircraft, with family, piloted by Jehangir Engineer, one of the famous Engineer brothers of the IAF,  was shot down by a Pakistani Sabre jet on 19 September 1965. This was confirmed by the Pakistani pilot, Qais Hussain in August 2011, when he wrote to the Beechcraft pilot apologizing for his mistake.

IAF Raids Badin Radar

Badin had one of the two high-powered radars overlooking the entire southern sector. PAF aircraft were located at Badin and Mauripur airfields. Wing Commander Pete Wilson was nominated to lead strike against the radar.

Six Canberra get airborne from Agra. Fly at height till Bikaner and then ultra-low level to Badin. The first four Canberras bombed Badin with a view to neutralize anti-aircraft defences. The fifth Canberra flown by Wilson flew at extremely low level and attacked the radome from below with rockets and blows up the radome.

The last Canberra was to perform dual role. First to act as decoy if Wilson encountered any enemy aircraft and secondly to be standby to Wilson if something happened to Wilson. In this case, no such action required. All aircraft return to base. Badin put out of action.

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