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		<title>India gives soldiers freedom along LAC in extraordinary times</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/india-gives-soldiers-freedom-along-lac-in-extraordinary-times/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2020 07:08:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=3238</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A significant change in Rules of Engagement (ROE) by the Indian Army following the Galwan Valley skirmish that left 20 Indian soldiers dead gives “complete freedom of action” to commanders deployed along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) to “handle situations at the tactical level,” two senior officers said on Saturday on condition of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-gives-soldiers-freedom-along-lac-in-extraordinary-times/">India gives soldiers freedom along LAC in extraordinary times</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>
<p>A significant change in Rules of Engagement (ROE) by the Indian Army following the Galwan Valley skirmish that left 20 Indian soldiers dead gives “complete freedom of action” to commanders deployed along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) to “handle situations at the tactical level,” two senior officers said on Saturday on condition of anonymity.</p>
<p>The commanders will no longer be bound by restrictions on the use of firearms and will have full authority to respond to “extraordinary situations” using all resources at their disposal, said one of the officers cited above.<span id="more-229564"></span></p>
<p>The amendment in ROE comes after Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in their first deadly conflict in 45 years in Galwan Valley on June 15, resulting in death of 20 Indian army troops and several Chinese casualties.</p>
<p>In his remarks during an all-party meeting on Friday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the army had been given the freedom to take necessary steps along the border and India had conveyed its position (to China) through diplomatic means.</p>
<p>“With the changes in the ROE, there’s nothing that limits the ability of Indian commanders to take whatever action they deem necessary on the LAC. ROE have been amended to address the brutal tactics being employed by Chinese troops,” said the second officer cited above.</p>
<p>The&nbsp;seven-hour Galwan Valley clash&nbsp;marked the first time India suffered combat fatalities in an incident involving Chinese troops since 1975. Changes in ROE were imminent after a series of violent clashes along the border, with the army finally deciding not to restrict the scope of response of its soldiers after the June 15 clash, the second officer said.</p>
<p>“Two violent clashes took place in Pangong Tso (May 5-6) and Galwan Valley (around mid-May) before the June 15 skirmish in eastern Ladakh. On all occasions, they came in huge numbers and assaulted our troops with iron roads and nail-studded clubs. Our troops fought back fearlessly but the ROE had to be revisited,” he said.</p>
<p>Forward troops keep their guns slung on their backs with the magazines in pouches and not clipped on.</p>
<p>“Since soldiers are allowed to carry weapons while patrolling the LAC, it is inherent that they can use the firearms in unprecedented situations like the attack in Galwan Valley,” said former Northern Army commander Lieutenant General BS Jaswal (retd).</p>
<p>The government said on Thursday that soldiers involved in the June 15 clash with Chinese troops were carrying weapons and ammunition but did not open fire as they were following border agreements between the two countries — a remark that came in response to a question from Congress leader Rahul Gandhi on whether the Indian soldiers were sent in “unarmed”.</p>
<p>“Let us get the facts straight. All troops on border duty always carry arms, especially when leaving post. Those at Galwan on 15 June did so. Long-standing practice (as per 1996 &amp; 2005 agreements) not to use firearms during faceoffs,” external affairs minister S Jaishankar tweeted, responding to a post by Gandhi earlier this week.</p>
<p>Border agreements from 1996 and 2005 between India and China disallow the use of firearms during face-offs. Article 6 of the agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC, signed by India and China in November 1996, states that both sides will not open fire or “conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers from the Line of Actual Control”.</p>
<p>Top retired commanders and China watchers, however, said that Galwan clash and last month’s Pangong Tso brawl were not classical face-offs between rival troops but were extremely violent attacks on Indian soldiers.</p>
</div>
<p><a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/no-restrictions-on-firearms-india-gives-soldiers-freedom-along-lac-in-extraordinary-times/story-pCcFAcSAkMRschq50Tom1L.html">Source link </a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-gives-soldiers-freedom-along-lac-in-extraordinary-times/">India gives soldiers freedom along LAC in extraordinary times</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Indian Army&#8217;s Response to Pak Terror Attacks in 2020</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/indian-armys-response-to-pak-terror-attacks-in-2020/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2020 09:16:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Counter-Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Homeland Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jammu & Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counter-terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HizbulMujahideen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IndianArmy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LeT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LoC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[POK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RashtriyaRifles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=1534</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>During April 2020, a number of terror launch pads along the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC) were destroyed by the Indian Army. India has been retaliating strongly to the Pakistani &#8220;misadventure&#8221; by targeting terror launch pads and ammunition storage across the LoC. Handwara Operation In the Army&#8217;s best traditions, Colonel Ashutosh Sharma, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/indian-armys-response-to-pak-terror-attacks-in-2020/">Indian Army&#8217;s Response to Pak Terror Attacks in 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During April 2020, a number of terror launch pads along the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC) were destroyed by the Indian Army. India has been retaliating strongly to the Pakistani &#8220;misadventure&#8221; by targeting terror launch pads and ammunition storage across the LoC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Handwara Operation</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the Army&#8217;s best traditions, Colonel Ashutosh Sharma, a decorated commanding officer of a Rashtriya Rifles battalion, along with company commander Maj Anuj Sood, two other soldiers and a policeman laid down their lives in a fierce encounter with terrorists at Chanjimulla area of Handwara in north Kashmir&#8217;s Kupwara district on 2 May.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two terrorists were killed in the encounter, one of whom was identified as top Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) commander Haidar alias Iqbal, a resident of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. They were part of a large group of Pakistani infiltrators who had sneaked into Kashmir through the Wadarbala-Rajwara forests in Kupwara in April. Col Sharma and his team reached the site after receiving reports that civilians were being held hostage in a house by terrorists. The Army officers were leading a team to rescue civilians who had been taken hostage by the terrorists.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Kishtwar Encounter</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a gunfight in Kishtwar district, on 17 April, two militants were slain. They had killed a Special Police Officer and injured another near Dacchan a week earlier, before decamping with their weapons. The weapons were recovered after the encounter near Sounder village.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In another encounter at Dairoo village in South Kashmir&#8217;s Shopian the same day two militans killed.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Keran Gunfight</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Army suffered its biggest casualties in a day since the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammau &amp; Kashmir (J&amp;K), on 5 April. It was foiling an infiltration bid at a high-altitude pass on the Line of Control (LoC) at Shalbatoo, in the Jumgund area of the Keran sector in Kupwara in north Kashmir, in tough terrain and bad weather.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Five members of the elite para unit – 4 Para – and five militants were killed in the fierce hand-to-hand combat and gunfight in the snowbound Ringdori forest area of Keran, 120 km from Srinagar. The unit took part in the 2016 cross-LoC surgical strikes in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).</p>



<div class="wp-block-image"><figure class="alignleft size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="600" height="351" src="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/14-A-Image-from-an-Army-video-showing-Pakistani-ammunition-dump-being-destroyed-by-precision-fire..jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-1536" srcset="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/14-A-Image-from-an-Army-video-showing-Pakistani-ammunition-dump-being-destroyed-by-precision-fire..jpg 600w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/14-A-Image-from-an-Army-video-showing-Pakistani-ammunition-dump-being-destroyed-by-precision-fire.-300x176.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption>14 A &#8211; Image from an Army video showing Pakistani ammunition dump being destroyed by precision fire.</figcaption></figure></div>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The special forces troopers, who had been air dropped near the LoC after information on the infiltrators was received, were found just six feet away from the terrorists, who they eliminated in an intense battle when the search party found them . They had infiltrated across the LoC from Qasim-II post in PoK and were headed to the Gulab Post on the Indian side.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At least three of the five terrorists gunned down on April 5 in the Keran sector belonged to Jammu &amp; Kashmir and had gone across the border to Pakistan for training in 2018. Five AK-47 rifles, grenades, and GPS and wireless sets were recovered from the encounter site.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Kulgam Gunfight</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A day earlier, on 4 April, four terrorists of Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM) responsible for killing several civilians were shot dead by security forces in a shootout in Kulgam district of Jammu &amp; Kashmir. Two soldiers of the Indian Army were also injured in the encounter, which took place in Hardmand Guri village of Kulgam. The house in which the terrorists were held up was demolished.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Army&#8217;s Response</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The army responded to the unprovoked ceasefire violation and the killing of Special Forces commandos, on 10 April, by targeting Pakistani positions across the LoC in the Keran sector with artillery guns and caused severe damage to posts, terror launch pads and an ammunition dump in PoK.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A 48-second video clip released showed heavy and precision artillery blasting some positions, including an ammunition dump that was seen exploding in a huge ball of fire. It was a message to Pakistan that nothing goes unpunished.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The assault on terror launch pads at Dudhnial facing the Keran sector killed eight terrorists and 15 Pakistan Army soldiers. There was an effort to camouflage the extent of the casualties on the Pakistani side.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was from Dudhnial that the five terrorists neutralised by the Indian Army special forces in the Keran sector on April 5 had been launched.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army had no option since credible information suggested that nearly 160 terrorists of mixed tanzeems – LeT, Jaish e Mohammed and HuM – were waiting in the area to infiltrate into Kashmir.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At least one terror launch pad, among other targets, was apparently &#8220;completely destroyed&#8221; in the firing by the Indian Army, which used 105mm field guns as well as 155mm Bofors howitzers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defence minister Rajnath Singh, on 19 April, said the Indian Army was carrying out &#8220;targeted strikes&#8221; on terror launch pads along the LoC in Jammu &amp; Kashmir and eliminating the Pakistani infiltrators before they crossed over to the Indian side.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;As you would have gathered from the operations along the LoC in the last two weeks, we are dominating the enemy through targeted intelligence based strikes on their launch pads and eliminating them before they set foot on Indian soil,&#8221; Singh said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Comments</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dispite the coronavirus (Covid-19) panedemic spreading in Pakistan, there has been a spike in incidents across the LoC suggested that the operations to foment trouble in Kashmir – by first radicalising locals in Valley; then getting them to cross over for weapons training with terror groups such as the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and HM; and then sending them back to wage war in India. There were attempts to smuggle assault rifles across LoC to supply to foreign and local terrorists in the Valley. Other moves which include propping up smaller indigenous armed groups, were linked with retaliation against India for the August 2019 nullification of Article 370.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan often resorts to ceasefire violations to push militants into the Indian side. Indian troops have also been retaliating to Pakistani actions under its policy of hot pursuit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/indian-armys-response-to-pak-terror-attacks-in-2020/">Indian Army&#8217;s Response to Pak Terror Attacks in 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pakistan : Pakistan to Continue on FATF’s Grey List</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/pakistan-pakistan-to-continue-on-fatfs-grey-list/</link>
					<comments>https://imrmedia.in/pakistan-pakistan-to-continue-on-fatfs-grey-list/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kunal Kaushik]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2020 04:21:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Counter-Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=1096</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At the plenary of the an inter-governmental body established in 1989 to combat money laundering – Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – in Paris, on 16-21 February, Pakistan expected to get about 12 countries to speak in its favour and get it off the &#8216;grey list&#8217;. However, out of the 27 action points that Pakistan [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/pakistan-pakistan-to-continue-on-fatfs-grey-list/">Pakistan : Pakistan to Continue on FATF’s Grey List</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the plenary of the an inter-governmental body established in 1989 to combat money laundering – Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – in Paris, on 16-21 February, Pakistan expected to get about 12 countries to speak in its favour and get it off the &#8216;grey list&#8217;. However, out of the 27 action points that Pakistan had to take to get there, it still needed to act on 13. In the last review meeting in Beijing in January, Pakistan was judged to have taken satisfactory action on 14 action points. It was theoretically possible that Pakistan could move out of the grey list. But that required the votes of at least 15 of the FATF&#8217;s 36 voting members.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FATF meeting was held a week after an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan sentenced Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attack and founder of the LeT, to 11 years in two terror financing cases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan should demonstrate that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of terror funding activities and that terror funding investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and those acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities and demonstrate effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions against all UN-designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets and prohibiting access to funds and financial services, the FATF said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FATF Plenary noted that till now, Pakistan has largely addressed 14 of 27 action items, with varying levels of progress made on the rest of the action plan. It strongly directed Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by June 2020. Failure to take steps towards prosecuting and penalising terror funding by the next plenary, the FATF will take action, which could include the FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Grey List</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The grey list categorisation means that the so-called improvement in Islamabad&#8217;s attitude on terrorism was being noted, but clearly it was far from enough. The improvement essentially lay in the Pakistan government taking over scores of seminaries that preach the terrorism gospel. FATF called for further action to show Pakistan&#8217;s commitment to deal with terror funding and money-laundering for terrorist purposes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States was instrumental in the &#8220;grey listing&#8221; of Pakistan in June 2018 by the 39-member FATF, overriding stiff resistance from China and Turkey, two of Pakistan&#8217;s close allies. Islamabad has been since working on implementing a list of conditions laid down by the watchdog to avoid being bumped up to the blacklist, and, under the most optimistic circumstances, be taken off the grey list altogether.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The FATF</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FATF is a Paris-based international watchdog established in 1989 to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. It currently has 39 members, including two regional organisations – the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. India is a member of the FATF consultations and its Asia Pacific Group</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>India&#8217;s Efforts</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although, Pakistan is believed to have received strong backing from Malaysia, it failed to impress western nations due to India&#8217;s consistent efforts by providing materials and evidence on Pakistan&#8217;s inaction to check funding to terror groups operating from its soil.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian diplomatic channel saw it as a victory for them. The plenary noted that Pakistan addressed only a few of the 27 tasks given to it in controlling funding to terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Hizbul Mujahideen, which are responsible for a series of attacks in India. India has been maintaining that Pakistan extends regular support to terror groups like the LeT, the JeM and the Hizbul Mujahideen, whose prime target is India, and has urged the FATF to take action against Islamabad.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has been maintaining that Pakistan extends regular support to terror groups like the LeT, the JeM and the Hizbul Mujahideen, whose prime target is India, and has urged the FATF to take action against Islamabad.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Next Course of Action</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan was placed on the &#8216;Grey List&#8217; by the FATF in June 2018 and was given a plan of action to complete by October 2019 or face the risk of being placed on the &#8216;Black List&#8217;.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In October 2019, FATF did not blackball Pakistan altogether on the terrorism question, placing Islamabad on its &#8220;grey&#8221; list for a period of another four months till February 2020. Again, at the February 2020 Plenary, the FATF gave an extension of four months to Pakistan to act against organisations involved in terror financing. This was leniency being shown since FATF is currently being chaired by China, which is known to be Pakistan&#8217;s all weather ally.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Pakistan&#8217;s Cosmetic Steps</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An anti-terror court in Lahore in February 2020 sentenced Hafiz Saeed, founder-chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the mother outfit of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and an associate to 11 years of rigorous imprisonment on two counts of terror funding and money-laundering, indicating that it was observing the letter of FATF&#8217;s instructions. Saeed, a UN designated terrorist on whom the US has placed a $10 million bounty, was arrested on July 17, 2019, in the terror financing cases.This 69-year-old head of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), and an aide, were both given five-and-a-half year jail terms in two cases of terror financing by an anti-terrorism court in Lahore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the FATF threat looming, a court has meted out punishment, at least for the record. Although, years of diplomatic demands by India to proceed against the terrorist mastermind over the Mumbai 26/11 attacks of 2008, in which 166 persons were killed, had produced no results as the Pakistani courts always found the evidence insufficient. This time the Pakistani judiciary was quick in giving its ruling as a negative FATF recommendation could imperil the 2019 IMF bailout package of $6 billion and the economic reforms tied to it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whether the rigorous imprisonment meted out to Saeed (LeT) is observed seriously is moot, considering it is Pakistan, where all state agencies are believed to be compromised,&nbsp; although Saeed has been declared a &#8220;global terrorist&#8221; by the UN and the US.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Further, the trial of seven people, including LeT operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, has floundered in a Pakistani anti-terrorism court for more than a decade with no visible results. Lakhvi was released on bail in April 2015 and his current whereabouts are not known.Pakistani officials have said the trial has not progressed because more evidence and information is required from India, but this claim has been rejected by Indian authorities</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Azhar, Pakistan has told FATF that it could not file an FIR against him since he could not be &#8220;found&#8221;. However, it is believed that Azhar is in the protective custody of the Pakistan government since 2016 but such reports were not confirmed by authorities. However, he used to release audio messages for his supporters. After Pulwama, he never released any video or audio message and the government also avoided speaking about him and his whereabouts. Since March 2019, government sources claimed several times that he had gone missing</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Comments</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With Pakistan&#8217;s continuation in the &#8216;Grey List&#8217;, it will be difficult for the country to get financial aid from the IMF, the World Bank, the ADB and the European Union, thus further enhancing problems for the nation which is in a precarious economic situation</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If Pakistan fails to comply with the FATF directive, there is every possibility that the global body may put the country in the &#8216;Black List&#8217; along with North Korea and Iran.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although, FATF has been successful in putting pressure on Pakistan in taking actions to stop terror funding but certain key aspects are left unaddressed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That being stated, it is in Pakistan&#8217;s national interest to prevent it from getting blacklisted. The latter would mean an embargo on all possible international aid it is scheduled to receive and which prove to be detrimental to its economy.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/pakistan-pakistan-to-continue-on-fatfs-grey-list/">Pakistan : Pakistan to Continue on FATF’s Grey List</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Artillery Systems : Mediumisation And Indigenisation of Indian Artillery</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/artillery-systems-mediumisation-and-indigenisation-of-indian-artillery/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2020 10:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Army]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[artillery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IndianArmy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Kargil]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Indian Army&#8217;s Field Artillery Rationalisation Programme (FARP) was approved in 1999 to equip 169 artillery regiments with over 2,800 155 mm guns by 2027. One artillery regiment is equipped with 18 guns. Cost estimates are in the $8-10 billion bracket. The programme, involving the acquisition of 1,580 towed, 100 self-propelled, 814 mounted and 145 [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/artillery-systems-mediumisation-and-indigenisation-of-indian-artillery/">Artillery Systems : Mediumisation And Indigenisation of Indian Artillery</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army&#8217;s Field Artillery Rationalisation Programme (FARP) was approved in 1999 to equip 169 artillery regiments with over 2,800 155 mm guns by 2027. One artillery regiment is equipped with 18 guns. Cost estimates are in the $8-10 billion bracket. The programme, involving the acquisition of 1,580 towed, 100 self-propelled, 814 mounted and 145 ultra-light howitzers, is under implementation and will take decades for fruition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Adrift for two decades, India&#8217;s artillery modernisation plan appears finally falling into place. In 2018, the Indian Army started inducting the M777A2 ultra-light howitzers and the K-9 Vajra tracked self-propelled guns. Both these guns are in the 155 mm/52 calibre class and the Indian Army&#8217;s first new artillery inductions since the infamous Bofors deal in 1986.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Dhanush, an upgrade of the Bofors FH-77B by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), too has provided some cheer. The Army is buying 145 M777s, 100 K-9 Vajras, and has committed an order for 114 Dhanush guns after receiving the first six.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lesson from Our Military History</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the 1965 war with Pakistan, India had a total of 628 artillery pieces against Pakistan&#8217;s 552 tubes. This small numerical advantage was largely neutralised by the fact that a fair amount of Indian artillery was deployed against China. This left Pakistan with a slight overall edge. The major edge that Pakistan had in firepower, however, was caused by the generous American allocation of medium and heavy artillery guns and howitzers. Thus, Pakistan had a total of 174x155mm and 155mm guns/8 inch howitzers to India&#8217;s 112 medium and heavy guns (5.5 inch howitzers and one regiment of 7.2 inch howitzers). Of these 112, some 30-40 per cent were deployed against China. As such, Pakistan had a marked preponderance of artillery – especially medium and heavy artillery. This had a major impact on the outcome of the various battles in the 1965 War – especially in the Chhamb, Sialkot and Lahore sectors. Let us analyse this in detail.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chhamb Sector. Pakistan’s 7th Infantry Division that launched the offensive on Chhamb was allocated two regiments of Patton tanks and the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade, which had three medium regiments, one field regiment and a heavy battery each of 155mm guns and 8 inch gun-howitzers. Pakistan&#8217;s 7 Division itself had 2×field regiments. Thus, Pakistan had 20 fire units (11 of them medium and heavy) against just four with India (a lone field regiment and a troop of mediums). The Pakistani medium guns just simply destroyed the sole Indian field regiment and blasted a path for the Pakistani tanks, which almost reached the Akhnur bridge. It was only India&#8217;s 1 Corps counter-offensive in Sialkot that forced Pakistan to pull back the formidable 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and one tank regiment out of Chhamb. This recoil forced a halt on the Pakistani advance to Akhnur.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sialkot Sector. Pakistan&#8217;s 6th Armoured Division was located there with 6 armoured regiments. The Indian 1 Armoured Division attacked with 5 tank regiments. Pakistan threw in its tank regiments one by one and suffered heavily. Its 11 Cavalry Regiment was wiped out by our Centurions. In panic, Pakistan withdrew the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and one regiment from Chhamb. The medium and heavy guns now stopped the Indian advance before Chawinda. In fact, the Pakistani medium guns destroyed more tanks than the Pakistani armoured regiments could. The preponderance of medium guns heavily affected the outcome of the battle. It finally stopped the Indian 1 Corps advance well short of Sialkot.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lahore Sector. On the first day of the war itself (6 September) an Indian battalion had crossed the Ichhogil Canal. Had India&#8217;s 1st Armoured Division been allocated to this sector, as Gen Harbaksh Singh wanted, we could have encircled Lahore. Pakistan&#8217;s artillery played a major role in slowing down the Indian advance to a painful slog that just managed to lean on to the Icchogil Canal by the end of the war. Pakistan&#8217;s 1 Armoured Division counter-offensive, to get behind our two attacking corps, was trapped in the flooded fields of Asal Uttar and decimated by a combination of tanks and artillery. The value of medium guns was evident.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indo-Pak War 1971. In the 1971 War, India had a clear edge in Artillery – especially in the East and it proved decisive. Pakistan had misused US aid given for cyclone relief to make concrete bunkers in Bangladesh. To neutralise these, additional medium artillery regiments were allocated to Eastern Command. In addition, 80 close air support (CAS) sorties per day were provided by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and these paved the way for a rapid advance in East Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kargil War 1999. Medium artillery once again proved to be a decisive and war-winning factor. Bofors medium guns and BM-21 Grad rocket regiments were pulled out from the Strike Corps to support our counter-attack in Kargil. 120 guns were deployed to support the attack on Tololing and proved to be the turning point. The norm set in this war was a 100 artillery tubes to support each battalion attack in the mountains. This won the war for us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Mediumisation of the Artillery</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No wonder, after the Kargil War, the Indian Army planned to rapidly rationalise the plethora of guns in its inventory and mediumize the artillery by standardising it around the 155/52mm calibre. Unfortunately, the ghost of Bofors has delayed this very vital artillery modernisation plan by over three decades. It was a disaster of monumental proportions. Only now, after a painful gap of 30 years, we have started inducting the American M-777 ultra light howitzers and the Dhanush locally made 155/45 cal medium guns along with the tracked 155/52 K- 9 Vajra of Korean origin. These have, at long last, started trickling in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We need to standardize and rationalize the plethora of calibres and guns to the 155/52mm standard calibre. This one major step itself will give us a revolutionary overmatching capability over Pakistan in the West and serve to deter China in the North. This process was sabotaged by the Bofors scandal. This, along with the tragic draw down in our air power and squadron strength, ensured that for three decades India could not react or respond in any meaningful manner to Pakistan&#8217;s provocations and proxy war in Kashmir and its hybrid terror war all over Indian cities. We just had to patiently grin and bear it. The clear cut military modernization task for our government is, therefore, apparent and most urgent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Artillery Profile</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Current Profile. India&#8217;s current artillery profile is a bewildering mish mash of various calibres and different artillery guns with the same calibre. Thus, India has:-</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 950 units of 130mm (M-46) Russian medium guns (some being upgraded to 155mm as the Sharang gun).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 500 units of 122mm (Russian field guns).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1800 units of 105mm Indian Field Gun (IFG).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 800 units of 105mm Indian Guns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 80 units of 105mm Abbot self-propelled (SP) guns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 110 units of 122mm Gvozdika (SP) guns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 410 units of 155mm FH-77 Bofors (now down to half).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 150 units of 122mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Proposed New Induction</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The proposed new inductions are-</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 150 x 155mm K-9 Vajra SP tracked guns (of Korean origin).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 145 x 155mm M777 Ultra Light Howitzers (ULH of US origin).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 150 x 155/52 Advanced Artillery Towed Gun System (ATAGS) of Indian origin.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 114 x 155/45 calibre Dhanush gun made by OFB.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This would cater for about 500-600 new guns of the 155mm calibre. The need is to induct almost some 3000 guns of the towed, truck mounted and tracked class.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Option Matrix</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We need to ensure that we not only mediumise but also indigenise in a manner that gives a major boost to defense production in the private sector. The option matrix so far is:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Public Sector. The Dhanush was developed as a 155/45 cal from the design drawings of the FH-77 Bofors. This gun now developed by the Indian ordinance factories is 25-30 per cent superior in performance to the Bofors. The first six guns were handed over to the Indian Army in April 2019. It has done well in trials and has a range of 40 kms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Private Sector. In 2013, DRDO started the development of the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS). Armament Research &amp; Development Establishment (ARDE) was the lead design agency in a project ably partnered by the Bharat Forge, Tata Power and OFB. Bharat Forge&#8217;s Baba Kalyani had rendered yeoman service in this effort. Kalyani had purchased an entire Austrian 155mm gun factory and shipped it to India. With the companies inherent expertise in metallurgy it has resulted in the development of a radically advanced gun. In firing trials it touched ranges of 48kms and consistently fired beyond 47kms. It has a rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Compare this with the American gun of the same class, which has a range of 45 km and a rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute. Thus, India has come up with a world beater design.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Need for Sector Specific QRs. However, our military and civilian bureaucracy is far more concerned with the fine print of the GSQR. This gun, at nearly 20 tons, is said to be some 6 tons overweight. We are completely prepared to overlook the far superior performance parameters and demonstrably superior metallurgy of this gun in our obsession with the weight of this gun. How is the weight such a disqualifying factor? Most bridges in the plains and desert environment are class 70-capable of taking a 70-ton load of a tank transporter with a tank. In the mountains, our bridges can take 45-ton medium tanks. So this furore over 20 tons being a catastrophe is most uncalled for hogwash designed to somehow sabotage our Make in India project. Public sector behemoths are most uncomfortable with competition emerging from the private sector. And, if the 20-ton weight is such a major drawback, please first explain why we can always do away with the platform or try some other ways to bypass bureaucracy. In future, to avoid such bureaucratic bottlenecks, we should go for sector specific QRs. The critical factor is reliable metallurgy. We simply cannot afford to have barrels flowering on the battlefields and that is the key distinguishing parameter of the ATAGS.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Given this analysis, the obvious choice is to induct the ATAGS rapidly in much larger numbers. The defence minister, new chief of defence staff (CDS) and new Army chief must take the key command decision and circumvent the petty bureaucratic hurdles to the large scale induction of the ATAGS &#8211; an indigenous Indian gun produced in our private sector. It is the only major Indian success story of the private sector in the entire Make in India initiative. Why our bureaucracy should be so keen to kill it is mystifying.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Export Potential. India has desperately been trying to export its weapon systems to achieve economies of scale . If we wish to sell the ATAGS in the world market, the Indian Army will first have to induct it in large numbers that go beyond tokenism (a la Arjun). Let us reinforce success. Let us give due weightage to performance and reliability factors over staff quibbles. Let us launch a major drive to push this gun in the export market once our own requirements are met &#8211; that is the only way our Make in India drive will ever take off. It will generate many new jobs in India. Perfect should not become an enemy of the good.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Precision Guided Munitions. Krasnopol Russian precision Laser-guided shells were extensively used in the 1999 Kargil conflict and were useful against enemy bunkers and mortar positions. However, these had limitations. Hence, in 2019, emergency purchase was made of the M-982 American Excalibur Satellite/ GPS guided PGMs (artillery shells). These have a circular error of probability (CEP) of some 5 meters and have proved particularly effective against terror training camps and command and control targets as also counter-battery tasks. With 50 km plus ranges, these are a formidable weapons against such hybrid war targets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Multi-barrel Rocket Launchers. India has some 150 units of Russian 122mm Grad MBRLs (range 20 kms), which have more than proved their worth in the 1971 and 1999 Kargil Wars as very effective area neutralization weapons. These are reaching obsolescence and are being replaced by the indigenous 214 mm Pinaka MBRLs, with ranges of 75 kms and plans to increase the range to 120 kms. In the time of extreme poverty of medium artillery, Pinakas were being used to replace medium guns. This is principally incorrect. We have also acquired the formidable Russian BM-30 Smerch MBRLs, which with their range of 70-90 kms and greater throw weight, can put the fear of God in any enemy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New Mounted Gun. The Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur has developed a new truck-mounted gun system. Its range is 40 km. This gun can fire multiple rounds in a short duration. It was featured in Defense Expo of 2018. It is undergoing a series of tests. It will be manufactured in collaboration with the private sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Athos 2052 Howitzer. The Elbit-Bharat Forge bid for the Autonomous Towed Howitzer Ordnance System (ATHOS) is a long-range 155mm/52 caliber gun was found significantly lower than that of French Nexter, which offered the Trajan gun jointly with its Indian partner Larsen &amp; Toubro. Elbit-Bharat Forge are said to have pulled their price below even that of the Dhanush 155 mm/42 calibre. While the requirement is for 1,580 towed guns, reports have suggested the possibility of the order being pruned to 400 imported guns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/artillery-systems-mediumisation-and-indigenisation-of-indian-artillery/">Artillery Systems : Mediumisation And Indigenisation of Indian Artillery</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Changes at the top : Challenges Facing the New Army Chief</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/changes-at-the-top-challenges-facing-the-new-army-chief/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maj Gen Ravi Arora]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2020 06:21:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Modernisation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Policy & Strategy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Gen Manoj Naravane has taken over the reins of the Indian Army as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) when a major reform of the higher defence organization has been implemented at the same time. The chief of defence staff (CDS) has been appointed along with a Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/changes-at-the-top-challenges-facing-the-new-army-chief/">Changes at the top : Challenges Facing the New Army Chief</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gen Manoj Naravane has taken over the reins of the Indian Army as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) when a major reform of the higher defence organization has been implemented at the same time. The chief of defence staff (CDS) has been appointed along with a Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This entails some modification of the role and tasks of the COAS for the better. Since the CDS has not been made the operational head of the three Services and not placed in command over the Service chiefs, the Army chief is more of an operational commander than at any other time. He does not have to push the Army&#8217;s demands and interests with the MoD any longer, leaving much of it to the office of the CDS and the DMA. He should have more time to devote to land warfare strategy and its execution, counter-terrorism operations and optimizing the resources of the Army.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Operational Matters</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gen Naravane need not spend too much time on integration with the Air Force and Navy, seeking increase in budgetary allocations, joint doctrines, employment of strategic forces, space, cyber, information warfare and so on, except insofar as it concerns the Army alone. Luckily, Gen Bipin Rawat, having just side-stepped from the Army chief&#8217;s office into the CDS&#8217;s, is well aware of the Army&#8217;s requirements. The new Army chief will, of course, have to take forward the changes initiated by Gen Rawat, when it comes to Integrated Battle Groups, restructuring of the Army HQ, manpower, and so on.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Army Restructuring</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The restructuring of the Army HQ in New Delhi, initiated by Gen Biopin Rawat, is in progress. It is the beginning of the first full-cadre review of the Army in over 30 years. Keeping in sight the emerging security matrix and the abiding challenge of sprucing up the force and equipping it with cutting-edge armoury and equipment on a budget, this is a part of changes that must be executed to achieve the objectives of a competitive force.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The restructuring of Army HQ to gear it up towards capability-based modernisation needs, would synergise and coalesce all revenue and capital spending under one organisation and effectively prioritise competing requirements with an operational focus to get better value for funds allocated by the government.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the restructuring approved now called Reorganisation of the Army Headquarters, two weapons and systems procurement branches will be merged and a new post of Deputy Chief of Army Staff created to coordinate with military intelligence, operations and logistics wings.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At present, there are an estimated 950 to 1,000 officers posted at the Army HQ. The officers who will be weaned off the HQ will be available to the formations and units. As many as 229 officers from the headquarters will be &#8220;optimised and relocated to units and formations of the filed armies&#8221;. Ninety per cent of these officers are from the ranks of Colonel and below.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Strategy &amp; Operations. The new Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy) will oversee strategy and operations, intelligence collation, conduct of operations and the movement of logistics. At present, the DG (Military Operations) and the DG (Military Intelligence) report to the Army Chief or Vice-Chief. The new DG (IW) will have the erstwhile ADGs (Public Information) and Information Warfare (IW) wings under him to counter social media propaganda and hybrid warfare.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Information Warfare. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has also okayed the creation of a consolidated information warfare wing that will subsume two existing wings under the DGMI and the DGMO. The Information Warfare branch will be headed by the Lieutenant General rank officer and will come under another newly created appointment- Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy).The new DG IW (Director General Information Warfare) will have under him the erstwhile ADGs PI (Public Information) and IW (Information Warfare) to meet needs of the future battlefield, hybrid warfare and social media reality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ADGPI branch deals with media projection and has a social media wing, which is likely to remain untouched. The existing Information Warfare branch operates under the Military Operations directorate. Separately, a cyber unit will also be placed under the DG IW.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Military Training. The third major reform is that the Army&#8217;s Training Command based in Shimla will now be sole adviser to the Army Chief on all training matters. The Military Training Directorate in Delhi is being merged into the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) in Shimla.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Capability &amp; Sustenance. Also, the restructuring will merge the Master General Ordnance (MGO), who is currently under the Vice-Chief, and the DG (Weapons and Equipment) under a single vertical with the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning and Strategy), which will be renamed Capability and Sustenance. Now all acquisitions of the Army will be handled by a new office under the Director-General (Capability Development). The revenue budget will be handled by DG (Sustenance).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vigilance &amp; Human Rights. New wings for vigilance and human rights issues will be set up under major-generals. The ADG (vigilance) wing will have officers drawn from the three services for an objective and impartial approach and will report directly to the army chief. The ADG (human rights) branch will have a police officer on deputation, he said. The ADG (human rights) will report to the director general of military operations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Countering Pak-sponsored Terrorism</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gen Naravane inherits the threat posed by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and its asymmetric warfare offensive against India, which began some 30 years ago in the Punjab in the 1980s. Since then Pakistan has shifted its proxy war to Jammu &amp; Kashmir (J&amp;K), although we have seen some sparks again in Punjab through its support to Khalistanis and the use of drones to drop arms, ammunition and equipment to the separatists there. Yet, it is an existential threat in Punjab.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Jammu &amp; Kashmir (J&amp;K), the Abrogation of Article 370 on 5 August 2019, and the subsequent steps taken to prevent large scale disturbances have brought down violence in the state, but the reorganization has brought in its own internal and external challenges, which are yet to show up in full. The political initiative, which was long overdue and which the Army had always been asking for, has yet to run its full course – until the elections are held in the state, as promised by the central government.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan&#8217;s deep state – the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military – is somewhat subdued at present, partly due to the pressure being asserted by the Unites States and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to force Pakistan to take action against declared terrorists, money laundering and to conform to international financial transaction standards. It has not helped Pakistan that its all-weather ally, China, has not done sufficiently enough to come to its help despite trying to raise the J&amp;K issue in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its chairmanship of the FATF. In fact, China has tried but Indian diplomacy has successfully thwarted all attempts by China to rake up the issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Troops levels are being reduced in J&amp;K, casualty figures show a downward trend but cease fire violations on the Line of Control show an upward trend. The upper hand and the moral ascendency over Pakistan in the proxy war must be maintained. That would be Gen Naravane&#8217;s principal operational task.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One way which has been tried and tested in the last two years is to retaliate every time there is a serious breach by Pakistan and raise costs and consequences for it in all manner possible without crossing the threshold. That threshold is now being pushed further and further as the deep aerial strike of 26 February 2019 at Balakot, in response to the Pulwama attack that killed 45 CRPF soldiers, showed. It is no one&#8217;s guess that the surgical strike 1.0 carried out on 29 September&nbsp; 2016 after the Uri attack was not the last one that the country has seen. The time to remain defensive, confined to consequence management in our own territory, which was the norm for 30 years, has now passed. As a corollary, one must say that creating the military capacity for punitive action is a sine qua non if Pakistani terror is not to continue unabated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Maoist Menace</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The police and home ministry have been claiming great success in containing the Maoists and reducing their influence. The unfortunate fact, however, is that each year in Apr-May they launch an annual tactical counter-offensive and inflict heavy losses on the police and Central Police Organisations (CPOs) and loot weapons. Their strike power is intact and we have not been able to penetrate the dense jungles of Dantewada to destroy the armed Maoist groups in that sanctuary. The number of armed Maoist battalions has gone up from 3 to 21 in this forest redoubt. This is most dangerous and we cannot lull ourselves into complacency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Conventional Capacity Building</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Balakot was a great morale booster but it also pointed out glaring shortcomings in our national security architecture. We need to get our act together for urgently needed arms acquisition. The process is dangerously dysfunctional and mired in so much red tape that it is becoming impossible to execute major arms acquisition programmes in any reasonable time frame.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the CDS in place with the express mandate to coordinate and prioritise acquisitions, there should be some improvement, but one cannot shy away from the fact that within the Army, too, refining and deciding upon requirements is a time-consuming process. There are external factors, which are beyond the COAS&#8217; control, like the planning and budgeting process itself, complicated defence procurement procedure (DPP), multi-layered sanctions and approvals, repeated cancellation of tenders, long trial periods and so on. But even government-to-government deals and procurement under fast-track procedures have always overshot the laid down timelines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army is the 2nd largest armed force at 1.3 million behind the Chinese Army. In the Global Fire Power Index, which is arrived at by considering 55 indices, Indian Armed Forces rank 4th. India ranks a poor 25th in terms of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), which include Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV); and 26th in terms of Self-Propelled (SP) Artillery.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It would have been a different matter if India were an arms exporter but it ranks nowhere in the first ten. In fact, India was the world&#8217;s second-largest arms importer during 2014-18, accounting for 9.5% of the global total, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which released its report released on 11 March 2019.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In terms of defence expenditure, China spends five times more than India, with its Defence Budget pegged at $250 bn (1,9% of GDP) for 2018, while India&#8217;s Defence Budget for 2018-19 was $51 bn (1.63% of GDP).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A large quantity of the Indian Army&#8217;s equipment is of foreign origin, notably Russian and much of it requires replacement or upgrade. Among them are T-72 tanks, T-90 tanks, BMP-2, Zsu-23-2, Zsu-23-4, Kvadrat air defence system, OSA-AK air defence system, Dragunov sniper rifles and so on.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Weapon Systems and Platforms</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mechanised Forces. The mechanised forces are equipped with Russian T-72 tanks, assembled in India, many of which have undergone upgrades but are nevertheless in need of replacement with a &#8216;Future Ready Combat Vehicle&#8217; (FRCV) or future main battle tank (MBT) – ultimately 2400 to be precise. The Army will in time add 464 T-90MS standard tanks in due course after negotiating a licence to make them in India. That will bring the T-90 tanks to a fleet strength of 1000. The target is 1600.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">All 1770 BMP-2 IFVs require to be replaced by modern IFVs. The search for a Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) started in 2010. The Expression of Interest (EoI) was issued for the third time in November 2017 after two failed attempts. When it does come, it might be a world-class tank but whether the Army will embrace it, cannot be certain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. The Russian Konkurs and French Milan anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are widely used and the Army has been waiting for many years for DRDO to finalise the development of the Nag ATGM. While the project is delayed, the government appears ready to approve the procurement of limited numbers of Israel Rafael&#8217;s Spike ATGM.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ammunition. The CAG had pointed out in 2017 that &#8220;Out of a total of 152 types of ammunition, the stock of 121 types of ammunition (80%) was below the authorization level of 10 days intense fighting. And availability of 55 per cent types of ammunition was below the minimum inescapable requirement to be maintained for operational preparedness and 40 per cent types of ammunitions were critical level having stock of less than 10 days,&#8221; The situation has since improved after fast-track purchases, but it is still alarming. What has emerged is that the Ordnance Factories are unable to meet the requirements of the armed forces as indented from time to time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Artillery. 10 K-9 Vajra 155mm tracked self-propelled (SP) guns, made under licence by L&amp;T Defence in India, were inducted on 9 November 2018.The entire process of inducting 100 K9 Vajra at a cost of Rs 4,366 crore will be completed by November 2020.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ordnance Factory Board&#8217;s (OFB) 155mm/45 calibre Dhanush gun, developed from the designs transferred by Bofors in 1980 to OFB, as part of transfer of technology (ToT) of the FH-77 155mm Bofors howitzer has been successfully inducted into the Army on 8 April 2019. The OFB will make 114 guns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), developed both by Bharat Forge and Tata Defence&amp; Aerospace, separately, based on DRDO designs has also passed muster and is undergoing final user trials. The MoD had sanctioned the ATAGS project in September 2012. A prototype was part of the Republic Day parade in 2017.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The BAE System&#8217;s M777 155mm ultra-light howitzer (ULH) was also inducted into service in November 2018. 145 pieces will be supplied.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An improved longer range Pinaka rocket for the multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) has been developed by DRDO. The Artillery also wants an indigenous Smerch-type long-range MBRL to be produced in India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Air Defence. The Russian Igla-S has been selected as the very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system weapon of choice through a contest between but the contract is yet to be finalised.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) and DRDO have completed trials of the quick reaction Surface-to-air missile (QRSAM).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Akash Weapon System (AWS) has been developed as a short-range surface-to-air missile (SRSAM) and two regiments have been inducted into service, while two more have been approved for purchase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the ground-based air defence weapons systems for area and point defence – the L70 gun and the ZSU-23-2 – the RFI was issued in January 2019 and the upgrade efforts also continue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Infantry. The Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) has been abandoned as an integrated approach. Instead, various components of the system are being pursued separately for procurement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Rs 639 crore contract was signed on 10 April 2018 with SMPP Ltd, an Indian vendor for the procurement of 186,138 bullet proof jackets (BPJs). The first lot of BPJs was delivered in April 2019.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A limited quantity (72,000) of Sig Sauer 716 assault rifles and 93,000 Caracal 816 carbines are being procured through Fast Track Procedure (FTP). Meanwhile, an Ordnance Factory is being established at Rae Bareilly to produce the AK-203 assault rifle in large numbers to cater for the remainder required of the armed forces and the paramilitary as well as for export.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Infantry also requires a lighter, more lethal shoulder fired anti-tank weapon, notably the Carl Gustav Mk IV, a Battlefield Surveillance Radar (BFSR) and an improved 81mm mortar.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Network-centric Operations. The Rs 50,000 crore Battlefield Management System (BMS) was envisaged by the Army to enable a faster decision process by commanders at all echelons, enable better decision due to reliable operational information provided in real time and have the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop by integrating all surveillance means to facilitate engagement through an automated decision support and command and control system, exploiting technology for mission accomplishment in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The project has been abandoned indefinitely due to costs involved. The Army chief reviewed the project in 2018 and decided to put it on the back-burner in favour of other projects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Army Aviation. While the Army had asked for 39 AH-64E multi-role attack helicopters, the government has accepted to procure six for it for the time being in addition to the 22 Apaches on order for the IAF.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Rudra ALH-WSI armed helicopter based on the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) is making steady progress, though the selection of anti-tank missiles it will carry is yet to be finalised. The production of the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) has started. The Army wants 114 LCH.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Army Aviation is expected to replace its ageing Chetak and Cheetah helicopters with the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Army continues to use Israeli IAI Searcher II unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and is looking to add to its fleet. Sadly, the Army is poorly equipped with such vital force-multipliers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Combat Engineering. The Engineers are looking for lighter, redeployable, foldable and air-portable bridges. Similarly, they would like to have lighter, higher capacity assault trackway, quick repair materials for damaged runways and fuel-air explosive (FAE) solutions for destroying mines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Infrastructure</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alongside modernisation of equipment, it si important for infrastructure &#8211; strategic roads, railway and bases &#8211; to be improved. The Chinese have built all-weather class-9 or 24 roads right up to all their posts in all sectors. They have excellent lateral roads. Their railway system and pipelines are being extended to major logistics bases. Deployment time of their formations has been cut down to enable them to launch an offensive for short duration wars while stocking is done for follow up echelons.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Overview</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fact remains that in the case of major systems, like artillery guns, main battle tanks, infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, air defence weapon systems, etc, we are far short of the ideal mix of obsolete-legacy-modern systems that should be in service at any time. Blaming the Defence Reasearch&amp; Development Organisation (DRDO), public sector undertakings (PSUs) or Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) alone is not enough. The Army should push for change. The Army Design Bureau, now in a fledgling state, the almost defunct Army Technology Board, and other initiatives must evolve into effective organisations capable of driving research and innovation. The enhanced powers of the Army Commanders, vice chief of army staff and other down the chain must be utilised to support procurement from private industry so as to force DRDO, PSUs and OFB to compete. The Army must also resolutely fight for user involvement in development, favourable terms and conditions like penalties for cost and time overruns, shortcomings in quality and guaranteed serviceability and availability of equipment.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/changes-at-the-top-challenges-facing-the-new-army-chief/">Changes at the top : Challenges Facing the New Army Chief</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Military History : Pakistani Version of the Battle of Laungewala, 1971</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/military-history-pakistani-version-of-the-battle-of-laungewala-1971/</link>
					<comments>https://imrmedia.in/military-history-pakistani-version-of-the-battle-of-laungewala-1971/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2020 07:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Military History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Miscellaneous]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pak]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=1335</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Brig ZA Khan is the author of &#8220;The Way it Was&#8221; &#8211; a raw, brutal account of the life of a Pakistan army officer. He was among nine brothers to have served in the Pakistan armed forces. He served in the Special Services Group during the traumatic events of the 1971 war and arrested Sheikh [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/military-history-pakistani-version-of-the-battle-of-laungewala-1971/">Military History : Pakistani Version of the Battle of Laungewala, 1971</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Brig ZA Khan is the author of &#8220;The Way it Was&#8221; &#8211; a raw, brutal account of the life of a Pakistan army officer. He was among nine brothers to have served in the Pakistan armed forces. He served in the Special Services Group during the traumatic events of the 1971 war and arrested Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman. He pulls no punches while describing the horror of war. He missed fighting in the Indo-Pak War 1965 but gave a thorough analysis of that war as well in his book. The Way it Was is available in India with Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division HQ were located. There the GOC Maj Gen BM Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lt Col Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Col Wajid Ali Shah present.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The General planned to defensively hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmer; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmer; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view. Lt Col Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmer had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was &#8216;top secret&#8217; and was not to be discussed with anyone. In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less &#8216;A&#8217; Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Mshl Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan, where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support. A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I considered the operation. Jaisalmer was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti. I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines. The GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements. The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lt Col Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border – Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border – without telling them that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming operations. About the middle of November, the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad. With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmer and neutralise the airfield.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the Division HQ, there was no preparations for the very imminent operations. On 1 December, Col Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters. On 2nd December, I received orders to report to the Division HQ and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening, that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade up to Laungewala and proceed to Jaisalmer to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the Division orders but to organise my force.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out. I next went to the AA&amp;QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol. The AA&amp;QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available. After a discussion with the Colonel Staff, the AA&amp;QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the 18 Division &#8216;O&#8217; group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander, informed the &#8216;O&#8217; Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to cancel or postpone the operation. The GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air. After the discussion, he informed the &#8216;O&#8217; Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the &#8216;national interest&#8217;.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the &#8216;O&#8217; Group that he would conduct the operation because, if he did not, he would be labelled as a General who had lost his nerve. The plan made by Maj Gen BM Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty miles to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations) and 22 Cavalry, by passing Laungewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division, which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metalled road to Jaisalmer, 20 miles inside India, and then continue to Jaisalmer. 206 Brigade, leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions), was to follow my force and secure Laungewala to form a firm base. After these orders were issued, 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmer with mechanically unsound tanks. The GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch, the Divisional Reconnaissance &amp; Support Battalion less a company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December. The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer, a total march of 120 miles in one night. On the evening of 2 December, I went to the 51 Brigade HQ. Lt Col Akram Syed was already there. He told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve. A little later, the brigade commander came to the tent, where the &#8216;O&#8217; Group had assembled. He appeared shaken. The GSO-3 laid out the maps of the operational area. The maps covered our territory, but Indian territory was blank squares. The brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the Division HQ.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table. From the ensuing discussion, it became apparent that the brigade commander&#8217;s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11, whereas, it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated, I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Laungewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Laungewala and by passing Laungewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Laungewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade. No one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan. When the &#8216;O&#8217; Group dispersed, the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border. On 3 December, 38 Cavalry tanks moved on tracks for 25 miles and entrained at Sadiqabad and arrived at Reti railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train. I realised that the AA&amp;QMG had not informed the railways about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and, after a lot of shouting and threatening, the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station, a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line. There was no &#8216;power&#8217; available at Reti. We were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through. I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At about 9 o&#8217;clock, the tank train with 14 tanks, whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters, arrived and were unloaded. We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule. From Reti, the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank. At Khenju, my second-in-command, Major Zia Uddin Javed, was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju, the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border. Thirteen out of fourteen tanks arrived at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar, I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC, who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At 0400 hours, the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On 4 December, the Indian Air Force did not show up. On checking up, I found that the lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&amp;QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki. I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion’s 6&#215;6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down. It was a few miles from Khenju. The Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju. That put an end to my engine replacement plan. During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders, the attack on the Jaisalmer airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light, a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry, mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At about 2100 hours, six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit. 22 Cavalry was refuelling. Lt Col Akram Syed told me that Brig Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Laungewala. I met Brig Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Laungewala. At about 2300 hours, 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brig Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The operation, so far, was a movement fiasco. Civilian requisitioned 4&#215;2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand. 20 Frontier Force, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert &#8216;to the sound of the guns&#8217; when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert. At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brig Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lt Javed Iqbal, with the reconnaissance troop, to lead, followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared. I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles. Four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Laungewala luckily on the highest ridge in the area. At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Laungewala and columns of smoke started rising. I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my Rover and, from a ridge overlooking the Laugewala-Jaisalmer metalled road, we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and an Indian tank burning. Four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets, etc, they flew away.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A little later, a helicopter took off. Later, I learnt that the GOC had come to 51 Brigade as it was out of communication with the Division HQ and ordered Lt Col Akram Syed to capture Laungewala. I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade HQ, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know. I then drove to the base of the hill on which Laungewala was located. Two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack. 22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Laungewala defences at about 0200 hours. In the absence of the brigade commander, 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Laungewala before advancing to Ramgarh.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At 0700 hours, a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks. One AMX was knocked out; then six Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out five tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to strafing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Half an hour later, 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours. 22 Cavalry formed up again but, after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Laungewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmer. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade HQ, re-opening the Indian communications to Laungewala. In subsequent air attacks, 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day&#8217;s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Laungewala from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres. After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry, I returned to where my tanks were. There I found Brig Jahanzeb Arbab. I told him of the state of affairs at Laungewala and he asked me to accompany him to Laungewala.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Laungewala. While we were at the 51 Brigade HQ, a helicopter, flown by Capt (later lt gen) &#8216;Mac&#8217; Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Laungewala and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmer. On receiving the orders Brig Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for the brigade to attack.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While we were witnessing the brigade commander&#8217;s refusal to obey the division commander&#8217;s orders, Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brig Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench. There we discussed what we had seen and I told Brig Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier. He hesitated and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After the Indian aircraft departed, Brig Jahanzeb informed Brig Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Laungewala and he ordered Lt Col Shah, CO 28 Baluch Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Laungewala-Jaisalmer and capture Ghotaru.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road. Brig Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped. His brigade had concentrated there. He made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December. He gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brig Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the forming up place (FUP) and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours. I met Lt Col Akram Syed and explained the plan. He told me that Brig Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade HQ and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander, who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it. At about 1900 hours, the brigade started moving back. The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar, a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped. Brig Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge. At about 1130 hours the next day, the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Laungewala-Jaisalmer road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position. Later, the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the Division HQ at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order. I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other. The GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By the morning of 7 December, 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar. My Quartermaster, Capt Bhatti, kept us supplied with food, meethi roti and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad. 38 Cavalry squadron, left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan. The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation. I told him I would see what the problem was.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade HQ to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break. My signal JCO could not find the reason. After the ceasefire, an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division HQ, switched off. On the night 8/9 December, 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade. 38 Cavalry, after firing all the HE ammunition, destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 9 December, after taking over the front, Brig Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade. 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank. The two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander&#8217;s imagination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A little distance from my regimental HQ, the divisional gun area was located. The IAF attacked the gun area and my HQ. A cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School, which fired single shots but kept the IAF away. On the night 11/12 December, the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar. On the morning of 12 December, when my second in command went to find out where the &#8216;forward defended localities&#8217; (FDLs) were, I found Maj Gen BM Mustafa standing there. Someone whispered that the General had been sacked and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I met the General and asked his GSO-2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were. The General heard me and indicating the GSO-2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day, ordered a &#8216;general withdrawal&#8217; – both brigades took off in the &#8216;Gabbar Gallop&#8217; and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the night of 12/13 December, I established my HQ at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December, &#8216;Tiger&#8217; Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone&#8217;s surprise. We ceased firing. After Operation &#8216;Labbaik&#8217; ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation, though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mission assigned to 18 Division was &#8220;Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.&#8221; This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was a classical spoiling attack, which put the Indians off balance and the Division&#8217;s mission was achieved.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task? Because the GOC Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal to be disclosed to the Awan Committee.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">How would you rate the various committee reports which studied the 1971 war like the Awan Committee, Akbar Committee and the Hamood Commission?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I was present when the Awan Committee investigated the 18 Division fiasco. The commanding officers and brigade commanders were divided into those who were allowed to speak and those who were ordered not to speak. I was in the &#8220;not&#8221; category. The effort was to cover up the shortcomings of Brig Tariq Mir and Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan&#8217;s &#8220;Gabbar gallop&#8221; with GHQ and Maj Gen BM Mustafa as handy scapegoats.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I have not seen the report but it must have been a farce. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report was prejudicial. It showed a lack of understanding of tactics and seemed to deliberately malign the performance of the army by its criticism of corps, division commanders and some brigade commanders. Examples are the criticism of Lt Gen Irshad and Maj Gen Zahid for tactical withdrawal and Maj Gen Mustafa for his spoiling attack. I am not aware of the contents of the Akbar Committee report.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/military-history-pakistani-version-of-the-battle-of-laungewala-1971/">Military History : Pakistani Version of the Battle of Laungewala, 1971</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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