Operations that aim to persuade an audience of a particular viewpoint, energize those who hold specific views, and/or divert target audiences are all examples of influence operations.

Propagandists are vying for users’ already-diminishing attention on social media platforms, according to the logic of distraction. Propagandists could successfully capture user attention without necessarily persuading them, if they can divert target audiences from an unfavorable narrative developing on social media by disseminating alternative theories or muddying the information environment.

Although influence operations can take many different shapes and employ a variety of techniques, there are a few common threads that connect them all. According to a recent study on political influence operations in the Middle East, these operations frequently used one of the following strategies:

• Making an effort to promote one’s own government, culture, or policies;

• Making an argument in favor of or against particular policies.

• Attempts to destabilize foreign relations or domestic situations in rival nations;

• Attempts to make allies appear good and opponents look bad to third-party countries

In a number of these instances, the accounts carrying out the operation pretended to be locals voicing their displeasure with their government or certain political personalities. This strategy of using digital agents of influence is frequently used by social media manipulation operations to conceal the genuine identity of the content source from the target audience. For instance, the Internet Research Agency (IRA) accounts of Russia sent direct messages to members of the Black American and conservative American communities while posing as activists. A misused idiom, a recurring grammatical fault, or even the use of a backtick (‘) where a real speaker would use an apostrophe (‘) are some subtle indicators that might help you spot these false reports. State-level antagonistic actors frequently deploy a variety of strategies, drawing on their own workforce or contracting out to virtual mercenaries.

Since 2016, Twitter and Meta have taken down well over 100 social media influence operations that originated in dozens of different nations. Inauthentic amplification attempts, fake news websites, and persona creation (the creation of false personas to disseminate a message) are frequently used in these operations.

However, influence operations have also greatly increased outside of Facebook and Twitter to other platforms, intimate settings, and encrypted areas. The New York Times reported on how “Iranian agents had infiltrated small [Israeli] WhatsApp groups, Telegram channels and messaging apps” to promote divisive messages. The report was done in collaboration with Israeli disinformation researchers. These influence operations occasionally show inventiveness by using platform rules in an offensive way.

For instance, a campaign in favour of the Tanzanian government that Twitter deleted in 2021 targeted Tanzanian activists’ accounts by making fake allegations of copyright reporting.

Recent studies and media coverage on influence operations have tended to concentrate on foreign campaigns, in which governments or individuals target individuals in other countries. But influence efforts can also be domestically focused, as the Tanzanian case demonstrates. Political actors frequently disseminate clandestine propaganda directed at their constituents in an effort to increase their popularity, detract from that of an adversary, or create commotion inside the political system. Facebook terminated phony accounts associated with Brazilian politicians, President Jair Bolsonaro, and his sons, Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro and Senator Jair Bolsonaro, in 2020 for disseminating divisive content about Brazilian politics. In fact, a lot of critics think that internal influence operations-rather than foreign ones-are the most concerning.

Additionally, influence operations have been used to take sides in intraparty disputes and, in the case of some campaigns linked to the Chinese Communist Party, to hit expatriate groups.

Techniques Employed

China employs a variety of techniques for influence operations to shape opinions, advance its interests, and project power. These techniques can be both overt and covert, and they are often coordinated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its various government agencies. Here are several techniques that China has been known to use:

Propaganda and Media Influence: China maintains a vast propaganda apparatus that includes state-controlled media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, and People’s Daily. These outlets disseminate narratives aligned with the CCP’s objectives and promote positive portrayals of China. They also engage in information warfare by spreading disinformation, censorship, and manipulating online discussions through social media platforms.

Economic Leverage: China utilizes its economic power to exert influence. It may offer financial aid, investment, or loans to other countries, attaching conditions that align with its political objectives. This can create dependencies and influence decision-making processes in target nations.

Diplomatic Influence: China engages in diplomatic efforts to shape global narratives, build alliances, and influence international organizations. It actively seeks to cultivate relationships with political leaders, academic institutions, and think tanks globally. It hosts conferences, forums, and summits to promote its interests and propagate its narratives.

United Front Work: The CCP employs a strategy known as “United Front Work” to co-opt and influence individuals and groups outside of its formal political structure. This includes overseas Chinese communities, ethnic or religious groups, business leaders, and intellectuals. The goal is to create a favorable perception of China and gain support for its policies.

Cyber Espionage and Information Warfare: China has been accused of engaging in state-sponsored cyberattacks and espionage to steal intellectual property, gain access to sensitive information, and manipulate public opinion. It also employs “50 Cent Army” or “Wu Mao” internet trolls who spread pro-China propaganda and disrupt discussions critical of the regime.

Confucius Institutes: China has established Confucius Institutes in various countries, which are cultural and educational centers that promote Chinese language and culture. However, they have been criticized for engaging in censorship, promoting self-censorship, and advancing Chinese Communist Party propaganda.

Overseas Investments and Infrastructure Projects: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-scale infrastructure development project that seeks to enhance connectivity across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. By investing in critical infrastructure projects in other countries, China can deepen its economic ties, gain influence, and extend its geopolitical reach.

United Front Work

United Front Work is a strategy employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to co-opt and influence individuals and groups outside of its formal political structure. Here are a few examples of United Front Work activities carried out by China:

Overseas Chinese Communities: China seeks to influence overseas Chinese communities by establishing various organizations and associations that promote Chinese culture and interests. These organizations often operate under the umbrella of the CCP’s United Front Work Department. They aim to maintain ties with overseas Chinese, encourage support for China’s policies, and discourage dissent or criticism of the CCP.

Ethnic and Religious Groups: China targets ethnic or religious groups within its borders and abroad through United Front Work. For example, it seeks to co-opt Tibetan and Uighur diaspora communities by promoting narratives that downplay human rights concerns and highlight economic development and cultural preservation efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang. China also uses United Front tactics to exert influence over overseas Chinese Muslim organizations.

Business and Intellectual Elites: China actively cultivates relationships with influential business leaders, academics, and intellectuals around the world. Through various means, such as funding research institutions, supporting academic exchanges, and organizing conferences, China seeks to shape narratives, gain access to cutting-edge technologies, and project soft power. These efforts aim to build networks of individuals who are sympathetic to China’s policies and willing to advocate for them.

Political Parties and Politicians: China seeks to cultivate relationships with politicians and political parties in other countries. It may offer financial support, establish friendship associations, or facilitate exchange programs to build political influence. This can involve providing financial assistance, investment opportunities, or other incentives to countries or politicians that align with China’s interests.

Media and Academic Institutions: China invests in media outlets and academic institutions worldwide to enhance its soft power and control narratives. This includes establishing partnerships with foreign media organizations, sponsoring Confucius Institutes in universities (which have been accused of promoting CCP propaganda), and funding research centers or think tanks that produce China-friendly analysis.

Operations and Impact of Influence

Influence operations may have an effect due to their particular content or focus (such as through persuasion) or by undermining public confidence in the information environment as a whole.

Resources, message quality, and operation detectability are sometimes constraints on the direct impact of content in modern influence operations. Depending on the objectives of the operator, these aspects may be more or less important. For instance, the effectiveness of each individual message is probably much less important if operators are merely trying to divert targets rather than persuade them of a particular opinion. Theoretically, language models might one day partially circumvent these limitations.

It is more important to create the impression that any given message can be false or deceptive in order to affect trust in an information environment. Even if influence operations fail to alter people’s opinions, they may cause people to doubt the veracity of information they get from even reliable sources, which could undermine trust in democratic and epistemic institutions more generally.

Content-Based Impact

If an influence operation

• Persuades someone of a specific position or supports an existing one,

• Distracts them from discovering or developing other ideas, or

• Distracts them from making any room for higher quality thought, then it may have an impact dependent on the content.

Often, the intention is to merely divert attention away from information that could be harmful to the operator. Distraction operations frequently take advantage of and worsen preexisting attention rivalries between advertisers, media sources, and platforms to crowd out crucial information with attention-grabbing, irrelevant material. Therefore, distraction operations do not require a target to be convinced by the information spread, but rather that a target not be convinced by (or even take into consideration) any other piece of information.

The impact of an influence operation can be quantified or tracked in both historical and modern cases. For instance, the Soviet Union engaged in an influence campaign to disseminate the myth that the United States government invented the virus in a lab during the HIV epidemic in the 1980s. According to a 2005 research, 27% of African Americans still held this belief. In 2016, the IRA organized rallies and counter protests outside the Islamic Da’wah Center in Houston using manipulative agents of influence on Facebook. As a result of the protests’ inability to take place without the IRA’s involvement, the impact is extremely simple to identify in this case.

While platforms assign blame and give researchers information about influence operations that were shut down, researchers still have little visibility into the impact on users or their post-engagement behavior. Additionally, not every influence operation is discovered. Due to multicausality and the obstacles associated with tracking changes in public opinion over time, even propagandists who try to gauge their own influence occasionally run into problems. Scholars have emphasized that historically, this uncertainty has helped intelligence agencies exaggerate the impact of their influence operations for administrative gain.

Despite these measuring difficulties, several characteristics, such as resources, material quality and messaging, and detectability, obviously restrict the impact of current efforts. Following a brief description of these drawbacks, we go into how generative models might be able to assist you get over them.

• Resources: Just like marketing efforts, the effectiveness of an influence operation depends on one’s ability to reach the target audience with the required material. A political actor employs how many propagandists to write material. How many social media accounts can someone open up to create a false online presence? Low-resource initiatives have a lower chance of reaching their target audience or getting media attention.

• Content’s Quality and Message: People are less likely to be persuaded by messaging if it sharply contradicts their preexisting viewpoint or if the arguments are shoddily put forth or illogically reasoned. Above all else, campaigns with messaging that contradicts targets’ beliefs, fails to successfully integrate with a target’s information environment, and presents weak arguments should be avoided.

• Detectability: Lastly, actions that are rapidly found have a lower likelihood of having an effect. Independent researchers and social media platforms aggressively look for influence operations, which the platforms then take down to reduce their reach. In fact, propagandists’ awareness that these operations can be abandoned might influence their actions, encouraging them to pursue diversion strategies rather than persona creation, which takes more time and effort but can be more persuasive to observers.

It is beneficial to keep these restrictions in mind as we think about the potential contribution of language models to influence campaigns. They could pose a serious problem for the information environment if they can get beyond the current barriers. In Section 4, we go into more detail about this.

Trust-Based Downstream Impact

The second method influence operations might have an effect is via undermining trust. Even when influence campaigns are recognized, their presence, especially at scale, may lead people to become skeptical of other, authentic sources. Degrading public trust does not necessarily require high quality initiatives. Particularly in areas where information technologies make it challenging to determine the reliability of sources, propagandists frequently seek to take advantage of weaknesses in their target’s mental shortcuts for gaining confidence. Influence operators have the ability to erode credibility beyond the narrow focus of their campaign by faking or using deceptive credentials and testimonials, as well as by altering with photographic and video evidence. Lowering societal trust might make it more difficult for a society to plan quick responses to emergencies, which could be an admirable objective for antagonistic actors in and of itself. As a result, propagandists can further their goals in an environment where there is less societal trust. Existing societal division and polarization make it harder for trustworthy actors to gain widespread respect. They can also provide influence operators a foothold to target their messaging at specific audiences, cause discord, and undermine institutional and social confidence. The norms that allow people and organizations to connect and collaborate without the need for numerous rules and processes to manage their behavior are threatened by low universal trust.

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Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Winning wars is all about gaining information about the enemy and denying him the same information about one self. Thus, information warfare is as old as war itself. However, in recent times, it has been waged most successfully over the mass media. During World War I, it was primarily waged over the print medium using newspapers, magazines and books to promote one’s own narrative and counter that of the enemy. It was used to wage unrelenting propaganda wars to sustain the morale of one’s own population and erode that of the enemies. In World War II, radio became the prime mass media that could reach across continents. Radio and print media were widely used to conduct some very successful psychological operations and information war for narratives dominance. After the war, TV became the prime mass media and its all out telematic assault was first used in the Gulf Wars. Now the Internet and social media have become the most influential mass media. These have overridden all the previous tools of mass media – whether print, radio or TV. Social media is a paradox – highly personalized yet open to mass outreach as far as manipulating the mind on a massive scale is concerned.

Social Media and Telematic Assault

The present Russia-Ukraine War has seen the massive impact of social media and television in waging information war at a global level. Social media has now become the greatest tool of reaching out to individual minds and, thereby, influencing the mass mind in a manner that supersedes the impact of all legacy mass media tools like print, radio and even TV. Donald Trump in USA and the BJP in India had also realised the overwhelming impact of the social media to challenge the customary dominance of mass media. Its message is so personalized and yet has such massive outreach that it is instrumental in shaping the mass mind. Today, its impact supersedes the impact of traditional mass media. Today, some 2.7 billion viewers use Facebook every day, some 206 million use Twitter and some 122 million use YouTube daily. These social media platforms, therefore, have major role in shaping public perceptions and opinion. Big Tech giants of the US-based social media were blatantly partisan in this war. They permitted calls to assassinate Putin, demonise the Russians as a race and went out of the way to push the Ukrainian narrative in this war. The truth is that hundreds of former US Government officials from the Departments of Defense, FBI, Homeland Security, etc. work in these companies to peddle the US Government narratives. There is a revolving door policy between Big Tech and US Government agencies (eg, Jerarad Cohen of US State Dept and Joseph Rozek of the US Dept of Defense and many others are now with the social media platforms) playing a blatantly partisan role. In fact, these platforms had received some $44.4 bn worth of contracts from the Pentagon and Dept of Homeland Security to spread stories of violent extremism during the Global War on Terror.

Network Battalion 65

Another CIA sponsored cyber army called Network Battalion 65, hacked into Russian Nuclear Institute files and published them openly on the net to spill Russian nuclear secrets. All these cyber warriors have every day been posting hundreds of video clips (some taken from video war games, previous conflicts and military exercises) showing destruction of Russian military equipment by Javelin missiles and Stinger SAMs. Even as they advertise American military equipment, they create a hype that Ukraine is winning the war against all Russian odds. The impression they generate is of an impending Russian military collapse of will and morale and a coup that could overthrow Putin in Moscow. In actual fact, Putin’s popularity rating has shot up to 80 per cent in Russia post this conflict.

This hype about a Ukrainian victory is plastered all over the social media. It is then picked up by the echo chamber of US electronic media – CNN and BBC – and relayed all over the world. The Third World media also dutifully picks up this western narrative and parrots it to create a climate of global opinion against Russia. The Russian view point has been totally blanked out in this war.

As it is, RTV and Sputnik have been banned by USA and Western Governments to block out the Russian viewpoint entirely. The wartime tactic of spreading disinformation to undermine morale of the rival camp has received a technical boost as seen in hundreds of false videos being circulated during this war on social media and then on to the TV screens. Fake narratives and lies are being promoted shamelessly.

Western Propaganda Playbook

Alwyn and Heidi Tofler, in their famous book – War and Anti War – had listed six basic propaganda ploys or tools. These are:-

Atrocity Accusations. These have most skilfully been employed in Ukraine with civilian deaths in Bucha being touted as not just atrocities but as genocide. The Russians have reacted angrily to these accusations – calling them fake and deliberately staged. With such fierce air attacks, tank battles and artillery barrages – civilian casualties are bound to occur on a large scale. The surprise is that despite huge amounts of ammunition expenditure the civilian causalities are comparatively much lower than what we have seen in Iraq and Syria. Ukraine prohibited all males from16 to 60 to leave the city battlefields. They armed some 18,000 civilians – thus making them legitimate targets. Now they are coming up with strident atrocity accusations that are used to justify more economic sanctions against Russia and additional weapons shipments to Ukraine.

Hyperbolic Inflation of Stakes. It gives the national audience a feel that everything that they hold dear is at risk. Thus, the Ukraine War has been made into a hyperbolic contest between Democractic and Autocratic regimes. India is being pressurised to take the side of democracies. Ukraine is hardly an ideal democracy and no better than Russia in democratic freedoms and practises. Corruption is, perhaps, more rife in Ukraine than it is in Russia. Yet the entire struggle is being elevated to that moral plane of democracies vs dictatorships.

Demonisation or Dehumanisation of Opponent. Putin has been called a war criminal and killer by no less than President Joe Biden himself. The Russian military in general and, especially Putin in particular, are being demonised. This is destroying any chances of resolving this crisis peacefully. How can you negotiate with killers?

Polarisation. Those who are not with us are against us. India is being pressurised to condemn Russia and not buy cheap oil and weapons from them. This, even as Europe continues to buy massive quantities of oil and gas from Russia every day.

Claims of Devine Sanction. Islamists freely invoke Allah’s support and blessings for their wars. Even western democracies stridently invoke God’s support in what they claim to be a just war. Justice is simply defined. Whatever they do is just – whatever the enemy does is unjust. The invasions of Afghanistan, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, etc, were all just and humane (regardless of the destruction caused and the number of civilians killed)! The Russian invasion of Ukraine alone is evil! Killing 1,30,000 civilians in Hiroshima and 80,000 in Nagasaki was just and moral – Bucha alone is evil.

Meta Propaganda. Propaganda that discredits the other sides propaganda is termed as meta propaganda. It calls into question everything that comes from the enemy. All statements made by Russian military are said to be lies and fabrications. Ukraine alone is telling the truth. Its aim is to produce “whole sale” disbelief in whatever the enemy says.

Out Sourcing Propaganda

Dan Cohen, writing in the Mintpress.news.com, has blown the lid off a massively funded, specialized PR campaign that is being run by several entities associated with the governments of US, UK and NATO to portray the war in Ukraine to suit western agendas. The Strategic Communication Narrative is to depict the Ukrainian military as a tiny but righteous David standing up to a brutal Russian military Goliath and winning outright. Not widely known is the fact that behind this massively successful propaganda campaign are a group of international PR firms working directly with the Ukraine foreign ministry.

Just hours after the beginning of the Russian military campaign, an anonymous figure who runs a PR firm in Ukraine, started collaborating with Ukraine’s foreign ministry. A slew of some 150 international PR firms collaborated to commence a massive propaganda Blitz. This PR juggernaut was led by PR Network co-founder Nicky Regazzoni and Francis Ingham. Francis Ingham, incidentally, is a top consultant loosely connected with the UK government. Reportedly, he sits on the UK Government’s Communication Services Strategy & Evaluation Council.

Dan Cohen also mentions Yuroslav Turbil – a communication Specialist –  who has worked with several US Government organizations. He is credited with creating a dossier containing key messages, approved language and other data to run the Ukraine PR campaign. Dan says the story of the Snake Island heroes (taken from famous incident in the German Ardennes offensive) and the Ghost pilot of Kiev (who in his lone SU-27 supposedly shot down half the Russian Air Force, are all credited to him). These were hugely popular and catchy stories. Unfortunately, in the end stories remain just that – stories. Art work and posters for these PR campaigns to promote the heroism of the Ukraine armed forces was done by Stephen Bandera. Dan Cohen says he was a one-time Nazi collaborator, who had earlier led an organization that had murdered thousands of Jews and ethnic Poles in World War II. These posters celebrated Molotov Cocktails – as Bandera smoothies. These posters listed Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Syria, etc., as incurable diseases and also created racist and violent depictions of Russians in general and Putin in particular.

There is an Army of lobbyists working to send more weapons to prolong the conflict in Ukraine . A tremendous media hype has been created of a heroic Ukraine that has thrashed an incompetent and lumbering Russian military. The problem is that this narrative most deliberately underplays the huge military differential between the two sides. Despite sweeping Western propaganda, Ukraine’s forces have taken very heavy losses. Over a 1000 Iskander tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), Kalibr and Yakhont cruise missiles have been fired which have reduced over 40 Ukrainian cities to rubble. More to the point, most oil refineries, petrol and lubricants storage facilities and ammunition dumps of Ukraine, have been destroyed. This will severely erode the Ukrainian capacity to continue the fight. Each day that the war lasts, those losses will mount and increase the pressure on the Ukraine military and population. Some 5.5 million have had to flee to neighboring countries and over 7 million have been displaced internally. Over time, this will take a cumulative toll. The longer the war lasts, the more vulnerable the Ukraine military will be to a sudden collapse of logistical stamina and the will to go on. The ability to continue fighting is premised upon a continual supply of arms, fuel oil and lubricants and huge stock piles of ammunition. While greatly playing up Russian losses, the Western media has completely blanked out the very heavy punishment taken by the Ukraine armed forces and logistical infrastructure. Over time, this will widen the gulf between propaganda and reality to unbridgeable levels.

Use of Intelligence Speculation & Analysis as Propaganda

NBC News reported that the US has been using intelligence leaks and even half-baked intelligence analysis as part of their information war. Most of the time, the intelligence cited is not rock solid. It is not based on hard evidence. Low confidence inputs based on mere analysis or even plain false and fake inputs are passed on as hard facts. Over time, this is eroding the reliability of information put out by the US. US officials conceded they were using intelligence releases not to tell the truth but to influence decisions of Putin. A former MI 6 chief said these were more designed to manipulate than inform. Some examples of this genre are the initial reports leaked about Russian plans to attack Ukraine. These were designed to delay the Russian attack. Then there was the claim that Russia had asked China for supply of weapons and spares. Then, Intelligence was put out that Russia was planning to use chemical and biological warfare agents (this was to cover up the US funding of some 32 bio-warfare labs in Ukraine). Critics in the US decried this imperial narrative control by a democratic government openly manufacturing the consent of its public to be lied to for their own good and get limited strategic gains. This could badly erode credibility in the long run. Thus, all the hype about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had later proved to be outrageous lies. The disenchantment with the American narrative building exercise is setting in rather early in this war. Most of this is see-thru and blatant propaganda that is eroding US credibility.

Like in the Gulf war, the danger now is the West getting carried away by its own propaganda and failing to analyse objectively the military outcomes in the field. There is a frenzied chorus from retired American Generals who feel that Ukraine has actually won the war and, with a little more of heavy weapons support, it can inflict a humiliating defeat on the Russian Army and push them back across the border. This has led to many futile Ukrainian counter-attacks that have been decimated by the Russian artillery and air. As the relentless attrition grinds down the Ukrainian armed forces, there could be a sudden collapse a few weeks down the line as the interdiction of Ukraine’s petrol oil and ammunition begins to take its toll.

Conflict Termination: Unconditional Surrender?

Then there is the aspect of conflict termination. President Biden calling Putin a killer and war criminal virtually closes the window for any dialogue for conflict termination. It takes us back to the two World Wars, when such maximalist stances were adopted and the call was for unconditional surrender. Is the US expecting Russia (armed with some 6,300 nuclear warheads) to surrender unconditionally? Russia will get disintegrated and economically destroyed but will never use weapons of mass destruction against the beloved US? The logic is very weird and could result in a nuclear catastrophe at the global level. Such levels of subjective thinking are very dangerous and could lead us to dead ends where crossing the nuclear threshold becomes entirely possible. Driving a nuclear armed adversary across a dead end drop is risky business at the best of time.

Russian Information War

Maskarovika and Disinformation have been an integral part of Russian strategic thought since World War II. In 2013, Gen Valery Gerasimov had propounded the Russian Whole-of-government Approach or Hybrid war doctrine. This entailed a judicious mix of conventional and sub-conventional warfare as also a coherent mix of hard and soft power options in terms of information war, cyber war, propaganda, disinformation and deception coupled with use of political, diplomatic and economic tools to prevail in any conflict.

Maskarovika in Ukraine. The massive Russian military deployment against Ukraine could be seen by the whole world via all-weather satellites – accompanied by UAVs and American AWACS and JSTARS flying over Poland and other East European countries bordering Russia. Yet the Russians were able to keep their intentions secret till the very end. Indian students in Ukraine were told it was all bluff and bluster and there was no need for them to go back. Most of them stayed back on the assurances of the Ukrainian authorities and had to face major problems in evacuation during the hot war. The head of German Intelligence was equally caught off guard and had to be flown out from Kiev at the very last minute when the war started. The French chief of intelligence reportedly had to resign as he failed to anticipate the Russian invasion. Even though President Biden was warning the world of an impending Russian invasion, perhaps, he actually did not believe it himself. He and most Western leaders felt Putin was just bluffing and was using the coercive military deployment merely as a show of force to get US and NATO to revamp the European Security Architecture. The Americans had spelt out 16 February as the date of attack. Putin had meanwhile given a very fair chance for extended negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, this only served to delay the launch of the operation and caused it to get bogged down in the mud of the spring thaw – especially around Kiev.

Winning the Information War

With the deployment of over 300,000 experts by the CIA in support of the Ukraine war effort, USA has succeeded entirely in winning the information war. The social media and electronic and print media are flooded by the Ukrainian narrative. One major advantage that the Americans have is the English language, which is a global link language. Information wars are waged at three levels – global, regional and local. Russia and China are able to hive off their social media domains from Western social media and, thereby, protect their local domains. However, the information domain at the global and regional level is all dominated by the Western narratives. The Russian and Chinese both tightly control their own domestic social media and, to a great extent, are able to insulate their domestic populations from the adverse impact of the enemy’s information war. India has major lessons to learn here because Indians use all Western social media systems and there are no firewalls to protect the local information domain.

However, one problem of this overwhelming global Information dominance is the trap of believing your own propaganda and treating this as the ground reality and not the fictive reality. This can lead to highly flawed estimates of the situation and a loss of objectivity in military planning. Perhaps, key organizations and individuals may know the truth but the general perception that is fashioned by the relentless info-war assault on the social, electronic and print medium, is so overwhelming that, overtime, it overrides and perhaps shapes the actions of the elite leadership itself.

Information Overkill

Buoyed up by the Western narratives of Ukraine’s military success, a lot of retired US Generals are pressing for a Ukrainian counter-offensive to throw out all Russian forces from Ukraine’s soil. This narratives is overly optimistic and dangerously flawed. It does not take into account the very heavy and severe punishment inflicted on Ukraine’s militaries logistics and infrastructure. In specific, Russian interdiction by tactical and cruise missiles, air and artillery has destroyed a great deal of Ukraine’s oil refining and FOL storage capacity as also underground ammunition depots. Over time, these cumulative losses are bound it have a significant impact on the ability to conduct prolonged and concerted operations. Each day that the war continues will tilt scales is favour of Russia. The next few weeks will be critical.

Nuclear Threshold

Also, the US generals are clearly losing all sight of the dangerous nuclear threshold. Russia has the largest number of nuclear warheads in the world. American Generals feel Putin is bluffing with his nuclear sabre rattling. Before Russia invaded Ukraine they had felt his force deployment was also a bluff and he would not invade – just use posturing to get the West to renegotiate the security architecture in Europe. They were wrong then. If they prove wrong a second time about nuclear thresholds, the consequences could be catastrophic for the whole world.

Demographic Weakness

What this war has highlighted, however, are the severe manpower shortages in Russia. Russia traditionally used to rely on heavy fire power and sheer mass. The mass is now clearly missing. Russia has no second or third echelons or even the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) to exploit the success gained by the leading troops of the first echelon. This was standard Russian doctrine in the Cold War. Russia now is simply recycling and reusing the same troops after giving them time for rest and refit. The same had been seen in Afghanistan. Five Motor Rifle Divisions were sent in initially and this force level was maintained throughout the war. Despite great escalation of support to the Mujahideen by the CIA and Saudi Arabia, this force level was not increased. The use of heavy and unrestrained fire power in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, however, saved the day. It was uninhibited by any presence of the media or mobile phones on the ground to record images. The large scale presence of the media in Ukraine is becoming a major hindrance for Russian forces to use excessive fire power. Frankly, for the time being, they have lost the information war. They may as well have to focus on winning the ground battle – however, brutal and bloody it becomes. Russia has now articulated pragmatic and achievable aims and should be able to achieve them in phase two.

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